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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217K3301999-10-19019 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 195 to License DPR-61 ML20206C8761999-04-28028 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 194 to License DPR-61 ML20238F2131998-08-28028 August 1998 SER Accepting Defueled Emergency Plan for Emergency Planning for Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co ML20202D1621998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License DPR-61 ML20217K2101998-03-27027 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-61 ML20198M8101997-10-14014 October 1997 SER Accepting Proposed Revs to Util Quality Assurance Program at Facility ML20141K4201997-05-22022 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 191 to License DPR-61 ML20024J2081994-10-0707 October 1994 SER Authorizing Alternatives Contained in Request for Relief 3-26,per 10CFR50.55(a)(3)(i).Ack Withdrawal of Request for Relief 3-19 ML20058F1151993-11-23023 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 170,69,169 & 86 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20059G6411993-11-0101 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 169 to License DPR-61 ML20059G5261993-10-27027 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 168 to License DPR-61 ML20057E2011993-10-0404 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 167 to License DPR-61 ML20057E1921993-10-0404 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 166 to License DPR-61 ML20058M9291993-09-29029 September 1993 SE Re SEP Topics III-2 & III-4.A, Wind & Tornado Loadings & Tornado Missiles. Licensee Estimated Reactor Core Damage Frequency Reduced Signficantly Such That Likelihood of Core Damage Reasonably Low ML20058M9051993-09-29029 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 165 to License DPR-61 ML20057A3551993-09-0202 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 163 to License DPR-61 ML20057A3501993-09-0202 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 164 to License DPR-61 ML20056G2891993-08-25025 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 162 to License DPR-61 ML20056D7061993-07-26026 July 1993 Safety Evaluation on SEP VI-4 Re Containment Isolation Sys for Plant.All Penetrations Either Meet Provisions of or Intent of GDCs 54-57 Except for Penetration 39 ML20046C1971993-07-20020 July 1993 SE Granting Relief Request P-9 from Vibration Testing Requirements,Based on Determination That Compliance W/ Vibration Amplitude Measurement Location Requirements Impractical ML20046B3581993-07-14014 July 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 161 to License DPR-61 ML20045G6731993-07-0909 July 1993 SER Authorizing Proposed Alternative Tests Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i).Concludes That Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety Will Be Maintained Using Proposed Alternative Tests Instead of Required Hspt ML20045G6781993-07-0909 July 1993 SER Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to ASME Code Section XI Requirements Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20045F3931993-06-28028 June 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 160 to License DPR-61 ML20045B8061993-06-11011 June 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 159 to License DPR-61 ML20044D7921993-05-17017 May 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 157 to License DPR-61 ML20035F1421993-04-14014 April 1993 Safety Evaluation Re SEP Topic III-5.A, Effects of Pipe Breaks Inside Containment ML20128E3291993-02-0404 February 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting Util Request for Authorization to Use Portion of Section XI of 1986 Edition of ASME Code for Visual Exams VT-3 & VT-4 to Be Combined Into Single VT-3 ML20128D5231992-11-25025 November 1992 Safety Evaluation Accepting 120-day Response to Suppl 1 to Generic Ltr 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors,Usi A-46, ML20210E1891992-06-12012 June 1992 Safety Evaluation Considers SEP Topic III-5.B to Be Complete in That If Pipe Breaks Outside Containment,Plant Can Safely Shut Down W/O Loss of Containment Integrity ML20062B7411990-10-22022 October 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 132 to License DPR-61 ML20059H3101990-09-0606 September 1990 Revised Safety Evaluation Clarifying Individual Rod Position Indication Testing Exception & Bases for Approving Test Exception ML20059A8021990-08-14014 August 1990 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Accepting Electrical Design of New Switchgear Room at Plant ML20056A5641990-08-0303 August 1990 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Pressurizer Has Sufficient Fracture Toughness to Preclude Fracture of Head W/Flaws Remaining in Component & Pressurizer Acceptable for Continued Svc ML20055G5441990-07-19019 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 128 to License DPR-61 ML20055G5561990-07-19019 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 129 to License DPR-61 ML20044A9691990-07-0909 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 127 to License DPR-61 ML20055E2361990-07-0202 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 126 to License DPR-61 ML20034C5771990-04-26026 April 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 125 to License DPR-61 ML20034A0481990-04-10010 April 1990 Safety Evaluation Granting Exemption Requests from App R ML20012E5021990-03-21021 March 1990 Safety Evaluation Re Reactor Protection Sys Upgrade Phase 1. Sys & Hardware Design Provides Reasonable Assurance to Perform Safety Functions Per Updated FSAR & Tech Specs ML20012E2001990-03-12012 March 1990 Safety Evaluation Accepting Plant Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Sys as Complying W/Requirements of ATWS Rule 10CFR50.62(c)(1) ML20012E1991990-03-12012 March 1990 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Plant Adequately Meets Intent of 10CFR50.62 & Exempt from Further Mods to Provide Turbine Trip on Indications of ATWS ML20006B4011990-01-22022 January 1990 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Electrical Sys Changes for Fire Protection ML19324B3851989-10-24024 October 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 124,35 & 144 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21 & DPR-65,respectively ML19325D8631989-10-18018 October 1989 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Large Containment Results in Slow Hydrogen Accumulation Rate & Ensures That Sufficient Time Available to Implement Addl Hydrogen Control Features as May Be Necessary Following Accident ML20247K2531989-09-11011 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 123 & 41 to Licenses DPR-61 & NPF-49,respectively ML20247E3761989-09-0707 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 122,34,143 & 40 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20247A4841989-09-0505 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 121 to License DPR-61 ML20245J0121989-08-14014 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Extension of Surveillance Intervals 1999-04-28
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217K3301999-10-19019 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 195 to License DPR-61 ML20206C8761999-04-28028 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 194 to License DPR-61 CY-99-047, Ro:On 981217,identified Unsuccessful Dewatering of Cnsi HIC, Model PL8-120R,containing Resins.Caused by Apparent Failure of Dewatering Tree.Other HICs Have Been Procured,Recertified & Returned to Plant for Use1999-03-23023 March 1999 Ro:On 981217,identified Unsuccessful Dewatering of Cnsi HIC, Model PL8-120R,containing Resins.Caused by Apparent Failure of Dewatering Tree.Other HICs Have Been Procured,Recertified & Returned to Plant for Use 05000213/LER-1999-001, :on 990105,main Stack RM R-14A Pressure Compensating Signal Was Not Calibrated.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Calibration Procedure.With1999-02-0101 February 1999
- on 990105,main Stack RM R-14A Pressure Compensating Signal Was Not Calibrated.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Calibration Procedure.With
05000213/LER-1997-016, :on 970825,discovered That Negative Pressure Was Not Maintained in Sf Bldg,Per Design Basis.Caused by Sf Bldg Ventilation Sys Being Based on Lower Pab Ventilation Flow Rates.Corrected Ventilation Sys Design.With1999-01-25025 January 1999
- on 970825,discovered That Negative Pressure Was Not Maintained in Sf Bldg,Per Design Basis.Caused by Sf Bldg Ventilation Sys Being Based on Lower Pab Ventilation Flow Rates.Corrected Ventilation Sys Design.With
ML20206F1971998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept for 1998 for Cyap. with CY-99-027, Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59, for Jan-Dec 1998.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59, for Jan-Dec 1998.With ML20198G9101998-12-22022 December 1998 Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Haddam Neck Plant. Marked Up Rev 1 Included 05000213/LER-1997-018, :on 971003,discovered That Sf Bldg Exhaust Fan Did Not Meet Design Basis.Caused by Higher than Expected Pressure in Pab.Design of Sf Bldg Ventilation Sys Was Corrected.With1998-12-0808 December 1998
- on 971003,discovered That Sf Bldg Exhaust Fan Did Not Meet Design Basis.Caused by Higher than Expected Pressure in Pab.Design of Sf Bldg Ventilation Sys Was Corrected.With
05000213/LER-1998-009, :on 980915,noted Excessive CV,SW-CV-963,seat Leakage in SW Supply Piping to SFP Heat Exchangers.Caused by Subject Cv Disc Being Stuck in Open Position.Valve Was Exercised & Freed from Stuck Open Position.With1998-10-14014 October 1998
- on 980915,noted Excessive CV,SW-CV-963,seat Leakage in SW Supply Piping to SFP Heat Exchangers.Caused by Subject Cv Disc Being Stuck in Open Position.Valve Was Exercised & Freed from Stuck Open Position.With
05000213/LER-1998-008, :on 980721,determined That Main Stack Radiation Monitor RMS-14B Samples Were Not Analyzed to Required Detection Level.Caused by Inadequate Design.Immediately Controlled Temp of Radiation Monitor Room.With1998-09-29029 September 1998
- on 980721,determined That Main Stack Radiation Monitor RMS-14B Samples Were Not Analyzed to Required Detection Level.Caused by Inadequate Design.Immediately Controlled Temp of Radiation Monitor Room.With
05000213/LER-1997-021, :on 971124,found Contaminated Matls Offsite. Caused by Breakdown of Health Physics Program in Effect at Time Contaminated Matl Was Released from Site.Revised Procedures.With1998-09-0101 September 1998
- on 971124,found Contaminated Matls Offsite. Caused by Breakdown of Health Physics Program in Effect at Time Contaminated Matl Was Released from Site.Revised Procedures.With
ML20238F2131998-08-28028 August 1998 SER Accepting Defueled Emergency Plan for Emergency Planning for Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co 05000213/LER-1998-007, :on 980714,excessive Check Valve Seat Leakage in SW Supply Piping to SFP Heat Exchangers,Occurred.Caused by SW-CV-963 Disc Sticking in Open Position.Increased Test Frequency from Quarterly to Monthly1998-08-13013 August 1998
- on 980714,excessive Check Valve Seat Leakage in SW Supply Piping to SFP Heat Exchangers,Occurred.Caused by SW-CV-963 Disc Sticking in Open Position.Increased Test Frequency from Quarterly to Monthly
CY-98-136, Ro:On 980727,flow Blockage Occurred & Caused Pressure in Sys to Increase,Resulting in Relief Valve Lifting & Pipe Vibration,Which Caused Leaks to Develop.Caused by Nearly Closed post-filter Inlet Valve.Repaired 2 Leaks in Line1998-08-12012 August 1998 Ro:On 980727,flow Blockage Occurred & Caused Pressure in Sys to Increase,Resulting in Relief Valve Lifting & Pipe Vibration,Which Caused Leaks to Develop.Caused by Nearly Closed post-filter Inlet Valve.Repaired 2 Leaks in Line ML20237B7461998-07-22022 July 1998 1998 Defueled Emergency Plan Exercise Scenario Manual, Conducted on 980722 ML20202D1621998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License DPR-61 05000213/LER-1998-005, :on 980511,determined That Design Deficiency Was Found in Main Stack Flow Rate Monitor.Caused by 1974 Mod Change on Original Installation.Declared F-1101 Channel Out of Svc & Develop Means of Estimating Flow1998-06-0909 June 1998
- on 980511,determined That Design Deficiency Was Found in Main Stack Flow Rate Monitor.Caused by 1974 Mod Change on Original Installation.Declared F-1101 Channel Out of Svc & Develop Means of Estimating Flow
05000213/LER-1998-006, :on 980507,design Deficiency Was Found in Stack RM RMS-14B Sampling Lines.Caused by Design Not Meeting ANSI N13.1-1969 Stds.Corrective Action Plan for RMS-14B Is Being Developed1998-06-0808 June 1998
- on 980507,design Deficiency Was Found in Stack RM RMS-14B Sampling Lines.Caused by Design Not Meeting ANSI N13.1-1969 Stds.Corrective Action Plan for RMS-14B Is Being Developed
05000213/LER-1998-004, :on 980507,discovered Design Deficiency in Stack Radiation Monitor RMS-14B Isokinetic Sampling.Caused by Failure to Account for Spent Fuel Bldg Ventilation Flow. Will Develop CAP for RMS-14B1998-06-0404 June 1998
- on 980507,discovered Design Deficiency in Stack Radiation Monitor RMS-14B Isokinetic Sampling.Caused by Failure to Account for Spent Fuel Bldg Ventilation Flow. Will Develop CAP for RMS-14B
05000213/LER-1998-003, :on 980505,compensatory Sampling Frequency Exceeded Time Limit W/Sw Effluent RM Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Individual Was Counseled & Technicians Were Reminded of Sampling within Required Frequency1998-06-0202 June 1998
- on 980505,compensatory Sampling Frequency Exceeded Time Limit W/Sw Effluent RM Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Individual Was Counseled & Technicians Were Reminded of Sampling within Required Frequency
05000213/LER-1998-002, :on 980421,determined That Visual Insp of Switchgear Cable Shaft Sprinkler Sys Was Not Being Performed Once Per 18 Months.Caused by Inadequate Implementation of License Amend.Fire Watch Patrol Established1998-05-19019 May 1998
- on 980421,determined That Visual Insp of Switchgear Cable Shaft Sprinkler Sys Was Not Being Performed Once Per 18 Months.Caused by Inadequate Implementation of License Amend.Fire Watch Patrol Established
05000213/LER-1998-001, :on 980409,seismic Monitor Sp Was Not in Compliance W/Ts.Caused by Inadequate Engineering Review. Submitted Proposed License Amend to Correct Issue1998-05-0707 May 1998
- on 980409,seismic Monitor Sp Was Not in Compliance W/Ts.Caused by Inadequate Engineering Review. Submitted Proposed License Amend to Correct Issue
CY-98-068, Follow-up to Verbal Notification on 980413 of Film on Discharge Canal.Investigation Continuing.Samples Collected for Petroleum Analyses & Biological Characterization at Intake Structure & Discharge Canal.Replaced Sorbent Booms1998-04-15015 April 1998 Follow-up to Verbal Notification on 980413 of Film on Discharge Canal.Investigation Continuing.Samples Collected for Petroleum Analyses & Biological Characterization at Intake Structure & Discharge Canal.Replaced Sorbent Booms CY-98-045, Ro:On 980212,0219,0225 & 0312,separate Sheens of Approx One Cup of oil-like Substance Was Observed at Discharge Canal. Cause Has Not Been Clearly Identified.Called in Vendor Spill to Install Sorbent Booms to Absorb Sheen.W/One Drawing1998-04-13013 April 1998 Ro:On 980212,0219,0225 & 0312,separate Sheens of Approx One Cup of oil-like Substance Was Observed at Discharge Canal. Cause Has Not Been Clearly Identified.Called in Vendor Spill to Install Sorbent Booms to Absorb Sheen.W/One Drawing ML20217A0001998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217F0611998-03-31031 March 1998 Historical Review Team Rept ML20217K2101998-03-27027 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-61 CY-98-046, Follow-up to 980311 Verbal Notification of Film on Discharge Canal.Cause Not Yet Determined.Film Is Contained & Will Be Absorbed by Containment & Sorbent Booms That Were in Place in Discharge Canal1998-03-12012 March 1998 Follow-up to 980311 Verbal Notification of Film on Discharge Canal.Cause Not Yet Determined.Film Is Contained & Will Be Absorbed by Containment & Sorbent Booms That Were in Place in Discharge Canal ML20216D6531998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217D7381998-02-28028 February 1998 Revised MOR for Feb 1998 Haddam Neck Plant CY-98-012, Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck Plant1998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck Plant CY-98-010, Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59,Jan-Dec,19971997-12-31031 December 1997 Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59,Jan-Dec,1997 ML20198N6681997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217P4861997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 Annual Financial Rept, for Cyap ML20199L5891997-12-24024 December 1997 Independent Analysis & Evaluation of AM-241 & Transuranics & Subsequent Dose to Two Male Workers at Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Plant 05000213/LER-1997-020, :on 971117,determined That Radioactive Effluent Dose Calculations Were Not Performed within Required Frequency.Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Will Revise Procedures & Will Enhance Tracking Process1997-12-16016 December 1997
- on 971117,determined That Radioactive Effluent Dose Calculations Were Not Performed within Required Frequency.Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Will Revise Procedures & Will Enhance Tracking Process
ML20203K4271997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant 05000213/LER-1997-017, :on 970924,identified Three Locations of Detectable Plant Related Radioactivity in on-site Landfill Area.Caused by Failure to Conduct Adequate Survey.Access to Area Controlled1997-11-18018 November 1997
- on 970924,identified Three Locations of Detectable Plant Related Radioactivity in on-site Landfill Area.Caused by Failure to Conduct Adequate Survey.Access to Area Controlled
05000213/LER-1997-019, :on 970808,compensatory Sampling Frequency Exceeded W/Rms Determined Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error Due to Incorrect Interpretation of Ts.Compensatory Sampling to Be Conducted in Time Frame Required1997-11-17017 November 1997
- on 970808,compensatory Sampling Frequency Exceeded W/Rms Determined Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error Due to Incorrect Interpretation of Ts.Compensatory Sampling to Be Conducted in Time Frame Required
ML20199B1141997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant 05000213/LER-1997-018, :on 971003,Spent Fuel Building Exhaust Fan Flow Was Found Below Design During Testing.Caused by Personnel Error.Evaluated Replacement of Spent Fuel Building Exhaust Fan Capable of Overcoming Higher Pressures1997-10-30030 October 1997
- on 971003,Spent Fuel Building Exhaust Fan Flow Was Found Below Design During Testing.Caused by Personnel Error.Evaluated Replacement of Spent Fuel Building Exhaust Fan Capable of Overcoming Higher Pressures
ML20198M8101997-10-14014 October 1997 SER Accepting Proposed Revs to Util Quality Assurance Program at Facility ML20198J8811997-09-30030 September 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant 05000213/LER-1997-015, :on 970813,functional Testing of Radiation Monitoring Sys Was Not Performed as Defined in Ts.Caused by Lack of Understanding of Definition of Acot.Revised Appropriate RMS Surveillance Procedure1997-09-12012 September 1997
- on 970813,functional Testing of Radiation Monitoring Sys Was Not Performed as Defined in Ts.Caused by Lack of Understanding of Definition of Acot.Revised Appropriate RMS Surveillance Procedure
05000213/LER-1996-027, :on 961010,boron Injection Flow Path Below Minimum Required Temperature Was Determined.Caused by Inadequate Design of Heat Trace Controls in Rtd.Boric Acid Flow Paths from Bamt Were Declared Inoperable1997-09-12012 September 1997
- on 961010,boron Injection Flow Path Below Minimum Required Temperature Was Determined.Caused by Inadequate Design of Heat Trace Controls in Rtd.Boric Acid Flow Paths from Bamt Were Declared Inoperable
05000213/LER-1996-016, :on 960801,potential for Inadequate RHR Pump NPSH During Sump Recirculation Was Determined.Caused by Failure to Fully Analyze Containment Pressure & Sump Temperature Response.Redesign of Piping Proposed1997-09-12012 September 1997
- on 960801,potential for Inadequate RHR Pump NPSH During Sump Recirculation Was Determined.Caused by Failure to Fully Analyze Containment Pressure & Sump Temperature Response.Redesign of Piping Proposed
05000213/LER-1997-014, :on 970808,ESFA Occurred Due to Deenergization of High Containment Pressure Actuation Circuits.Reemphasized Expectations of Mgt for Performing non-routine Operational Tasks1997-09-0505 September 1997
- on 970808,ESFA Occurred Due to Deenergization of High Containment Pressure Actuation Circuits.Reemphasized Expectations of Mgt for Performing non-routine Operational Tasks
05000213/LER-1996-021, :on 960828,valve Leakage Resulted in Nitrogen Intrusion Into RCS During Cold Shutdown.Caused by Leaking Valve BA-V-355.Training Has Been Been Provided to Operators on Event & Features & Limitations of Sys1997-09-0505 September 1997
- on 960828,valve Leakage Resulted in Nitrogen Intrusion Into RCS During Cold Shutdown.Caused by Leaking Valve BA-V-355.Training Has Been Been Provided to Operators on Event & Features & Limitations of Sys
05000213/LER-1996-005, :on 960301,spent Fuel Cooling Was Shut Down Due to Discovery of Loose Parts.Caused by Inadequate Design. Piping from Both Sent Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps to Plate Exchanger Were Inspected for Loose Parts w/bore-a-scope1997-09-0505 September 1997
- on 960301,spent Fuel Cooling Was Shut Down Due to Discovery of Loose Parts.Caused by Inadequate Design. Piping from Both Sent Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps to Plate Exchanger Were Inspected for Loose Parts w/bore-a-scope
1999-04-28
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UNITED STATES 10 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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W ASHINGTON, D.C. 20S$5-0001 i
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RE0 VEST TO USE AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ASME CODE HYDROSTATIC PRESSURE TESTS CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY HADDAM NECK PLANT l
DOCKET NO. 50-213 l
1.0 INTRODUCTION
In its letter of April 8, 1993, supplemented by letters of May 21, June 1, and i
June 25, 1993, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO), the licensee, submitted a request to use an alternative to the provisions of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Summer 1983 Addendum, that requires hydrostatic pressure tests (HSPT) after performing repairs to the Class 3 service water system (SWS).
once the repairs are completed, the ASME Code requires that HSPT and a visual examination be performed on the repaired segments.
As stated in the I
submittal, the full HSPT of the SWS during this current outage would cause significant hardship in the form of additional downtime to perform the test, the locating and installing of additional hydrostatic pumps to pressurize the i
system, and the pressurization of large underground areas of the original SWS.
CYAPC0 has requested approval of the use of Code Case N-416, " Alternative Rules for Hydrostatic Testing of Repairs of Replacement of Class 2 Piping," as an alternative pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i).
The proposed alternative consists of radiographic (RT) examinations of the butt welds and magnetic particle (MT) examinations of the root and final pass of the fillet welds, 1
including an inservice leak test performed at the normal system operating pressure.
2.0 BACKGROUND
CYAPC0 identified pitting in the elbows of the SWS between the main header and intake manifold of the A and B emergency diesel generators (EDGs).
CYAPC0 will replace the affected elbows and pipe segments on either side of the elbows with the same nominal size (6-inches) and wall-thickness (0.280-inch) carbon steel elbows and pipe segments.
The pipe segments'are connected to the i
main header with a saddle-designed end that is fillet welded over a smaller opening cut in the main header.
The opposite end of the pipe segments are butt welded to the 90 degree elbows, which in turn, are butt welded to other pipe segments in the EDG systems. After the repairs, the ASME requirement imposed on the repaired welds are:
IWA-4400(a) states that after repairs by welding on the pressure retaining boundary, a system hydrostatic test shall be performed in accordance with IWA-5000.
IWA-5214(b) states that the test pressure and 9307150034 930709 PDR ADOCK 05000213.
P ppg
_. _..,. ~ - _ _. _. ~. _ _ _. _ _
l
. temperature shall comply with IWD-5223.
IWD-5223(a) states that the system hydrostatic test pressure shall be at least 1.10 times the system for systems with design temperatures of 200* F or less, and pressure P,"25 times the P,y at least 1.
for systems with design temperature above 200* F.
The o, shall be the lowest pressure setting among the number of safety or relief valves provided for overpressure protection within the boundary of the system to be tested.
For systems (or portions of systems) not provided with safety or relief valves, the system design pressure P shall be substituted for P,,.
g The licensee proposed the following alternative requirements:
(1)
Invoke Code Case N-416, " Alternative Rules for Hydrostatic Testing of Repair of Replacement of Class 2 Piping Section XI, Division 1."
(2)
The fillet welds will receive magnetic particle examinations on the root and on the final weld, a visual examination of the welds, and an inservice leak test at normal system operating pressure.
(3)
The butt welds will receive radiographic and magnetic particle examinations, and an inservice leak test at normal system operating pressure.
3.0 EVALUATION AND DESCRIPTION Code Case N-416 is included in Regulatory Guide 1.147 " Inservice Inspection Code Case Acceptability ASME Section XI Division 1," Revision 9, April 1992, and is applicable to Class 2 systems. To use Code Case N-416, the repaired piping cannot be isolated by existing valves or that isolating the piping would require securing safety or relief valves. The repaired piping cannot be locally isolated.
There is a valve between the repaired piping and EDG; however, the other end of the piping is connected to a main header. A HSPT would require the locating and installing of additional hydrostatic pumps to pressurize the system, and the pressurization of large underground areas of the original SWS.
The application of Code Case N-416 to Class 3 system includes the consideration of weld accessibility, additional examinations, and the schedule for conducting a HSPT on the repaired segments. The welds are surrounded by several feet of clearance that provide easy access for tests and inspection.
Code Case N-416 requires RT and MT examinations of the butt welds, MT examinations of the finished surface of the fillet welds, and the system inservice leak test of the repaired segments.
In addition, the licensee will perform MT examinations of the root pass of the fillet welds. The above testing establishes the structural integrity of the joints in the absence of a HSPT.
Code Case N-416 allows for the deferment of the HSPT until the next regularly scheduled system HSPT.
The next system HSPT is scheduled for (approximately) 1997.
CYAPCO is committed to performing the required HSPT of the SWS at the
.. end of the present 10-year inspection interval, unless the ASME Code provisions change before then.
By invoking Code Case N-416, CYAPC0 has also committed not to use Code Case N-498, " Alternative Rules for 10-Year Hydrostatic Pressure Testing for Class 1 and 2 Systems," in 1997.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The staff concludes that an acceptable level of quality and safety will be maintained using the proposed alternative tests instead of the required HSPT.
Invoking Code Case N-416 with additional MT examinations ensures the structural integrity of the system.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i), the proposed alternative tests are authorized.
Principal Contributor:
D. Naujock Date: July 9, 1993