ML20207S417

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SALP Rept 50-354/85-98 for Nov 1985 - Nov 1986
ML20207S417
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 03/12/1987
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207S410 List:
References
50-354-85-98, NUDOCS 8703190414
Download: ML20207S417 (72)


See also: IR 05000354/1985098

Text

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ENCLOSURE

SALP BOARD REPORT

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

_

SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE

INSPECTION REPORT 50-354/85-98

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY

HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

ASSESSMENT PERIOD: NOVEMBER 1, 1985 - NOVEMBER 30, 1986

BOARD MEETING DATE: JANUARY 28, 1987

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

I.

INTRODUCTION

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

A.

Purpose and Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

8.

SALP Board Members. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

C.

Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

II, CRITERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

I I I . S UMMARY O F RES U LT S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

3.1 Overall Facility Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

3.2 Facility Performance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

A.

Plant Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

8.

Radiological Controls and Chemistry . . . . . . . . . . .

17

C.

Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

D.

Surveillance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

E.

Emergency Preparedness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

F.

Security and Safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

G.

Outages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32

H.

Preoperational and Startup Testing. . . . . . . . . . . .

34

I.

Licensing Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

J.

Training and Qualification Effectiveness. . . . . . . . .

41

K.

Assurance of Quality.

45

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V.

SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

A.

Investigations and Allegations Review . . . . . .

49

....

B.

Escalated Enforcement Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

C.

Management Conferences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

D.

Licensee Event Reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

TABLES

Table 1 - Tabular Listing of LERs by Functional Area

53

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Table 2 - LER Synopsis

54

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Table 3 - Inspection Hours Summary

60

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Table 4 - Enforcement Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

Table 5 - Inspection Report Activities

64

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Table 6 - Unplanned Automatic Scrams and Shutdowns

69

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I.

INTRODUCTION

A.

Purpose and Overview

The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) is an

integrated NRC staff effort to collect observations and data on a

periodic basis and to evaluate licensee performance. The SALP

process is supplemental to the normal regulatory processes used to

ensure compliance to NRC rules and regulations.

It is intended to be

sufficiently diagnostic to provide a rational basis for allocating

l

NRC resources and to provide meaningful guidance to licensee

management in order to improve th. quality and safety of plant

operations.

An NRC SALP Board, composed of the staff members listed in Section B

below, met on January 28, 1987 to review the collection of performance

observations and data in order to assess the licensee's performance

at the Hope Creek Generating Station. This assessment was conducted

in accordance with the guidance in NRC Manual Chapter 0516,

" Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance". A summary of the

guidance and evaluation criteria is provided in Section 2.0 of this

report.

This report is the SALP Board's assessment of the licensee's safety

performance at the Hope Creek Generating Station for the period

November 1, 1985 through November 30, 1986. The summary findings and

totals reflect a thirteen month assessment period.

B.

SALP Board Members

Chairman

W. Kane, Director, Division of Reactor Projects

Members

W. Johnston, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety

P. Eselgroth, Chief, Projects Branch No. 2, DRP

L. Bettenhausen, Chief, Operations Branch, DRS

L. Norrholm, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 28, DRP

R. Borchardt, Senior Resident Inspector, Hope Creek

E. Adensam, BWR Project Directorate, NRR

D. Wagner, Licensing Project Manager, NRR

Other Attendees

D. Allsopp, Resident Inspector, Hope Creek

R. Gallo, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2A, DRP

R. Summers, Project Engineer, Section 28, DRP

M. Shanbaky, Chief, Facilities Radiation Protection Section, DRSS

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W. Lazarus, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section, DRSS

L. Wink, Reactor Engineer, Test Programs Section, DRS

R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section, DRSS

4

C.

Background

C.1 Licensee Activities

j.

The licensee began the evaluation period with construction

activities essentially complete and preoperational testing

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approximately 32% complete. On December 2, 1985, the scheduled

initial fuel load date was revised from December 2, 1985 to

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February 15, 1986, and overall project completion responsibility

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was transferred from the Vice President - Engineering to the

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Vice President - Nuclear. The Assistant General Manager for

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Hope Creek operations was assigned the duties of project com-

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pletion manager. Many of the more significant preoperational

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tests were conducted during the months prior to fuel load.

In

addition to the system testing conducted during the early part

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of this assessment period, significant licensee resources were

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dedicated to the completion of administrative functions. :These

administrative functions included the writing and issuance of

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station administrative procedures, surveillance test procedures,

maintenance procedures, and department operating procedures. A

large effort was also directed toward reducing the number of

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outstanding NRC inspection items.

On April 11, 1986, Facility Operating License NPF-50 was issued

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to PSE&G authorizing operation of the reactor at power levels

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not to exceed 5% power.

Fuel load activities commenced on

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April 15.

Except for a two day delay caused by a faulty refuel-

ing bridge power supply cable, fuel loading progressed without

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a major delay until it was completed on April 27, 1986.

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On May 2, 1986, an alert was declared when offsite power was

lost to the four vital buses and only two of four emergency

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diesel generators (EDG) were available for loading. Although

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only 2 of 4 EDGs are required to satisfy Technical Specifica-

tions in operational conditions 4 and 5, the emergency

classification guide.left no room for interpretation and

required the declaration of an alert. The licensee made the

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required notifications, restored power to the vital buses and

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terminated the alert within one half hour.

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Initial criticality was achieved on June 28, 1986, and was

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followed by a full core shutdown margin demonstration and a

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source range non-saturation demonstration,

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10n June 29, 1986, the reactor scrammed on high intermediate

range' monitor (IRM) flux. The reactor was in a non-coincidence

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reactor protection system logic mode at the-time (shorting links

removed). . Having just completed the necessary tests to install

the' shorting links, the reactor.had been placed in a sub-

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critical condition. Due to decreasing neutron' counts, the

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operator was downranging'IRMs. The' operator intended.to down-

range IRM "B", however he incorrectly selected IRM "D", which

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then exceeded the RPS trip point and a reactor scram resulted.

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The licensee reinstalled the shorting links, restarted the

reactor and resumed startup program testing.

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The licensee manually scrammed-the reactor on June 30, 1986, to

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repair the reactor manual control system (RMCS), which had been

inserting a continuous rod motion block for unknown reasons.

The licensee and General Electric representatives diagnosed the

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problem as a failed RMCS power supply. The licensee completed

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RMCS power. supply replacement and the unit went critical on July

1, 1986.

1

On July 4, 1986, the reactor scrammed during-heatup for power

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ascension testing. The scram occurred when an average power

range monitor (APRM) channel "E" high ~ upscale neutron trip was

coupled with a half scram manually inserted due to' narrow range

level perturbations. The shift carried out the scram procedure

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and the plant was placed in a shutdown condition. The APRM'

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channel "E" high upscale neutron trip was attributed.to a

- failed local power range monitor (LPRM) which was subsequently

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bypassed. The reactor was taken critical on July 7,1986.

4

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At 6:30 p.m. on July 6,1986, an alert was declared when

tampering was considered a possible cause for the initiation of

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the diesel generator (DG) building fire suppression system. No

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water was actually released since the fusible links remained

intact.

Subsequent investigation revealed that an area deter.or

(heat sensor) malfunction caused the system initiation and that

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tampering was not the cause. The alert was terminated at 7:30

p.m. on July 6, 1986,

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On July 12, 1986, the licensee inserted a manual scram when

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both "C" and "D" steam flow transmitters in main steam line "B"

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sensed high steam flow and shut all main steam isolation valves

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(MSIVs). The high steam flow indication was attributed to

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transmitter drift.

Both "C" and "D" transmitters were replaced

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and the reactor taken critical on July 13, 1986 to continue low

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power testing.

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During the period from July 15 to July 20, 1986, the unit

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experienced four separate automatic initiations of the high

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pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system.

During each of the

events, the HPCI turbine was tripped before any water was

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injected into the reactor vessel. A review of plant conditions

prior to, and after the actuations showed that reactor vessel

water level remained within the normal range and that the HPCI

system should not have received an actuation signal. The

licensee's investigation and a subsequent test conducted on July

20, 1986, established the most probable cause for three of these

spurious actuations to be workers in the drywell bumping into

reactor vessel level sensing lines.

For the actuation on July

16, 1986, the cause was determined to be an instrument and con-

trols (I&C) technician valving error.

In an effort to prevent

further spurious actuations, the licensee placed more stringent

controls on access into the drywell and reinforced the impor-

tance of proper valve operations to I&C technicians.

On July 19, 1986, the reactor scrammed from approximately 0.5%

power due to an operator error in the manipulation of the "B"

and "G" IRM range switches. The reactor was taken critical on

July 19,1986, for continuation of the low power test program.

On July 25, 1986, a reactor scram occurred from 3% power due to

reactor vessel low water level.

Surveillance testing was in

progress on the turbine stop and control valves when an operator

erroneously shut the valves to start turbine chest warming.

This resulted in all bypass valves opening and a reactor high

water level due to swell which tripped the two operating feed

pumps.

Feedwater was not restored before the reactor scrammed

on low level. All systems responded normally to the scram.

Following a SORC review of the event, the reactor was made

critical at 7:48 a.m. on July 26, 1986.

On July 30, 1986, the reactor scrammed while troubleshooting the

-22 volt DC portion of the electro-hydraulic control (EHC) logic

system. During troubleshooting, the -22 volt DC supply failed

and all bypass valves went full open causing a reactor vessel

high water level which tripped all feed pumps.

The feed pumps

could not be restarted prior to receiving a low water level

reactor scram. The licensee commenced a reactor startup at 3:15

a.m. on July 31, 1986, and terminated startup at 4:45 a.m. when

the rod position indication system (RPIS) failed. The reactor

!

was maintained sub-critical until RPIS troubleshooting was

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complete and the reactor taken critical later that day.

On August 8, 1986, the licensee declared an unusual event when

it was discovered that the reactor building to torus vacuum

breaker butterfly isolation valves were inoperable and would

have prevented the vacuum breakers from fulfilling their safety

function. The plant was shutdown and separate investigations

by the plant staff and the offsite safety review committee

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commenced.

It was determined that the differential pressure

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transmitter sensing lines were connected backwards, such that

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the isolation valves would close as a vacuum was created in the

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torus instead of open as required.

The licensee's corrective

actions included a complete walkdown of the vacuum breaker

system and a verification that similar problems did not exist

in other plant systems.

On August 13, 1986, the reactor was placed in operational con-

dition 1 and the main generator was synchronized to the grid.

The shutdown from outside the control room test was conducted

on August 22, 1986.

On August 31, 1986, the reactor scrammed on low vessel level.

Loss of level control occurred during plant startup when a

secondary condensate pump was started. The startup control

system was controlling reactor level since the feedwater con-

trol system does not have single element control capability.

The licensee reviewed the event, took the reactor critical,

and entered operational condition 1 on September 2, 1986.

On September 6, 1986, the unit scrammed from 38% power due to

low water level in the reactor vessel. The low water level

condition occurred during reactor feed pump (RFP) minimum flow

valve (MFV) response tuning.

In preparation for tuning the "C"

RFP MFV, the "C" RFP was paralleled with the running RFP. While

paralleling RFPs, the "C" MFV began oscillating which resulted

in reactor level oscillations and a low level reactor scram.

This scram was caused by a combination of operator inexperience

and a lack of feed system tuning. The unit returned to power

operation on September 7, 1986.

On September 11, 1986, a " Loss of Offsite Power" (LOP) test was

commenced as part of the power ascension test program. This

test simulated a total loss of offsite power by simultaneously

opening the appropriate circuit breakers on the 13.2 KV ring bus

and tripping the main turbine. The plant's automatic response

was then evaluated, including the fast transfer of selected

buses to emergency DC power, the starting and loading of all

four emergency diesel generators (EDG), and the automatic

sequencing of loads needed to respond to the resulting scram.

The LOP test was initiated from approximately 20% reactor power.

The reactor plant's response to the resulting transient was

within design limits.

However, because cooling water flow to

the drywell coolers was lost, the Senior Nuclear Shift Super-

visor (SNSS) aborted the test and had offsite power restored to

the site distribution system.

Cooling water flow was lost due

to the tripping of the reactor auxiliary cooling system (RACS)

pumps.

In addition to the loss of RACS, other problems identi-

fied during the test included:

the failure of the "C"

EDG

output breaker to automatically close and supply power to the

"C" 1E bus, the sustained loss of power to the safety relief

valve acoustic monitor panel, the failure of the "B"

safety

auxiliary cooling system (SACS) pump to restart, and the loss

of reactor building ventilation.

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The unit remained shut down from September 12 to October 9,

1986.

During this outage, the licensee conducted.an investi-

gation into the causes for the LOP discrepancies and took

corrective actions.

In addition to the LOP related activities,

the service water pipe elbows at the SACS Feat exchangers were

-replaced due to erosion.

On September 24, 1986, a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL No.

86-12) was issued to the licensee to confirm that an Augmented

Inspection Team (AIT) was being dispatched to the Hope Creek

site to assess the anomalies identified during the LOP tests.

After receiving authorization from the AIT team leader, a

non-critical LOP test was conducted on October 2,1986. This

test was successful in that it satisfied all Level 1 and Level 2

acceptance criteria.

In addition to the original LOP test

scope, this test also verified the proper operation of a sample

of Bailey 862 logic module functions not previously tested.

Based upon the satisfactory test results, on October 7, 1986,

the CAL was modified and the NRC authorized a plant startup in

order to conduct an LOP test with the reactor critical.

The loss of offsite power (LOP) test was conducted from

approximately 20% power on October 11. All Level 1 and Level 2

acceptance criteria were met and although a number of

observations were made, the test results were determined to be

acceptable.

After successful completion of the LOP test, NRC Region I

authorized a plant restart for power ascension testing. The

unit was brought critical on October 12.

On October 18, 1986, the reactor scrammed on low reactor vessel

water level after an I&C technician installed a test box on the

"A" reactor feed pump (RFP) flow controller. The test box

caused both the "A" and "B" RFPs to run back to minimum flow

causing a decrease in water level. The licensee's investigation

determined that a wiring error had been made internal to the

test box. The test box wiring configuration was corrected prior

to the continuation of power ascension testing on October 19.

The facility attained 100% power on November 10.

On November 14, 1986, the reactor scrammed from 97% power after

receiving a reactor vessel high pressure signal. The high

pressure condition was caused by power ascension closure testing

of a main turbine control valve.

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The licensee entered cold shutdown on November 16, 1986, in

order to conduct various outage repairs. The reactor was taken

critical on November 28, for continuation of the power ascension

program. The unit remained in operational condition 1 through

the end of the assessment period.

C.2 Inspection Activities

Two NRC resident inspectors were assigned to the site throughout

the assessment period, and for a total of four months, there

were three resident inspectors on site. During this thirteen

month assessment period, 9170 hours0.106 days <br />2.547 hours <br />0.0152 weeks <br />0.00349 months <br /> of direct inspection were

performed, which equate to 8460 hours0.0979 days <br />2.35 hours <br />0.014 weeks <br />0.00322 months <br /> on an annual basis.

During the assessment period, five NRC team inspections were

conducted to examine the following areas:

As-built inspection in the areas of mechanical, electrical,

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instrumentation and control, and structural systems as well

as a review of as-built equipment for selected emergency

procedures and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) accident

analysis assumptions.

Technical Specification review to determine whether the

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draft Technical Specifications and the Final Safety

Analysis Report were in agreement with the plant's as-built

condition.

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Special inspection of the Hope Creek SAFETEAM program.

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Post accident sampling and monitoring systems inspection

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to verify the implementation of selected NUREG-0737,

Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements.

Operational As sessment Team Inspection to assess the

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facility's operational effectiveness.

An Augmented Inspection Team was dispatched to the Hope Creek

site to review the anomalies that occurred during the power

ascension loss of offsite power tests.

Two special inspections were also conducted, as follows:

An investigaticn into the cause for the inoperability of

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the reactor building to suppression chamber pressure relief

system.

An inspection in support of a licensing action related to

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the deletion of the fire protection Technical

Specifications in accordance with Generic Letter 86-10.

8

This assessment report also discusses " Training and Qualifica-

tion Effectiveness" and " Assurance of Quality" as separate

functional areas. Although these topics, in themselves, are

assessed in the otner functional areas, through their use as

evaluation criteria, a synopsis of these two areas is provided.

For example, quality assurance effectiveness has been assessed

on a day-to-day basis by resident inspectors and as an integral

aspect of specialist inspections. Although quality work is the

responsibility of every employee, one of the management tools to

measure this effectiveness is reliance on quality assurance

inspections and audits. Other major factors that influence

quality, such as involvement of first-line supervision, safety

committees, and worker attitudes, are discussed in each area.

Due to limited inspection activities in the fire protection

area, it is not included as a separate functional area in this

report.

Inspection activity that was performed in the area of

fire protection is included in the Plant Operations functional

area and related licensing activities are discussed in Section

IV.I.1.

Tabulations of inspection activities and associated enforcement

actions are contained in Tables 3, 4 and 5.

The percentage of

total inspection time devoted to a functional area, tabulated

in Table 3, is included at the heading of each area analyzed in

Section 4.

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II. CRITERIA

Licensee performance was assessed in selected functional areas significant

to nuclear safety at operating facilities.

The following evaluation criteria were used, as appropriate, to assess each

functional area:

1.

Management involvement in assuring quality.

2.

Approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint.

3.

Responsiveness to NRC initiatives.

4.

Enforcement history.

5.

Operational and construction events (including response to, analysis

of, and corrective actions for).

6.

Staffing (including management).

7.

Training effectiveness and qualification.

Based upon the SALP Board assessment, each functional area evaluated is

classified into one of three performance categories. The definitions of

these performance categories are:

Category 1.

Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate.

Licensee

management attention and involvement are aggressive and oriented toward

nuclear safety; licensee resources are ample and effectively used so that

,

a high level of performance with respect to operational safety is being

achieved.

Category 2.

NRC attention should be maintained at normal levels.

Licensee management attention and involvement are evident and are

.

concerned with nuclear safety; licensee resources are adequate and

reasonably effective so that satisfactory performance with respect to

operational safety is being achieved.

Category 3.

Both NRC and licensee attention should be increased.

Licensee management attention or involvement is acceptable and considers

nuclear safety, but weaknesses are evident; licensee resources appear to

be strained or not effectively used so that minimally satisfactory

performance with respect to operational safety is being achieved.

Trend. The SALP Board may determine to include an appraisal of the

performance trend of a functional area. Normally, this performance trend

will only be used when both a definite trend of performance is discernible

to the Board and the Board believes that continuation of the trend will

result in a change of performance level.

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Improving:

Licensee performance was determined to be improving near

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the close of the assessment period.

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Declining:

Licensee performance was determined to be declining near

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"IM. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

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3.1 Overall Facility Evaluation

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The licensee completed the transition from a construction facility

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u an operating nuclear power plant during this assessment period.

Trh plant progressed from a 90% complete construction status to

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beiag only a few weeks away from commercial operation in a thirteen

en+n period. A very ambitious schedule was established by manage-

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ment., and, although not met for most milestones, it did provide good

direction throughout the period. Despite the ambitious schedule, a

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good perspective on quality and nuclear safety was maintained.

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Plant procedures and administrative programs are generally of high

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quality, due in part to the operating experience evaluation program.

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Soma aspects of the radiation protection program, however, warrant

additional management attention.

Efforts to improve administrative

activities without sacrificing quality are also needed. The incident

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report program provides excellent feedback of operating experience to

all departments.

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Control room operations have been cor acted in a consistently pro-

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fessional and safety conscious manner.

Noise and access control,

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especially during power ascension testing, have been excellent.

Except for two operator-error-induced scrams early in the test pro-

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grem, the operators have performed well throughout the period.

The

shift turnover meetings, work control group, and Technical Specifi-

cation interpretations promote good performance in the operations

area. Areas which warrant attention include: maintenance of control

room logs, reducing the number of alarming annunciators and reducing

the number of unplanned scrams and reportable events.

The organization is generally well staffed with qualified personnel.

The radiological and chemistry department vacancies which have been

recently created need to be filled promptly in order to provide the

'

necessary supervisory oversight. Approximately one-third of all

-reportable events were attributable to personnel error (mostly during

surveillance tests). The major contributor to these events has been

spurious initiation signals of the engineered safety features (ESF).

The occurrence rate of these events has been significantly reduced by

comprehensive corrective action programs.

Overall, a solid foundation has been established for the first cycle

of plant operation. Management support is evident, particularly in

the areas of emergency planning, security, and quality assurance.

The licensee recognizes the need for additional attention to support

programs, in particular, radiological controls.

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3.2 Facility Performance

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Functional

Category

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Category

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Area

Last Period

This Period

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(11/1/84-10/31/85) (11/1/85-11/30/86)-

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A.

Plant Operations

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'

B.

Radiological

Controls

2

2

C.

Maintenance

2

1

D.

Surveillance

Not

2

Evaluated

E.

Emergency

_

Preparedness

2

1

F.

Security and

Safeguards

1

1

G.

Outages

Not

No Rating

Evaluated

H.

Preoperational and

Startup Testing

2

2

I.

Licensing Activities

2

1

,

J.

Training and

Qualification

Not

2

Improving

Effectiveness

Evaluated

K.

Assurance of

Not

2

)

Quality

Evaluated

This area was titled Operational Readiness in the previous SALP

f

,

,

I

l

t

?

e

. _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ - - _

_ _ _ _ _ - - _ . . _ . . _ . - _ . _ _ _ . - _ . _ _ .

.

.

13

IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

A.

Plant Operations (33%, 3030 Hours)

1.

Analysis

The functional area of " operational readiness" was evaluated

to be Category 1 during the previous assessment period.

Some

weaknesses were identified but the general conclusion was that

the transition from construction to operations was well control-

led, staffing was adequate and experienced, training programs

were effective, and administrative controls under development

appeared generally adequate. The SALP Board recommended that

the applicant provide NRC an operational readiness presentation,

based on a self appraisal, which was completed during April,

1986.

The operations area was under continual review by two resident

inspectors for the entire assessment period and by a third

resident for a total of four months.

In addition to the

resident inspectors, this area was reviewed by preoperational

and startup program inspectors, the augmented inspection and

operational assessment teams, and senior NRC management during

numerous site visits. Two sets of initial operator licensing

examinations were given to a total of 25 candidates during

February and July,1986.

Training and qualification effec-

tiveness is discussed in Section J of this report.

Plant operations have been conducted in a consistently

conservative and safety conscious manner.

The transition of

project completion responsibility from the Vice President -

Engineering to the Vice President - Nuclear on December 2, 1985

(5 months prior to fuel load), helped change the focus from

construction completion to plant operations. Assigning the

assistant general manager for Hope Creek operations to the

position of project completion manager and providing him with

the resources necessary to do his job, significantly contrib-

uted toward establishing a high standard of performance and

emphasis on nuclear safety. A safety conscious attitude

was apparent throughout the entire Hope Creek operations

organization.

Senior plant management is intimately involved

with the day-to-day operation of the plant. The station's

general manager and all department managers attend a daily

management meeting to discuss current issues and establish

priorities for future activities. The Vice President - Nuclear

occasionally attended these meetings. All work activities are

scheduled by the planning department based upon the priorities

established by management and input from the work group

superv, sors.

This method of planning and scheduling has worked

well throughout the power ascension program and has ensured

that the " big picture" was maintained. The station operations

<

__ _

-.

- - - - -

_.

_ _

..

,

.

.

i

14

review committee (SORC) has generally done a thorough job of

overseeing plant operations.

The offsite safety review group

performed a number of in-depth reviews including an independent

investigation into the causes for the inoperability of the

reactor building to suppression chamber pressure relief system.

In addition to an accurate assessment, their recommended cor-

rective actions were timely and effective.

The licensee has been responsive to NRC concerns both prior to,

and since, plant licensing.

Major NRC team inspections such

as the As-Built, Technical Specification, Augmented Inspection

Team, and the Operational Assessment Team inspections received

timely and effective support during the assessment period.

Prior to plant licensing, all appropriate NRC open items were

resolved.

The licensee's commitment tracking system has ensured

prompt resolution of outstanding inspector concerns. Numerous

briefings were conducted for the NRC on spurious engineered

safety feature (ESF) actuations, Bailey 862 solid state logic

modules, the inoperable reactor building to suppression chamber

pressure relief system, and the loss of offsite power tests.

Plant procedures and administrative controls are thorough and

based upon a review of over 3000 documents such as IE bulle-

tins, circulars, information notices, INPO documents and vendor

recommendations.

However, in an effort to incorporate these

numerous requirements, recommendations, and good practices, a

large administrative burden has been created for the plant

staff. Occasionally, this burden impacts negatively on the

implementation of the overall program. A review of the

equipment malfunction identification tagging (EMIT) system

identified a large percentage of tags on equipment in the

plant were no longer valid, and system walkdowns by the NRC

have identified a number of discrepancies in the tagging

request inquiry system (TRIS) valve lineups.

It appears that

this administrative burden contributed to a month long delay

in determining the inoperability of the reactor building to

suppression chamber pressure relief system.

The Operations Department has a more than ample number of both

licensed and non-licensed operators to meet staffing require-

ments and man a 5 shift rotation with a minimum use of overtime.

The control room is consistently maintained in a professional

manner with very good access and noise control. Noise control

is especially aided by the plant page system design which pre-

vents routine pages from being heard in the control room. The

control room environment is also aided by the use of a work

control group that processes all work orders, surveillance

tests, and blocking permits outside of the control room with

the exception of the senior nuclear shift supervisor's (SNSS)

final approval.

.

_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _

.

15

The narrative control room log needs to be improved. On

occasion, the logs have been found to lack detail and are

inconsistently maintained among different shifts.

In addition,

there is significant duplication of information between the

SNSS, shift supervisor, and control room operator's logs. Also,

the control room alarm system needs to be improved. The large

number of overhead annunciators that are in alarm at any given

time, interferes with the ability to understand current plant

conditions. During full power operations, over 50 annunciators

in alarm have been observed.

With the exception of two violations identified shortly after

-

initial licensing, no further Technical Specification adherence

problems have been identified in the operations area. The

establishment of a formalized TS interpretation log has aided

the operators in establishing a consistent and well thought out

approach to TS compliance.

Shift briefings conducted by the SNSS in the operations support

center are noted as a strength.

Pre-shift briefs are conducted

for both the operators and all other support organizations.

Despite the pre-shift briefings, the interface between opera-

tions and chemistry needs improvement. A number of TS action

statement violations involving a failure to take a sample have

occurred, partially as a result of inadequate communications

between departments.

Control room operator errors directly caused, or may have con-

tributed to, 3 of the 14 unplanned scrams during the power

ascension program.

(All plant scrams are described in Table 6

of this report.) Although higher than desired, this number

appears consistent with other recently licensed BWRs. There

have been 89 reportable events since low power license issuance

on April 11, 1986. Of these events, 47 can be categorized as

personnel errors and/or new procedure problems. The major

contributors to the reportable events are: 7 loss of coolant

accident (LOCA) signals, 9 engineered safety feature (ESF)

actuations, and 5 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system

actuations. The majority of these spurious signals share the

common root causes of valve misoperation, and inadvertent con-

tact with sensing lines during drywell work. The licensee

formed a task force to investigate these events and completed

the following corrective actions:

(1) installed quick discon-

nects on instruments, (2) installed identification tags on

sensing lines, (3) installed protective cages around instrument

racks, and (4) blew back instrument lines to remove entrapped

air. Based upon recent performance, these corrective actions

have been effective.

-.

.

_ _ _ _ _ _

.

.

,

.

16

The licensee has implemented a strong housekeeping program

throughout the plant. An integral part of this program is the

plant management tours made on a routine basis and the follow-up

inspections to verity implementation of corrective action. A

plant painting program is being implemented that should also

improve the plent's appearance. Considering the status of the

l

plant during this assessment period, housekeeping and cleanli-

ness are adequate.

During the assessment period, two inspections were performed

to review the licensee's fire protection program, the system's

installation, and the FSAR and Technical Specifications for

compliance with Generic Letter 86-10. During these inspec-

tions, corporate and site management exhibited thorough and

aggressive involvement with, and control of, fire protection

program activities.

It was also evident that priority was

given to problems requiring hardware solutions.

The licensee

requested deletion of the fire protection Technical Specifica-

tions as reconnended in Generic Letter 86-10. The NRC deter-

mined that deletion of these Technical Specifications was in

accordance with the guidance provided in the Generic Letter

and that existing fire protection requirements ha u been

incorporated into plant procedures and equivalent adminis-

trative controls exist to control these activities.

It was

concluded that adequate controls exist to evaluate fire pro-

tection program changes and ensure the ability to achieve and

maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. Staffing for

the fire protection program and training of personnel were

judged to be adequate.

In summary, the proper perspective on safety has been estab-

li2hed throughout the plant staff and station procedures.

Control rocm operator performance during plant transients and

events has been a noteworthy strength.

Strong management

attention is evident in the day-to-day operation of the

facility.

2.

Conclusion

Rating: Category 2

l

Trend: None

3

Board Recommendations

Licensee: Evaluate methods to improve administrative

,

activities consistent with safe plant operations.

!

NRC: None

!

l

L

.

.

17

i

B.

Radiological Controls and Chemistry (6%, 592 Hours)

1.

Analysis

During the previous assessment period, the licensee's perform-

ance was evaluated as Category 2 in the area of Radiological

Controls and Chemistry. Weaknesses identified during the

period were:

a lack of adequate licensee oversight and atten-

tion to detail in the development of the radiation protection

program; a need-to improve coordination and communication

between the operations, radiation protection, and chemistry

groups; and a lack of adequate justification to support

deferral of operability of certain process radiation monitors.

Inspection early in this period found a continuation of the

radiation protection program development problems identified

during the last period. These included inadequacies in the

radiation work permit program, high radiation area access

control program, and airborne radioactivity sampling and anal-

ysis program. A number of technical deficiencies in procedures

were also identified and were attributed to inattention to

detail during procedure reviews by the station and corporate

radiation protection group. These problems were attributed to

the lack of a thorough operational readiness review of the

program by the licensee. Although QA audits of selected ele-

ments of the radiation protection program were performed, they

focused primarily on procedure compliance and not on program

adequacy. While a limited operational readiness assessment of

station radiation protection program adequacy was performed by

the corporate radiation protection group, the assessment find-

ings were not tracked to resolution or verified closed by the

corporate group. The licensee initiated aggressive action to

resolve subsequent NRC findings.

The findings were priori-

tized and contractor support was obtained to assist in their

resolution.

Despite the number of findings, the licensee was

able to adequately resolve them to the satisfaction of the NRC

prior to issuance of the low power license.

In order to fur-

4

ther upgrade the program, the licensee, after issuance of the

l

low power license, initiated a contractor review of the entire

program to identify other weaknesses. The findings are tracked

by computer to resolution and monitored by management. The

effectiveness of this review has yet to be verified.

A contributing factor to the lack of adequate program develop-

ment was a reorganization of the station radiation protection

group which resulted in the loss of some key supervisory

personnel and the lack of a fully staffed corporate radiation

protection group. The losses adversely affected the corporate

group's capability to provide normal program development

support. At the close of the assessment period some posi-

tions remained vacant and administrative procedures had not

l

l

, '

.;

18

'been updated to reflect revised _ reporting chains and personnel-

responsibilities. Experienced contractor personnel were effec-

)

tively used.to augment the organization.

,

Due to the low radiation and radioactive material. source terms,

the radiation protection program was not sufficiently challenged

to allow NRC to fully evaluate oversight and-control of in plant

radiological work activities.

However, limited NRC review of

radiation protection technician' performance in'the field, and

review of an unplanned exposure to the hand of a technician

indicated _ weaknesses in the supervisory oversight of initial

program implementation and the training program for some

technicians. Also, the assignment of a junior technician'to

handle radioactive sources was considered inconsistent with the

goal of assuring that personnel are assigned to tasks commen-

surate with their training and experience.

A need to increase supervisory oversight of activities in the

radiation protection area was evidenced by the following:

some

technicians using improper meters to perform radiation surveys,

inadequate documentation of radiation surveys, lack of consis-

tent performance of surveys, and use of inadequate radiation

work permits to control work with radioactive sources. The

licensee initiated appropriate action to review and resolve

the deficiencies associated with the identified problems.

Technicians were reinstructed regarding proper meter use and

documentation of surveys, source control was tightened, and

-reviews of program implementation were initiated.. The train-

_

ing program was permanently revised to address the identified

problems.

In addition, supervisors were counseled and directed

not to assign individuals, including junior technicians, to

tasks for which they had not been qualified.

The special inspection to review implementation of NUREG-0737

post-accident sampling and analysis recommendations identified

a number of problems requiring licensee attention. Although

appropriate sampling and analysis equipment was installed and

operable, and procedures were in place where needed, NRC review

and observation during walkthroughs identified a lack of ade-

quate field testing of procedures, weaknesses in training and

qualification of personnel, and weak intragroup communications.

The weaknesses identified did not preclude collection of samples

but did delay their collection. The licensee initiated aggres-

sive and timely corrective action to address these NRC identified

problems.

Regarding effluent monitoring and control, NRC review

determined that the licensee's recovery from delayed installa-

tion / testing of the process and effluent monitors, resulting

from the vendor going out of business, was well planned and

executed.

n

-

-

_______ - _______ _ _ __ ______

.

-

19

Reviews of the ALARA Program found that a management commitment

to ALARA was evident.

In addition, state-of-the-art techniques

are evaluated and adopted as appropriate.

Radiation prctection

personnel have been placed in the planning and scheduling group

to provide for effective group interface and understanding of

planned work. Although a basic ALARA Program is in place, pro-

gram elements needing up grade were the ALARA goals program and

on going job reviews. These areas are being reviewed and eval-

ucted by the licensee in response to NRC concerns.

Reviews of radiation protection facilities and equipment found

them to be of acceptable. quality.

Radiation protection equip-

ment was considered state of the art with ample supplies

available. The supplies were adequate to support plant opera-

tion, demonstrating adequate management attention to this

important area.

Resolution of effluent sample line loss issues associated with

the north and south plant vent monitors was delayed due, in

part, to the resignation of the Senior Radiation Protection

Supervisor-Radioactive Material Control and the subsequent

elimination of the position.

Personnel were unable to locate

contractor line loss test reports and line loss test results

were not reviewed, evaluated and incorporated into plant

effluent surveillance procedures, demonstrating poor control

of records and inadequate evaluation and use of test results.

The water chemistry control program was reviewed and found to

conform to generally-accepted industry standards for controlling

contaminant ingress, activated product transport, and corrosion

of pressure boundary and heat transfer surfaces. Radiological

capability test standard interccmparisons showed all measure-

ments to be in agreement. However, comparisons of chemistry

measurements for metals and boron were in disagreement and

weaknesses in controlling, charting and trending chemical

measurements were noted.

Resolution of these technical

issues was delayed, in part, by the resignation of the

Chemistry Engineer.

Reviews of preoperational/startup testing of radwaste systems

and initial implementation of the radwaste management program

indicated that management attention was directed to developing,

implementing, and maintaining a generally effective radwaste

management program. The licensee requested and received

approval for deferral of test completion for the gaseous and

solid radwaste systems into the startup phase.

Preoperational

testing of the liquid radwaste system showed that the system

was able to perform its intended function.

Tests were completed

in a timely manner and met generally-accepted industry standards

for such tests.

_--_

_

.

,

-

20

The development of the packaging and shipping program was

delayed by discussions between the Hope Creek Generating

Station and the Salem Station regirding a unified packaging

and shipping program.

No radwaste shipments from Hope Creek

Generating Station were completed during the assessment

period.

In summary, NRC reviews at the beginning of the period identi-

fied numerous programmatic deficiencies, particularly in the

area of radiation protection. These deficiencies were attrib-

uted to lack of a thorough review of program operational

readiness, reorganizations, and some staff vacancies. However,

the licensee was able to prioritize the NRC identified problems

and resolve them in a timely manner. The remaining problems

indicate a need to strengthen the internal audit program, sta-

bilize the organization, fill identified position vacancies and

improve inter- and intra group communication.

2.

Conclusion

Rating:

Category 2

Trend: None

3.

Board Recommendations

Licensee: None

NRC: None

,

l

l

!

!

!

!

,

-

,

[+

l

21

C.

Maintenance (5%, 445 Hours)

1.

Analysis

,

The previous SALP evaluated the maintenance functional area

as a category 2.

Noted strengths included the maintenance

traini_ng program and experienced supervisors and managers.

The majority of weaknesses identified were associated with the

-

transition from construction to operations, and the shift of

equipment responsibility from Bechtel to PSE&G. The SALP Board

recommended that this interface problem be resolved in order to

prevent problems during the operations phase. Early in this

assessment period, the station maintenance _ group assumed full

responsibility for the maintenance of all equipment.

During this assessment period, NRC inspectors conducted admin-

_

istrative program and procedure reviews, and observed a limited

number of corrective and preventive maintenance activities.

The mairitenance department is adequately staffed with experi-

enced personnel although the use of contractors is still

required to complete the required staffing in the instrument

and controls (I&C) area.

There are approximately 60 personnel

in the mechanical and electrical-maintenance sections, all of

whom are permanent PSE&G employees. -Approximately one half of

the 80 I&C personnel are contractors.

The reliance on con-

tractors is being reduced as new hires complete their required

training. These staffing levels appear to be adequate for the

plant work load since the number of outstanding corrective

maintenance work orders is maintained at approximately 800.

Less than 10% of.the outstanding corrective maintenance work

orders would be categorized as safety-related high priority.

The total outstanding ~ work order count is normally higher than

800 because all preventive maintenance (PM), and surveillance

tests (ST), are also given work order numbers by the inspection

order (IO) program. The 10 system appears to be an effective

management tool for the scheduling and tracking of periodic PM

and ST requirements.

The majority of maintenance department activity has been in.the

areas-of minor valve repair, gasket leaks, early life failure

replacements, preventive maintenance, and surveillance tests.

Surveillance tests are further discussed in Section D.

The

major activities observed during this assessment period include

control rod drive (CRD) seal replacement, repair and replace-

-

ment of service water elbows at the safety auxiliary cooling

system (SACS) heat exchangers, and replacement of the B resid-

ual heat removal (RHR) pump. Although these activities were

generally well controlled, some problems were identified. A

lack of procedural adherence and a failure to satisfy the

appropriate prerequisites was observed during the CRD seal

l

..

-

22

replacement. Also, the service water system was declared

operable following reassembly, even though a deficiency

report documenting questionable wall thicknesses had not been

dispositioned. The licensee has taken corrective action for

these problems, however, there has not been sufficient basis

to evaluate their long term effectiven*3s.

The plant management meetings, shift turnover meetings, and use

of a planning department to prioritize and schedule all work

activities has been an effective method of placing management's

plan into action. The maintenance planners are responsible for

developing a complete work package including special instruc-

tions, procedures, tool and parts requirements, and retest

requirements. This significantly reduces the administrative

burden on the worker in the field and ensures a consistency

among work packages.

Based upon a limited review in this area, good practices that

have been noted are a comprehensive preventive maintenance

program, the use of M0 VATS on all safety-related, motor operated

valves, the incorporation of the operational. experience evalu-

ation program findings into procedures, and the development of

a master equipment list.

In summary, based upon a limited amount of review, it appears

that a good foundation of procedures and programs has been

established in the maintenance area. Corrective actions have

been taken for procedure adherence and operability determination

problems which occurred early in the assessment period. There

has been limited activity in program implementation during the

period and the organization has not been fully challenged.

2.

Conclusion

Ratino: Category 1

Trend: None

3.

Board Recommendations

Licensee: None

NRC: Maintain normal inspection activity.

--

.-

.

-

23

D.

Surveillance (9%, 823 Hours)

1.

Analysis

The surveillance area was not evaluated during the previous

assessment period.

Surveillance tests performed by the

licensee are the responsibility of several departments,

depending on the surveillance. The operations, maintenance,

chemistry, and site protection departments participate in

surveillance testing. This section addresses surveillance

tests performed without reference to the particular department

involved. Surveillance activities were routinely witnessed by

NRC inspectors. Because of problems encountered with the

review of preoperational test packages, an increased emphasis

was placed on the technical adequacy and performance of sur-

veillance tests during this assessment period. The surveillance

program is a well defined, computer based system that utilizes

technically adequate procedures.

The use of the computerized

inspection order (IO) system for scheduling all periodic sur-

veillance tests allows for efficient and generally effective

management oversight of the approximately 5000 surveillance

tests performed on an annual basis.

Prior to the initial entry into each reactor operational con-

dition, the completion of mode change required surveillance

tests was frequently the critical path. Test progress normally

lagged the schedule for a number of reasons including:

- Not all surveillance procedures were fully written and

approved before needed.

- Technicians were not familiar with all procedures.

- Time delays for equipment failures were not factored into the

schedule.

Of the 89 reportable events during this assessment period,

26 are associated with the performance of surveillance tests.

Deficient surveillance procedures resulted in, or contributed

,

l

to, the July 25 scram on low water level and the November 14

scram on high pressure. Schedule pressure and technician

unfamiliarity with surveillance procedures contributed to many

of the reportable events and to an NRC concern regarding the

use of unauthorized temporary procedure changes which altered

the intent of the procedure but had not been Station Operations

Review Committee (SORC) approved. Based upon recent perform-

ance, these problems have been corrected.

e

-

24

Six instances of a failure to perform required surveillance

tests or take the action required by the appropriate technical

specifications were identified. The lack of effective communi-

cation between the operations and chemistry departments has

caused failures to obtain and analyze a number of samples

required by the technical specifications.

It is noted that

many of these samples are situational in nature and cannot be

placed into the normal scheduling program. The licensee

recognizes that a problem exists and has taken steps to improve

the situation. There has not been sufficient basis to evaluate

the effectiveness of the corrective actions.

On numerous occasions during this assessment period, a single

channel loss of coolant accident (LOCA) signal was generated

from a not always apparent cause.. It appears likely that some

of the LOCA signals resulted froa valve operations on or around

the reactor pressure and level instrument racks which feed the

reactor protection and emergency core cooling system logic

schemes. However, because the exact cause for all of these

LOCA signals could not always he positively determined, the

licensee formed a task force to identify the root cause of

these LOCA signals.

The investigation included a review of

all available data. Although no positive determination could

be made of the cause for the signals, a comprehensive action

plan was carried out. These actions included: blowing back

all instrument lines to remove entrapped air, installing

identification tags on all LOCA/ECCS instruments and sensor

lines, installing quick disconnects on LOCA/ECCS instruments,

technician training, review of all LOCA/ECCS surveillance

procedures, and installing cages around instrument racks.

These actions have apparently been effective since no spuri-

ous LOCA signals have been generated during the last four

months of the appraisal period.

Regarding effluent monitoring and control, our review found that

the licensee's recovery from delayed installation / testing of the

process and effluent monitors, resulting from the vendor going

out of business, was well planned and executed. However, the

simultaneous need for preoperational testing of the monitors and

continuous surveillance of those monitors to support early

operation led to occasional lapses in Technical Specification

surveillance tests. On two occasions, effluent monitors were

removed from service and necessary grab samples were not taken

resulting in self-identified failures to meet Technical Spec.1-

fication surveillance requirements. The failure to ensure

adequate communications among the various testing, operations

and technical support groups, and to clearly assign responsibil-

ity for declarations of operability /inoperability, contributed

to the problems noted.

-

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

.

25

The licensee implemented adequate local leak rate test (LLRT)

and containment integrated leak rate test (CILRT) programs.

The tests were conducted using acceptable procedures and

equipment, and the test personnel were knowledgeable and well

qualified.

,

In summary, the majority of difficulties experienced in the sur-

veillance area can be attributed to the self-imposed schedule

pressures associated with the plant entering the startup phase of

testing.

The procedures and administrative controls in place

are adequate to implement an effective surveillance program.

Increased attention is needed to improve communications between

departments in order to reduce the number of missed nonroutine

surveillance tests.

,

1

2.

Conclusion

Rating: Category 2

Trend: None

3.

Board Recommendations

Licensee:

None

NRC:

None

!

!

-

I

I

B

.

_m_________

_______ __________

m._

____

_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ .

_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ .

.

.

26

E.

Emergency Preparedness (5%, 454 Hours)

,

1.

Analysis

During the previous assessment period, the licensee was eval-

uated as Category 2 in the area of Emergency Preparedness.

That assessment was based on the results of an Emergency

Preparedness Implementation Appraisal (EPIA) conducted on

August 12-16, 1985, observation of the annual exercise held

r

on October 29, 1985, and two routine inspections. Several

critical emergency planning (EP) program areas were determined

to be incomplete and indications were that management attention

had been diverted from Hope Creek EP capabilities development

to (i) upgrading the Salem EP program and (ii) corporate

reorganization. The licensee's performance during the October

29, 1985 exercise was good with only a few weaknesses noted.

During this assessment period, there were two inspections.

One inspection was a follow-up emergency preparedness inspection

conducted February 3-6, 1986, of concerns identified during the

August 1985 EPIA. All but two of the concerns identified during

the EPIA had been resolved. One unresolved item related to

incomplete emergency preparedness training since sufficient

numbers of personnel had not been qualified to provide a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

emergency staffing capability. The licensee committed to com-

plete key personnel training and provide qualified staff prior

to exceeding 5% power. The licensee affirmed, in writing, on

April 8, 1986, that training had been completed and would be

maintained.

Full staffing capability was satisfactorily

demonstrated during the November 12, 1986 full participation

exercise. A second unresolved item involved the radiation

monitoring system (RMS). The installation, calibration, func-

tional testing and operability of process and effluent monitors

has now been confirmed by reactor health physics inspections.

The RMS computer links were completed and computer capability

demonstrated.

Functionality of the RMS during simulated emer-

gency conditions was confirmed during the November 1986

exercise.

The second inspection included observation of the November

exercise. The licensee satisfactorily demonstrated the ability,

within scenario limitations, to:

identify accident conditions;

declare the correct emergency action level; notify governmental

authorities; activate and staff emergency response facilities;

take proper corrective actions; develop protective action recom-

.wndations; interface with governmental authorities including

the NRC Director of Site Operations; effectively plan recovery

operations; and adequately provide measures to protect public

health and safety.

In addition, strong performance was noted

in the areas of personnel exposure control and radiation

sJrveys.

No significant deficiencies were identified; and,

overall licensee performance during the exercise was adequate.

O.

27

The En;ergency Preparedness Manager resigned and has been

replaced by a staff senior emergency planner promoted to fill

the vacancy. The Artificial Island emergency preparedness staff

which supports Hope Creek consists of twelve professionals.

Management has provided appropriate support of EP.

An Alert was declared on May 2 when offsite power was lost to

the vital buses and again on July 6 when tampering was con-

sidered a possible cause for a plant fire suppression system

actuation.

In both cases, notifications were made promptly

and the emergency plan effectively implemented.

The licensee has installed a state-of-the-art siren system to

meet the requirement for an alert and notification system.

This system provides hard copy diagnostics of performance for

any one or all sirens. Additionally, an advanced surface water

clearing plan for Delaware River surface waters has been

developed and was satisfactorily tested during the November 1986

exercise.

The licensee and the State of New Jersey have negotiated an

agreement whereby the State receives 10 CFR 50.72 notifications

in the same time frame as the NRC as well as the follow-up 10 CFR 50.73 Licensee Event Reports.

FEMA will complete its review of the New Jersey State

Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Artificial Island

during 1987 to determine if approval is warranted per 44 CFR

350.12.

"350" approval has been given to the Delaware Plan,

contingent upon a successful siren test.

In summary, the licensee has dedicated sufficient corporate

management attention and resources to establish an effective

emergency preparedness program. Strong performance has been

,

noted during events and drills.

2.

Conclusion

Rating: Category 1

Trend:

None

3.

Board Recommendations

Licensee: None

NRC: None

T

.

.

.

28

F.

Security and Safeguards (4%, 348 Hours)

1.

Analysis

During the previous assessment period, the licensee was evalu-

ated as Category 1 in the area of Security and Safeguards.

The

previous SALP assessment of this area was based on reviews of

pre-operational activity in the development of a site security

program. The licensee was effective in:

integration with the

Salem security program, resolution of outstanding issues, and

training security personnel.

During this assessment period, the licensee completed both the

integration of the Hope Creek facility security program with

the Salem program and a major upgrade to the security program

that began several years ago. That upgrade included a combined

access control facility, installation of an integrated security

computer system and associated hardware, computerized access

control devices, state-of-the-art assessment aids and new

personnel search equipment. Those extensive activities were

completed by developing and implementing plans in a comprehen-

sive, well thought out and organized manner.

Management

attention and oversight of the program was evident throughout

the period from the smooth transition and relatively trouble-

free implementation of program changes. The licensee provided

NRC with thorough and clear progress reports and prompt noti-

fications whenever changes to the plans were necessary.

The licensee aggressively addressed previously issued NRC

'

security related guidance during the development of the Hope

Creek program. The licensee demonstrated a clear understanding

of the safety and safeguards issues and effectively applied

l

Salem program experiences to the Hope Creek program.

Solutions

to technical safeguards problems were sound, timely and

,

!

conservative. Concerns identified by NRC were promptly and

effectively resolved by the licensee in a competent manner.

The NRC Site Evaluation Team was able to review and certify

the Hope Creek security program for implementation with minimal

difficulty and delay due to adequate records and preparation.

l

Aggressive corporate management attention to the development

'

and implementation of the security program aided in NRC

certification. The licensee has been effective in fostering a

highly professional attitude towards maintaining performance

!

objectives of the NRC approved security plans by continued and

effective management. The performance of the security systems

and equipment has been sound and relatively trouble free since

the initial startup period. This performance results from the

extensive design, procurement and engineering effort expended

on program development. To date, the impact of integrating Hope

Creek into the Salem security program has been essentially

unnoticeable when viewed from an NRC regulatory perspective.

f

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!

.-

_

.-

-

.

-.

.

.

.

--

.

.

- -

- .

.-

. . . - - . -

-

.

-.

.

.

w

. .

1

29-

Corporate management's interest in establishing and maintaining

a strong security program was further demonstrated by the high

quality of security force performance indicated during a

,

'

special NRC inspection of the security force training and quali-

fication program. That inspection was conducted to determine-

the quality'and effectiveness of the training program and to

'

measure the ability of security personnel to carry out their.

assigned duties. The training is conducted by individuals who

are experienced and competent in their field and who are

assigned to security training only. . Training facilities have

~

adequate' classroom space and good training aids.

Lesson plans-

.

are.well developed, thorough, and kept current through'. feedback

4

from supervisory personnel who perform on-the-job surveillance

,

'

of security personnel performance. The results of the special

inspection indicated that the security training program is broad

in scope, of high quality, and administered in a highly profes-

i

. sional manner. The results indicated extensive corporate and

onsite licensee management involvement -in the training program

as well as a strong positive influence on'the part of the con-

- tractor's site management and supervisory personnel.

.

The licensee's-security plans, procedures, and instructions are

'

clear,-concise and thorough.

Letters and reports submitted to

NRC are also clear, promptly submitted, technically -accurate,

,

and seldom generate questions from the NRC.

The licensee's security management and contract security force

supervisors display a very positive and conservative attitude

towards plant security issues and compliance with regulatory

i

l

requirements. These individuals are quick to understand issues

.

that arise during simulated and actual security events and how

>

'

those. issues can impact on plant security.

i

i

The security program is strongly supported by the other plant

'

i

operating divisions on site and frequent interface is evident.

The maintenance staff detects unacceptable conditions with

!

security equipment, and then aggressively pursues-corrective

[

action before they develop into major problems. When minor

problems were found during NRC inspections, security managers

,

i

were most often already aware of them and were in the process

'

of establishing corrective actions. This degree of cognizance

is creditable to a strong internal audit and surveillance

program and is further evidence of the licensee's desire to-

l-

implement a high quality security program.

Security force personnel exhibit excellent morale because of

3'

their recognized and respected role onsite, the excellent

support they are afforded by the management of all divisions

and the quality of the equipment they have been provided. As

a result, they carry out their assigned duties and responsi-

bilities in a professional and dedicated manner,

4

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30

Corporate security management is actively involved.in the

Region I Nuclear Security. Organization and other nuclear

industry groups engaged in security innovations and the

development of security program standards. This is evidence

of management support of the security program at a high level

in the licensee's organization.

To ensure continued effectiveness of the security program,

the licensee conducts in-house surveillances to monitor the

performance of the security organization.

Experienced and

knowledgeable personnel perform these surveillances and the

findings are aggressively pursued to en:ure prompt and effec-

tive corrective action and feedback to the training program.

These surveillances are conducted in addition to the annual

security program audit required by the NRC.

Housekeeping of the access control facility and other security

areas is noteworthy. The general state of cleanliness demon-

strates a high degree of pride and morale on the part of the

security force.

The licensee submitted two security event reports pursuant to

10 CFR 73.71(c) during the assessment period. Both events were

bomb threats that were adequately responded to by the licensee

and were subsequently determined to be hoaxes.

During the assessment period, the licensee submitted a

temporary change (TC) applicable to both the Salem and Hope

Creek security plans.

This TC identified compensatory measures

that would be implemented during modifications necessary to

consolidate the Salem and Hope Creek protected area.

Prior to

the submittal of this change, the licensee contacted Region I

Safeguards personnel and requested a meetir.g onsite to review

and discuss the modification plans. The resulting TC fully

described the issues.

The approach to and planning for this

modification is another indicator of the licensee's commitment

to maintain an effective and high quality security program.

In summary, close licensee management attention to this area

has resulted in an effective security program following a

smooth transition period during which the Salem features were

expanded to encompass the Hope Creek site.

2.

Conclusion

Rating:

Category 1

Trend: None

._.

-_-

_._ _ _

_ _..

.... _= ..

. _ _

..... _ - .. .. __

_ .._ -. _ .

_ __

,

. ..

31

1-

,

,

3.

Board Recommendations

'

Licensee: None

NRC: Due-to the hiring of a new security force contractor,-

r

- maintain normal levels of inspection.

4

-

4

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wwe< staff questions and exhibited evidence of prior planning in

producing responses to NRC conderns.

In most cases, responses

are sufficiently complete and timely. 'Decistor, making is done

at a level which assures adequate canegement review. Management

involvement is evident in P5E&G's responses to staff concerns as

most responses indicate awareness of pelicy, design and opera-

tional considerations.

~

During the current rating period all outstanding SER issues

were resolved, a number of exemptions to the regulations were

,

processed add granted, a compresstd power ascension test pro- /

-

gram was prpposed and submitted to the NRC, anj the low and full

power operating licenses were issued.

In addition, following

,

!

licensing, a number of Technical Specification amendment

>

,

requests have been submitted.

In all cases, the licensee has

'

exhibited a clear understanding of the issues involved as

,

exemplified by the licensee's effort to " compress" the power

.

ascension test program.

For each test, the licensee' identified'

th9 purpose of the test, the proposed modifications, and pro -

,

vided safety evaluations supporting the requested modifications.

,

During various conversations with the licensee regarding the

proposed modifications, the licensee exhibited a very clear

understanding of the issues involved. Similaris, the licensee

exhibited clear understanding of the issue: involved when it

i

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. . _ . .

, , _ _

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39

.

submitted vari 6us exemption requests.

Each request was accom-

.,

panied by a detailed safety evaluation in support of_the

request, and the necessary findings under 50.12a.

In each

y

case, it was the licensee's-responsibility to demonstrate to

'

the' staff's satisfaction-the acceptability'of the proposed

,,'A

action'

The licensee did so with clear knowledge and full

iS

understanding of the issues at hand and their implications on

"'

planti operations.

,

Conservatism is routinely exhibited by the licensee when the

-

l'

issue involves safety significance. Most of the licensee's

submittals have exhibited careful forethought, consideration

of the_ proposed action, and technically sound responses.

J.

In most cases, technically sound resolutions are proposed

initially; however, during this rating period,.one example

..

exists where this was not the case.

In this instance, involving

'

,

.the _ testing of Bailey 862 solid state logic modules (SSLMs), the -

'

licensee proposed removing a fixed number of module sample popu-

.lation on a regular basis for testing during power operations.

p

Fe1. lowing discussions with the staff, the staff and licensee

t.

bota agreed that this was not an acceptable test method, and the

j

proposal was superseded. -In this instance, the. licensee appeared

overeager to resolve the NRC concern without assuring itself

"

P

that a safety concern did not exist. Overall, however, sound

(

resolutions are initially proposed.

V

(

'"

In most cases, PSE&G was responsive to staff initiatives. With

5

the exception of not submitting the detailed control room design

3

review Summary Report II on the. schedule required by a license

'

-condition, most submittals met the deadlines. The licensee has-

provided timely responses to a number of Generic Letters during

j,

this rating period. _PSE&G appears to make special' efforts in

~

' resolving issues in a timely fashion, and with full knowledge of

F

the-issues at hand. The licensee's responses are usually tech-

I

inically sound and thoroughly presented and supported.

In the

j

few cases where.the licensee has not provided sufficiently

detailed responses, upon notification of this, the licensee

has been very responsive in supplying the needed additional

i

f

information.

Usually this evaluation is provided within twenty-

four hours. As noted earlier, acceptable resolutions to issues

~ '

are initially proposed in most cases.

Positions in the Hope Creek organization, including senior.-level

..

management, are well defined. Positions and their associated

1

responsibilities are accurately described in the FSAR and Emer-

j '

'

gency Plan and appear to be consistent with actual practice.

Since the last SALP cycle, PSE&G has filled the vacancies that

.

7

y

existed in the organization. The staff has reviewed the quali-

'

.

fications of the individuals filling the previously vacant

~

-

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1

1

-

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,

-

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. ' ~

.

.

40

I

'

The licensee

positions and.found them acceptably qualified.

has maintained'a substantial and knowledgeable licensing staff

to assure timely and quality responses to NRC concerns.

In conclusion, corporate management is taking a very active role

in licensing matters and responses to NRC initiatives continue

to be timely, thorough, complete and conscious of safety

impacts.

2.

Conclusion

Rating: Category 1

{

>

Trend: None

.

3.

Board Recommendations

Licensee.' None

.

' '

'

\\~

>

i

.

,

NRC: None M

'

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.

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--

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.

_

41

J.

Training ar.d Qualification Effectiveness (NA)

1.

Analysis

During this assessment period, Training and Qualification

Effectiveness is being considered as a separate functional area

for the first time.

Training and qualification effectiveness

continues to be an evaluation criterion for each functional

area.

The various aspects of this functional area have been considered

and discussed as an integral part of other functional areas and

the respective inspection hours have been included in each one.

Consequently, this discussion is a synopsis of the assessments

related to training conducted in other areas. Training effec-

tiveness has been measured primarily by the observed performance

of licensee personnel and, to a lesser degree, as a review of

program adequacy.

The licensee operates anc maintains well equipped training

facilities which provide training for all of the nuclear

departments including operations, I&C technicians, electricians,

mechanics, chemists, health physics technicians, machinists, and

welders. The Hope Creek training program is modeled after the

Salem program which has been INPG accredited in all ten training

areas.

The NRC administered two sets of initial operator licensing

examinations at Hope Creek during this SALP assessment period

(February 1986, and July 1986). A total of 25 Senior Reactor

Operator candidates were examined with 22 passing.

,

Weaknesses identified during the oral examinations included an

unfamiliarity with the flow signals to the APRM/RBM systems, ADS

logic, and fire protection equipment.

It was also noted that

several candidates had a fundamental misconception about the

operation of the feed water control system (FWCS).

Two unplanned reactor scrams, early in the power ascension pro-

gram, were a result of control room operator errors.

In both

cases, an IRM range switch was incorrectly downranged resulting

in an IRM-high trip. A difference between the simulator and the

,

as-built feedwater system may have contributed to two other

scrams. The simulator does not accurately reflect the as-built

condition of the feedwater turbine reset logic and the actions

required to reset the turbine from the control room.

Because of

these differences, the operators were slow to recover a tripped

feed pump and the reactor scrammed on low level.

Prompt cor-

rective action in the form of shift briefings was taken and

simulator upgrades are planned.

.

-

.

,.

.

--- - , _ .

.

42

Strengths observed during the oral examinations included the

candidates' familiarity with safety and major systems (with the

exception of the FWCS). Also, most candidates displayed a

responsible attitude toward their duties as licensed operators.

A weakness in the ability to interpret and apply the Technical

Specifications was noted during the grading of many of the SRO

written examinations. Also identified were weaknesses involving

the response of the FWCS (as mentioned above) and fire brigade

manning exemptions.

The Hope Creek full scope simulator is performing well and is

providing a . valuable tool for licensed operator training. The

simulator was also used to perform validations of all major

power ascension tests prior to actual in plant performance.

This significantly improved the quality of power ascension test

procedures and provided valuable training to both operators and

test engineers.

The plant operators, in general, have positive attitudes

towards the training program. They felt they have been ade-

quately trained on plant systems and system operations.

They

also feel the lecture and simulator programs are excellent.

Although varying opinions were observed as to the technical

adequacy of the written training material, it was agreed that

the readability of these materials could be greatly improved.

Based upon discussions and direct observation, the performance

of licensed operators in the control room has been observed by

the NRC to be excellent. The operators are proficient in

recovering from plant transients and equipment malfunctions in

a competent and professional manner and have demonstrated a

consistently improving knowledge of Technical Specifications

as evidenced by daily discussions with NRC inspectors.

Knowl-

edge of system operational characteristics, familiarity with

procedures, and actions on transient response were noted, and

are indicative of effective and valid training for licensed

operators.

The licensee's corporate and station management involvement in

training is good. Training review groups evaluate training on a

regular basis and provide feedback to the training program.

The

training department is well staffed with experienced personnel.

Laboratory facilities are excellent and provide hands on train-

ing on such things as rebuilding circuit breakers, Limitorque

valve operators and motors.

The 2 year assignment of licensed

operators to the training department is also a positive feedback

mechanism.

-__

- _ __-_-___-___ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

- _ - -

,.

-

43

The training program has been responsive to the requests of

various departments on a timely basis. When it became apparent

that valving errors by I&C technicians were causing spurious

LOCA signals, the training department set up a training instru-

ment' rack on site and provided training to all technicians.

This training directly contributed to a reduction in spurious

signals.

In addition, a modified SR0 training program is

planned for personnel designated as system engineers.

It

appears that these changes will have a positive impact on the

performance of the engineering support groups.

Regarding training and qualification of radiation protection

personnel, a documented training and qualification program

for radiation protection personnel has been established and

implemented. The program consists of formal classroom and

on-the-job training. The program is not yet INPO accredited

and is. based on a job-task-analysis for the Salem Station.

Some findings this period (e.g., lack of adequate training for

individuals handling sources and improper use of radiation

survey instruments) suggest a need to perform a specific job

task analysis for radiation protection personnel at Hope Creek

and an upgrade of the program as appropriate. The licensee is

planning to do this as part of efforts to become INPO accredited

in this area.

Management's interest in establishing and maintaining a quality

security program was demonstrated by the high quality of secu-

rity force performance indicated during a special NRC inspection

of the security force training and qualification program. That

inspection was conducted to determine the quality and effective-

ness of the training program and to measure the ability of

security personnel to carry out their asugned duties. The

training is conducted by individuals who are experienced and

competent in their field and who are assigned to security trata-

ing only. Training facilities have adequate classroom space and

good training aids.

Lesson plans are well developed, thorough,

and kept current through feedback from supervisory personnel

who perform on-the-job surveillance of security personnel

performance. The results of the special inspection indicated

that the security training program is broad in scope, of high

quality, and administered in a highly professional manner.

Also, the results indicated extensive corporate and onsite

licensee management involvement in the training program as well

as a strong positive influence on the part of the contractor's

site management and supervisory personnel.

In summary, based upon the high examination pass rate and

operators performance in the control roon, the licensed

operator training program is effective.

Problems encountered

during plant operations were due to inexperienced personnel

more than training inadequacies.

__

_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ -

.

44

2.

Conclusion

Rating:

Category 2

Trend:

Improving

3.

Board Recommendations

Licensee:

None

NRC: None

.

45

K.

Assurance of Quality (NA)

1.

Analysis

Assurance of Quality is a new separate functional area for this

SALP period and is a summary assessment of management oversight

and effectiveness in implementation of the quality assurance

program and administrative controls affecting quality.

Activities affecting the assurance of quality as they apply

specifically to a functional area are addressed under each of

the separate functional areas.

Further, this functional area

is not an assessment of the quality assurance department alone,

but is an overall evaluation of management's initiatives,

programs, and policies which affect or asrure quality.

During the assessment period, four inspections were performed

in the area of quality programs and administrative controls

affecting quality.

These inspections covered the following

areas:

- Administrative procedures, records, design control and

modification, review committees and staffing and

nonlicensing training for operations;

- Bulletins and Construction Deficiency Reports (CDRs); and

- Licensee actions concerning the Salem ATWS event.

In addition, the implementation of the Quality Assurance

(QA) program was reviewed by the resident and region based

inspectors in conjunction with other functional areas.

Overall, the licensee appears to have developed a strong

program for assuring quality during operations.

The licensee

established a generally effective program for ensuring the

timely issuance of the plant administrative procedures.

These procedures are well written, complete and meet the

FSAR commitments.

The operating experience evaluation program's review of over

3000 industry documents from the NRC, INPO, and vendors has

had a positive impact on the quality of plant procedures.

In addition, the incident report program provides a rigorous

mechanism to ensure that Hope Creek's own operational experi-

ence is evaluated and changes made to procedures when required.

All occurrences meeting certain criteria, whether reportable to

the NRC or not, are documented and investigated.

Each dispo-

sition is performed by the appropriate work group and includes

the correcth e action taken or planned.

Station management is

required to review and approve the disposition of all incident

reports.

m

-

,

46

In the design change and modification area, the licensee has

made major organizational changes with respect to engineering

support for plant operations. A new engineering manual has

been developed that is a distinct improvement on previous

procedures.

In the area of review committees, careful forethought and

planning by management in the establishment of the various

committees is evident. The Station Operations Review Committee

(SORC) has been extensively involved with the preparations for

operations since it became functional in July 1984. Since

then, the licensee has made significant changes in the SORC

review process to enhance the quality and timeliness of com-

mittee reviews. Other strengths include the Offsite Safety

Review Group initiative to be in the online review of pro-

posed design changes / modifications which exceeds 10 CFR 50.59

requirements. The Offsite Safety Review Group performed a

timely and in-depth review of the reactor building to

suppression chamber pressure relief system inoperability.

The licensee has implemented an effective program, with

adequate staffing to follow-up NRC bulletins, circulars,

information notices and CDRs. The evaluation, analysis and

resolution of problems and NRC initiatives have been effective

and timely.

In the area of licensee actions concerning the Salem ATWS

event, licensee management has been aggressive in taking an

active part to assura that the ATWS issue receives proper

emphasis.

This aggressive approach is indicated by the Vice

President - Nuclear's letter to station personnel regarding

" Commitment Management," and by licensee procedures wnich have

been implemented including the following:

Reliability and

Assessment Management, Response Coordination, Vendor Interface

and Reliability Monitoring.

The licensee has established a

Response Coordination Team which is responsible for review,

approval and implementation of all vendor supplied information,

regulatory bulletins, industry standards, engineering recommen-

dations, and operational experiences as applicable.

During this assessment period, the implementation of the QA

program was judged as generally very good.

Strong points

observed during review of other functional areas included

extensive QA review of preoperational test results and excel-

lent surveillance coverage of the containment integrated leak

rate test (CILRT). One weakness concerns timeliness of

addressing quality concerns. QA had previously identified a

deficiency involving the use of unapproved temporary proce-

dures for performance of surveillance tests, however, the

practice was not corrected until an NRC inspector identified

the same concern.

Upon subsequent review, the NRC found that

_

_

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _

_

.

.

47

a large number of QA identified concerns were not responded to

in a timely manner by various departments. The licensee has

since increased the visibility of QA concerns and improved the

timeliness of corrective actions.

The licensee's philosophy on assuring quality at Hope Creek

keys on individual achievement of a high level of performance,

emphasizing personnel responsibility, accountability, and pride

of ownership.

In keeping with this philosophy, programs to

I

promote quality awareness and employee involvement have been

instituted during this SALP period and appear to be well

received by station personnel.

Examples of these programs are:

- Plant Material Improvement Programs which include cleanup,

painting, and labeling activities in the plant.

- Employee Involvement Program facilitates management / worker

interfaces and awards for good performance.

- Quality Awareness Committee comprised of nuclear department

volunteers who periodically issue a " Quality Gram" promoting

improvements in quality performance.

- Quality Awareness Days are sponsored by individual depart-

ments and inform other departments of quality-improvement

activities in progress within the sponsor department.

- Quality Concerns Reporting Program enables plant personnel to

confidentially express quality concerns to be investigated by

licensee QA personnel.

l

Due to the low radiation and radioactive material source term,

!

the radiation protection program was not sufficiently challenged

to allow NRC to fully evaluate oversight and control of in plant

i

activities.

However, a need to increase supervisory oversight

'

of activities in this area was evidenced by:

technicians

repeatedly using improper meters to perform radiation surveys,

less than adequate documentation of radiation surveys, lack of

consistent performance of surveys, and use of inadequate radi-

ation work permits to control work with radioactive sources.

Although corrected by the licensee when brought to his atten-

tion, these example, demonstrate a lack of aggressive oversight

of in plant activities during initial program implementation.

A combination of these weaknesses resulted in a technician

receiving an unplanned exposure of 1.4 rads to his hands.

Reviews of the external and internal exposure controls program

prior to plant licensing found examples of deficient procedures

being established and implemented.

Examples include a less

than adequate:

radiation work permit (RWP) program, high radi-

ation area access control program and airborne radioactivity

__ ..

.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

e

.

48

sampling and analysis program. Although corrected in a timely

manner, these examples are indicative of lack of adequate

attention to detail during program development and a lack of

acceptable reviews.

Quality Assurance review of the technical program development

and implementation of the radiation protection program at Hope

Creek was limited.

Technical evaluation of program procedures

was conducted solely by the Station Operations Review Committee.

Less than adequate procedures were generated due to insufficient

technical review.

Reviews of preoperational/startup testing of radwaste systems

and initial implementation of the radwaste management program

indicated that management attention was directed to developing,

implementing, and maintaining a generally effective radwaste

management program. Application of the Quality Assurance

program to preoperational tests of the radwaste systems was

thorough and demonstrated an effective identification, track-

ing and closure of test discrepancies. A contingency plan for

processing solid radwaste was developed using vendor-supplied

solidification equipment temporarily attached to the solid

radwaste system.

Vendor procedures were reviewed and incor-

porated as controlled plant procedures and included inspection

hold points and other controls governing the vendor's process

control programs.

In summary, the licensee has established a generally effective

program for ensuring quality. The operating experience evalu-

ation program has had a positive impact on the quality of plant

procedures and management has frequently reinforced the role of

the individual in assuring quality. However, increased station

and corporate management attention is warranted in the radio-

logical controls area.

2.

Conclusion

Rating: Category 2

Trend:

None

3.

Board Recommendations

Licensee:

None

NRC:

None

.

_ ___ _ _______ _ __ - -____ __- ___- __

_ - _ _ _ _

_ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _

-

.

49

V.

Supporting Data and Summaries

A.

Investigations and Allegation Review

No investigations were conducted during the assassment period.

Five allegations were received during the assessment pariod.

Hiring impropriety

-

-

Crack or scratch in a main steam isolation valve (MSIV) poppet

assembly.

Member of Safety Analysis Group does not have a degree.

-

-

Improper drawing control, retests after maintenance,

performance of preoperational tests, setup and calibration of

radiation monitors.

-

Inadequate training in Chemistry Department, unqualified

supervisors.

All of the allegations were investigated and no significant safety

issues were identified.

B.

Escalated Enforcement Actions

On September 24, 1986, a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL No. 86-12)

was issued to the licensee to inform them.that an Augmented Inspec-

tion Team (AIT) was being dispatched to the Hope Creek site to

assess the anomalies related to the Loss of Offsite Power (LOP)

tests.

The CAL also confirmed that the licensee would take the

following actions:

-

Defer any additional LOP integrated testing until the NRC AIT

team leader determines that such testing can continue.

Provide any LOP test procedures to the NRC AIT for their review

-

prior to implementation.

Make available to the NRC AIT relevant written material related

-

to deficiencies identified during the LOP tests conducted on

September 11 and 19, 1986, including:

  • preoperational test results

surveillance test results

component installation and function test records

- _ _ _ _ _ _ .

_________________ _ _______

_ _ - _ _ _ _ .

-,

.

50

-

Provide a written report to the Regional Administrator prior to

restart that includes an analysis of the LOP testing conducted

on September 11 and 19, 1986.

-

Receive Regional Administrator authorization for unit startup.

On October 7,1986, the CAL was modified to allow a plant startup

in order to conduct a reactor critical LOP. The CAL was further

modified on October 16 to allow limited continuation of the power

ascension test program. Based upon the AIT findings, licensee

commitments made in an October 15, 1986 meeting, relating to

Bailey 862 modules, and discussions between NRC Region I and PSE&G

on October 17, 1986, a letter terminating the CAL was issued on

October 21.

On November 17, 1986, an enforcement conference was held to discuss

design deficiencies identified during the LOP test, Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrumentation, and the inoperability of the Reactor Building

to Suppression Chamber Pressure Relief System.

Enforcement action

was under review at the conclusion of the assessment period.

C.

Management Conferences

February 27, 1986: SALP management meeting

-

March 10, 1986:

NRC/ Region I - PSE&G readiness for fuel

-

load

March 11, 1986:

NRC/NRR - PSE&G readiness for fuel load

-

June 5, 1986:

Spurious ECCS actuations, management

-

changes, lessons learned at similar plants

during startup, control of work practices

(

-

July 21, 1986:

Commission meeting for Hope Creek full

!

power license

July 24, 1986:

Corrective action program to prevent

-

spurious ESF actuations

i

!

-

September 19, 1986: LOP Test results

-

October 15, 1986:

LOP Test results and Bailey 862 modules

November 17, 1986:

Enforcement Conference, Design deficiencies,

-

LOP, Vacuum breaker operability, RG 1.97

instrumentation

,

f

O

O

51

D.

Licensee Event Reports (LERs)

1.

Causal Analysis

Eighty-nine LERs, numbered 86-01 through 86-89, were reported

during this assessment period.

These LERs are characterized in

Table 1 by cause for each functional area.

Three common causal

chains were identified.

a.

Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Actuations

Nineteen LERs (354/86-2, 86-7, 86-10, 86-14, 86-19, 86-20,

86-21, 86-23, 86-24, 86-33, 86-39, 86-41, 86-42, 86-43,

86-46,86-53,86-54,86-59,86-61) describe actuations of

the ECCS due to low reactor vessel water level signals.

Seven ECCS actuations occurred as a result of personnel

error while conducting surveillance tests and nine have

unexplained causes.

Investigations eventually discovered

that ECCS initiations could result when personnel in the

drywell stepped on or bumped reactor vessel level instru-

ment piping. While it could not be positively determined

that this explanation applied to all unexplained ECCS

actuations, the licensee has concluded that it is the most

probable cause.

b.

Surveillance Testing

Fourteen LERs (354/86-8, 86-9, 86-17, 86-20, 86-21, 86-33,

86-38,86-43,86-52,86-53,86-57,86-62,86-87,86-89)

describe I&C technician personnel errors.

Seven LERs

(354/86-2,86-6,86-13,86-15,86-49,86-55,86-66)

describe events initiated due to I&C procedural errors.

Seven of these LERs initiated ECCS equipment and are

identified in Section V.D.1.a. of this report.

c.

Actuation of Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System

Eight LERs (354/86-12, 86-16, 86-17, 86-25, 86-36, 86-47,

86-74,86-75) describe inadvertent actuations of CREF.

Six CREF actuations occurred due to drift of the high

voltage power supply to the ventilation duct radiation

monitors. One actuation resulted from an I&C technician

error during a surveillance test and another actuation

was a result of a design deficiency. The licensee has

replaced all high voltage power supplies which have

caused inadvertent CREF actuations with an upgraded model.

.

-

52

2.

AE00 Review

The Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data

(AE0D) assessed fifteen of the LERs submitted during the

assessment period using a refinement of the basic methodology

presented in NUREG-1022, Supplement 2.

The results of this

evaluation, which was sent to the licensee by letter dated

January 9,1987, indicate that Hope Creek has an overall LER

score approximately equal with the industry average.

The principal weaknesses identified in the LERs, in terms of

.

safety significance, involve the requirement to provide identi-

fication of failed components and the requirement to discuss

the safety consequence of the event. The failure to adequately

identify the manufacturer and model number of the components

that fail prompts concern that others in the industry won't

have immediate access to information involving possible generic

problems. Deficiencies in the safety assessment discussions

cause concerns about whether the potential safety consequences

of each event are being identified and evaluated.

A strong point for the Hope Creek LERs evaluated is the discus-

sion of the mode, mechanism, and effect of failed components.

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

..

53

TABLE 1

TABULAR LISTING OF LERs BY FUNCTIONAL AREA

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

(November 1, 1985 - November 20,1986)

Area

Cause Code

A

B

C

D

E

X

TOTAL

A.

Plant Operations

13

6

2

12

12

45

B.

Radiological Controls

3

1

1

5

C.

Maintenance

6

1

1

8

D.

Surveillance

13

1

9

4

27

E.

Emergency Preparedness

F.

Security and Safeguards

G.

Outage

H.

Preoperational and

Startup Testing

I.

Licensing Activities

J.

Training and Qualification

Effectiveness

K.

Assurance of Quality

1

1

1

3

Other

1

1

Totals

35

10

12

18'

14

89

Cause Codes:

A.

Personnel Error

B.

Design, Manufacturing, Construction, or Installation Error

C.

External Cause

D.

Defective Procedure

E.

Component Failure

X.

Other

_.

._

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

..

.

54

TABLE 2

LER SYNOPSIS

Hope Creek Generating Station

LER NUMBER

EVENT DATE

CAUSE CODE

DESCRIPTION

86-001

2/15/86

A

Damaging of "D" Diesel Generator

86-002

4/13/86

D

Inadvertent "B" Channel LOCA

Signal During Surveillance Test

Performance

86-003

4/15/86

A

Inadvertent RPS Initiation During

Performance of NMS Component

Troubleshooting Activities86-004

4/16/86

E

Noncoincident Scram Signal

Resulting from Neutron Monitoring

System Component Failure

86-005

4/16/86

A

FRVS Inoperability During Core

Alterations86-006

4/17/86

D

Primary Containment Isolation

Resulting From a Procedural

Inadequacy

86-007

4/20/86

X

B Channel Engineered Safety

Features Actuation

86-008

4/24/86

A

Missed Surveillance During

Initial Core Loading Due to

Personnel Error

86-009

4/25/86

A

Inadvertent RPS "A" Trip System

Initiation During Surveillance

Testing

86-010

4/26/86

X

A Channel Engineered Safety

Feature Actuation

86-011

5/02/86

A

Loss of Off-Site Power

86-012

5/4/86

E

Control Room Emergency Filtration

Actuation Resulting From

Equipment Malfunction

.

.

55

1

Table 2 (Cont'd)

LER NUMBER

EVENT DATE

CAUSE CODE

DESCRIPTION

86-013

5/6/86

D

Inadvertent Isolation of RWCU

System During Surveillance Test

Performance

86-014

5/6/86

X

D Channel Engineered Safety

Feature Actuation

86-015

5/6/86

D

Spurious A Channel LOCA

Initiation

86-016

5/8/86

E

A Control Room Emergency

Filtration Initiation

86-017

5/9/86

A

Inadvertent Actuation of the "A'

Control Room Emergency Filter

Unit During Troubleshooting

86-018

5/12/86

B

Failure of Service Water

Strainers86-019

5/13/86

X

D Channel Engineered Safety

Feature Actuation

86-020

5/15/86

A

D Channel Engineered Safety

Feature Actuation

86-021

5/15/86

A

D Channel Engineered Safety

Feature Actuation

86-022

5/16/86

A

Inadvertent Isolation of Reactor

Water Cleanup System

86-023

5/19/86

A

B Channel Engineered Safety

Feature Actuation

86-024

5/25/86

D

Inadvertent "D" Channel LOCA

Signal During Surveillance Test

Performance

86-025

5/30/86

A

Power Supply Trip Causes Control

Room Emergency Filtration Chiller

Activation

86-026

5/30/86

E

Automatic Start of a Control Room

Chiller

86-027

6/2/86

B

Installation of Combustible Material

in the Traveling Screen Motor Room

..

.

56

Table 2 (Cont'd)

LER NUMBER

EVENT DATE

CAUSE CODE

DESCRIPTION

.86-028

6/7/86

X

Spurious Actuation of the

"A"

Channel of the Standby Liquid

Control System

86-029

6/11/86

E

Automatic Start of "B" Control

Area Chiller

,86-030

6/18/86

A

Automatic Start of "B" Control

Area Ventilation Train

86-031

6/29/86

A

Reactor Scram Due to Personnel

Error in Ranging IRMS

.86-032

6/30/86

E

Initiation of Manual Scram for

Troubleshooting of Reactor Manual

Control System

86-033

7/3/86

A

Inadvertent "B" Channel LOCA

4

-

Signals During Instrument

Calibration Performance

86-034

7/12/86

E

Main Steam Isolation Valve

Closure and Subsequent Manual Scram

86-035

7/4/86

E

Reactor Scram Signal Originating

From The Neutron Monitoring

,

l

System

,86-036

7/7/86

E

Isolation of The "A" Control Room

Ventilation Unit Due to Radiation

Monitor Upscale Trip

4

86-037

7/12/86

A

Failure to Comply With Technical

Specifications Action Statement

86-038

7/13/86

A

Missed Channel Checks on Reactor

Protection and Isolation

Actuation Instrumentation

86-039

7/14/86

X

"A" Channel LOCA Logic Actuation

86-040

7/9/86

A

Inoperable RCIC Actuation

Instrumentation

-

..

57

Table 2 (Cont'd)

LER NUMBER

EVENT DATE

CAUSE CODE

DESCRIPTION

86-041

7/15/86

X

Inadvertent HPCI System

.,

Initiation

-

86-042

7/17/86

X

Inadvertent HPCI System

Initiation

86-043

7/17/86

A

Inadvertent HPCI System

Initiation Due to an I&C Error

86-044

7/25/86

E

Reactor Scram on Low Level

Resulting from an EHC Transient

.86-045

7/19/86

A

Reactor Scram Due to IRM Ranging

Error

86-046

7/20/86

X

Inadvertent HPCI System.

Initiation

86-047

7/29/86

E

Actuation of the Control Room

Emergency Filtration System Due

To Radiation Monitor Spike

86-048

7/30/86

E

Full Reactor Scram on Low Water

Level

86-049

8/1/86

D

Missed Response Time Surveillance

Due to Procedure Inadequacy

86-050

8/1/86

D

Reactor Water Cleanup System

Isolation on High Differential

Flow

86-051

8/3/86

E

Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation

on Spurious High Temperature Trip

86-052

8/20/86

A

Violation of the Surveillance

Requirements for the Suppression

Pool Temperature Monitoring

System

86-053

8/4/86

A

"A" Channel LOCA Logic Actuation

86-054

8/4/86

A

"A" Channel LOCA Logic Actuation

and Full Reactor Scram

-

-

,-

.

'

58

Table 2 (Cont'd)

LER NUMBER

EVENT DATE

CAUSE CODE

DESCRIPTION

86-055

8/5/86

D

Primary Containment Isolation Due

To Procedure Inadequacy

86-056

8/8/86

A

Inoperable Re

..or Building to

Torus Vacuum ;reakers86-057

8/8/86

A

Inadvertent Actuation of the "A"

Channel NSSSS Isolation Logic

86-058

8/8/86

A

Failure to Sample Results in

Technical Specification Violation

86-059

E/14/86

X

"B" Channel ESF Logic Actuation

86-060

8/16/86

8

Violation of Suppression Pool

Level Technical Specification

86-061

8/22/86

D

Inadvertent HPCI System

Initiation

86-062

9/20/86

A

Failure to Satisfy TS

Surveillance Requirement for

Leakage Detection Monitors86-063

8/28/86

B

ASCO Solenoid Valve Air Supply

Prassure Rating

86-064

8/31/86

A

Reactor Scram on Low Level

86-065

9/6/86

X

Full Reactor Scram on Low Reactor

Water Level 3

86-066

9/7/86

D

Missed Surveillance: Turbine

!

Bypass Valve Testing

'86-067

9/15/86

B

SRV Acoustic Monitors Inop:

Seals Missing

86-068

9/17/86

A

Missed Surveillance: North Plant

i

Vent

86-069

9/24/86

D

Reactor Scram - IRM/APRM

86-070

10/22/86

A

"C" Core Spray Pump Discharge

Pressure Transmitter Isolated

-

.-

, . - - , . . - - . . . . - - ,

,

,-m---,

-

- ~ . , . .

-. - , -

.

59

Table 2 (Cont'd)

LER NUMBER

EVENT DATE

CAUSE CODE

DESCRIPTION

86-071

10/4/86

B

PASS Sample Valves Installed in

Less Favorable Orientation

86-072

10/3/86

X

Inoperable Reactor Building

Exhaust Radiation Monitoring

Instrument

86-073

10/3/86

B

Electrical Penetration Assembly

Installation Error

86-074

10/2/86

A

Inadvertent Actuation of "B"

Control Room Emergency Filtration

Unit when Connecting a Recorder

86-075

10/5/86

B

Inadvertent Actuation of "B"

Control Room Emergency Filtration

Unit During Troubleshooting

'86-076

10/5/86

X

Inadvertent Automatic Start of

"B" Emergency Diesel Generator

,

'86-077

10/10/86

E

Inadvertent Isolation of Reactor

Water Cleanup System

86-078

11/11/86

E

RWCU Isolation

86-079

10/19/86

E

RWCU Isolation on High Differential Flow

86-080

10/18/86

B

Full Reactor Scram on Low Reactor

Water Level 3

86-081

10/19/86

E

Isolation of Reactor Cleanup

i

86-082

10/28/86

A

High Pressure Coolant Injection

System Inoperative

'86-083

10/30/86

E

ESF Actuation

86-084

10/30/86

A

North / South Plant Vent Monitors

Inoperable

86-085

11/14/86

A

Reactor Scram on High Pressure

,86-086

11/14/86

X

Reactor Building Ventilation Isolation

86-087

11/17/86

A

ESF-A Channel NSSSS Isolation

86-088

11/18/86-

D

Loss of RHR Room Cooling

86-089

11/19/86

B

RWCU Isolation Due to Loose Wire

!

.

.

-

_

-- .-

. - - - -

- _ _ . - _

. - -

-

. . . -

. . -

. .. .

. ..

.

..

.

60

TABLE 3

INSPECTION HOURS SUMMARY (11/1/85 - 11/30/86)

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

HOURS

% OF TIME

A.

Plant Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3030

33

B.

Radiological Controls and Chemistry. .

592

6

.....

C.

Maintenance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

445

5

D.

Surveillance . . . . . . . . . .

823

9

........

E.

Emergency Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . .

454

5

F.

Security and Safeguards. . . . .

348

4

........

G.

Outages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

N/A

H.

Preoperational and Startup Testing . . . . . . . 3478

38

I.

Licensing Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

N/A

J.

Training and Qualification Effectiveness . . .

N/A

.

K.

Assurance of Quality .

N/A

.............

Total

9170

100

..

..

..

.

.

. . . _

. ,

-

_ _ . . _ .

._ __.

.

_.

_ _ _ .

,

.. __

__.

. . .

.-

61

-

TABLE 4

ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY (11/1/85-11/30/86)

Hope Creek Generating Station

i

'

SEVERITY LEVEL

AREA

1

2

3

4

5

DEV

TOTAL

OPERATIONS

4

4

RAD PROTECTION

MAINTENANCE

s.

SURVEILLANCE

4

4

EMERGENCY PREP.

SEC/ SAFEGUARDS

DUTAGES

.

'

TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS

LICENSING

1

{

ASSURANCE OF QUALITY

PREOP /STARTUP

1

8

2

11

.,

1'

. TOTALS:

1

12

6

19

,

>

.

I

i

!

!

,

e

I

,

- - - - - , ,

-.4,_t-

7..,..w,

,--__~.,,e

-,_., ,.

,.,r,...,,,,__..,%_,,-_,_..,,,,,_%.,.,,_-,,,%,.,,-,,,ww_.

. - , - ,

...,---w--

-

.

-

62

TABLE 4 (Cont'd)

ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY

INSPECTION

VIOL.

FUNCTIONAL

REPORT

REQUIREMENT LEVEL

AREA

VIOLATION

354/85-61

APPENDIX B

4

PREOP /

MANDATORY WITNESS POINT BYPASS

12/01/85

01/12/86

STARTUP

DURING PRE 0P TEST

354/85-61

APPENDIX B

4

PRE 0P/

INADEQUATE QUALITY CONTROL

12/01/85

01/12/86

STARTUP

INSPECTION

354/85-65

APPENDIX J

5

PREOP /

VALVE IMPROPERLY OPERATED IN

2/23/85

01/03/86

STARTUP

PREPARATION FOR INTEGRATED LEAK

RATE TEST.

354/86-03

APPENDIX B

4

PREOP /

INITIAL CRITICALITY PROCEDURES

01/06/86

01/17/86

STARTUP

354/86-06

APPENDIX B

4

PREOP /

FAILURE TO FULLY TEST CORE SPRAY

01/13/86

02/09/86

STARTUP

LOGIC

354/86-10

APPENDIX B

4

PREOP /

BYPASSING OF MANDATORY WITNESS

01/27/86

02/07/86

STARTUP

POINTS.

354/86-10

APPENDIX B

5

PRE 0P/

INADEQUATE REVIEW OF TEST RESULTS.

01/27/86

02/07/86

STARTUP

354/86-20

TECH SPECS

4

OPERATIONS

FRVS INOPERABLE DURING CORE

03/17/86

04/30/86

ALTERATIONS.

354/86-20

TECH SPECS

4

OPERATIONS

MISSED SBLC SURVEILLANCE TEST.

03/17/86

04/30/86

354/86-30

LCO 3.0.4 &

4

OPERATIONS

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION:

3.7.4

RCIC INOPERABLE DUE TO NO AUTO-SWAP

06/10/86

07/14/86

0F SUCTION TO SUPPRESSION P00L.

354/86-32

APPENDIX B

5 SURVEILLANCE FAILURE TO PERFORM POWER ASCENSION

06/23/86

07/03/86

TEST IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROVED

PROCEDURES

354/86-35

APPENDIX B

5 SURVEILLANCE USE OF A POWER ASCENSION PROCEDURE

07/07/86

07/24/86

INAPPROPRIATE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES

i

i

l

i

.

..

_ - - . -

-

.

63

TABLE 4 (Cont'd)

,

INSPECTION

VIOL.

FUNCTIONAL

.

REPORT

REQUIREMENT LEVEL

AREA

VIOLATION

354/86-35

10 CFR 50

5

SURVEILLANCE FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE AND

l

07/07/86

07/24/86

FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY REVIEW TEST

'

RESULT

354/86-41

TECH SPEC

3

PRE 0P/

REACTOR BUILDING / TORUS VACUUM

,

3.6.4.2

STARTUP

BREAKER ASSEMBLIES INOPERABLE

>

08/13/86

09/02/86

'

354/86-41

TECH SPEC

4

PREOP /

ACOUSTIC MONITORS NOT POWERED

3.3.7.5

STARTUP

FROM UNINTERRUPTIBLE SOURCE

08/13/86

09/02/86

354/86-40

TECH SPEC

5

SURVEILLANCE UNAUTHORIZE0 OPERATOR AIDS

6.8.1

08/12/86

09/08/86

1

354/86-48

TECH SPEC

4

OPERATIONS

CORE SPRAY PRESSURE TRANSMITTER

6.8.1

ISOLATED

10/14/86

11/17/86

'

354/86-49

10 CFR 50

4

PREOP /

FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE FOR

10/11/86

10/16/86

STARTUP

TORQUING POSEMOUNT TRANSMITTER

354/86-53

LICENSE

4

PREOP /

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH LICENSE

NPF-57

STARTUP

CONDITION C10 - DID NOT PERFORM

10/27/86

10/31/86

TIMELY 50.59 REVIEW

d

I

k

i

l

- -

, - - , . , , . - - - - . _ , - - . _ _ . - , _ - .

.,n_

- , - . . -

. - - . - - - . . , . - - , - . , - - - - . -

-._ - ---.--

.

, . . - -

-__

__ __ __

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

.

64

TABLE 5

INSPECTION REPORT ACTIVITIES (11/1/85-11/30/86)

Hope Creek Generating Station

REPORT / DATES

INSPECTOR HOURS

AREAS INSPECTED

l

354/85-55

SPECIALIST

40 PREOP TEST PROGRAM

11/04/85 11/15/85

354/85-56

RESIDENT

251 ROUTINE RESIDENT INSPECTION

10/28/85 12/01/85

354/85-57

SPECIALIST

76 PRE 0PERATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM REVIEW

11/12/85 11/15/85

354/85-58

SPECIALIST 829 AS-BUILT TEAM INSPECTION IN AREAS OF

12/02/85 12/13/85

MECHANICAL, ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION AND

CONTROL AND STRUCTURAL SYSTEMS

354/85-59

SPECIALIST

72 PREOPERATIONAL INSPECTION OF CHEMICAL AND

11/18/85 11/22/85

RADI0 CHEMICAL MEASUREMENT PROGRAM.

354/85-60

SPECIALIST

44 PRESERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM

11/18/85 11/22/85

354/85-61

RESIDENT

265 ROUTINE RESIDENT REPORT. MAJOR FOCUS ON

12/01/85 01/12/86

PRE 0P TESTING.

354/85-62

SPECIALIST 105 STAFFING, TRAINING, QUALIFICATION OF

12/09/85 12/18/85

PERSONNEL AND LOCAL LEAK RATE TESTING.

354/85-63

SPECIALIST

34 CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

12/16/85 12/23/85

354/85-64

RESIDENT

300 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REVIEW CONDUCTED BY

12/02/85 12/13/85

PARAMETER INC.

354/85-65

SPECIALIST 115 CILRT INSPECTION

12/23/85 01/03/86

354/85-66

SPECIALIST

63 FOLLOWUP ON GENERIC LETTER 83-28, QA

12/30/85 01/03/86

RECORDS AND MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT.

354/86-01

SPECIALIST 142 FIRE PROTECTION AND FOLLOWUP ON

01/07/86 01/11/86

CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM 0"EN ITEMS.

354/86-02

SPECIALIST 146 PLANT PROCEDURES AND FOLLOWUP ON PREVIOUSLY

01/27/86 02/14/86

IDENTIFIED ITEMS.

.-

.

65

Table 5 (Cont'd)

REPORT / DATES

INSPECTOR HOURS

AREAS INSPECTED

354/86-03

SPECIALIST 151 PREOP AND POWER ASCENSION PROGRAMS

01/06/86 01/17/86

354/86-04

SPECIALIST

74 QA PROGRAM OVERVIEW

01/06/86 01/16/86

354/86-05

SPECIALIST

95 PRE 0PERATIONAL WATER CHEMISTRY CONTROL

01/13/86 01/24/86

PROGRAM AND FOLLOWUP ON PREVIOUSLY

IDENTIFIED ITEMS.

354/86-06

RESIDENT

410 ROUTINE RESIDENT REPORT WITH EMPHASIS ON

01/13/86 02/09/86

PRE 0P TESTING.

354/86-07

SPECIALIST

50 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS INSPECTION

01/21/86 02/14/86

354/86-08

SPECIALIST

32 PREOPERATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM REVIEW.

01/27/86 01/31/86

354/86-09

SPECIALIST 140 FOLLOWUP OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

02/03/86 02/03/86

IMPLEMENTATION APPRAISAL.

354/86-10

SPECIALIST 145 PRE 0PERATIONAL TEST PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION.

01/27/86 02/07/86

354/86-11

SPECIALIST

44 RPV INTERNALS RECORD REVIEW

01/27/86 01/31/86

PRESERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM.

354/86-12

SPECIALIST 103 PREOPERATIONAL AND STARTUP PROGRAM

02/10/86 02/21/86

IMPLEMENTATION.

354/86-13

SPECIALIST

82 FOLLOWUP ON OUTSTANDING ITEMS AND

02/10/86 02/14/86

MECHANICAL SNUBBER INSPECTION.

354/86-14

SPECIALIST

73 SAFETEAM INSPECTION

02/03/86 02/07/86

354/86-15

RESIDENT

501 ROUTINE RESIDENT INSPECTION WITH EMPHASIS

02/10/86 03/16/86

ON OUTSTANDING ITEMS FOLLOWUP AND

PRE 0PERATIONAL TESTING.

354/86-16

SPECIALIST

0 OPERATOR LICENSING EXAM.

02/24/86 03/24/86

354/86-17

SPECIALIST

36 MAINTENANCE AND I&C SURVEILLANCE

02/24/86 02/28/86

PROCEDURES.

- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

/

4

J

'

.

66

, ,

'

TABLE 5 (Cont'd)

,

REPORT / DATES

INSPECTOR HOURS

AREAS INSPECTED

354/86-18

' SPECIALIST

75 PREOP, STARTUP', CILRT, AND SURVEIL 1.ANCE

']

03/03/86 03/14/86,'

TEST INSPECTION.

,

j

354/86-19

SPECIALIST

35 FOLLOWUP ON OPEN ITEMS.

's -

03/03/86 03/06/86

-

.

354/86-20

RESIDENT

530 PbuTINERESIDENT

~

03/17/86 04/30/86

7

354/86-21

7 SPECIALIST 108 %REOPsAND STARTUP PROGRAM REVIEW.

03/12/86 03/21/86

354/86-22

SPECIALIST 128 INSPECTION BY 3 REGION-BASED INSPECTORS OF

03/31/86 04/11/86

PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS.

354/86-23

SPECIALIST 156 ROUTINE INSPECTIOM BY 5 REGION-BASED

.04/14/86 04/25/86

INSPECTORS OF PAEVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS

c

354/86-24

c SPECIALIST

71

INSPECTION BY 2 REGION-BASED INSPECTORS OF

04/28/86 05/09/66

PREOPERATIONAL TESTING.

354/86-26

. RESIDENT

271 R,0VTINE RESIDENT INSPECTION

J

05/01/86 06/09/86

354/86-27

SPECIALIST 100 INSPECTION FINDINGS OH PREVIOUS

5/19/86 5/30/86

INSPECTIONS.

.

354/86-28

SPECIALIST

65 SECURITY INSPECTION OF TRAINING PROGRAM FOR

4

5/27/86 5/30/86

SECURITY PERSONNEL.

'

354/86-29

SPECIALIST

.38 SPECIAL INSPECTION IN SUPPORT OF LICENSING

5/27/86 5/30/86

ACTION RELATED TO LICENSEE REQUEST DATED

5/13/86 TO DELETE FIRE PROTECTION TECH.

SPEC.

'

354/86-30

RESIDENT

353 ROJTINE FOLLOWUP INSPECTION.

6/10/86 7/14/86

354/86-31

SPECIALIST

75 INSPECTION OF PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS,

6/9 /86 6/20/86

POWER ASCENSION TEST PROGRAM.

354/86-32

SPECIALIST

94 IhSPECTION OF POWER ASCENSION TEST PROGRAM

t

6/23/86 7/3 /86

COVERING INITIAL CRITICALITY

354/86-33

SPECIALIST

28 UNANNOUNCED INSPECTION OF RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE

6/16/86 6/18/86

(RADWASTE) PROGRAM DURING INITIAL FUEL LOAD

ACTIVITIES.

L-_-

.

_

-

-

4

,3

,

s

67

-

TABLE 5 (Cont'd)

REPORT / DATES

INSPECTOR HOURS

AREAS INSPECTED

354/86-34

SPECIALIST

0 OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINATIONS

7/7/86

7/11/86

.354/86-35

SPECIALIST

90 INSPECTION OF OVERALL POWER ASCENSION TEST

~ -27/7/86

7/24/86

PROGRAM, QA/QC INTERFACES AND TOURS OF THE

FACILITY

354/86-36 i

RESIDENT

204 ROUTINE RESIDENT INSPECTION

7/15/86 8/11/86

354/86-37

SPECIALIST

26 INSPECTION OF PREVIOUS FINDINGS IN

7/30/86 8/1 /86

RADIATION AREAS

354/86-38

SPECIALIST

45 POWER ASCENSION TEST PROGRAM, PROCEDURE

'_ , ,'

x8/11/86 8/22/86

REVIEWS, QA/QC INTERFACES AND TOURS OF THE

FACILITY.

-354/86-39

SPECIALIST

36 INSPECTION OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE PROGRAM

8/12/8S; 8/15/86

'

354/86-40

RESIDENT

92 ROUTINE RESIDENT INSPECTION

8/12/86 9/8/86

,

,

354/86-41

(RESIDENT

93

8/13/86. 9/02/86

'

SPECIAL INSPECTION OF THE CAUSES FOR

'

'

INOPERABILITY OF REACTOR BUILDING TO

SUPPRESSION CHAMBER PRESSURE RELIEF SYSTEM.

354/86-42'

CANCELLED

354/86-43

SPECIALIST

31 INSPECTION OF OVERALL POWER ASCENSION TEST

9/2/86 9/5/86

PROGRAM.

354/86-44

SPECIALIST

72 ROUTINE INSPECTION OF SOLID RADIOACTIVE

9/08/86 9/12/86

WASTES (RADWASTE) PROGRAM DURING STARTUP

ACTIVITIES.

354/86-45

SPECIALIST 154 INSPECTION OF THE LICENSEE'S IMPLEMENTATION

9/22/86 9/26/86

AND STATUS OF NUREG-0737

354/86-46

SPECIALIST 60 INSPECTION OF OVERALL POWER ASCENSION TEST

9/11/86 9/19/86

PROGRAM

354/86-47

RESIDENT 283 ROUTINE RESIDENT INSPECTION

/'

9/9/86 10/13/86

-

354/86-48

RESIDENT 195 ROUTINE RESIDENT INSPECTION

10/14/86- 11/17/86

\\<

,

f-

'

,

,

.

e

/

68

1

-.

.

TABLE 5 (Cont'd)

REPORT / DATES

INSPECTOR HOURS

AREAS INSPECTED

354/86-49

SPECIALIST

50 INSPECTION OF OVERALL POWER ASCENSION TEST

10/11/86 10/16/86

PROGRAM

354/86-50

TEAM INSP

538 INSPECTION OF THE LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER

9/25/86 10/3/86

TEST ON' SEPTEMBER 11, 1986

i

354/86-51

SPECIALIST 227 INSPECTION OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

11/10/86 12/1/86

PROGRAM AND IMPLEMENTATION

354/86-52

TEAM INSP

344 OPERATIONAL READINESS TEAM INSPECTION

10/20/86 10/31/86

354/86-53

SPECIALIST

37 INSPECTION OF OVERALL POWER ASCENSION TEST

10/27/86 10/31/86

PROGRAM

354/86-54

CANCELLED

al'

354/86-55

SPECIALIST

48 INSPECTION OF OVERALL POWER ASCENSION TEST

e-

I/ O

11/10/86 11/19/86

PROGRAM

s

e

f

%

s.

,

1

4 '

9

l$

a

!

. - - , .

= , - - ,

. --

.

_.

-. -

,

e

69

TABLE 6

UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC SCRAMS AND SHUTDOWNS (11/1/85 - 11/30-86)

i

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

Root

Functional

Date

Power Level

Description

Cause

Area

1.

4/15/86

Shutdown

IRM high scram due to

Personnel

Surveillance

bumping IRM cable.

error

2.

4/16/86

Shutdown

High APRM scram due to

Equipment

failure of 1 LPRM input.

failure -

random

3.

4/25/86

Shutdown

IRM high scram due to

Personnel

Surveillance

bumping IRM cable.

error

4.

6/29/86

less than 1% IRM high scram, caused by

Personnel

Operations

downranging the wrong IRM

error

(non-coincident RPS mode).

6/29/86

Restart

5.

6/30/86

1%

Manual scram to trouble-

Equipment

shoot reactor manual

failure -

control system.

random

7/1/86

Restart

6.

7/4/86

2%

High APRM trip due to a

Equipment

momentary upscale spike of

failure -

an LPRM. A half scram was

random

already present due to

inoperable instrumentation.

7/5/86

Restart

7.

7/12/86

1%

Manual scram after the

Equipment

MSIVs were automatically

failure -

closed due to steam flow

random

transmitter drift.

7/13/86

Restart

8.

7/19/86

less than 1% IRM high scram caused by

Personnel

Operations

downranging vice upranging

error

2 separate IRMs.

7/20/86

Restart

, < , -

70

TABLE 6 (Cont'd)

Root

Functional

Date

Power Level

Description

Cause

Area

9.

7/25/86

3%

Reactor vessel low level

Inadequate

Surveillance

Scram caused by the loss of

procedure

feed flow after RFP trip

on swell induced high level.

7/26/86

Restart

10. 7/30/86

6%

The EHC power supply failure Equipment

caused the bypass valves to

failure -

open. The resulting swell

random

tripped the feed pumps and

level could not be restored

prior to the low level scram.

7/31/86

Restart

11. 8/31/86

5%

Reactor feed pumps tripped

Equipment

Preop /startup

due to level control dif-

failure

ficulties as a result of

inadequate minimum flow

valve tuning. Operators

were unable to reset the

trip before low level scram.

9/1/86

Restart

12. 9/6/86

33%

Low level scram while

Personnel

Operations

swapping feed pumps as a

error

result of unstable control

of "C" RFP prior to

completion of tuning.

9/6/86

Restart

13. 10/18/86 50%

Feedwater control test box

Faulty test Preop /startup

had internal wiring errors

box wiring

that caused RFP runback and

low level' scram.

10/19/86 Restart

14. 11/14/86 98%

High pressure scram due to

Procedure

Preop /Startup

control valve closure test

deficiency

surveillance

exceedino maximum combined

flow limit.

11/28/86 Restart