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ADVISORY COMMIT. TEE ON REACTOR GAFEGUARDS I
Ih UNITED STATES'/.TOMIC r!ERGY COMMIS3 TON 3
.WASIIING~I ON. D.C. 20545 l
April 7,1971 l
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Honorabic Clenn T. Seaborg Chairman U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C.
20545
Subject:
PILGRIM NUCIEAR POWER STATION
Dear Dr. Seaborg:
At its one-hundred thirty-second raceting, April 1-3, 1971, the Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards revleued the application by Boston Edison Co:npany for authorization to operate tha Pilgrim Nucicar Power Station, comprising a singic nucicar power generating unit, at power 1evcis up to 1998 Id(t). The tet 1Leation-was previcusly considered at a Subcummittee meeting held at th site on Itirch 22, 1971.
During its' h
re,%u the Comaitt( c had thd bene. it of discussicos with representatives and courullants of 3oston Edison C cpany, General Electric Coa.pany, Ecchtel Cocporation. and the AEC E gulatory Staff, and of the documents listed below. The Committee repor 2d to you at the construction permit 3.g stage for this sts: ion on April 12, 1968.
The Pilarlia Nuc1 car :. tat *,n is on t e wast shore of Cape Cod Bap, approximately five m:.lcs from the c nter of Plymouth, Massachusetts h
(mpulatica about 11.000). Boston s 36 miles northwest of the site,
%,and Providence is 44 miles ucst.
T. c Pilgrim reactor is a boiling water reactor generally similar to 1:111 stone Unit 1 and other boiling uater reactors recently revicued by the committen for operation. -
The appitcant has no : provided equi; ment for concentrating and separating radioactivity from liquid wastes, and he states that the radioactivity concentration in the condenser circelating water dis-charge vill not exce.sd that permitted by 10 CFR 20.
During the first reactor shutdoun for refueling, the applicant will install an evaporator designed to permit tha holdup of lic;uld wastes and thereby reduca the gross radioactivity.:ischarged. The Committee bc1teves that the design and operation of thi cvaporator system shoulo be such is to reduce to Icycis as lou as praiticabic the amount of long-lived radioisotopes discharged. The Regtlatory Staff should revicu and approve the design' t
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April 7, 1971 p.
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and operating mode of this equipment. The Committee.also believes that prior to the installation of this equipment, effort should be made to reduce the radioactivity released.
I The applicant proposes that the gaseous and particulate radioactivity j
,1 discharged through the stack will not cxceed 10 CFR 20 limits.. The Committee believes the applicant should set a much lower operatin~g limit and should make such equipment changes as may be necessary to t
accomplish this.
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In previous reports, the Committec' has commented on the fo11owing matters co: mon to boiling unter reactors recently revicued for opera-i tion; these cornents apply also to the Pilgrim Plant. The dommittee believes that the reactor containment should be inerted during normal operation, and that the primary control of accident-generated hydrogen should be by some method other than purging; the need for inerting should b,e reviewed periodically as operating experience and further knouledge fro.n development work are obtained and as other means of coping with hydrogen arc found. The applicant propos'es to protect the containmant nguinst breaching that may be caustid by whipping of unrestrained tiping in the s.*nnt of a pipe rupture, and also to guard i
against missille that could be geerated from the biological shield s
by rupture of ipes, incluaing saf e-eds, within the shicid.
The applicant 1 oposes to assure t'. at accident al dropping of the spent-fuel cash into he fuel storage poc1 will not cause Icakage in excess of the make-up. spacity, and will e ike such modifications as may be necessary. T)e 2pplicant said he would make tests a:' equate to confirm the predictedjv: arational characteristics of the vessel internals.
.., The Comittee believes the applican should make timely proposals for i'esolution of tha problem of possible failure to scram on anticipated transients. The applicant should reevaluate, before routine operation at full power, the performance of the emergency core cooling system, using recent heat transfer data and calculational methods. Several items regardin3 plant instrument, sy stems and'elcetrical systems are under review by the Regulatory Staff. All these matters should be resolved to the satisfaction of the Regulatory Staff; the Committec wishes to be kept inforced.
The committec bclieves the applicant should continue to explore means i
of improving access to vessel wolds for inservice inspection. Tho Committee also believes that the recctor veasel, pressure should,be limited in accozdance with current /EC bases, when the vessel tempera-ture is below 1800F.
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A 11onorabic Glenn T. Scaborg April 7, 1971
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' The site is served by tw 345 kv cicetrical. transmission lines on the same tos.crs and a separate 23 kv line. Over a short' distance, the
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lines are adjacent 'and it is physically possibic for the fall of a p
touer to break the,23 kv line. The Co.mittee believes that the appli-cant should explore the, feasibilit.y of using an alternative 23 kv supply or of making local changes to reduce the possibility of' losing J
the 345 and 23 kv lines simultaneously.
The Advisory Ccmmittee on Reactor Safeguards believes that, if duc regard is given to the items c'entioned above, and subject to satis-factory completion of construction and pre-operational testing, there is reasonahIc escurance that the Pilgrim Nucicar Poacr Stat, ion can be operated at pouer Icycis up to 1998 h".1(t) uithout unduc risk to the health and safety of the public.
Sin eb fy yours,
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II. Bush
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Chairman References - Pilnrim Neelcar Power station 1.
/ceni.nent Nos. 12 through 27 to License App 11 cation for the Pilgrim Eucicar Power Station and Volumes 1 through 5 of FSAR.
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Letter fyon Boston Edison Company, dated Septs v%r 26, li ~>S; Report c' titled " Installation of Stub Tubes - Pilgrim St -ion Reactor [essel - Boston Edison Project".
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Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Final Safety Analysis Report
' Volumco I through.V dated Deccmber 31, 1969
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Prepared by Air Rchources Environmental Laboratory Environmental Science Services Administration
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June 2, 1970 1
Onsite meteorological statistics indicate that at a Icycl of 220 feet above l
the surface (300 feet Mean Sea Lovel) the annual ccan wind spcod is 16 mph and the frequency of calms is 0.43 parcont.
At this level, stab'le (modcrate and slight) conditions uith enchore winds cad a speed of 3 mph or less (including all calms) occurs less than 1 percent of the time.
Consequently, it would be reasonable to conclude that a diffusion factor (%/Q) equal to or greater than,that equivalent to Pasquill Type 'F and a vind speed of 2 rt/sec
- would occur less than 5 percent of the timo.
' For the clevated reler.ws from a stack which is 100 m above the surface, the mechanism resulting in the hignert Cround concentration is either a rapid mixing downuard er a de:rce.ac in th:; e ffectiv t, tach hsight boccucc of rising s
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downuind terrain. The Icarcot site be.uvlevy, other than the shoreline, is at a distance of 330 m ost northwest of the tack uhere the terrain is about 90 m bolcw the top of t1i stack.
In tlis situatinn a very rapid diffusion (Pasquill Type A) with t wind speed of. '. m/sec and an offcetive stack height of 90 m would result in relative cone.ntratien of 2 x 10~S see m-3 The highest nearby terrain 1: toward the so. th soutiraest at a cistance of 800 m and at 2200 m.
In the f. cmer (Roadside Park on site boundary) the terrain is 40 m below the htack a nd in the latte r (Manoment. Hill) it is at the same clovation as the stack tcp. In this sit untion the contro111ng' condition seems to be an inversien condition with =cro effective stnck height at the distance of Manonent Hill and a wind spacd of 2 m/sec resulting in a con- -
centration of 1-x 10~4 see m-3 Thesitoinvestigationofscnbreezcs(AppendixI verifies ano her mechanism, that of fumigation, which brings an clevated plume rapidly to the surface.
In the case of the nearcot site boundary uo have assumed the initial p/sec, lume to remain horizontal despite underlying terrain, the wind spacd to be 2 m the horizontal spread to be equivalent to Typo F and the, ed layer to be t
,90 m thick. The resulting concentration is 2 x 10-4 see m~.
For a surface release, ths controlling condition would be an inversIen i
(Type F) with a 2 m/sec wind speed. Allowing a factor of 3 for the acro-nearest site boundary of 33.0 m is 1.4 x 10-3 see migg concentration at dynaalc effect of the building complex, ihe result
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The controlling onshore direction with regard to the avera.,e annual r
concentration appears to be a wind from the north northeast towards the high terrain (Roadside Park) at the site boundary. Assuming an effective each of unstable (Type B), r/ scc 1;ind speed and a frequency of 1.5 percentand stack height of 40 m, a 6
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of inversion (Type F) conditions (see Tob1cs 2.3.3 to 2.3.6), the resulting averego concentraticii over a 22ho sector at 800 m was 1.4 x 10-7'.see m-3 i
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d In sumary,'for the cases listed we compute the controlling concentrations at offsite locations to be as follous:
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Elevated, 0 - 2 hr release P. n 10 see m
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Ground, 0 - 2 hr release 1.4 x 10
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Elevated, annua'l release
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1.4 x 10 The latter is in good agreement with the applicant 8 s Tablo E.O.16.
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