ML20214R900

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Proposed Tech Specs,Modifying Pressure Range for HPCI & RCIC Operability
ML20214R900
Person / Time
Site: Pilgrim
Issue date: 06/01/1987
From:
BOSTON EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20214R897 List:
References
NUDOCS 8706090049
Download: ML20214R900 (5)


Text

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I Attachment 2 Proposed Technical Specification Chanae Paaes - HPCI and RCIC Operability G7706090049 870601 PDR ADOCK 05000293 P- PDR ,

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

  • 3.5.8 Containment Cooling Subsystem 4.5.B Containment Cooling Subsystem l (Cont'd) (Cont'd)
2. From and after the date that 2. When one containment cooling one containment cooling subsystem loop becomes subsystem loop is made or inoperable, the operable found to be Inoperable for subsystem loop and its any reason, continued reactor associated diesel generator operation is permissible only shall be demonstrated to be during the succeeding seven operable immediately and the days unless such subsystem operable containment cooling loop is sooner made operable, subsystem loop daily thereafter.

provided that the other containment cooling subsystem loop, including its associated diesel generator, is operable.

3. If the requirements of 3.5.8 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a Cold Shutdown Condition i within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, C. HPCI Subsystem C. HPCI Subsystem
1. The HPCI Subsystem shall be 1. HPCI Subsystem testing shall be operable whenever there is performed as follows:

Irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and steam is a. Simulated Once/ operating being produced at reactor Automatic cycle pressure greater than 150 Actuation psig, except as specified in Test 3.5.C.2 and 3.5.C.3 below.

b. Pump Oper- Once/ month and ability Once/ cycle from the Alternate Shutdown Station
c. Motor Once/ month Operated and Va've Once/ cycle Operability from the Alternate Shutdown Station
d. Flow Rate Once/3 months
  • Conditional relief granted from this at 1000 psig LCO for the period October 31, 1980 through November 7, 1980. e. Flow Rate Once/ operating at 150 psig cycle 107

. ' LIMITING CONDfTION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENT 3.5.C HPCI Subsystem (Cont'd) 4.5.C HPCI Subsystem (Cont'd)

The HPCI pump shall deliver at least 4250 gpm for a system head corresponding to a reactor pressure of 1000 to 150 psig.

2. From and after the date that 2. When it is determined that the the HPCI Subsystem is made or HPCI Subsystem is inoperable found to be inoperable for any the RCIC, the LPCI subsystem, reason, continued reactor both core spray subsystems, and operation is permissible only the ADS subsystem actuation during the succeeding seven logic shall be demonstrated to days unless such subsystem is be operable immediately. The sooner made operable, RCIC system and ADS subsystem providing that during such logic shall be demonstrated to seven days all active be operable daily thereafter, components of the ADS subsystem, the RCIC system, the LPCI subsystem and both core spray subsystems are operable.
3. If the requirements of 3.5.C cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor pressure shall be reduced to below 150 psig l within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3.5.0 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling 4.5.D Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Subsystem (RCIC) Subsystem

1. The RCIC Subsystem shall be 1. RCIC Subsystem testing shall be operable whenever there is performed as follows:

Irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and steam is being a. Simulated Once/ operating produced at reactor pressure Automatic cycle greater than 150 psig, except Actuation as specified in 3.5.0.2 below. Test

b. Pump Once/ month and Operability Once/ cycle from the Alternate Shutdown Station
c. Motor Once/ month and Operated Once/ cycle from Valve the Alternate Operability Shutdown Station 108

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d. Flow Rate Once/3 months at 1000 psig
e. Flow Rate Once/ operating at 150 psig cycle The RCIC pump shall deliver at least 400 gpm for a system head corresponding to a reactor pressure of 1000 to 150 psig.
2. From and after the date that 2. When it is determined that the RCIC the RCICS is made or found to subsystem is inoperable, the HPCIS be Inoperable for any reason, shall be denonstrated to be operable continued reactor power immediately and weekly thereafter.

operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days provided that during such seven days the HPCIS is operable.

3. If the requirements of 3.5.0 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor pressure shall be reduced to or below 150 l psig within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3.5.E Automatic Depressurization 4.5.E Automatic Depressurization System System (ADS) (ADS)

1. The Automatic Depressurization 1. During each operating cycle the Subsystem shall be operable following tests shall be performed whenever there is irradiated on the ADS:

fuel in the reactor vessel and the reactor pressure is a. A simulated automatic actuation greater than 104 pstg and test shall be performed prior to prior to a startup from a Cold startup after each refueling Condition, except as specified outage.

In 3.5.E.2 below,

b. With the reactor at pressure, each relief valve shall be manually opened until a corresponding change in reactor pressure or main turbine bypass valve positions indicate that ,

steam is flowing from the valve,

c. Perform a test from the alternate shutdown panel to verify that the relief valve solenoids actuate. Test shall be performed after each refueling outage prior to startup.

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BASES:

3.5.A Core Spray and LPCI Subsystem This specification assures that adequate emergency cooling capability is available whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel.

Based on the loss of coolant analysis performed by General Electric in accordance with Section 50.46 and Appendix K of 10CFR50, the Pilgrim I Emergency Core Cooling Systems are adequate to provide sufficient cooling to the core to dissipate the energy associated with the loss of coolant accident, to limit calculated fuel clad temperature to less than 2200*F, to limit calculated local metal water reaction to less than or equal to 17%, and to limit calculated core wide metal water reaction to less than or equal to 1%.

The limiting conditions of operation in Specifications 3.5.A.1 through 3.5.A.6 specify the combinations of operable subsystems to assure the availability of the minimum cooling systems noted above. No single failure of CSCS equipment occurring during a loss-of-coolant accident under these limiting conditions of operation will result in inadequate cooling of the reactor core.

Core spray distribution has been shown, in full-scale tests of systems similar in design to that of Pilgrim, to exceed the minimum requirements-by at least 25%. In addition, cooling effectiveness has been demonstrated at less than half the rated flow in simulated fuel assemblies with heater rods to duplicate the decay heat characteristics of irradiated fuel. The accident analysis takes credit for core spray flow into the core at vessel pressure below 205

> psig. However, the analysis is conservative in that no credit is taken for spray cooling heat transfer in the hottest fuel bundle untti the pressure at rated flow for the core spray (104 psig vessel pressure) is reached.

The LPCI subsystem is designed to provide emergency cooling to the core by flooding in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. This system functions in combination with the core spray system to prevent excessive fuel clad temperature. The LPCI subsystem and the core spray subsystem provide adequate cooling for break areas of approximately 0.2 square feet up to and including the double-ended recirculation line break without assistance from the high pressure emergency core cooling subsystems.

The allowable repair times are established to that the average risk rate for repair would be no greater than the basic risk rate. The method and concept are described in reference (1). Using the results developed in 113