ML20214N085

Errata.* Forwards Corrected Pages to Minority Opinion, Matters of Dissent.Served on 870528

ML20214N085
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	05/19/1987
From:	Grossman H Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
To:
References
CON-#287-3547 79-410-03-OL, 79-410-3-OL, OL, NUDOCS 8706020057
Download: ML20214N085 (34)

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00tFETED 05NWC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 37 tiAY 27 P2 :46 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD OFFE s- . a' d

00Chlll4 % ~ B lf1 Before Administrative Judges: BRANCH i Co e SERVED MAY 2B 1987 A. Dixon Callihan In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-456-0L 50-457-0L COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) ASLBP No. 79-410-03-OL (Braidwood Station, Unit Nos. I and 2) May 19, 1987

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ERRATA Attached herewith are corrected pages to the minority decision, as follows: pages 1, 23, 24, 37, 72, 73, 74, 81, 101, 105, 107, 109, 111, 112, 115, 116, 120, 126, 128, 129, 130, 198, 199, 204, 207, 223, 231, 232, 246, 248, 253, 257, 258.

FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Herbert Grossman, Chaiman ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE SM'R888E88Ek6 o

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1. MINORITY OPINION A. Matters of Dissent I cannot agree with a number of conclusions reached in the majority opinion. In this Minority Opinion and underlying Minority Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law I find, contrary to my colleagues, that 10 C.F.R. Part 50 was violated by certain practices and in certain instances: Commonwealth Edison Company's Project Construction Department improperly asserted production pressure on its electrical contractor, Comstock, which, in turn, improperly asserted pressure on its Quality Control inspectors; Comstock improperly appointed Irving DeWald as Quality Control Manager to orient the Quality Control Department away from good quality control practices to production; Comstock management improperly gave supervisory authority to Richard Saklak for the purpose of promoting quantity over quality; Comonwealth Edison Company and Comstock improperly terminated Level III Quality Control welding supervisor Worley Puckett for raising legitimate quality concerns; amd, Comstock management harassed and attempted to intimidate Quality Control Inspectors Perryman, Archambeault and Martin, and retaliated against them for raising quality concerns.

I also find that the complaints of 24 inspectors to the NRC on March 29, 1985 evidenced improper production pressures asserted on l

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1 23 CORRECTED Mr. Saklak, Mr. Puckett's predecessor as Quality Control Supervisor over welding (from August 1983 until May 1984), never became certified. Mr. Puckett's successor, Mr. Tony Simile, who supervised weld inspection activities from September,1984 onward, did not become certified until July 12, 1985, a period of over 10 months. Similarly, other supervisors supervised Quality Control disciplines for many months without becoming certified.

During his tenure at Braidwood, Worley Puckett appeared to have been highly respected by the Quality Control inspectors who were familiar with his work. For example, welding inspector Danny Holley volunteered:

Well, I could say Mr. Puckett was, you know -- maybe I'm out of line, but the welding inspectors that were around when Mr. Puckett was here really respected his -- his professionalism and his background and really felt that he was doing a good job.

When he was let go, a lot of people, you know, brought to ,

their own mind, "Why was he let go?"

There was talk, like I said, that was going on around the office.

Mr. Puckett testified over a number of days at hearing. Despite grueling examination by Applicant's and Staff's counsel, who had been well prepared by their respective experts, Mr. Puckett demonstrated an extensive knowledge of the welding procedures and codes, and a clear grasp of the issues discussed. Although he did not speak as l

e 24 CORRECTED an educated man in the traditional sense and his syntax suffered, his positions and opinions were expressed clearly and logically.

On the basis of his testimony, Mr. Puckett appeared to be a highly conscientious, knowledgeable and competent welding authority --

certainly as competent in his area as any of the other experts who testified. On the other hand, we have no way of knowing how much of Mr. Puckett's knowledge and insight into the welding procedures and issues before us was acquired after his tennination.

Applicant has failed to sustain its burden of proving that Mr.

Puckett was not terminated for raising quality concerns. In fact, the preponderance of evidence is that Mr. Puckett was terminated for raising legitimate concerns and requiring that they be dispositioned in writing. Nor is this an instance in which Applicant, Comonwealth Edison Company, has only derivative liability for Mr. Puckett's improper termination by its contractor, L. K. Comstock. In addition to Comonwealth Edison's placing production pressure on Comstock because of Comstock's backlog in inspections and documentation at that time, which mtde Comstock inhospitable to Mr. Puckett's proposed revamping of inadequate procedures, CECO had direct responsibility in Mr. Puckett's termination. Mr. Gieseker, a CECO official, had played a large part in the Stop Work conferences that led to Mr. Puckett's termination, and had disparaged Mr. Puckett at those conferences. At l one point, when the issue of the use of the AWS D1.1 Code arose, Mr.

Gieseker told Mr. Puckett to " Shut up. I don't want to hear [any]

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37 CORRECTED originally. Not only is it inconceivable that the weld inspection j reports indicating acceptances of multi-hundred welds could have  !

reflected the original condition of the welds, it is also i inconceivable that such large numbers of discrepancies could have been  ;

reworked or repaired during the one, two, three or four days between the beginning of the inspection and the signing of the inspection report. Neither time nor space would be adequate for such operations even if craft were not otherwise occupied in its further construction activities.

Moreover, the failure to record discrepant conditions, which surely must have existed in the multi-hundred weld inspections under the grid system, if observed, would violate Criterion XVII of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B, which requires, as a minimum, a record of any deficiencies noted. On the basis of the evidence adduced, which indicates that the inspection standards of a significant portion of the weld inspectors were substandard, that the inspectors failed to observe significant numbers of discrepancies, and that the weld inspectors failed to document discrepant conditions as required by Appendix B, the weld inspections performed under the grid system, in effect until October of 1983, are totally lacking in credibility.

Under those circumstances, a 100% reinspection program, rather than a sampling program, is ordinarily required to determine whether there is reasonable assurance about the safety of the construction. However, j since the grid system inspections and the time period in which those )

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73 CORRECTED inspectors that Comstock stressed quantity over quality. Tr. 7087.

Several inspectors remembered Mr. DeWald's talking about a minimum required number of inspections to be perfomed as an attempt to eliminate inspection backlog. Tr. 6866-67, 9240-41.

39. Six inspectors testified that Comstock Quality Control management was pressuring inspectors for production under an Edison threat to cancel the Comstock contract if the inspection backlog was not eliminated by certain dates. Gorman, Tr. 5840-41; Holly, Tr.

5151-52; Bossong, Tr. 9857; Hunter, Tr. 8499-8500, 8744-47; Peterson, Tr. 5950-51; Seeders, Tr. 7567-69. Three inspectors acknowledged that the threatened loss of Comstock's contract was shoptalk among the Quality Control inspectors. Bassong, Tr. 9857; Gorman, Tr. 5840-41, 5871, 5884-85; Seeders, Tr. 7568. Mr. Seeders testified that such shoptalk was fairly comon when Comstock was not meeting its deadlines. Tr. 7568. Inspector Danny Holley recalled a meeting in the sumer of 1984 at which QA manager Robert Seltmann indicated that if the backlog of inspections were not eliminated, it could mean that the livelihood of Comstock at Braidwood would be lost. Tr. 5151-52.

Inspector R. D. Hunter testified that more than once at the weekly meetings during 1984, Mr. DeWald had stated that Comstock was in danger of losing its contract if it failed to satisfy certain promised completion dates. Tr. 8499-8500, 8655, 8744, 8747. Inspector Dean Peterson recalled a sp?cial meeting where assistant Quality Control Manager Larry Seese indicated that things were looking very critical

74 CORRECTED for Comstock and that everyone's help was needed to eliminate the backlog. Tr. 5950-51. Mr. DeWald acknowledged such a rumor that Comstock was in jeopardy of losing its electrical contract. However, he recalled the rumor circulating in January, 1985. Tr. 1345-47.

Ul timately, Comstock did lose its contract for a portion of the electrical work on Unit 2. The Gus K. Neuberg Company has replaced Comstock for a portion of the Unit 2 electrical installation and inspection work. Tr. 1349.

40. In order to monitor inspector productivity and manage the inspection backlog elimination program as well as the performance of inspections on current installations, Comstock's Quality Control management developed a status tracking syster.. Under this system., the scheduled completion of various inspection tasks, including the inspection backlogs which existed in the spring of 1984, was projected on the basis of the number of average inspections an individual inspector was expected to perform in a day, e.g., an

)

average expected level of performance, goal or quota. Int. Ex. 23; )

Seese Pref., ff. Tr. 2320 at 8-10; Seese, Tr. 2350-51; Saklak, Tr.

8116-18. For example, Mr. DeWald's early June 1984 backlog completion schedule was based on the average of five welding, equipment and configuration inspections per day; six termination inspections per day; and seven conduit inspections per day on average. Int. Ex. 12.

The status report figures showing the number of inspections actually performed were compiled from individual inspectors' daily reports, i

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l then passed through the inspectors' leads, who sumarized and routed them to the status department. Comstock management posted the periodic status reports for Quality Control inspectors' information.

Seese, Tr. 2498-99; DeWald, Tr. 1576-78. Comstock management acknowledged utilizing the status reports and tracking system to regulate inspector overtime assignments, and to transfer inspectors from one inspection area to another. Seese Pref., ff. Tr. 2320, at 9; Seese, Tr. 2350,

41. It is against this background that I consider alleged harassment, intimidation, and discrimination cited by Intervenors in its inspector harassment contention. First, I take up the matter of Worley O. Puckett, a Level III Weld Inspector, who, according to Intervenor, was fired by LKC because he "make numerous complaints about safety and quality deficiencies which he identified in the ,

course of his duties at Braidwood." Second, I consider the case of l John Seeders, an LKC inspector who allegedly was transferred out of ,

I LKC Quality Control Department to a clerk position in LKC's Engineering Department "in retaliation for his expression of quality  ;

concerns." Contention 2.C. Third, I discuss the complaints of harassment and intimidation made to the NRC by 24 LKC inspectors in March of 1985. Finally, I discuss additional instances of alleged j 1

harassment and intimidation not cited specifically in Intervenors' J Contention.

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l his tenure at Braidwood, Mr. DeWald took Mr. Puckett on a tour of the f facility. Mr. DeWald pointed out welds to Mr. Puckett which Mr.

1 DeWald had inspected when he previously worked as a Level II Weld Inspector. The welds were on a very large hanger but even through

, glancing at the welds, Puckett observed a number that he deemed unacceptable. The welds he observed had undercut, excessive spatter, slag, overlap and craters below the nominal wall thickness. While Mr.

Puckett acknowledges that the acceptability of welds is a matter of individual inspector judgment within limits, Mr. Puckett stated that he would not have had a weld inspector working for him who had accepted some of the welds he observed. Tr. 6214-20. Mr. Puckett expected that after he had become qualified, he would have returned to

. these areas and further dispositioned the welds he observed.

51. During his tenure, Mr. Puckett undertook the. assignment

of overseeing the Comstock welder test facility. Mr. Puckett qualified two other Level II Quality Control inspectors to run the facility and wrote a set of test facility operating rules to be provided to each welder candidate to insure that the welder was aware of the rules durir.g the test. App. Ex. 71. Mr. Puckett was concerned that there be adequate quality control inspector verification of the we' der qualification process. Tr. 6186-97, 6202.

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101 CORRECTED Engineering function to detennine how such a welding procedure specification can be implemented -- by testing a weld of A-446 to A-36, by relying upon prequalification provisions in the existing welding procedure and code, by adopting a revised edition of the code, or by any other means. Tr. 2922-23, 2928-29, 3041.

83. That Comstock, Commonwealth Edison and Sargent & Lundy reacted so vigorously to Mr. Puckett's alleged continued disagreement with the pronosed resolution of this problem when Mr. Puckett had no further official responsibility in the dispositioning of the matters he raised, may reveal a heretofore unmentioned misgiving with Mr.

Puckett: his refusal to acquiesce to the proposed disposition of the matters he raised did not preclude their being dispositioned along the lines suggested by Mr. Gieseker, but his continued presence and nonacquiescence prevented them from withdrawing the entire matter, i

rather than dispositioning it properly. While Staff glosses over DeWald's failure to complete the proper "Stop Work Report" (Form 62) and his having issued an informal memorandum instead, as having l

" complied with the spirit but not the letter, of LKC Procedure  !

4.1.1.3" (Staff Prop. Find.137), the violation was considerably more egregious. Had Mr. Puckett agreed to Gieseker's resolution of the matter, the informal stop work memorandum, not having been logged as would be the formal "Stop Work Report," could simply be withdrawn, with no documentation being brought to the NRC's attention. Mr. Puc-kett complicated matters by causing the issuance of NCR 3099 five days l

105 CORRECTED I

i with regard to Attachment H, which qualified the procedure welding A-446 to A-500, and the AWS D1.1-1975 Code provision allowing for the substitution of a prequalified metal (A-36) for another prequalified metal (A-500). Although the inspection report appeared to recognize that the alleged invalidity of Attachment 0 was part of the A-446/A-36 allegation, it dismissed this matter as follows:

1 The weld procedure was in error in that the A-446 [ sic] base material was not listed as required and that technique sheet "0" was referenced with rejected test results within the procedure. The inspector reviewed the revised procedure and the NCR and found them to be acceptable. This item was satisfactorily resolved.

Nowhere in the inspection report was there recognition of Mr.

Puckett's complaint that Attachment H only qualified a small portion of the welding being performed by Comstock at Braidwood, involving weldments of three-eighths of an inch or greater, and that no procedure qualified the welding of A-446 to A-36 for the smaller welds, Mr. Puckett's major complaint. Although Mr. Schapker was aware at the time he investigated the allegation that the welds being done were predominantly less than three-eighths of an inch (Tr.

10972), he asserted that Mr. Puckett had never expressed his concern to Mr. Schapker about the welds of less than three-eighths inch in size not being covered by Attachment H (Tr.10970). Mr. Schapker's ignorance of this issue is somewhat remarkable since the deletion of any reliance upon Attachment 0 from the disposition portion of NCR

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90. At hearing, Mr. Schapker's testimony was little more than an apologia for Applicant. Although Mr. Schapker's inspection report and his testimony appeared to substantiate almost all of Mr.

Puckett's concerns, they denigrated the allegations as having no technical or safety significance. Included in this denigration of Mr.

! Puckett's allegations was Mr. Schapker's dismissal of the A-446/A-36 issue as involving only a " procedural violation", not an AWS Code violation. Tr. 10991, 11,330. However, when asked repeatedly by the

! Board whether it would have been an AWS Code violation for Comstock to i

have welded less-than-three-eighths inch welds on the basis only of I Attachment H Attachment H having been limited to three-eighths inch

. or greater welds and Attachment 0 being assumed to be invalid at the time, Mr. Schapker would not answer that question directly. Tr.

I l 11331-34.

i i 91. With AWS Code 1.1-1975 (App. Ex. 12) now before us, the l answer is clear: unless the welding procedures are exempted by virtue

} of the metals' and the welding procedures' having been prequalified under the AWS Code, Section 5.2 requires that the welding procedures be qualified "by test". Since Attachment H did not reflect any testing of weldments of less than three-eighths inch and Attachment 0 was invalid at the time because it had relied upon testing that was inappropriate for the specifications authorized, the making of welds l

of less than three-eighths of an inch in size would have violated the i

r Code because it was neither prequalified nor qualified by testing.

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109 CORRECTED

94. The NCR was subsequently dispositioned on the basis of requalifying the weld procedure and welders to include the 2G (horizontal) position for welding, removing the previously installed horizontal welds, and replacing the welds after requalification.

App. Ex. 51, Body of Report at 4.

95. On August 22, 1984, after his first meeting with Gieseker and other Ceco, S&L, and LKC personnel regarding the A-446/A-36 issue, Mr. Puckett sent Mr. DeWald a third memorandum concerning stopping work on welding. This memorandum recomended that all welding, including A-36 to A-446, be stopped because Comstock was

" dangerously approaching a complete breakdown" in its Quality Control Program. In the memorandum, Mr. Puckett stated that procedures involving A-446 "were qualified using the criteria of AWS D1.1-1975 and it should never have been done." That Code, he explained, was never intended for thin-gauged materials like A-446, and all procedures involving A-446 "should have been qualified using the criteria of D1.3." App. Ex. 56; DeWald Prep. Test., ff. Tr. 1700 at 49; DeWald, Tr. 1751-52.

96. Mr. Puckett admitted that he did not expect Mr. DeWald to stop work based on his August 22, 1984 memorandum. Tr. 6250-51.

Indeed, he conceded that the drastic recommendation to stop all welding was "a little strong" and was designed to attract strong attention within the organization. Tr. 6273, 6276. Mr. Puckett wrote

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i. j approached the engineering group, threatening them with his ,

recommending a stop work procedure. Tr. 6956-57, 6968-69. Mr.

4 Bowman's discussions with Mr. Puckett may have persuaded Mr. Puckett that a similar recomerdation to stop work with regard to the problems Mr. Puckett encountered might also get the desired action. At hearing, Mr. Bowman believed that if Mr. Puckett had taken other measures that had proven unsuccessful in controlling the deficiencies that he had identified and that the measures that he had tried to correct the problem had not corrected it, then the only recourse he had would have been a stop work request. Tr. 6958-59.

98. Considering the discussions that Mr. Puckett had had with Mr. Bowman and Mr. Bowman's past experience with recalcitrant l

management in which Mr. Bowman had had to resort to a threat of a I

stop work recommendation before the discrepant condition would be corrected, it was not unreasonable nor unjustified for Mr. Puckett to recommend any of the stop work requests even when, as in the third request, the circumstances may not have required that work be stopped imediately. Comstock's past history must be taken into account. in detennining whether Mr. Puckett's stop work requests were reasonable.

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99. The Board heard extensive testimony with regard to Mr.

I Puckett's recomendation that AWS Code D1.3 be utilized for the welding of sheet materials at Braidwood other than with regard to the welding of A-446 to A-36, which we have already explored in depth.

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112 CORRECTED Applicant's witness Gieseker testified (Tr. 2866-67) that, while Mr.

Puckett had agreed to the minor revision of the welding procedure proposed by Mr. Gieseker with regard to adding A-36 to the A-446 procedures, Mr. Puckett continued to believe that the real solution to the problem was the use of a later AWS Code D1.1 which included D1.3.

100. Much of Applicant and Staff's position that Mr.

Puckett's job performance at Braidwood demonstrated his incompetence is based upon Mr. Puckett's persistence in recomending that Comstock adopt a later code. AWS Code D1.3 was promulgated for the purpose of addressing welding on thin gauge materials, such as the galvanized metal used in cable pans which Comstock employed at Braidwood. Tr.

1752. Even Mr. DeWald, the Quality Control Manager who terminated Mr.

Puckett, agreed that AWS Code D1.3 was a more appropriate code to use for that kind of work than the earlier version of AWS Code D1.1. Tr.

1753. However, Applicant's witnesses took the position that use of either the earlier version of AWS Code D1.1 or a later version which included AWS Code D1.3 was optional and that Mr. Puckett's behavior was " erratic" in continuing to advocate the conversion to the later AWS code. Tr. 2867. In fact, they recognized that Mr. Puckett had ,

1 agreed to the resolution of the narrow A-446/A-36 question on the I

procedural change suggested by Mr. Gieseker, but that Mr. Puckett thought "the real solution to the problem was use of this later code."

Ibid. According to CECO's Mr. Gieseker, who apparently was a moving l

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115 CORRECTED Tr. 12891. Comstock did not have a completed contract with Commonwealth Edison until February 5,1979, the date of execution of the purchase order. Tr. 12903, 12908. Had that contract incorporated the latest edition of the AWS standard on that date, as its express language indicated, it would have adopted 01.3 as the applicable code.

Tr. 12908-10. Similarly, the incorporated specifications, L-2790 and Fonn 1701, each of which contains similar language specifying the use of the latest edition of the code then in existence, had been amended with an effective date later than the adoption of AWS Code D1.3.

Amendment 1 to L-2790, specified in the purchase order, was issued on February 15, 1979. App. Ex. 16 at A-1. Fonn 1701 had been withdrawn and was readopted on October 11,- 1978. Tr. 12946. Applicant's witnesses did not rely upon the contract documents themselves to support their position that DI.1-1975 was the governing code for Comstock welding; they relied upon what they perceived to be the

" understanding of Comonwealth Edison" (Tr. 12917) at the time Comonwealth Edison and Comstock entered into the agreement, to adopt the same specifications to which Comstock's predecessor, Ernst, had been operating under, even though they did not specify such in the contract doctr.nts. Tr. 12891-92, 12905, 12916-17.

104. It is clear that had Mr. Puckett familiarized himself with the contract documents when he assumed the position as a Level III, as Mr. Gieseker believed he should have, he would not have concluded that Comstock was not bound to Code D1.3 with regard to thin l

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material. Applicant's witnesses Treece and Kostal, admitted that viewing the completed contract as a whole would have put into effect the latest issued version of the AWS standards which would have included AWS D1.3. Tr. 12908-10.

105. But, to be fair to Applicant, it does not appear that Mr. Puckett made his recommendations in the context of a review of the contract documents. Rather, it appeared that his recomendation was based upon his experience and expertise with regard to welding and the welding codes. And, considering that context, one must conclude that Mr. Puckett's recommendation to adopt the later Code appears eminently reasonable. The situation of Comstock's welding sheet material under the older edition of Code D1.1 appeared to be an anomaly. Most of the time under AWS Code D1.1 contractors use prequalified procedures and stay with the materials listed in the Code. AWS Code DI.1-1975 gave a prequalified status for only those materials listed, but none of the sheet metals were listed.

Consequently, any company utilizing the earlier editions of Code D1.1 would have to end up doing qualifications for all the sheet metals, and the qualification requirements are very stringent. The problem  ;

Comstock encountered with qualifying A-446 to A-36 was an uncomon problem that resulted from Comstock's not using D1.3, which would have

, prequalified the sheet metal. Tr. 3014-15.

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120 CORRECTED 2.5.1 A work operation proceeding in violation of hold ,

instructions placed on drawings, specifications, l procedural requirements, equipment, or material l installation. (Emphasis added.) l i

In the five subsections (2.5.1 -

2.5.5) to Section 2.5, only subsection 2.5.3, involving malfunctioning or inoperative equipment, contains any express or implied safety-significant items. It is difficult to believe that either Comstock or the NRC Staff could ever adopt a standard such as Mr. Schapker's which would permit discrepant work to continue at the option of a quality control inspector, who would make an engineering judgment as to the safety significance of the discrepant condition.

111. In summary of the three matters raised in the Mr.

Puckett's recommendations for stop work -- the A-446/A-36 welds, the welding in the 2G position, and the adoption of AWS Code D1.3 -- Mr.

Puckett's analyses and reconsnendations had much merit. He may not have been fully correct in the final analysis (although hc appears to be), but his raising of these issues cannot be faulted and certainly cannot be considered as reflecting adversely on his competence. Nor was there any suggestion that he was insubordinate with regard to the proposed dispositioning of these issues. The record is clear that, while Mr. Puckett may not have agreed with the proposed dispositions, he was willing to accept them provided that they were in writing.  ;

That these issues may not have had safety significance in the sense 1

126 CORRECTED was tenninated. Similarly, Applicant and Staff devote a significant portion of proposed findings to Mr. Puckett's failure to achieve  ;

certificatien by virtue of not having passed that practical. App.

Prop. Find. 262-266; Staff Prop. Find. 116-128. Mr. Puckett had passed one practical examination, on July 19, 1984. Although he correctly determined that the item in question contained no deficiency welds and thus met acceptance criteria, through no fault of his own that passing performance was invalidated when it was discovered that the inspected item did not contain any nonconforming conditions as required by LKC Procedure 4.1.3. DeWald, Prep. Test., ff. Tr.1700 at A.29; Tr.1673-74. There is also some question as to whether Mr.

Puckett passed another practical examination taken under the supervision of Joseph Hii. According to Mr. Puckett, the practical examination was graded by Mr. Hij who informed him that he had passed.

When, after a few weeks had passed and Mr. Puckett had not yet received official confirmation of this fact, Mr. Puckett went to discuss the matter with Mr. DeWald. According to Mr. Puckett, Mr.

DeWald infonned him that he could not find his test papers and thus LKC had no record by which to demonstrate that Mr. Puckett had, in fact, passed the examination. Thus, he would have to take and pass yet another practical examination. Tr. 6442-49.

119. Mr. Puckett's testimony on this point was disputed by Mr. Hii. According to Mr. Hii, he did not grade any of Mr. Puckett's examinations, practical or written, and had no recollection of the

I 128 CORRECTED delivered Mr. Puckett's test papers to Mr. DeWald for grading on August 22, 1984. Dominique Test., A.16 at 6. Mr. DeWald, however, did not grade Mr. Puckett's examination until four days later. Mr.

DeWald Rebuttal Test., A.5 at 2. An additional question involves the weld coupons offered by Applicant which are purported to be the weld coupons utilized in Mr. Puckett's examination. On their face the weld coupons do not precisely correspond to the examination graded by Mr.

DeWald inasmuch as the examination reflects that 14 weld coupons were evalueted by Mr. Puckett even though Mr. Vogt's key indicates that there were 16 weld coupons. Although Applicant produced 14 weld coupons (App. Exs. 168-171), Mr. Dominique, who was the custodian of the weld coupons, could not account for the whereabouts of the two missing coupons. Tr. 16527. According to him, they "just disappeared." _Id .

122. Moreover, although Mr. DeWald graded Mr. Puckett's practical examination, it was unusual for a Level III supervisor to grade those exams. That was usually done by a Level II, although Mr.

DeWald would review the results and assign the grade. Tr. 16644-45; 16653-54. When Mr. DeWald graded Mr. Puckett's exam, Mr. DeWald had already decided to fire Mr. Puckett and Mr. Simile had already been contacted to replace Mr. Puckett. Tr. 16548. At the time Mr. Puckett took the exam, he was assigned the task of going to the Quality Control vault to review all the welders' qualifications withdrawal foms that had been issued on the project since it started, to review

Q 129 CORRECTED all the welding procedures and make the required changes in them within a week. Although he complained that this was a " physically impossible" task, he was given no help. Tr. 6260. Under these circumstances Mr. Puckett had no time to prepare for the practical, although well-experienced inspectors are usually given at least ten working days and up to 6 or 8 weeks to train for the practical. Tr.

13782-83. Furthermore, the calls that Mr. Puckett allegedly missed on his practical were discrepancies that were on the coupon near the welds, not on the welds themselves: slag near weld number 5 and an arc strike near weld number 9. See App. Exs. 5, 6. But it is a

matter of judgment, that varies from project to project, as to whether

defects near the welds are close enough to be considered part of the

! judgment call on the weld itself. Tr. 16549-53. From the testimony adduced at hearing, even Level III weld engineer Vogt who had written the test answers employed by Mr. DeWald in grading Mr. Puckett would have failed the practical on the answers he supplied. Tr. 3255-59, i 3284-85.

123. More importantly, Comstock attached little or no importance to whether Level III supervisors passed their qualification i

tests and became certified. Mr. Saklak, Mr. Puckett's predecessor as

! Quality Control Supervisor over welding (from August 1983 until May of 1984), never became certified. Mr. Puckett's successor, Mr. Tony Simile, who supervised weld inspection activities from September,1984 onward, did not become certified until July 12, 1985, a period of over

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ten months. Similarly, Mr. Saklak supervised other disciplines such

as Cable Pull, Conduit, Cable Tray, Equipment, Terminations, and Calibrations for periods ranging from four-and-a-hal f months to two-and-a-half years, during the period of July 1,1982 to March 29,

! 1985, before becoming certified, if at all. Int. Ex. 24 at 3.

! Similarly, other supervisors such as M. Kast, J. Hall, L. Phillips, R. Tuite, J. Hii, J. Walters, A. Simile, and K. Worthington, supervised Quality Control disciplines for many months without

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j becoming certified. Ibid, i

i 124. During his tenure at Braidwood, Worley Puckett appeared i

to have been highly respected by the Quality Control inspectors who s

were familiar with his work. For example, welding inspector Danny l Holley volunteered (Tr. 5273):

i 1

i Well, I could say Mr. Puckett was, you know -- maybe I'm i out of line, but the welding inspectors that were around )

when Mr. Puckett was here really respected his --

his 1 professionalism and his background and really ' felt that I he was doing a good job.

i When he was let go, a lot of people, you Know, brought to their own mind, "Why was he let go?"

I There was talk, like I said, that was going on around the

office.

125. Mr. Puckett testified over a number of days at hearing.

4 Despite grueling examination by Applicant's and Staff's counsel, who i

had been well prepared by their respective experts, Mr. Puckett

198 CORRECTED and in the substance of even the final report co-authored by Mr.

Mendez and Mr. Neisler. Mr. McGregor never reviewed the final report produced after Mr. Neisler joined Mr. Mendez on the inspection. Tr.

11614.

242. Although the 24 inspectors were complaining about harassment, intimidation and production pressures, during their inspection, Mr. Mendez and Mr. Neisler were unaware of two significant allegations about retaliatory termination and retaliatory transfer over quality concerns that had recently been brought to the NRC's attention -- by Worley Puckett and John Seeders in August and September of 1984. This, despite the Department of Labor's notification to the NRC by letter dated November 6,1984 (Int. Ex.11) that it had found in Mr. Puckett's favor, and the clear indication in the NRC memorandum of March 29, 1985 concerning the meeting with 24 inspectors that a person named John was " railroaded out" of his job through no fault of his own (Int. Ex. 42 at 2). Even though they were assigned to review the inspector's complaints, Mr. Mendez and Mr.

1 Neisler never inquired about who " John" was and never determined that he was John Seeders. Tr. 10662, 10708-09, 10711-12, 10719, 10879.

243. Neither were Mr. Mendez and Mr. Neisler aware of internal NRC documents predating the March 29, 1985 incident by a few months indicating other Quality Control inspector complaints about Quality Control management. Included in these documents was a

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199 CORRECTED September 25, 1984 memorandum from R. D. Schulz, a Senior Resident Inspector at Braidwood to the Chief of Project Section IA (Int. Ex.

91) about a visit to his office by five Comstock Quality Control inspectors complaining, among other things, of low or non-existent morale due to poor management. Tr. 10660. Nor had they seen the memorandum of December 28,1984 (Int. Ex. 92) in which Mr. Schulz met with the CECO project manager and construction superintendent to discuss the issue of Comstock site quality control management intimidation and harassment. They were not even aware of the meeting.

Tr. 10705, 10708. Mr. Mendez had not even made any specific inquiry of Mr. McGregor or Mr. Schulz to ask about past difficulties with Comonwealth Edison or Comstock. Tr. 10658.

244. In conducting the interviews with Quality Control inspectors, Mr. Mendez took no precautions against having the Quality Control managers complained about, Mr. DeWald, Mr. Seese, Mr. Simile, etc., learn the names of the inspectors being interviewed and the j exact times of interview. The procedure adopted was to notify Comonwealth Edison of the person to be interviewed at the NRC site residents' office, who in turn would give the name to L. K. Comstock management. LKC management would, in turn, call that person off the job and inform him that the NRC wanted to speak to him. Tr. 10734-44.

l 245. The inspection report itself, Staff Ex. 17, demonstrates a superficial inspection of the allegations raised by the l

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204 CORRECTED

! counsel on cross-examination that touched on the subject matter of the l

criminal investigation at a time when the investigation was not yet '

formally concluded, had an intimidating effect on his testimony. The l

Board temporarily excused Mr. McGregor from further testifying at that point and requested further information from Staff with regard to the conclusion of the criminal investigation. Tr. 11898-915. NRC Staff counsel indicated that he would endeavor to determined why the investigation had not been completed by July 4, 1986, as promised.

Tr. 11912-13.

252. Thereafter, both on and off the record, the Board requested that the criminal investigation be formally concluded at an early date if only fomalities were involved, so that we could continue with Mr. McGregor's testimony. See, for example, Tr.17006, 17063, 17065-66. It was not until the middle of November of 1986 that Mr. McGregor was formally notified that he wcs exonerated and he was able to resume testifying. See Tr. 17197. Apparently, during the hiatus in McGregor's testimony, another investigation had also been conducted that might have inhibited his testimony, although he was not l

a subject of it. The Office of Inspector and Auditor began investigating the identity of the person or persons who had leaked  !

i internal NRC documents to Intervenors during the course of the  !

hearings that, apparently, had been improperly withheld from Intervenors and the Board under discovery rules, F0IA requests, and i

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207 CORRECTED different set of drawings called "Rev. A." drawings. Tr. 9680, 9865.

Comstock Quality Control inspectors would then reinspect the hangers to detemine whether the as-built configuration of the installed hanger corresponded with that shown on the Rev. A. drawing. The inspectors were to use checklists to indicate acceptance or rejection of the hangers. Tr. 3418, 3421-22; Simile Pref. Test., ff. Tr. 3305, at 20. The Rev. O. drawings were accompanied by hanger configuration checklists (Forms 7) which was normally utilized in performing configuration inspections. Under LKC Procedure 4.8.12, signing off on a Form 7 indicated acceptance of a hanger. Under this special program, the inspectors were expected to use such a Form 7 to document and verify the accuracy of the as-built hangers as reflected in the red-lined drawings. Tr. 9674-80, 9865. Mr. Bossong, Mr. Perryman and the other inspectors objected to this use of the configuration checklist Form 7, believing that it might be improperly understood as reflecting final Quality Control verification of the adequacy of the hanger's configuration instead of simply verifying that the Rev. O.

drawing reflected the as-built condition. Tr. 3424-25, 9675-81,.

9866-69. Mr. Perryman was even fearful that he might later be accused of falsifying the quality document. Tr. 9690-91.

. 256. Because management was unresponsive to their concerns, Mr. Perryman, Mr. Bossong and the other inspectors requested transfers from the walkdown program to the in-process inspection duties to avoid i

future misinterpretation of their signatures on these checklists.

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223 CORRECTED l

Mr. Archambeault brought up the fact that he wanted to transferred to

~

the first shift, Simile's only knowledge of Mr. Archambeault's desire to transfer was his inclusion with two other shift inspectors by Harry Mr. Revels in June,1986 of inspectors who were interested in being transferred to first shift. Mr. Simile indicated that the other two inspectors had previously spoken to him about being transferred to first shift and he (Simile) had promised them thai. he would transfer them. Simile Prep. Test. ff. Tr.15180.

290. $r. Simile did not recall' whether he had heard of Mr.

Archambeault's raising concerns with the HRC (on June 4,1986) when Mr. Simile decided to transfer the other two' inspectors, rather than Mr. Archambeault, on June 18, 1986. Mr. Simile acknowledges that during the sumer of 1986 he discussed with Harry Revels, Mr.

Archambeault's request for transfer in the context with the concerns that Mr. Archambeault had raised with the NRC. According to Mr.

Simile, what he had expressed to Mr. Revels was that, if he transferred Mr. Archambeault, the newspapers might construe that action as an effort to remove Mr. Archambeault from an area in which he raised quality concerns and, on the other hand, if he did not transfer Mr. Archambeault, it would be interpreted as punishing him  !

for having raised those concerns. He indicated that this conversation took place after he had already transferred the other two inspectors to the day shift. Id. at A.13-A.14.

j 231 CORRECTED and coil" method. Tr. 12706-08. Under the " pull and coil" method, the cable and pulled and inspected in sections. At each interval, the remainder of the unpulled cable is coiled while the pulled section is being inspected. As each section is completed, the cable is uncoiled and the pulled section inspected. Tr. 12708, 12770-71. Mr. Martin was far,iliar with the " pull and coil" method but never used it himself because he thought it an inferior type of inspection since the increased coiling of the cable heightened the possibility of a minimum bend radius violation. Tr. 12744-45, 12765-66, 12771. According to Mr. Martin, Mr. Lechner did not indicate that the inspection could be performed using the " pull and coil" method, or that there were no inspectors available to assist Martin." Tr. 12715-16.

302. Mr. Martin had been assigned to a particular craft foreman, Mr. Murphy, all of whose cable pulls Mr. Martin inspected.

On the evening of April 28, 1986, af ter Mr. Lechner assigned Mr.

Schirmer in Mr. Martin's place to the disputed caole pull, Mr. Lechner also removed Mr. Martin generally from his assignment to foreman l l

Murphy and replaced him with Mr. Schinner. Tr. 12719.

303. The rest of the evening of April 28, Mr. Martin simply sat in the office and was not assigned any other cable-pulling work.

The next day, April 29, Mr. Martin was assigned to perform hold-tag verifications, a task which lasted about a week. Tr. 12721-22.

l

I 232 CORRECTED 304. On April 29, Mr. Martin asked his shop steward, George Nemeth, to arrange a meeting with Mr. Lechner and Mr. Tuite to clear the air. Mr. Nemeth told Mr. Martin on the night of the 29th that he i

had set up a meeting with Mr. Lechner and Mr. Tuite for the night of the 30th. On the 30th, Mr. Martin went to work as usual and Mr.

Nemeth said he would contact Mr. Martin when Mr. Tutte and Mr. Lechner arrived for the meeting. Mr. Lechner and Mr. Tuite never showed up for the meeting. Mr. Martin discussed the situation with Mr. Nemeth, and both agreed that Mr. Martin should take his concerns to the NRC.

Subsequently, Mr. Martin went to see Mr. Kropp at the NRC. Tr.

12728-32, 305. After he finished the hold-tag verifications, Mr.

Martin was assigned no further Cable-Pull work. He occupied himself by assisting other inspectors on his own initiative; no one assigned ,

him to help them. That situation lasted for approximately two weeks.

In mid-May, Mr. Martin was taken off the second shift, reassigned to the first shift, and assigned to do clerical work for Mr. Seese. He was given no further inspection work. Tr. 12722-24, 306. Shortly after his deposition in this case, Mr. Martin was reassigned to the third shift, on what he termed " clean up inspections." Martin, Tr. 12726-27.

i

t 246 CORRECTED l

l 332. The CSR consisted of a visual reinspection of a sample of on-site, safety-related construction work which, as of June 30, 1984, had been completed and Quality Control inspected. The sample was selected based in part on engineering judgment and in part on the use of statistical concepts. The reinspections were carried out from October,1984 through July,1985. Kaushal, Pref. ff. Tr.13069 at 3, 13-16.

333. The CSR (and other elements of BCAP) were carried out by the BCAP Task Force. The BCAP Task Force Director was Edison employee Dr. Narindar Kaushal. Kaushal reported directly to the Braidwood project manager, Mike Wallace, who had principal production responsibilities at Braidwood. Kaushal Pref. ff. Tr.13069 at 9-10.

The BCAP QA group, a part of Edison's QA department, under the direction of an Edison employee, Neil Smith, oversaw the BCAP Task i

Force activities. Id. at 10.

1 334. Discrepancies found by BCAP CSR inspectors were evaluated for design significance by Sargent & Lundy (S&L), which was responsible for developing the design drawing specifications for Braidwood. The activities of Sargent & Lundy, the BCAP Task Force, and BCAP QA were reviewed by an Independent Expert Overview Group (IE0G) established through the Evaluation Research Corporation.

Kaushal, Pref. ff. Tr.13068 at 10-11.

248 CORRECTED in June, 1984. Keppler's response to Edison, Intervenor's Exhibit 140, made 27 specific recommendations for changes in the program design. With only one exception, Edison responded to each of Keppler's comments that " Edison believes that no change to the existing BCAP document is warranted." Kaushal, Tr. 13114-17.

339. The Board ruled that Mr. Gardner was not competent to vouch on behalf of the NRC for the adequacy of the BCAP program design or the S&L design significance evaluations because he had no role in either aspect and that if Edison or the Staff wished to establish that the NRC had approved the BCAP design or design significance evaluations, they would have to present other witnesses. Tr.

17566-606. No such witnesses were ever produced.

340. The CSR was a sample program. For purposes of taking samples, the entire population of on-site contractors' safety-related construction work was divided into 30 " construction categories," which were defined as groups of hardware constructed using similar processes or containing similar types of components. Six of those construction categories contained electrical work: cables; cable pans, cable pan hangers, conduit, conduit hangers, and electrical equipment installation. Kaushal, Reb. Prep. Test. at 11-13, ff. Tr. 13068. The total sample for each construction category consisted of three parts.

The first or " random" portion was chosen in such a manner as to support formal statistical conclusions with at least 95% confidence

) 253 CORRECTED l

1 CSR reinspection deficiencies was the fast pace at which BCAP Task Force inspectors were working. Gardner, Reb. Prep. Test. at 10, ff.

Tr. 13068. Although Mr. Gardner did not discuss this concern with Kaushal in their meeting on January 23, 1985, or document it in his l inspection reports, he continued to monitor BCAP inspectors' attitudes j and instructions. Tr. 18369. Subsequently the CSR reinspectors were instructed to disregard any pace concerns and take as much time as l necessary to perfonn their inspections. Tr. 17623-24.

t l

Three types of data were produced as a result of -the 345.

BCAP CSR program. The first, the raw data from the CSR reinspections i were tabulated in terms of the number of the discrepancies and the 1

i number of acceptable conditions identified by the CRS overinspectors.

Second, those numbers were used to compute so-called " agreement i

rates." Third, the discrepancies were analyzed to determine whether they were design significant.

t 346. All CSR reinspection observations reported by the BCAP l l Task Force inspectors were reviewed by their lead discipline i

inspectors for clarity, completeness and accuracy. Kaushal, Reb.

I Prep. Test, at 22-23, ff. Tr. 13068. If suitable for further processing, the observations were evaluated for validity by BCAP engineers. Under BCAP procedures (Int. Ex. 143), CSR observations

which had previously been identified by Applicant or its contractors i on an existing nonconformance report or other controlled system were i

f i

}

l _ . - _ . . _ _ _ . _ . . _ - _ . _ . _ , _ . .

4 257 CORRECTED 350. The criteria in the letter for approval of the bend radius did not apply to Cable 130 without a further determination by 1 the manufacturer of the condition of the cable, and a different cable was examined by the manufacturer's representative, than assumed by Sargent & Lundy. Tr. 14456-62, 14482-89, 14565-67. The errors in both the CPH 104 and Cable 130 design significant evaluations were not discovered and corrected until the S&L experts were cross-examined by Intervenors' counsel at hearing.

351. The quality control inspection of an item such as a cable or a cable pan hanger requires the inspector to verify that the item conforms to design requirements for each attribute on his checklist. Verification of each such attribute may require one or more inspection judgments. Kaushal, Reb. Prep. Test. at 19-20, ff.

Tr. 13068; Tr. 13761-62. Moreover, the items included in the CSR sample varied greatly in their cc.aplexity and thus in the number of inspector judgments required for the initial Quality Control inspection and for the CSR reinspection. Tr.13758-59,14166-73; App.

Exs. 143, 144. To pennit meaningful judgment of inspector performance and meaningful comparison of inspector performance with respect to items of differing complexity, the BCAP Task Force together with BCAP Quality Assurance and Sargent & Lundy developed the concept of

" inspection points" and " discrepancy points." Tr. 13758-59, 13770, 13773, 14173-79. Each inspector check to determine the acceptability )

or rejectability of an item or an attribute was identified and termed 1

l

\

258 CORRECTED an " inspection point." Each inspection point which resulted in a CSR discrepancy was termed a " discrepancy point." Kaushal, Reb. Prep.

Test, at 19-20; ff. Tr.13068; Kostal, Reb. Prep. Test, at 13-14, ff.

Tr. 14270; Tr. 13760-64. On this basis, over 98% of the inspection poinh were found to be correct (nondiscrepant) and more than two-thirds of the discrepancy points were insignificant. App. Ex. 179 at 16; Thorsell, Reb. Prep. Test. at 11, ff. Tr. 14270; Kostal, Reb.

Prep. Test, at 22, ff. Tr.1^270.

352. Applicant also presented the CSR results for the electrical construction categories on a per weld basis. About 84% of the welds had no discrepancies. App. Ex. 181; Reb. Prep. Test. at 38, ff. Tr. 16740. The comparable figure for the PTL overinspection data for the period July 1,1982 to June 30, 1986 is 93%. For the period in which the two data bases overlap (July 1,1982 to June 30,1984), .

the agreement rates are 89% and 90%, respectively. DelGeorge, Reb.

1 Prep. Test. at 37-38, ff. Tr. 16740, 16801-02.

353. A third way of looking at the CSR results was supported l

by Intervenors in this proceeding. Any item with one or more discrepancies would be tenned a " discrepant item." The NRC had originally required that any conclusions on expanding the CSR sample size be based on the percentage of acceptable items, irrespective of the numu., (f attributable inspection points. Int. Ex.140 at BCAP Comments II-4; Tr. 17710-11. Applicant committed itself to this l

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