ML20134N313

Sys Design Description for Containment Spray

ML20134N313
Person / Time
Site:	Byron, Braidwood
Issue date:	10/31/1996
From:	COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20134N295	List: ML20134N292 ML20134N305 ML20134N313
References
NUDOCS 9611260260
Download: ML20134N313 (82)

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i COMMONWEALTH EDISbN COMPANY BYRON /BRAIDWOOD STATIONS UNITS 1 AND 2 SYSTEM DESIGN DESCRIPTION

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1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CS) 1 Al /. R foh/s ittapa er-Byron /Date

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b l% parer--Braldwood/Date N.bmkh io/2e/w O

Reviewer /Date W. fm f o /3t /9f-Approver /Date 9611260260 961113 PDR ADOCK 05000454 P

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Identification No Proiect Nos Dated Rev.No.

Dated SDD-CS-01-BB 4391/2-45 11-4-87 0

N/A 4683/4-45 SDD-CS-01-BB N/A 1

Reason For Pages.

Prepared By/

Reviewed By/ Approved By/

Rev,No.

Chanae Chanaed-Date Date Date O

initial N/A issue l

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Design All Review l

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i Table of Contents 1.0

SUMMARY

.........................................................................................................6 2.0FUNCTlONS......................................................................................................7 3.0 S Y ST E M D E SI G N D ES C RI PTI O N........................................................................ 7 3.1 M ec hanical S ystem Bou nd arie s.............................................................. 7 3.2FlowPaths...........................................................................................7

3. 2.1 A c c i d e n t Fl o w Pa t h...................................................................... 7 3.2.1.1 I nj e c ti o n P h a s e........................................................................ 8

3. 2.1. 2 R e circ u l atio n Ph a s e.................................................................. 8 3.2.2 Testing.....................................................................................8 3. 3 S y s t e m D e s ig n D a t a................................................................................ 9 3.3.1 DesignParameters......................................................................9 3.3.2 Design Limitations and Considerations.......................................... 9 3.3.2.1 Seismic Design and Load Combinations...................................... 9

3. 3. 2. 2 Separation R equire m e nts........................................................ 10

3. 3.2.3 Environm e ntal Qu alific atio n..................................................... 10 3.3.2.4 Protection Against High/ Moderate Energy Line Break.................10 3.3. 2. 5 0 ve rp re s s u re Lim it a tio ns......................................................... 10

3. 3. 2. 6 C S S y st e m Te m p e rat u re......................................................... 1 1

3. 3. 2.7 C S S y ste m Pre s s u re............................................................... 1 1 3.4 Syste m Pe rf orma nce C h aracteristics......................................................... 12 4.0 C O M PO N E NT D E S I G N D ES C R I PTI O N.................................................................. 15 4.1 C o nt a in m e nt S p ra y Pu m p s....................................................................... 1 5

4. 2 S p ray Ad d itive Ta n k ( S AT)...................................................................... 1 6 4.3 Eductors................................................................................................17 4.4 S p r a y Ri ng s a nd N ozz l e s.......................................................................... 1 9

4. 5 R e f u elin g Wat e r Sto ra g e Ta n k ( RW ST)...................................................... 20 4.6 C o nta inm e nt R e c irc ulatio n S u m p s............................................................. 21 4.7 Valves..................................................................................................21 4.8 Instruments, Controls, Alarms and Protection Devices............................... 24

4. 8.1 C o nt a i n m e nt S p ra y s................................................................... 2 4 4.8.2 Containment Spray Discharge Header Isolation Valves (CS007)...... 24 4.8.3 Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) Eductor Supply Valves (CS019)............. 25 4.8.4 Containment Spray Pump Suction Valves from Recirculation Sumps (CS009)....................................................................25 4.8.5 Containment Spray Pump RWST Suction Valves (CS001).............. 25 4.8.6 Containment Spray Eductor Motive Fluid Valves (CS010)............... 25 4.8.7 Spray Additive Tank Level Instrumentation................................. 26 4.8.8 Containment Spray System Flow instrumentation.......................... 26

4. 8. 9 Cont ainm e nt Pre s s u r e Ala rm s...................................................... 2 6

5. 0 S Y ST E M I NTE R F A C ES................................................................................

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1 5.1 S a f ety i nj e eti o n ( S I) S y st e m..................................................................... 2 6 i

5. 3 Nit rog e n ( NT) S yst e m........................................................................... 2 7 5.4 I n s trum e n t Air (I A ) S ys t em...................................................................... 2 7 i

5. 5 Au xili a ry Po w e r ( AP) S y st e m.................................................................... 2 7 s

6.0 O P E R ATI N G D E S C R I PTI O N................................................................................ 2 7 6.1 S y st e m O p e r a t i n g M o d e s....................................................................... 2 7 6.1.1 N o rm a l O p e r a t i o n....................................................................... 2 8 6.2 Accident / Abnormal System Operation...................................................... 2 8

6. 2.1 C S S yste m I nj e c ti o n Ph a s e.......................................................... 2 8 6.2.2 C S Syste m Recirculation Ph a se................................................... 29 4

1 7.0 SYSTEM PROTECTION FROM PLANT INCIDENTS............................................... 31 7.1 Lo s s-O f-O f f site Pow e r ( LO O P)................................................................ 31 7. 2 Fi re Pr o t e e t i o n........................................................................................ 3 1 4

7.3 High/ Moderate Energy Line Break (HELB/MELB).......................................... 3 2

7. 4 S e i s m i c Ev e nt s....................................................................................... 3 2

7. 5 Fl o o d Pr o t e c t i o n...................................................................................... 3 2 i

8. 0 S A F ETY C R I T E R I A............................................................................................ 3 2 1

9.OREFERENCES..................................................................................................33 i

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Containment-Spray System Design Description 1.0

SUMMARY

The Containment Spray (CS) System, consisting of a spray subsystem and an additive subsystem, serves to mitigate the consequences of a loss of coolant accident or a main steam line break inside containment, by injecting a water spray into the containment atmosphere. The containment spray system may be used to aid safety by performing one or more of the following functions:

1.

Contdihment Post-Accident Pressure Suppression 2.

Containment Post-Accident Heat Removal 3.

Containment Atmosphere Post-Accident Fission Product Removal 4.

Post-Accident Mixing of Containment Atmosphere 5.

Post-Accident Containment Sump Chemistry Control The CS System is initiated only during an accident or prescribed testing condition. The CS System delivers chemically treated water to the spray rings mounted in the containment dome such that during atomization the above design features are met.

The CS System consists of two independent 100% capacity trains with no common discharge headers (other than the pump test header retum to the RWST). Each train consists of a Containment Spray Pump (CSP), an Eductor, three Spray Rings with nozzles, the Containment Recirculation Sump and the piping and valves which connect them. Two additional components which are shared by each train are the Spray Additive Tank (SAT) and Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). Control and Instrumentation features are provided to monitor the condition and performance of the system as well as provide input to the control system and the Engineered Safeguards Features (ESF) Systems.

The CS System physically interfaces with several systems which also provide a supporting function during normal operation. The RWST, which is part of the Safety injection (SI)

System (an emergency safety system), is functionally part of the CS System in that it is connected to the CS System at all times. The RWST provides support to the CS System during the injection mode of CS System operation. The RHR System, which also interfaces with the St System, shares the suction source from the containment recirculation sumps during the ECCS mode of operation. The Nitrogen (NT) System is connected to the CS System to provide a cover gas blanket for the SAT. Two additional systems which play more of a supporting function rather than an interfacing function are the Instrument Air (IA)

System and the Auxiliary Power System. These as well as the above mentioned interfacing systems will be discussed in detail in Section 5.0. j 1

2.0 FUNCTIONS The primary safety function of the Containment Spray System is to ensure the removal of iodine from the containment atmosphere to limit offsite and site boundary radiological doses to values below those set by 10CFR100. It also must ensure that containment has both depressurization and cooling capabilities available in the event of a LOCA or steam line break.

3.0 SYSTEM DESIGN DESCRIPTION 3.1 Mechanical System Boundaries The boundaries of the Containment Spray System and certain other systems are called the Containment Spray Boundary. This denotes the limits within which borated fluid can travel when the system is isolated either manually or by a Engineered Safeguards Features (ESF) actuation. The boundaries are generally ASME Section ill Class 2 piping and pressure vessels, normally closed valves and/or automatic isolation valves.

The CS System boundaries at the interfaces with the Safety injection System (which in turn interfaces with the Residual Heat Removal System) are motor operated isolation gate valves (with_ the exception of the CS Pump test line that is isolated by a locked-closed valve). The RHR System, which also interfaces with the SI System, shares the suction source from the containment recirculation sumps during the Emergency Core Cooling (ECCS) mode of operation. This design feature ensures the proper system fluid interface during ECCS operation. The Liquid Radioactive Waste System bounds the CS System via closed manual valves. This safety class interface is bounded per ANSI /ANS-51.1 code case 6(a), where; " Class 2 or 3 piping totally inside or outside the primary containment and not connected to the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) to any less stringent class, the interface is at the less stringent class connection to one administratively closed valve." This design allows system fluid leakoff to the Auxiliary Building Drain System as required. The Nitrogen System also bounds the CS System via a normally open pressure control valve. This feature ensures proper pressure for the SAT to prevent degradation of the NaOH in the SAT.

3.2 Flow Paths The CS System has no normal plant operating flow paths, but rather has two system accident flow path conditions, injection and recirculation. Additionally, it has a system testing flow path condition.

3.2.1 Accident Flow Path in the event of a LOCA, the immediate function of the CS System is to reduce temperature and pressure as well as reduce elemental iodine and fission products in the containment atmosphere. This is accomplished via the following two flow phases:

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i 3.2.1.1 Injection Phase

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Borated water at ambient temperature is taken from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) via suction from the Containment i

Spray Pumps (CSP's). The borated water is chemically treated with sodium hydroxide delivered from the Spray Additive Tank.

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The CSP's discharge the chemically treated water to the Containment Spray Ring headers where it is atomized and sprayed into the containment atmosphere. A small percentage of the spray volume does not reach the operating floor; this area includes the refueling cavity, the main steam vertical pipe chase j.

and the regenerative and excess letdown heat exchanger compartments. The water which reaches the operating floor is I

collected in the containment sump. If the RWST reaches the Lo-3 level prior to the SAT Lo-2 level, the containment sump -

becomes the source of CS water and the NaOH eduction continues. This ensures that the SAT provides~enough NaOH to the overall sump water mixture (see Section 6.2).

i NaOH addition will occur until the LO-2 level setpoint is reached in the Spray Additive Tank. At that time, the Spray Additive Tank I

is manually isolated from the CS eductor suction.

3.2.1.2 Recirculation Phase i

I The CS System recirculation phase is initiated when the level in the RWST decreases to the LO-3 setpoint. Upon this occurrence, j

the CS System suction source is manually switched over from the l

RWST to the containment recirculation sump. The discharge flow i

j path during the recirculation phase is identical to that in the injection mode. Further NaOH addition may occur during the j.-

recirculation phase, depending on the addition rate during i

injection. The CS system is run for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after i

NaOH isolation. This ensures that the sump water is well-mixed i

and rinses any components that may have been exposed to high 1

pH during the injection mode.

i 3.2.2 Testina t

Testing of the CS System is accomplished by taking nomial suction from the RWST by the CSP. The CSP discharges recirculating water back to the RWST via a 8" test line connected to the pump

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discharge header. The pump test starting circuitry has interiocks to 1

ensure that valves CS007A/B and CSO40A/B are closed and that j

valve S1001 A/B is open. These interlocks prevent water admission to the spray rings, prevent NaOH addition to the pump discharge and ensure a flow path for the pump. Quarterty ASME pump runs 4

are performed to verify that pump degradation has not occurred.

The NaOH addition ability of the system is tested by injecting a i a 4

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4-specified flow rate of primary water through valves CS026A/B, while throttle valves CS018A-and CS0188 (or CS021 A and CSO21B) are l.

adjusted to the desired water flow rate equivalent to the required NaOH flow rate. The spray rings are tested by inducing compressed air through flanges connected to the headers. This test is performed

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' to ensure that there are no nozzle obstructions.

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j 3.3 System Design Data V

The Containment Spray System is designed to limit containment pressure, remove elemental iodine from the containment atmosphere by washing the atmosphere and i

control the containment sump pH during a loss-of coolant accident (LOCA). The -

Containment Spray System, in conjunction with its interfacing and support systems, is required to: maintain containment pressure below 50.0 psig, accommodate a i

decontamination factor of 100 for containment recirculation sump solution temperatures between 150* and 212 F, maintain the equilibrium sump pH solution i

between 8.0 and 11.0, and limit the site and offsite boundary doses to values below -

those set by 10CFR100. Design Data for the system and its components are listed and discussed in the remainder of this Section.

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3.3.1 Des'ign Parameters

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j CS System design parameters are listed in Table 3.1. This table is i

separated into overall CS System design and normal system operating parameters. These values are the best estimate 4

mechanical design conditions (limiting) which are expected during i

the operation of the system. These values are conservative parameters which have been used to provide additional margin to

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the CS System design.

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3.3.2 Design Limitations and Considerations

.1 The CS System design is required to accommodate and incorporate j

i various considerations and limitations. Discussion relative to this

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subject is presented in the following subsections.

i 3.3.2.1 Seismic Design and Load Combinations i

f The entire CS System except the test-recrculating line must be designed to withstand the postulated Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) and the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) when combined j

with operational and accident loads. Specific system load j

combinations are displayed respectively in the Byron and Braidwood i

Piping Design Specification for the Containment Spray System (DS-CS-01-BY and DS-CS-01-BR).

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3.3.2.2 Separation Requirements Redundancy of components, as well as separation and independence of the redundant components is required as one of the design basis features of systems required for plant safety. The CS system incorporates this basis by physically, electrically and mechanically separating the system into two independent trains. The i

support systems for each train incorporate a similar separation. The I

CS system utilizes two redundant Safety Category I (Class 1E) ESF Electrical Divisions. The two redundant ESF Divisions are physically and electrically separated in accordance with IEEE Standards 279-1971 " Criteria For Protection System For Nuclear Power Generating Stations" and 384-1974 "lEEE Trial-use Standard For Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits." The system is physically isolated via prescribed distances to prevent postulated damage due to jet impingement effects resulting from breaks.

3.3.2.3 Environmental Qualification i

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Various CS system components are located in harsh environments and as a result are subject to' environmental qualification requirements. Electrical components that perform safety functions and those which are connected to Class 1E ESF electrical divisions, without isolation, require qualification. Active mechanical components are also required to be qualified. The EQ requirements and related reference documents are identified in the CS system portion of the Safety-Related Component Ust (SRCL).

3.3.2.4 Protection Against High/ Moderate Energy Line Break The CS system is required after a LOCA and Main Steam Line Break (MSLB). All CS system equipment, instrumentation and cables, with exception of two independent sets of spray headers and nozzles, that are required for safe shutdown are located in the Auxiliary Building. The spray headers, and nozzles are inside containment. Due to the physical location of the system, postulated i

damage resulting from a LOCA orjet impingement will not occur to the CS system. " Byron Confirmation of Design Adequacy for Jet Impingement Effects Report" demonstrates that the CS system will l

fulfill its intended safety function for a postulated accident scenario.

3.3.2.5 Overpressure Limitations Overpressurization protection for the CS system is provided. This result is due to the fact that the CS system is open to the containment atmosphere and the maximum anticipated operating pressure / temperature is below the design pressure / temperature. l

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Also, the CS system contains no pressure relieving devices such as safety valves, or relief velves, thus concem for system secondary design pressure is not considered. Overpressure protection for the Spray Additive Tank is also provided by virtue of the fact that the intamal design pressure of the SAT is much higher than the maximum pressure which could occur in the SAT. In addition, a pressure relief device is provided on the nitrogen supply to the SAT.

3.3.2.6 CS System Temperature The CS system valves and piping maintain a general design temperature of 200 F with the exception of the piping extending from the Spray Additive Tank which is rated at a temperature of 120 F to 150 F. Individual CS component ratings may be found in Section 4.0 of this document. The maximum operating temperature to which the CS system pipe lines were analyzed are provided on the CS system piping line list.

The containment recirculation sump solution temoeratures range between 150 F and 212 F. Similarly as above, specific containment sump solution temperatures may be sought via the CS system piping linelist.

The design temperature of the instrument sensing lines is designed to be the same as the process line or equipment to which they are connected, up to and including the first isolation valve. Instrument sensing lines for which flow is maintained, are designed to have a design temperature equal to the process line design temperature.

3.3.2.7 CS System Pressure The CS system valves and piping maintain a general design pressure of 275 psig. Individual CS component ratings may be found in Section 4.0 of this document. The maximum operating pressure to which the CS system pipe lines were analyzed at are provided on the CS System piping line list.

The Spray Additive Tank has a nitrogen blanket above the solution to exclude oxygen from the tank. The maximum tank pressure is documented in the Overpressure Protection Report, and is based on pressure variations with changes in the ambient temperature.' The resulting expansion of the nitrogen gas and increased vapor pressure of the solution result in a maximum tank pressure of 5.08 psig. The Spray Additive Tank is qualified to an intemal design pressure of 15 psig, which is much greater than the maximum tank pressure. i

3.4 System Performance Characteristics The CS system performance characteristics are listed in Table 3.1 for overall system operation. The CS system ensures that requirements for containment atmosphere cleaning are met.

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Table 3.1 Overall System Desian Parameters i

i Number of spray trains available per unit.

1 of 2 l

Spray flow rate, w/o Eductor flow rate l

Train A, gpm 3285 Train B, gpm 3795 Containment recirculation equilibrium surnp pH (minimum) 8.0 Decontamination factor for iodine removal during injection 100 Nozzle spray flow (each), gpm 15 Nozzle A P, psig 40 Spray fall height, ft.

154 Number of eductors available per unit 1 of 2 Eductor flow rate, gpm (approximately) 130 30% NaOH maximum flow rate, gpm 55 1 36% NaOH maximum flow rate, gpm 53-58 30% NaOH minimum flow rate, gpm 19 (for the required spray pH range of 8.5-10.5)

Maximum net containment free volume, cu. ft.

2.8 x 10' Max Unsprayed containment volume, %

15.41 %

Min Unsprayed containment volume, %

12.86 %

Maximum Design Temperature, F 200 (line list)

Maximum Design Pressure, psig 275 (line list)

Spray pump discharge pressure, psig 190 Spray Additive Tank volume, gal.

4,000 (minimum prior to spray actuation) 1 l

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Refueling Water Storage Tank volume, %

(minimum prior to safeguards actuation) 89

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Maximum Spray pH EQ l.imit 10.5^^

Spray pH during injection 8.5 - 10.5^^

Sump pH during Recirculation per Tech Specs 8 -11.0 l

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^^ Once the containment sump becomes the suction source for the CS pumps, the pH may be higher than the spray pH if NaOH addition is still occurring.

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4.0 COMPONENT DESIGN DESCRIPTION i

j The CS system contains several major safety-related components. These components are listed and briefly described in this Section. Additional information, if required, can be found l

on design drawings or instruction and maintenance documents as referenced.

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4.1 Containment Spray Pumps Each CS system train (A and B) contains one Containment Spray Pump (CSP).

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These pumps are vertical shaft, centrifugal pumps. The pumps themselves, as well 4

as the parts contained within the pumps, which come in contact with the spray fluid, j

are made of austenitic stainless steel or other corrosion resistant material. The i

pumps are ASME Section Ill, Safety Category 1, Quality Group 3 components. The pumps are located outside the secondary shield wall end therefore protected from i

LOCAs and jet impacts. The pumps are required for sa'e shutdown subsequent to a j

high energy line break inside containment only. Pump A is located in Hazard Zone

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11.2B-1 and 11.28-2 for Units 1 and 2, respectively. Pump B is also located in 4

1 Hazard Zone 11.2C-1 and 11.2C-2, respectively. Both pumps are considered active j

components and are environmentally qualified harsh. The pumps are maintained in constant standby condition and are aligned to take suction from the RWST. During injection phase, the pumps are required to pump borated water from the RWST to the spray ring headers. Likewise during recirculation phase, the pumps take borated 5-water from the containment recirculation sump and deliver it to the spray ring i

headers. The pumps are required to be operated for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> following a LOCA and are available for longer operation if required. The CS pumps do not i

have to be stopped when transferring from the RWST as the source of water to the containment recirculation sump as the source of water, provided that the RWST Lo-3 level has not been reached. The actuation and interlocks involved in valve and i

pump operation are described in Section 4.8.

t The pumps are electric motor driven, able to operate at a long-term ambient temperature of 122 F. The ambient temperature is maintained by cubicle coolers j

consisting of fans and coils which utilize Essential Service Water (SX) as the cooling medium. The pump motors are classified Safety Category I (Class 1E).

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l The CS Pump parameters are listed below- -

CS Pumo Desian Parameters:

Tag Numbers:

1/2CS01PA,1/2CS01PB Type:

Vertical Centrifugal Number per plant 4 - 2 per unit Minimum Design Capacity including Eductor flow, gpm:

Pump A 3415 Pump B 3925 Developed Head, ft of Water:

450 NPSH (Required /Available), ft:

22.5 Normal Pressure, psig:

190 Design Temperature, *F:

200 J

Fluid Type:

. Borated Water Primary Material:

Austenitic Stainless Steel (pump casing),

I Martensitic Stainless Steel (impeller)

Safety Classification:

Safety Category I

. Quality Group:

B Seismic Category:

Seismic Category I CS Pumo M:br Desian Parameters:

b Type:

Induction Horsepower:

600 Voltage:

4000V Phase:

3 RPM:

1780 (at rated Load)

Frequency:

60 Hz Safety Classification:

Class 1E 4.2 Spray Additive Tank (SAT)

The CS system contains one Spray Additive Tank (SAT) which is shared by both CS system trains (A and B). The SAT is a 5000 gallon capacity vertical cylindrical tank fabricated from austenitic stainless steel. The tank is considered a pressure vessel and is classified a ASME Section lil, Safety Category 1, i

Quality Group B component. The tank is located outside the containment and therefore protected from LOCA and jet impacts.

The tank is required for safe shutdown subsequent to high energy line break inside containment only. The tank is located on elevation 364' in Hazard Zone 11.3-1 for Unit 1 and 11.3-2 for Unit 2. The tank is considered a passive component and is environmentally qualified harsh. The tank supplies NaOH solution to be educted into the borated water from the RWST or the containment recirculation sump. This caustic solution is mixed by the CS

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1 eductors and atomized via the spray nngs to maintain a minimum pH of 8.5 in I

1' the containment atmosphere. The tank has level indicators which transmit

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annunciation to the main control board. The SAT instrumentation is discussed in Section 4.8. To ' prevent degradation of the NaOH solution, a nitrogen blanket of l

approximately 1.0 psig is applied to the SAT. Control valve (CS036) maintains pressure at 0.4 to 0.8 psig to protect the SAT from overpressurization by the Nitrogen Gas System. A low pressure relief device is provided as back-up to the control valve. Also two, vacuum relief valves set at -0.02 to 0.0 psig prevent a vacuum condition in the tank and protect it against extemal pressurization.

The Spray Additive Tank parameters are listed below:

Sorav Additive Tank Desion Parameters:

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Tag Numbers 1/2 CS01T j!

Type Vertical, cylindrical Number per plant 1 per unit l

Capr:9v, gals.

5000' Design Pressure, psig 2 -

(Intemal/Fixternal)

' 15 psig/ Vacuum @ 4 psia Design Temperature, F 100 l

Operating Pressure, psig (Normal) 1.0

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l Primary Material Austenitic Stainless Steel j

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Fluid 30 - 36% NaOH in Water

.J Nitrogen Blanket l.

Safety Classification Safety Category I

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. Quality Group B

j Seismic Category Seismic Category I i

j 4.3 Eductors Each independent, redundant pumping train is provided with a liquid jet eductor. The

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eductor is similar to a stainless steel venturi tube. The eductor is a ASME Section 111, 1

Safety Category I Quality Group B component. The eductor is located outside j

containment and therefore protected from LOCAs and jet impacts.

The eductor is required for safe shutdown subsequent to high energy line break inside containment only. Eductors CS01SA/CS01SB are located in Hazard Zones 11.28-1 l

and 11.2C-1 for Unit I and in Hazard Zones 11.2B-2 and 11.2C-2 for Unit 2, respectively. Both eductors are considered passive components and are environmentally qualified harsh. The eductors are used to add 30% - 36% sodium e

j hydroxide (NaOH) solution to the spray flow during the CS system injection phase. As i

water flows through the restrictive section of the venturi tube, its velocity is increased and its pressure is decreased. The line from the SAT is connected at this low pressure

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area such that NaOH solution is induced into the spray water flow.

4 4-i Valve CS018A and B or CS021A and B are prepositioned to ensure a sodium l

hydroxide solution flow rate between 55 - 60 gpm of 30% NaOH (53 - 58 gpm of 36%

NaOH). This is set while simulating a SAT at high level and eductor motive flow

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conditions equal to the values determined during the pre-operational tests (at design i

total flow of 3415 gpm/3925 gpm A train /B train).

One eductor delivering 30% NaOH solution is capable of forming the 8.0 pH solution of.

final sump for containment fission product and iodine reduction.

Flow indication and control for flow elements signaling the eductors is discussed in Section 4.8.

The CS Eductor parameters are listed below:

Eductor Desion Parameters:

Tag Numbers 1/2 CS01SA,1/2 CS01SB Number par plant 4 - 2 per unit Design Pressure, psig 275 Design Temperature, psig 200.

Design Flow (Motive Fluid), gpm 212^

Operating Flow (Motive Fluid), gpm ~

130 Maximum Design Flow (30% NaOH), gpm 55-60 Maximum Design Flow (36% NaOH), gpm 53-58 Minimum Design Flow (30% NaOH), gpm 19 Equivalent H O flow rate (max,30% NaOH) 68 - 74 gpm 2

Primary Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Safety Classification Safety Category I Quality Group B

Seismic Category Seismic Category I Specific gravity for 30% NaOH Solution 1.3279 j

' ^ actual eductor motive flow is lower than initial design flow, and has been found to be acceptable (approximately 130 gpm / as determined during Pre-Operational testing) i 4.4 Spray Rings and Nozzles Each of the CS system trains include three ring-type spray headers mounted in the ceiling of the Containment Building. Each of the rings are made of ASME Section lit, 1

Safety Category I Quality Group B austenitic stainless steel piping. All risers and ring headers are supported to withstand loads resulting from Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) as well as operating loads. Each of the rings are designed as follows:

Nominal Designation of Pipe Number Pump Delivering Ring Mean Diameter of Fluid to the Number Radius (Inches)

Nozzles Rino 1

13 ft. O inch 4

39 Pump A 2

23 ft. 6 inches 6

51 Pump B 3

34 ft.1/2 inch 6

60 Pump A 4

45 ft. 9 inches 6

90 Pump B 5

56 ft. 7-1/2 inches 8

120 Pump A 6

64 ft. 9 inches 8

112 PumpB Spray rings 1,3 an'd 5 are supplied by spray pump CS01PA via a 10 inch riser pipe.

Restricting orifices in the supply lines to spray rings 3 and 5 control flow such that flow to each spray ring is proportional to the number of nozzles on the ring. Spray rings 2,4 and 6, which are supplied by spray pump CS01PB, are designed with similar restriction orifices for flow control.

4 Each of the 472 spray nozzles,219 in train A and 253 in train B, is of swiri chamber i

design, having no moving parts. Flow through the nozzle at the design operating point is at least 15 gpm, coincident with a design differential pressure (psid) across t

the nozzle of 40 pounds per square inch. The Sauter (surface to volume ratio) mean

(-

diameter of the spray drops produced by the nozzle at the design pressure drop across the nozzle are designed to be approximately 1000 microns on test.

Flow indication of water being sent to the spray rings is discussed in Section 4.8.

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The Spray Rings and Nozzles design parameters are listed below; Sorav Rinos and Nozzle Desion parameters i

Numberof Rings 6 per unit Train A 3 Rings, numbered 1,3,5 Train B 3 Rings, numbered 2,4,6 j

Nozzle Manufacturer Sprayco Number of Nozzles per Unit:

Train A 219

-i 4-Train B 253 i

Sauter 1000 microns Operating Design Flow, gpm 15 i

Operating Design AP, psid 40 l'

Primary Material Austenitic Stainless Steel i

Fluid Borated Water Safety Classification Safety Category I Quality Group B

i Seismic Category Seismic Category I l

4.5 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)

The CS system is physically aligned to the Safety injection system's Refueling Water Storage Tank (Sl01T). The RWST is shared by both CS system trains (A j

and B) during the CS system's design conditions. The RWST is a 500,000 gallon capacity vertical cylindrical tank. The tank is constructed of concrete and lined with austenitic stainless steel. The tank is considered a Seismic Category I l

structure and designed as such. A Safety Category II (Non-lE) electric heater j

prevents freezing of the borated water (2300-2500 ppm boron solution of boric j

acid) in winter months. The tank is required for Safe Shutdown subsequent to high energy line break inside containment only. The tank is located in Hazard Zones 16.1-1 and 16.1-2 for Units I and 2, respectively. The RWST is considered a passive component. The tank is the normal source of borated j

water for the CS system and the Emergency Core Cooling system. During CS i.

system operation, the RWST delivers borated water to the CS pumps for injec-tion and testing phases only. For further discussion of the RWST, and its automatic switching features and level monitoring system instrumentation and interlocks, see the Emergency Core Cooling system Design Descriptions in the 4

UFSAR.

i l

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u

.1

1.

i The RWST design parameters are listed below:

j RWST Desian Parameters:

Tag Numbers 1/2 SiO1T Type Vertical, cylindrical d

Number per plant 2

l Capacity, total gal.

500,000 Minimum Volume Required, %

89 j

Design Pressure, psig Atmospheric Design Temperature, 'F -

200-

.MinimalTemperature, F 35 Maximum Temperature, F 100 t

Primary Material i

Exterior '

Concrete i

Interior Stainless Steel Fluid 2300-2500 ppm Boron Solution (nov 'al)

Safety Classification Sat. Category 1 Quality Group B

i Seismic Category Seismic Category I i-i 4.6 Containment Recirculation Sumps 4

p Two recirculation sumps, one per train, are provided inside the containment at elevation 367' to collect the spray and other incident water within the containment. The temperature within the sump ranges from 150 to 212 F. The i

sumps are a source of spray water during the CS system recirculation mode.

The sumps also provide suction to the residual heat removal pumps, during i

required pump actuation. The sumps are equipped with screens. Level instrumentation is discussed in detail in the Primary Containment isolation j

System Design Description (SDD-PC-01-BB).

i 4.7 Valves The major CS system valves which will be discussed herein are those valves located outside containment and utilized for safe shutdown. The CS system valves are designed to ASME Section Ill, Safety Category 1, Seismic Category 1, and Quality Group B requirements unless otherwise noted on design drawings.

1 j.

l a.

Containment Spray Pump RWST Suction Valve (CS001NB)

These valves are isolation valves used for safe shutdown. The valves are l.

located in Hazard Zones 11.31 for Unit 1 and 11.3-2 for Unit 2. The valves are.

l physically located on the suction lines from the RWST to the CS pump. The valves are normally open and are required to close for switchover during CS l

recirculation phase. The valves and their motors are required for accident i

mitigation and are considered active. The valves are environmentally qualified j

harsh.

i b.

Containment Spray Header Isolation Valves (CS007NB) i These valves are isolation valves used for safe shutdown. The valves are located in Hazard Zones 11.3-1 for Unit 1 and 11.3-2 for Unit 2. The valves are physically located downstream of the CS pump discharge just outside of containment. The valves are normally closed during normal plant operation such i

that the CS pumps can recirculate water from the RWST for testing. During an accident the valves are actuated to open such that borated water may be j

discharged to the CS spray rings. The valves and motor operators are required j

to operate for accident mitigation and are considered active. The valves are environmentally qualified harsh.

. c.

Containment Spray Pump Suction Valve from Recirculation Sump (CS009NB) j These valves are isolation valves used for safe shutdown. The valves are located in Hazard Zone 11.28-1 and 11.2C-1 for Unit 1 and 11.28-2 and i

11.2C-2, respectively for Unit 2. The valves are physically located downstream 3

of the CS recirculation sump and on the suction side of the CS pump. The valves are normally closed valves. The valves are actuated to open to align the CS system for taking water from the recirculation sump. Interlocks exist between i

these and the containment sump isolation valve (S18811 A/B). The interlock

?

ensures that the RHR loop inlet isolation valve (RH8702A/B) valve is closed and the containment sump isolation valve (Sl8811 A/B) is open prior to opening the containment sump suction valve. The valves and motor operators are required to operate for accident mitigation and are considered active. The valves are environmentally qualified harsh.

d.

Containment Spray Eductor Motive Fluid Valve (CS010NB)

These valves are air-operated valves used for safe shutdown. The valves are located in the Hazard Zones 11.2B-1 and 11.2C-1 for Unit 1 and 1142B-2 and 11.2C-2, respectively for Unit 2. The valves are physically located at the inlet side of the eductor and at the discharge of the containment spray pumps. The valves are normally maintained in the open position during normal plant operation. Regardless of the initial position of these valves, receipt of CS actuation signal from ESF signals opens the valves to ensure proper eductor flow.

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Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) Eductor Supply Valve (CS019A/B) l These valves are motor operated isolation valves used for safe shutdown. The i

valves are located in Hazard Zones 11.28-1 and 11.2C-1 for Unit 1 and 11.28-2 f-and 11.2C-2, respectively for Unit 2. The valves are physically located on the supply line from the SAT to the inlet side of the eductor. The valves are normally closed during plant normal operation. Upon ESF signal the valves are actuated to the open position to provide NaOH to the eductor. Failure of the valves to l

open will prevent auto starting of the associated CS pump. When the Spray

- Additive Tank reaches the Lo-2 level setpoint, the valves are manually closed.

The valves and motor operators are required to operate for accident mitigation and are considered active. The valves are environmentally qualified harsh.

f.

Eductor NaOH Supply Throttle Valve (CS018A/B or CS021 AIB)

These valves are manual operated, normally open or throttled, locked in position, globe valves. These valves are not required for safe shutdown. They are located in the caustic addition line at the inlet side of the eductor. Either valve (CS018A/B or CSO21 A/B) maybe locked-in-position to accommodate the.

desired NaOH flow rate to the eductor during injection phase. The calculated desired 30% NaOH flow rate is 55 - 60 gpm for injection phase. The function of these valves is to allow for adjusting the NaOH flow rate to the system to achieve an acceptable spray pH. This flow rate is established with a simulated i

full SAT and an eductor motive flow from Pre-Operational tests at design flow (3315 gpm A train,3925 gpm B train). The required minimum long term sump pH of 8.0 is achieved under worst case condition by ensuring that the full

^

volume of the SAT (Lo to Lo-2 level setpoints, or at least 2326 gallons of 30 wt% NaOH) has been injected into containment. Thus the concern of controlling a specified flow rate between 55 and 60 gpm becomes inconsequential to the fact of ensuring that enough caustic is added to maintain proper pH levels in the final sump mixture.

i 4.8 Instruments, Controls, Alarms and Protection Devices 4.8.1 Containment Sprays A control switch and a test switch are provided for_each pump on the main control board (MCB). Pump operation can be transferred to and j

manually controlled from the switchgear cabinet Cubicle cooler fans will i

auto start on a pump start signal. Interlocks are provided to.

SafeguardsTest Cabinet circuitry.

Each pump can be started under any of the following three modes:

(1)

Iniection Mode: A containment spray actuation signal from the ESF Actuation System (ESFAS) logic will start the pump provided that the containment spray eductor spray additive valve (CS019) is open. Pump auto-start, auto-start failure and pump trip annunciation is provided on the MCB.

(2)

Recirculation Mode: Operation of the pump control switch to the CLOSE position will start the pump provided suction is lined up from the containment recirculation sump and not from the RWST (Sl8811 and CS009 open).

(3)

Test Mode: Operation of the control switch to the CLOSE position will start the pump provided that; the isolation valve to the containment ring headers (CS007) is closed; the isolation valve for recirculation back to the RWST (S1001) is open; the manual isolation valve between the Spray Additive Tank and the eductor (CSO40) is closed; and the test switch on the MCB is in the TEST position. Pump status is indicated at the MCB and on a MCB monitor light box at the switchgear panel.

To monitor pump performance a watt-hour meter is provided on the switchgear cabinet and an ammeter and circuit test switch are provided on the MCB.

Pump suction and discharge pressure and motor bearing temperature can be monitored by the plant computer.

4.8.2 Containment Spray Discharge Header Isolation Valves (CS007)

A control switch is provided on the main control board for each valve.

Each valve is opened automatically by a containment spray actuation signal from the ESFAS. Each valve can be manually opened with its control switch provided that the test switch for the CS pump on the MCB is in the NORMAL position and at least 30 seconds have elapsed since the CS pump has been operated. Valve status is indicated on the MCB and on a MCB monitor light. An alarm actuates if the valve fails to open with the containment spray actuation signal.

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4.8.3 Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) Eductor Supply Valves (CS019)

! A control switch is provided on the Main Control Board for each valve.

Automatic opening of the valve occurs when a containment spray actuation signalis received from the ESFAS. Manual opening of the valve using the control switch is possible when the test switch associated with the corresponding CS pump is placed in the TEST position. Valve 2

status is indicated on the MCB and on a MCB monitor light. An alarm J.

actuates if the valve fails to open with the containment spray actuation signal.

J 4.8.4 Containment Spray Pump Suction Valves from Recirculation Sumps i

(CS009) i A control switch is provided on the main control board for each valve, j

Each valve can be opened provided that: the containment recirculation i

i sump isolation valve is open and the RHR pump suction valve from the loop hot legs is closed. The purpose of these interlocks is to ensure that neither RWST water nor reactor coolant can be drained to the containment sump through this valve. Valve status is provided on the MCB and on a MCB monitor light box.

4 i

4.8.5 Containment Spray Pump RWST Suction Valves (CS001)

A suction valve is provided for each containment spray pump. A control switch is provided on the Main control board for each valve. Each valve can be opened provided that the containment spray pump suction valve from the containment recirculation sump is closed. Interlocks to St i

system valves (Sl8811 A/B) are provided by the valve limit switches.

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Valve status is indicated on the MCB and on a MCB monitor light box.

4.8.6 Containment Spray Eductor Motive Fluid Valves (CS010)

I An air-operated valve is provided for each eductor suction from the discharge of the containment sprcy pump. The valve fails open on loss of air. A control switch is provided on the main control board for each valve. The valve is normally maintained in the open position. Regardless

- of the initial position of this valve, receipt of a containment spray actuation signal opens the valve. Valve status is indicated on the MCB 4

and on a MCB Monitor Light Box.

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4.8.7 Spray Additive Tank LevelInstrumentation The Spray Additive Tank has two safety-related Lo-2 levelindicating lights (one ESF Division 11,21 and the other, ESF Division 12,22) on the MCB. This provides safety-related indication on the MCB of Lo-2 l

levelin the Spray Additive Tank.

Additional Safety Category 11 (non-safety-related) instrumentation for the j

Spray Additive Tank consists of (1) level indicators on the MCB and on 4

the local control panel.

4.8.8 Containment Spray System Flow instrumentation i

Containment spray ring flow, eductor suction flow, and spray additive flow is indicated by Safety Category II (non-safety-related) indicators on the MCB. Low spray additive flow is annunciated on the MCB.

Annunciation will occur if 40 seconds have elapsed since a containment spray actuation signal and spray additive flow is still low, e

d 4.8.9 Containment Pressure Alarms Containment Spray (CS) system actuation due to high containment pressure is discussed in detail in the Primary Containment Isolation System Design Description (SDD-PC 01 BB).

5.0 SYSTEM INTERFACES Interfaces with each system are described separately in the below Sections. Appendix 9.1 identifies the plant condition in which the below systems interface with the CS system. For additional information or interfaces with safety-related systems, see the respective system's System Design Description.

1 2

i 5.1 Safety injection (SI) System The Si system is used to supply cool borated water from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to the CS system in the event of a LOCA or a prescribed i

testing condition. The Si system is connected to the CS system by a 24 inch header leading from the RWST to a 14 inch suction line off of the CS pumps.

The CS pumps are normally maintained in alignment with the RWST for immediate CS pump head injection. The Si interface is isolated by a motor operated gate valve. 4

5.2 Residual Heat Removal (RH) System The CS system boundaries at the interfaces with the Safety injection system, which in turn interfaces with the Residual Heat Removal system, are motor operated isolation gate valves (with the exception of the CS pump test line that is isolated by a locked-closed valve) through a 16 inch line which connects the RHR and CS pumps to the containment recirculation sumps. The RHR system, which also interfaces with the SI system, shares the suction source from the containment recirculation sumps during the recirculation mode of Emergency Core Cooling (ECCS) operation. This design feature ensures the proper system fluid interface during ECCS operation. During switchover from injection phase to recirculation phase, the RHR pumps take suction from the containment recirculation sumps, cools the water in the RHR heat exchanger, sends the water into the i

breached RCS, and the water retums to the containment sump.

5.3 Nitrogen (NT) System The NT System is connected to the CS system via 1" connection from the NT supply to the Containment Spray Additive Tank (SAT). This connection provides a nitrogen blanket to eliminate ambient air contact with the sodium hydroxide contained within the SAT.

5.4 Instrument Air (lA) System The lA system is a support system used in pneumatic instrumentation of the CS system. The CSOlOA/B valves in the eductor motive fluid lines are normally open air operated valves. The loss of instrument air to these valves allow them to fail in an open safe position.

5.5 Auxiliary Power (AP) System The AP system is a support system used to power various components in the CS system. The motors of spray pumps 1 A (2A) and 18 (28) are powered from

)

4.16 KV ESF buses 141 (241) and 142 (242) respectively. The major motor operated valves CSOO1 A/B, CS007A/B, CS009A/B and CS019A/B are powered from the 480 V AC ESF buses. A backup support power source for the Auxiliary Power system is provided by the Diesel Generator system, via two diesel generators through ESF buses.

l 6.0 OPERATING DESCRIPTION i

i 6.1 System Operating Modes The CS system has two primary phases of operation associated with accident and/or abnormal cor.ditions. Each of these phases are described in this Section.

I 6.1.1 Normal Operation The CS system provides no direct support to the reactor plant during normal plant operation. The system is maintained in a constant stand-by condition that allows instantaneous system initiation upon a accident i

and/or abnormal response. In this configuration, those portions of the system that are not in operation, or interface with normally idle systems, are aligned to provide necessary pressure and flow boundaries. The CS system's standby alignment provides minimum active component operation during an accident and/or abnormal response.

Portions of the CS system, as required, are released from " stand-by 4

readiness" only to meet specific Station Technical Specification testing / surveillance requirements. These requirements are commitments which are scheduled and performed to ensure the integrity of the CS system.

6.2 Accident / Abnormal System Operation 6.2.1 CS System injection Phase The CS system is designed such that in an unlikely event that the MCB ESFAS receives a two-out-of-four coincidence of a Hi-3 containment pressure signal (approximately 20 psig) or a manual containment spray actuation signal, the CS system willinitiate injection phase of operation.

The CS007A/B valves, which allow pump discharge to the containment spray rings, and the eductor NaOH supply isolation valves, CS019A/B, will simultaneously open. The CS pumps will start after the CS019A/B valves are open. The CS pumps will take suction from the RWST, through normally open motor-operated isolation valves CSOO1 A/B. This process will occur within a period of 25 seconds unless offsite power to the ESF buses has been lost. If offsite power has been lost, coincident with LOCA, the CS pumps will be sequenced to start upon receipt of a safety injection signal and restoration of bus voltage, by the diesel engine generator load sequencer. The sequencing of the diesel generator load sequencer to the CS pumps will then take approximately 50 seconds. The valve motor-operators will start immediately upon receipt of a Hi-3 signal when power is available.

In parallel with the above sequencing, prepositioned valves CS018A/B or CSO21 A/B ensure a flow rate of between 55 - 60 gpm of 30% sodium hydroxide (NaOH), or 53 - 58 gpm of 36% NaOH from the SAT is provided to the suction of the eductor. This flow is mixed with flow from the RWST at the CS pump suction. This blended flow of chemically treated water is then discharged to spray rings. Orifices in the lines to the spray rings ensure sufficient flow will be diverted to the spray rings such that each ring nozzle will produce a spray flow of 15 gallons per minute. The cool chemically treated water condenses the steam in the containment atmosphere reducing containment temperature and -

..._.m_.._._m F

3 i

1 i

i pressure. The water descends downward and is collected in the i

containment sump.

i This process continues until the RWST's Lo-3 level alarm annunciates.

l At this time the operators will align the Containment Spray suction to the containment recirculation sump by opening the CS009 valve and then i

closing the CS001 valve. The eduction of NaOH may continue with the l

source of water as the containment sump until the SAT Lo-2 level alarm annunciates. This ensures sufficient NaOH has been added into j

containment to provide a final sump pH of 8.0 -10.5. At this time the NaOH tank is isolated. The containment spray system will operate for at least two hours following a LOCA. The two hour timing will commence when the SAT is isolated. If the initiating event is a MSLB, the SAT will be isolated upon Operator identification of the MSLB and after isolation of the faulted steam generator.

l 6.2.2 CS System Recirculation Phase l

The recirculation phase of containment spray is that time when the CS pump is taking a suction from the containment recirculation sump following injection of the NaOH. The containment spray is run for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> following a LOCA to ensure that the various sources of water have been adequately mixed so that the final pH is between 8.0 and 10.5. The iodine removal was achieved during the injection phase.

' The expected long term sump pH of 8.0 to 10.5 will minimize iodine re-

)

evolution (>7 per SRP 6.5.2 Revision 1). This pH will also reduce the i

probability of stress-corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steel components (minimum 7.0 per BTP MTEB 6-1). The spray of sump I

water during the recirculation phase (no further addition of NaOH) will tend to wash off any of the containment spray water during the injection phase that had a pH higher than 10.5 (see 6.2.3 below). This will reduce the final pH on these components to less than 10.5. In order to achieve recirculation of containment spray, the eductor NaOH supply line is isolated, and the system is allowed to run. The CS system is taking suction from the sump at this time and discharging through the spray rings.

It is important to note that CS cannot be terminated until all of the following conditions are met.

1. Containment pressure is less than 15 psig.

2. Spray Additive Tank Lo-Lo level lights lit. (LOCA only)

3. Spray operating time is at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. (LOCA only) i l

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i 6.2.3 CS System pH Response I

The containment spray pH may vary during the event. The containment

[

spray pumps will initially see a back pressure due to the elevated containment pressure. The flow rates in Table 3.1 assume a containment pressure of 50 psig. Therefore, the flow of waterwill j

increase as the pressure in containment is decreased. This will cause i

the eductor motive flow to decrease slightly which will decrease the 1

amount of NaOH added,' thus slightly decreasing the pH of the spray.

Additionally, as the NaOH tank empties, the flow rate of NaOH will i

decrease due to decreased head pressure from the Spray Additive Tank.

This also slightly decreases the spray pH.

j j

When the containment spray pumps begin to use the containment sump l

l' as a source of water the eductor may still be adding NaOH to water that j

already contains NaOH This will cause the spray pH to increase. These variances are discussed below.

4 i

To resolve these competing variances, the eductor throttle valve for i

NaOH (CS018, CSO21) has been set for 55-60 gpm of 30% NaOH at j

high SAT level, using the equivalence of 68-74 gpm of water. This will 4

provide for an actual pH in the A train (3415 gpm total flow) of slightly i

less than 10.5. The B train pH would be lower since it will have higher borated water flow rate (3925 gpm) and the same NaOH addition rate.

l The eductor motive flow will be as determined in the Pre-Operational tests while the pump is delivering a total flow of 3415 gpm (A train),3925 gpm (B train). These flow rates are minimums expected while the containment is at 50 psig. The other changing parameters (decreasing containment back pressure and correspondingly increasing total CS flow rate, lower eductor motive flow rate, lower SAT level) will provide for a j

lower pH, while the RWST is supplying the system.

i 4

i When the source of containment spray water is switched from the RWST E

to the containment sump, the eductor will be c.dding NaOH to water that already contains NaOH. This will cause the pH to increase. The increase will be based on the actual flow rates prier to (and present at) the time of switchover. However, this value is bor.nded by a maximum pH of 11.4, which assumes no increase in soure'.s water flow rate, and no decrease in NaOH flow rate.11.4 is the pH of the spray water in the final minute of injection, assuming all the NaOH previously injected had mixed uniformly and made it to the recirculation sump to be source water. The duration of this phase of increased pH would be from a few minutes (one train of ECCS and two trains of CS in operation) to up to 41 minutes (two trains of ECCS and one train of CS in operation).

If the NaOH flow rate decreases (due to reduction of eductor motive flow and NaOH tank level drop), then the duration of the pH higher than 10.5 will be longer, but the magnitude of being above 10.5 will be less. The NaOH injection flow rate to achieve a minimum pH of 8.5 (minimum allowable per SRP 6.5.2, rev 1) would be 19 gpm, conservatively using the B train maximum flow rate of 3925 gpm; if the flow rate were 1

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increased to 4600 gpm (maximum recorded runout). lf the NaOH flow rate started at 55 - 60 gpm (spray pH of 10.5) as initially set, and quickly dropped to 19 gpm (spray pH of 8.5), the duration of injection would be approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> before enough NaOH is added to the sump to obtain a sump pH of 8.0. This is not expected, but bounds the review of minimum NaOH injection. These conditions will provide for improved iodine removal, due to higher spray pH, during recirculation and establish the same final sump pH as the high flow case (since final sump pH is based on volume of SAT added to sump, not the rate at which it is added), and are therefore acceptable.

The examples above bound the worst case calculated pH and duration.

The actual pH profile cannot be easily calculated and therefore, these worst case values have been reviewed. Both cases are acceptable with regard to iodine removal, and final sump pH. However, with regards to pH of the injection spray, the Equipment Qualification of components in containment was performed assuming a maximum spray pH of 10.5. It is acceptable to have spray water with a pH higher than 10.5 for short periods of time as long as the high pH water is washed down with water with a pH lower than 10.5. The containment spray system will be run for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in the scenario (LOCA) where high pH can occur.

The pH and duration represented above have been reviewed and are not a concern for either the environmental qualification of equipment or hydrogen generation inside containment. This increase in spray pH beyond the maximum EQ limit of 10.5 is acceptable based on the fact that sensitive components are protected from chemical spray, as well as the fact that the duration of high pH spray is short. In addition, electrical cables have jacket material that exhibit excellent chemical resistance to NaOH at high temperatures. Revised hydrogen generation rates based on high pH show that the hydrogen concentration inside containment remain below the 4% limit given in Regulatory Guide 1.7.

7.0 SYSTEM PROTECTION FROM PLANT INCIDENTS 7.1 Loss-Of-Offsite Power (LOOP)

The design of the CS system accommodates loss-of-offsite power by providing power from the Class 1E buses or Station batteries for the system functions required for safe shutdown. The power sources are redundant and separated and are designed in accordance with IEEE Standard 279-1971, " Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," and 384-1974 IEEE Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits."

7.2 Fire Protection The CS system's Safety Category I (safety-related) components and piping have been designed to withstand the affects of postulated fire conditions. The system has

.e 4

l been reviewed for separation of safe shutdown cables and components to insure that postulated fires will not prevent safe shutdown. Specific information may be i

obtained in the Byron /Braidwood Fire Protection Report.

i i

l 7.3 High/ Moderate Energy Line Break (HELB/MELB)

Protection against high/ moderate energy line breaks is afforded by basic geometric CS system separation and redundant design. Since all CS system components with l

exception of the two independent sets of spray headers and nozzles, are in the Auxiliary Building, jet impingement inside containment will not impair the safe shutdown function of the CS system. Specific requirements of the CS system and 4

components can be found in the Byron /Braidwood HELB/MELB calculations as well i-as " Byron 1-Confirmation of Design Adequacy for Jet Impingement Effects."

i l

7.4 Seismic Events -

i The safety-related portion of the CS system is designed and supported to remain

}

intact following the design Operating Basis Earthquake and Safe Shutdown Earthquake. The active equipment is designed to remain functional after these events. Component (s) qualification by test or design is documented as referenced in i

the CS portion of the project's Safety-Related Component List (SRCL).

7.5 Flood Protection The CS system is designed to withstand the maximum probable flood plant 3

scenarios. Details relative to CS system submersible components and water sprays i

affecting the CS system are respectively described in the Byron and Braidwood i

Flooding Calculations entitled, " Confirmation of Safe Shutdown Capability After

. Auxiliary Building Flooding."

8.0 SAFETY CRITERIA l

The Containment Spray system and its components, with exception of the test / recirculating line are classified as Safety Category 1, ASME Section 111, Quality Group B (Class 2), as shown on the system design drawings. Instrument sensing lines are designed to the same ASME Code Class as the process line, up to and including the first isolation valve.

References to the components Hazard Zones and Environmental Qualification Report may l

be sought via the CS system portion of the Project Safety-Related Component Ust (SRCL).

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9. 0 REFERENCES i

1. BYRON Pre-op Test Results, R-232, p. 57 for 1B & R-232, P. 54 for 1 A

2. BYRON Pre-op Test p.114 for 2A & p.119 for 2B l

3. CS-RS-83, Rev. O, dated 7/7/83, BYRON /BRAIDWOOD Calculation of Equivalent j

Water Flow Rates for 55 gpm of 30% NaOH solution.

}

4. BYR-96-119, Rev. O, dated 8/8/96, BYRON /BRAIDWOOD Calculation of flow rates i

of 36% by wt NaOH based on 55-60 flow rate of 30% of NaOH.

5. BYR-96-160, Rev. O, dated 8/12/96, BYRON /BRAIDWOOD Calculation of Estimated Flow Rate of 36 Wt % Sodium Hydroxide Solution at Varying Tank Levels.

j 6.- BYR-96-051, Rev.1, dated 3/28/96, BYRON Calculation of back pressure readings for CSAT Hi & Lo-2 setpoints l

7. BYR-96-051, Rev. O, dated 3/25/96, Byron Calculation of CS Eductor Flow Test Pressure Determination

8. NED-M-MSD-201, Rev. O, dated 3/22/96, BRAIDWOOD Evaluation of Containment Spray Test Flow rates (Correction Factor).

9. BYR-96-060, Rev. O, dated 3/28/96, BYRON Calculation of NaOH Addition Rates for Containment Spray injection pH of 8.5 to 10.5.

10.BYR96-061, Rev. O, dated 3/29/96, BYRON Calculation of Minimum & Maximum Acceptable Test Water Flow Rates for the CS Eductor.

11.BRW-96-342-M, Rev. O, dated 09/04/96, BYRON /BRAIDWOOD Calculation of Maximum CS pH when the CS pump is taking a suction from the Containment Recirculation sump and NaOH from the CSAT is added to the CS pump flow.

12. ATD-0356, Rev. 2, dated 9/20/96, BYRON /BRAIDWOOD Post-LOCA Containment Sump minimum pH.-

13.NDIT # BYR-96-061, Rev.0, dated 3/27/96, BYRON Transmittal of Containment Spray Additive Eductor Flow Test Reference Test Conditions.

14.BYR96-113, Rev. O, dated 3/5/96, Byron /Braidwood increase in the Internal Design Pressure of Spray Additive Tanks 1/2CS01T and 1/2CS02T.

Exhibit B NEP-12-03 e -

Nucl3ar D:: sign Inf2rmation Transmittal R_visi: n a

@ Safety-Related Originating Organization:

4 0 Non-Safety-Related

@ Comed NDIT No. BYR-96fp9. Rev. O O Regulatory Related O Other(specify)

Station: Byron /Braidwood Unit (s): d!!

Pagelof 3 Design Change Authority No.: n/a 1

System Designation: CS To: Steve Gould/Tvrone Stevens

Subject:

Containment Soray Additive eductor flow test. reference test conditions.

1 Mark S. Bruckner S&L b

bw

/Of/of"1A Preparer Posamn Properors signature 6 ate /

W. J. Felmster Lead Mechanical

.k.bM

\\

/0 - /&96 1

Reviewer Postion Reviewer 3 Signature Date Status of Information: @ Approved for Use O Unverified O Engineering Judgment Method and Schedule of Verification for Unverified NDITs: N/A Description of Information:

l The information provides the test conditions at which the flowrate of the Spray Additive system eductor (as reibrenced in Technical Specification 4.6.2.2.d) should be tested.

Purpose of issuance:

To transmit revised necessary information for the perfonnance of CS Eductor Flow Test (1/2BVS 6.2.2.d-1 of Byron and 1/2BwVS6.2.2.d-1 of Braidwood)

Source of information:

See references Distribution:

Per DDL, J. Feimster, L Wehner, A. Ferko, S:nGauki, T. Stevens, H. Singh, B. Acas File No.: 4 02.0201 CHRON No.: N/A Controned Electrone Form Page 1 of 4 File: 1203B-o.coc See NEP Table of Contents leeued: 12/18/95

Exhibit B NEP-12-03 Nuclear D sign Information Transmittal a;visi:n o ATTACHMENT B, PART 2 COMED NUCLEAR DESIGN INFORMATION TRANSMITTAL NDIT No. BYR-96-209. Rev. O Page got 3 As a result of a comprehensive design review for the Containment Spray (CS) System which was done for Byron and Braidwood, it has been determined that the surveillance tests should be re-performed, even though the present system configuration is acceptable. This re-performance centers mainly around the performance testing of the CS eductors, and requires that the Spray Additive Tank flow be re-established based on testing at both hi and low tank levels.

In order to determine the correct boundary conditions for eductor now performance testing in Technical Specification 4.6.2.2.d (55 gpm of 30 wt% NaOH +5,-0; 68 gpm water +6,-0), a review was made of the requirements of the NaOH injection system. From the ANS standard (Reference 1) and UFSAR system descriptions (Reference 2) the Spray Additive subsystem is used for Mssion product removal and sump chemistry control. Sump chemistry controlis not in question as it pertains to NaOH addition rates, since the overall volume of NaOH which enters the sump is predetermined regardless of the addition rate. This is assured by operating procedures which require a SATlevel during normal operations between Hi and Lo-1 alarms and that, upon CS initiation, the CS pumps will educt NaOH from the Spray Additive Tank (SAT) untilit reaches the Lo-2 setpoint. Only the eductor flow rates for Mssion product removal will be reviewed by this NDIT (as weII as EQ Ilmits).

From Reference 1, calculations ofiodine removal are sensitive to pH (in NaOH additive systems) in that the partition factoris directly related to pH (per Reference 1, Figure 8.3-1). Partition coetScient is dehned as the equilibrium ratio ofiodine in the liquid phase to the concentration in the gas phase. This table provides that the same partition factor 1

is allowed for NaOH solutions with a pH range from 8.5 to 11. Therefore, from an iodine removalperspective, the design points of pH would be from B.5 to 11. [ Note: A spray solution with a lowerpH than 8.5 could be demonstrated to be acceptable, but this is not being pursued at this time).

EQ engineers were consulted conceming the maximum allowable pH values during the NaOH addition phase of CS operation. References 6 and 7 establish the normal basis of containment spray as beingless than or equalto 10.5, while Reference 9 demonstrates that the peak spray pH could be as high as 11.43 (assuming failure of SATisolation valve CS019 to close and an upperlimit NaOH concentration of 36 wt%). This peak value and associated time 1

frame have beenjusti5sd from an EQ standpoint, andis documentedin Reference 10. Conservatively, forpurposes of this NDIT,10.5 willbe used.

From these finalminimum and maximum pH values, 8.5 to 10.5, limiting flowrates of 30 wt% NaOH irnection have been evaluated to determine the sensitivity of the Tech Spec allowable flows on the spray solution pH. Calculations performed by Sargent and Lundy Air and Water Quality Division personnel (Reference 3) revealed that the limiting upper bound pH of 10.5 corresponds to a 30 wt% NaOH flowrate of approximately 65 gpm (which is above the Tech l

Spec allowable range of 55-60 gpm). This is at worse case pump flow and RWST concentration. Conversely, to achieve 8.5 pH, a 30 wt% NaOH flowrate of approximately 19 gpm would be required (again assuming worst case pump Row and RWSTconcentration). 30 wt% NaOH was speci6ed since the relationship of flow for 30 wt% NaOH and wateris prescribedin Tech Spec 4.6.2.2.d. From this evaluation, the Tech Spec required flowrates (55 gpm

+5,-0 of 30 wt% NaOH) are associated with and bound the maximum NaOH injection. The minimum required Mowrate would be much less (19 gpm).

Testing on 3/25t96 (B VS 4. 6.2.2.d-1) and review of preoperational tests (Reference 5) indicate an impact on educted Mow by the motive 60w through the eductor. To assure the eductor flow is representative of actual accident /startup test conditions, the eductor motive flow rates which were recorded during startup testing (Reference 5) should be re-established by throfiling the CS035 valve during the surveillance.

Maximum NaOH Mow:

The boundary conditions for the Technical Speci6 cation 4.6.2.2.d value of eductor water flow applies to the maximum

\\

case of NaOH irnection, and therefore the eductor throttle valve should be set:

1.

for a Tech Soec water flow of 68 to 74 gpm (by reading 62 to 67 gpm on FI-CS015/16) (Reference 11).

l Controhed Electronic Form Page 2 of 4 File: 1203B-o.coc See NEP Table of Contents issued: 12n8/95

j

'te Exhibit B NEP 1243 i,

Nucintr Design Information Transmittal n:vi:itn a 2.

at eductor motive flow conditions, equal to preoperational data (Reference 5) by throttling the CS035 valve to now rates at Byron: for U-1,135 gpm; 2A,133 gpm; 28,130 ppm; at Braidwood: for U-1,130 gpm, U-2,140 gpm, 3.

while simulating a Hi-level setpoint in the SAT (30 wt% NaOH, removing vacuum effects, and adding N2 blanket

+1.0 psi): for Byron, A trains 7.3 psi, B trains 6.9 psi (Rekrence 4).

4. These values should be embodied in future surveillances, so that controIIed reference points are established in monitoring eductorRow.

Minimum NaOH Row:

The minimum NaOH Row rate is not considered a Technical SpeciRcation requirement, but will be compared with the overall design basis. The following one-time testing of the minimum system perkmance willbe done (either under a Temporary Change or an SPP). This testing encompasses simulating the Lo-2 SATlevel and the minimum and i

maximum preoperational test eductor motive Row rates. 7hese tests willrepresent high containment pressure and l

Iow containment pressure. This test consists of 2 cases, as described below:

CASE 1. design pump flow:

Further evaluation of system perkmance shall be evaluated based on the eductor Row at minimum 30 wt% NaOH injection by measuring eductor Row (and NOT adjusting the eductor NaOH tiow throttle valve from maximum setting) while simulating:

1, an eductor motive Row approximating preoperational test design tiow conditions (Reference 5)(CS035 valve set for those values provided in item 2 for Maximum Row testing above),

2.

while simulating a SAT at the Lo-2 level: for Byron, A trains 1.1 psi, B trains 0.5 psl. The NaOH Row should be st least 19 gpm (Reference 3)(by reading 22 gpm water Row on FI CS015(16)(Rellerence 11)).

j CASE 2 -maximum pump Row:

j As containment pressure decreases during an event, the CS pump Row rate willincrease, and eductor motove Row wW decrease. Preoperational data shows the 1A to be the most affected One time vahdation of NaOH Row should be performod on the 1A train, whoe simulating:

1. an eductor flow approximating preoperationaltest maximum CS pump Row conditions (Reference 5); CS035 valve set at Byron for train 1A,125 gpm; at Braidwood for train 1A,120 gpm.

2. whHe simulating a SAT at the Lo 2 level: for Byron,1.1 psi. The NaOH Row should be at least 20 gpm (by readsng 23 gpm water Row on FI-CS015). [ Expected value derived thom ratioing design CS Row (3925 gpm) over maximum 1A CS tiow (4125 gpm)(Reference 5, R-232) times minimum NaOH Row (19 gpm)(Reference 3) and similarly increasing the indicated reading.]

References:

1. ANS-56.51979.

2. UFSAR, Section 6.5.

3.

Casculation BYR 96-000

4. Calculation BYR 96-051.

5. Preoperationaltests: Byron, 2.17.10, 2.17.60, Retests R-191, R 232; Braidwood, BWPT-CS-10 rev. 0 (Unit 1),

BWPT-CS-50 rev. 0 (Unit 2), Retest BWPT-CS-10 rev.1 (Unit 1).

6. EQ Program Design Basis Dccument, PMED-BB-EQ-DBD-00.

7. IEEE-323-1974, Tab 6e 1.

6. Calculation BRW-06-071

9. Calculation BRW-96-342-M, Rev. O, dated 09/04/96.

10. Byron Letter BYRON-96-5134, " Evaluation ofincreased Containment Spray pH for Environmental QuakRcation of Byron and Braidwood Station Equipment".

11. Calculation NED-M-MSD-201, Rev. O, " Evaluation of Containment Spray Test Flowrote".

Contromed Electroruc Form Page 3 of 4 File: 12038-acoc Sem NEP Tobio of Contents leeued: 12/1845 j

s BAP 1245-1T1 d,

.e, APPROVED 05/10/94 Jacwnilel Revision 3 BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UFSAR (DRP) DRAFT REVISION PACKAGE REQUEST / TRACKING SHEET DRP #

[o - 077 Affected Section(s); Table (s); Figure (s):

SWE A-7 7)k'. J E b

\\

STATION / UNIT (CIRCLE)

BW2 Q BY1 BY2 BW1 Originator: M( M/dMME1 /

N

_,j/_/ /7 / 7b (please print name)

(signature)

(date)

Company: 6 h/

Dept /Div:

MC Phone Ext.: M N Location: ON TYPE OF CHANGE:

Facility Change N Technical Change Editorial Change (MOD,MPC,SSCR,Etc.)

New Safety Issues, (Typos, Etc.)

Procedures, Etc.

10CFR50.59

Attachment:

N Evaluation Screening J

Description and Reason for Change (Attach marked up pages)

A d.S CYG7k}1 hkSMO EKIS kkVEL47 t04C PFD 4fMAA THE AE&lSICAM AKSULLE;h F A M -/

7NF AEINEW Supporting Documentation (List all ECNs, Cales, Drawings, Letters, Etc.

Include attachments where appropriate):

dAe.itL4T? ors s RVR H2 klo

• ML- % ~ ow /lo T Ekkr= % -3+J~/f B1A - % -l70 Un " Bkt<T 'Th '432-W/ Avr - 9L~ ILTMi> l Ensk m*14-d'k entA77en fr~r'h - o a r t K/1.

i '~

/

/

Date & Schedule for Facility Changes:

g Unit Facility Change No.

Scheduled / Outage Actual / Outage BY1

/__/

/_/

BY2

/_/

/_/

BW1

/_/

/_/

BW2

/_/

/_/

Comments:

(Final) (1227AA/WPF/042294) h

T.

BwAP 1245-1T1 Revision 1 l '.,

l PMED EFED SPED CID HVAC l

l CQD ATD NAR WEST l STATUS:

Completed i

on Hold (explain) l l

l l

l Rejected j

(explain) i 1

I 1

I 1

l INCORPORATED INTO UFSAR REV.

l REMARKS I

l l

l (Final) 1 272(012392)

ZWBWAP I

i e

- - - _. -. - - -. - - - -... - -.. - - -. =

B/B-UFSAR

).

event of having a LOCA coincident with a 1 O fslte power

}

(LOOP) in one unit, the supply and exhaust fans powered from

?

that unit are tripped and charcoal booster fans s' tarted.

The supply fan and exhaust fan associated with the second unit continue to operate.

Two hours after the above event, the

{

supply and exhaust fans associated with the LOCA/ LOOP unit may i

be manually restarted at the operator's discretion.

1 1

All harsh Class lE equipment associated with this equipment is environmentally qualified as shown in Reference' 3.

All Class j

IE electrical equipment associated with the cubicle coolers and j

auxiliary building HVAC system satisfies IEEE 279-1971 and IEEE i

308-1971 design criteria.

l i

i l

A failure of any equipment component is audibly and visibly annunciated in the main control room.

The operator can i

manually start and stop the standby system from the main I

control room.

I In the event of a single failure of one of the cubicle coolers, 4

l the safety-related function is performed by the other ESF j

division pump and cooler, and safe shutdown of the reactor is 1

not affected.

i l

In the event of a single failure of an auxiliary building HVAC l

j system supply or exhaust fan, the safety-related function is 1

performed by one of the other ESF division supply or exhaust l

fans and safe shutdown of the reactor is not affected.

1 3.11.4.5 Containment i

The equipment located within the containment which is required to safely shut down the reactor is served by the reactor con-tainment fan cooler (RCFC) system which is described in detail in Subsections 6.2.2 and 9.4.8.

l The 100% redundant RCFC units are designed to remove the heat l

generated by a loss-of-coolant accident.

The electrical i

equipment associated with the RCFC units are Class lE and are environmentally qualified to the postaccident environment as j

shown in Reference 3.

l A single failure of the RCFC units will not impair safe shutdown of the reactor since 100% redundancy has been provided.

t I

3.11.5 Estimated Chemical and Radiation Environmant 1

4 The chemical compositions and pH values for reactor coolant for

}

purposes of this discussion are listed in Table 3.11-3.

The j

itir rre resultin of the liquid in containment sumps 4F]

fell:r :

1.

44r j

sees e::in: r:::i;; witt. ;r.a a:;;at.

1 t'

rel: tic will h;;; 0.07 peand of KeOH ye. youua of a with r.sultio, ya oz 3.3.

p l

Sb1 um qQ wA Lser4 C. kare.

L',Q 3.11-6 REVISION 2 - DECEMBER 1990 J

t

B/B-UFSAR s % rt u a> p ccy k a % J a s d h M -

i.

b.

-b.

"i t-h-A-t-rei n r u nn i n g o n ly, the-solution "ill %"a.

1.41 pound of NaOH p.er pound-of-B-with a resulting s o no pu e c.

'fith everything running, th celutic.- :ill h:/ -

1.215 pound-of-of-NaOH par pound of :: with e

Talti.;

" ^f S.?5 The hydrogen generation as a result of core radiolysis, I

radiolysis of sump water, and the control of hydrogen buildup within the containment are discussed in Subsection 6.2.5.

The organic materials inside the containment and the material released due to the radiation exposure are discussed in Subsection 6.1.2.

The design radiation environment for each area of the plant is listed in Table 3.11-2, for both normal operation and design-basis accident conditions.

The values listed represent gamma plus beta integrated doses.

Safety-related equipment (Class lE) which can withstand the specified radiation levels is chosen based on its location in the plant.

Specifications for the equipment purchased state that a gamma irradiation test to the specified radiation level is acceptable for meeting the specified radiation level beta plus gamma requirement.

The calculation of the design-basis accident is presented in Subsection 15.6.5.

All source data and assumptions are pre-sented there.

Source terms and chemical environments for which the NSSS. scope equipment is qualified are described in Appendix A to Reference 1.

3.11.6 coerability Recuirements Specific postaccident operability requirements for each device are developed from the guidelines which are given in Table 3.11-4.

The operability requirement for each piece of Class lE equip-ment is the length of time the equipment is required to remain functional during accident mitigation.

A margin of at least I hour of equipment operating time has been included in the qualification program for each piece of applicable Class lE equipment.

I pa s e im 3.11-7 P. 2 y g TRP 6-n?

i B/B-UFSAR

~

i LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd)

NUMBER TITLE' PAGE 6.3-9 Normal Operating Status of Emergency Core Cooling System Components for Core Cooling 6.3-70 6.3-10 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis -

Emergency Core Cooling System Active

{

Components 6.3-71 6.3-11 ECCS Active Components 6.3-85 6.3-12 RWST Outflow Large Break - No Failures 6.3-89 6.3-13 RWST Outflow Large Break - Worst Single Failure 6.3-91 6.3-14 ECCS Air Operated Valves 6.3-93 6.3-15 RWST Outflow Large Break - Operator Error 6.3-94 6.3-16 ECCS Vent Valves Located Inside Containment 6.3-96 6.4-1 Expected Dose to Control Room Personnel

+

at Byron Station Following a Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) 6.4-17 4

6.4-la Principal Assumptions Used In Control Room Habitability Calculations (Byron) 6.4-18 6.4-1 Expected Dose to Control Room Personnel at Braidwood Station Following a Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) 6.4-19 i

6.4-la Principal Assumptions Used In Control Room Habitability Calculations 3

i (Braidwood) 6.4-20 6.5-1 Single Active Failure Analysis -

i Containment Spray System 6.5-34 6.5-2 FuelHandlingAccidentInsideSp[ent Fuel Storage Building 6.5-35 10I^ 'W}

Cir.gi; " ilcr;

'.' ::t C::: ECCC-6.5-3 6.5-36 l

6.5-4 "i"gle ??il"~ NNt Care Cent Opr:y Cyctedt 6.5-37 6.5-5 Nonaccessible Areas of the Auxiliary i

Building 6.5-38 O,.qllustlm l

p ;as l P. i of 16 i

Ntp d-017

[

6.0-x REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

l B/B-UFSAR i.

~

CHAPTER 6. 0 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES i

LIST OF FIGURES NUMBER TITLE

'N DO 6.1-1 Fl"id-Amountr-and-pH-vs-T4me, M:in Ste =lin: Er:2.

Insidi Centsinsent--

Lw. M^M p

6.1-2 F-luid A;;unt and p!! vsr-Tims, Msin -

^'

w=&

Erc k Insid: Centain;;nt

?

b I

6 1-3

"4d

' 'a a " " *

'"d

' ^ ' "

6.2-1 Containment PEessuEe kesponse for beuble nded Pump Suction MAX SI 6.2-2 Containment Pressure Response for Double Ended Pump Suction MIN SI 6.2-3 Containment Pressure Response for 0.6 Double Ended Pump Suction 6.2-4 Containment Pressure Response for 3 ft Pump Suction 2

Split 6.2-5 Containment Pressure Response for Double Ended Hot Leg 6.2-6 Containment Pressure Response for Double Ended Cold Lag 6.2-7 Containment Temperature Response for Double Ended 3

Pump Suction MAX SI 6.2-8 Containment Temperature Response for Double Ended Pump Suction MIN SI i

6.2-9 Containment Temperature Response for 0.6 Double Ended Pump Suction 6.2-10 Containment Temperature Response for 3 ft2 Pump Suction 6.2-11 Containment Temperature Response for Double Ended Hot Leg 6.2-12 Containment Temperature Response for Double Ended Cold Leg 6.2-13 Containment Pressure Response for 0.942 ft2 Split Break at 30% Power with Steamline Stop Valve Failure 6.2-14 containment Temperature Response for 0.942 ft2 Split Break at 30% Power with Steamline Stop Valve Failure 6.2-15 Heat Transfer Coefficient, DEPS, DECL, and DEHL 6.2-16 Heat Transfer Coefficient, Steamline Break I

6.2-17 Heat Removal from Containment 6.2-17a Deleted 6.2-17b Deleted 6.2-18 Containment Subcompartment Nodalization Diagram 6.2-18a Nodalization Schematic 3

6.2-19 Loop Compartment and Upper Compartment Pressure Transient for Worst Case Break Compartment (Element

3) Having a DECL Break 6.2-20 Loop Compartment and Upper Compartment Pressure Transient for Worst case Break compartment (Element

3) Having a DECL Break f

f.4 of M l

r DRP 6 -877

(* l 6.0-xi REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 s

l d

l 9P B/B-UFSAR I

/,

I

^

assoc 1 ll on ts, and control of the use of sensitized st'ai.nless steels can be found in-Appendix A.

quad l

6.1.1.2 Comeosition, Comoatibility, and Stability of i

Containment and Core Sorav Coolants g

og

-'4---

=4 n a

The containment spray system is designed to i

i

Od::ter d:li:::ing 30t " ^" 2:12ti:2, rith 211 g n : :;;

tin;. :: r;h ":^" to the containment to form O pH solution

1. l l

l h 5gi when combined with the refueli-- "-t r --' spilled reactor M

coolant waterae64es the refueling water storage tank 4 hew-been i,)gg***g

.y :. i;; (see Subsection 6.5.2)E).

The probability of stress-6,9 '

corrosion cracking of rus&anitic stainless staal components '

MM therefore minimize pq pH ak 8 l

Most components in the containment are fabricated of austenitic i

stainless steel.

These materials are compatible with the NaOH l

solution, with the exception of galvanized steel and aluminum.

The amount of hydrogen generated within the containment by i

corrosion of materials can be neglected, as described in Subsection 6.2.5.3.2.

To prevent degradation of the sodium hydroxide, an inert gas is maintained within the spray additive tank.

A relief valve is provided to prevent overpressurization of the tank.

The vessels used for storing ESF coolants. include the accumu-lators, the containment spray additive (sodium hydroxide) tank, and the refueling water storage tank.

The ESF coolant is stored in a stainless-steel-lined concrete refueling water storage tank.

The chloride ion concentration of borated water coolant stored in this tank normally is less than 0.15 ppm, therefore stress corrosion cracking of the lined stainless steel or ESF components through which'the coolant circulates is very unlikely.

The accumulators are carbon steel clad with austenitic stain-less steel.

Because of the corrosion resistance of these materials, significant corrosive attack on the storage vessels is not expected.

The accumulators are vessels filled with borated water and pressurized with nitrogen gas.

The nominal boron concentra-tion. i::i cri'. is4 000-ppm.

Samples of the solution in the accumuAarors are taken periodically for checks of boron concen-tration.

Principal design parameters of the accumulators are listed in Table 6.3-1.

The refueling water storage tank is a source of borated cooling water for injection.

The nominal boron concentration _ : ba crid.-is dece ppm, which is below the solubility limit at eezing.' The temperature of the refueling water is maintained above freezing.

Further information on the refueling water

5 'f "

'2500-2SD Q DAP 6-a11 6.1-3 REVISION 2 - DECEMBER 1990

W N' i ((

f

/,

1, B/B-UFSAR The quantity (weight and volume)_of uncovered cable and cable in conduit or..c'losed cable trays are as follows:

a.

Uncovered Weight (W) = 11',359.31 pounds Volume (V) = 81.96 cubic feet b.

Covered W = 75,061.53 pounds V = 586.49 cubic feet.

A breakdown of cable diameters and associated conductor cross sections is shown on Table 6.1-5.

The insulation and jacket materials are also indicated on Table 6.1-5.

There is no wood or asphalt inside the containment.

6.1.3 Postaccident chemistry In the event of an accident, sodium hydroxide and boric acid solutions will be present in the containment sump; the presence

. _ _, of sodium hydroxide in the sump solution will reduce the proba-g,*.

bility of stress corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless

'i steelsp The tir hict :7 Of th: ;" ;f th; ;;;;;;.; eh;.;e ir. J..

loq rerr n-r-t

" ; i

i

: in Fi;;;; 5.1 2.

5d O ^

There are two independent safety grade sumps in the containment 1

which are used to recycle ESF fluids.

The only significant

- ! p n abVC source of low pH fluids is a possible leak of borated reactor coolant.

The boric acid content of this water is very low, andj j

84 as a result, the pH of the coolant will be only_ al:,chtly less P

than 7.0.

In the event of a LOCA, the reactor $cooMa~n~tsiwill be ~

M

-de+mted by theycontainment spray.

A sutticient quantity of i

~

NaOH i=^"-"

8=

"r -- tr to maintain the pH of liquids in the gg containment abov;.:.0.0.

This pH level can be maintained even in

~

the event of a maximum break size LOCA, and the concurrent U-failure of one of the two safety grade containment spray systems.

The containment spray systems are designed so that each division fully covers the containment, there

t

li;;; p ensu W ';

that all reactor coolant spillage i:

) Memlaked WM 6.1.3.1 steamline armak Inside containmant y 3 uuf 3 ha.5 a. m hd *,

pn o 6.0, In the event of a main steamline break inside the c taTnment concurrent with failure of the isolation valve to close in the faulted steamline, there would be backflow from piping which is external to the containment.

Low steamline pressure setpoints would be reached within approximately 5 seconds after the break 04 ef %

p p 6-*17 6.1-9 REVISION 1 - DECEMBER 1989

I" i

f B/B-UFSAR 8

b I

occurs, and the three remaining main steam ine 1 oh,ti n valves I

and the main feedwater isolation valves would require an addi-tional 5 seconds for closure.

In addition, steam:would be i

l released from the steam generator via a 1.4-ft2 flow restrictor i

j located within the vessel discharge nozzle.

Peak containment l

pressure resulting from this break is 36.9 psig, which would i

cause actuation of containment spray and caustic eduction.

L [^C'4g Fi;tre 5.1 1 cher: th: rrrunt ;f liquid th;t is ecc.c...les 0 iu i

lewksbA f'

th; ;;nt:in;;nt 5:::r:nt

ti;;, :10 ; rith ;::, xii;h i; er7 ted te be eenet:nt et 10.c.

The gi;; : i 5:::e up:: 3 th j

pra c rc. k h/

nt

ir

:t :pr:y pumps delivering borated-weber ccateining i

g"J #" ' '(,)

0000 pp; cf beren :: B-10, buffered to 10.0 pH by s.ue wf ^e; g/

l

ti: reditien, te th ci Spr:7 rir;:

t the deri;r flet-g i

bgka3[5pN

tc.

It i: 215 hered uper 511 ferr reerter certei----t f r I I i

.st.-

..a

---a-

.t.,

.s-.-

.s su t-

---ut-uu, j

4gg CS pugs T7-- _:

........ 1.: ~.T.; ;', T;, -,Z..T. T.,

.Z..Z. 2 T.. s.i. _ ;_

_1_ ;;. ; E..;_ _;"Z _ _'.' ' - ~

fraq AASo zeleeeed and fleshed to th: ;; tci-rnt :trr:ph::: h:: b:::

l gg

-eendensed, Af ter the type of break has been ascertained, thed-

nt;in;;nt ;;;;y ;;;;; can be by operator action.$

I Although there may be up to 1.5'O ppm of ammonia in the steam l

l resulting from decomposition of morpholine or from direct feed i

of ammonia, this has no significant effect upon pH of condensed i

steam containment spray mixture as it accumulates in the containment sump.

i I

6.1.3.2 Main Feedwater Line Break Inside Containment I

i In the event of a main feedwater line failure inside the con-1 tainment concurrent with failure of the isolation valve to close in the faulted line, but with the feedwater. regulator valve located in the turbine building assumed to close within 10 seconds after the break occurs, the resulting peak contain-i ment pressure will be less than the pressure at which contain-ment spray is actuated.

Therefore, the accumulation of liquid in the containment basement will be the amount of liquid dis-charged from the feedwater line, plus water and steam released from the feedwater nozzle via a restricting orifice located in the nozzle.

It is assumed that all four reactor containment fan coolers will condense flashed steam at their total design rate of 6,840 lb/ min.

Th: q ::tity ;f liquid th;t will.

1=*=

"ithin th: :::t:ir :nt b;;:n:nt end pn ef G.

11guis j

.e...e time e;e ehewn in rig;;; f.1 T.

The following chemical i

composition of the liquid is expected:

I Free hydroxide, ppm as CACO 3 less than 0.15 Ammonia, ppm less than 0.25

{

In addition, there will be trace quantities of other substances such as silica, sodium and chlorides.

1 i

i i

a 6.1-10 REVISION 2 - DECEMBER 1990 e

DaP 6-e17 w

I-a

.e i

[

a B/B-UFSAR g[

l 6.1.3.3 Loss-L f-oolant Accident t

In the. event of a pipe break of a reactor coolant loop, bo l

safety injection and containment spray will be initiated.

9he-i hi;hert' fin:1 pH will re: ult when both ECCS : d 00 tciar:nt

y t

in

:: ::tu:ted with 20% ::::ti: =01uti:n h ing l

ducted inte e:ch centeirrent :; 27 pr ; :::ti:n :t th

t Of 55 ; 1/rin.

The 10" t final ;M "ill result - :: 5:th ::005 : d certei----t sprey trairr ere acti" ted but ene cru:ti: : ;;1; j

• v:1ve fril: te crer.

Fi;rre 5.1-? '?hret 1) indic te: felr--

Of liquid :::rrrl: tic: in th: :::t:in-at 5::: :;t :nd p:: Of

-the-solution-f:: th: fi::t ;;;; in xhich th: fin:1 y;; is highe t, and ;igu : f.1 0 'Ch::t 2) indic:t : Ciril:: inf:rrr r

l tica fer th recend c :: in "hich the fin:1 ;H-=ill he :t :

p

,1

-asesmum The systems function in the same manner regardless of U,1 I

whether one or two ECCS/ containment spray trains are in opera-l,f.

tion.

The residual heat removal pumps will be semiautomati-

\\tk[

sacAu d,mm cally transferred to the recirculation mode when appeee4me4e4y

1. gos 250,000 ;2110r: ef 50::t:d r:te: 5::: 5::: ; x;;d ist: th:

1 psy Jr

nt:inc: t frer the refueling water storage tankE l

inecharg-[bLr 0 j

-ing and safety injection pumps are then manually aligned'for the recirculation mode..The containment spray pumps will e

o- !

l continue to operate with?r:::tir -'rrtir until the RWSTh Wa.\\

1; -- i: :: rded "h:2 : tet:1 ef pprerimetely $15,000 ; 11:::

gtpo I as A N cf h:::t;d x;ter h:v: h::: pur;;d,- The operator will then I

manuallytsamese-the containment spray pum I

y g 12;::ti:2 Trfr-g=9hegfi al sump s 1 t on w'111 always be at a pH

.j or or greater.

3 ansores -NA l

l g

ST* fo nt. d 6.1.

References N

T hH W. Sea. Sech% 6.f.7. for Arbr duas tt.4 l

radukkbn w

~ - - -

1.

WCAP-7803, " Behavior o Austenitic tainless Steel in Post 1

Hypothetical Loss of Coolant Environment."

D' 2.

L. F. Picone, " Evaluation of Protective Coatings for Use in d Auc Reactor Containment," WCAP 7825, December 1971.

v@ We p I

3.

" Radiation Effects on Organic Materials," R. Bolt and J.

j gg4 Carroll, Academic Press, 1963.

. rh %

l.o.2.tw el; n 4.

" Study of kadiolysis of Epichloryhydrin by an Electrical e ra3ud(es3 or Conducting Method," V. Zhiklarer, et al. (Institute of Physical Chemistry, Kier, 1973), abstract only in Nuclear Science O/d Abstracts, 28, No. 12, Item 29672, 1973.

'such scuce.

6.1-11 REVISION 2 - DECEMBER 1990 P.Eaf16 3M 6-e17

-u ni a

.Q.

kU j

a_

_o m

i m$

2 E

m's 2

A

~

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F-O j

u. Z y)

O rD j

O W w

"t I

2 W2

~D Z-Ek

• U!

O h

_oo Of dZ 2jj oO' 6u o me x.

OJJ e4'

_ 'W

%JJ m

Nhh

• 0'

~

i

%I LOf Iw.

F-

)

1 52' 41

'\\

o d!

0 2 s

gj H

a2 C Dl Ju-E Zi h

\\

l J

Z n

to

\\

a u j/

, Zl g

\\

Wl i

y

~y!

~

l l

l 4

I l

l I

bl l

EI o

i E

e a /s e

e a

a sva Ba LVM AVBd5 + 21VSN3GNOJ \\AVBdS

_L N3tN 'lV_LNOJ N1 Oln 13.50 01 x SN nVO l

2 o

l 9

m o

s a

n 7

n u

.LN3WNIV1N00 NI 01013 30 Hd 03103dX3 NOTE:

1.BOTH LONTAI f1ENT SPRAY AND RCFC BYRON /BRAIDWOOD STATIONS TRAINgIN ERVICE UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPOR1)

2. ACCIDENT DENTIFIED AND CONTAlid NT SPRAY INJECTION FIGURE 6.1 1 IS STO ) ED BY OPERATOR ACTION AT 30 MINUTES

, FLUID AMOUNT AND pH VS. TIME, ar u.s Essi main m cf.iui4Eaa-w ;;4s;s c o NT ;.:.J :: r P.iof56 PAP 6- 017

W U

a fk 1

to -

w E%PEC.TED PH OF J

j I

WATER-CORDE NS ATE SOLO 1 F

3,_

.5 1

W

~

F F

4 2

W W

28-y w

0 2.}

GALLON OF FLUID IN CON TA) MENT Z

i O

F <w U

2 I

O A

ROXIM AT TIME REGUIRED FOR -

%7-V

'S CO DENS ION OF STEAM W

0 F

z w W

2

- - APPRO t ATE TlME ~REGUIRED FOR O

g,_

]%

BLO N OF LlQUlO O

Ez O

1 fG a

o l

h5-s r

= 0' 0

z W

OW a

dF4 s

63o l

I I

I I

O 2

• f 4.

to 81 l

\\

)

IME IN MINUTES AFTER BREAK OCCUR S d

NOTE:

1.BOTH RCFC TRAINS IN SERVICE BUT NO ONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATED BYRON /BRAIDWOOD ST NS UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYS REPORT FLUID AMOUNT AND pH VS. TIME, MAIN FEEDWATER LINE BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT P. Io *f U DRP t-017

DMld AFTER 30 MINUTE S 7

8203 LBS. OF BORON IN CONTAINMENT /

n.

10,797 LBS. OF NaOH IN CONTAINME i

W

~

- L f

f PH OF FLUID IN

'j t

CONTAINMENT 7

k"

~

2 i

O no

/

0: U TERMINAT E INJE TION PHASE hc,

OF EMERGENC CORE COOLl%

e 1

UZ 44

$f

• i Z

p2jw I

w 0 l

2 O I

zu=

l hsto oO i

O U

pt 3

50 OE*

l 0

~

5o TERMINATE ' C. NTAINMENT SPRAY gg j

AND CAUSTIC ADDITION l

3 kWu -

O

"_o <k no o

I x

\\

jI*

GALLONS OF FLUID IN O<

CONTAINMENT

J w>

JO bb l

l l

l l

l l

l l

l l

l l

0 2

'9 4.

6 to 42 t*t l(.

68 20 22 2*4 30 TIME IN MINUTES FROM SAFETY INJECTION NOTE-BYRONIBRAIDWOOD STAT NS 1.B H EMERGENCY CORE COOLING AND UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYS! REPORT NTAINMENT SPRAY TRAINS IN SERVICE FIGURE 6.1-3 FLUID AMOUNT AND pH VS. TIME, L (SHEET 1 OF 2)

P. It of 56 DRP 6 -c17

wO 1

PH OF SUMP SOLUTION

\\

AFTER 40 MINUTE S g

8333 LES. OF BORON IN C ONTAINMEN T g

"1210 LBS. OF NADH IN CO N T Al N MENT Z

~

k #

~

PH OF FLUlO IN f

CONTAINMENT SUMP 4

i J

- 520 85 w

u a s m

10-M MSO

{

E 4

spz i

V W z

O 41 i

i W

--W F

g7 O

4 60-4 W

f FF so ld 7

2 Z m

2 Wo 20

[

g.

- 320 b

K 0

Z b

\\

4 so-F2

-teo o

m

[

E.

F h

U

- 2MO y

z<

I

~J b

E

_ 200 28 m

E s,

8 8

u a

i.

bl W

U E

$O W

- -i20 W

d b

a

(

30- - - >

--BO E

wO 2

1

- HO w

35 I

I I

I i

i I

i i

i i

i il 42 o 6

9 12 15 IB 21 29 7

30 33 34 39 ew Tl IN MINUTES FROM SAFETY INJ E TlON N

\\

NOTE-

\\

1.BOTH MERGENCY CORE COOLING AND BYRON /BRAIDWOOD STATIONS CONT INMENT SPRAY TRAINS IN SERVICE, UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANKLYSIS RE BUT VALVE IN CAUSTIC SUPPLY LINE F LED TO OPEN FIGURE 6.1-3 FLUID AMOUh T AND pH VS.TI

,LOCA (SFEET 2 OF 2)

P IL of 36 DAP b-c17 m

p[s t

m ou 4

i

^

B/B-UFSAR

' p hj l

t d

]

Themaincontrolroomdisplay/ rec)dbm_

qu$ cements 6.

of Regulatory Guide 1.97 are met for containment sump level.

Reactor support concrete temperatures are indicated inside containment.

Reactor support liquid coolant, utilizing component cooling water, may be provided if the need is indicated by the concrete temperature indicators.

Refer to Section 7.3 for design details.

6.2.2 Containment Heat Removal System t

The containment heat removal system consists of the reactor containment fan cooler system and the containment spray system.

The reactor containment fan cooler system has no emergency function other than containment heat removal, while the primary i

4h '

function of the containment spray system is the removal of iodine

+

sdon u and other radionuclides from the containment atmosphere.

bout +ktL The containment spray system is designed to operate following a ferttobdwA;LOCA to reduce the elemental iodine concentration of the yLa 4he !

s som

-P containment atmosphere and to raise the pH of the containment sump by adding NaOH, to ensure that the iodine removed from DN co'ntainment atmosphere will be retained in the sump solution. 4 keto-3 f 'TL eLj : m:

Yc@l ted in approni=:tely 20

.inuter,_ ct cr leht, 4 hich time the pray injecti n ph::: ir termin:ted.

Thefsystem Q s e+ ten isolated from A e RWST and plant valves are aligned fo 5%l ss,,

rc ::: _ cts:: operatio#. 4 (It should be noted that af ter 30 N

hMh"*E ' minutes most of the heat removal from containment is provided by the reactor containment fan coolers, which are safety grade for i

Lrog rad Byron /Braidwood.)

Sprays are not required for long-term heat g

ouaM#1o removal.

Nevertheless, the containment sprays will be operated 1

t for at least 2hoursfollowingaLOCAbeforetheyareterminated.Gbs hod ISS;

)' (gg adj The RHR, CV, and SI systems are designed to operate following a gajsT LOCA to cool the reactor core.

These systems are switched fr rou)&-

h> 4h4 injection to recirculation at pproximatcli 20 t: 00 c..mm m.

nd facutAlto^ remain in operation for the remainder of the accident.

' Nk Gawp 3 +ke Additional fuel clad failure is not postulated while these level

' s.

systems are operating.

NL ISW k i 5 The containment spray system is discussed in Subsection 6.5.2, and the performance of both the reactor containment fan cooler kebehuk ! system and the containment spray system under the design-basis b

^--J loss-of-coolant accident condition is evaluated in Subsection 6.2.1.1.

The containment heat removal system rejects heat to the ultimate heat sink.

Containment analyses to support the design bases of the ultimate heat sink are described in Subsection 9.2.5.

i 1

6.2-38 REVISION 5 - DECEMBER 1994 4

NLP 6-ef 7 P.fiof36

B/B-UFSAR mg p ymn!u t

p r

A l

l E

~

l "l TABLE 6.2-54 s

l ACTIVE HEAT SINK DATA ld l

FOR MINIMUM POST-LOCA CONTAINMENT PRESSURE I

Containment Spray System Parameters A.

Maximum spray system flow, total 4646-gpm l

3W B.

Fastest post-LOCA initiation of spray system assuming offsite power loss at I

start of LOCA 35 sec II Containment Atmosphere Recirculation i

Fan Coolers-A.

Maximum number of fan coolers operating 4

i B.

Fastest post-LOCA initiation assuming offsite power loss at start of LOCA 15 sec C.

Performance data See Figure 6.2-25 for fan cooler temperature versus heat load curve.

6.2-183 REVISION 2 - DECEMBER 1990 P. 64 *f M Du 6-011

qq pas7m B/B-UFSAR f

[

=?

i s

q

=

1

\\

these functions manual isolation valves are undejal l r. nja tr,ltive control which require them to be locked in the correct position

.(i.e.,

locked open, locked closed or locked in place) to support ECCS operation.

The following manual valves are utilized as maintenance isolation valves and are located so that no single valve can isolate both trains of ECCS equipment:

SI8921 A/B Safety injection pump discharge CV8471 A/B Charging pump suction CV8485 A/B Charging pump discharge RH8724 A/B Residual heat removal pump discharge The following manual valves are utilized as throttling valves in the injection branch paths of high and intermediate head ECCS pumps.

These valves are located inside containment and are common to redundant pump subsystems.

If incorrectly positioned, j

these valves could affect ECCS flow rates to the reactor coolant system.

Pump runout protection is provided by properly sized orifices located in the injection lines.

SI8810 A/B/C/D Charging pump to cold legs SI8816 A/B/C/D Safety injection pump to hot legs SI8822 A/B/C/D Safety injection pump to cold legs In addition to the above itemized valves, there are other ECCS manual valves which, through mispositioning, can degrade the performance of the ECCS in mitigating an accident.

These valves, listed below, are under administrative control commensurate with their function in the ECCS.

Additionally, all of these valves, with the exception of CV8479A and B, have computer point inputs providing position indication that could be used to monitor availability of ECCS.

CV8479A & B Centrifugal charging pump recirculation SI8963 Return to RWST from accumulator fill line CS002A & B Containment spray pump suction CS004A & B Containment spray pump di ar we4Ne bu) Su CS035A & B Containment spray eductor N CSO21A & B Containment spray eductor NaOH cuct m 'E by' l CS018A & B Containment spray eductor NaOH seedsen 50 CSO40A & B Containment spray eductor NaOH c rti CS017A & B Containment spray eductor NaOH seetr+en 6.3A-2 REVISION 5 - DECEMBER 1994

f. ts f %

D RP 6 - 017

B/B-UFSAR i'

?

m ens i

I j [

j.

6.5.2 Containment Sorav Systems -

l l

The containment spray systems are designed to remove fission products, primarily elemental iodine, from the containment atmosphere for the purpose of minimizing the offsite radio-j logical consequences following the des _ign-basis loss-of-coolant accident.

At the same time, the spray water serves to nomi-nally reduce containment temperature and pressure during the injection phase.

6.5.2.1 Desian Bases The containment sp. ray system is designed to reduce the pressure in the containment atmosphere at a rate which will ensure that the design leakage is not exceeded and to remove sufficient i

iodine from the containment atmosphere to limit, in the un-likely event of a LOCA, the offsite and site boundary doses to i

values below those set by 10 CFR 100.

n tJc, asd D & d e k oT t

The spray system is designed to clir r, tit? :nly nc cductor 4

doli->cring 30% to 36% NaOH solution but xith all pua.ps

_, g[y n

ep; rating, oncugh " OH-to the containment to form er6#pH g

solution when combined with the *= fueling "ater and spilled 6.o reactor coolant waterd;fL;c the refueling water storage tank j

f h=r b4dn empticd.

The containment spray system consists of two g, '(,

entirely independent subsystems such that the aforementioned j

requirements can be met in the event of a single active failure

- in either of the subs stem.

v se he,M cor}sponMD6ntainment 'hs sale-Q cad ou. nota. rF

^^

spray system except the test / recirculating line are Safety Category I and Quality Group B and are protected from missiles which could result from a loss-of-coolant accident.

All risers and ring headers are supported to withstand loads resulting from the safe shutdown earthquake as wel-1 as operating loads.

A seismic dynamic analysis has been performed on the system.

The following criteria apply to the spray nozzles:

4 a.

The Sauter (surface to volume ratio) mean diameter of the spray drops produced by the nozzle at the design pressure drop across the nozzle must be approximately 1000 microns or less.

b.

The pressure nozzle used is of a swirl chamber design, without any internal parts, such as swirl vanes, etc., which would be subject to clogging.

j c.

Flow through the nozzle at the design operating point is at least 15 gpm.

6.5-21 P r6186 ser s-on

B/B-UFSAR 6.5.2.2 System Desian (for Fission Product Removal)

,(

v i

The c'o'ntainment spray system has been divided into two inde-pendent 100% capacity pumping systems with no common headers.

A single active failure in either of the two pumping systems l.

will therefore not affect the operation of the other sub-system.

A single-failure analysis is_ presented in Table 6.5-1.

The system diagram (Figure 6.5-1) illustrates equipment l

redundancy, flowpaths, and system operation.

(-

The containment spray system includes six ring-type spray i

headers each having the following radii, pipe diameter,' number i

of nozzles, and served by the pump indicated:

Nominal Designation of Pipe Number Pump Delivering

{

Ring Mean Diameter of Fluid to the l

Number Radius in.

Nozzles Rino i

1 13 feet 0 inch 4

39 "A"

Pump 1j' 2

23 feet 6 inches 6

51 "B"

Pump 3

34 feet 1/2 inch 6

60 "A"

Pump 4

45 feet 9 inches 6

90 "B"

Pump 5-56 feet 7-1/2 inches 8

120 "A"

Pump 6

64 feet 9 inches 8

112 "B"

Pump There are no cross connections _between the "A"

and "B"

spray headers.

Rings 1, 3,

and 5 are supplied via a single 10-inch -

riser pipe with restricting orifices in laterals supplying rings 3 and 5 to assure that the flow to each ring is propor-

- tionate to the number of nozzles supplied.

Similarly, rings 2, 4,

and.6 are supplied via a single 10-inch riser pipe with restricting flow orifices in laterals supplying rings 4 and 6.

The plan view of the spray headers showing nozzle location and orientation is given in Figures 6.5-2, 6.5-3, and 6.5-4.

The "A" pump is designed to deliver 15 gpm to each of 219 spray nozzles, plus approximately 130 gym of motive fluid to the eductorg "hr rperstir; in the injectier red crurtic recctier rk-e, at a containment pressure of 50 psig.

The "B"

pump under like conditions is designed to deliver 15 gpm to each of 253 spray nozzles plus approximately 130 gym of motive fluid to the eductor.

The pump ratings are therefore 3415 and 3925 gpm for the "A"

and "B" pumps respectively, at 450 feet total developed head.

In the event of a high-high-high (Hi-3) containment pressure signal (corresponding to approximately 20 psig), the contain-ment spray pumps will start immediately, the CS007, the CS019, I

6.5-22 DAP 6-e17

b.

N kl B/B-UFSAR

i..

and the CS010 valves will open immediately if thd 4 d d

4 previously in the' open position,-provided that of fsite power to the ESF buses has not been lost.

Otherwise, upon receipt of a safety injection signal and restoration of bus voltage, the containment spray pumps will be sequenced to start by the diesel engine generator load sequencer, providing the Hi-3 signal is present.

The valve motor op.erators will start imme-diately upon receipt of an Hi-3 signal if power is avaijaple.

Sco-2s68) gn The refueling water storage tank (RWST) (containing ppm of boron er heric cid) for each unit has a capacity of 458,000 so6in$a#

Low-level switches are provided to automatically open b-2 IRV8h gallons.

the containment sump isolation valves, SIB 811 A and B, on two-to;%, '

out-of-four logictand the presence of a safety injection signal. It should be noted that manual reset of safety injec-tion does not defeat the automatic opening of the SI8811 A and B valves.

The RHR pumps are thereby transferred to the recircu-lation mode automatically without stopping them.

The charging pumps and safety injection pumps are then manually changed to the recirculating mode (see Subsection 6.3.2.8).t Contai.....ma spr=y injection and ceuttic cductic t thc retc of 55-60 wem per educter of 20t to 2 n McOH celuticn uill continuc until l

Q15 Ann

= ens 5'a"e heer pumped int th; con * 'n

nnunci.tcd.he.-. cat...dL;..

at tracing the e pty le"el 21 err ef. the P'?ST i spray additive tanks and piping is not necessary to prevent crystallization of the 30% to 36% sodium hydroxide solution.

The spray additive tank also has a nominal 1 psig nitrogen cover blanket applied to eliminate ambient air contact with the solution.

Centainmcat spray and injcction is thcn tren; fezzed Le el.e

• =M eculation -cde.

Centainment-pump cuct-ion is switched f reis, the P'?ST tc th; cont;in nt ;cci rcu la tion e m...y.

S;;cd upon en; cf the contein.ncat erc af y o...y.

omyelgius sv 1

o cf 210 no::1c:

nd th; oth;;

c. total of 2 3 um

1me, o'

m o m.

ou gr.,,per n

--12, the Sc;;;,ing ; a ;;;,,,_,,,,,,,

noe r,nm em*e ns

,e 2nd mini u-fic" retcc f rcr the refueling ::tc stc;;;; tank;'

rill eccur-b Gmb^me sprey pomp edwas,b Q 30cf% h-the, EwsT od:l

% L-5 levd is reachal. Tb cs pomp suchen ts, ftus Ily b G rej -hh reewt 4% sq. koll culolb ce44ws, regardle5S of pom socM soorte.j o A 4?I N s p A '/

kh bE h b Wlf lo. 2. imt h. reachi. The. sF-t m,l

'sdM b. Oc. CS..cluc.b.

e. a y 9 6.5-23 MP6 W

h

?

3 mas a B/B-UFSAR

[

u w unamum Maximum Flow Flow es Rates, N Failure Activ or of Power Capacity p

ive to One Quan-Each ailures ESF Bus i

Pumps tity (ao (com)

(com) i Containment spray j

Pump 1 3285*

3285*

3285*

j Pump 2 1

7958 3795*

Safety injection 2

6 1300 650 Residual heat removal 2

3000 6000 3000 Centrifugal chargif'g 2

550 100 550

{

Total maximu nd minimum 15,334, 7485 flows a

"fn:1;;i:: cf 120 ;;; ;;;.;;;d fe;

d.ct...,

me.;t.m CS50N The worst-case condition postulates failure of one valve to open that admits NaOH solution to the suction of one of the

~containment spray pump %w but 'ith 211 p;;;; ;;;;

t...,

...de.

?-i e-f 12-cenditi'n; :ndic;ted ube...

d d.usommiwu au thi: ::::. i ll b: t:: in: tad ;fter 21 minut;;, but ;;nt-int.;nt i

; inj :ti r :nd

ti; ;dditi;n tili;in; e.1, j

trinr nt p :1 pump _ill b; ; atinued f;; ;...dditi... 1 10 4.,,, u e vgw isJehveed'l Under.this worst case with only one eductor in effective service but.ith 11 p une ; ; u...1..

, sufficient NaOHtto the f

A *^,

containment to formder5 pH sump solution when ECCS injection 9.0 fluid (from the refueling water storage tanks, and accumula _

,j tors) is combined with spilled reactor coolant f Tt : pF 12"21 i

4 e errer"i t tt:ir nr i: din p; titi;r :: ffi icnt ; renter l

?

th r i n 10

^ich _111 ;;; ult in ; d;;;nt;.T.insti:n f::t:: ;f

,mo 1_

mt_

__m_

____m

__,..t

^ T ~ * "Q.~-

to itssure. EA;+"Qf.'"T"Q'5"Q ~[g[/ v:$fjjQQ[l

Q^

wfn:aw toliae tM-esclubu wit o<.a.m.

Regula or

'dh i, o m

e in which temperatures of the pumped fluid are at a maximum.

The recir-culation mode dictates the design for residual hect removal and containment spray pump suction piping because during the injec-tion phase there is 50 to 90 feet of positive head available from the refueling water storage tank acting on the suction of these pumps.

Moreover, the water in the RWST is at vapor pres-sure of 0.8153 psig maximum, and an additional 31 feet of avail-able NPSH is derived from the difference between vapor pressure and atmospheric pressure.

6.5-24 REVISION 1 - DECEMBER 1989 P.M y W pne 6-a77 m

i r*

• f B/B-UFSAR 4

j l

l The residual. heat removal pumps require appro

' ~11-est of i-NPSH at 3000 gal / min design capacity and approximately 19 feet

)

of NPSH at runout capacity of 5000 gal / min.

The containment spray "B" pump requires approximately 19 feet of NPSH at 3925

-gal / min design capacity and approximately 22 feet of.NPSH at i

4600 gal / min runout capacity.

Since the "B" train containment

}

spray pump is of higher capacity than the "A" train pump, and j

.the line size and equivalent feet of pipe are about the same for i

both the trains, the NPSH required versus available is most critical for the "B" train containment spray pump.

Values of NPSH required are indicated as approximate because there are l

slight variations between pumps of duplicate design.

4 i

Allowing no credit-for the water standing in the basement of the containment but assuming that the recirculation sump is full, i

the static head available is 377.0 feet (containment basement i

elevation) minus 346 feet, 7-7/8 inches (centerline of

[

containment spray pump), or 30 feet, 4-1/8 inches net static head available.

i Based upon both the RHR and containment spray "B" Pump operating under runout conditions, friction losses between the sump and j

. pump inlet are conservatively calculated to be 3.58. feet.

The j

resultant NPSH available is approximately 26.8 feet.

This analysis assumed that the. liquid in the recirculation' sump

}'

is at its vapor pressure at all times, thus'there is no'need to deliberately continue a high containment pressure condition to j

satisfy pump NPSH requirements.

j It ir c51r 12ted thrt the "A" ;- ; ?ill r; r_._ ct :pp :xir t:17 j

d200 ;;r rrf the """ ;"-

it $500 ;;r'"hile in th: :::ir;;1:ti:n i

amada. The sump solution satisfies NPSH requirements of the pumps it 'Mr thrz: fir > rrter with adequate margin to assure i

satisfactory pump op

=tinn-enqcgrrent th R

at i

the rate of 5000 gp f ed C5 pmp twoo rem. et 6copm.

S I

Containment sump water temperature is not monitored for i

postaccident analysis.

Although identified in Regulatory Guide 1.97 as an important parameter, containment sump water l

temperature indication would only be useful to determine if l

adequate NPSH is available to the CS or RHR pumps during the i.

recirculation mode.

By design, cavitation of these pumps will l

not occur even at containment saturation peak water temperature.

j The B/B design complies with Regulatory Guide 1.1 which states i

i that, " Emergency core cooling and containment heat removal i

systems should be designed so that adequate. net positive suction head (NPSH) is provided to system pumps assuming maximum i

expected temperatures of pumped fluids and no-increase in i

containment pressure from that present prior to postulated loss 2

]

of coolant accidents."

Containment sump water temperature is t

therefore not a parameter required to indicate proper operation

{

of the CS or RHR systems when in the recirculation mode.

a e

6.5-25 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 1

P. M T 54

)

DAP 6-aff I

m rm c:s me

(

i ll i

ab8MD "

B/B-UFSAR i

2 1

pray operation will continue for la [i ;lmuni of 2 n

Containmen hours fter 2' hours of operation, containment spray ma be djgMi%#E4eBF"*afRfrio.um. *," "

"i ed SuctionMs toMniM6d with guard pipes and suction valve protection chambers up to and including the first valve outside the containment for pas'sive failure protection.

I Both pumps and all motor-operated valves are supplied with power from the emergency diesel generators in the event of a loss of offsite power.

Failure of a single diesel generator or emergency bus will affect one subsystem only.

Spray Engineering Company of Burlington, Massachusetts, 1713A nozzles meet the requirements stated in the design basis.

The J

following listed figures illustrate the characteristics of this nozzle when spraying into a chamber at atmospheric pressure and normal ambient temperature and humidity:

a.

Figure 6.5-5, Diameter of spray envelope versus height when spraying vertically downward.

b.

Figure 6.5-6, Diameter of spray envelope versus height when spraying horizontally.

c.

Figure 6.5-7, Diameter of spray envelope versus height when spraying downward at a 45' angle.

The above figures are predicated upon a 40 psi drop across each nozzle with a resulting flow of 15.2 gpm per nozzle.

Pressure versus flow characteristics of this nozzle are illustrated in Figure 6.5-8.

In determining the number of spray nozzles required and their configuration, the effects of density of the containment atmos-phere must be considered.

The reduction factors to be applied to spray envelope diameter as a function of containment saturation temperature are shown in Figure 6.5-9.

To prevent degradation of the sodium hydroxide, an inert atmos-phere is maintained within the spray additive tank by means of a nominal 1 psig nitrogen blanket.

A relief valve is provided to prevent overpressurization of the tank.

P The components for this system are as follows:

a.

Containment Spray Pumps Fellaoq w M5L3j MM6m gr9 o M

Number - two per unit h1 b b l act M a. h Type - Vertical centrifugal MMAmad pressore is i

Material - Stainless steel less h is p,, Nao H 4

oMJlb b secured uAe^

h 6.5-26 REVISION 2 - DECEMBER 1990

a. MSLS.[

P4 6-m e.n o

~ - -. -. _ _..-

S D [;1 3

B/B-UFSAR l

l fj Capacity "A" pump - 3415 gpm l

Capacity "B" pump - 3925 gpm i

Net developed head - 450 feet l

b.

Spray Additive Tank i

j Number

.one per unit i

Material - Stainless steel i

i Volume - 5000 gallons I

Fluid - 30% to 36% NaOH in water i

Cover gas - Nitrogen i

i-Design pressure - 1.3 psig Design temperature - 100*F i

C.

Eductors Numb'er - two per unit Design Pressure - approximately 300 psig

,D,esigg Temperature - 300*F q

w-O m

n o

AgA.4 La tu A

u.ad Ae.4 e-WW

• O esign f ow O gpm c

on connection g

I Material --Stainless ste d.

Spray Nozzles j

)

Material - Stainless steel Type - Sprayco 6.5.2.3 Desian Evaluation An extensive research and development program has been con-ducted as part of the NRC's Reactor Safety Program to determine the iodine removal effectiveness of the chemical spray systems.

Containment spray experiments were performed in the 1350 ft3 vessel of the Nuclear Safety Pilot Plant (NSPP) at ORNL and were supported by additional containment spray experiments in the large 25-foot-diameter by 66.7-foot-high -

3 (26,500 ft ) vessel (approximately one-fifth the scale of a typical 1000 MWe nuclear reactor) of the Containment Systems Experiment (CSE) at BNWL.

Since the containment spray tests 6.5-27 f* *

• T N FR9 6-on

M

{/

}1 Q

B/B-UFSAR s

. [

e f r'om the injection to the recirculation m&

d

{

predded %4 be rhanually initiated and completed.

' elaution wiil".

od c

08 WU The containment spray pumps do not have to be stopped when i

ha.s not transferring from the injection mode to the recirculation mode

% Q 4 4.

of'operatiorb.

A summary of the sequence of events leading up i

]

gg to and.during switchover follows.

i The RWST level is initially one volume inaccuracy below the low

]s alarm setpoint.

""ST cutficr during injection 1; 10,2 0 0 v y.n.

1

"'CCC critchtv he-in:

t One velu r in?r?"r?ry h^'^"

^^

l NN b*

10. 1:n 10:.- ::tpbint.

The velure cen:ured prier te :"itrP l

g-cv;; i; 2 7,454 ;;11;;; ;nd I;,

c; 14.10 al.. m s.

ECCS d* k'g' g g ' switchoverdist;iv:n in T bl f2 12.

It ::';'.i r ; 2 0 0 ;;ce..J iiN*

h '5 09 minuter) :nf

::r:: 101,000 ;:ll :: :;;uning tx; t ;ia;

! - ll.4 7. M M

" "^rrt ringl: ECCS f:ilu ;.

r;11w-.uv w w.ny l o i. 4 v u vi Ea v5 r eOS r"itcherer, the Outfi:r f := the ""CT is 14,400 vy.n oud vun-t tinu:: until 2':.1 minutee-have-elep;ed, censuain ddl i..vu -l v

-u i

410.752 ;;11:n:.

s -

I- [

j[

(,til,s va 4

EwST L - alarm A*wnch

.Y

Spray switchover _ ;:n: -- __

c fr713 t h ".:--

l{>#

MN 22.S rinut:0 h:::-- 1 pe:d, ::ncurin; 2n 2dditirn:1 10,000

/

yl.o.5 o.larM;

llrnr. 4At this time all ECCS and containment spray pumps A r/

have a long-te:m suction supply of water.

Any further delay in

. %) Y

,)

the containment spray switchover will not jeopardize the perfor-l mance of the safeguards pumps.

S r T:b1: 5.5 2.

l loses %

Upon initiation of containment spray, the operator monitors the j

%g spray additive tank level; on a LO-2 level, the containment spray eductor spray additive valve for each operating train is 4

i closed In the event of a single failure of the containment

! I h ( h spray e.ductor spray additive valve to open, the pump in the

/ train with the failed valve will not-autostart.

In thic m:d:

l 3 lael.

^f apa"ti^, the cu ul:tive v:1;;; u :d at th; time CCC-r"itchever i rempl:t: i: 25':,000 ;;11;ns.

While the ECCS pumps are operating from the recirculation sump, the one

, operating spray pump continues to take suction from the RWST until the RWST$ level i: :n; V:1 ;; i..;e-..y

uvminal,

,w v o i. u w

- pty 212r. ::t;rint.

This eccu.; e l

^.;1. 7 minui....

At this time the spray pump is switched to the recirculation mode, NMt minut;~& of 8.Ch e-sy r"itchere: i: :::;1 t

t 2

In order to obtain the long-term req 1 red sump H in t__: ;;;nt

rf : rpr y educt:- --Iv f ilu::, a minimum of1 gallons of

[f*# M 30% L

". NaO%..) b :requ:iredFf rom the spray additive tankAr--

.,,,f.,f 1y

^fter 22.4 "u

ncth:: 1022 g:ll::: i: : quired t: h_

h Thi M te=,

5,f '% *l, dded.

accomplished by continuing caustic addition h~

pp fer nether 11.5 mi_nute: whil r

um is n

c from the sumpy 500 T:bl: C. 5' ".

he. Qua 4 g

e.

Som 44. Lo +. l.0-2. lue.l Ss.4 Peidi5

• Operator Actions g gg g gg g4 The parameter [inment spray switchover to recirculation-eee+. NRp35Tlem used by the operator to determine when to g

"'1 initiate conta h- ) N l

6.5-30 REVISION 2 - DECEMBER 1990 d

I a

n

B/B-UFSAR P}

cm i

Y apryi additive tank icvel, and 2.

I i

h.

""ST level.

l l

Regardless of wha. he single failure is or when it occurs, the above parameterp

'the only indicator determine when to initiate switchover.,g the operator needs to

?. p;rsi;;ive fim-the li;it switchc; n valv 0C010 is used to preclud: aut =atic pump-rperatir..

j Educhtor flows are stopped when the spray additive tank level indicates that the required amount of NaOH has been added to i

achieve the required final pH in the containment sump.

This ensures that at least 2766 gallons of 30% to 36% NaOH is added.

There is a status lamp indicator to show when the low-low level has been reached.

There is also an annunciator alarm.

This j

quantity ensures that the required pH is achieved under worst p

case conditions of maximum reactor coolant and RWST boration.

In the '"-^-- ' case where the spray additiveflevel alarm does

~

not initiate before the RWST "";p:3"ralarm initiates, spray M'

chover is initiated when the RWST " i n;" *1 arm A eoAhej o(M %e. stga,W4est. h t. Lo-2. leVe.1 es rcu:.hinitiate 4 b Q l

-~l Two serDiis'of operations are required to be a y the operator to complete spray switchover:

opening of the containment spray pum'p suction valve to the recirculation sump; and, closing of the containment spray pump suction valve to the RWST.

Each valve har 2 trirur rpening and clering tire of 20

rende, :: the total suitch ver can bc accouplished in e

inu; cf 00

:nds.

6.5.2.4 Tests and Inspections 4

6.5.2.4.1 Preocerational Test Procram The preoperational test program has been conducted.

The pump discharge was routed through the test recirculating line back to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) or routed directly into the refueling cavity inside containment.

The valve operating and pump starting times, the pump and eductor delivery rates, and valves adjusted to ensure proper flows through the eductors, were recorded.

The eductors were tested with demineralized water instead of sodium hydroxide, and the test values wer adiustad for the annennriate sodlum hvdrnvida finu rates. TIkewskud edui4er. %4n %td

^

4,3 maia. ciehurmAd a.+ %h b me.

.4.

Re la ili y Tests a Inspec io Routine periodic testing of the containment spray components and support systems are performed per ASME Section XI requirements.

Remote operated valves are cycled to verify operability and inspected for leakage.

The pumps are tested using the recirculation line to the RWST.

6.5-31 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 P. a44 M PAP h-Of f

[$fP

]

10 M B/B-UFSAR J

cy f< le J a L

system testing, a visual inspection of pump s f d, a

e packings, flanged connections and relief valves is;made to detect leakage and confirm that no significant deterioration is occurring in the containment spray syctem.

All testing of the containment spray system components may be done while the unit is in operation except for air testing of the nozzles, which should be accomplished when the reactor is shut down.

6.5.2.5 Instrumentation Recuirements The containment spray system is provided with the instrumentation and controls to permit the monitoring and actuation of the system from outside the containment.

4 The containment spray pumps and motor-operated valves can be actuated either automatically or manually.

Automatic actuation signals are generated in the solid-state protection system cabinets.

Both spray subsystems will be actuated by a Hi-3 containment spray signal.

Actuation includes starting both pumps, and opening all_ valves required for system operation.

Manual actuation is from control switches on the main control board.

Indicating lights are provided on the main control board and on the ESF status panels to show the status of the pumps and the position of the valves.

Main control board monitor lights are provided to show the status of the pumps and valves as an operator aid in evaluating system response subsequent to automatic safeguard actuation.

Alarms on the main control board are provided for pump automatic trip, pump automatic start, pump fail to start and valves fail to open.

Refueling water storage tank level is indicated on the main I

control board, and alarms are provided for high, low, low-low, and*x.,tj t.A levels.

Spray additive tank level is indicated locally and on the main control board, and alarms are provided for high, low, and low-low tank levels.

There is also a status lamp indicator for

,,) %). t,

low-low tank level located on the main control board.

9 gggge During preoperational testing, either adjustable manual valves 1

CS018A or CSO21A and CS018B or CSO21B in the caustic line was set (utilizing water and correcting for specific gravity) and locked in position at the desired 30% to 36% NaOH rate of flow to the eductor (55-60 gpm).4 Main control board flow indicators are provided for pump discharge, pump to eductor recirculation, and eductor NaOH suction, and an alarm is provided for NaOH injection flow failure.

1 N

Q,%

U ds

&N OSN W

o'ts w m h a w A ~4s a M9 sh gT

~

'I 6.5-32 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 P. 85 4 34 DRP t-pf7

N p ::ij P98 i

llI B/B-UFSAR o

e The temperature of the pump motor bearings is moni ol.d.d

'd l

c Am-meters are provided on the main control board to monitor motor current.

i Design details of the containment spray controls and instrumen-tation are presented in Section 7.3.

6.5.2.6 Materials All components in the containment spray system which come into contact with spray solution during either the injection or recirculation phase are fabricated of-ewebee4M e stainless steel.

All containment materials are compatible with the NaOH solution with the exception of galvanized steel and aluminum.

These materials are discussed in Subsection 6.2.5.

6.5.3 Fission Product Control Systems The primary containment fission product control systems during normal plant operating conditions consist of the containment charcoal filter units and the containment normal and miniflow purge systems.

For further discussion of these systems, refer to Subsections 9.4.8 and 9.4.9.

The system which ope' rates following a design-basis accident to.

remove fission products is the containment spray system.

For further discussion of this system, refer to Subsection 6.5.2.

P. 26 y 36 6.5-33

3l' m } [

' m ens i

i.!

B/B-UFSAR l

lm TABLE 6.5-3 y

el cn:cLr r=Lunr ucncr :Acr rccs 0

ELAPSED PHASE CUMUL' TIVE IME OF V

(E USED (MI

. ES)

ACCIDENT (GAL)

N,' s.

Begin injection 0

0

\\

s 14.15

'Begin ECCS switc)tover 257,454 ECCSswitchev/

N er complete 359,000 19.23 X

22.1 Begin spra tchover 400,000 1

ray switchoveb g mplete 410,000 22.8 24.17 Spray additive additfbn N

complete "At is time, all of the safeguard pumps have an a uate g-term suction supply of water.

Any further delay 'n closing the RWST to containment spray pump valves will n jcc;;rdi=0 the performance of the ca"*=i"=="*

erray r"are o

4 a b(4 IM.bk'bhk kk i

i 4

9.17of16 DRP 6- 07 6.5-36

3m para B/B-UFSAR L

?

.f s

e b,i }l'

a y

c s

L f

9 TABLE 6.5-4

!asl bl l

0 37 cAsc cc;; ;;;g ;;-

-.j.

mm-r m unm PSED PHASE CUMULATI F

yong' SED (MINUT

)

ACCIDENT jc'gg)

O egin injection 0

14.15 Begin ECCS switchov 257,454 4

19.23 ECCS swit ove complete 279,878 32.86*

Begin sp sw h hover 424,234 switchoverc\\

ompi te 426,533 32.4 Spr 46.9 Spray additive addition

/

complete

/

"The contiainment spray pumps and ECCS pumps have an adequ long term suction supply of water.

Any further delay in l'osing the RWST to containment spray pump valves will not

/jeoperdize-the performance-of-the e ntsinT. nt sprey poy o.

bC 14 ttApl1b Q.

I P.29 y 16 var 6-c77 6.5-37

B/B-UFSAR q

m I

j 7.3.1.1.12.3.8 Environmental Considerations Temperature,. pressure, humidity,-and radiation e

on -

sidered in the selection of various instruments, controls and l' devices for the RCFC units.

These are described in detail in Sections 3.11 and 9.4.

7.3.1.1.12.3.9 coerational Considerations j

The RCFC is required during both normal and abnormal station operating conditions.

The automatic circuitry is designed to start the emergency equipment as described in Section 9.4.

7.3.1.1.12.4 Desian Basis The generating station condition which requires the RCFC units to activate is the ESF actuation signal.

4 IEEE Standard 279-1971 requirements are discussed in Subsection 7.3.2.2.12.

7.3.1.1.13 containment Sorav system ooeration Containment spray system component description and design informa-tion are presented in Subsection 6.5.2.

Only instrumentation and controls and their operation are described in this subsection.

a.

Containment Sorav Pumos 1

A control and test transfer switch is provided for

~

en h pump on the main control board.

nwded ikad Yht aasocwebuh NaON Each containment spray pump can be started under any e d u c-b r 50Pf 7 "(vg the following three conditions:

gg; l V 3

ge 4

(csogq') is, opeA

• Q l.

Automatically:

A M containment ; ::::::'

44 signal from the ESF actuation system (ESFAS) 5 logic will start the pumpys N'~ f " A OG\\at< d M

2.

Manually:

Operation of the control switch to the cuo u re.'al4) e4 i k O CLOSE position will start the pump provided that embol bo(rd, the suction is lined up from the containment recirculation sump and not from the refueling water storage tan 3.

Manually in test mode:

Operation of the control

-s#'

switch to the CLOSE position will start the pump (csoc7) provided that; thy isolation valve to the contain-ment ring neacera is closed; the isolation valve for recirculation back to the RWST4 is open; the

~>~ se isolation valve between the spray additive tank

)

-s#

and the eductordis closed; and the transfer

{

}

on the main control board is in the TEST 7.3-35 P.4 1 M par 6-e 77

l hj]j l

g B/B-UFSAR g

(,

Two chromel-constantan thermocouples

.e h de.for each motor to measure bearing temperature which is monitored.by the computer.

An ammeter is provided on the main control board for each pump to measure motor current.

A pressure gauge is provided in each pump suction and discharge line to provide pressure indica i ns locally.

gg y b.

Containment Sorav (."

Discharce Valve A control switch is provided on the main control board for each valve.

Each valve can be opened automatically by the containment spray signal from the ESFAS.

Each valve can be manually opened with its control switch provided that the NORMAL-TEST transfer switch for the spray pump on the main control board is in the NORMAL position and at least 30 seconds have elapsed since the. spray pump has been operated.

QQ Limit switches on each valve provide valve position

^

indication on the main control board. An Q indicates if the valve failed to open on an automatic signal.

c.

Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) EductorCurtienValve[CSOL A control switch is provided on the main control board for each valve.

Automatic opening of the valve occurs when a containment spray actuation signal is received from the ESFAS.

Manual opening of the valve using the control switch is possible when the test switch associated with the corresponding spray pump is placed in the TEST position.

s Limit switches on each valve provide valve position on the main control board.

An 21: d indicat v

ve fa ed to open on an automatic sign F4bes,f hwdyc. M opna w".

prev 4AY M &

ef h C oc la M c.s pomp en ox c5 Facb.bs 7.3-36 REVISION 5 - DECEMBER 1994 P. 9 q 56 pm.P 6 - 0 7 7

-. - -. - _ ~. -... -. -. - - -

i i

B/B-UFSAR d.

Containment Sorav Pane-Suction Valve f rom N N/7,

Recirculation Sumnf i

A control switch is provided on the main control board for each of the valves.

Each valve can be 4

(g gy3 t d noened provided that:

the containment recirculation 4

sump isolation valvefis open, and the RHR pump suction valve from the loop hot legs 4are closed.

The purpose of these interlocks is to ensure that neither RWST water nor reactor coolant can be drained to the l

containment sump through this valve.

b j

Limit switches on each valve provide position indication on the main control board.

~

e.

Containment Sorav Pumn RWST Suction Valv (C.$dc h i

One suction valve is provided for each spray pump.

A control switch is provided on the main control board for each valve.

Each valve can be opened provided that the containment spray pump suction valve from the containment recirculation sump 4 s closed.

i Limit switches on each valve provide position indica-tio rol board.

f.

Con a n e orav uctor valv, C50lo

09. '

An air-operated valve is provided for M eductor 6 from the discharge of the containment spray pump.

The valve fails open on loss of air.

A control switch is provided on the main control board for each valve.

The valve is normally main-tained in the open position.

Regardless of the initial position of this valve,

^b g dgq racei?t of_a containment spray actuation signal from the E3FASPf::::: th: 7:1: int: th:

n p

:iti:n to ensure proper educt Limit switches on eacfFvalve provide position indica-tion on the main control board.

g.

Additional containment spray system alarms on the main control board annunciation system are provided as follows:

1.

Low flow alarm in the NaOH suction line to the eductor following a containment spray initiate signal.

7.3-37 REVISION 1 - DECEMBER 1989

9. 3t of %

MP 6-077 er---e+ ' "

B lM. low 2.

High, low, and :- gy level alarm for the spray additive tank.

( g,. g. 2 M*-3) 3.

High containment pressure alarm are provided from four redundant pressure monitors which also initiate the containment spray actuation signa.

ani CC h.

Testing of the operability of the containment spray " gjj system is referred to in Subsection 6.5.2.4 and Chapter 16.0.

GAMuntic d

7.3.1.1.14 Diesel Fuel Oil System I

Diesel fuel oil system components and design information are presented in Subsection 9.5.4.

Only instrumentation and controls and their operation are described in this subsection.

i a.

Diesel Generator Diesel Oil Sucolv The diesel oil supply for the standby diesel genera-tors consists of four 25,000-gallon diesel oil storage tanks for Unit 1 diesels, two 50,000-gallon diesel oil storage tanks for Unit 2 diesels, two i

diesel oil transfer pumps, and one 500-gallon diesel oil day tank per diesel generator.

Each diesel oil storage tank is provided with local level indication and a low level alarm in the main control room.

Each diesel oil transfer pump is provided with a control switch on the associated diesel-generator engine control panel.

A selector switch is provided to select the A or B diesel oil transfer pump.

Both diesel oil transfer pumps start automatically when the diesel generator starts.

When the diesel genera-tors are not running, a low level in the diesel oil day tank will auto-start the transfer pump which has been selected.

Each 500-gallon diesel oil day tank is provided with local level indication and a low level alarm on the diesel-generator engine control panel.

Controls and instruments are supplied from the same ESF bus as the diesel generator it serves.

b.

Diesel-Driven Auriliary Feedwater Pumo Diesel Oil Sucolv The diesel oil supply for the diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater pump consists of a 500-gallon diesel oil The diesel oil day tank is provided with md r

g I EE h

p. 32 ef y I

DRP 6- 017

B/B-UFSAR

.l l

ATTACHMENT A6.5 s

\\

IODINE REMOVAL EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM il

~

I g

i

r. n 4 u PR P I-c77

a INSERT A

~

The containment spray pH will vary during system operation. At the initiation of containment spray, the CS pumps will be taking a suction from the RWST. The resulting pH of the RWST and NaOH mixture will be between 8.5 and 10.5. When the CS pumps are aligned to take suction from the containment sump, the eductors may still be in operation and adding NaOH to the pump flow. This will result in a maximum pH of 11.4. When NaOH addition is secured and the CS pump suction is from the recirculation sump, the spray pH will be the same as the sump pH (8.0-10.5). The effects of these pH values on Equipment Qualification and hydrogen generation have been evaluated and found acceptable. Below is a detailed description of the effects on pH caused by CS system operation.

The containment spray pumps will initially see a back pressure due to the elevated containment pressure. The flow of water into containment will increase as the pressure in containment is decreased. This will cause the eductor motive flow to decrease slightly which will decrease the amount of NaOH educted, thus, slightly decreasing the pH of the spray. Additionally, as the NaOH tank empties, the flow rate of NaOH will decrease due to decreased head pressure from the spray additive tank. This also slightly decreases the spray pH.

As discussed above, when the containment spray pumps begin to use the recirciation sump as a source of water, the eductor may still be adding NaOH to water that already contains NaOH.

This will cause the spray pH to increase. These variances are discussed below.

To resolve these competing variances, the NaOH eductor throttle valve (CS018, CS021) has been set for 55-60 gpm of 30% NaOH at high SAT level (using the equivalence of 68 74 gpm of water) and an eductor motive fluid flow rate as determined in the Pre-Operational tests when the CS pump was delivering a total flow of approximately 3415 gpm (A train) and approximately 3925 gpm (B train). This will provide for an actual pH in the A train of approximately 10.5. The B train pH would be lower since it will have higher borated water flow rate and the same NaOH addition rate. These flow rates are minimums expected while the containment is at 50 psig. The other changing parameters (decreasing containment back pressure and correspondingly increasing total CS flow rate, lower eductor motive fluid flow rate, lower SAT level) will provide for a lower pH, while the RWST is supplying the system.

When the source of containment spray water is switched from the RWST to the recirculation sump (LOCA only), the eductor will be adding NaOH to sump water that has already been treated with NaOH. This will cause the pH to increase. The increase will be determined by the actual flew rates prior to and present at the time of switchover. However, this value is bounded by a maximum pH of 11.4. This pH assumes no increase in CS pump flow rate and no associated decrease in NaOH flow rate due to decreasing containment pressure. The pH of 11.4 occurs in the final minute of NaOH addition, when it is assumed that all the NaOH previously added had mixed uniformly and made it to the recirculation sump. The duration of this phase of increases pH would be from a few minutes (one train of ECCS and two trains of CS in operation) up to approximately 61 minutes (two trains of ECCS and one train of CS in operation) assuming worst case failures.

If the NaOH flow rate decreases (due to reduction of eductor motive fluid flow rate and NaOH tank level drop), then the duration of the pH being higher than 10.5 will be longer, but the magnitude of the pH being above 10.5 will be less. The NaOH injection flow rate to achieve a minimum spray pH of 8.5 (minimum allowable per SRP 6.5.2, revision 1) would be approximately 19 gpm using the B train pump flow rate of 3925 gpm. If the NaOH flow rate sta ted at 55-60 gpm as initially set, and then quickly dropped to 19 gpm, the duration of required NrOH addition would take approximately two hours. This is not expected, but bounds the review of minimum NaOH addition. These conditions will provide for improved lodine removal due to a hgher spray pH. In addition, these conditions will result in the same final sump pH since the j, N # 3L bM t-o77

j l\\

., c i

INSERT A cont'd l

j sump pH is determined by the quantity of NaOH added, not the rate at which it is added.

Therefore, these conditions are acceptable.

The examples above bound the worst case calculated pH and high pH duration. The actual pH profile cannot be easily raiculated. Therefore, these worst case values will be reviewed. Both cases are acceptable with respect to iodine removal and final sump pH. However, with respect I

to the pH of the spray, the Equipment Qualification of components in containment was performed assuming a maximum spray pH of 10.5. The pH and duration described above have been reviewed with respect to hydrogen generation and Equipment Qualification and have been found acceptable.

INSERTB will be between 8.0 and 10.5. The pH is independent of the number of ECCS and CS pumps in operation. It is dependent on the borated water quantity and concentration in the RWST, RCA and safety injection accumulators and the concentration and quantity of NaOH educted from the spray additive tank.

lNSERT C The pH of the liquid in the containment spray system is determined by the CS pump suction source and the quantity of NaOH educted by the CS system. During the onset of containment spray when the CS pump suction is from the RWST and NaOH is being educted from the spray additive tank, the pH will be between 8.5 and 10.5. This is ensured by positioning of the CS018/CS021 valves and by the spray additive tank NaOH concentration. When NaOH is being educted while the CS pump suction is from the recirculation sump, the spray pH may be as high as 11.4. During operation with the CS pump suction from the recirculation sump without NaOH addition, the spray pH will be the same as the recirculation sump pH (8.0 - 10.5).

INSERT D The Equipment Qualification of components in containment was performed assuming a maximum spray pH of 10.5. It is acceptable to have spray water with a pH higher than 10.5 for a short duration. The pH and duration described above have been reviewed with regard to Equipment Qualification and hydrogen generation and have been found acceptable.

The pH of the CS system is discussed in detail in Section 6.5.2.

INSERT E The pH of the final sump solution is independent of the number of trains of ECCS and CS pumps in operation. The final sump pH is determined by the quantity of water and concentration of boron in the RWST, the RCS and the SI accumulators and the quantity of water and concentration of NaOH educted from the containment spray additive tank. The pH of the spray solution is determined by the CS pump suction source and the quantity of NaOH educted from the spray additive tank.

1 I

g3GM o## g-077

Pp Timsme y

s g

N[

ja e INSERT F l

1 The following evaluation assumed a spray pH of ".. no greaterthan 9.1 l a t b es... an( listed a pH of 9.8 in the input Parameters and Results Table. The operation of the CS system is such that the pH of the spray fluid varies from > 8.5 to 5.11.4.

The lodine removal constant, A., that is determined in the following eva,uation is dependent upon the spray pH in that the iodine partition coefficient, H, is determined by the pH. ANS-56.5-1979 Figure 8.3-1 shows that the same partition coefficient is allowed for NaOH solutions with a pH from 8.5 to 11. In addition, WCAP-12635 states that lodine removal efficiency is greatly enhanced at pH values greater than 8.5. Since the allowed partition coefficient is constant over the range of pH's created by the 'CS system, with the exception of 11.0 to 11.4, and sinc 3 iodine removal efficiency increases at pH values greater than 8.5, (11.0-11.4) the results of the evaluation will remain unchanged since the allowed partition coefficient is constant over the rango of CS operation.

1 1

p. y of %

DRP d-017

n The Rest are Supporting Documentation for B/B UFSAR DRP #

6 - 077

7' 11/1496 CONTAINMENT SPRAY - DESIGN BASIS MATRIX PURPOSE:

The primary safety function of the CS system is to ensure the removal ofiodine from the containment atmosphere to_ limit offsite and site boundary radiological doses to values below those set by 10CFR100. It also must ensure that containment has both depressurization and cooling capabilities available in the event of a LOCA or steam line break.

SAT DESIGN PARAMETERS:

During the injection phase the tank releases NaOH solution into the borated water from the RWST. This addition is mixed by the CS eductors to maintain sump pH of 8.0. A nitrogen blanket of-0.6 psig at Byron and 0.5 psig at Braidwood is applied to the SAT. Currently, the control valve, CS036, maintains pressurization by the nitrogen gas system at Braidwood. (Byron will have the same operating conditions as Braidwood per NDIT# BYR-96-147). Two vacuum relief valves are set at -0.02 to 0.0 psig to prevent a vacuum condition in the tank and protect it against underpressurization.

EDUCTOR DESIGN PARAMETERS:

The eductors are used to add 30 - 36 wt% NaOH solution to the spray flow during the es system injection phase. As water flows through the restrictive section of the venturi tube, its velocity is increased and its pressure is decreased. The line from the SAT is connected at this low pressure area so that the solution is induced into the spray water flow. CS018A/B (at Byron) or CS021 A/B (at Braidwood) are pre-positioned to maintain a 30 wt% sodium hydroxide solution flow rate at 55 - 60 gpm.

EDUCTOR SUCTION FLOW VALVE (CS018A/B OR CS021 A/B):

Either valve maybe locked in position to accommodate the desired 55 -60 gpm of NaOH to the eductor during injection phase. The required pH is achieved under worst case condition by ensuring that at least 2,326 gallons of 30% NaOH (per ATD-356, Rev.1) has been added to the sump.

l 1

- - =

l 1I/6/96

[DESidN PARAMETURS iinal Resolution STANDARD REVIEW PLAN Comed UFSAR l

(Reference)

(SRP Section 6.5.2, Rev. 2,12/88)

(Section 6.5.2) l_ System Design Parameters:

1. of spray trains available per unit 1 of 2 (per SDD-CS-01-BB, GDC 38,39,40,41,42,43 1of2 Rev.0, Table 3.1)

Pump Spray flow rate, w/o Eductor flow rate are:

Train A, gpm 3285 (per SDD-CS-01-BB, Rev.0, Not Provided 3285 Table 3.1)

Train B, gpm 3795 (per SDD-CS-01-BB, Rev.0, Not Provided 3795 Table 3.1)

Spray pH during Injection 8.5 - 10.5 8.5 -11.0 9.8 (Attachment 6.5-A)

(per SRP, R/l)

(ANSI /ANS 56.5-1979)

Sump pH during Recirculation 8.0 - 11.0 8.5 -9.5 8.07 (7 min as required by BTP MTEB (the system should ly: capable of raising 6-1per Byron SER Section 6.1.I the sump pH to a value exceeding 6.5 w/

8.0-11.0 per Tech Specs. Bases 4 hrs after the LOCA to minimize stress (4),2/82) 3/4.6.2-2 corrosion of stainless steel.

BRANCII TECil. POSITION MTED 6-1 (p. 6.1.1-13,7/81)

CMEB cnteria for plIlevel of post-accident i

emergency coolant water to REDUCE the probatuhty of STRESS-CORROSION CRACKING orss.

Minimum pli-7.0 Sump pli during Recir. 7.o-9.5. If pII)7.5 is used, consider 112 generation problem from corrosum of Al in the contmt.

Decontamination factor (using 100 (ANSI /ANS 56.5-1979) 100 100 sump solution)

(ANSI /ANS 56.5-1979)

>4,000 (ANSI /ANS 56.5-1979)

Iodine Partition Coeflicient 5,000 (ANSI /ANS 56.5-1979)

>4,000 (p. 6.5-24)

1. of Spray Nozzles:

Train A 219 (per SDD-CS-01-BB, Rev.0, Not Provided 219 Section 4.4)

Train B 253 (per SDD-CS-01-BB, Rev.0, Not Provided 253 Section 4.4) i Nozzle spray design flow 15 (per SDD-CS-01-BB, Rev.0, Not Provided 15 2

11/6/96 DESIGN PARAMETERS Final Resolution STANDARD REVIEW PLAN Comed UFSAR (Reference)

(SRP Section 6.5.2, Rev. 2,12/88)

(Section 6.5.2)

(each), gpm Section 4.4) 1 Nozzle spray dp, psig 40 (per SDD-CS-01-BB, Rev.0, Not Provided 40 Section 4.4)

Spray fall height, ft 154 (per UFSAR Table A6.5-1)

Not Provided 154

1. of Eductors available per 1 of 2 (per SDD-CS-01-BB, 1of2 1of2 unit Rev.0, Section 4.3)

Eductor flow rate, gpm 130 (per SDD-CS-01-BB, Rev.0, Not Provided

~130 (approximately)

Section 4.3) at press. connection NaOH flow rate, gpm 55-60 for 30% NaOH (per Not Provided (SRP provides DF 55-60 UFSAR Sect. 6.5.2.2) only) at suction connection 53-58 for 36% NaOH (per Calc.

BYR96-160 rev. 0)

Maximum net containment free 2.76 x 10'(per UFSAR Table Not Provided 2.76 x 10' volume, ff A6.5-1) l Unsprayed contmt volume, %

max.15.41% min.12.66%

Not Provided (requires that spray max.15.41%, min.12.66% (Sect.

(UFSAR Sect. 6.5) coverage be maximized) 6.5)

Maximum Design Temp., F 200 Not Provided 300 (per line list)

Maximum Design Pressure, psig 275 Not Provided 300 (per line list)

Spray pump discharge press., psig 450 fl. TDH (per I/R pump curves Not Provided Not Provided N-1027/28/ 29/30)

Spray Additive Tank Volume, gal. (min. prior to spray 4,000 (per SDD-CS-01-BB, Not Provided 4,000 actuation)

Rev.0, Table 3.1)

Required Level 78.6% - 90.3% (Tech Spec Not Provided Not Provided min / max values) 3 a:_-m_----_m-__

_ _. ~

I1/6/96

' 55ES GN PARAMETERS Final Resolution STANDARD REVEEW PL N Comed UFSAR

~

(Reference)

(SRP Section 6.5.2, Rev. 2,12/88)

(Section 6.5.2)

Required Concentration of NaOH 30 - 36 wt % (per UFSAR Sect.

Not Provided 30% -36 %

Solution 6.5)

RWST volume, gal. (min. prior to 412,114 Not Provided 458,000 safeguards actuation)

(per SITH-1, R/3 w/ 2000 ppm Piping Extending from the SAT to 120 F Not Provided Not Provided the Eductor is rated at to 150'F (per SDD-CS-01-BB, Rev.0, Sect. 3.3.2.6)

Contmt Recire. Sump Solution 150 - 212 F (per SDD-CS-01-BB, Not Provided 150-212 temp. range Rev.0, Table 3.1)

• 3 Containment Spray Pump Type:

Vertical, Centrifugal Not Provided Vertical, Centrifugal (per SDD-CS-01-BB, Rev.0, Sect.

4.1)

1. per unit 2 (per SDD-CS-01-BB, Rev.0, Single Failure Criteria requirement 2

Sect. 4.1) only Min. Design Capacity including Eductor flow, gpm:

Pump A 3415 (per Pump Vendor Curves #

Not Provided 3415 N-1027/29)

Pump B 3925 (per Pump Vendor Curves #

Not Provided 3925 N-1028/30)

Developed Head, ft of Water 450 (per Pump Vendor Curves)

Not Provided 450 NPSH (required /available) 19 / 26.8 (per Pump Vendor Not Provided

~19' for B Curve #)

26.8' for A Normal / Design Pressure, psig 190 (per SDD-CS-01-BB, Rev.0, Not Provided Not Provided Sect. 4.1)

Classification S/R,IB (per ANSI /ANS-18.2 and Not Provided S/R,IB ANS-51.1)

Maximum temp., F 200 (perlinelist)

Not Provided Not Provided SPRAY ADDITIVE TANK:

4

1:/6/96 DESIGN PARAMETERS Final Resolution STANDARD REVIEW PLAN Comed UFSAR

~

(Reference)

(SRP Section 6.5.2, Rev. 2,12/88)

(Section 6.5.2)

Type

vertical, Not Provided

vertical, cylindrical (per Graver Tank cylindrical Drawing NL10753 Rev.15)

1. per unit 1 (per SDD-CS-01-BB, Rev.0, Single Failure Criteria requirement 1

Sect. 4.2) only Fluid type 30 -36 wt% NaOH (per UFSAR NaOH solutions, TSP, borated 30 -36 wt% NaOH Sect. 6.5) water, pure water, hydrazine t

Capacity, gal 5,000 (per SDD-CS-01-BB, Not Provided 5,000 Rev.0, Sect. 4.2)

Design Pressure, psig Not Prosided 1.3 (internal / external) 15 internal / vacuum external (per Calculation BYR96-185 Rev. 0)

Design Temperature, F 100 (per SDD-CS-01-BB, Rev.0, Not Provided 100 Sect. 4.2)

Operating Pressure, psig (normal)

Brr.idwood -0.5 Not Provided 1.3 (design)

Byron ~0.6 (per SDD-CS-01-BB, Rev.0, Sect. 4.2)

Operating Temp, F Ambient Not Provided 100 (design)

Vacuum Relief Valve 2 set @ -0.02 to 0.0 psig (per non-vented atms. tank requires 2 set at -1.3 psig GPE Dwg. LO 240-497, S&L redundant vacuum reliefs Valve Data Sht. S-0122)

ReliefValve-Overpressure I reliefvalve set at I psig (per Should be in accordance w/ ASME I relief Protection valve data sheet S0106, no valve Section III, class 2 per ANSI 56.5-dwg. available) 1979-the relief desices shall be set to relieve pressure at the lowest design press. of the system subject to the pressure source.

Cover Gas Nitrogen (per SDD-CS-01-BB, Specifies only that an inert cover Nitrogen Rev.0, Sect. 4.2) gas should be provided for (design pressure 1.3 psig) solutions which may deteriorate upon exposure to air.

classification S/R IB (per ANSI /ANS 18.2 and SR ASME Section III, class 2 per Not Provided ANS 51.1)

ANS Eductors:

5

G55ARAMETERS Vinal 5esolution 5TA5DMD REUIEWfilN~ Uo~mEd UESAR~

~

~

(Reference)

(SRP Section 6.5.2, Rev. 2,12/88)

(Section 6.5.2)

1. per unit 2 (per SDD-CS-01-BB, Rev.0, Not Provided 2

Sect. 4.3)

Design pressure, psig 275 (perlinelist)

Not Provided 300 Design Temperature, F 200 (perline list)

Not Provided

~300 Design Motive Flow, gpm 212 (per Design Spec F/L-2899 Not Provided 130

@ pressure connection Operating Motive Flow, gpm

~ 130 (per Desig:1 Spec F/L-2899)

Not Provided Not Provided Suction Fluid NaOH 30 -36 wt% (per UFSAD i t.

Not Provided 30-36 wt%

Concentration, %

6.5)

Design Suction flow, gpm 55 - 60 (per UFSAR Sect. 6.5.2.2)

Not Provided 55-60 Specific Gravity 1.3279 (based on 30 wt%, per Dependent upon the spray solution Not Provided Cameron) type listed above Viscosity (design), cp 10 (based on 30 wt%, per Dependent upon the spray solution Not Provided Cameron) type listed above Operating temp.

Ambient Not Provided Not Provided R

Classification ASME III, Class 2 (per ASME Section III, class 2 per Not Provided ANSI /ANS 18.2, ANS 51.1 ANS UFSAR Sect. 6.3, SRCL)

Spray pH 8.5-10.5 (per SRP, R/1) 8.5 - 11.0 9.8 1.

( UFSAR Table a.6.5-1)

• 1.

Instrument Sensing lines w/ flow is designed to have a design temp equal to the process line design temp.

• 2.

He CS pumps are required to operate a minimum of 2 hrs following a LOCA, but are available for longer period if required

• 3.

CS is required for minimum operation of 2 hrs. It can be stopped when the containment pressure < 15 psig.

6

,f, o

OPERATIONAtuDESIGN BASIS Sl8812A RHR System designed to deliver:

u

_ pU p a) Enough 30% by weight NaOH solution to form a 8.55 pH 1A solution when combined with RCS leakage and all RWST water. pH control minimizes effect of Chloride and caustic RH8701B stress corrosion.

b) System will satisfy design requirements with one eductQ(

j r

and both CS pumps operable.

Q 73 p

Injection:

3415 gptr S!8811 A CS009A C"

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS gEC C g

g X

A

1. Reduce pressure in Cnmt atmosphere at a rate to prevent SUMP exceeding design leak rate.

~

h I'

I' A

2. Remove sufficient lodine from Cnmt atmosphere to limit site CS001A

'h M

and offsite boundary doses below 10CFR100 requirements.

]

3. Components (except test / recirculating lines) are Safety RWST \\

l

/

130 gpm Catagory I and Quality Group B.

4. Components protected from missiles that could be generated by a LOCA

5. Ring header and risers are designed for Safe Shutdown d

Earthquake.

Throttled on S188128 U.1 & U 2 RHR for 55 gpm flow y

p 1B 12 + 2OH = l + 10 + H2O RH87028 L

EMPTY ALARM:

rT

~

j Empty alarm and 125vde injectio) 3925 gpc l

status lights at 17.4%.

Sl8811B CS009B To close CS019's:

~

RE C C LJ k

a) Reset CS Signal SUMP rT r1 8

b) Manually close CS019's 9

9 b

b' j

CS SYSTEM INTERLOCKS i30 9pm l$I bll!

'I awsr v

E Nui

espuu, AUfo START MANUAL START

cseuu, N

" 8'^"'

TECH SPECS E"we

[

3.6.2.1 Containment Spray 2 CS systems operable with each opm from RWST and transferring suctic escows f

CeEN S!"S* __

• 3.6.2.2 Spray Additive Sys'I E

Tank level between 78.6 and 90.E by weight NaOH solution. Two edi E""

NaOH to CS pp flow (both 7 days.

EE" 3.6.3 Containment isolatl4 ctosa esoows.

CS007A/B shall be operable (Moc n esmere 30 seconds

' ~ ~ ~ ^

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SUN'Y b

$$$.2 I lMlHl EEll CS007A g

CSAS

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15 GPM / Nozzle PWfe.,g!

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ANSTEee0 psig in Cnmt CS010A 7

APERTURE CSAS Conn.

--lg CARD

,L CS019A h

CoM -

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mga e Also Availabic on 1

Aperture Card s

55 gpm

1. 6 l4 N-1lHll- %E"Il 0-6000 gpm

1. 4 230 psig

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Z te CS010A F

C CSAS g

l 0 CS0198 il RW T h

CSAS DESIGN FLOWS CS ACTUATION SIGNALS stem A Pump; Recirc: 4200 gpm

1. Cnmt Hi-3 Pressure (>20# 2/4) apable of taking suction injecnon: 3415 gpm

2. Manual (2/2 @ 1/2 locations)

)to Cnrnt sump (7 days)

B Pump; Recirc: 4600 gpm injection: 3925 gpm CS TERMINATION e m 30v. and 3ev.

1. Cnmt Pressure < 15 pSig AND ers capable d educung INITIATION.0F CS SIGNAL

(

2. Operati,ng > 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (LOCA only)

,, g7,(g b Valves

2. CS019A(B) Opens J 1-4), Isolation time:

3. CS Pumps start only when the CS-1. CONTAINMENT SPRAY CS019NB) h are open AUG 23,1992. REV. 0 4.CS010A(B) gets a conGrmatory FOR TRAINING USE ONLY open sagnal a,

9(p i 340& *n

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