Safety Evaluation Accepting Request to Apply LBB Analyses to Eliminate Large Primary Loop Pipe Rupture from Structural Design Basis for Plant,Units 1 & 2ML20129F910 |
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Byron, Braidwood ![Constellation icon.png](/w/images/b/be/Constellation_icon.png) |
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10/25/1996 |
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ML20129F884 |
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NUDOCS 9610290236 |
Download: ML20129F910 (5) |
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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217G9961999-10-14014 October 1999 SER Accepting First 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Requests for Relief for Plant,Units 1 & ML20212A7441999-09-10010 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Alternatives Contained in Relief Request 12R-07 Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety ML20210U8111999-08-0404 August 1999 SER Granting Licensee Relief Requests VR-1,VR-3 & Portion of VR-2 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii).Relief Request VR-4 Does Not Require Explicit NRC Approval Because Relief Applies to Valves Not Required by 10CFR50.55a ML20210K9861999-07-30030 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee 60-day Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs ML20207B6481999-05-25025 May 1999 SER Accepting Revised SGTR Analysis for Byron & Braidwood Stations.Revised Analysis Was Submitted to Support SG Replacement at Unit 1 of Each Station ML20205B5091999-03-26026 March 1999 SER Accepting Relief Requests 12R-24,Rev 0 & 12R-34,Rev 0, Related to Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp for Byron Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205C5101999-03-21021 March 1999 Revised Safety Evaluation Supporting Improved TS Amends Issued by NRC on 981222 to FOLs NPF-37,NPF-66,NPF-72 & NPF-77.Revised Pages Include Editorial Corrections ML20204G3831999-03-19019 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Second 10-yr Interval ISI Request for Relief 12R-11 ML20155B6711998-10-26026 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Requests for Relief Associated with Second 10-yr Interval ISI Program Plan ML20154D4401998-10-0202 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Second 10-yr Interval ISI Program Request for Relief 12R-30 for Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20238F3281998-08-31031 August 1998 SER Approving Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Request for Relief 12R-14 for Braidwood Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20238F6551998-08-28028 August 1998 SE Authorizing Licensee Request for Relief NR-20,Rev 1 & NR-25,Rev 0 Re Relief from Examination Requirement of Applicable ASME BPV Code,Section XI for First ISI Interval Exams ML20217K6331998-04-20020 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Methodology & Criteria Used in Generating Flaw Evaluation Charts for RPV of Braidwood IAW Section XI of ASME Code ML20217K7171998-04-20020 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Requests for Relief NR-22,NR-23 & NR-24 for First 10-yr Insp Interval ML20216F4921998-03-11011 March 1998 Correction to Safety Evaluation Re Revised SG Tube Rapture Analysis ML20212H1851998-03-0606 March 1998 SE Approving Temporary Use of Current Procedure for Containment Repair & Replacement Activities Instead of Requirements in Amended 10CFR50.55a Rule ML20197B7531998-03-0404 March 1998 SER Accepting License Request for Relief from Immediate Implementation of Amended Requirements of 10CFR50.55a for Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20199G2591998-01-28028 January 1998 Safety Evaluation Rept Accepting Revised SG Tube Rupture Analysis ML20199H0031998-01-21021 January 1998 SER Accepting Pressure Temp Limits Rept & Methodology for Relocation of Reactor Coolant Sys pressure-temp Limit Curves & Low Temp Overpressure Protection Sys Limits for Byron Station,Units 1 & 2 & Braidwood Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199C1401998-01-16016 January 1998 SER Accepting Request to Integrate Reactor Vessel Weld Metal Surveillance Program for Byron,Units 1 & 2 & Braidwood,Units 1 & 2 Per 10CFR50 ML20199C1231998-01-13013 January 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Second 10-yr Inservice Insp Program Plan Relief Request ML20197G0041997-12-11011 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting First 10-yr Interval Insp Program Plan,Rev 4 & Associated Requests for Relief for Plant ML20198H3211997-12-0303 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Re Licensee Submittal of IPE for Plant, Units 1 & 2,in Response to GL 88-02, IPE for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities ML20198R3061997-10-27027 October 1997 Staff Evaluation Rept Concluding That Licensee IPE Complete Wrt Info Requested by GL 88-20 & Process Meets Intent of Subj GL ML20211L2151997-10-0303 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Relief Request,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20217C1681997-09-22022 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Request for Relief from ASME Code,Section Iii,Div 2 for Repair of Damaged Concrete Reinforcement Steel NUREG-1335, Staff Evaluation Rept Concluding That Licensee IPE Complete Wrt Info Requested by GL 88-20 & Associated Guidance, NUREG-13351997-08-28028 August 1997 Staff Evaluation Rept Concluding That Licensee IPE Complete Wrt Info Requested by GL 88-20 & Associated Guidance, NUREG-1335 ML20141L9321997-05-29029 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Use of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Ix,Code Cases 2142-1 & 2143-1 for Reactor Coolant Sys for Plants ML20141B5551997-05-13013 May 1997 SE Accepting First 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan Request for Relief NR-29 for Braidwood Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20140H8871997-05-0808 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Request for Relief from ASME Code Repair Requirements for ASME Code Class 3 Piping Ceco ML20134L7811996-11-18018 November 1996 Safety Evaluation Granting Listed Relief Requests,Per 10CFR50.55a(f)(6)(i) Based on Impracticalities in Design of Valves That Limit IST in Traditional Manner Using Position Indicating Lights ML20129F9101996-10-25025 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Request to Apply LBB Analyses to Eliminate Large Primary Loop Pipe Rupture from Structural Design Basis for Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20059E2871993-12-30030 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 57,57,45,45,93,77,152 & 140 to Licenses NPF-37,NPF-66,NPF-72,NPF-77,NPF-11,NPF-18, DPR-39 & DPR-48 Respectively ML20056D4921993-07-27027 July 1993 Safety Evaluation Re Fuel Reconstitution ML20127N1851993-01-25025 January 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Inservice Testing Program for Valves,Relief Request VR-4 ML20059L3371990-09-14014 September 1990 SER Granting Interim Relief for 1 Yr or Until Next Refueling Outage to Continue Current Testing Methods While Licensee Investigates Feasibility of Acceptable Alternatives ML20059L4581990-09-14014 September 1990 Sser Supporting Util Changes to Inservice Testing Program ML20058L9961990-08-0606 August 1990 Safety Evaluation Denying Licensee Response to Station Blackout Rule.Staff Recommends That Licensee Reevaluate Areas of Concern Identified in SER ML20058M0001990-08-0606 August 1990 Safety Evaluation Denying Licensee Response to Station Blackout Rule.Staff Recommends That Licensee Reevaluate Areas of Concern Identified in SER ML20248D5911989-08-0707 August 1989 SER Accepting Util 881130,890411,27 & 0523 Submittals Re Seismic Qualification of Byron Deep Wells ML20247D1471989-07-18018 July 1989 SER Supporting Util Proposed Implementation of ATWS Design, Per 10CFR50.62 Requirements ML20244D8191989-06-13013 June 1989 SER Supporting Util ATWS Mitigating Sys Actuation Circuitry Designs ML20247B3281989-04-24024 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Re Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Tests ML20244A7221989-04-11011 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Rev 1 to First 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan Constitutes Basis for Compliance w/10CFR50.55a & Tech Spec 4.0.5.Response to Items 2.2.2 & 2.2.3 of Inel Technical Evaluation Rept Requested ML20155F1591988-10-0606 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Re Mixed Greases W/Greater than 5% Unqualified Contaminant in Limitorque Valve Operators. Insufficient Info Presented to Draw Conclusions ML20236L2001987-10-30030 October 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 11 to Licenses NPF-37 & NPF-66,respectively & Amend 1 to License NPF-72 ML20237G8561987-08-10010 August 1987 SER on Util 870303 & 0522 Ltr Re Optpipe Computer Code Used in Snubber Reduction Program.Code Acceptable for Piping Dynamic Analysis Using Both Uniform & Independent Support Motion Response Spectrum ML20210R2061987-02-0606 February 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 850517,0802,0823,1211 & 860429 Submittals Re Environ Effects of High Energy Line Breaks in Auxiliary Steam or Steam Generator Blowdown Sys. Design of Blowdown Sys Acceptable ML20210T2571987-02-0606 February 1987 SER Re Util 850802 Submittal Describing Design Details of Steam Generator Blowdown & Auxiliary Steam Sys to Detect & Isolate High Energy Line Breaks.Sys Design Acceptable, However,Two Deviations from IEEE-STD-297 Criteria Apparent ML20209C3571987-01-23023 January 1987 SER Supporting Facility Design,Per Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2, Reactor Trip Sys Reliability,On-Line Testing 1999-09-10
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217G9961999-10-14014 October 1999 SER Accepting First 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Requests for Relief for Plant,Units 1 & BW990066, Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With ML20217H5221999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Byron Station, Units 1 & 2.With ML20217P6351999-09-29029 September 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 6 to HI-982083, Licensing Rept for Spent Fuel Rack Installation at Byron & Braidwood Nuclear Stations ML20217A1691999-09-22022 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Engine Sys,Inc Controllers,Manufactured Between Dec 1997 & May 1999,that May Have Questionable Soldering Workmanship.Caused by Inadequate Personnel Training.Sent Rept to All Nuclear Customers ML20212A7441999-09-10010 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Alternatives Contained in Relief Request 12R-07 Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety ML20212B9261999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Byron Station,Units 1 & 2.With BW990056, Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With ML20210R6421999-08-13013 August 1999 ISI Outage Rept for A2R07 ML20210U8111999-08-0404 August 1999 SER Granting Licensee Relief Requests VR-1,VR-3 & Portion of VR-2 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii).Relief Request VR-4 Does Not Require Explicit NRC Approval Because Relief Applies to Valves Not Required by 10CFR50.55a ML20210R3431999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Byron Station, Units 1 & 2.With BW990048, Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With ML20210K9861999-07-30030 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee 60-day Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs ML20210E2251999-07-21021 July 1999 B1R09 ISI Summary Rept Spring 1999 Outage, 980309-990424 M990002, Revised NFM9900022, Braidwood Unit 2 Cycle 8 COLR in ITS Format & W(Z) Function1999-07-12012 July 1999 Revised NFM9900022, Braidwood Unit 2 Cycle 8 COLR in ITS Format & W(Z) Function ML20216D3841999-07-12012 July 1999 Revised NFM9900022, Braidwood Unit 2 Cycle 8 COLR in ITS Format & W(Z) Function ML20209G1751999-07-0808 July 1999 SG Eddy Current Insp Rept,Cycle 9 Refueling Outage (B1R09) ML20209H3711999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Byron Station, Units 1 & 2.With ML20207H7771999-06-30030 June 1999 Rev 0 to WCAP-15177, Evaluation of Pressurized Thermal Shock for Byron,Unit 2 ML20207H7851999-06-30030 June 1999 Rev 0 to WCAP-15183, Commonwealth Edison Co Byron,Unit 1 Surveillance Program Credibility Evaluation BW990038, Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With ML20207H7941999-06-30030 June 1999 Rev 0 to WCAP-15180, Commonwealth Edison Co Byron,Unit 2 Surveillance Program Credibility Evaluation ML20207H8071999-06-30030 June 1999 Rev 0 to WCAP-15178, Byron Unit 2 Heatup & Cooldowm Limit Curves for Normal Operations ML20207H7561999-06-28028 June 1999 Pressure Temp Limits Rept (Ptlr) ML20207H7621999-06-28028 June 1999 Pressure Temp Limits Rept (Ptlr) BW990029, Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Braidwood Stations, Units 1 & 2.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Braidwood Stations, Units 1 & 2.With ML20195J8001999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Byron Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20209H7481999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Braidwood Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20207B6481999-05-25025 May 1999 SER Accepting Revised SGTR Analysis for Byron & Braidwood Stations.Revised Analysis Was Submitted to Support SG Replacement at Unit 1 of Each Station ML20195B2591999-05-19019 May 1999 Rev 66a to CE-1-A,consisting of Proposed Changes to QAP for Dnps,Qcs,Znps,Lcs,Byron & Braidwood Stations ML20206R6991999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Byron Station Units 1 & 2.With BW990021, Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With M980023, Rev 2 to NFM9800233, Byron Station Unit 2 COLR for Cycle 8A (BY2C8A)1999-04-28028 April 1999 Rev 2 to NFM9800233, Byron Station Unit 2 COLR for Cycle 8A (BY2C8A) ML20195C7961999-04-28028 April 1999 Rev 2 to NFM9800233, Byron Station Unit 2 COLR for Cycle 8A (BY2C8A) BW990016, Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20205P7001999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Byron Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20205B5091999-03-26026 March 1999 SER Accepting Relief Requests 12R-24,Rev 0 & 12R-34,Rev 0, Related to Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp for Byron Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205C5101999-03-21021 March 1999 Revised Safety Evaluation Supporting Improved TS Amends Issued by NRC on 981222 to FOLs NPF-37,NPF-66,NPF-72 & NPF-77.Revised Pages Include Editorial Corrections ML20204G3831999-03-19019 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Second 10-yr Interval ISI Request for Relief 12R-11 ML20206A8831999-03-17017 March 1999 Rev 0 to NFM9900043, Byron Unit 1,Cycle 10 COLR in ITS Format W(Z) Function M990004, Rev 0 to NFM9900043, Byron Unit 1,Cycle 10 COLR in ITS Format W(Z) Function1999-03-17017 March 1999 Rev 0 to NFM9900043, Byron Unit 1,Cycle 10 COLR in ITS Format W(Z) Function ML20196A0721999-03-16016 March 1999 Cycle 8 COLR in ITS Format & W(Z) Function ML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999 Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results ML20207J4371999-03-0808 March 1999 ISI Outage Rept for A1R07 ML20204H9941999-03-0303 March 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 4 to HI-982083, Licensing Rept for Spent Fuel Rack Installation at Byron & Braidwood Nuclear Stations BW990010, Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20204C7671999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Byron Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20206U9011999-02-15015 February 1999 COLR for Braidwood Unit 2 Cycle 7. Page 1 0f 13 of Incoming Submittal Was Not Included BW990004, Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20199G8271998-12-31031 December 1998 Rev 1 Comm Ed Byron Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 Cycle 9 Startup Rept 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
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% UNITED STATES g ,g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o 's WASHINGTON, D.C. 20666 4001
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION i
l RELATED TO LEAK-BEFORE-BREAK ANALYSIS COMMONWEALTH EDIS0N COMPANY 4
BYRON STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2. AND BRAIDWOOD STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. STN 50-454. STN 50-455. STN 50-456 AND STN 50-457
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated April 30, 1996 (with enclosure WCAP-14559 [ Reference 1]),
Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed, the licensee) requested elimination of l primary reactor coolant system (RCS) loop pipe rupture as a design basis for Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, and Braidwood Station, Units I and 2. The
~
request was based on the leak-before-break (LBB) analysis of the primary loop
, piping as permitted by General Design Criteria 4 (GDC-4) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A. Additional information was provided by Comed by letter dated September 25, 1996, in response to the staff's request for additional l
information.
2.0 BACKGROUND
GDC-4 allows the use of analyses to eliminate the dynamic effects of postulated pipe ruptures in high energy piping from the design basis in nuclear power units. Implementation of the LBB technology permits the removal of pipe whip restraints and jet impingement barriers as well as other related changes in operating plants. The acceptable technical procedures and criteria of the LBB evaluation are defined in NUREG-1061, Volume 3 [ Reference 2] and
, summarized, in part, as follows:
The forces and moments due to pressure, deadweight, thermal expansion, and earthquake loadings associated with normal operation and the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) should be considered. The location (s) at which the highest l stresses coincident with poorest material properties for base metals, weldsents, and safe ends should be identified. Through-wall flaws for the determination of the leakage flaw and critical flaw size should be postulated at those location (s).
Operating experience should demonstrate that the pipe will not experience stress corrosion cracking, fatigue, or water hammer. The operating history should include system operational procedures; system or component modification; water chemistry parameters, limits, and controls; resistance of ENCLOSURE 9610290236 961025 PDR ADOCK 05000454 p PDR .
d piping material to various forms of stress corrosion; and performance of the pipe under cyclic loadings.
The materials data provided should include types of materials and material specifications; stress-strain curves and J-R curves (not required if limit load analysis is used in the stability analysis); consideration of long-term effects such as thermal aging; and other limitations to materials data (e.g.,
J , and maximum crack growth). The piping materials must be free from bWttle cleavage-type failure over the full range of the system operating temperature.
The postulated leakage flaw should be shown to be stable under normal operational plus SSE loads for long periods of time; that is, crack growth of j'
the postulated leakage flaw is minimal during an earthquake. This stability analysis is sufficient if the normal operational plus SSE loads are summed absolutely (a conservative, worst-case loading assumption). A flaw stability analysis should be performed to show that the leakage flaw is stable under larger loads (at least 1.4 times the normal plus SSE loads) if a more detailed sum-of-the-squares combination of the normal operational plus SSE loads is considered.
! NUREG-1061, Volume 3, provides the following criteria for assessing the critical and leakage flaw sizes. First, the leakage flaw size should be large enough so that the leakage is assured of detection with at least a margin of 10 using the minimum installed leak detection capability when the pipe is subjected to normal operational loads. Then, under normal plus SSE loads, there should be a margin of at least 2.0 between the leakage-size flaw and the critical-size flaw which would propagate to piping failure to account for the uncertainties inherent in the analyses and leakage detection capability.
Finally, the slope of the J line for the critical-size flaw (d(J.)/da) should be less than the slo,e p to the material's resistance curve (d(J,/da))
at the point of intersection to demonstrate flaw stability.
3.0 LICENSEE EVALUATION 1
The licensee first examined background information on the potential for )
primary loop piping degradation mechanisms, as required by NUREG-1061, l Volume 3. No evidence of stress corrosion cracking, water hammer, or other degradation has been c'sserved in the primary system piping of these four units. Therefore, oased on this plant-specific experience and similar histories u other Westinghouse plants, the staff concludes that stress corrosion, water hammer, and other degradation mechanisms are not issues for the primary loop piping in these four units.
The licensee then established the sensitivity of the RCS leak detection system for these four units. The installed systemt meet the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.45 such that a leakage of one gallon per minute (GPM) for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> can be detected. The calculated leak rate through the postulated leakage flaw was 10 GPM and, thus, is large relative to the sensitivity of the plant's leak detection systems and consistent with the criteria in NUREG-1061, Volume 3.
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! The primary loop piping in these four units has a nominal outs 162 diameter l (00) of 34.12 inches with a minimum wall thickness of 2.500 inches at the j critical location in the RCS hot leg and a nominal OD of 32.14 inches with a l j
minimum wall thickness of 2.215 inches at the critical location in the RCS i l cold leg or crossover piping. The piping material is austenitic wrought l stainless steel, SA-376 Grade 304N, and the material for the elbows is cast stainless steel, SA351 CF8A. Location 11 (as defined in WCAP-14559), the cold 1eg weld at the reactor coolant pump outlet nozzle, was the most highly j stressed position in the RCS and, therefore, the critical location for the 1 SA-376 Grade 304N piping. Location 3 (again defined in WCAP-14559), in the
{ cast stainless steel elbow near the steam generator, was the critical location
- for the SA351 CF8A material due to a combination of thermal aging effects and high applied stresses.
j The licensee provided material properties data for the primary loop piping, elbows, and weld material based on the certified materials test reports j (CMTRs). In the LBB calculations, the minimum material properties at average j pipe section temperature were used for the critical flaw size and critical l flaw stability evaluations; while the average material properties were used ,
1 for calculation of the leakage flaw size. For estimating the material l toughness parameters (J ie and J.) of the cast stainless steel, the licensee !
used the results of fracture toughness testing conducted by Westinghouse for a i fully-aged cast stainless steel sample. The staff accepts that the fracture toughness data from this sample material (References 4-6] bound the expected properties the cast large diameter primary loop piping of these four units, i The licensee used combined normal operational and SSE loadings in the flaw stability analysis to assess margins against pipe rupture during postulated faulted load conditions. The normal operating loads included internal pressure, deadweight, and normal thermal expansion; and the SSE loads included loads due to inertia and anchor motion related to SSE. In the worst loading case for the stability analysis, all individual components that made up the !
normal and faulted loads were summed absolutely. 1 For the stainless steel piping (SA-376 Grade 304N material) and the weld locations therein, a limit load analysis was employed. The welds in this piping were manufactured by a combination of tungsten inert gas (TIG) and shielded metal arc (SMAW) processes. Z factor corrections (Reference 3] to address the weld material properties were used in the limit load analysis for the critical location. The reported margin, which is the ratio of the critical flaw size to the leakage flaw size, at Location 11 was 1.91.
For the cast stainless steel elbow fittings (SA351 CF8A material), an elastic-plastic J-integral evaluation (J/T methodology) was employed. The licensee used the EPRI approach (Reference 7] for estimating the applied J value. The reported margin for this material at Location 3 was greater than 2.0 and the licensee showed that the postulated critical flaw was stable under normal plus SSE loads.
L i ;
i- i i
j !
4 I
4.0 INDEPENDENT STAFF CALCULATIONS The staff conducted independent leak rate and flaw stability calculations for i Location 11 and found that the licensee's leakage flaw size under a normal operational load (5.87 inches) condition was larger than (and, therefore, more 4 conservative too) that calculated by the staff (5.31 inches) by using the
! PICEP computer code [ Reference 8]. Further, the value of the critical flaw i size calculated by the staff using PICEP (11.97 inches) was larger than that i calculated by the licensee (11.18 inches). Since the minimum margin (the
! ratio of the critical flaw size to the leakage flaw size) for the wrought .
! stainless steel piping and the associated SAW and SMAW welds by the staff's l l calculation is 2.25 (greater than the required margin of 2.0), the LBB criteria in NUREG-1061, Volume 3, are satisfied. While the flaw stability criteria was not explicitly investigated for the wrought stainless steel i piping because of this material's high J-resistance values and steep J- l resistance curve, it is clear that d(J /da would be smaller than j i d(J /da for this material and the stla )ility criterion would be satisfied. 1 i The7n) formation that the staff used in its calculations was derived from d '
{ provided in the licensee's submittal (Reference 1] and a stress-strain curve !
j for SA-376 Grade 304N from a standard materials handbook [ Reference 9].
1 I
! The staff also performed independent calculations for the cast stainless steel l fitting at Location 3. The licensee's calculated value for the leakage flaw i size (6.20 inches) was smaller (less conservative) than that calculated by i j the staff (7.86 inches). However, the staff used the program NRCPIPE
- [ Reference 10] to evaluate the critical flaw size based upon information j provided in the licensee's submittal (Reference 1] and data from Argonne
- (References 11,12] on the effects of thermal aging on the stress-strain curves and J-resistance curves for cast stainless steels. The J-R curve used i in the staff's analysis was conservative compared to that used by the licensee
- at all points up to and including J . The staff confirmed that a critical i flaw with a margin of 2.0 on the stIIf's calculated leakage flaw (15.72
. inches) would be stable under the normal operational plus SSE loading conditions given in the licensee's submittal. As to the stability criterion, 2
it is clear that J line will intersect the J-R curve at the curve's steep l rising portion; thEefore, d(J j stability criterion is satisfiU)/da is smaller than d(J )/da and the I Therefore, since the independent staff calculations demonstrated that a margin j greater than 2.0 exists for both critical locations and that flaw stability requirements are satisfied, the staff accepts the conclusions presented in the l licensee's submittal.
i
5.0 CONCLUSION
] The staff concludes that the licensee's LBB analysis is consistent with the criteria in NUREG-1061, Volume 3, and, therefore, demonstrates that the 4 probability of fluid system piping rupture is extremely low under conditions l consistent with the design basis for the piping. Thus, per GDC-4,
> consideration of the dynamic effects associated with primary loop pipe rupture l
l
) i I
4 .
j
{ may be eliminated from the design basis for Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, and Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2.
Principal Contributor: Matthew A. Mitchell, NRR Date: October 25, 1996
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l' l l 6.0 EfERENCES j 1. D. C. Bhownick and D. E. Prager, " Technical Justification for Eliminating Large Primary Loop Pipe Rupture as the Structural Design i Basis for the Byron and Braidwood Units 1 and 2 Nuclear Power Plants,"
WCAP-14559, Revision 1, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, May 1993 (proprietary). l I
- 2. NUREG-1061, Volume 3, " Report of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Piping Review Committee, Evaluation of Potential for Pipe Breaks," U. S. '
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, November 1984.
- 3. Standard Review Plan; Public Comment Solicited; 3.6.3 Leak-Before-Break Evaluation Procedures; Federal Reaister/ Volume 52, No.167/ Friday, i August 28,1987/ Notices,pp. 32626-32633.
- 4. "The Effects of Thermal Aging on the Structural Integrity of Cast Stainless Steel Piping for W NSSS," WCAP-10456, Westinghouse Electric !
Corporation (proprietary).
- 5. G. Slama, P. Petrequin, S.H. Nasson, and T.R. Mager, "Effect of Aging on Mechanical Properties of Austenitic Stainless Steel Casting and Welds,"
presented at Smirt-7 Post Conference Seminar 6 - Assuring Structural i Integrity of Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components, Monterey, CA, August 29/30, 1983.
i
- 6. F. J. Witt and C. C. Kim, " Toughness Criteria for Thermally Aged Cast Stainless Steel," WCAP-10931, Revision 1, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, July 1986 (proprietary).
- 7. V. Kumar, M. D. German, and C. F. Shih, "An Engineering Approach for Elastic-Plastic Fracture Analysis," EPRI Report NP-1931, Project 1237-1, Electric Power Research Institute, July 1981.
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