ML20217M835

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Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Revs to TS 3.7.1.6, Atomospheric Steam Relief Valves, to Ensure Automatic Feature of SG Power Operated Relief Valve Remains Operable During Mode 1 & 2
ML20217M835
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 08/18/1997
From:
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20217M525 List:
References
NUDOCS 9708250323
Download: ML20217M835 (4)
v • d • e


Text

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ST-llL-AE-5689 ATTACllMENT 3 PROPOSED CilANGES TO APPENDIX A, i

TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, OF FACILITY OPERA r!NO LICENSES NPF 76 AND NPF 80, SOUTil TEXAS PROJECT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision to Technical Specification 3.7.1.6 Affectedhscs 3/4 7-10 B 3/4 7 3 B 3/4 7-3a Proposed changes indicated by revision bars in right hand side of page.

Additions indicated by underlining.

Deletions indicated by strikethrough.

The applicable amendments at the bottom of page B 3/4 7-3 v ere revised to reflect Unit 1 - Amendment 19 and Unit 2-Amendment 9 as tt: applicable amendments prior to the amendment proposed by this request.

Information previously on page B 3/4 7-3 that was affected by.

Unit 1 - Amendment 85 and Unit 2 - Amendment 72 has been relocated to page B-3/4 7-3a.

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9708250323 970818 sTI: ?am4n DR -ADOCK O 4

4 l'LANT1YSIlMS AIhiOSl'IlliRlC3EAhtlWLililLYA13ES L1hilTING CONDIT10Nf0R01' ERAT 10N 3.7.1.6 At least four atnxnpheric steam relief valves and associated enanuakor.trols shall be l

OPERAllLE.

API'LICAU1LITY: MODES 1,2,3, and 4.*

ACIl0N:

a.

With one less than the required atmospheric steam relief valves OPERAllLE, restore the required atmospheric steam relief valves to OPERAllLE status within 7 days; or be in at least ilOT STANDilY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in llOT SilVTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and l

place the required RCS/RilR loops in operatien for decay heat removal.

b.

With two less than the required atmospheric relief valves OPERABLE, restore at least three atmospheric relief valves to OPERAllLl! status with;n 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least ilOT STANDilY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in 110T SilVTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and place the required RCS/RilR hiops in operation for decay heat removal.

SURVEILLANCEREQUIP1htENTS j

4.7,1.6 Each atnxnpheric relief valve and assoelated manual-controls shall be demonstrated OPERABLE l by; Verifying that all valves will open and close fully by operations of-manual controls prior to a.

startup following any refueling shutdown or COLD SilVTDOWN of 30 days or longeruind b.

PCIfErml011LCllANNElcCAllilllAT10NiuttachfGilbutermur_actuatinashmor1.pijtas once cierY IfLinualhL

SOUTil'IT!XAS UNITS 1 & 2 3/4710 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 4 o

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L'1ANTSYSTlihis ilASliS 3/411.6 ATh10SfillilllC_SI1MhilliLif1LYAINES ne atmospheric stearn relief valves are required for decay heat removal and safe cooldown in I

accordance with Iltanch Technical Position RSil 5 1, in the*afety enalyrietroperationof the atmospheeie titeam relief +alvon h awumedin eeeldent analyses for enitigation of*malli eak LOGAr-lu buemkirted Ol'lilMiltitlahj QDESlon12dhutmmpheiluat am3cliclyahttmnLbc_inAutomalic_91th.an indicatedartre10trL122ipilgrutntbtennson'inlliantrefageneratortinntutrttslun_1225 P31L_IthiWeLLand11boafclunnly11unumeuulematitralstionsflhulmostberlatentairlief yaltrudthanindkaltdicipulairL1221r11s_EkttuncertaintktformitigatientfamallkttallaCA I

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estattenlahlodes 1 and 2 pinyldtithutmmphetlutcarniti!cLyahtutesnaduringlhelimerf l

manualentatlunindatr_ttlicylngluffkkaltarigyJamalntalajhuecondaryaldtrtenututst.belew anindicattdlif 4mitnttAl0LpftiWre of I 221piltJnA11stellandAJhtanalyaltdocumentedio WCAP 12416. "EvaluatigtteLLOCA_Duringiledes 3 arid 4 for WettloghongjiSSS " Ahuwithat l

AutomalltstnianuAlrMration of thutmosphfiluttatnitlitliahtilin9titquittdJlhuaffly.Danlyih almmlumrithunanvalsprtolleiteilhttur.ltsidurlos1huicatagrattatetiuhuuntutementmThe APnephetioltam relief valYr1EAtLalio be ustdlapInEkILAltfAtatelltifatittani'l311ttl0nilttm toeling for eventtiuchiumallbttn_l LOCA feedwa,er line break, loss of normal feedwater and loss-of.

L ofIsite power. 'Ihutilikat10DlhalallDunsphttluttautitliclYalicuillersaDndIl03tlully_pIlotle Etattup_folluringanyltfuelingahulduwnsLCQl,D_S11LLTDQ_WNrL3ftday19th>agttallertfer DMtaliens using eithetmanualvtautomatitSpaltehdIhf_umtrilalatittialhuaitlyJAalyllunumc_a channtlialibratlonratrasitatmestheiluttatattlicLntruutomattuttuallenShannelttin11udt yttificallan efautomatic.ncluntluaaltht.l22iriluttpointitatformedritty_lBanenthi l

3/4.7.1,7 FEEDWATEIUSDIATION VAINES

%e OPERAll!LITY of the feedwater isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blow down in the event of a steam line or feedwater line rupture. %e operatiility of the Feedwater Isolation valves will minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and limit the pres <ure rise within containment. De OPERAlllLITY of the feedwater isolation valves within the closure times of the Surveillance Requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analysis.

3/4.7.2 STEAM GENER_A'IDitl'11ESS11111ZIEb8PERATURELlhilTATION

%e limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressurvinduced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits.

De limitations of 70'F and 200 psig are based on a steam generator RTun f 10*F and are sufficient to o

prevent brittle fracture.

3LQ3 COMIONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEh!

he OPERA 111LITY of the Component Cooling Water System ensures that sulficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. He redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure,is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

SOUTilTEXAS - UNITS I & 2 113/473 Unit 1 Amendment No.19 Unit 2. Amendment No. 9 l

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PLANT SYSTilMS I

BASES 3/414 ESSENTIALCQOLING WATER SYS111M

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The OPERAHILITY of the Essential Cooling Water System ensures that sufucient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions. "Ihe redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

When a risk important system or component (for example Essential Cooling Water)is taken out i

of service,it is important to assure that the impact on plant risk of this and other equipment simultaneously taken out of service can be assessed. The Configuration Risk Management Program j

evaluates the impact on plant risk of equipment out of service. A brief description of the Configuration j

Risk Management Program is in Section 6.8.3 (administration section) of the Technical Specification.

3/4.7.5 ULTIMAll! HEAT SINK The limitations on the ultimate heat sink level and temperature ensure that sufucient cooling i

capacity is available either: (1) provide normal cooldown of the facility or (2) mitigate the effects of j

accident conditions within acceptable limits.

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SOUTH TEXAS. UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7 3a Unit 1 - Amendment No. 85 -

d Unit 2 Amendment No.72 l

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