ML20235C794
| ML20235C794 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 09/08/1971 |
| From: | Hard J Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Kaufmam W Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20234A777 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-87-40 NUDOCS 8707090535 | |
| Download: ML20235C794 (18) | |
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Meeting Date: September 8, 1971
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g:q W. J. Kaufman, Chairman Einsner Subcoamaittee MINUTES OF EDetER SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING, SEPTEMBER 8,1971, IESHD1010N, D. C.
Minutes of this meeting are attaEhed for your review. Copies have been sent to the other ACRS Members.
f1 J. E. Hard Senior Staff Assistant
Attachment:
Minutes of Zimmer subcommittee Meeting, 9/8/71. Washington, D. C., w/attats cc: Other ACRS Mechers, w/attat FILE: Zimmer project file w-
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Form AEC-518 (Rev. 9 53) AECM 0240 U, s, covEnMENT PRDfTDiG OFFICE : 1990 O. 405-34e
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Septester e.g;tt:f Enest sUSComtIttEE MEETING Rg UASHINGTON, D. C.
4 SEPTEMBER 8, 1971
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Summary The unresolved Staff issues on Eimmer are as follows:
1.
H2 Control The applicant has not selected a omstrol sys-tem though he is studying the matter.
2.
Primary Containment Inerting - The Staff will require; the
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applicant feels it is unnecessary because his assumption of J
H2 evolution rate is considerably less than the Staff's.
3.
Main Steam Lt.ne seismic Design - The Staff wants these lines to b6 Class I up to and including the turbine stop valves.
The applicant feels that this is a site-sensitive requirement which is not opplicable to Einmar.
Other itema particularly pursued in the aseting included:
flood protec-tion, foundation materials, meteorology, vibration testing, and activity re leases.
Attendance Cincinnati Gas g
m**ulatorv
==d Electric W. Kaufman T. Ippolito DES J. Flynn A. O'Eally L. Riani, BEL E. Borpaann L. Squires C. Miller, DRS E. Pandorf J. Hard, Staff V. Stello, DRL J. Schott F. Willimas, DEL R. Raiman Sarment & Lundy R. Grill, DRL R. Van Veen R. Tedesco, BEL E. Casil E. Sranch R. Boyd, BEL W. Chittenden General Electric J. Anderson Meteorology Research S. Rurka L. Gifford J. Sumpter D. Leavensood W. Frankel R. Jason G. Davis R. Fruski Indus. Bio-Test Labs R. Estchel R. Cotta W. Regener L. Beer J. Ward Issued:
September 9, 1971 omer>
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Form AEC41, (Rev. 9-53) AECM 0240 1:, s. GovrRNuzNT PettNTDIG OFFICE 7 1970 0 - 406-546
OmC!M USE OtB Zimmer Subcoesmittee Meeting Emoting Date: Sept. S.1971 l
7 J,h L,
- rutive Session
{, f Main steam line design, H2 control, extent of metal-water reaction 4 reactor building blowout panels, ANS, and vibration monitoring were identified for discussion.
Meeting with Reaulatory Staff Unresolved Issues - L. Riani, BEL 82 Control - A control system to meet the safety guide will be required by the Staff. h applicant has not agreed to put in a system, though he has provisions for installing one.
Dr. O' Kelly noted that these safety " guides" are actually being used as rules. He also questioned what was being done to get a value for metal-water reaction more accurate than the 5%.
R. Boyd noted that CE is looking for money to do research on this subject. He also stated that a venting system for H2 control will be acceptable provided that the doses are low enough. b SGTS has double charcoal filters but this is not adequate for post-14CA H2 control venting. b GE proposal involving a very large charcoal bed has not yet been evaluated by the Staff.
Independence of redundant channels - four or five switches had redundant channels attached to them. b applicant has recently volunteered to corr < set this and to provide six inches of separation.
Primary containment inerting - h Staff is to require inerting; the l
spplicant does not want to.
Boyd felt that as long as 5% metal = water is assumed, inerting would be required. The Staff felt that inerting would be required even if the extent of reaction were as low as 0.75%.
g h flammable limits are reached within about three minutes. OE feels that 8% H2 is the flammability limit whereas the Staff assumes 41.
Crill reported that lack of mixing will cause detonations even if the flammability limit is actually 8%.
Seismic design of mein steam lines - R. Boyd reported that the Staff feels that the steam lines for all BWRs should be seismic Class I down to the turbine stop valves and that these lines should have the in-proved inspection. Newbold and Limerick were the first plants on which the staff's recommendation was accepted. b argument for this shange is the 16 Rem dose which results from a steam line break. Boyd stated that this is a 10 CFR 100 accident. Stallo added that the applicant feels the consequences are not that bad and that this requirement is site-sensitive. Dr. Kaufman noted that a Class I piping system inside issuod:
September 9,1971 OFFICE >
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Form AEC-Ste (Rev. 9 53) AECM 0240 t:. s. GovERNurNT PaprToao orricE : 1970 o - eos ses
0FFICIAl. USE ONE Zimmer Subcommittee Meeting 3-Meeting Date: Se aS. 1971 h
a Class II building doesn't make much sense. Nousver, the applisant hh apparently is committed to a turbine building design whiah will not $-M '#;3 damage the lines if the DBE occurs. Orill added that the Calvert
- /v.v Cliffs decision calls for a cost-benefit analysis of accidents is addition to the other aspects.
Rasolved Issues - L. Riani, DEL 1.
MIL isolation valve leakage.
2.
Freoperational vibration testing.
3.
Annunciation of bypassed ESF's.
4.
ATW8 - The pump trip is to be employed. Royd asked for a reading from ACRS on whether or not this is site-sensitive.
5.
Post-incident monitoring instrumentation.
6.
Effects of recirculation loop flow control valve on a IACA - The only outstandius issua here is whether or not the valve wiring should be upgraded. This is to berresolved on Bailly.
l 7.
Low condenser vacuum signals for indirect scram.
8.
RFS and E8F circuits testing.
l 9.
Independence of the off-site power system - A too hour loss of power can be tolerated by the plant. An alternate 69 kv switch can be thrown within 30 minutes by someone from the plant.
l
- 10. seismic design of cable trays.
An amendment was expected before Friday, september 10, to document all these commitments.
Other Discussion One percent of Part 20 - The applicant is committed to concentrations 4 17 of Table B st the site boundary.
It was not clear to Dr. Kaufman that the applicant had shown the staff that this took care of critical biological paths. Grill cosamented that the environmental program is es thorough as most programs. The safety guide on this subject has not been issued.,
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September 9,1971 0FFICE >
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4 Form AEC-He (Rev. 9-53) ALCM 0240
- c. s. GOVERNMENT PF WTING OFFICE : 1970 0 406 348
i UFi2 LISE ORLY Einumer gubcommittes Neeting Meeting Date Sept. 8, 1971 TkW Mastina with the Aeolicant v,
Flood Levels - R. Van Veen, CG4E M.h.fgh.
- Shio River water levels are controlled by a series of low-level dams.
Efamer is in the Markland pool about 7 miles downstream of the up-steens dam. The largest flood of record was in 1937; a level of 517' M8L. Flood control basir.s established since then would cause the same flood to be 9 ' lower, or 506'. A value of 60% of the maximum probable flood was used as the project flood. An elevation of 546' results at the site. The plant will be designed for this plus an additional 3' for waves. (Note that this is 41' highertthan the flood of record.) Finished grade is at 520' MsL. All Class I kuild-ings have poured concrete walls up to the design flood level. N wall along the L-row of the plant, between Class I and Class II struc-tures, has several penetrations below design flood level. These pene-trations are to be flood-proof. Administrative 1y, when the flood level of record is reached, the bulkhead doors in the Class I building are secured. Two very large bulkhead doors are required in the reactor building at grade level. Openings have been minimised below the de-sign flood level. (The reactor building siding will blow off at about 2$) aph which is equivalent to about 7" H O pressure.)
2 Flood retention basins upstream of the plant used for flood control are drained before flood conditions arise. The effect of all dans failing simultaneously has not been evaluated. The applicant assumed the fail-ure of the dam upstream seven miles. The pool level of, this dem is be-low plant grade elevation.
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Foundation Materisis - g. Rurka, Sargent & Lundy All materials between grade and 450' HBL are being removed from under-neath the entire building complex. This will be partially refilled to about 466' MBL and densified during the refilling. Vibraflotation is the densification process to be employed. A relative density >85% is the goal. A clay blanket is employed in the excavation as a partial water seal. This water would tend to reduce the soil strength. The clay blanket is 6+' thick in the circumference and about l' thick in the bottom of the sacavation.
Dr. Kaufman suggested a site related presentation to begin the ACES meeting -- related to population distribution, etc.
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4 Issued: geptember 9,1971 Of71CE k SURNAMEp DATE >
j Form AEC-518 (Rev. 9 53) AECM 0240 U. S. GOVI;RNMENT PRDfTD4G OFFICE - 1970 0 - 405-34s 1
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Einmer Subcommittee Meeting
-5 Meeting Date: September 197L I
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4 Maia Steam Line Seismic Desian
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There is no change in CC6E's position. The applicant noted that tho f.O T question of MSL seismic design was never raised in the regulatory process until the Newbold review. CG4E feels it is site-related and the Einmer site is not in the same category.
A rough estimate of the coct of Class I seismic design for ML is e $10).
The M8L design (current) between the second isolation valve and the turbine stop valve was described (see attachment).
The tunnel between the containment and the turbine building contains a barrier (seal well) which will prevent water from getting into the reactor building in the event of a probable maximum flood.
The tunnel is Class I and the total length of the line between the isolation valve and the stop valve is y 300 linear feet. A table was shown summarizing the design parameters (see attachment). Lists were shown of quality assurance requirements for MSL outside of the con-tainment (gd. "B+" as defined in the PSAR, see attachesnt), and for i
valves, except the isolation valves, which bound the main steem system (see attachment).
MSL break doses have been calculated - based on "ABC assumptions":
2-hr whole body - 0.0113 R at the site boundary 30-day whole body
.0113 R 30-day thyroid - 12.3 R l
It was not clear what doses would result if the isolation valves were not closed in 10.5 sec. There was some question about what closure time to use, etc., and it was not clear what was wanted. The applicant stated that they will do something.
Dr. Kaufman suggested a type of parametric study, e.g., what if it takes 50% longer for two of the valves to close, etc.
i i
la evaluating the seismic event, the response of the steem line
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downstream of the second isolation valve (to the seal wall) was pd j.
(malysed to determine its effect on the second valve.
In addition,
'.P the steam line tunnel is Class I.
Hydraulic type snubbers are used for seismic resistance in the Class I portion of the steen line.
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Support of the Cirss II portion is by spring hangers. The staan line
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=6 Einsmer Subconunittee Meeting h eting Date: Septesher 8, 1971
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%TT' Meteorology - D. Leavengood, Meteorology Research, Ins.
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Data sollection started in June. That data collected up to mid-August has been evaluated Leavengood noted that for this part of the year, which has a high percentage of calms, the data look at least as good as the Staff's assumption of Type F and 0.2m/sec. The stability category appears to be Type F.
H2 Control Mr. Flynn stated that inerting is not necessary and that it is a safety hasard to personnel. CG6E is studying both venting and recombination and will install some formof N2 control. Inerting is not a solu. tion to the flasanability question since 02 is evolved as well as 52 during radiolysis. Venting through the SGTS is proposed for H2 control. Con-tainment fission product, H, and 02 monitoring sys'tems will advise 2
the operator of conditions therein. The three reasons for being opposed to inerting aret is generated early.
1.
Only a small amount of H2 2.
Long-term radiolysis is easily accommodated.
3.
Anantry to the containannt is hasardous and a majer operation.
Inspectability is hindered.
A system other than purging is opposed by the applicant. The applicant reviewed GE's position as compared to Safety Guide 7.
Some of the
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differeness are as follows:
AEC Applicant G(H )
0.5 molecule /100ev 0.2 2
).
M-W reaction 5%
2%
Flammability limit 4%
8%
According to the applicant, recent experiments by Ferna hav_e shown that the downward propagating flemanability limit is 8%.
The applicant felt that pocketing of H2 cannot occur in the drywell because of turbulence created by the blowdown and by the reactor sprays.
Also, pocketing cannot occur in the torus because of the open geometry.
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b Form AEC-Ste (Rev. 9 53) AECM 0240 t:. s. novrRNMENT PRDITDiG OFFICE : 1970 0 - 405-346 i
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f i a d. s Einmer Subcommittee Meeting
-7 Meeting Date: September 8,;1971
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Control systems which have been studied include purging through the."
fuel pool and the SGTS, and also recombiner devices. One possible ;-
method is to use the existing off gas recombiner. With the latter -
design, a containment isolation.:gmal would automatically valve the recombiners into an emergency gas treatment system. As ammiliary oxygen supply would be included in the treatment package. Flynn emphasised thatCG4E is still studying this situation and has not made a final selection of a B2 control device.
Vibration Testina - J. Flynn, CG4E provisions will be made for full or confirmatory testing, if required.
The differences between 67 and 69 product line cooling systems are very minor. The most significant in-vessel change appears to be the LPCI injection point.
Activity Releases CG4E proposes to limit releases to 1% of 10 CFR 20 concentrations.
In the service water discharge canal, this is 10-9.*Ci/cc and 5 ares /
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year from the off-gas. Appendix I has a new limit on the ammber of l
euries released / year. All liquid wastes will be recycled if the plant has capacity to do so.
Dr. Kaufman asked regarding the experience at Dresden 2 ytth;pluggdd radwaste filters. Jason felt there was a sising problem there that overloading of the floor drain system occurred with condensed steam. Se, they ran i
out of storage room. Dr. Kaufman expressed his concern abost the timener system ability to meet these restrictive limits.
Dr. Bier commented on the sampling-analysing program to monitor the food chain. Channel catfish and freshwater drum will be particularly monitored and fish are believed to be the path of most eencern.
Col 37 appears to be the critical isotope in the aquatie chain. Dr. Bier reviewed the sample locations which have been established. 14vels of detectica are being established as part of the progree. The dose tu man through the food chain should be calculable according to Jason.
Concludina Igasths, Dr. Kaufman asked the applicant to be ready with a 10-minute presenta-ties on the differences between 67 and 69 product lines.
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Date Issued: September 9, 1971
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7 ZPS
' EXHIBIT IV
' TABLE 14.6-14 STEAMLIIS BREAK ACCIDENT:
RADIOLo01 CAL EFFECTS" l
(ToTALDoSE)
DISTANCE
(!ETERS)
VS-1 MS-1 N-1 N-5 U-1 U-5 Paccing Cloud Whole Body Doce (Rem) 380.b 1 5 x 10 1.6 x 10-3 1 5 x 10-3 3.1 x 10-4 9 5 x 10-4 2.1 x 10-4 805 1.0 x 10-3 1.1 x 10-3 9 5 x 10-4 2.2 x 10-4 4.6 x 10-4 1.1 x 10-4 4
4 1 5 x lo-N 19x10 5 0 x 10-5 1609 8.2 x 10-4 8.3 x 10 5 7 x 10 4
4 8045.
2.8 x 10
-2 3 x lo 5.8 x 10-5 2.2 x 10-5 1.1 x 10-5 3 7 x 10-6 A
d 16090.
13xlo 9 2 x 10-5 1.4 x 10-5 6.9 x 10-6 2.2 x lo 9.8 x 10-7 Lifetime Th>Toid Dose (Rem) 380.D 1.5 x 10-7 1 7 x 10-1 4.3 x 10-1 4.o x 10-2 4.6 x 10-1 1.1 x 10-1 805 2.7 x 10-6 3 0 x'10-1 5.6 x 10-1 1 3 x 10-1 1.6 x 10-1 4.0 x 10-2
- 1609, 7 3 x 10-5 3 3 x 10-1 2.4 x 10-1 6.9 x 10-2 g,7 x yo-2 1.2 x 10-2 8045 1.8 x 10-2 1,o x 19-1' 1.6 x 10-2 5,o x 10-3 2.6 x 10-3 6.7 x 10-4
'16090.
3.4 x 10-2 4,2 x 10-2 4.7 x 10-3 1.4 x 10-3 7 1 x 1o-4 19x104 a Recults do not reflect terrain features.
b Site Boundary Meteorology WindSpeed(M/S)
VS-1 Very Stable 1
MS-1 Moderately Stable 1
N-1 Neutral 1
N-5 Neutral 5
U-1 Unstable 1
U-5 Unctable 5
lo CFR loo Limite 25 Rem Uhole Body Dose i
303 Rem Thyroid Dose 14.6-49
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s AMENDMENT 7 TABLE 14.9-1 DESIGN-BASIS ACCEENT' RADIOIAGICAL DOSES (REKS)
(Based on Assumptions listed in Paragraphs 14.9.2.1 thru 14.9.2.4)
.~
Whole-Bod y
- Thyroi'd
' ' - ~
n... ;
2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />' 30 day 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />
.30 day
~
Accident
.380 m 4827 m 380 m 4827 m Loss-of-Coolant 3.13x10 1(a) 1.35x100 2.15x101(a) 2.10x101
-2.17x10 ' :1.50x10-1 623x100 9.83x10-1 Refueling Control Rod Drop 8.9x10-2..
~
6.60x10-2 6.23x101 1.22x10-1 Steamline Break 1.13x10-2 3.95x10-3 1.23x101 4.08x100
~
~
5
.z
.,_. : e _..
1 e i=.
The 30 day thyroid doses can be. compared with the maximum thyroid doses of Subsection 14.6.
O.
(*
Thetwo-hourddsesn're'directlyproportional-totEEiri.marycon-
~ ~
tainment leak rate. For example, a primary containment leak rate ^
of 2.5'/./ day results in a two-hour thyroid dose at the site boundary (380 m) of 100 rem.
~
I O
l 14.9-5
of d 0EAtllSE OLY INL 1w 9/7/71 y;
gd9 '
- Project
- Einmer Station Status
- Constructies Permit Review -- Letter Requested
~-
Background
- Staff Report -- August 20, 1971 Site Visit -- August 27, 1971 Subcommittee Meeting (ECCS) -- September 1,1971 Subcommittee Meeting (site) -- September 8,1971 h Zimmer Station will utilise a single-eycle, forced circulaties BWR rated at 2436 MN(t). N plant will be jointly evned by the Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company, Columbus and Southern Ohio Electric Company, and the Dayton Power and Light Company.
It will be the first plant to use the General Electric '69 product line.
N features of this design vice those of the previous '67 produce line plant were reviewed at the subcommittee meeting of September 1, 1971.
DEL Ra' view N status of DRL's consultants' reports is as follows:
F64f5 - Report is on h)and.
Nemark & Hall-(seismology and foundation design) - Report not in; the information, however, has been tramanitted informally and is i.in the Staff Report.
USGS - Report is not is; infonisal communications indicate there j
will be no problems.
i NOA - Report is not in; informal communications indicate there will be no problemas.
Apparently, there have been no consultants acting for the Regulatory Staff in the area of meteorology and hydrology.
Radweste Manamement N minutes of the Subcommittee Meeting of August 27, 1971 indicate that the Radunste Treatment System will met " handle" the floor drains' I
smotes (page 7). N Regulatory staff's report to the Committee of Angust 20, 1971 states (page 118) that " low purity wastes from floor ',
I drain sumps are... processed in the same meneer as high purity unstes".
(i.e., filtration, domineralisation,and re-use). N matter should be starified in view of the Commaittee's recent saphasis en limiting Ilgaid discharges (e.g., Quad cities 0. L. report to the AEC).
omcE>
SURNAME >
[,[,,,,
DATE >
Form AEC-318 (Rev,9 53) AECM 0240 U. 5. GOVERNMENT PRINTDIG OFFICE : 1910 0 - 405 848 b