ML20209G329
| ML20209G329 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 09/09/1986 |
| From: | Treby S NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209G335 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#386-664 OL, NUDOCS 8609120430 | |
| Download: ML20209G329 (13) | |
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d C0CKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 86 SEP 11 P4 :01 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE Tile ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BhdD$.; biiN: ,
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In the Matter of ) .
) ,
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-450 .
) 50-457 (Braidwood Station, Unite 1 and 2) )
NRC STAFF I!ESPONSE TO APPLICANT'S MOTION FOR AUTHORITATION OT FUEL LOADING AND PRECRITICAL TESTING I. INTRODUCTION Commonwealth Edison Company (Applicant) filed a " Motion For -
Authorization of Ftul Loading And Precritical Testing" on August 18, 1980
(" Applicant's Motion") O. The Applicant's Motion requests the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ("Doard") pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 8 50.57(c),
to authorize the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (" Director, NRR"), upon making the applicable findings required by 10 C.F.R 0 50.57(a), to issue a license to Applicant to load fuel and conduct certain precritical testing for Braidwood Station , Unit I. Applicant's Motion at 1. Attached to Applicant's Motion are the supporting affidavits of Kenneth D. Brienzo, Thomas J. Maiman and Richard J. Slember, In its motion, Applicant argues that these affidavits demonstrate conclusively
~1/ The parties reached a stipulation that Intervenors' and Staff % w responses to Applicant's Motion should be filed r,'ednesday ,
- September 10, 1986 by hand delivery to the Board and other paities at the beginning of the hearing session. The Board Chairman approved this stipulation.
DESIGNATED ORIGINAL hh DO 50 56 Certified By O S N7 he Q PDR _
i
0 that Applicant will carry out its fuel loading and precritical testing i
activities in a manner that will ensure that Braidwood Unit i remains suberitical without any reliance on electrical systems or circuitry under accident and transient conditions. Id. at 10-15. Applicant further argues that since the Intervenors' contention only puts in issue the assurance that electrical systems have been installed at Braidwood in compliance with quality requirements, and because no reliance need be placed on these for the safe completion of Applicant's fuel loading and precritical testing activities, the Intervenors' contention has no relevance to these activities. Id. at 15. Therefore, Applicant argues, the Board should issue an order pursuant to 10 C.F.R. I 2.730(e) authorizing the Director, NRR to make the necessary findings and grant a IIcense authorizing the requested operation. Id. at 16. Finally , Applicant
- argues that the Board should decide this motion on the basis of the pleadings. In the event the Board deems it appropriate to permit discovery or hold a hearing on the issue whether the admitted contentions are relevant to the matters raised in this Motion, Applicant requests that the Board refer this question promptly to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board pursuant to 10 C.F.R. I ? 730(f). Id. at 16.
The NRC Staff (" Staff") suNL Ub t' 8.s response to Applicant's Motion.
For the reasons discussed belus, tw staff supports Applicant's Motion.
II. BACKGROUND There are two areas of controversy which remain as contentions in the proceeding. One area concerns emergency planning Contentions 1(a) and 1(b) and Offer of Proof Issues, 2, 3, 4 and 6. All of these
o I
. contentions and issues deal solely with aspects of the Applicant's offsite emergency plan for Braidwood. The status of litigation on these conten-tions and issues is that the hearing on these matters has been completed and the record closed, proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law have been submitted by the parties but no initial decision has been issued.
The other area of an admitted contention relates to whether Appli-cant's electrical contractor, Comstock (specifically its QA/QC manage-ment), conducted "[s]ystematic and widespread harassment, intimidation, retaliation and other discrimination . . . against Comstock QC inspectors
... who express safety and quality concerns . . . and whether such misconduct, if it occurred . . . discourages the identification and correc-tion of deficiencies in safety related components and systems at the Braidwood Station . " Contention 2C. The contention sets out certain allegations made by Comstock QC personnel which, in Intervenors' view, support their assertion. Id. As characterized by Applicant in its motion, "[g]iven its most expansive interpretation, the contention asserts that the quality of Comstock's electrical installations is indeterminate. "
Applicant's Motion at D. The status of litigation on this contention is that presentation of evidence on the issues raised in this contention is ongoing.
III. DISCUSSION 10 C . F. R . I 50.57(c) permits an applicant , in a contested proceeding where a hearing is being held, to move the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to authorize the issuance of a " low power" operating
license. S The regulation was promulgated "to provide explicitly for early consideration of facility testing in the event of a contested hearing on the issuance of a license for full power operation." Fed. Reg. 8862 (May 14,1971).
If no party opposes the issuance of the license, the rule provides that the Board will issue an order authorizing the Director, NRR to make the appropriate findings in Section 50.57(a). On the other hand, if the license is opposed by any party, the Licensing Board makes findings on the matters specified in subsection (a) of 10 C.F.R. E 50.57, EI but only 2/ 10 C.F.R. 9 50.57(c) provides:
An applicant may, in a case where a hearing is held in connection with a pending proceeding under this section , make a motion in writing , pursuant to this paragraph (c), for an operating license authorizing low-power testing (operation at not more than 1 percent of full power for the purpose of testing the facility), and further operations short of full power operation. Action on such a motion by the presiding officer shall be taken with due regard to the rights of the parties to the proceedings, including the right of any party to be heard to the extent that his contentions are relevant to the activity to be authorized. Prior to taking any action on such a motion which any party opposes, the presiding officer shall make findings on the matters specified in paragraph (a) of this section as to which there is a controversy, in the form of an initial decision with respect to the contested activity sought to be authorized. The Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation will make findings on all other matters specified in paragraph (a) of this section. If no party opposes the motion , the presiding officer will issue an order pursuant to 9 2.730(e) of this chapter, authorizing the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to make appropriate findings on the matters specified in paragraph (a) of this section and to issue a license for the requested operation.
-3/ 10 C.F.R. I 50.57(a) provides that an operating license may be issued upon finding that:
(1) Construction of the facility has been substantially completed, in conformity with the construction permit and the application as (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE) i
4
. to the extent that "there is a controversy." 10 C.F.R. I 50.57(c) . The Director, NRR is responsible for making findings "on all other matters specified in' paragraph (a) of this section." Id. If the admitted contentions are not " relevant to the activity to be authorized (i.e. , do _
not raise issues which, if proved, could affect a decision on controverted 5 50.57(a) findings) , then the Board does not make any 50.57(a) findings, but instead issues a 5 2.730(e) order authorizing the Director, NRR to make the required findings. 10 C.F.R. I 50.57(c); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant , Units 1 & 2),
LBP-81-5, 13 NRC 226, 233 (1981); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE) amended, the provisions of the Act , and the rules and regulations of the Commission; and (2) The facility will operate in conformity with the application as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; and (3) There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by the operating license can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the regulations in this chapter; and (4) The applicant is technically and financially qualified to engage in the activities authorized by the operating license in accordance with the regulations in this chapter. However, no
, finding of financial qualification is necessary for an electric
- utility applicant for an operating license for a utilization facility of the type described in 5 50.21(b) or I 50.22.
(5) The applicable provisions of Part 140 of this chapter have been satisfied; and (6) The issuance of the license will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2, CLI-83-27, 18 NRC 1146, 1140-50 (1983).
In accordance with the regulatory scheme described above, the following possible courses of action present themselves to the Board in this proceeding. If Intervenors posed no objection to the Motion, the situation would be analogous to that in the Catawba proceeding. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station , Units 1 & 2), Memorandum and Order (May 30, 1984). In Catawba, the Intervenor agreed with Appli-cants that the proposed fuel load and testing would not present any
" technical threat to the public health and safety. " Accordingly, the Intervenor did not oppose the issuance of a license authorizing those activities. Catawba, pp. 1-2. A stipulation was reached among the parties in that proceeding; the Licensing Board adopted the stipulation and authorized the Director upon making the finding on all applicable matters in 10 C.F.R. 9 50.57(a), to issue the requested license to the Applicants. Id.
On the other hand, if Intervenors do object to the Applicant's Motion, they must show why their admitted contentions are relevant to the fuel loading and testing activities proposed to be conducted by the Applicant. The Board should then review Intervenors' objection to ascertain whether it raises an aspect of Intervenors' admitted contentions in the full power operating license proceeding relevant to the requested fuel load authorization. If it does not , the Licensing Board is not required to make 50.57(a) findings concerning the requested license, but should follow the provisions of 50.57(c) and issue an order authorizing the Director, NRR to make appropriate findings and to issue the
requested license upon making the requisite findings. If on the other hand Intervenors' objection raises aspects of their admitted contentions relevant to the requested fuel loading authorization, the Licensing Board must make the evidentiary findings called for by 50.57(a) relevant to the requested license. The Staff has considered the legal arguments in the Applicant's Motion and the technical information contained in the supporting affidavits. For the reasons discussed below , it is the Staff's view thet none of the Intervenors' remaining contentions in the full power operating license proceeding are relevant to Applicant's motion for authority to load fuel and conduct precriticality testing.
There are two contentions pending in this proceeding, the emergency planning contention and the harassment and/or intimidation of Comstock QC inspectors contention. The emergency planning contention deals solely with aspects of Applicant's offsite emergency plan for the Braidwood facility. The Commission's regulations and case law establish that issues regarding the offsite emergency plan are not relevant to the grant of a license for fuel loading and/or low power operation. 10 C.F.R.
I 50.47(d); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-728,17 NRC 777, 789 (1983). The Commission has stated that "[Section 50.47(d)] established unqualified authorization
. . . to issue a low power license in the absence of either NRC or FEMA approval of an off-site emergency plan and without the need for a predictive finding of reasonable assurance that a full-power license will eventually issue, so long as the prerequisites for a low-power license are
met . " Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station),
CLI-85-1, 21 NRC 275, 278 (1985).
Turning to the remaining unresolved contention relating to harass-ment and/or intimidation of Comstock QC inspectors , thc. question is whether it is relevant to the activities proposed to be performed by Applicant in Applicant's Motion. This contention places in issue whether the electrical systems or circuitry at Braidwood have been installed in compliance with quality requirements. If the filings on Applicant's motion demonstrate that no reliance need be placed on any electrical system or circuitry in order for Applicant to conduct safely its fuel loading and precritical testing activities, then the Board should find that the contention has no relevance to the requested fuel loading and precritical testing activities. The Applicant provided the Affidavit of Richard J.
Slember (Attachment to the Applicant's Motion) to show that if the concentration of boron within the reactor vessel is maintained at or above 2000 ppm throughout the fuel loading process and precriticality testing sequence, there will be no physical means of the reactor core becoming critical, and therefore no electrical systems or circuitry will be required under accident and transient conditions. The Staff has eval-uated the ability to perform fuel loading and precritical testing at Braidwood without reliance upon electrical equipment for protection of the health and safety of the public. The Staff's evaluation was performed by Dr. Walter L. Brooks, who holds the positions of Nuclear Engineer in the Reactor Systems B ranch , Division of Pressurizing Water Reactors - A, Office of Nuclear Regulation. Affidavit of Walter L. Brooks at 1 1.
Dr. Brooks' affidavit indicates that the only threat to public health and
safety in the performance of the proposed fuel loading and precritical testing arises from an inadvertent criticality in the core. Id. at 14. O I!c concludes that inadvertent criticality will not occur during the proposed testing if a boron concentration of 2000 ppm in the core is main-~
4 tained. Id. at 1 6. His conclusion is based on values of critical boron in Applicant's FSAR calculated in an approved manner and calculated with l all rods out.
As set forth in the Affidavit of Thomas J. Maiman (Attachment to the Applicant's Motion) , the Applicant commits that special administrative procedures will be in place during the contemplated fuel loading and I precriticality testing to assure that the boron concentration does not go below 2000 ppm. Maiman Affidavit at 15. These procedures consist of periodic sampling of the water in the reactor coolant and makeup water i
- systems at least once per shift from these systems by manually taking grab samples to verify that the boron concentration is at least 2000 ppm; and mechanically locking closed the appropriate valves, the opening of j which could permit the entry of nonborated water into the reactor coolant system. The Staff has evaluated the administrative procedures committed to by the Applicant to ensure that no unborated water or under borated I water could be introduced into the reactor coolant system and cause the i boron concentration to go below 2000 ppm. The Staff's evaluation was performed by Bernard Mann who holds the position of Nuclear Engineer, i
Dr. Brooks indicates that the unirradiated fuel does not contain any
~4/
- fission products and is not sufficiently radioactive to pose a threat if it were dropped and broken. Brooks Affidavit at 5 4. Further, he explains that in the event that coolant is lost from the core, no reduction in the margin to criticality occurs. Id. at 1 5.
I
i-1 i
1 Reactor Systems B ranch , Division of Pressurized Water Reactors - A,
! Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Affidavit of Bernard Mann at 1 1.
As Mr. Mann discusses, the Applicant provided to the Staff tables listing the valves for which administrative controls would be taken for unborated water sources to the reactor coolant system. Using the Applicant's tables, the Staff has reviewed the piping and instrumentation diagrams for the l chemical volume and control system and portions of relevant connecting systems to verify the potential flow paths that could introduce unborated water to the reactor coolant system and whether the Applicant had identi-fled the proper valves for which administrative controls would be taken for isolating unborated water sources from the reactor coolant system.
Id. at i 6. The Staff's review indicates that the Applicant had identi-fled the proper valves. Id. The Staff will include as a license condi-i tion to any fuel loading and testing license that may be issued the tobles listirig the valves to be locked closed and the administrative I controls under which they will be locked closed. In addition, the information provided for those valves which may be required to be open for short intervals to perform procedures required by plant chemistry 4
were reviewed. Id. at 1 7. In order to assure that unborated or under-borated water is not inadvertently added to the RCS at those times, the Staff will require as a license condition that each time valves are r
f j
manipulated, an independent confirmation of valve positions shall be f made by a separate person knowledgeable with the systems being used.
Further, the Staff will require as a license condition that each time valves are manipulated and water is added to the RCS, the Applicant
shall sample the RCS both before and after the addition of water to determine the level of boron concentration of the water in the RCS and to ensure it is at or above 2000 ppm. Id.
In addition, the Staff through its inspection program at Braidwood Unit 1 will take action to ensure compliance with the license conditions contained in any license issued by the Commission authorizing the activi-ties requested by Applicant's Motion. The Staff provided an affidavit by Ronald N. Gardner, Chief of the Braidwood Section, Division of Reactor Projects, Region III which affirmed that the Commission will require the Applicant to have, in place, procedures containing provisions which ensure that during fuel load and precritical test activities the boron concentration of the reactor coolant and makeup water systems will be maintained at or above 2000 ppm. Affidavit of Ronald N. Gardner at i 4.
In addition, initial and periodic verifications will be performed by the NRC so as to ensure that the special administrative provisions of the Applicant's fuel loading and precritical testing procedures are being adhered to. Id. at T 5.
In sum, the Applicant's affidavits and the Staff's affidavits filed in support of Applicant's Motion demonstrate that if the boron concentration in the reactor coolant system is maintained at 2000 ppm or greater throughout the activities requested by Applicant's Motion, there is no physical means of the reactor becoming critical. The Staff's affidavits indicate that the Commission will require as license conditions measures to assure that water with a boron concentration level less than 2000 ppm is not inadvertently added to the reactor coolant system. Further, the Commission's Region III will require procedures be in place and will inspect to ensure that the procedures and all license conditions are
I complied with. In sum, the implementation of the special measures proposed and committed to by the Applicant together with the license conditions which would be imposed by the Staff in any license issued for F fuel loading and precritical testing will assure maintenance of a boron 4
i concentration in the RCS of at least 2000 ppm and no reliance need be placed on electrical systems or circuitry. Thus the Intervenors' conten-tion on harassment and/or intimidation of Comstock QC inspector is not relevant to the activities contemplated by Applicant's Motion.
As the Commission observed in Diablo Canyon, supra:
The risk to public health and safety from fuel loading and precriticality testing is extremely low since no self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction will take place under the terms of the license and therefore no radioactive fission products will be produced. A review of the pleadings or Joint Intervenors' two hearing requests reveals no significant safety concerns material to fuel loading and pre-criticality testing. This should not be surprising since the FDVP and related efforts focus on plant systems engineered to handle the hazards associated with radioactive fission products and, as stated above, no such fission products will be produced.
18 NRC at 1149. Similarly, in this case there appears to the Staff no significant safety issues relevant to fuel loading and precriticality testing.
1 As argued in the Applicant's Motion in deciding a 10 C.F.R. I 50.57(c) motion for fuel loading and testing, the question for a Board to resolve is whether any of the contentions admitted in the full power operating licensing proceeding is relevant to the fuel loading and testing activities sought to be authorized. The Commission has stated that a Section
, 50.57(c) motion is not an opportunity for the admission of new i
contentions aimed at the limited operation sought by the Applicant.
Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1
. , - . r-,- +w.,,---,n~---,.,-n- - - - , - . - - > , . , ,m- - - - . - - - -
a 2), CLI-85-5, 13 NRC 361, 362 (1981); Pacific Gas and Electric Co.
(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 801 n.72 (1983). The affidavits filed by Applicant and Staff demonstrate that the Intervenors contentions admitted in the full power operating license proceedings are not relevant to the activities requested in Applicant's Motion. The Staff agrees that the Board can determine on the pleadings that Intervenors' contentions has no relevance to the activities requested in Applicant's Motion and the Board need not hold a hearing for this purpose. Therefore , this Board should authorize the Director, NRR to make appropriate findings under 10 C.F.R. 5 50.57(a) and issue the license requested in Applicant's Motion authorizing fuel load and procriticality testing.
IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Board should issue a decision
! finding that neither of the pending contentions in this proceeding has relevance to the activities of fuel loading and precriticality testing and to issue an order pursuant to 10 C.F.R. I 2.730(e) authorizing the Director, NRR to make the necessary findings and issue a license authorizing the loading of fuel at Braidwood Unit 1 and the conduct of precriticality testing of the facility.
Respectfully submitted, tuart A. reb Deputy Assistant Ge eral Counsel Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 9th day of September,1986
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