ML20196F645

Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.1.A,3/4.10.B & 3/4.12.B,proposing Changes to Relocate Requirement to Remove RPS Shorting Links Which Enable non-coincident Scram for Neutron Instrumentation,To Licensee Controlled Document

ML20196F645
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden, Quad Cities
Issue date:	11/30/1998
From:	COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17191B011	List: ML20196F645
References
NUDOCS 9812070094
Download: ML20196F645 (19)

Text

_ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ .__ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ -___ -______-_-___ _ __

O TABLE 3.1.A-1

" m m

~ >

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION Q z

• m c Applicable Minimum Z 3 OPERATIONAL OPERABLE CHANNEL (s) O m

Functional Unit MODElsi per TRIP SYSTEMid ACTION f

-4 w 1. Intermediate Range Monitor: O Z

a. Neutron Flux - High 2 3 3, 4 11 y 2 12 m 3 13 E

b. Inoperative 2 3 11 3, 4 2 12 5 3 13 ta 7

a 2. . Average Power Range Monitor'd: '

N

a. Setdown Neutron Flux - High 2 2 11 3 (p 2 12 5 2 13

b. Flow Biased Neutron Flux - High 1 2 14

c. Fixed Neutron Flux - High 1 2 14

d. Inoperative 1, 2 2 11 -

y , 3 2 12 9 5'8 2 13  ;

a 2

! 3. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High 1, 25 2 11 i

x g 4. Reactor Vessel Water Level- Low 1, 2 2 5 .

11 '

u

.a

" a ,

9812070094 981130 '

• PDR ADOCK 05000237 p PDR ,

i

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RPS 3/4.1. A

, TABLE 3.1.A 1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION l

pd C 6 TABLE NOTATION

• ]

w~

(a) A CHANNEL may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for required surveillance -

without placing the TRIP SYSTEM in the tripped condition provided at least one OPERABLE CHANNEL in the same TRIP SYSTEM is monitoring that parameter.

(b) This function may be bypassed, provided a control rod block is actuated, for reactor protection system logic reset in Refuel and Shutdown positions of the reactor mode switch. C_ f

/ +

(c)I Unless,adecprate, SHUTDOWN MARGIN has been demonstrated per Specification 3/4,3.A and the]

l "one.' rod-out"Aefue[ modem,vitchinterlocbhiis been'8emonstraied OPERABLE per Specification '

~  :

[10.Afibe'"sberting lin1Is" shall be remlived frorn the RPSicircuitry Irior to arid duringthi time f any'Iontfolio'd is withdrawr( However, thisis not req'uired forfontrol rods removed per Sppeff'icati'on 3.10'l or 3dO.J. [ [ /

(d) With THERMAL POWER greater than or equal to 45% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

(s) An APRM CHANNEL is inoperable if there are fewer than 2 LPRM inputs per level or there are less than 50% of the normal complement of LPRM inputs to an APRM CHANNEL.

(f) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when the reactor pressure vessel head is unbolted or removed per Specification 3.12.A. ,

(g) Required to be OPERABLE only prior to and during required SHUTDOWN MARG'N demonstrations performed per Specification 3.12.B.

(h) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is not required.

(i) With any control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.10.1 or 3.10.J.

j (j) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when reactor pressure is less than 600 psig.

l l

DRESDEN UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.1 6 Amendment Nos. 155 & 150 l

. _. ~_ _ ._.. ___ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ .

RPS B 3/4.1 l BASES 4

3/4.1. A REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION l The reactor protection system (RPS) automatically initiates a reactor scram to:

s. preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding,

b. preserve the integrity of the primary system, and

!' c. minimize the snergy which must be absorbed and prevent criticality following a loss-of-coolant accident.

4 This specification provides the Limiting Conditions for Operation necessary to preserve the ability of the system to perform its intended function, even ouring periods when instrument CHANNEL (s) may be out-of-service because of maintenance. When necessary, one CHANNEL may be made i i inoperable for brief intewals to conduct required surveillance.  !

The reactor protection system is made up of two independent TRIP SYSTEM (s), each having a i minimum of two CHANNEL (s) of tripping devicer. Each CHANNEL has an input from at least one i instrument CHANNEL which monitors a critical parameter. The outputs of the CHANNEL (s) are  !

combined in a one-out- of-two-logic, i.e., an input signal on either one or both of the CHANNEL (s) will cause a TRIP SYSTEM trip. The outputs of the TRIP SYSTEM (s) are arranged so that a trip on j

both systems is required to produce a reactor scram. This system meets the intent of the '

proposed IEEE 279, " Standard for Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems" issued September 13, 1966. The system has a reliability greater than that of a two-out-of-three system and somewhat l less than that of a one-out-of-two system (reference APED 5179). lne bases for the trip settings  !

of the RPS are. discussed in the Bases for Specification 2.2.A.

g ./p g3/y,J.Q, heyQ , { i The IRM system provides protection against excessive power levels and short reactor periods in the startup and intermediate power ranges (reference SAR Sections 7.4.4.2 and 7.4.4.3). /Duri g  ; i psfi/eling the y primary Narutroponporing S9 stem MS) ascatsop of neutron flux levels is

! f p[ovided by theISoured Rarles Monitors (SRM). l e SR s provide inpulto th/RPS, blJt sh ing

' links,4e inst 411ed across,the nofrnally cidsed co a cts ch ther'trippi 4

t Unks mus)t befemoved frorp the RP)lf. The SRM c m function, t 'se st dtting 3

protection to rsfueli6g inte'rlocks'and SHUTDOWN MARGIN shodid a prompt reactivity %xcursion occdr. '

Alth'oughMe IRWi and APRM functions are required to by'OPERpLE e during refy' ling f' provido'the oply on-scale moditoring of'neutrorlflux levels re theduring j refu thorting link 1i mustM remdved to enable the' scram)dnctionj df the SRMs. Jhe non-coincident (

NMS react'or trip 4unctiorllogic ispuch that'all charmels tr go,to bott)p ip sysymsf o

/ '

However, 3 IBM CHANNELS and'2 APRM CHANNELS per TRIP S STEM are stiu required, i.e.

'minir6um of 6 IRMs,4nd 4 AP s. #

/ / /

/ /

. The RI?S (and therafore removal of'the RPS s orting inks) is' required'to be OPERABLE in Refuel only with any control rod'withdra'wn from4 core cell containing orye' or more fuel /asser6blies.

i

( Control rods withdrawn from s core cell dontaining no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity

}

DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 B 3/4.1-1 Amendment Nos. 150 a us l , -

-w.m.- - .u -.s - - - - . . - - - -- > - . .

i f i

RPS B 3/4.1

! BASES

%bJ%RT L

+ -

of thejcore and)herefore are not requiredy have the cppability to scram. If all sontrol rods,are l inserted, p the RPS functio s not required, in this corydition, the reqdIired SHUTDOWN MARGIN-

!any the one/od out inte ock provide assurance that'the reactor w$l not beco'me critical,/lf the l' S)4UTDO MARGINMas been demonstrated, the'RPS shorti ' links are, dot requireddo be f  ;

removed. Under tpese conditionp[the capabijl ty'of the one -out interlock to prevent criticality) j has bpn demorystrated and the scram protection provided y the IRMs is sufficien't to ens,ure a i

gly reliable scram if required.F T A/S M T c1 "

in the power range, the APRM system provides required protection (reference SAR Section 7.4.5.2). Thus, the IRM system is not required (and is automatically bypassed) in OPERATIONAL '

MODE 1, the APRMs cover only the intermediate and power range; and the IRMs provide adequate coverage in the startup and intermediate range. The IRM inoperative function ensures that the ,

instrument CHANNEL fails in the tripped condition upon loss of detector voltage. i Three APRM instrument CHANNEL (s) are provided for each TRIP SYSTEM. APRM CHANNEL (s) #1  !

and #3 operate contacts in one logic path and APRM CHANNEL (s) #2 and #3 operate contacts in  !

the other logic path of the TRIP SYSTEM. APRM CHANNEL (s) #4, #5 and #6 are arranged '

similarly in the other TRIP SYSTEM's duallogic paths. Each TRIP SYSTEM has one more APRM than is necessary to meet the minimum number required per CHANNEL. This allows the bypassing  !

of one APRM per TRIP SY3 TEM for maintenance, testing, or calibration. Additional IRM l

CHANNEL (s) have also been provided to allow for bypassing of one such CHANNEL.

l A reactor mode switch is provided which actuates or bypasses the various scram functions  :

appropriate to the particular plant operating status (reference SAR Section 7.7.1.2). A bypass in the Refuel or Startup/ Hot Standby operational modes is provided for the turbine condenser low vacuum scram and main steam liree isolation valve closure scrams for flexibility during startup and to allow repairs to be made to the turbine condenser. While this bypass is in effect, protection is provided against pressure or flux increases by the high-pressure scram and APRM 15% scram, respectively, which are effective in Startup/ Hot Standby.

The manual scram function is available in OPERATIONAL' MODE (s) 1 through 5, thus providing for a manual means of rapidly inserting control rods whenever fuel is in the reactor.

The turbine stop valve closure scram, the turbine EHC control oil low pressure scram, and the turbine control valve fast closure scram occur by design on turbine first stage pressure which is normally equivalent to -45% RATED THERMAL POWER. However, since this is dependent on bypass valve position, the conservative reactor power is used to determine applicability.

Surveillance requirements for the reactor protection system are selected in order to demonstrate proper function and operability. The surveillance intervals are determined in many different ways, i such as,1) operating experience,2) good engineering judgement,3) reliability analyses, or 4) other enslyses that are found acceptable to the NRC. The performance of the specified surveillances at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective functions associated with each CHANNEL can be completed es assumed in the safety analyses. A surveillance interval of " prior to startup* assures that these functions are available,to perform their safety functions during control DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 B 3/4.12 Amendment Nos. 150 a us

l l

i

!- REFUELING OPERATIONS '

Instrum:ntation 3/4.10.B 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS .

i B.

• Instru' mentation B. Instrumentation At least 2 source range monitor" (SRM) Each of the required SRM channels shall be CHANNEL (s) shall be OPERABLE and ,

demonstrated OPERABLE by:  :

inserted to the normal operating level with:

1. At least once per 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />s:

1. Continuous visual indication in the  :

control room, s. Performance of a CHANNEL CHECK.  !

2. One of the required SRM detectors located in the quadrant where CORE b. Verifying the detectors are inserted ALTERATION (s) are being performed to the normal operating leve!, and i and the other required SRM detector located in an adjacent quadrant, and c. During CORE ALTERATION (s),

7 7 1 verifying that the detector of an '

r! .

'rhU ss a uste UTDO MA IN OPERABLE SRM CHANNEL is  :

s em located in the core quadrant where '

rated y Speciffbation .3.A and the " e-rod / CORE ALTERATION (s) are being out V Refuel' position terio has 'n performed and another is located in ddmonstrated O BLE+er an adjacent quadrant.

pociHcation 3. O.A, $h's "sprting/ i linluf' shall be remove,d frpm ths4PSj 2. Performance of a CHANNEL oircuitrypsor nd during i FUNCTIONAL TEST:

[any c,on, trol r is wittidra, ,

s- a. Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to the start of CORE ALTERATION (s), and APPLICABILITY:

b. At least once per 7 days.

OPERATIONAL MODE 5, unless the following conditions are met: 3. Verifying that the channel count rate is

1. No more than two fuel assemblies are present in each core. quadrant a. Prior to control rod withdrawal, associated with an SRM;

b. Prior to and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during CORE ALTERATION (s),

c. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

a The use of specal movable detectors dunng CORE ALTERATION (s) in place of the normal SRM neutron detectors

] is permesMe as long as these specal detectors are connected to the normal SRM circuits.

i

[-t 1 : - w * ~ e:- -?=* . _ ;d ; e;- 'r-

- . 3. m ! d 3.1 ,

DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.10-3 Amendment Nos. 150 a ses

i I

+

REFUELING OPERATIQ_NE .N instrum:ntati:n 3/4.10.B  :

f 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVElLLANCE REQUIREMENTS i

2. While in the core, these two fuel 4 ithin 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> prior to and at '

assemblies are in locations adjacent to Veriffing, le,est once,,p w'er 12 ho6rs during the tir 1 the SRM; and ny control rod is' withdrawn

• that'the (j" shorting linkshave been remov'ed /!

3. In the case of movable detectors, each frorn'the RPgcircuitry unlessidequate  !

group of fuel assemblies shall be

' UTDOWN MARGfN hasAeen / .

separated by at least two fuel cell demonsfrated per'Specificatio,n 3.3.Af  !

locations from any other fuel andsthe "one-rod-out"4efuel position  ;

assemblies. l interlockdas been siamonst' rated /

OPERABLE per Specificefion 3AO.A.

! /

ACTION:

' With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately

, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATION (s) and fully insert all insertable control rods.

i i

l l

I t

[t 1. . - .~ i . .J = ....a ;:= i; ::r _ --. 3.10. w 3.10.7 - - -

t DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.10 4 Amendment Nos. 150 s as l , -

. - - . - - . . - - ~ .. ----- . - - . - - - - . - . - . _ - . - _ _ - -

REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3/4.10 BASES l

3/4.10. A Reactor Mode Switch i i

Locking the OPERABLE reactor mode switch in the Shutdown or Refuel position, as specified, ensures that the restrictions on control rod withdrawal and refueling platform movement during the .  !

refueling operations are properly activated. These conditions reinforce the refueling procedures and reduce the probability of inadvertenttriticality, damage to reactor internals or fuel assemblies, and exposure of personnel to excessive radioactivity. I The addition of large amounts of reactivity to the core is prevented by operating procedures, which  !

are in turn backed up by refueling interlocks on rod withdrawal and movement of the refueling  !

platform. When the mode switch is in the Refuel position, interlocks prevent the refueling platform  !

from being moved over the core if a control rod is withdrawn and fuel is on a hoist. If the refueling j platform is over the core with fuel on a hoist, control rod motion is blocked by the interlocks. With  ;

the mode, switch in the refuel position only one control rod can be withdrawn. ,

4 3/4.10.B instrumentation f

J The OPERABILITY of at least two source range monitors ensures that redundant monitoring j capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core, whenever reactor j criticality is possible.

The source range monitors (SRM) are provided to monitor the core during periods of station shutdown and to guide the operator during refueling operations and reactor startup. Requiring two  !

OPERABLE source range monitors in and adjacent to any core quadrant where fuel or control rods  ;

are being moved assures adequate monitoring of that quadrant during such alterations. Requiring a i minimum of 3 counts per second whenever criticality is possible provides assurance that neutron l

flux is being monitored. The SRM system is designed to provide a signal-to-noise ratio of at least I 3:1 and a count rate of at least 3 counts per second. Criticality is considered to be impossible if i there are no more than two assemblies in a quadrant and if these are in locations adjacent to the source range monitors (i.e., spatially separated). l i

Special movable detectors may be used during CORE ALTERATION (s) in place of the normal SRM neutron detectors. These special detectors must be connected to the normal SRM circuits such that the applicable neutron flux indication, control rod blocks and scram signals can be generated.

The special detectors provide more flexibility in monitoring reactivity changes during fuel loading since they can be positioned anywhere within the core during refueling provided they meet the location requirements of the specification.

j L I

LWhen ttfe Roa'ctor potecyid'n Systerri shorting' links m are re' oved(the source, range monitors f grovide added protection agains local criticalities by pr'vidirjg'an o initiating 1signaljo'r a reactor scr'am prIhigh,neutrpn' flux. / / / / /

DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 B 3/4.10-1 Amendment No,s. noaus i

.- . - . _ _ - . - . . - ~ .- - . ... _- - .- -. . - - --. - .-

i l

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS SDM 3/4.12.8 3.12 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.12 + SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS B. SHUTDOWN MARGIN Demonstrations B. SHUTDOWN MARGIN Demonstrations The provisions of Specifications 3.10.A and Within 30 minutes prior to and at least 3.10.C and Table 1-2 may be suspended to once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during the performance permit the reactor mode switch to be in the of a SHUTDOWN MARGIN demonstration, Startup position and to allow more than one verify that; control rod to be withdrawn for SHUTDOWN MARGIN' demonstration, 1. The source range monitors are provided that at least the following f requirements are satisfied. OPERABLE jwith'the RPS oirgui3ryJ rsirso4ihits" pomo[ed/per

1. The source ranos monitors are 5 #cuitryl I 2.

[.Mhattina'IFnKs OPERABLE)hp*h The rod worth minimizer is OPERABLE remove th7 RP)dJper with the required program per Specification 3.10.B.

Specification 3.3.L or a second licensed

!. 2. The rod worth minimizer is OPERABLE operator or other technically qualified individualis present and verifies L per Specification 3.3.L and is compliance with the SHUTDOWN programmed for the SHUTDOWN

~ MARGIN demonstration procedures, MARGIN demonstration, or and conformance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN demonstration procedure is 3. No other CORE ALTFRATION(s) are in verified by a second licensed operator progress.

! or other technically qualified individual.

3. The " rod-out notch-override

• control l shall not be used during out-of-sequence movement of the control rods.

4. No other CORE ALTERATION (s) are in progress.

' APPLICABILITY:

l OPERATIONAL MODE 5, during -

SHUTDOWN MARGIN demonstrations.

ACTION:

j With the requirements of the above

! specification not satisfied, immediately .

j place the reactor mode switch in the i Shutdown or Refuel position.

l DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.12-2 Amendment Nos. iso a as l

t

\ - . - - -

^

O TABLE 3.1.A-1 g y . >

0 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION O Q O

3 '

Applicable

@ Minimum 3 OPERATIONAL OPERABLE CHANNEL (s)

Functional Unit per TRIP SYSTEM'd

@ MODEls) ACTION g '

5 d m o

1. Intermediate Range Monitor: z ,

so M

a. Neutron Flu'x - High 2 3 Q

11 g 3, 2 12 m 3 13 5 '

b. Inoperative 2 3 11 3, 4 2 12 5 3 13 w

k y 2. Average Power Range Monitor'd:

w

a. Setdown Neutron Flux - High -

2 2 11 2 12 5 2 13

b. Flow Biased Neutron Flux - High 1 2 14

c. Fixed Neutron Flux - High 1 2 14

d. Inoperative 1, 2 2 11 y 3 2 12 3- 5'8 2 13 E

o.

5

3. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High 1, 2"' 2 11 m

z o o .

4. Reactor Vessel Water Level- Low 1, 2 2 11 x

ii

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RPS 3/4.1 A

• TABLE 3.1.A 1 (Continued)

[ w.. '

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (L CO <

, TABLE NOTATION y (a) A CHANNEL may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for required surveillance without placing the TRIP SYSTEM in the tripped condition provided at least one OPERABLE ,

! CHANNEL in the same TRIP SYSTEM is monitoring that parameter.

(b) This function may be bypassed, provided a control rod block is actuated, for reactor protection !

system logic reset in Refuel and Shutdown positions of the reactor mode switch. ,

V (c) dARGIN pss been defnonstrated,per Specification 3/4.3.A and the f IJnless ade.quitNHU,700WN)

1. o'ne-rMut" Refuel mode,4W itch inteflock hasieen demonstrated '

f

! j)dO.A, the " shorting lini$" shall,be' removed'from the. CPS circuitry priIr to and'during'the tinie

! any control'r'od is withdrawn., However(t'his is not>equired '

for control rods'femoved per/

! Specifica' tion 3.Ki.I or 3.10.J. ' / / '

I (d) With THERMAL POWER greater than or equal to 45% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

(c) An APRM CHANNEL is inoperable if there are fewer than 2 LPRM inputs per level or there are less than 50% of the normal complement of LPRM inputs to an APRM CHANNEL.

(f) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when the reactor pressure vessel head is unbolted  ;

l or removed per Specification 3.12.A. l l

(g) Required to be OPERABLE only prior to and during required SHUTDOWN MARGIN l demonstrations performed per Specification 3.12.B.

(h) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is not required.

(i) With any control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.10.1 or 3.10.J.

l i

i QUAD CITIES-UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.1-6 Amendment Nos. 174 & 170 f

1

)

. -___m________. _ _ . __- - - _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ ._

- RPS B 3/4.1 i BASES q 3/4.1. A R5 ACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION l The reactor protection system (RPS) automatically initiates a reactor scram to

)

a. preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding,

$ ' b. preserve the integrity of the primary system, and i c. minimize the energy which must be absorbed and prevent criticality following a

) loss-of-coolant accident.

l This specification provides the Limiting Conditions for Operation necessary to preserve the ability of the system to perform its intended function, even during periods when instrument CHANNEL (s)

! may te out-of service because of maintenance. When necessary, one CHANNEL may be made j inoperable for brief intervals to conduct required surveillance.

The reactor protection system is made up of two independent TRIP SYSTEM (s), each having a 1 ' minimum of two CHANNEL (s) of tripping devices. Each CHANNEL has an input from at least one j instrument CHANNEL which monitors a critical parameter. The outputs of the CHANNEL (s) are combined in a one-out- of-two-logic, i.e., an input signal on either one or both of the CHANNEL (s) will cause a TRIP SYSTEM trip. The outputs of the TRIP SYSTEM (s) are arranged so that a trip on both systems is required to produce a reactor scram. This system meets the intent of the proposed IEEE 279, " Standard for Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems" issued September 13, 1966. The system has a reliability greater than that of a two-out-of-three system and somewhat lass than that of a one-out-of-two system (reference APED 5179). The bases for the trip settings of the RPS are discussed in the Bases for Specification 2.2.A.

g f fgg gg_.g The IRM system provides protection against excessive power levels and short reactor periodsD the startup and intermediate power ranges (reference SAR Sections 7.4.4.2 and 7.4.4.3). [During r!.f,u6lingye pnpeary Neptron Montroring System (NMS) indicatiorrof neutrop flux levelsy's pJovided by the'Sourceftange'Morfitors (SRM). TheARMs provide input to,4he mg RDS, b j'#mks are inst 4 fled acre'ss the no ' ally closs'd contacts such that' tripping SRM CHAN'NEL oes not,/esult n the trip'of the R unction, these s rting ljnks mus)t be removed frony he RPS.jThe SRM' control ides backup' rop protection tor scram rsfuelitig interle6ks and SyfUTDOWif' MARGIN'should a prompt reactivity excursion oce'ur.

/ i A

Although the'IRM and APRM functions are4equired to,b'e OPERABI.E during refdelingf the Sps prdvide the'only on-scale monitodng of,4eutron flux evels during refueling anff ther'efore the t abortingi' inks must b'e removed to er)able the scram) function 4 NMS,rsactor trip, function Jo6ic is such that all ch'annels godo both trip pysteme (1 out of nl.

Hovvever, 3 IRM CHANNELS and'2 APRM CHANNELS p,er TRIP SYSTEM are still require'd, i.e. af I

mifilmum of 'IRMs and 4 AP ' s. / I

/ '

The RPS (and thyre fore / of the/PS shorting links) is re ired to be OPERABLE in efuoi/

removal only with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one orJ d ore fdel assendlies/

Control rods withdrawn from a core cell containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4.1-1 Amendment Nos. 171 a 167 sw

RPS B 3/4.1 l BASES mwmT 1 #

Tf 3he core inserted, the and'therefoye arept required to havadhe capability to scram. If all control rods a'ndJbe one/PS function is41ot required. In t, bis w'illconditior(

not become the required SHUT

! rod-out'Interlodk provide assurance that theisactor criticaf. If the i 7 SHUTDOff/N MARGIN had been de'monstratad', the RPS short' ' links are not'requirsti to be/

I rjdnoved. Undsi'these/conditiopis, the capability c has,been dem'onstrpted and the scramprotection -out/he intepck on topre've,nt'criticakt'y' provided y the IRMs is suffidient to ensure a )

~

3 highly reliable scram if reauitejd.]~

l TN.NRT & >

In the power range, the APRM system provides required protection (reference SAR Section 7.4.5.2). Thus, the IRM system is not required (and is automatically bypassed) in OPERATIONAL MODE 1, the APRMs cover only the intermediate and power range; and the IRMs provide adequate coverage in the startup and intermediate range. The IRM inoperative function ensures that the i instrument CHANNEL fails in the tripped condition upon loss of detector voltage. i l Three APRM instrument CHANNEL (s) are provided for each TRIP SYSTEM. APRM CHANNEL (s) #1 i

cnd #3 operate contacts in one logic path and APRM CHANNEL (s) #2 and #3 operate contacts in the other logic path of the TRIP SYSTEM. APRM CHANNEL (s) #4, #5 and #6 are arranged similarly in the other TRIP SYSTEM's duallogic paths. Each TR!P SYSTEM has one more APRM '

than is necessary to meet the minimum number required per CHANNEL This allows the bypassing of one APRM per TRIP SYSTEM for maintenance, testing, or calibration. Additional IRM i CHANNEL (s) have also been provided to allow for bypassing of one such CHANNEL.

A reactor mode switch is provided which actuates or bypasses the various scram functions  ;

appropriate to the particular plant operating status (reference SAR Section 7.7.1.2). A bypass in l the Refuel or Startup/ Hot Standby operational modes is provided for the turbine condenser low j vacuum scram and main steam line isolation valve closure scrams for flexibility during startup and '

to allow repairs to be made to the turbine condenser. While this bypass is in effect, protection is provided against pressure or flux increases by the high-pressure scram and APRM 15% scram, rsspectively, which are effective in Startup/ Hot Standby.

The manual scram function is available in OPERATIONAL MODE (s) 1 through 5, thus providing for  !

a manual means of rapidly inserting control rods whenever fuel is in the reactor.

The turbine stop valve closure scram, the turbine EHC control oil low pressure scram, and the '

turbine control valve fast closure scram occur by design on turbine first stage pressure which is normally equivalent to -45% RATED THERMAL POWER. However, since this is dependent on bypass valve position, the conservative reactor power is used to determine applicability.  ;

Surveillance requirements for the reactor protection system are selected in order to demonstrate proper function and operability. The surveillance intervals are determined in many different ways, such as,1) operating experience, 2) good engineering judgement, 3) reliability analyses, or 4) other cnalyses that are found acceptable to the NRC. The performance of the specified surveillances at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective functions associated with each CHANNEL can be completed as assumed in the safety analyses. A surveillance interval of

• prior to startup" assures that these functions are available.to perform their safety functions during control '

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! QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4.12 Amendment Nos. 171 & W

- . - .. - ~ - . . . - . - . . . - ._ - _ - .- - -

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REFUELING OPERATIONS Instrum:ntation 3/4.10.B i

3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Bt Instr'umentation B. Instrumentation At least 2 source range monitor" (SRM) Each of the required SRM channels shall be CHANNEL (s) shall be OPERABLE and demonstrated OPERABLE by:

inserted to the normal operating level with:

1. At least once per 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />s:

1. Continuous visual indication in the control room, a. Performance of a CHANNEL CHECK.

2. One of the required SRM detectors l

located in the quadrant where CORE b. Verifying the detectors are inserted r ALTERATION (s) are being performed to the normal operating level, and i and the other required SRM detector ,

l located in an adjacent quadrant, and c. During CORE ALTERATION (s),

' verifying that the detector of an

! 3/UNss acdquate SHWTDOWN AR OPERABLE SRM CHANNEL is I# as beei$ demonspratedjp'er l } located in the core quadrant where Specification 3 j a.A and tly "onprod- CORE ALTERATION (s) are being l po't" Refuel positioginterfock s en performed and another is located in i

PERpLE -

an adjacent quadrant.

l /demoristrated Sp 'c ifiodion 2. 0,10A, the horting/ ; t linksVshalkb,e remove &fron(the/P B i 2. Performance of a CHANNEL

! ariy circ'uitry,colitrol rod isprior /t'o andduritiIg the' tim [)e withffrawrd/

FUNCTIONAL TEST:

a. Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to the start of CORE ALTERATION (s), and APPLICABILITY:

b. At least once per 7 days.

OPERATIONAL MODE 5, unless the j following conditions are met: 3. Verifying that the channel count rate is at least 3 cps:

1. No more than two fuel assemblies are present in each core quadrant a. Prior to control rod withdrawal, l- associated with an SRM;

b. Prior to and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during CORE ALTERATION (s),

c. At least once per.24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

t a The use of special movable detectors dunng CORE AL1ERATIONis) in place of the nomial SRM neutron detectors

is perrmssible as long as these specal detectors are connected to the nomial SRM circuits.

4 5 5 - H 6 __._ :n i. a nd p C- A --, 0.10.';-43.10.d [ ,

f QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.10-3 Amendment Nos. 171 s ur 1

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REFUELING OPERATIONS InstrumIntatien 3/4.10.8 l 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

2. While in the core, these two fuel 4./Ver#ying y Within4 hours pjior tofand at I assemblies are in locations adjacent to / ast once per42 hours d6 ring the tinie i the SRM; and any co'ntrolfod)s'withdawjt* that4'he oved

3. In the case of movable detectors, each "shortijg1in)s* haye'been' rem,deq rom,,theJtPS ciroditry,,unless'a group of fuel assemblies shall be Sif0TDOWN s /

separated by at least two fuel cell ,4e' mot 5strated,MARfatN has eenpe locations from any other fuel ositio'n assemblies. an[thehas'been,4e Anterlock ",dne-ro'd-ouJ' fistrafRefo'ei / p'ed OPEf(ABLEIper Speci tion 3.'10.A ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATION (s) and fully insert all insertable control rods.

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lb ':n rM fr -.;.J .ch i,.c "-;+2 '::1. 3.?O.! = 3.103 4

QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.10-4 Amendment Nos. 171 a 167 l

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., REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3/4.10 BASES.

3/4.10. A Reactor Mode Switch Locking the OPERABLE reactor mode switch in the Shutdown or Refuel position, as specified, ensures that the restrictions on control rod withdrawal and refueling platform movement during the refueling operations are properly activated. These conditions reinforce the refueling procedures and reduce the probability of inadvertent criticality, damage to reactor internals or fuel assemblies, and exposure of personnel to excessive radioactivity.  ;

The addition of large amounts of reactivity to the core is prevented by operating procedures, which are in tum backed up by refueling interlocks on rod withdrawal and movement of the refueling ,

, platform. When the mode switch is in the Refuel position, interlocks prevent the refueling platform l from being moved over the core if a control rod is withdrawn and fuel is on a hoist. If the refueling l platform is over the core with fuel on a hoist, control rod motion is blocked by the interlocks. With l the mode switch in the refuel position only one control rod can be withdrawn.

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l 3/4.10.B instrumentation l

The OPERABILITY of at least two source range monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core, whenever reactor criticality is possible.

The source range monitors (SRM) are provided to monitor the core during periods of station i shutdown and to guide the operator during refueling operations and reactor startup. Requiring two l OPERABLE source range monitors in and adjacent to any core quadrant where fuel or control rods are being moved assures adequate monitoring of that quadrant during such siterations. Requiring a

! minimum of 3 counts per second whenever criticality is possible provides assurance that neutron  ;

flux is being monitored. The SRM system is designed to provide a signal-to-noise ratio of at least 3:1 and a count rate of at least 3 counts per second. Criticality is considered to be impossible if l there are no more than two assemblies in a quadrant and if these ar,e in locations adjacent to the

source range monitors (i.e., spatially separated).

l Special movable detectors may be used during CORE ALTERATION (s) in place of the normal SRM neutron detectors. . These special detectors must be connected to the normal SRM circuits such that the applicable neutron flux indication, control rod blocks and scram signals can be generated.

The special detectors provide more flexibility in monitoring reactivity changes during fuel loading since they can be positioned anywhere within the core during refueling provided they meet the location requirements of the specification. '

Khe'n t)n Reactor /Protectiop' System shyting links are rery'ved, t source range sponitors' y f l

provide add'ed protecdon painstiocalpraticalides bf proyiding a initisting s,gnalfor i a reactor scram o(high/ neutt'on flox. / / / / / / / / /[ ,l l QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4.10-1 Amendment Nos. 171 a 167 l

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SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS SDM 3/4.12.8 3.12 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.12 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS B. SHUTDOWN MARGIN Demonstrations B. SHUTDOWN MARGIN Demonstrations The provisions of Specifications 3.10.A and Within 30 minutes prior to and at least -

3.10.C and Table 1-2 may be suspended to once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during the performance permit the reactor mode switch to be in the of a SHUTDOWN MARGIN demonstration, Startup position and to allow more than one verify that:

control rod to be withdrawn for SHUTDOWN MARGIN demonstration, 1. The source range monitors are provided that at least the following OPERABLEjwith they4:irpuitry requirements are satisfied. D'shortinElinimVremove6 ber Specification 3.10.B,

1. The source rance monitors are j l OPERABLIMit6thd pA5iscuitrt] 2. The rod worth minimizer is OPERABLE

,Psh'ostihadirW6"/emoves/per with the required program per Specification 3.10.B. Specification 3.3.L or a second licensed

. . operator or other technically qualified

2. The rod worth minimizer is OPERABLE individual is present and verifies per Specification 3.3.L and is compliance with the SHUTDOWN programmed for the SHUTDOWN MARGIN demonstration procedures, MARGIN demonstration, or and conformance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN demonstration procedure'is . 3. No other CORE ALTERATION (s) are in verified by a second licensed operator progress.

or other technically qualified individual.

3. The " rod-out-notch-override" control ~

shall not be used during out-of-sequence movement of the control rods. '

4. No other CORE ALTEliATION(s) are in progress.'

APPLICABILITY:  !

OPERATIONAL MODE 5, during - -

SHUTDOWN MARGIN demonstrations.

' ACTION: ,

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown or Refuel position. .

QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.12-2 Amendment Nos. 171 a w

I ATTACHMENT C SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION ,

. Comed has evaluated this proposed amendment and determined that it involves no significant l hazards consideration. According to 10 CFR 50.g2(c), a proposed amendment to an operating l license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance j with the proposed amendment would not:  !

l Involve a significant increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed; or l

Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

f Comed proposes to relocate, to administrative controls, the requirement to remove the Reactor )

Protection System (RPS) shorting links (which enables a non-coincident scram for Neutron InstrumentatSn). The proposed amendment requests a change to Technical Specifications l l 3/4.1.A,' Reactor Protection System Instrumentation, 3/4.10.B, Refueling Operations, I instrumentation, and 3/4.12.B. SHUTDOWN MARGIN Demonstrations.

• The determination that the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 are met for this amendment  !

. request is indicated below: l l

Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an  !

i. accident previously evaluated?  !

l The RPS shorting links are not precursors to any previously evaluated accident. The l Source Range Monitors (SRMs), and the ability of the SRMs to provide a RPS trip, are also j not precursors to any previously evaluated accident. Therefore, relocating the RPS shorting '

link requirement to administrative controls will not increase the probability of an accident l

previously evaluated.

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, The RPS shorting links are not assumed to be removed in any accident analysis, and the l l SRMs are not assumed to provide a RPS trip in any accident analysis. The refueling l interlocks and SHUTDOWN MARGIN calculations will continue to provide assurance of reactivity control. Therefore, relocating the RPS shorting link requirements to administrative controls will not increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

l The RPS shorting link requirements will be relocated to administrative controls that are administered pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, thereby reducing the level of regulatory control. The level of regulatory control has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

l l l Consequently, this proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the i l probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

l Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

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1 Shorting Links TS Change. doc 1 of 2 Attachment C - Significant Hazards i l

ATTACHMENT C j SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION l

Relocating the RPS shorting link requirements to administrative controls does not create any new failure mechanisms. No new equipment will be installed or utilized, and no new l operating conditions will be initiated as a result of this change. Therefore, the proposed ,

change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any 1 l previously evaluated.

l Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

l The refuel interlocks and SHUTDOWN MARGIN calculations will continue to ensure that the l reactor stays suberiticalin the Refuel Mode. The margin to safety as represented by the l l SHUTDOWN MARGIN designed into the core and verified in the SHUTDOWN MARGIN calculations will be unaffected by relocation of the RPS shorting link requirements to l administrative controls. The margin to safety as represented by the fuel bundle drop assumptions protected by the refuel interlocks will be unaffected. In addition, no accident I analysis assumes that the RPS shorting links are removed. In addition, the RPS shorting  ;

link requirements will be relocated to administrative controls for which future change will be l l evaluated pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. Therefore, there will be no I

change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents released offsite, l and, thus, these changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

l Therefore, based upon the above evaluation, Comed has concluded that these changes involve no significant hazards consideration. l l

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Shorting Links TS Change. doc 2 of 2 Attachment C - Significant Hazards

ATTACHMENT D l l

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT i

. 1 Comed has evaluated this proposed operating license amendment request against the criteria for identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental ,

assessment in accordance with 10 CFR 51.21. Comed has determined that this proposed  !

license amendment request meets the criteria for a categorical exclusion set forth in  !

10 CFR 51.22(c)(g) and as such, has determined that no irreversible consequences exist in  ;

accordance with 10 CFR 50.92(b). This determination is based on the fact that this change i is being proposed as an amendment to a license issued pursuant to 10 CFR 50 that i changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located  ;

within the restricted area, as defin.c1 in 10 CFR 20, or that changes an inspection or a i surveillance requirement, and the amendment meets the following specific criteria-  !

(i) the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

l As demonstrated in Attachment C, this proposed amendment does not involve any significant hazards consideration. i 1

(ii) there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite. l l

As documented in Attachment C, there will be no change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents released offsite.

)

(iii) there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

There will be no change in the level of controls or methodology used for processing of radioactive effluents or handling of solid radioactive waste, nor will the proposal result in any change in the norma! radiation levels within the plant. Therefore, there will be no increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure resulting from this change.

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Shoning Links TS Change. doc 1 nf 1 Attachment D - Environmental