ML20209C912

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Forwards Accident Evaluation Branch Response to Comments on Accident Consequences Section of Des.No Changes in Des Proposed
ML20209C912
Person / Time
Site: Satsop
Issue date: 04/23/1984
From: Muller D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Novak T
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-WNP-1455 NUDOCS 8405150519
Download: ML20209C912 (3)


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DISTRIBUTION AEB RF -

ADRP RF PEasley Docket !!o.: 50-508 JRead APR23 @

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!!E!!0RAllDUM FOR: Thomas li. flovak, Assistant Director AEB Plant File for Licensing Division of Licensing FR0ll: Daniel fiuller, Assistant Director for Radiation Protection Division of Systens Integration

SUBJECT:

RESP 0flSES TO WNP-3 DES C0ftflEllTS The Accident Evaluation Branch (AEB) prepared respon::es to five connents on the Accident Consequences section of the WNP-3 Draft Environnental Statement (DES); these responses are enclosed. flo changes to the DES text are proposed.

Pat Easley, the WilP-3 Environnental Statenent coordinator for AE3, prepared the respnnses.

Crijral CIFed by Car.iet it. f tutter ,

Daniel t1uller, Assist 66t Director for Radiation Protection Division of Systens Integration

Enclosure:

As stated cc: R. Itattson R. Gon;:alez G. Knighton

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V. Flerses J. Rosenthal J. Carter l

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Responses to Cor.nents on WNP-3 DES, by Comment Number , ,

DEC-4 The staff has attempted to minimize the amount of academic verbiage, and to present conclusions and comparisons that are reicvant. The staff does not think it would be useful to separate the topics into generic and site-specific--this would render the discussion less cohesive. We have tried to nake the text clear, but we do not want to give up neaning for the sake of simplicity. At several times in the past; when specific public comments indicated that a given portion of an Envi~onmental r

Statement was unclear to people, that portion was r.evised ard clarified. '

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'he " pre-TMI analysis" would have been the analysis of an enmple Surry) pressurized water reactor (PWR) in Wash-1400, later revised commonly referred to as the rebaselined Surry analysis). Accident release categories and probabilities from this analysis were used by the staff for several PWR Environmental Statements. Later on, other i Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA) for PWRs were reviewed by the stsff ,

during and after the implementation of the Three Mile Island Task Action Plan. For WNP-3, the staff decided that results and insights from these PRAs (particularly Indian Point and Zion) were reore relevant to the WNP-3 design than was the "Surry rebaselined" analysis. Therefore, some of the release categories defined in the staff's Indian Point study were. '

used for WNP-3, with modified probabilities per reactor-year. In u rn, the calculated results fcr Indian Point reflected some of the required changes described in NUREG-0737. The net effect of the NUREG-0737 changes on the calculated results for WNP-3 is small, and obscured because of the level of detail in the fault tree analysis at wnich the effect of the changes is introduced.

WNP 21 The source from which the staff derived the effective evacuation speeds was the D. L. Renberger (WPPSS) letter to D. G. Eisenhut, July 24, 1980, regarding emergency evacuation times. The WNP-3 Emergency Preparedness Plan does indicate generally shorter times to evacuate. If the shorter times are more valid, the staff's calculated early fatality risk (and, j to a lesser extent, other risk measures) is likely to be an j overestimate.

WNP 22 The staff agrees that the assumption of 100% of the cesium reaching the river is conservative. It is difficult to quantify has much cesium would be immobilized before reaching the river. The staff decided to use the upper limit of 100% rather than refine the analysis.

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The staff does say, in the DES, that the health effects can be reduced through interdiction and also that, "The consequences would, therefore, be largely economic or social,. rather than radiological." Past studies

, of the cost of interdiction after a postulated release through the groundwater pathway showed that the interdiction costs were small compared to the interdiction costs after releases via other pathways.

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