ML20210Q199

Rev 0 to VPAP-2604, Severe Accident Mgt Guideline (SAMG) Program Administration

ML20210Q199
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	06/10/1997
From:	VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML20210P682	List: ML20210P677 ML20210Q199 ML20210Q205
References
FACA, VPAP-2604, NUDOCS 9708280215
Download: ML20210Q199 (39)

Text

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Title:

Severe Accident Management Guideline (SAMG) Program Administration Process / Program owner: Director Emergency Planning Procedure Number Revision Number Effective Date VPAP 2604 0 06//o/pp Revision Summary

. New procedure to address Severe Accident Management Guideline (SAMG) Program Administration NOTE: This procedure covers the key administrative requirements for the SAMG ProFram.

Instead of creating an extensive series of Administrative Procedures to cover the development and processing of S AMGs, existing Administrative Procedures used for developing and processing Technical Procedures will be used, as applicable, and as directed by the Supervisor Station Procedures.

REEERENCE ONLY Approvals on File 9708280215 970820 PDR ADOCK C*)OOO338 F PDR a.mim nvu m en

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TAHLE OF CONTENTS Section Page 1.0 PURPOSE 5 2.0 SCOPE 5 3.0 REFERENCE / COMMITMENT DOCUMENTS 5 4.0 DEFINITIONS 6 5.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 8 6.0 INSTRUCTIONS 11 6.1 Guideline Development i1 6.2 Review 11 6.3 Validation 12 6.4 Approvals 13 6.5 Training 13 6.6 Distribution of Approved SAMGs 19 7.0 RECORDS 20 ATTACHMENTS 1 SAMG Background Development 21 2 SAMG User's Guide 23 3 SAMG Training Outline 37

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PAGE 5 0F 39 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to provide background and guidance for the development, maintenance, training, and use of the Sevt.re Accident Management Guidelines (S AMGs). This procedure applies to information related to the Diagnostic Flowchan (DFC), Severe Challenge Status Tree (SCST), Severe Accident Guidelines (S AGs), Severe Challenge Guidelines (SCGs), the Severe Accident Exit Guidelines (SAEGs), Computational Aids (CAs). and the Severe Accident Control Room Guidelines (SACRGs).

A discussion of the background (basis) associated with S AMG implementation is provided as Attachment 1. SAMG Background Development. Detailed information regarding the rules of use for the SAMGs is provided as Attachment 2, SAMG User's Guide.

2.0 SCOPE 2.1 This procedure appli:,., to all Severe Accident Management Guidelines (S AMGs) used at the North Anna and Surry Power Stations.

2.2 Severe Accident Control Room Guidelines (S ACRGs) and the Diagnostic Flow Chart (DFC) shall be written in accordance with VPAP-0505, Writer's Guide for Dual-Column Procedures, while the remaining S AMGs shall be written in accordance with VPAP-0504, Technical Procedures Writer's Guide, unless as otherwise specified by the Supervisor (s) Station Procedures.

2.3 S AMGs shall be prepared, reviewed. validated, approved, and used in accordance with this procedure.

3.0 REFERENCE / COMMITMENT DOCUMENTS 3.1 References 3.1.1 VPAP-0502, Procedure Process Control 3.1.2 VPAP-0504, Technical Procedures Writer's Guide 3.1.3 VPAP-0505, Writer's Guide for Dual Column Procedures 3.1.4 VPAP-0601, Document Distribution and Control 3.1.5 VPAP 2802, Notifications and Reports 3.1.6 Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Severe Accident Management Guidance, MUHP-2310,05/94 3.1.7 Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Severe Accident Management Guidance Training. MUHP-2312,08/95 1

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j PAGE 6 OF 39 3.1.8 Nuclear Safety Analysis letter,6/25/96, ET No. NAF 96123, Rev. O Transmittal of SAMG Serpoints and Computational Aids, North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 3.1.9 Nuclear Safety Analysis letter,9/17/96, ET No. NAF-96163. Rev. O, Transmittal of Revised SAMG Serpoints and Computational Aids, North Anna Power Station Units I and 2 3.1.10 Nuclear Safety Analysis lettet,5/22/96, ET No. NAF 96092, Rev. O, Transmittal of

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S AMG Setpcints and Computational Aids, Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 3.1.11 Nuclear Safety Analysis letter,9/5/96, ET No. NAF 96159, Rev. O, Transmittal of Revised SAMG Serpoints and Computational Aids, Suny Power Station Units 1 and 2 3.1.12 Nuclear Safety analysis letter,6/18/96, ET No. NAF-96120. Rev,0, Transmittal of S AMG Severe Challenge Status Tree Figures, Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 3.1.13 NRC Correspondence: SECY 88147, SECY 89-012, SECY 93 308, Generic Letter 88 20 3,1.14 1/2 ECA 0.0, Loss of All AC Power 3.1.15 1/2 FR C.1, Response to inadequate Core Cooling 3.1.16 1/2 FR S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation /ATWS 3.1.17 NRC Letter to Consumers Power Company (CPC),11/5/86, CPC Request For Interpretaiion of 10 CFR 50.54(y)

3.2 Commitmenis 3.2.1 Virginia Electric and Power Company letter, Serial No. 95 130, dated 3/25/95, Severe Accident Management 4.0 DEFINITIONS 4.1 10 CFR 50.54(x) and (y) Action The reasonable actions that depart from a license condition or a technical specification (procedure ) in an emergency, where the actions taken are needed immediately to protect public health and safety. -

4.2 Computational Aid (CA)

An aid that provides the TSC with a tool to evaluate recovery actions.

4.3 Diagnostic Flowchart (DFC)

A flowchart that directs the TSC to perform the appropriate mitigative actions to place the plant in a controlled, stable state.

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, PAGE 7 0F 39 4.4 Individual Plant Examination (IPE)

Site specific analysis characterir.ing severe degraded core accidents and source term generation.

4.S - Phenomenology Term used to describe those elements characteristic of severe ac:ident conditions.

4.6 Severe Accident Control Room Guideline (SACRG)

A guideline that provides for the transition from Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGS) into the Severe Accident Management process.

4.7 Severe Accident Management Guideline (SAMG)

SAMGs are guidelines for actions and are NOT procedures.

Guidelines for actions in accordance with the NRC definition of accident management, presented in SECY 89 012, encompasses those actions taken during the course of an accident by the plant operating and technical staff to achieve the following:

. Prevent core damage '

Terminate the progress of core damage if it begins and retain the core within the reactor vessel Maintain containment integrity as long as possible

. Minimize offsite releases 4.M Severe Accident Exit Guideline (SAEG)

A guideline that provides either long term monitoring of actions that have been implemented or provides guidance for terminating ur af a SAMG.

4.9 Severe Accident Guideline (SAG)

A guideline that evaluates strategies that can be performed to mitigate challenges identified b the Diagnostic Flow Chart.

4,10 Severe Accidents Those accidents that result in a catastrophic fuel failure, core degradation and fission produ release into the reactor vessel, containment, or the environment.

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• PAGE 8 OF 39 4.11 Severe Challenge Guideline (SCG)

A guideline that provides strategies that can be performed to mitigate severe challenges identified by the Severe Challenge Status Tree.

4.12 Severe Challenge Status Tree (SCST)

A status tree that directs the TSC to immediately perform the appropriate mitigative actions to mitigate a severe challenge to the plant.

5.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 5.1 Requester Any individual may request a revision to the S AMGs. He requester is responsible for completing a Procedure Action Request in accordance with VPAP-0502, Procedure Process Control.

5.2 Supers isor Station Procedures The Supervisor Station Procedures is responsible for implementing the appropriate sections of VPAP-0502. Procedure Process Control, as they apply to the S AMGs, and directing the activities of the Procedure Writer to that effect.

5.3 Superintendent Operations The Superintendent is responsible for reviewing revisions to all S AMGs.

5.4 Director Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (NEP)

The Director Nuclear Emergency Preparedness is responsible for the following:

5.4.1 Reviewing revisions to all S AMGs other than the SACRGs.

5.4.2 Developing and conducting S AMG table top drills.

5.4.3 Maintaining records on S AMG training and Refresher Training.

5.5 Superintendent Nuclear Training The Superintendent Nuclear Training is responsible for the following:

5.5.1 Providing SAMG training as described in this procedure.

5.5.2 Assisting Nuclear Emergency Preparedness in developing and conducting SAMG table top drills.

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.. PAGE 9 OF 39 5.5.3 Developing and maintaining SAMG training materials.-

5.5.4 - Conducting SAMG classroom and self study training.

5.6 Superintendent Station Engineering i

The Superintendent Station Encineering is responsible for reviewing SAMGs. when c'eemed necessary by the Supervisor Station Procedures.

5.7 Supervisor Station Nuclear Safety The Supervisor Station Nuclear Safety is responsible for reviewing SAMGs, when deemed necessary by the Supervisor Station Procedures.

5.8 Manager Nuclear Analysis & Fuel The Manager Nuclear Ar.Jysis & Fuelis responsible for reviewing draft SAMGs, when deemed necessary by the Supervisor Station Procedures, for maintaining S AMG Serpoints and Computational Aids, and for initiating revisions to the SAMGs based on changes to the IPE, as applicable.

5.9 - Reviewer Individuals astigned the responsibility for performing Writer's Guide, Validation, Periodic or Departmertal reviews are responsible for the following:

5.9.1 Reviewing the guideline in accordance with the applicable criteria.

5.9.2 Documenting any comments in memo form or on a mark-up of the draft guideline.

5.9,3 Obtaining resolution of comments from the writer and documenting concurrence by signing the Procedure Routing Form.

5.10 Station Manager The Station Manager is responsible for approving new SAMGs and revisions to all SAMGs.

5.11 Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee (SNSOC)

SNSOC is responsible for reviewing and recommending approval of the SAMGs.

5.12 Supervisor Records Management Nuclear The S upervisor Records Management - Nuclear is responsible for the distribution and retention 4

of approved SAMG documents in accordance with this procedure.

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' 6.1 Guideline Development 6.1.1 S AMGs are based upon the WOG generic S AMGs. Deviations from the WOG generie .

S AMGs shall be documented and included as part of the initial set and any subsequent revision packaFe. This documentation shall provide written justification to ensure the actions are consistent with the basis of the ass,ociated WOG SAMG.

6.1.2 S AMGs will be written in accordance with VPAP 0504, Technical Procedures Writer's Guide, and VPAP 0505, Writer's Guide for Dual Column Procedures, as determined by the Supervisor (s) Station Procedures. The cross references to NA&Fs serpoint basis document should be maintained as part of the text.

6.1.3 For processing purposes. Computational Aids (CAs) will be treated as distinct guidelines, even though they are supplemental information used in the performance of the guidelines.

6.1.4 S AMGs are non safety related.

6.2 Review SAMGs shall be reviewed in accordance with VPAP-0502, Procedure Process Control, as determined by the Supervisor (s) Station Procedures, and as follows:

6.2.1 A PAR form shall be used to document the revision sumrnary. However, all questions on the PAR form should be marked N/A because Station Manager approval is required.

6.2.2 An Activity Screening shall be performed, but ONLY for the impacts on the non affected unit.

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i 6.2.3 The initial set of SAMGs shall be reviewed by the following organizations:

~. Operations

. . Nuclear Training .

. Station Engineering

. Station Nuclear Safety

. Human Performance Enhancement (HPE) Coordinator

. Nuclear Emergency Preparedness

. Nuclear Analysis and Fuels

. Station Procedures

. SNSOC, after all others 6.2.4 Subsequent revisions shall be reviewed by Operations, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and SNSOC. Revisions shall be reviewed by the NA&F and/or Station Engineering if the revision impacts their jurisdiction. Other cognizant Hepartments impacted by specific modifications shall also review subsequent revisions, as deemed uppropriate by the Supervisor Station Procedures.

6.2.5 NA&F shall maintain S AMG Serpoints and Computational Aids current, periodically review SAMGs against changes to the IPE, and initiate revisions based on these reviews, as appropriate.

6.3 Validation 6.3.1 When a new guideline has been developed or when major revisions have been made to guidelines, they should be validated by one of the following methods prior to implementation:

Use the guideline during a functional drill (not an exercise)

Perform a walkthrough of the guideline Hold a stand-alone table top drill with the guideline

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l 6.3.2 Minor guideline revisions, such as editorial changes, changing serpoints, and other changes that do not change the method of performing tasks, do not need to be validated in accordance with 6.3.1. These revisions will be reviewed as set forth in VPAP-0502 Procedure Process Control.

6.3.3 Guideline validation shall be documented using the Validation section of the Procedure Routing form (See 3.1.1).

6.4 Approvals S AMGs shall be approved by the Station Manager.

6.5 Training Based on a philosophy adopted from the WOG SAMG, personnel assigned to work with the S AMGs have been categorized into one of three positions. The Decision Maker and Evaluator positions will normally work out of the TSC. The implementor works out of the Control Room.

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_ PAGE 14 OF 39 6.5.1 Decision Maker

a. The position title of Decision Maker has been given to personnel trained to be in charge of the SAMG use and application. The Decision Maker should maintain a I

high level perspective of all the SAMGs.

b. The normal Emergency Response Organization position (s) trained for the Decision Maker position are the Station Emerfency Manager, Emergency Operations Director Emergency Technical Director, and the Emergency Procedures Coordinator. Additional selected ERO personnel should also receive classroom x training at the Decir ion Maker level. However, their participation in table top drills and associated debriefings is not required. This target audience should include the following:

TSC:

• . Emergency Maintenance Director

*. Radiological Assessment Director

.LEOF:

.. Recovery Manager

.. Radiological Assessment Coordinator Emergency Plan Advisor LEOF Operations Suppon Coordinator CERC:

• . Corporate Response Manager

• • Technical Support Manager Plan / Design / Construction Manager

.. Chief Technical Spokesperson w

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POWER VPAP 26(u REVISION O PAGE IS OF 39 6.5.2 Evaluator

a. The position title of Evaluator has been assigned to individuals who have been tasked with becoming familiar enough with severe accident phenomenology and the associated uncertainties to perform the evaluations required in the S AMG.

Specifically, the Evaluator (s), within the context of the SAMG, are members of the TSC tasked with any of the following activities:

. Diagnosing conditions that require entry into specific guidelines

+ Evaluating the positive and negative impacts of strategies presented in cenain of the guidelines Responding to severe challenges

. Interpreting the response of plant parameters following strategy implementation Assessing the effectiveness of implemented strategies and determining whether additional mitigation is needed Using the Computational Aids

b. The normal Emergency Response Organization positions trained for the Evaluator position are the Technical Suppon Team Reactor Engineer, Electrical Engineer, Mechanical Engineer, Operational Advisor, and Technical Suppon Team Leader.

Additional selected ERO personnel should also receive classroom training at the Evaluator level. However, their participation in table top drills and associated debriefings is not required, This target audience should include the following:

. CERC Reactor Engineer

+ CERC Safety Analysis Engineer

c. A minimum of three Technical Suppon Team members should be SAMG qualifie to fulfill Evaluator duties at the time of an event.

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PAGE 16 OF 39 6.5.3 Implementor

a. The remaining small fraction of the SAMGs, specifically the S ACRGs,is assigned to the Control Room staff. The position title for the Control Room staff utilizing the S ACRGs is implementor (s). One of the Control Room guidelines, S ACRG 1 is for use during fast acting transients that proceed to core damage before the TSC is staffed and functional. The second Control Roo.m guideline, S ACRG 2 is for use when the TSC is staffed and functional,

b. The normal Emergency Response Organization position (s) trained for the implementor position are the Senior Reactor Operators, Reactor Operators, and STAS. Additional selected ERO personnel should also receive classroom training at the implementor level. However, their participation in table top drills and associated debriefings is not required. This target audience should include the following:

State / Local Emergency Communicators a

NRC Communicators

. OSC Director

. Public Information Technical Advisor 6.5.4 SAMG Curriculum S AMG training lessons and requirements are specified in accordance with guidance provided by the Westinghouse Owners Group. A SAMG training overviewis provided in Attachment 3. SAMG Training Outline.

6.5.5 Initial Training Requirements

a. Initial training requirements will normally include either classroom or self study training, followed by participation in a table top drill, for each of the following positions:

Decision Maker Evaluator

• Implementor

. Selected ERO personnel (classroom training only)

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b. Following implementation of the SAMG program, initial training will not be a prerequisite for assignment to an ERO position. Personnel newly assigned to an ERO position shall complete initial classroom or self study SAMG training within 6 months of their assignment, followed by participation in the next scheduled table top drill. Portions of S AMG training previously completed by an assignee need not -

be repeated (e.g., for an Evaluator who becomes a Decision Maker).

6.5.6 Refresher Training Requirements Refresher training requirements for Decision Makers (DM) Evaluators (E), and implementors (1) will normally be required to be completed once every three calenda years as follows:

a. Severe Accident Phenomena - (DM, E I) will complete at least one of the following:

Computer Based Training (CBT), or

-. Classroom training, or Self study

b. Severe Accident Management Guideline Usage-(DM,E,1) will panicipate in ALL of the following:

. SAMG table top drill, and

• Associated post-drill debrief 6.5.7 Table Top Drills

s. - Table top drills will be conducted to provide for initial training of new/ repla Decision Makers Evaluators, and implementors, and for S AMG refreshe as previously described.

b. Table top drills that involve a single location (TSC or Control Room) may be to better focus on the training needs of the participants as follows:

1. Table top drills for Decision Makers and Evaluators do not necessaril the panicipation ofimplementors.

2. Similarly, table top drills for implementors do not necessarily require the participation of Decision Makers and Evaluators.

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c. Table top drills are not a part of, or associated with, Emergency Plan drills and exercises.

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.d. NEP r.nd Nuclear Training will coordinate the scheduling of SAMG related table top drills.

6.5.8 Tracking Mechanism

a. The current NEP and station departmental procedures for notifying individuals of ERO assignments and training will be used for assigrung SAMG positions and notifying individuals of training requirements.

b. NEP will be responsible for tracking refresher training requirements.

6.5.9 ' Evaluation Strategy and Self Assessment Periodic table top drills will be the mechanism utilized to ensure ERO personnel are familiar with the use of S AMGs and with the interfaces (i.e., between Decision Maker.

Evaluator, and implementor) during SAMG use. Debriefings will be held following the drill to capture lessons leamed, identify useful preventive or mitigative measures undertaken, and ensure weaknesses are identified.

The assessment of performance during drills should be based on the process used to 1

arrive at a recommendation, ensuring evaluations are made in a systematic method based on the best available information at the time. Elements of a systematic evaluation of severe accident strategies should include the following:

. Diagnosis of plant conditions to determine the applicable strategies to be evaluated

. Verification of plant conditions and use of alternate indications

. Communication with the Control Room to determine available equipment

. Identification of positive and negative impacts of the strategy

. Identification of limitations and long term concems

. Follow-up to verify expected plant responses The post-drill debriefings will provide participants the opportunity to receive direct feedback from drill facilitators. Debriefs also allow the participants to provide direct input into the self assessment process. During these debriefs, feedback forms will be made available to the participants, giving them the opportunity to provide additional comments that may be factored into the assessment.

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- 6.6 . Distribution of Approved SAMGs Revisions to SAMG documents shall be distributed as follows:

6.6.1 Copies of the SACRGs shall be distributed to the Control Room and Simulator.

6.6.2 Copies of all S AMGs (S ACRGs, DFCs, S AGs, SCSTs, SCGs, S AEGs, CAs, and supporting set point technical reports) shall be distributed to the TSC, LEOF, and CEOF.

6.6.3 Copies of all SAMGs shall be distributed in accordance with VPAP-0601, Document Distribution and Control.

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• l PAGE 20 OF 39 7.0 RECORDS 7.1 The following individual and packaged documents and copies of any related correspondence completed as a result of the implementation or performance of this procedure are records. They shall be transmitted to Records Management in accordance with VPAP-1701, Records Management. Prior to transmittal to Records Management, the sender shall assure that:

. Each record is packaged when applicable

. QA program requirements have been fulfilled for Quality Assurance records

. Each record is legible, completely filled out, and adequately identifiable to the item or activity involved

. Each record is stamped, initialed, signed or otherwise authenticated and dated, as required by this procedure 7.1.1 Individual Records None 7.1.2 Records Package Records package for new or revised S AMGs will contain the following:

. PAR form

. Approved Guideline

. Routing Form

. Deviations from WOG generic S AMGs with justification Results of training table top validations performed

. Supporting documentation 7.2 The following documents completed as a result of the implementation of this procedure are not records and are not required to be transmitted to Records Management.

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PAGE 21 OF 39 ATTACHMENT 1 (Page 1 of 2)

SAMG Background Development GrNERAL The developmem of Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMG)is in response to an industry

- initiative under the direction of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). This initiative is in response to a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) notification that a plant specific severe accident management program would be one of the requirements for closure of the severe accident regulatory issue (Ref. SECY 88 147). The NRC invited NEl to participate in the development of the scope and content of severe accident management guidance before the NRC developed the detailed regulatory requirements. The NRC delineated the expected overall objectives of an accident management plan and the minimum requirements for any plant specific accident management program in SECY 89-012.

The NRC definition of accident management, presented in SECY 89-012, encompasses those actions taken during the course of an accident by the plant operating and technical staff to:

1) Prevent core damage.

2) Terminate the progress of core damage if it begins and retain the core within the reactor vessel.

3) Maintain containment integrny as long as possible,

4) Minimize offsite releases.

In SECY 93 308, the NRC stated that it would consider a binding industry initiative on accident management to be an acceptable alternative to a generic letter provided that the initiative met the established objective.; for accident management set forth in SECY 88 147 and SECY 89-012. This path has been followed with the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) developing the formal industry position. NEl 9104, Revision 1.

The S AMG is designed primarily for the TSC staff to fill the void beyond the Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGS) with respect to formalized guidance for severe accident situations. The primary goal of the ERGS is to protect the core with secondary goals of protection of fission product boundaries and returning the unit to a stable condition. in the S AMG, the principle goal is to protect fission produ boundaries and mitigate any ongoing fission product releases with secondary goals to mitigate severe accident phenomena and retum the unit to a controlled stable condition.

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• PAGE 22 OF 39 ATTACilMENT 1 (Page 2 of 2)

SAMG Background Development DEVEl OPMENT B AS!S Unit specific S AMGs are based on the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) generic S AMG. The generic S AMG was developed to provide Fuidance that would satisfy the regulatory severe accident concems and, at the same time, provide a product that could be implemented at Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) sites in a reasonable and consistent manner, The S AMGs consider severe accident scenarios, phenomena and accident proFression based on the results of IPEs completed by the WOG member utilities. *Ihe SAMG framework provides symptom-based diagnosis of these scenarios which leads directly to a set of possible actions. Symptom based diagnosis is needed based on the potential for a severe accident progression to be different from those previously analyzed, and the potential that a comprehensive knowledge of the plant conditions may not be well known based on instrumentation readouts. By defining symptom-based diagnosis, the challenFes to the plant fission product boundaries and the achievement of a controlled stable plant state can be determined through monitoring of a small number of critical parameters whose magnitude can be determmed through a variety of instrumentation and/or computational aid references.

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PAGE 23 OF 39 4 - ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 1 of 13)

SAMG User's Guide This attachment has been developed to provide detailed information regarding S AMG rules of use. As previously discussed, the S AMG is used by control room and TSC emergency response personnel.

Each is further discussed, separately, in this section, as is entry into the S AMG process.

The S AMGs are GUIDELINES. not procedures. The principle distinction is that verbatim compl '

with each step of the SAMG is not required. Each step in the guidelines is part of the overall proce that should be used to reach a decision reFarding the appropriate actions to take during a severe accident. However, the repetitive nature of the S AMG guidelines, where they may be in use for m hours under relatively slow changing unit conditions, suggests that a detailed reading of each ste each iteration through the guidelines is not required.

When the S AMG is put into use, the unit conditions are well beyond the design basis for the pla Since severe accidents are beyond design basis events, pre planned or spontaneous procedures an guidance written to mitigate the consequences of these events, and rny changes made to the plan during such an accident, to help mitigate the consequences are not governed by 10 CFR 50.59.

Therefore, actions that are recommended for implementation using the SAMG do not fall under 10 CFR Part 50.59. The implementation of the SAMGs is considered to be an exercise of the provi of 10 CFR 50.54 (X), therefore, notification of the NRC is required in accordance with VPAP-2802, Notifications and Reports, upon SAMG implementation.

TR A NSITION FROM THE ERGS TO THE SAMGS The first decision point in the use of the Severe Accident Management Guidance is the transition from the Emergency Response Guidelines to the Severe Accident Management Guidance. 'Ihe SAMG was developed based on severe accident considerations for events which are initiated at power op While the S A MG may be valid for accidents initiated from shutdown conditions, these conditions w not considered in the development of the SAMG nor their validation. Caution should be exercised in using the S AMG for accidents that did not originate from power operation states. Since the SAMG developed for accidents that are initiated at power operation, the initial control roorti esponse accident condition involving inadequate cooling of the reactor core would be the Emerge Guidelines.

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4 ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 2 of 13)

SAMG User's Guide -

Changes to the ERGS have been made to provide a clear transition from the ERGS to the S AMG. Based

- on a review of the ERGS for severe accident sequences, there are only three procedures that could be in use at the time of core damage and possible transition to the SAMG. The first is from 1/2-ECA 0.0, Loss of All A.C. Power The second is from 1/2 FR-C.1, Response to inadequate Core Cooling, The third is 1/2 FR S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation /ATWS, and is potentially applicable to accidents initiated by an ATWS event. It is likely that an ATWS event would result in a transition to the S AMG from FR C. I since coolant voiding would result in core suberiticality prior to core damage and FR S.I would not be in use, The FR S.] transition to the SAMG was developed to provide assurance that the S AMG would always be used in a timely manner for ATWS events.

The criteria for transition from ECA 0.0 to the S AMG is a core exit thermocouple temperature greater 0

than 1200 F and no A.C. power buses energized.

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ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 3 of 13)-

. SAMG User's Guide -

i The criteria for transition from FR C.1 to the S AMG is also based on a core exit thermocouple 0

temperature prester than 1200 F and FR C.1 actions to cool the core are ineffective. FR C.) is entered when indications of inadequate core cooling are present, as indicated by core exit thermocouple ,

temperatures and/or reactor vessel water level. Within FR C.1, there is an " instruction loop" which _

. attempts to cool and depressurize the reactor coolant system to minimize inventory losses and to achieve a low RCS pressure to increase the potential sources ofinjection to the RCS. Within FR C.1, '

I RCS cooldown ~and depressurization using the steam generators is attempted first, if there is steam generator inventory. If the steam Fenerators are unavailable or the cooldown and depressurization is

not effective, all available reactor coolant pumps are started and all relief pathways from the RCS are

~~

! opened. If this is not effective, the " instruction loop"is entered where the steam generators and relief I pathways are continually anempted until core cooling via injection can be restored. Since FR-C.) is focused on restorinF core cooling, transition to the SAMG is not made until all attempts to re-establish core cooling have been tried and are not successful. Therefore, the transition criteria has been place at the end of the " instruction loop" which ensures that all attempts to re establish core cooling have

~

been mad: and none are successful. At this step in the FR C,1 procedure,if the core exit thermoco 0

temperatures are greater than 1200 F and increasing, none of the attempts to re establish core cooling '

have been successful. At this point,it is appropriate to transition from the ERGS to the SAMG since the focus of accident management must now include protection of fission product boundaries and the potential for actions to mitigate onFoing fission product releases associated with significant core damage.

- The criteria for transition from FR S.] to the SAMG is a core exit thermocouple temperature grea than 1200"F, Although this is the F hi hest priority status tree in the ERGS, it is not certain that the control room staff will be using FR S.1 when the core exit thermocouples exceed 1200 0 F. With the core uncovered, subcriticality should be achieved due to coolant voiding and the accident response would be from FR-C.1 described above. This transition to the SAMG was developed to ensur transition for ATWS events.

a

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PAGE 26 OF 39 i

ATTACHMENT 2 i (Page 4 of 13) l SAMG User's Guide CONTROL ltOOM SAMG When the decision is reached that a transition from the ERGS to the S AMG is appropriate, the control l room will open the S AMO to SACRG 1." Severe c.ccident Control Room Guideline initial Response". [

- Upon entering the SAMG, the use of the ERGS is discontin9ed. The ERGS are discontinued primarily to avoid potential conflicts in guidance given in the ERGS and the SAMG, A secondary reason is to re focus the goals of the controf toom personnel from restoring core cooling to a mu:h broader goal of  !

- protecting plant fission product boundaries while attempting to establish a controlled stable plant state.

' All guidance in the T A C.! procedure which is still appropriate for core darnage conditions and does i not conflict with other S AMG guidance,is restated in the SACRG 1 guidance.

When use of the ERGS is discontinued, any equipment and/or systems put into service within the ERGS

should remain in service unless specifically stopped by a S ACRO step or a recommendation from the ,

TSC, Additionally, any local recovery actions initiated while the ERGS were in effect should be  !

continued when use of the ERGS is discontinued, unless funher evaluations conclude that the priorities for recovery have changed and recove y of other equipment is more important.

'f If the TSC is staff vi functional (i.e., strendy monitoring the TSC S AMG) at the time the SAMG is entered, un early > of S ACRG 1 instructs the operators to go to SACRG 2," Severe Accident >

Contr01 Room Guidelme For Transients After TSC is Functional". lf the TSC is not already monitoring the TSC S AMG. the control room personnel continue in S ACRG 1.

The major ponion of S ACRG 1 is focused on fast moving accident sequences. Since most accident sequences would not progress to core' damage until some time after the TSC is functional, under existing Emergency Plan criteria for TSC activation and staffms, most of SACRG 1 would not be used. .

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. o. m.,3. , on VPAP 2604

, POWER REVISION O PAGE 27 OF 39 ATTACllhtENT 2 (Page 5 of 13)

SAhtG User's Guide S ACRG 1 puts the control room personnel in an " instruction loop" which includes the check to determine if the TSC is ready to use the TSC S AMG. The control room personnel carry out the instructions in S ACRG 1 as appropriate, based on plant conditions and equipment availability. The -

S ACRG I guidance is written in the same format and language as the EhGs ar.d the " rules of use"from the ERGS apply to the S ACRG 1 instructions with one exception: the SAMG control room guidelines are GUIDELINES and not procedures - verbatim compliance with the guideline steps is not required.

As an example of the ERO/S AMG " rules of use", the SACRG 1 instructions are written in two column format with the left column designated as ActiorvExpected Response (A/ER) ano the right column designated as Response Not Obtained (RNO). If the condition (s)in the A/ER column is obtained, the instructions in that column are canied out,if possible, if the condition in the A/ER colurre. is not obtained, the instructions in the RNO column are carried out for that numbered step. After the RNO instructions for that step are completed, the flow proceeds to the A/ER column for the next numbered step, if it is not possible to carry out an instruction due to equipment unavailability, the flow proceeds to the next step. Also, the instruction flow does not stop at a given step to await a change in the plant conditions that caused the step to be executed, unless specifically instructed by a step. Another situation is when an "lF THEN" statement cannot be completed due to equipment unavailability, the guidance flow continues to the next step.

The use of the S AMG requires that certain information be available as the basis for decision making.

For the control room guidance, it has been assumed that the plant instrumentation will be available since the plant conditions have not progressed to the point where a challenge to instrumentation survivability is a concern. The exception to this is the core exit thermocouples which may be permanently damaged by the core temperatures during core melt. In any case, any information that is used as the basis for taking actions during a severe accident should be verified by an attemate information source if available. A table of primary and alternate instrumentatisn fur each of the key decision parameters is provided as an attachment to the TSC Diagnostic Flow Chart ar'd Severe Challenge Status Tree,

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POWER REVISION 0 ,

PAGE 28 OF 39 ATTACHMENT 2

-(Page 6 of 13) l SAMG User's Guide )

When the TSC is ready to use the TSC S AMG, the control room will transition to the S ACRG 2  ;

i guideline via the SACRG 1 instruction. At this point, use of SACRG.1 will be discontinued and the

_ control rom personnel will begin the SACRG 2 instructions. The guidance in SACRG 2 is formatted

(

as an " instruction loop" and consists of monitoring the plant condition, advising the TSC of potenual q

- equipment alignments to implement severe accident management strategies, and performing certain actions which do not require TSC consultation. As in the case of S ACRG 1, the instructions are written in two column format and the " rules of use" described for SACRG.! also apply to S ACRO.2. The control room personnel would be expected to continue in S ACRG 2 until the use of the SAMG is  !

discontinued by a decision from the TSC as described below.

While executing the S ACRG 2 instructions, the control room personnel are also responsible for carrying out the implementation of severe accident management strategies recommended by the TSC.

While this is formalized in SACRG 2 as a guideline step, the control room personnel would be expected to immediately begin the process of implementing a strategy recommended by the TSC. The ,

form of communication between the TSC and the control room with respect to strategy implementation is not specified in the SAMG and may take many different forms including verbal and/or written

, communications. The S AMG was developed based on the philosophy that the ultimate responsibility

• i-for plant response in an emergency resides in the highest authority in the chain of command of the i facility licensee available to make a decision about the response. Any senior reactor operator licensed l

for a unit and acting for the facility licensee can make the decision for the unit, unless more senior licensee personnel are available and are authorized to make the decision; however, no one below a licensed senior reactor operator can make the decision. The facility licensee's guidance for handling an emergency, including the personnel who can and must make decisions within the chain of

' command, must be clear and precise. Pers%nel working for a facility licensee should understand the consequences in an emergency of not following the orders of their superiors. All personnel working for the facility licensee should use their best judgement in an emergency, and a licensed senior reactor operator should give thatjudgement to his superiors (Reference lener from NRC to Consumers Power

- Company dated November 5,1936),

1 l

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POWER VPAP 2604 REVISION O PAGE 29 OF 39 ATTACilMENT 2 (Page 7 of 13)

SAMG User's Guide Once the TSC is using the TSC S AMG. all actions by the control roon, should only be undertaken after consultation with the TSC. Als, comm.nication should be established between the control room and the TSC in updating the tabl 3qard:ng the plant status vs. the TSC diagnostic tools (the Diagnostic Flow Chan and Severe Challt.,pe Status tree). This table is contained in control room guideline 5 ACRG 2 and TSC Guideline SAEG 1. It is especially important that the control room and TSC have a mutual understanding of the priorities and objectives of severe accident management, which is summiuized in the SACRO 2 and S AEG 1 tables, so that:

. The control room can provide information to the TSC regarding potential equipment and systems alignments to f.aplement the strategies being considered by the TSC

. The control room can continue with the accident recovery if the TSC becomes temporarily uninhabitable during a severe accident TSC S AMG The control room is responsible for the decision that the Emergency Response Guidelines are not effective and that a transition to the Severe Accident Management Guidance is appropriate, based critena in the ERGS. If the TSC is functional at this time, the control room may consult the TSC for advice on the decision to transition to the S AMG. Upon entering the S AMG, the use of the ERGS is discontinued.

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• ATTACHMENT 2 *

(Page 8 of 13) [

SAMG User's Guide 4 i The TSC always begins using the S AMG at the beginning of the Diagnostic Flow Chart (DFC). The

first step of the DFC instructs the TSC to begin monitoring the Severe Challenge Status Tree (SCST) l h parameters. The remainder of the DFC consists of key plant parame'ters whose values are obtained

from the plant instrumentation or through the use of computational aids. The DFC specifies seven plant .

parameters to be sequentially monitored until a controlled stable state can be declared. The seven plant ,

parameters have been prioritized and should be monitored in the order specified by the DFC Although  !

the SAMG validation revealed that the DFC can be used in a parallel mode if sufficient personnel are 4 available, this method has not been validated in detail and should only be used with caution. A 1

controlled stable state can only be declared if the four most important parameters meet the setpoint specified in the DFC. Each of the seven parameters in the DFC has a "setpoint" value which is the basis i for determining whether recovery / mitigation actions should be evaluated, The SCST specifies four e  ;

plant parameters to be monitored to identify the need for immediate actions to mitigate a severe i challenge to a fission product barrier or to mitigate a significant fission product release. The four SCST parameter > are monitored in the order specified by the SCST. Each of the four parameters in the SCST also has a "serpoint" value which is the basis for determining whether recovery / mitigation actions should be implemented.

Thus, the TSC diaFnoses the plant status and challenges to fission product barriers as indicated by the DFC and SCST parameters and their setpoints.- If a DFC setpoint is exceeded, the TSC goes to the appropriate Severe Accident Guideline (S AG) and performs the evaluations in the SAG to determine the appropriate course of action. The TSC can recommend a set of actions, chosen from the strategies in the S AG to the control reom for implementation. De TSC and control room then monitor the short term implementation based on information available in the TSC and the control room. As long as a SCST parameter setpoint is not exceeded, the TSC continues using the DFC. It should be noted that ,

the evaluations directed by a SAG may lead to the TSC recommendation that no severe accident manaFement actions be taken at this time. Such a decision is likely to be based on either: a) the unavailability of equipment to carry out strategies in the SAG, or b) the potential negative impacts of

~ implementing a strategy outweigh the benefits.

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.. POWER VPAP 2604 REVISION 0 o

PAGE 31 OF 39 ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 9 of 13)

! i SAMG User's Guide  !

L

_ If equipment is recovered during the TSC evaluation process, a significant time period may p l

the equipment is put into service if a rigorous use of the TSC SAMG and DFC is employed. For 1 example,if the evaluation for injection into the RCS wasjust finished and no actions recomruended I 4

due to equipment unavailability and, after moving to the next guideline, the equipment to perfor '

injection becomes available, a rigorous use of the DFC would require a complete cycle throu ,

DFC before the equipment was used, in this case, the TSC must use judgement as to whether to ui the newly available equipment immediately or continue in the DFC in a more rigorous manner.

Each of the parameters in the DFC specify one Severt Accident Guideline to be used when the parameter setpoint is exceeded. The SAGS are used to: - '

• Determine the availability of equipment to perform the strategies in the guideline

. Determine the positive and negative impacts associated with implementation of each of the e available strategies -

. Determine the limitations dictated by plant conditions associated with implementation of n strategy j

. Determine the impact of not implementing any of the strategies

. Determine the short term and long term plant response after strategy implementation

. Determine if an implemented strategy should be stopped due to excessive negativ

• i Worksheers are provided in the SAMG for each guideline as an aid in performing some of t determinations described above, it is not mandatory that the worksheets be used. They h provided in the SAMG only as aids for making the SAG determinations.

The use of the SAMG requires that certain information be available as the basis fo For the TSC guidance, it has been assumed that the plant instrumentation will be availab ERG setpoints, the SAMG setpoints do not necessarily include explicit uncertainties to ac

{ possMe adverse environmental effects on the various instruments that are used. Users sh alternate inst ument indications when verifying plant status. Suspect instrument indications used for trending of a parameter rather than relying on an explicit numerical valu and attemate instrumentation for each of the key decision parameters is provided as anI the TSC Diagnostic Flow Chart.

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V1MOINIA VPAP 2604 .

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• PAGE 32 OF 39  :

- ATTACHMENT 2--

(Page 10 of 13) i SAMG User's Guide

Although TSC evaluations of the different aspects of the strategies in a S AG may proceed in parallel, the order for decision making purposes should be that specified in the guideline. The guideline steps specify when and how the guideline is exited. The Fuldeline may be exited prior to the DFC parameter i

changing status with respect to the DFC setpoint for that parameter. For example if RCS depressurization is initiated from S AG 2, S AG 2 may be exited prior to the RCS pressure reaching the DFC setpoint.  ;

When the TSC is referred to another guideline (SAG) to evaluate the benefits and negative impacts of

-implementinF a set of actions, work in the present guideline should stop until the evaluation in the new guideline is completed. At that point, the exit from the second guideline would send the TSC back to  ;

the original guideline and the evaluations in that guideline would then be completed. Since the S AMG are guidelines and strict compliance with each guideline step is not required, it is especially important to evaluate negative impacts before reaching a decision on the f nplementation of a strategy. The I '

evaluation of neFative impacts in S AMG space should be considered a " good practice". Each of the j_ S AGs has an exit which directs the user to either the DFC or the guideline and step in effe:t, as

appropriate.

l just prior to exiting a S AG, the TSC is instructed to refer to the "long term concerns" attachment to that guideline. Here, the TSC would determine the long term concerns that are applicable to the I

strategy implemented from the S AG and attach the worksheet to the S AEG 1 guideline. The long term concems workr.heet is intended to provide a checklist of plant parameters that should be periodically j monitored to ensure that the implemented strategy can be continued in the long term.

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• POWER REVISION 0 PAGE 33 0F 39 i

~  !

A'ITACHMENT 2 (Page 11 of 13)  ;

SAMG User's Guide I i

The SCST is similar to the critical function status trees in the ERGS except: a) there is only one tree i and 'all paths on the tree are either " red" or " green". lf a SCST setpoint is exceeded, a " red" path encountered and the TSC should stop monitoring the DFC or evaluating SAMG strategies dictated by  ;

the DFC. Strategies already implemented should be continued, if no SCST serpoint is exceeded, a

" preen" path is encountered and the TSC continues with the ongoing activities. When a " red" path is  ;

encounter' ed, the TSC should refer to the appropriate dCG and recommend the appropriate strategy .

' actions to the control room. The SCST parameters should be monitored on a periodic basis with the interval determined by the margin between the parameter actual value and the serpoint. For example; p

• if the margin between the actual value and the serpoint for all SCST parameters is large (e.g.,50%).

- monitoring the status tree parameters could be performed several times per hour. However, if the

! margin between the actual value and the serpoint is small and decreasing, monitoring the status might be performed continually.

The SCOs are similar to the SAGS except that the evaluation of the positive and negative impacts of implementing strategies is not done in the SCOs. The negative impact of not implementing a strat assuming the equipment is available, would be loss of a containment fission product boundary. This dictates that a strategy must be implemented. Although TSC evaluations of the different aspects of the i strategies in the SCOs may proceed in parallel, the order for decision making purposes should be that specified in the guideline. The SCG guideline steps specify how the guideline is exited. he guideline may be exited prior to the SCST parameter changing status (i.e., from a " red" path to a " green" p If no equipment was available to implement any of the strategies contained in the SCO, the SCO can be exited but a retum to the SCG is required when equipment becomes available to implement one o the SCG strategies. All of the parameters in the SCST are also represented on the DFC. With the cseeption of containment vacuum, once a SCST parameter is " cleared"due to implementation of SCG >

strategy, the DFC parameter would still be exceeded. De next pass through the DFC would involve evaluation of the strategies in the appropriate S AG and the decision to stop a strategy impleme a SCG could be made at that time. Also, the S AEG 1 guideline described below permits evaluation of the need to continue strategies implemented from the DFC or the SCST. In a manner similar to the S AGS, the TSC is instructed to defm' e the long term concems associated with any strategy implemented from a SCG and attach the long term concems to the SAEG 1 guideline.  !

4 2

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PAGE 34 OF 39 4

ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 12 of 13)

SAMG User's Guide 4 The last step of each S AG and SCG, as well as the last step of the DFC, instructs the TSC to implement SAEG.I. Thus, once a strategy is implemented, SAEG 1,"TSC Long Term Monitoring", is implernented and monitored in addition to the DFC and SCST parameters. S AEG 1 contains: a) a summary sheet of the DFC and SCST parameters, and b) a set of parameters for each strategy implemented that should be monitored for long term impacts. The set of parameters to be monitored for long term impacts are those identified just prior to exiting a SAG or SCG. The summary sheet of DFC and SCST parameters is intended to provide:

. A check of the recovery progress for implemented strategies, as measured by the trending of the DFC parameter toward its setpoint,

. A check of the accident progression for parameters for which no strategy has been implemented to assist in setting recovery priorities, and

. A tool to communicate TSC priorities to the control room (this table is in SAEG 1 and SACRG 2).

For the purposes of using the summary sheet to define the strategies that are "in use" to control parameters on the DFC, three situations should be considered. All three of these situations should be treated as though a strategy was implemented from the SAMG for the purposes of monitoring long term concems, even if it was not initiated from a SAG or SCG. The three situations are:

. Equipment o: systems that were initiated from one of the S AGs or SCOs to control one of the DFC parameters

. Equipment or systems that were initiated in the ERGS prior to transition to the SAMG and which control one of the DFC parameters

. Equipment or systems which are automatically initiated during the event (or remain in service from the pre trip plant configuration) and which control one of the DFC

- parameters l

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. POWER VPAP 2604 REVISION 0 PAGE 35 OF 39 A*ITACHMENT 2 (Page 13 of 13)

SAMG User's Guide For each of the long term concem parameters, a serpoint and suggested recovery actions if the is exceeded is hiso provided in S AEG 1. SAEG 1 provides a worksheet to track the strategies currently in use to aid in the determination of the appropriate parameters to be monitored. Only tho parameters associated with active strategies need to be monitored in SAEG 1 While the possible recovery actions to be considered if an SAEG 1 parameter exceeds its setpoint is specified in S AEG 1, the methodology for evaluation and selection of the appropriate recovery actions is not specified in the S AEG 1 guideline. 'Re TSC would be e:,pected to perform an evaluation based on available information, including information in the SAG or SCO associated with the parameter u.ider consideration, to determine the appropriate recovery actions.

The progress toward achieving a controlled, stable state is checked in the last step of the DFC

" instruction loop", based on four key DFC parameters. After these DFC parameters indicate that a controlled, stable state has been achieved, the TSC would transition to SAEG 2,"5 AMG Termination" for S AMG exit guidance and would terminate usaFe of the SAMG. SAEG 2 consists of a series of steps to identify the appropriate cautions, limitations and notes to be observed in transitioning fr structured guidance in the S AMG.

There are a !imited number of specific exceptions to the SAMG " rules of use" described above:

1) If S AG 1 specifies steam generator depressurization as a prerequisite to injection into the ste generators, the TSC would exit SAG 1 after the recommendation for steam generator depressur is made to the control room. When the steam generator pressure reaches the prescribed level t

' permit injection to the steam generators, the TSC would immediately return to SAG 1 to finish the guideline by monitoring the implementation of the injection to the steam generators, as sp S AG 1. The instructions to exit S AG 1 and return when the steam generator (s) is depres clearly described in SAG 1,

2) Monitoring the SCST parameter for fission product releases is suspended when a str the containment from SCG 2 or SCG 3 is being implemented Under the normal rules of us fission product releases exceed their setpoint value, all other actions are stopped and SCG immediately mitigate the releases. When venting is used from SCG 2 or SCG 3, the releas expected to exceed the SCST setpoint, but termination of venting would not be appropria SCO 1 should not be implemented if intentional containment venting is being canie e +g. * - -

- = . - . _ . _ . - . . _ - .. - - .- -.._- - - - . - . _ . _ . . . - - . . - . - - - - - - - . . . _ .

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Intentionally Blank .

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' POWER VPAP 2M14 REVISION O PAGE 37 OF 39 i

ATTACHMENT 3 '

(Page 1 of 3)

SAMG Training Outline CONTENT ll ASIS 1

1 The bas 4 of content of SAMG related initial training materials was established by NEl 9104, Revision 1 (formerly NUM ARC 9104)," Severe Accident Issue Closure Guideline" as impleme by Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Program MUHP 2312, Westinghouse Owners Group S Accident Management Guidance Training. Alllesson plans and self study guides are Virginia Power specific adaptations of WOG supplied materials.

WOG. supplied training materials were analyzed, designed, and developed using the Systematic Approach To Training. Any changes to the WOG supplied materials were restricted to those re by differences in guideline content reflected in reference plant design and terminology. The plan-specific materials were implemented in accordance with categories provided by the WOG (see Minimum Required Content below).

t INTTI AL TRAINING PLAN DESCHIPTION Initial training is accomplished through the following:

+ Lecture

+ Self study

+ Table top exercises While lecture and self study methods can be exchanged (depending on trainee needs and resourc availability), all trainees complete a table top exercise, except where previously noted for selected ERO personnel.

Trainee knowledge is evaluated by the following:

• The debrief phase of the table top exercise

• ne self assessment questions of the self study guide.s, and

. Any required (as determined by the instructor conducting a lecture) quizzes No formal knowledge / skill evaluation is required.

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PAGE 38 OF 39 ATTACHMENT 3 (Page 2 of 3)

SAMG Training Outline MINIMUM MFOUIMFI) CONTENT l

The minimum required training toples, by module description (actual titles will vary), for the three l cateFories of personnel implementing the S AMG are as follows:

DECIRION M AKFR

. Oserview Of The SAMG

. SAMG Executive Volume

.SACRG.1

. SACRG-2

. DFC/SCST

. Instrumentation

. Severe Accident Progression and Phenomena IMPI FMENTOR

. Overview Of The SAMG

. SAMG Executive Volume

.SACRG1

. SACRG 2

.- -. = . -

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J ATTACHMENT 3 (Page 3 of 3)

SAMG Training Outline

• i EVAll1ATOR

. Overview Of The SAMG '

I e

. SAMG Executive Volume

.SACRG1

. SACRG 2 DFC/SCST

. Instrumentation

. Severe Accident Progression and Phenomena '

. Computational Aid #1

. Computational Aid #2 Computational Aid #?

Computational Aid #4 Computational Aid #5

. Computational Aid #6  ;

. Computational Aid #7 SCG1

. SCG 2 SCG 3

.SCG4

.SAEG1 SAEG 2 SAG 1 1

. SAG 2

. SAG 3

. SAG 4

. SAG 5 SAG 6

. SAG 7

~ . . . - - . - . , - . - - - . _ - . .. .