ML20210Q205

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1997 Severe Accident Management Tabletop (Scenario 1) Drill Manual
ML20210Q205
Person / Time
Site: North Anna  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 12/31/1997
From:
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML20210P682 List:
References
FACA, PROC-971231, NUDOCS 9708280216
Download: ML20210Q205 (23)
v • d • e


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VIRGINIA POWER NORTH ANNA POWER STATION 1997 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TABLETOP (SCENARIO 1)

DRILL MANUAL p PDR

VIRGINIA POWER

  • NORTH ANNA POWER STATION 1997 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TAHLETOP (SCENARIO 1)

TABI F OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction
2. Drill Control
n. Facilitating Organization
b. Participants
c. Simulations
3. References / Assumptions
4. Scope & Objectives S. Sequence Of Events
a. Initial Conditions

, b. Narrative

c. Time Line
6. Messages / Data
a. Multi Function
b. Operations Data 4

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VIRGINIA POWER NORTH ANNA POWER STATION 1997 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TABLETOP (SCENARIO 1)

INTRODUCTION In the interest of confirming reasonable assurance of the health and safety of the general public surrounding North Anna Power Station (NAPS) it is necessary for Virginia Power to conduct drills to ensure the emergency response organization is able to perform the assigned emergency response functions.

This drill package was developed to provide the basis for the conduct of a simulated emergency at North Anna Power Station located in Louisa County, Virginia. The drill facilitators will use this package to initiate and control the aethities of the drill panicipants.

The drill will allow Virginia Power emergency response personnel to practice the emergency response activities assigned to them by the current emergency preparedness plans and procedures.

- Specifically, this drill is designed to provide training for the implementors, Evaluators and Decision Makers assigned the responsibility for implementing the Severe Accident Management Guidelines.

This package was developed to assist the facilitators in the conduct of the drill. Furthermore, this package contains the information and data necessary to properly conduct the drill in an efficient and coordinated manner. -

Virginia Power establishes this document as the standard for conduct in performance of this drill.

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P VIRGINIA POWER NORTH ANNA POWER STATION 1997 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TABLETOP (SCENARIO 1)

DRILL CONTROL

  • Rus section contains:
1. Facilitating Organization 2, Participants
3. Simulations y

0 VIRGINIA POWER NORTil ANNA POWER STATION 1997 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TADLETOP (SCENARIO 1)

DRILI FACIIITATOR ASSIGNNfrNTS L:sd B.M. Thompson -

Control Room Simulator W.R. Madison -

Ogcrational support Center / Damage Contr d E.R.lienry J.D. Rayman PARTICIPANTS The following personnel are expected to participate in the Severe Accident Management Tabletop:

Severe Accident Management Guideline Implementors

  • Ev'duators
  • Decision Makers SIhfULATIONS All activities, except the actual use of the severe accident guidelines, will be simulated.

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0 VIRGINIA POWER NORTII ANNA POWER STATION ,

1997 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TABLETOP (SCENARIO 1)

REFERENCES / ASSUMPTIONS This section contains:

1. References
2. Assumptions 4

o VIRGINIA POWER NORTH ANNA POWER STATION 1997 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TABLE TOP (SCENARIO 1)

REFERENCES

1. VPAP 2604, Severe Accident Management Guideline (SAMO) Program Administration
2. Severe Accident Management Guidelines
3. WOO SAMO scenario Template #1 ASSUMPTIONS ,

An emergency drill requires significant effort be put forth in research and development to ensure that the events depicted are as realistic and credible as possible. To create a drill scenario, equipment malfunctions are necessary to create the postulated accident.

  • The following are the assumptions used to create this drill scenario.

During the event, Unit 2 remains stable and the spent fuel pool remain stable and within

limitations.

Un:t I parameter values provided are for trend purposes to drive strategy implementation per the SAMOs. The values provided are not the actual values that would potentially exist for the given conditions. 1 Assumed pump flow values:

Inside Recire Spray Pump- 3300 gpm Outside Recirc Spray Pump 3700 gpm Casing Cooling Pumps - 1000 gpm Quench Spray Pump 2000 gpm

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Motor Driven Aux Feed Pump - 350 gpm

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Steam Driven Aux Feed Pump- 350 gpm

VIRGINIA POWER NORTH ANNA POWER STATION 1997 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TABLETOP l (SCENARIO 1)

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o SCOPE & OBJECTIVES t

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0 VIRGINIA POWER

, NORTH ANNA POWER STATION 1997 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TAHLETOP (SCENARIO 1)

DRit 1 SCOPE The purpose of this drill is to provide the emergency response personnel responsible for implementing the Severe Accident Management Guidelines the opportunity to practice the use of the guiuelines and the associated supponing materials..

'!he drill provides the implementors, Evaluators and the Decision Makers the opponunity to develop the key skills needed to use the Severe Accident Management Guidelines in the event of a severe accident at North Anna Power Station.

The drill allows emergency response personnel the opportunity to demonstrate responses to a potential radiological event commensurate with the objectives established by the Westinghouse Owners Group. Free play is encouraged and the drill facilitators are allowed to interface with the participants to provide information and as necessary, to coach and correct identified deficiencies.

DRII I OBJECTIVES The following objectives establish the scope and extent of play for this. Also, these objectives ensure that required events are included in the drill scenario.

1. Given access to the SAMO documentation and given the information and data specified in this scenario, the Evaluator will be able to use the guidance provided in the SAMO to perfonn the evaluations required by that process so that the Decision Maker will be able to make process based decisions.
2. Apply the entry criterion and exit conditions for applicable guidelines.
a. Recognize the criteria for entering applicable guidelines,
b. Prior to exiting a guideline, ensure that applicable exit conditions are met and that a process to follow long term concems is implemented.
3. Determine which strategies are available and applicable under current plant conditions.
4. Identify any negative impacts potentially associated with the available strategies and

. valuate action to mitigate negative impacts.

S. Decide whether to implement a strategy and which mitigative action, if any, to take.

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DRJLL OHJECTIVES (ennainued) 9

6. Specify instructions for the control room-pertaining to strategy implementation and mitigative action,
n. Preferred lineup _
b. Limitations
7. Verify implementation ofinstructions pertaining to strategies and mitigative actions.
8. Monitor negative impacts and decide whether to take additional mitigative action.
9. Check the effectiveness of an implemented strategy and determine whether alditional strategies should be attempted.
10. Evaluate data and interpret instrumentation readings given that severe accident conditions exist.

I 1. Use computational aids as needed.

12. - Utilize effective communication techniques to coordinate emergency infonnation/ actions with the Control Room implementors and other emergency response personnel.
13. Actively participate in the scenario critique process.

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VIRGINIA POWER NORTH ANNA POWER STATION 1997 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TABLETOP (SCENARIO 1) 4 4

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS This section contains:

1. Initial Conditions
2. Narrative
3. Time Line

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o VIRGINIA POWER  ;

NORTil ANNA POWER STATION .

1997 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TAHLETOP (SCENARIO 1)

INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS (Prior to 05001997)

.Unill:

Operating normally at 100% power prior to the event.

1.FW.P.2 is tagged out for pump rotating element replacement. Approximately eight hours before the pump will be back together and ready for testing. Twenty.nine hours remain in the action statement before unit shutdown is required.

Two hours into a seven day action statement for the charging cross tie with unit 2 not being available. Replacing a vent valve on the header.

Unit 2:

In a refueling outage and is defueled.

All three charging pumps are tagged out for replacement of a vent valve on the charging cross tie header, Estimated time to complete replacement is 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

2H EDO is out of service for engine overhaul.

Initiating Events 10500 and after):

NOTE: For purposes of this tabletop, unit 1 is the unit actions must be taken for.

At 0$00 a severe tomado stmek the switchyard and all transmission lines were lost due to damage to lines and towers.

The 1H EDO did not start due to a fuel supply problem. The fuel problem was fixed at 0650 and the engine was started; however, the output breaker did not close. When swapping out the breaker, one of the stabs was bent. The electricians are working to fix the problem.

The 1J EDO started, loaded and then stopped abruptly. Upon investigation, the mechanics discovered the connecting rod for the lower #2 cylinder penetrating the casing.

Also, the 23 EDO started, loaded and then stopped abruptly. Investigation has not revealed any

- problem at this time.

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INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS (continued)

When attempting to start the SB0 diesel, the control panel caught fire and destroyed the control system. The fire was extinguished; however, the S130 is not available.

At approximately 0545, the seals on all three RCPs began leaking resulting in the loss of RCS l

inventory. The rate ofloss ofinventory wrts slow at first, but then increased. ,

l An Alert was declared based on tomado striking the facility (Tab L 5). The emergency was subsequently upgraded to a General Emergency due to probable large radioactivity release initiated by LOCA with ECCS failure leading to core degradation (Tab C 1). All required offsite notifications have been made and all the emergency response facilities are manned.

The control room placed equipment in PTL and manually isolated seal injection to the RCP seals in accordance with ECA 0.0," Loss of All AC Power".

Since auxiliary feedwater was not available, the steam generators were not depressurized to attempt to cool the RCS.

The RCS is still at high RCS pressure, the accumulators are full and the steam generators have little inventory.

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UNIT I INITIAL CONDITIONS 4

Primary Plant Parameter Value Equipment Status RCS Pressure: 1750 psig PRZR PORVs: Available & Closed RVLIS Ful! Range: 30 % PORY 131ock Valves: Not Available & Open Upper Range: 0% PRZR & llead Vents: Available & Closed Core Exit Thermocouples: 2175'F RCPs: Not Available RWST Level: 97 %

Accumulator Pressure: 640 psig Accumulators: Available & Full Charging Flow: 0 gpm Charging /lillSI Pumps: Not Available St Flow 0gpm LilSI Pumps: Not Available Secondary Plant Parameter Value Equipment Status SG Levels A 25 % WR AFW Pumps B 20 % WR Motor Driven: Not Available C 10 % WR Turbine Driven: Not Available SG Pressures A 1085 psig SG PORVs! Not Available Il 1085 psig SG Steam Dumps: Not Available - No C 1085 psig C "de"S"'

SG Safeties: Available & Operating Total Feedwater Flow: 0gpm Main FW Pumps: Not Available Steam Line Radiation: Normal Condensate Pumps Not Available MSTV Available & Closed Containment Containment Sump Level: 1.6 ft. QS Pumps: Not Available Containment Pressure: 19 psia Casing Cooling Pumps Not Available Containment Temperature: 150*F ISRS Pumps: Not Available OSRS Pumps: Not Available Containment liydrogen Not Available Hydrogen Recombiner: Not Available Quench Spray Flow 0gpm Containment isolation: Isolated Recire Spray Flow 0 gpm Containment Radiation 5.1 x ES R/hr

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l4 e VIRGINIA POWER NORTII ANNA POWER STATION 1997 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TABLETOP (SCENARIO 1)

SCENARIO NARRATIVE ,

Narrative:

A Severe Accident Management Tabletop is scheduled to be conducted at the Nonh Anna Power Station.

When the drill is initiated, all the emergency response organizations will be activated (simulated).

The beginning conditions are per the Initial Conditions and will be reviewed with the participants at the beginning of the tabletop. When scenario play begins the Control Room initiates 1-SACRG-1.

The TSC will not be monitoring SAMGs and the Control Room will direct the TSC to do so.

When the Control Room completes 1 SACRG 1, the TSC is monitoring SAMGs and the Control Room enters 1-SACRG 2.

During the fust time the Evaluators and the Decision Makers work through the Diagnostic Flow Chart (DFC), no equipment is available, except the PRZR PORVs, PRZR and Reactor Vessel head vents, and the diesel driven fue pumps. The Evaluators will reconunend implementing a limitred number of available strategies possibly including SAG-1, SAG-2, SAAG-4 and SAG 7.

Prior to working through the DFC again, the IH EDG is retumed to servica. With the IH bus restored, the Evaluators and Decision Makers are now able to direct additional strategy implementation for the implementors. These strategies chould include SAG 1 and SAG 3.

The drill terminates after SAG-3 implementation.

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I VIRGIN A POWER NORTil ANN A POWER STATION 1997 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TAHLFTOP (SCENARIO I)

TIME LINE TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION ANTICIPATED RESPONSE Beginning Perform participant briefing.

After Brief Start drill. Control Room enters 1-SACRG-1.

Per Play Control Room requests the TSC to monitor SAMGs. TSC initiates monitoring of SAMGs. TSC Evaluators enter the Diagnostic Flow Chart (DFC) and initiates monitoring the Severe Challenge Status Tree.

Per Play Control Room initiates depressurization of RCS using a RCS pressure begins to s'.owly decrease.

l PRZR PORV.

Per Play Control Room complete I-SACRG-1 and TSC assumes Control Room transitions to 1-SACRG-2 and implements responsibility for monitoring SAMGs. TSC directives Per Play TSC Evaluators check water level in SGs > 33 %. No. TSC Evaluators enter I-SAG-1.

Per Play TSC Evaluators Permine no high pressure water source is TSC Decision Makers direct depressurization of the SGs available to feed the SGs. to allow feeding with low pressure source. TSC Evaluators retum to the DFC.

Per Play TSC Evaluators check RCS pressure < 400 psig. No. TSC Evaluators enter I-SAG-2.

Per Play TSC Evaluators determine that RCS depressurization TSC Decision Makers / Evaluators inform the Contml should continue using the PRZR PORV. Room Implementors to continue depressurizing the RCS.

Per Play Control Room Implementors to continue depressurizing the TSC Evaluators verify effectiveness of the strategy and RCS. retum to the DFC.

Per Play TSC Evaluators check core temperature < 700 *F. No. TSC Evaluators enter 1-SAG-3.

Per Play TSC Evaluators determine no water source, except the SI TSC Decision Makers prioritize action to restore Safety accumulators, is available to inject into the RCS. Injection capability. TSC Evaluators retum to tim DFC. ,

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VIRGl...A POWER

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NORTil ANNA POWERSTATION. ' t 1997 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TABLETOP (SCENARIO I) a TIME LINE  :

1 TIME' EVENT DESCRIPTION ANTICIPATED RESPONSE

i. ~ Per Play _ .;

TSC Evaluators check containment water level > 1 ft 8 in. TSC Evaluators enter 1-SAG-4. j Me. TSC Evaluators check water volume > I.94 Mgal. No. '

i PerPlay TSC Evaluators determine that no sprays are available. TSC Decision Makers direct gravity draining the Casing .;

Hey also determine that gravity draining the RWST to the Cooling Tank. TSC Evaluators retum to the DFC.

j containment is not available. Dey de: ermine that gravity draining the Casing Cooling Tank is available. "

Per Play TSC Evaluators check site sa'sless than Site Area TSC Evaluabrs continue with next step in DFC.

Emergency levels. Yes.

1 Per Play . i TSC Evaluators check containment pressure < 17 psia. No. TSC Evaluators enter 1-SAG-6.

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a i Per Play TSC Evaluators determine that no sprays or fans are TSC Decision Makers prioritize action to restore Spray j Y available. Systems. TSC Evaluators return to the DFC. ,

Per Play TSC Evaluators determine that containment hydrogen is EC Evaluators recommend hydrogen burn. TSC greater than curve for hydrogen burn.

Decision Makers / Evaluators direct the Control Room I..@...cinors to in./eswnt a hydrogen burn. De s

hydrogen bum is successful. TSC Evaluators return to t

' the DFC.

Per Play TSC Evaluators enter SAEG-1. EC Evaluators review conditions and review with Decision Makers. TSC Decision Makers should discuss -

concems with the Control Room In@exe; ors.

Per Play OSC reports that III EDG output breakeris repaired. TSC Decision Makers inform the Control Room implementors to energize the 1il bus with the diesel. - 'I 1

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VIRGle..A POWER '

NORTII ANNA POWERSTATsen j 1997 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENTTABLETOP (SCENARIO I)

TIME LINE '

' TIME EVENT DESCRIITION ANTICIPATED RESPONSE Per Play TSC Evaluators determine that SAMG conditions still exist. TSC Evaluators return to step 2 of the DFC.

l Per Play TSC Evaluators check water level in SGs > 33 %. No. TSC Evaluators enter 1-SAG-1.

t Per Play TSC Evaluators determine that 1-FW-P-3A is available to TSC Evaluators reccisin,cnd feeding the SGs. TSC..

feed the SGs and evaluate whether er not the SGs should be Decision Makers / Evaluators inform the Control Room -

fed.' Implementors to implement the strategy. -

Per Play Control Room Implementors implement the strategy. TSC Evaluators verify strategy implementation and return to the DFC.  ;

Per Play TSC Evaluators check RCS pressure < 400 psig. No. TSC Evaluators enter 1-SAG-2. i Per Play TSC Evaluators determine that RCS depressurization TSC Decision Makers / Evaluators inform the Control Q should continue using the PRZR PORV. Rocm Implementors to continue depressurizing the RCS.

Per Play Contml Room Implementors continue depressurizing the TSC Evaluators verify efTectiveness of the strategy and ,

RCS. return to the DFC.

Per Play TSC Evaluators check core temperature < 700 *F. No. TSC Evaluators enter 1-SAG-3.

1 Per Play TSC Evaluators determine that 1-CII-P-1 A is available to TSC Evaluators reu, nu,end injecting into the RCS. TSC

inject into the RCS. Decision Makers / Evaluators inform the Control Room

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Implementors to implement the strategy.

Per Play Control Room Implementors implement the strategy. TSC Evaluators verify strategy imples,cntation and retum to the DFC.

Per Play Terminate drill. Perform debriefing.

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VIRGINIA POWER NORTH ANNA POWER STATION 1997 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TABLETOP (SCENARIO 1)

MESSAGES / DATA This section contains:

1. Multi Function messages
2. Operational Data

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VIRGli..A POWER NORTII ANNA POWER STATION 1997 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TABLETOP (SCENARIO 1)

MULTI-FUNCTION MESSAGES l TIME FACILITATOR FACILITATOR INSTRUCTIONS MESSAGE Per Play OSC Facilitator SCENARIO message to the Emergency He SBO diesel conrol panel is completely l

Maintenance Director. destroyed. We are checking with the manufacturer to locate a new control system.

Time of repair is unknowTi.

t Per Play OSC Facilitator SCENARIO message to the Emergency The 15112 breaker has been repaired. The Maintenance Director. operators can start and load ill EDG.

Per Play Control Room Ifcontainment 112burn is requested and The containment pressure spiked to 54 psia and Facilitator ignition source is used, then provide this decreased back to slightly less than previous SCENARIO message to Operations Shift value. The containment temperature increased Supervisor. 20*F.

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VIRG k POWER

  • NORTII ANNA POWER STATION s 1997 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TABLETOP (SCENARIO 1)

OPERATIONAL DATA ,

Time 0 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 Time 5 Time 6 Time 7 1 RCS Pressure (psig): 1750 1550 1300 1100 900 550 390 350 RVLIS - Full Range (%): 30 28 Failed Failed Failed Failed Failed Failed Upper Range (%): 0 0 Failed Failed Failed Failed Failed Failed Core Exit Thermocouples (*F): 2175 2178 Failed Failed Failed Failed Failed Failed RWST Level (%): 98 98 98 98 98 93 84 71 Accumulator Pressure (psig): 640 640 640 640 570 400 355 250 Charging Flow (gpm): 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SI Flow (gpm): 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 480 SG Levels - A (%): 25 WR 23 WR 20 WR 18 WR 15 WR 20 WR 45 WR 55 WR B (%): 20 WR 18 WR 10 WR 9WR II WR 18 WR 45 WR 55 WR C(%): 10 WR 8WR 2WR 5WR 9WR 12 WR 45 WR 55 WR SG Pressures - A (psig): 1085 1085 1085 800 50 50 50 50 B (psig): 1085 1085 900 50 50 50 50 50

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C (psig): 1085 1085 50 50 50 50 50 50 Total Feedwater Flow (gpm): 0 0 350 350 350 350 350 350 Steam Line Radiation (mR/hr): oos oos oos Normal Nonnal Normal Normal Normal Containment Sump Level (ft): 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.9 Containment Pressure (psia): 19 20 20 21 23 22 19 17 Containment Temperature ( F): 150 151 151 152 153 153 154 154 Containment Ilydrogen (%): 00s oos 00s 00s oos oos oos oos Quench Spray Flow (gpm): 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Recire Spray Flow (gpm): 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Casing Cooling Tank Level (%) 100 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 Containment Radiation (R/hr): 5.1 x E5 5.1 x E5 5.2 x E5 5.2 x E5 5.3 x E5 5.2 xES 5 xE5 5xES i

VIRGl. .a POWER NORTII ANNA POWER STATION 1997 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TABLETOP (SCENARIO 1)

OPERATIONAL DATA l

Time Column Use Notes:

Time 0 - Initial Condition Values ,

Time 1 - Values during tumover between Control Room and TSC.

Time 2 - Values for first work through of the DFC.

Time 3 - Use these values between the first and second work through of the DFC.

Time 4 - Values for second work through of the DFC.

Time 5 - Values for use as appropriate after the second work through of the DFC.

[, Time 6 - Values for use as appropriate after the second work through of the DFC.

Time 7 - Values for use as appropriate after the second work through of the DFC.

o OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT INCLUDING ALL AREAS / BUILDINGS ATTACIIED TO WALL I

On Contact at 1 ft at 2 ft at 5 ft at 10 ft at 20 ft at 40 ft at 80 ft at 100 ft R/hr R/hr R/hr R/hr raw R/hr R/hr R/hr R/hr 51.0 52.5 53.6 56.1 51.0 45.9 40.8 30.6 25.5 V

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