ML20214T294

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Comm Ed Final Summary Rept on Human Factors Review for Byron/Braidwood Stations Emergency Response Facilities
ML20214T294
Person / Time
Site: Byron, Braidwood, 05000000
Issue date: 05/27/1987
From:
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20214T287 List:
References
NUDOCS 8706100198
Download: ML20214T294 (50)


Text

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e CO!!!!O!INEALTI! EDISOri CO!!PA!!Y FI!!AL SU!!!!ARY REPORT OF Tile

!!U!!A!! FACTORS REVIEN FOR T!!E BYRON /DRAIDMOOD STATIONS E!!ERGE!!CY RESPO!!SE FACILITIES

!!ay 27,1987 8706100198 870601 PDH ADOCK 05000454 F PDR

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PREFACE This document was prepared jointly by the Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) and the Advanced Resource Development ( ARD)

Corporation. The ARD Corporation assisted CECO throughout all phases of the Emergency Response Facility (ERF) Review.

3 This report contains CECO's Final Summary Report for the Human i Factors Review of the Byron /Braidwood ERFs which was conducted as per Ceco's April 14, 1983 response (Reference 1) to NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 (Reference 2).

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TABLE OF COMTENTS TITLE EAgg

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1-1 2.0 OVERVIEW 2-1 2.1 Data Collection Phase 2-2 2.2 Findings Assessment Phase 2-3 2.3 Reporting Phase 2-3 3.0 MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING 3-1 4.0 DOCUMENTATION AND DOCUMENT CONTROL 4-1 4.1 Input Documentation 4-1 4.2 Output Documentation 4-2 5.0 INTEGRATION WITH OTHER SUPPLEMENT 1, NUREG-0737 INITIATIVES 5-1 6.0 REVIEW PROCESSES 6-1 6.1 Checklist Survey 6-1 6.2 Observation of GSEP Exercises 6-1 6.3 Personnel Survey 6-2 6.4 Evaluation of Need for Reg. Guide 1.97 Information 6-3 6.5 Reference to the DCRDR Task Analysis /

Validation Data 6-4 7.0 FINDINGS ASSESSMENT 7-1 8.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 8-1

9.0 REFERENCES

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TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE E APPENDICES A ERP QUESTIONNAIRE USED FOR BYRON /BRAIDWOOD PERSONNEL INTERVIEW A-1 B DEMOGRAPIIIC

SUMMARY

OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE PERSONtIEL INTERVIEW OF Tile BYRON /BRAIDWOOD TSC REVIEW B-1 C FINDINGS PRO!! T!!E BYRON /BRAIDWOOD TSC PERSONNEL INTERVIEW C-1 D DEMOGRAPHIC

SUMMARY

OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE PERSONNEL INTERVIEW OF THE BYRON /BRAIDWOOD EOF REVIEN D-1 E FI!! DINGS FROtt THE BYRON /BRAIDWOOD EOF PERSO!!NEL It1TERVIEW E-1 P FItTDINGS PROM THE GSEP OBSERVATIONS F-1 G FINDINGS PROM Ti!E BYRON /BRAIDWOOD TSC CHECKLIST REVIEW G-1

!! FINDINGS PROM THE BYRON EOF CHECKLIST REVIEW H-1 I FINDINGS FROM Tile BRAIDWOOD EOF I-l CIIECKLIST REVIEW

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Among the directives issued to the nuclear power industry by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the aftermath of the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, was the need to establish Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) for each generating station. These facilities include an on-site Technical Support.

Center (TSC), from which plant management personnel would assist the control room personnel in mitigating emergency conditions, and an off-site Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), from which management personnel would coordinate the utility's overall response to the er..argency. The fuhetional criteria for these

-facilities were set forth in NUREG-0696 (Reference 3), and acceptance criteria were offered in NUREG-0814 (Reference 4).

Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO), as part of its April 14, 1983 response (Reference 1) to NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 (Reference 2), committed to a human factors review of the ERFs at each of its nuclear stations. The purpose of this review was to examine the personnel / equipment interface within the TSC and EOF to determine whether these facilities provide system status information, feedback capabilities, communication capabilities and job performance aids necessary for the TSC/ EOF personnel to accomplish their functions and tasks effectively.

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2.0 OVERVIEW Byron and Braidwood's TSCs are located in the owner's protected area. Emergency exercises have been performed at each facility.

The Byron EOF is located at Dixon Illinois, the Braidwood EOF at Mazon, Illinois.

The human factors review of the ERFs evaluated each facility in terms of the effectiveness of:

o organizational structure and staffing o facility layout; access to sources of information; traffic patterns o the information provided by displays and communication equipment o the environment -- ambient noise, air quality, lighting o procedures; availability of needed documentation and job performance aids The ERF review was conducted as a three-phase process. The first phase consisted of several data collection activities that provided the basic data from which human factors problems were documented. The second phase consisted of an assessment of the findings. For those findings significant enough to warrant a corrective action, approaches were decided upon for modifying the ERFs that would correct the problems described. The third phase consisted of reporting the results of the review. The present report is the product of this phase.

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2.l'. Data Collection Phase There were several activities involved in the review that provided data for consideration:

o A Iluman Factors Checklist Survey of the TSC/ EOF including the use of computers and CRTs o A Personnel Survey consisting of structured interviews of key TSC/ EOF personnel o- A Job Analysis / Task Analysis of' key positions in the TSC/ EOF to compile information needs and communication links based on the interview results and GSEP documentation o Reference to the data collected during the DCRDR Task Analysis and Validation processes,.to determine if these data contained any implications for TSC/ EOF information needs The checklist survey was performed separately for the Byron /

Braidwood TSCs and EOFs. The reference to the Detailed Control:

Room Design Review (DCRDR) task analysis data was, of course, also specific to the Byron /Braidwood stations.

A more_ detailed description of the methods employed in each activity and the findings that resulted are presented in Section 6.

2.2 Findinos Assessment Phase There is a recommended disposition for each finding for the EOF. The finding dispositions are noted in Appendices C,E,F,G, II, and I of the report.

2.3 Reoortina Phase This report is generated to present the outcome of the review at Byron and Braidwood. This report contains the pertinent findings and conclusions from the Byron /Braidwood Stations' ERF review, as well as a description of the review methodology employed.- This report was prepared to show compliance with CECO's April 14, 1983, commitments to the NRC (Reference 1).

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3.0 MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING

-The human factors review of the Byron /Braidwood TSCs and EOFs was conducted through the cooperative efforts of CECO and ARD personnel. .The review team met or exceeded the CECO commitments in Reference 1 and included well qualified and experienced personnel in the areas of nuclear emergency planning, opera-tions, engineering and human factors. Both CECO station and general office personnel participated.

The CECO effort was headed by the Human Factors Engineering Coordinator and Alternate Human Factors Engineering Coordinator (R. E. Howard and K. A. Hesse) in the Nuclear Services Technical Department. They have participated in human factors activities at each of Ceco's nuclear power stationsand coordinated the DCRDR projects at Byron and Braidwood. They were assisted by upper-level plant and general office personnel with direct responsibilities for emergency planning and plant operations.

Personnel from the Byron and Braidwood stations supported the human factors team, as needed, as Subject Matter Experts (SMEs).

These SMEs included personnel familiar with the computer and communications systems in the ERFs.

The Lead Human Fa'ctors-Engineer (R.L. Kershner, ARD) was supported by senior and staff-level human factors engineers with '

appropriate experience in nuclear industry human factors.

In order to promote the integration of the ERF review with other 0737 initiatives, a number of the human factors personnel who supported the Byron /Braidwood ERFs review were selected from those who had previously supported the DCRDR at the Byron /

Braidwood Station.

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i 4.0 DOCUf1ENTATION AND DOCU1ENT CONTROL 4.1. Inout Documentation The review team used the following documents to support the review process:

1. Byron and Braidwood's Generating Station Emergency Plan (GSEP) manuals )
2. Drawings of the physical layout of the Byron and Braidwood TSCs and EOFs
3. Notes from recent Emergency Exercises at Byron and Braidwood and other Ceco nuclear stations
4. Human Factors Checklist developed by CECO for use in the DCRDRs
5. The CECO Supplement 1 submittal letter to the NRC (Reference 1)
6. NUREGs 0737 (Reference 2), 0696 (Reference 3), 0814 (Reference 4), 0700 (Reference 5), and 0800 (Reference 6)
7. Reg. Guide 1.97 (Reference 7)
8. Documentation of communication lines in the TSC and EOF
9. Design specifications for'the SPDS and Prime computer displays l
10. DCRDR task analysis data and instrumentation _ require-ments list
11. Completed ERF~ Checklist Surveys of the Dresden, Quad Cities, LaSalle and Zion reviews L 12. Results of the ERF Personnel Survey involving the ERF l

at the Dresden, Quad Cities, LaSalle and Zion reviews

13. Resulting Human Engineering Findings (HEPs) from the ERF reviews at Dresden, Quad Cities, LaSalle, and Zion Stations i

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4.2 Outout Documentation In addition to the present report, the following documents were generated during the review process:

Checklist derived from Input document #4, which was

- l,1. specific for CECO ERFs

2. Completed checklists for the Byron and Braidwood TSCs and EOFs
3. Summary of responses to the Personnel Survey
4. Summary of Job Analysis information
5. Copy of the Findings in the form that they were presented, including alternative corrective actions for consideration t

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5.0 INTEGRATION MITH OTHER SUPPLEMENT 1. I NUREG-0737 IMITIATIVES Commonwealth Edison Company has an integrated program to address each of the NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 initiatives. This-program extends throughout its system of nuclear generating stations and ,

has specific provisions for'each station. This program provides '

the necessary integration and support to ensure that a i systematic approach is adopted for the inclusion of each of the '

-recommended design changes resulting from these initiatives. '

I Details of this process, including schedules, were provided in l Commonwealth Edison's April 14, 1983 submittal to the NRC (Reference 1).

At each station, the design of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), the Regulatory Guide 1.97-based instrument displays, the development of function-oriented emergency l operating procedures, the training of the operating staff, and the DCRDR are being integrated with the ERF reviews in a manner which takes full advantage of the scheduling of each of these initiatives. The human factors review of the ERFs is being conducted after the DCRDR at each station and after the operational date for the TSC/ EOF. By performing the ERF review after the DCRDR, it is possible to better integrate the data collected and the findings derived from these two activities.

By performing the ERF review after the operational date of the TSC/ EOF, it is possible to obtain more meaningful input from TSC/ EOF personnel, because by this time they have had experience in the actual facilities during emergency drills.

As part of the integration effort, the applicability of Reg.

Guide 1.97 variables to ERF activities was reviewed. The variables not currently available in the ERP were to be reviewed for the need'or lack of need in the ERFs based on the job f analysis / task analysis of ERF personnel. The ERP job / task analysis data were reviewed for explicit references to currently unavailable Reg.. Guide 1.97 variables, a follow-up interview was conducted with selected ERF personnel to question them specifically about their need for this information.

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l 6.0 REVIEW PROCESSES 6.1 Checklist Survev 1

A checklist survey was conducted at both the Byron and the Braidwood EOFs and the TSCs to determine whether the facility layout and environment, as well as the: communication and computer. equipment available, met a standard set of human factors design guidelines. The checklist of guidelines was

' derived from, and is a subset of, those that CECO had developed and used to support the DCRDR. The CECO DCRDR checklist was derived from NUREG-0700 and the differences between this CECO checklist and MUREG-0700 have been documented.

One copy of the checklist was completed at each facility by a human factors engineer with assistance, as needed, by Ceco

- subject matter experts. Checklist items and associated findings that pertain to the SPDS will be documented in a separate report of the SPDS review. Checklist items and findings that: pertain to CRT displays or interactive devices other than the SPDS displays, are documented herein.

6.2 Observation of GSEP Exercises CECO and ARD personnel have observed several GSEP exercises.

Observers were stationed in the TSC and' EOF during the exercises, and they attended the debriefings conducted by the CECO GSEP controllers and afterwards by the NRC. Attention was paid to such human factors' issues as:

o Use of CRTs, particularly the SPDS and rad / met displays o Use of communications systems o Use of status boards o Use of procedures; availability of critical information o Snvironmental issues -- noise, air quality, lighting o Organizational structure (are responsibilities well-defined?)

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! In addition,. human factors personnel reviewed CECO's files

! containing comments from the NRC and CECO controllers for other GSEP exercises in recent years. An emphasis was placed on

identifying improvements for-the present ERP facilities and GSEP organization to meet the information needs of the ERF staff
members. I 6.3' Personnel Survev

! Structured interviews were conducted by human factors engineers j on a one-to-one basis.with key personnel who have staffed the

.TSCs and EOFs at Byron and Braidwood during recent drills, in i l order to draw upon their experience under operational

, conditions. The questionnaire presented in Appendix A was used 1 as a basis for the interviews. The interview, which lasted 2 approximately forty-five minutes with each individual, was j structured to provide information regarding the following areas:

l o Chain of command o Facility layout o Communications systems o Specific information pertaining to a given staff position including:

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Duties and responsibilities 3 -

Communication links 2

Workstation design Computer use Information needs Interviews were conducted with both station personnel who staff the TSCs, and general office personnel or station personnel from other stations who staff ~the EOFs. The backgrounds and ERP experience of the participants are summarized in Appendices B and D. The~ interviewers recorded the responses.

} Motes on the interview responses were transcribed and responses

from all participants were compiled question by question. A content analysis was performed and a listing of issues was compiled. Frequency counts as to the number of participants from a given ERF staff position who had mentioned each issue

! were derived. Each issue was then categorized by human factors

personnel as 1

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7.0 FIMDINGS ASSESSilENT The findings resulting.from the data collection activities included the following information:

1. The ERF facility to which the Finding applied
2. Finding' number
3. Checklist guideline number (if applicable)
4. Data collection activity from which the Finding resulted
5. Description of the Finding
6. Disposition of the Finding 7-1

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'i i 8.0 I!!PLE!1ENTATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTIO!!S The responsibility for assessing the Findings discovered in the ERF review process rested with the Nuclear Services Technical and Station Operations. The recommendations with regard to the resolution of Findings were reviewed by appropriate representa-tives of these departments, in conjunction with human factors personnel, and final decisions were made as to which Findings warranted correction. Justifications were written for those Findings that warrant no further action. Implementation of corrective actions for items requiring further action will be completed by 10/1/88.

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9.0 REFERENCES

1. April 14, 1983 letter from Cordell Reed, Commonwealth  ;

Edison, to Harold Denton, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, regarding CECO's response to NUREG-0737, Supplement 1.

, 2. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Clarification of TMI

' Action Plan Requirements," USNRC Report NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 (Generic Letter 82-33), 1982.
3. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities," USNRC Report NUREG-0696,

, February, 1981.

l 4. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Methodology for Evaluation of Emergency Response Facilities," USNRC Report NUREG-0814, August, 1981.

5. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Guidelines for Control i Room Design Reviews," USNRC Report NUREG-0700, September, 1981.
6. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, LWR Edition," USNRC Report NUREG-0800, Revision 0 of Appendix A to SRP Section 18.2, " Human Factors Review Guidelines for the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS),"

. January, 1985.

7. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.97,

" Instrumentation for Light-Water-cooled-Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident," Revision 2., December, 1980.

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APPEITDIX A ERP QUESTIOt1NAIRE USED FOR BYRON /BRAIDUOOOD PERSOllNEL INTERVIEWS A-1

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BYRON /BRAIDUOOD STATIONS TMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES (ERF)

PERSONNEL INTERVIEWS A Human Factors Engineering (HFE) review of each of Commonwealth Edison Company's (CECO) nuclear stations's ERFs is required by NUREG 0737 Supplement 1. An essential part of that HFE review l is a structured interview with participants involved in previous

! exercises using these facilities.

Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation is supporting i CECO in this human factors review of the Byron /Braidwood ERFs.

The goal is to ensure:

. (1) that the ERFs provide staff members with all the information they need in order to accomplish their-

! intended functions during an emergency and l (2) that the organizational structure and physical environments of the ERFs allow the staff as a whole to perform effectively, t

i In this context, we are interviewing key CECO personnel who have

staffed the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency l Operations Facility (EOF) at each station during recent l emergency drills. Our immediate concern is with the TSC and EOF 2

at Byron and Braidwood Stations.

The interviews will address the issues listed in the attached l questionnaire. THERE IS NO NEED FOR YOU TO WRITE RESPONSES TO i THESE QUESTIONS. We are distributing the questionnaire now so .

i that, if your schedule permits, you can familiarize yourself with the issues that will be raised during the interviews.

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! Your input will be valuable to us in documenting what the staff

! views to be the strong points of the present ERFs, in identi-fying potential human factors problems, and in formulating recommendations that will both correct any problems and respond to recent Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements.

Me anticipate that each interview will last 45 minutes to one

! hour. The interviewer will be taking notes on your verbal

} replies to the items on the questionnaire. These notes will be i transcribed and then combined and summarized, along with those

! of your colleagues, on a question-by-question basis.

l Any potential human factors problems will be documented in the

, form of Human Engineering Findings (NEFs). These HEFs will then j be assessed and resolved by an HEF Assessment Team documenting j these HEFs and their proposed resolution is required to be transmitted to the NRC by'6/1/87.

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i ERF INTERVIEN -- DE!10 GRAPHICS

1. Present position:

How long?

2. How long with Commonwealth Edison?
3. How long in nuclear industry?
4. Previous industry positions:

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5. Have you held a Reactor Operator (RO) license?

How long?

6. Have you held a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) license?

How long?

7. Have you been involved in Emergency Planning? How?
8. What staff positions in the TSC or EOF have you filled during CECO Emergency Drills? At which sites? When?

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l Date Interviewer i Station GENERAL IMPOR!!ATION

1. Is the chain of command clear in the TSC/ EOF? Does it allow  !

for effective functioning? If not, why?

2. Is the layout of the TSC/ EOF conducive to effective operations? Traffic flow? Interactions between individuals who need to interact? Is there space for all participants?

If not, why?

3. Do the communications systems (telephones, radios, loud speakers, etc.) provide for an adequate flow of information? If not, why?
4. Are the CRTs used effectively? Why or why not?
5. Do the status boards keep the staff updated as to plant conditions? event status? rad / met status? If not, why?
6. Does the TSC/ EOF provide an adequate working environment (noise, air quality, lighting) for the staff? If not, why?

SPECIFIC INFORMATION PERTAINIMC TO A GIVEN STAFF POSITION Responsibilities

7. What role would you play in the TSC, EOF during an emergency?
8. Have you played this role during emergency drills? How many? What station?
9. Briefly describe your duties and responsibilities.
10. In the TSC/ EOF, to whom do you directly report? Is this person easily accessible to you (physical access, communications equipment)?

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11. In the TJ:/:OF, who directly reports to you? Are they easily ac:2ssible to you (physical access, communications equipment) ?
12. Uith whom else in the TSC/ EOF do you frequently interact?

Are they easily accessible to you (physical access, communications equipment) ?

13. Is there any task related to your job that takes too much of your time or attention?
14. Are the procedures you must follow clear and well documented? If not, why?
15. Have you received adequate training to perform your job? If not, what areas should receive more emphasis?

Workstation

16. What equipment do you need to perform your job? Do you have all the equipment you need? Is there any equipment at your workstation that you consider extraneous?

Tvoe of eauinment Readily available?

telephones .

radios procedures other documentation maps status boards CRTs hardcopy printers other

17. Do you have adequate workspace at your workstation? Is there enough storage and file space at the workstation? Is the workstation laid out in a manner that makes it easily usable?
18. Can you see all the status boards from your workstation and read the information written on them? Does the specific -

information presented and format of the status boards meet your needs? Would you prefer that some other method be used to keep you posted on current conditions?

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19. Do the :: munications systems (telephones, loud speaker, radios) ;a the TSC/ EOF meet your needs? Adequate number of lines? Sase of use? Well labeled? Any confusion as to which lines are active?

Comouter use

20. Do you make use of the computer or CRT displays?

If so:

21. Are the CRTs located conveniently?
22. What displays or programs do you use most frequently?
23. Are there any additional displays or programs that you would find useful?
24. Are the procedures and documentation for the CRTs easy to use?
25. Are the words and symbols that appear on the screen easy to understand? 1
26. Are the keys labeled clearly and unambiguously? Are they consistent with abbreviations and labels used elsewhere?
27. Do you need hardcopy outputs? Are they readily available?
28. If you have been involved in drills for more than one station, have the different display formats at the different stations caused any confusion for you?

Information Needs

29. What general types of information do you need in order to perform your job? How do you get that information at present? Can you think of any types of information that are not readily available?

Tyne of Info Source of Info If on a CRT, how often should oreferred format be undated?

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30. 'That specific parameters do you need to track in order to perform your job? Ilow do you get that information at present? Can you think of any parameters that are not readily available? (If appropriate, refer to scenarios and task analysis data)

Parameter Source of Param. If on a CRT. how often should oreferred format be undated?

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APPENDIX B DEt10 GRAPHIC SU:1:1ARY OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE PERSONNEL INTERVIEW OF THE BYRON /BRAIDWOOD TSC REVIEN l

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i Personnel Democrachics of the Byron and Braidwood TSC Interview ParticiDants Current Job Classification Ten TSC personnel for the Byron and Braidwood Stations were interviewed during April and May, 1987. Table 1 lists the current Ceco positions and the number of interviewees holding those positions.

Table 1. Job Classification of Interviewees Position Precuency Station Manager 1 Lead Health Physicist 3 office Supervisor 1 Operating Engineer 2 Superintendent of Production 1 Master Instrument Mechanic 1 Stores Supervisor 1 Nuclear Exoerience The distribution of experience of interviewees with CECO, in the nuclear industry, and in their present positions, is presented in Table 2.

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?able 2. Exoerience of Interviewees l LENGTH OF EMPLOYtlENT l I

l 1-5yr 6-10yr 11-15yr 16-20yr 20yr+ -l l i I I l Uith Ceco 2 3 4 1 0 l l .N l l lNT l In Nuclear 1 4 2- 2 1 l lUE l Industry l lMR l l lBVl LENGTH OF E!!PLOYMENT l lEI l O-6mo 6-12mo 1-3yr 4-7yr l lRE ~ I l I Wl l l 0 E:l In Present 0 2 6 2 l lFE l Position l I SI I I I I The average tenure of the interviewees is 2.6 years in their

. current positions, 9.4 years at Ceco, and 11.6 years in the nuclear industry.

.Of the ten, personnel interviewed, three indicated that they held the Senior Reactor Operator's (SRO) License. The average tenure for holding the SRO was 2.3 years.

TSC Roles Table 3 indicates positions in the TSC that interviewees have played in previous exercises.

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s Table 3. TSC Positions Plaved by Interviewees Position Precuency Administrative Director 1 Environs Director 1 Maintenance Director 1 Operations Director 3 Rad-Chem Director 2 Station Director 2 Technical Director 1 Stores Director 1 The average number of exercises in which the interviewees have articipated is 3.2.

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APPE:iDIX C FI IDIf1GS FRO:1 T'IE BYROti/'33 AID'lOOD TSC PERSO 111CL I:1TERVIE'T 9

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l C-1 FItiDING: Rad Chen personnel indicate they require additional workspace within the TSC to layout graphs and trends. The job requirements and associated tools presently create space problems.

DISPOSITIOM: Additional work area is available to be moved into position as required.

C-2 FIMDIMG: Five respondents noted that the handheld microphone system used at the Braidwood TSC during the latest GSSP drill is not satisfactory. The system was unreliable and hampered the half-hour updates required during the drill.

DISPOSITIOM: A reliable TSC public address system will be provided.

C-3 PIMDING: The frequency of updates and therefore validity of information on the status boards used in the TSCs are recorder dependent. It is difficult to assess how valid a particular value is because there is no indication of hou recent the information was posted.

DISPOSITIOM: A method to provide some indication of how recent the information was posted will be provided where and when it is necessary.

C-4 FINDIMG: The ambient noise levels in the TSC due to the ventilation fans and the number of personnel in the area is high.

DISPOSITIOM: The person in charge has the authority to request quiet when conversations become loud.

C-5 FIMDING: Training for participation in GSEP drills was viewed to be adequate, but improvement could result from more role-specific training.

DISPOSITIOM: The training program is updated as needed to reflect changes in procedures, feedback from students and drill participants, and performance observed during exercises.

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L C-G PI"9IMG: A rolling cart for use with the P& ids /C& ids -

vould facilitate working botueen groups at the TSC.

t DISPOSITIOM: Additional work area is available in close proximity to the directors.

, C-7 FIMDIMG Having the RM-11 available in the TSC uould

! facilitate the Environs and Rad Chem Directors' jobs. l l Having the control room and the TSC view the nn-11 data  ;

i simultaneously would be most helpful.

I dis 90sITIOM: Additional review will be conducted to  ;

determino the utility of providing the RM-11 into the TSC.

C-8 FINDIMG: Tecnding blocks could be provided on the CRT displays. Rather than punching containment rad levels, pressure temperature, humidity, H2 levels, etc. on the CRT individually. A function key for containment could be provided and trended on the screen as blocks of information.

DISPOSITIOM: Additional review will be conducted to determine the utility of providing a menu system for cacy access to prodofined blocks of data.

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l APPEllDIX D DE!!OGRAPHIC SUt!!!ARY OF PARTICIPANTS IN Tile PERSOllNEL INTERVIEN OF T!!E BYRON /BRAIDNOOD EOF REVIEU D-1

Personnel 7enocranhics of Byron and Braiducod 90P Interview Particinanta Current Job Classification Six personnel experienced at the Dixon EOF (Dyron) and six porconnel experienced at the Mazon Eor (Braidwood), uore interviewed during May, 1987. Tablo 1 lists the current Ceco positions for the participanto and the number of interviewees holding those positions.

Table 1. Job Classification of Interviewees Position Freaucagg Byron Braidwood Division Vice Procident 0 1 Production Superintendent 1 1 Lead floalth Physicist 0 2 Senior Staff Enginocr 1 0 Technical Staff Engineer 1 0 Radiation Chemist Supervisor 1 0 Station !!anager 2 1 Project floalth Physicist 0 1 Muclear Exoerience The distribution of experience of interviewoon with Ceco, in the nuclear industry, and in their pronont positions, in presented in Tablo 2.

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Table 2. Exnerience of Interviewees l LENGT!! OF EMPLOY: LENT l l 1-Syr 6-10yr 11-15yr 16-20yr 20yr+ l l By Br By Br By Br By Dr By Br I i l l I l Nith Ceco 0 0 2 1 2 3 2 0 0 1 l l NI I lNT l In Nuclear 0 0 2 1 0 1 2 1 2 2 l lUE l Industry l lMRl l lBVl LENGTil OF E!!PLOYI!ENT l lEI l O-6mo 6-12mo 1-3yr 4-7yr >7 yrs l lRE I By Br By Br By Br By Dr By Brl l ul l l0E I I lFE l In Present 0 0 1 1 4 3 0 1 1 0l l SI Position l I I I I I I Byron The average tenure of the Byron (Dixon) interviewees is 2.9 years in the current position, 13 years at Ceco, and 15.4 years in the nucioar industry. Of the six persons interviewed, one-half indicated that they held the Senior Reactor Operator's (SRO) Liconne. The average tenure for holding the SRO was 7.1 years.

Braidwood The average tenuto of the Braidwood (Mazon) interviewoon la 2.5 yearn in the current position, 13.4 years at Ceco, and 14.0 years in the nuclear industry. Of the five persons interviewod, 60% indicated that they held the Senior Reactor Operator's (SRO)

License. The average tenure for holding the SRO was 7.7 years.

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I l EOF Roles i

i Table 3 indicates the primary positions in the EOF that the

! Byron and Braidwood interviewees have played in previous exercises.

Table 3. COP Positions Played by Interviewees Position Precuency Byron Braidwood Communicator 1 1 Asst. Environmental Coordinator 1 1 Health Physics Director 1 1 Recovery Manager 2 1

, Technical Director 1 1 l Recorder 1 1 1

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APPENDIX E FINDIt1GS FRO!! THE BYRON /BRAIDMOOD EOF PERSOt!NEL I!!TERVIEN E-1

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s FINDINGS APPLICABLE TO BYROM AND BRAIDWOOD EOFs E-1 FINDING: Several respondents indicated on RM-ll would be useful in the EOF. '

DISPOSITION: Although RAMTEC terminals on RM-ll might prove useful in the EOF, they are not essential. Most, but not all of the information is available through the Prime Point History and Point Trending programs. The determining factor is that the system that driv,es;RM-ll is becoming saturated with users. Ensuring availability of this system to users in the station is considered to be higher priority at this time.

E-2 FINDING: The frequency of updates and therefore the validity of information on the status' boards in the EOF are recorder dependent. It is difficult =to assess how-valid a particular value is because there is no indica-tion of how recent the information was posted.

DISPOSITION: The Status Board and Recorder programs are being revised to include a date time entry for the information to augment the computer clock time of entry.

The computer driven status program is currently being tested in the Zion EOF. Mazon and Dixon EOFs will be-provided with the system at the conclusion of testing and revisions.

E-3 FINDING: Recovery managers indicated,'they would like to see what the release problem looked like. A graphic display of trend data would be most useful along with indication of plume disbursement.

DISPOSITION: The EOF improvement program dall provide 7 color terminals (three with printers) that will function the Point Trending on Track Model programs.

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E-4 FIMDING: Several persons indicated that the plant status information should be automated. The informa-tion can be pulled directly from the prime and process computers and should be available in the EOFs.

DISPOSITION: The EOF improvement program will provide computer status board, Point History, Point Trending, Track Model and ODCS from station and EOF Primes.

Information is received by the station Prime from the Process computer. No EOF terminal will have direct access to Process computer.

E-5 FINDING: Radiological models only actuate once an accident level has been reached. The model is not adequate for small (from inception) releases. The model should be enabled at any point of release.

DISPOSITION: The C model ODCS is capable of projecting dose analysis to very low levels (lmr/hr).

Findings Specific to.the Byron EOF (Dixon)

E-6 FINDING: The traffic flow at the Dixon EOF is marginal ,

at best. The location for the placement of status '

boards is suspect. The-present traffic pattern negatively influences interaction between individuals.

Consideration should be given to restructuring the layout.

DISPOSITION: The final Rev. 6 layout of Dixon will be implemented. Computer driven status boards will be included.

E-7 FINDING: There are very high levels of ambient noise identified at the Dixon EOF. Consideration should be given to dampening the present noise levels.

DISPOSITION: The person in charge has the authority to request quiet when conversations become loud.

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'e APPENDIX F FI?IDI!!GS FRO!! GSEP OBSERVATIONS F-1

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F-1 FIMDING: It was observed the communicator in the TSC seated next to the Technical Director placed piles of-papers on the floor by his seating area. It appeared the table space did not provide sufficient room to meet his needs.

DISPOSITION: Additional work area is available to be moved into position as required.

F-2 FINDING: There are no lights on some phones in the EOF. Some participants appeared confused as to which phone was ringing.

t DISPOSITION: Lights will be provided on phones as '

needed to reduce confusion.

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APPENDIX G FIIIDI!!GS FRO!! THE BYROli/BRAIDWOOD TSC CllECKLIST REVIEW G-1

. s, G-1 FIM9I'TG : (1.1.4.B.3) Operating procedures are stored in a bookshelf with annunciator response, maintenance, fuel handling procedures, and the. curve book. The operating procedures should be stored separately from these other procedures.

DISPOSITION: The operating procedures are clearly marked and readily available to.TSC personnel. The arrangement of procedures in the shelves is in. alpha-betical order. This ordering system is logical and the documents are' easy to identify.

.G-2 FINDING: (1.1.5.A) Replacement bulbs for the light indicators on some TSC telephones are not available in the TSC.

DISPOSITION: These. telephones are checked during annual communications drills. Burned-out bulbs are replaced.at'this time if necessary.

G-3. FINDING: . (6.2.3.A.1) The " Princess", style phones, OSC Hotline and Control Room Hotline phones have labels

. running lengthwise on their handset. These phones are normally. oriented so that this label'must be read sideways. For maximum readability, labels should be.

horizontally oriented.

DISPOSITION: Reading the labels on these phones is no more difficult than reading the labels on the spines of books in the bookshelves. Furthermore, these

. phones.are color-coded as to their function. This coding serves as redundant means of identifying the phones.

Lastly the' phones can be turned 90 degrees by the operator.

.G FItIDING: (6.3.3.B, 6.3.3.C) Some TSC status board label abbreviations are not consistent with plant standard abbreviations. On the status board containment is abbreviated " CONT". "CN:1T" is the plant standard as defined in BWAP 1300-2A2.

DISPOSITION: "COtiT" will be changed to "CNMT" on the TSC plant status board with the next revision to the board and corresponding paper forms.

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G-5 FI' DI'iG: (6.4.2.D) The TSC status board is cluttered. There is too much information for the size of the board.

DISPOSITIOM: The status boards were developed to mirror the plant status forms with S!!E input.

These forms can be used to track different parameters .

and all aprameters may or may not be trended depending I on the nature of the emergency. Changing-the amount of data included on the status board could negatively impact the original purpose of this board. If the form and board are different, a communication failure f could occur both within the TSC and between the TSC and the control room and/or other ERFs.

'G-6 FINDIMG: (7.1.4.1) Many keys on the process computer keyboard are used only by programmer personnel. To reduce complexity and error, these keyboards should contain only those keys normally used.

DISPOSITION: Only computer group personnel use the process computer keyboard when the TSC is activated. These

. personnel need access to all of the keys to perform their duties.

G-7 FINDING: (7.2.1.B) The large Aydin Controls CRTs used for SPDS in the TSC reflect glare from the overhead lights.

DISPOSITION: Additional review will be conducted to determine the most appropriate approach to adopt to reduce glare on the CRTs.

G-8 FINDING: (7.2.1.C.3) The graphic meteorological display on the Aydin Controls CRT in the TSC uses dark l characters on a light background, but the background I luminance is not within the guideline range of 23 to 46 foot-lamberts.

DISPOSITION: The characters on this display represent numerical compass points. They do not supply crucial data. These characters are readable at normal viewing distances. Furthermore, more important information on this display is presented as light characters on a dark background.

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G-9 FINDING: (7.2.1.C.4) The luminance of the characters displayed on the TSC CRTs does not fall within the guideline range of 23-46 foot lamberts.

DISPOSITION: Although the illuminated characters do not fall within the range given in the guidelines, they are readable at the normal viewing distances. This luminance does not cause operational problems. Furthermore, the operator can adjust the brightness of the characters on the screen.

G-10 FINDING: (7.2.5.E) Lists of equal probability menu

' options on the process computer are not presented in alphabetical or numerical order.

DISPOSITION: These lists are organized roughly by system. This listing is logical and rapid scanning is not required.

G-ll FINDING: (7.2.6.G) Error messages on the Prime computer do not include corrective actions to be taken by the user.

DISPOSITION: Error messages on the Prime computer concern problems with the operating system which are intended to be addressed by trained computer personnel.

G-12 FINDING: (7.2.7.A) Highlighting is not used on the CRTs to attract the user's attention to data important to decision making or data requiring user action.

DISPOSITION: Points that go into alarm condition are identified by an alarm message in a column reserved for alarms. If a message appears in that column, the user knows that the point is alarmed.

G-13 FINDING: (7.3.1.E.3) Instructions for reloading paper and ribbons are not attached to the DecWriter printers in the TSC.

DISPOSITION: Personnel unfamiliar with these printers may have difficulty properly replacing paper or ribbons.

During TSC use, however, only Computer Group personnel replace the paper or ribbons. They have the necessary training and experience to perform this task effectively.

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G-14_ PIITDI!TG: (7.3.1.E.5) DecNriter terminals in the TSC do not have paper baskets to collect output. The paper falls to the floor behind the printers.

DISPOSITIOli: . Paper collection baskets for these printers will be provided on a as needed basis.

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APPENDIX H FINDINGS FROM THE BYRON EOF CHECKLIST REVIEW H-1

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BYROM (DIXOM) EOF CHECKLIST 1

H-1 FINDING: (1.5.7.A.4) Approximately one-half of the desk chairs in the EOF are straight-backed wooden chairs that have.no seat cushioning.

DISPOSITION: These chairs do not impede the operation of the facility and replacement is not warranted.

H-2 FINDING: (5.1.3.C.2) There are magnetic labels with white letters engraved on a black background._ Black letters on a white background provide better visibility.

DISPOSITION: The-Status Board and Recorder programs are being revised. The computer driven status program is currently being tested in the Zion EOF. Mazon and Dixor. EOFs will be provided with the system at the conclusion of testing and revisions.

H-3' FINDING: (5.1.6.E.1) There are several large

" Telephone lines" labels in the EOF that display the

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codes for various communications lines. Next to each of these lines of text on these labels are placed color coded squares of paper. The codes correspond to color codes on.many of the telephones in the EOF. The colors on these squares of paper were applied with high-lighters, and have since faded to a point which makes them difficult to distinguish from each other.

DISPOSITION: Color will be applied to permanent labels to make them distinguishable from each other.

H-4 FINDING: (6.1.1, 6.2.1.A, 6.2.1.B, 6.2.4.B, 6.2.4.C)

CRTs and printers in the EOF are labeled with dynotape applied across their upper horizontal surfaces. One must stand over these CRTs and printers to read these labels.

DISPOSITION: Terminals and printers that have a dedicated function will be so labeled with permanent labels.

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H-5 FINDING: (6.2.2.A) The labels identifying each of the desks in the EOF are not secured so as to preclude their movement.- These labels are fitted into a groove in a block of wood sitting on top of each desk.

DISPOSITION: Permanently engraved labels will be

. mounted on each desk so that they cannot be accidently moved.

H-6 FINDING: (6.3.3.B, 6.3.3.C) Several abbreviations used on the main status board are not consistent with standard station abbreviations. For example, " CONT" is used for containment on the EOF status board: "CNMT" is the station-approved standard abbreviation.

DISPOSITION: The status boards will be reviewed for discrepancies, and corrections made to reflect station standards.

H-7 FINDING: (6.4.2) Many of the desk labels in the EOF are handwritten, and difficult to read at a distance.

DISPOSITION: Permanently engraved labels will be mounted on each desk so that they cannot be accidently moved.

H-8 FINDING: (6.6.2) The EOF wall phones are identified with red labels. The use of red labels should be reserved for emergency equipment.

DISPOSITION: Red wall phone labels will be removed.

H-9 FINDING: (7.2.1.C.3) The graphic meteorological display on the Aydin Controls CRT in the EOF uses dark characters on a light background, but the background luminance is not within the guideline range of 23 to 46 foot lamberts. The characters on this display represent numerical compass points. They do not supply crucial data.

DISPOSITION: These characters are readable at normal viewing distances. Furthermore, more important infor-mation on this display is presented as light characters on a dark background.

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H-10 FINDING: (7.2.1.C.4) The luminance of the characters displayed on the EOF CRTs does not fall within the guideline range of 23-46 foot-lamberts. Although the illuminated characters _do not fall within the range given in the guidelines, they are readable at the normal viewing distances.

DISPOSITION: This luminance does net cause operational problems. Furthermore, the operator can adjust the brightness of the characters on the screen.

H-ll FINDING: (7.2.3.C.2.A) The CRT used for SPDS display is located at the approximate front center of the EOF.

In this location it cannot be seen from all points in the room.

DISPOSITION: The EOF improvement program will provide 7 color terminals (three with printers) that will display the SPDS, Point Trending, and Track Model programs.

H-12 FINDING: (7.3.1.E.3) The printers in the EOF do not have instructions for reloading paper attached to them.

DISPOSITION: An instruction manual is located in close proximity to the printer that contains instructions for reloading paper.

H-13 FINDING: (7.3.1.E.5) The EOF alarm printer and both printer /login devices do not have collection baskets to collect printing output.

DISPOSITION: Collection devices for these printers will be provided.

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APPENDIX I FINDINGS FROtt THE BRAIDWOOD EOF CHECKLIST REVIEW I

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7 S' 0 BRAIDNOOD (MAZON) EOF CHECKLIST I-l FINDING: (5.1.3.C.1) The large wall-mounted printer labels are black with white lettering. These should be white with black lettering for optimal readability.

DISPOSITION: These labels are legible, are located in a clean environment and do not contain time critical or safety related information.

I-2 FINDING: (5.1.1) Because the Mazon facility can serve as EOF for Dresden, LaSalle or Braidwood, it is necessary to maintain some status boards that are plant specific.

The boards are not clearly labeled as to which plant they pertain. This could cause confusion or delays in getting the EOF functional at the beginning of an event.

DISPOSITION: The EOF improvement program will provide computer status board, Point History, Point Trending, Track Model and ODCS from station and EOF Primes.

Information is received by the station Prime from the Process computer. No EOF terminal will have direct access to Process computer.

I-3 FINDING: (5.1.1) Some items on different status boards are redundant. There is a potential problem in that a failure to update a given piece of information in all places that it is displayed could lead to inconsistencies and confusion.

DISPOSITION: Some redundancy is needed to ensure people have the basic information including GSEP status and rad levels. However, unnecessary redundant infor-mation will be eliminated from the status boards.

I-4 FINDING: (6.3.3.B, 6.3.3.C) Several abbreviations used on the main status board are not consistent with standard station abbreviations. For example, " CONT" is used for " containment" on the EOF status board, whereas "CNMT" is the station-approved standards abbreviation.

DISPOSITION: The status boards will be reviewed for discrepancies, and corrections made to reflect station standards.

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