ML20205T087

Advises That Amend to FSAR Chapter 16 to Encompass Surveillance & Operability Requirements Would Resolve NRC Concerns

ML20205T087
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	05/19/1987
From:	Tam P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Carey J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
References
TAC-62942, NUDOCS 8811140109
Download: ML20205T087 (5)

Text

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Hay 19,1987

/

Cocket No. 50-412 Mr. J. J. Carey, Senior Vice President v Duquesne Light Company Nuclear Group Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077

Subject:

Beaver Valley Unit 2 - Requirements ten Control Room Isolation Instrumentation (TAC 62942)

During our review of the Beaver Valley 2 Technical Specifications, an issue concerning inadequate surveillance and operability requirements for control room isolation automatic actuation logic, relays, and instrumentation channels was raised. Recent draft correspondence and discussions with your staff indicate that you may be reluctant to include explicit requirernents for the l subject instruinentation in the Beaver Valley 2 Technical Specifications.

To end this deadlocked situation and to resolve our concern, we believe a compromise can be made in the form of an FSAR amendment to Chapter 16 to 1 encompass surveillance and operability requirements for instrumentation compcnents which currently are not explicitly covered by the Beaver Valley Unit 2 Final Draft Technical Specifications. To facilitate the FSAR amendment process, we have enclosed hereto a list of specific areas which should be addressed.

,' The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance 1e not required under P.L.96-521.

Sincerely,

!! /s/

N Peter S. Tam, Project Manager 48 Project Directorate I-4 Division of Reactor PnJjects I/II 38' oo E8

Enclosure:

1 m As stated

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Mr. J. J. Carey

, Duquesne Light Company Beaver Valley 2 Power Station cc:

Gerald Charnoff, Esq. Mr. R. E. Martin, Manager Jay E. Silberg, Esq. Regulatory Affairs Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Duquesne Light Company 2300 N Street. N.W. Beaver Valley Two Project Washington, DC 20037 P. O. Box 328 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 Mr. C. W. Ewing, Quality Assurance Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Manager Advocate Quality Assurance Department ATTN: Michael Bardee Duquesne Light Company 1425 Strawberry Square P. O. Pox 186 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Shippingport Pennsylvania 15077 John D. Burrows, P.E.

Director, Pennsylvania Emergency Director of Utilities Management Agency State of Ohio Public Utilities Comission d

Rcom B-151 Transportation & Safety Butiding 180 East Broad Street Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Columbus, Ohio 43266-0573 Mr. T. J. Lex Bureau of Radiation Protection Westinghouse Electric Corporation PA Department of Environmental Power Systems Resources O P. O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 ATTN: R. Janati P.O. Box 2063 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Mr. F. RaySircar Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation BVPS-2 Records Management Supervisor P. O. Box 2325 Duquesne Light Company Boston, Massachusetts 02107 Post Office Box 4

, Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 Mr. J. Beall

, U. S. NRC John A. Lee Esq.

P. O. 181 Duquesne Light Company Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 1 0xford Centre 301 Grant Street Regional Administrator, Region 1 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15279 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

ENCLOSURE CONTROL ROOM ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE AND OPERABIL1TY REQUIREMENTS I

Since explicit surveillance and operability requirements are not included in the proposed Beaver Valley 2 Technical Specifications, the following must be

! addressed in Chapter 16 of the Beaver Valley 2 Final Safety Analysis Report:

) 1. Control Room Isolation on High Radiation:

I

a. Operability requirements for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 actuation relays

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j downstream of the radiation monitors should be provided. These i requirements can reference the appropriate Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) of the related control room area monitor from 1 Technical Specification 3.3.3.1.

l

b. A comitment should be provided to ensure that jumpers are not used to prevent energization of Unit 1 and Unit 2 relays downstream of the

. control rooo area '.cnitors during r.hannel functional tests of the monitors.

. JUST!FICATION:

i l

a. TheLCO(TechnicalSpecification3.3.3.1)fortheradiationmonitors

! states that these instrumentation channels are operable when their alare/ trip setpoints are within specified limits. Operability (Technical Specification 4.3.3.1) is verified monthly by performance 2

of a channel functional test (verifies bistable setpoint). Clearly, j these specifications do not address operability of any components j (relays)downstreemofthemonitors. Additionally,the i all-encompassing operability requirements (see Defined Term 1.6 of i O

t u .

, l i 2- l l l l  :

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the Beaver Valley Unit 2 Technical Specifications) for a system l has e not been interpreted by the staff to apply implicitly to reactor

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l protection system components such 6 actuation logic and relays downstream of instrument channel bistables. Reactor protection (

system components historically (including Beaver Valley Unit 1) have j i explicit operability requirements.  !

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] b. The actuation logic is one-out-of-one (1/1) for control room isolation

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on high radiation. The relays downstream of the radiation monitors  !

!' are "G0" relays. When the monthly channel functional test is j conducted, the relays and components (dampers, etc.) downstream cf j i the bistable will be energized when the bistable input exceeds its l l setpoint. This, in effect, verifies the operability of the downstream }

components for which no explicit monthly surveillance requirement  !

l exists in the Beaver Valley 2 Technical Specifications. Ifjumpers  ;

l (the use of which the staff discourages) or other means are used to prevent energization of downstream components during the monthly i j channel test, operability of the system is in question until the full f

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~

system test is performed (once every 18 months), j l j

2. Control Room Isolation on High Chlorine

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' t I

a. Operability requirements for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 actuation logic l l and relays downstream of the chlorine detectors should be provided. l l These requireme.its can reference the appropriate LCO of the related f train of emergency ventilation system, bottled air pressurtration }

l system, or intake and exhaust dampers from Technical Specification f 4

3.7.7.1. '.

]

I I j b. A comitment should be provided stating that the Unit 1 and Unit 2 l

! automatic actuation logic and relays downstream of the chlorine detectors, which effect control room isolation, are tested as part f l of the Reactor Protection Logic System Test conducted monthly on a (

staggered tes' '* sis.

4

'.~*'

rx JUSTIFICATION:

a. TheLCO(TechnicalSpecification3.3.3.7)forthechlorinedetectors, like the radiation monitors above, does not address operability of any component downstream of the detectors nor has the system operability motherhood statement historically been applied to reactor protection system components.

b. The actuation logic for control room isolation of high chlorine is two-out-of-three(2/3). The relays and automatic actuation logic are part of the Westinghouse Solid State Protection System which 15 tested as a unit monthly on a staggered test basis. Currently, our review indicates that these tests are included in procedures such as 2MSP-1.04-1 (for Beaver Valley 2) and MSP 1.05 (for Beaver Valley 1).

To ensure surveillance will be performed and to avoid future technical specification interpretation problems, an explicit FSAR comitment

, should be made.

J l

J e

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