Text

Proposed Tech Specs,Modifying Bypass Logic for Msli Valve Isolation Acuation Instrumentation on Condenser Low Vacuum
	ML20203G505
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	12/12/1997
From:	; COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
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References
	NUDOCS 9712180144
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_. .. ._ ._ .. _. . . . . _ _ . _ . . _ . _ _ _ . . . _ _ . _ _ . .

1 ATTACHMENT 3

. PROPOSED AMENDMEhTS TO THE LICEtlSEITECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l l

NPF-11 _

NPF-18 3/4 3-11* 3/4 3-11*

3/4 3-14 3/4314 3/4 3-20* 3/4 3-20' 3/4 3-22 3/4322 B 3/4 3 2* B 3/4 3-2*

B 3/4 3 2a B 3/4 3-2a l

l I

l B-1

. 9712180144 971212 PDR ADOCK 05000373 P PDR

i _

_. o TABLE .s.3.2 For _Tyrformdi<nNy, .

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION #

9 #I ~

VALVE CROUPS MINIMUM OPERABLE APPLICABLE OPERATED BY CHANNELS PER OPERATIONAL TRIP FUNCTION SIGNAL TRIP SYSTEM (b) _ CONDITION ACTION A. AUTOMATIC INITIATION

1. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION a2 Reactor Vessel Water Level l Low, Level 3 7 2 1, 2, 3 20 1 Low Low, level 2 2, 3 2 1, 2, 3 20

) Low Low Low, Level 1 1, 10 2 1, 2, 3 _20

b. Drywell Pressure - High 2, 7, 10 2 1, 2, 3 20

c. Main Steam Line .

1 l DELETED 2; Pressure - Low l-i 1 2 1 23 3h Flow - High 1 2/line'#' 1, 2, 3 21

d. DELETED

e. Main Steam Line Tunnel ATemperature - High 1 2 1 8

',',',I,g8 2' ' " I 3 ,

f. Condenser Vacuum - Low 1 2 1, 2*, 3* 21

2. SECONDARY CONTAllMENT ISOLATION

a. Reactor Building Vent Exhaust 4""*'

~

Plenum Radiation - High 2 1, 2, 3 and ** 24

b. Drywell Pressure - High 4 " " 2 1, 2, 3 24

c. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 4"" 2 1, 2, 3, and '- 24

d. Fuel Pool Vent Exhaust Radiation - High 4"" 2 1, 2, 3, and ** 24 LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 3-11 Amendment No. 115

)

M1

_i2. - IConi.a nuso)

IEOLATION Ac?tfATION TWCTRtfMENTATTON ACTION ACTION 20 -

Se in at least NOT SHUTDOWN within 1*; hours and in COLD SNUTDOWN ACTION 21 -

within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Be in at least STARTUP with the associated isolation valves

- + closed within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months or be in at least NOT SHUTDOWN within ACTION 22 - 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Close the aff ected system isolation valves within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and ACTION 23 -

declare the affected system inoperable.

ACTION 24 - Re in at least STARTUP within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ..

Establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY with the standby gas ,

ACTION 25 -

treatment system operating within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . j Lock the affected system isolation valves closed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months I 1

ACTION 26 -

and declare the af f octed system inoperable.

Provided that the ranual initiation function is CPERABLE for each other group valve. inboard or outboard, as applicable. in each line, restore the manual initiation function to CPERABLE :

status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months otherwise. restore the manual initiation function to CPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months otherwise:

a.

Be in at least HOT SNUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in

b. COLD St.'TTPOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . or Close the oc af fected system isolation valves within the next hou re the af fected system inoperable, nof hlloP" meu May bevos stop va qsed wit,h (reactor steam pressure s 1043 psig an all turbine When handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment and during CORE ALTERATIONS vessel. and operations with a potential for draining the reactor During reactorCORE vessel. ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential f or d.*aining the (a) Deleted.

(b)

A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for required surveillance condition provided at without least placing the channel in the tripped system is monitoring that parameter. one other OPERABLE channel in the same trip with a design providing only one channel per trip system,In addition for those trip systems be placed in an inoperable status for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for requiredthe channel may surveillance provided that testing without placing the channel in the tripped condition the redundant applicable, in each lira 'J isolation valve. inboard or outboard, as instrumentation for th, operable and all required actuation system in the tripped uondition.:edundant valve is OPERABLE. or place the trip (c)

(d)

Also actuates the standby gas treatment system.

(e) A channel is CPERABLE if 2 of 4 instruments in that channel are OPERABLE.

Also Tableactuates 3.6.5.2-1. secondary containment ventilation isolation dampers per (f)

Closes only RWCU system inlet outboard valve.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. 104

_T_ABL 3.2.1-1 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUME:'IATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CilANNEL OPERATIONAL -

CHAfGEL IUNCTIONAL CHANNEL - CONDIT10N5 IOR WICH TRIP FUNCTION CHECK TEST CALIBRATION _ SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED A. AUTOMATIC INITIATION for Inforrnq[/On On/ ,

7

1. PRIMARY CONTAlmENT ISOLATIOM N # S85

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level

1) Low, Level 3 5 Low Low, Level 2 Q R 1, 2, 3

2) NA Q R 1, 2, 3

3) Low Low Low, level 1 5 Q R 1, 2, 3

b. Drywell Pressure - High NA Q Q 1, 2, 3

c. Main Steam Line

1) DELETED

2) Pressure - LL. NA Q Q 1

3) Flow - High NA

d. DELETED Q R 1, 2, 3

e. Condenser Vacuum - Low NA Q Q 1, 2*, 3*

f. Main Steam Line Tunnel A Temperature - High NA q R 1, 2, 3

2. SECONDARY CONTAINNENT ISOLATION

a. Reactor Building Vent Exhaust Plenum Radiation - High 5 Q R 1, 2, 3 and "

b. Drywell Pressure - High NA Q Q 1, 2, 3

c. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, f.evel 2 NA

d. Fuel Pool Vent Exhaust Q R 1, 2, 3, and '

Radiation - High S Q R 1, 2, 3 and **

3. REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEN ISOLATION ,

a. A Flow - High S Q R

b. Heat Exchanger Area 1,'2, 3 Temperature - High NA

c. Heat Exchanger Area Q Q 1, 2, 3 Ventilation AT - High NA Q Q 1, 2, 3

d. SLCS Initiation NA

e. Reactor Vessel Water R NA 1, 2, 3 -

Level - Low Low, Level 2 NA Q R 1, 2, 3 LA SALLE - UNIT I 3/4 3-20 Amendment No. 115

TABLE 4.3.2.1-1 (Continued)

ISOLATION ACTUAIlo!LIMIR'alENTATION EURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL OPERATIONAL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL IRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS FOR WHICH

_ CHECK. TEST CALIBRATION EMEXEILLANCE REDUIRED

6. RHR SYSTEM SHUTDsWN COOLING NODE ISO E'IDH J

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -

Low, Level 3 S Q R 1,'2, 3

b. Reactor vessel (RHR Cut-in Permissivel Pressure - High NA Q Q 1,2,3

c. RHR Pump Suction Flow - High NA Q Q 1,2,3

d. RHR Area Temperature - High NA Q Q 1,2,3

e. RHH Equipment Area AT - High NA Q Q 1,2,3

8. MANUAL INITIATION ,

3. Inboard Valves NA R NA 2 Outboard Valves 1, 2, 3 NA R NA 1, ' 2, 3

3. Inboard Valves NA R NA 1, 2, 3 and **,8

4. Outboard Valves NA R NA 1, 2, 3 and **,5

5. Inboard Valves NA 't NA 6 Outboard Valves 1, 2, 3 HA 1 NA 1, 2, 3

7. Outboard valve NA a NA 1, 2, 3 Not regaireo' when alI turbine stop valves are not Fullopen.

t e

i Othen _ ramer.or stwem dessu 1043 psig and/or any turbine stop valve is open.)

A \

When handling arrauimten fuel In cr.e secondary c'ontainment ano auxing CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

8 During CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

LA $ALLE - UNIT 1 .

. DMt L S9 I

i 4

INSTRUMENTATION - -

BASES 7

3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

. FunctionalTUnits response time testing for the remaining channel components,

~ including any ana, log trip units, is required. This allowance-is supported by NE00-32291-A, " System Analyses for the Elimination of. Selected Response Time

Testing Requirements," October 1C35.

Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurement, provided sucP tests demonstrate

. the total channel response time as defined.- Sensor responsw cime verification may be demenstrated by either (1) inplace, onsite or offsite test measurements, or (2)-utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

1/4.3.2 4

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION This specification ensurts the effectiveness of' the instrumentation used :

to mitigate the consequences of accidents Oy prescribing the OPERABILITY trip

setpoints and response times for isolation of the reactor systems. When necessary, one channel may be inoparable for brief intervals to conduct i required surveillance. Both channels of each trip system for the main steam tunnel ventilation system differential temperature may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for required reactor building ventilation

-system maintenance and testing and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months due to loss of reactor building ventilation or for the required seconky containment Leak Rate test without glacing the trip system in the tripr < condition. This will allow for maintaining the reliability of the ventilation system and secondary i , containment. Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and L maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with NEDC-30851P-A, supplement 2, " Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR

-Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation", March 1989, o and with NEDC-31677P-A, " Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR

. Isolation Actuation Instrumentation", July 1990. When a channel is placed in an-inoperable status solely for performance of required surveillances, entry into LCO and required ACTIONS may be delayed, provided the associated function maintains primary containment isolation capability. .Some of the trip settings may have tolerances explicitly stated where both the high and low values are

! critical and may have a substantial effect on safety. The setpoints of other instrumentation, where only.the high or low end of the setting have a direct bearing on safety, are established at a level away from the normal operating range to prevent inadvertent actuation of the systems involved.

Except for the MSIVs, the safety ana!ysis does not address individual sensor response times or the response times of the logic-systems to which the

!, sensors a ected = For A.C. operated valves, it is assumed that the A.C. -

! Inser&A .

LA SALLE - UNIT I B 3/4 312 Amendment No. 114 v

L__________- ._ . _ . _ . - . -._ ._ - - , . . .- - - . - . -.

i ATTACHMENT B

. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE LICENSE / TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 1 INSERT A TS Basos insert:

The Condenser Vacuum - Low Function isolates group 1 valves and is provided to prevent overpressurization of the main condenser in the event of a loss of the main condenser vacuum. Since the integrity of the condenser is an assumption in offsite dose calculations, the Condenser Vacuum - Low Function is assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating closure of the MSIVs. The closure of the MSIVs is initiatt.d to prevc4 the addition of steam that would lead to additional condenser pressurization and possible rupture af the diaphragm Installed to protect the turbine exhaust hood, thereby preventing a potential radiation leakage path following an accident.

As noted (footnote

to Tables 3.3.21 and 4.3.2.1-1), the channels are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, when all turbine stop valves (TSVs) are not full open, since the potential for condenser overpressurization is minimized. Switches are provided to manually bypass the channels when all TSVs are not full open. TSV position setpoints are controlled by TS 2.2.1 and surveillances are performed per TS 4.3.1. The TSV closure scram bypass below 30% power (TS Table 3.3.1-1, Note 1) does not affect the TSV position interlocks for the condenser vacuum - low bypass logic.

1 e

B-2

e >

J ForInformotion oniy.

INSTRUMENTATIDN ko C,bng8S BASES l

3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION (Crntinued)

I

' power supply is lost and is restored by stcrtup of the emergency diesel

generato1. . In this event, a time of 13 seconds is assumed before the valve- '

J starts to move. The safety analysis considers an allowable inventory loss

. -which in turn determines the valve speed in conjunction with the 13 second delay.

. For the sensors associated with MSIY isolation, instrumentation channels are not-required to be response time tested. Response time testing for the ,

i remaining channel components, including any analog trip units, is required.

This allowance is supported by NED0-32291-A, " System Analyses for the '

Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995. i 3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION -

The emergency core cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate actions to mitigate the consequences'of accidents that are beyond the ability of the operator to control. This specification provides the OPERABILITY requirements, trip setpoints and response times that will ensure effectiveness of the systems to provide the design protection. Although the

instruments are listed by system, in some cases the same instrument may be used to send the actuation signal to more than one system at the same f.ime.

Per Note i, the ECCS actuation instrument channels are not required to be response time tested. The overall ECCS res -

includes diesel generator injection valves,ponse timeand pumps, requirement, which still other components, applies. This allowance is supported by NEDO-32291-A, " System Analyses for the Elimination of Selected Response Time 'esting Requirements," October 1995.

Specified surveillance intervals and m ye111ance and maintenance outage

) times have been determined in accordance with NEDC-30936P-A, " Technical Specification Improvement Methodology (With De'ionstration for BWR ECCS Actuation Instrcaentation)", Parts 1 and 2. December 1988, and RE-025 Revision 1,'" Technical Specification Impiovement Analysis for the-Emergency Core Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation for LaSalle County Station,

! Units I and 2", April 1991. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status i

solely for performance of required surveillances, entry into LC0 and required ACTIONS may be delayed, provided the associated function maintains ECCS initiation capability.

4 9

LA SALLE - UNIT-1 8 3/4 3-2a Amendment No. 114

FoeInibcmatton only, ~ -

TABLE 3.3.2-1 kO Matig85 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTAT10N VALVE GROUPS MINIMUM OPERABLE' APPLICABLE .

OPERATED BY ' CHANNELS PER OPERATIONAL TRIP FUNCTION- SIGNAL TRIP SYSTEM (b) CONDITION ACTION

'A. AUTOMATIC INITIATION

1. PRIMARY CONTAlletENT ISOLATION :

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level

, 11 Low, level 3 7 2 1, 2, 3 20 21 Low Low,-Level 2 2, 3 2 1, 2, 3

3) Low Low Low, level 1 20 1, 10 2 1, 2, 3 20

b. Drywell Pressure - High 2, 7, 10 2 1, 2, 3 20 !

c. Main Steam Line

-11 DELETED '

21 Pressure - Low 1 2 1 23 l 3h Flow - High 1 2/11ne 1, 2, 3 21

d. DELETED

.e. Main Steam Line Tunnel ATemperature - High 1 2 1" ',',3 '3d>2""I',

f. Condenser Vacuus - Low 1 2 1, 2*, 3* 21 .

2. SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISDLATION

a. Reactor Building Vent Exhaust Plenum Radiation - High i 4 '* * *' '2 1, 2. 3 and " 24 i

b. Drywell Pressure - High 4 ' * " !

2 1, 2, 3 24

c. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 '4'*" 2 1, 2, 3, and

24 i

d. Fuel Pool Vent Exhaust Radiation - High 4'*" 2 1, 2, 3, and " 24 l

-t LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-11 "

Amendment No.100

" " ~ ^ ^ ' ~

~ -. -

. . _ ;--.. :..o..

~

IsotAT:on Ac uATION TNETRUMENTA 70N e

A C"'70N STATE =1-u s

. ACTION 20 -

se in ct lea t HOT SHUTDOlet within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SRUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

ACTION 21 -

Se in at least STARTUP with the associated isolation valves closed within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months or be la at least not SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWs withi.n the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

ACTION 22 -

Close the affected systne isolation valves within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and declare the affected system inoperable.

ACTION 23 -

Se in at least STARTUP withim 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

ACTION 24 -

Estab3 ish SECONDARY CONTAIMMENT INTEGRITY with the standby gas treatswnt systee operating within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

ACTION 25 -

Lock the affected system isolation valves closed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and declare the affected system inoperable.

ACTION 26 -

provided that the manual initir*. ion function is OPERA 3LE for each M her group valve, inboart, or outboard, as applicable, in each line, restore the manual initiation function to CPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ; otherwise, restore the manual initi.ation function to OPERABLE status within 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months st otherwise:

a.

Se in at least NOT SEUIDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and y b. in COLD SHUTDOWN wit %ia the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , or Close the affected system isolation valves within the next DO ,]wlIopen our and declare the affected system in. operable.

TABtr NOTATIONS Hay be b stop va ve assed with (reactor steam ar-- ure rl:::d.g < 1343 psig anDall turbine When handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment and during CORE ALTERATIONS vessel. and operations with a potential for draining the reactor During CORE reactor vessel. ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the (al Deleted.

(b)

A channel 'aay be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for requireo surveillance without placing the channel in the tripped condition system isprovided monitoring at least one other GPERABLE channel in the same trip that parameter.

In addition for those trip systems with a design providing only one channel per trip system, the channel may be placed in an surveillance inoperable testing withoutscatus for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for required provided that the redundant isolation velve, placing the or inboard channel in the outboard, astripped condition applicable, in each line ,is operable and all required actuation instrumentation system for thatconditian.

in the tripped redundant valve is OPERABLE, or place the trip (c) Also actuates the standby gas treatment eyeten.

(d)

(e) A channel Also actuates is OPERABLE if 2 of 4 instruments in that channel are OPERABL Table 3.6.5.2-1. secondary containment ventilacion isolation dampers per I (f)

Closes only RWCU system inlet outboatt valve.

l l

-l l

l l

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. 90 l

l l

..~

- J_AJ1f - 3.2.1-1 ISOLATION ACTUAT10N INSTRUNENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL OPERATIONAL -

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL TRIP FUNCTION CON 0lil0NS FOR WHICH

_ CHECK _ TEST CALIBRATION A. AUTOMATIC' INITIATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED v *

1. or TS^ormat%*onlys PRIMARY CONTAINNENT ISOLATION

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level

%d gg i 1) Low, tevel 3 5 2)- Low Low, level 2 Q R 1, 2, 3 NA'

3) Low Low Low, Level 1 -5 Q R 1, 2, 3

,b. Q k 1, 2, 3

' Drywell Pressure - High NA

c. Main Steam Line Q Q 1, 2, 3 -

1) DELETED

2) Pressure - Low NA

3) Flow - High . NA Q Q l .

d. DELETED Q R 1, 2, 3

e. Condenser Vacuum - Low NA

' f. Main Steam Line Tunnel Q Q- 1, 2*, 3*

A Temperature - High NA Q R .

1, 2, 3 .

2. SECONDARY CONTAlfetENT ISOLATION

a. Reactor Building Vent Exhaust Plenum Radiation - High S

b. Drywell. Pressure -.High NA Q R 1,'2, 3 and **

c. Q Q 1,'2,'3 Reactor Vessel Water-Level - Low low. Level 2 NA

d. Fuel Pool Vent Exhaust Q R 1, 2, 3, and # .

Radiation - High S Q R 1, 2, 3 and **-

3. REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM ISOLATION

a. A Flow - High S

b. Heat Exchanger Area Q R 1, 2, 3 Temperature - High NA ~

c. Q Q 1, 2, 3 Heat Exchanger Area Ventilation AT - High NA

d. SLCS Initiatlea NA Q Q. 1, 2, 3 R MA - 1, 2, 3

e. Reactor Vessel Water' Levsl - Low Low, tevel 2 NA Q R 1, 2, 3. ,

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-20 Amendment No. 100

s .

IABLE 4.3.2.1-1 (Continuedt ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILIJJOCE REDUIREMENTS CHANNEL OPERATIONAL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL

] TRIF FUNCTIOM CONDITIONS FOR WNICN

_ CHECK TEST CALIBRATICAf SURVEILIJdICE REDUIRED

6. RMA SYSTEM SHUTDONN COOLING NODE _ ISO 1ATION

a. Reactor Vessel Mater Level -

Low. Level 3 S Q R 1,2,3

b. Reactor' Vessel' l (RHR Cut-in Permissivel Pressure - High NA g g 1,'2, 3

c. RHR Pump Suetion Flow - High NA Q g

d. RNR Area Temperature - Nigh 1, 2, 3 e NA g g 1, 2, 3

e. Rp6R Equipment Area AT - High NA g g 1, 2, 3

3. NAMMAL INITIATION

1. Inboard Valves MA R i NA 1, 2, 3

.2. Outboard Valves NA R NA

3. Inboard Valves 1, 2, 3 MA R NA

4. Outboard Valves 1, 2, 3 and **,f MA R NA 1, 2, 3 and **,9

-5. Inboard valves NA R NA 1, 2, 3. '

6. Outboard Valves NA R NA

7. Outboard Valve 1, 2, 3 {

NA R NA 1,2,3 i

Sthen reactor steamJ ressure > 1043 nsin and/or any turbine stop valve is_open7_3L,

- When handling 3 Irradiated fuel in the secondary containment and during tumF. ALTERATIONS and operations' 3 with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. 'I EDuring CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. ,

1 i

r

, Not reguiced wh en elI tubine sty valvesare notmpen.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-22 I Amendment No. 90

INSTRUMENTATION ftAsrs 3 /4. 3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

Functional Units, response time testing for the remaining channel components, including any analog trip units, is required. This allowance is supported by NE00-32291-A, " System Analyses for the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995.

Response time may, be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurement, provided such tests demonstrate the total chanael response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either (1 inplace, onsite or offsite test measurements, or (2) utilizing re) placement sensors with certified response times.

3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION This specification ensures the effectiveness of the instrumentation used to mitigate the consequences of accidents by prescribing the OPERABILITY trip setpoints and response times for isolation of the reactor systems. When necessary, one channel may be inoperable for brief intervals to conduct required surveillance. Both channels of each trip system for the main steam tunnel ventilation system differential temperature may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for required reactor building ventilation ,

system maintenance ar.d testing and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months due to loss of reactor building l l

ventilation or for the required secondary containment Leak Rate test without placing the trip system in the tripped condition. This will allow for maintaining the reliability of the ventilation system and secondary containment. Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with NEDC- i 30851P-A, Supplement ?, " Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR j Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation", March 1989, and with NEDC-31677P-A, " Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR '

Isolation Actuation Instrumentation", July 1990. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required surveillances, entry 1 into LCO and required ACTIONS may be delayed, provided the associated function j taintains primarf containment isolation capability. Some of the trip settings i may have tolerances explicitly stated where both the high and low values are l critical and may have a substantial effect on safety. The setpoints of other instrumentation, where only the high or low end of the setting have a direct bearing on safety, are established at a level away from the normal operating range to prevent inadvertent actuation of the systems involved.

Except for the MSIVs, the safety analysis does not address individual sensor response times or the response times of the logic systems to which the

, sensors are connected. For A.C. operated valves, it is assumed that the A.C. ~

L f

hsertX .

1 A SALLE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-2 Amendment No. 99 l

1 l

0 4

ATTACHMENT B

. . PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE LICENSE / TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS INSERT A TS Bases insert:

The Condenser Vacuum - Low Function isolates group 1 valves and is provided to prevent overpressur!r.ation of the main condenser in the event of a loss of the main condenser vacuum. Since the integrity of the condenser is an assumption in offsite dose calculations, the Condenser Vacuum - Low Function is assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating closure of the MSIVs. The closure of the MSIVs is initiated to prevent the addition of steam that would lead to add'tional condenser pressurization and possible rupture of the diaphragm installed to protect.

the turbine exhaust hood, thereby preventing a potential radiation leakage path following an accident.

As noted (footnote

to Tables 3.3.2-1 and 4.3.2.1-1), the channels are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, when all turbine stop valves (TSVs) are not full open, since the potential for condenser overpressurization is minimized. Switches are provided to manually ,

bypass the channels when all TSVs are not full open. TSV position l setpoints are controlled by TS 2.2.1 and surveillances ure performed per ;

TS 4.3.1. The TSV closure scram bypass below 30% power (TS Table 3.3.1-1, Note 1) does not affect the TSV position interlocks for the condenser vacuum - low bypass logic.

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-INSTRUMENTATION

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BASES' 3/4[3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATlQtLJHiIRWENTATION (Continued) power supply is lost and is restored by startup of the emergency diesel generators. In this event, a time of 13 seconds-is assumed before the va'lve starts to move. The safety analysis considers an allowable inventory loss-which in turn determines the . valve speed in conjunction ~with the-13 second delay.

For the sensors associated with MSIV isolation, instrumentation channels

.are not required to be response time tested. Response time testing for the-remaining channel components, including any analog trip units, is required.

- This allowance is supported by NED0-32291-A, " System Analyses for the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995. -

-314;3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The emergency core cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate actions.to mitigate the consequences of accidents that are beyond

. the ability of the operator to control. This specification provides the-OPERABILITY requirements, trip setpoints and response times that will ensure effectiveness of the systems to provide the. design protection. Although the instruments are listed by system, in some cases the same instrument may be used to send.the actuation signal to more than one system at the same time.

Per note i, the ECCS actuation instrument channels are not required to be response-time tested. The sverall ECCS response time requirement, which includes diesel generator injection valves, pumps, and other components, still applies. This allowance is: supported by NEDO-32291-A, " System Analyses for j the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing- Requirements," October 1995.

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L LA SALLE UNIT'2 83/4.Na Amendment No. 99

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l ATTACHMENT C

. . SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION j Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed) proposes to revise Appendix A, Technica; Specifications of Facility Operating Licenses NPF 11 and NPF-18, 1 1 LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes include changes ;

4 to the Technical Specifications (TS) to modify the bypass logic for Main Steam

, Line Isolation Valve Isolation Actuation Instrumentation on Condenser Low i

Vacuum as stated in Note

of TS Tables 3.3.21 and 4.3.2.11. The TS affected is TS 3/4.3.2, Isolation Actuation Instrumentation. The proposed changes are supported by testing performed by General Electric in the 1970s.

The TS Table notes state that Condenser Vacuum - Low is bypassed when all turbine stop valves are closed, rather than when all turbine stop valves are not full.open, which is more accurate. A change to these notes is proposed to correct this information.

Commonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed Technical Specification i~ Amendment and determined that it does not represent a significant hazarde consideration. Based on the criteria for defining a significant hazards consideration established in 10 CFR 50.92, operation of LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an i- accident previously evaluated because:

The reactor vessel steam dome pressure switches, which are proposed to i be removed from the Main Steam isolation Valve (MSIV) closure scram

bypass logic and the Condenser Vacuum - Low MSLIV isolation bypass

. logic cause the above trip functions to become active when the reactor

mode switch is not in the RUN position and reactor pressure is greater than 1043 psig. The setpoints of the reactor vessel steam dome pressure switches are the same as the reactor vessel steam dome pressure - high scram function. Also, any pressure transients as a result of MSIV closure

, when not in Operational Condition 1, Run mode, are minor due to low steam flow compared to the same event at rated power. Therefore, the reactor pressure switches being removed from the bypass logic of the MSIV closure scram has little or no affect on reactor startup, operation, shutdown, or analyzed accidents.

The condenser vacuum -low isolation function bypass is interlocked by the same pressure switches that bypass the MSIV closure scram when the C-1 i

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ATTACHMENT C

. . SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION q reactor modo switch is not in the RUN position, in addition to reactor pressure not high, the bypass of the condenser vacuum -low is bypassed only if the reactor mode switch is not in the RUN position, all Turbine Stop Valves (TSVs) are.not full open, and the keylock bypass switches are in BYPASS (one for each channel)._ With the reactor pressure interlock removed, the remaining interlocks assure that the condenser will not be overpressurized in Operational Conditions 2 and 3. The Reactor mode switch Interlock limits reactor thermal power to less than about 12% in i

Operational' Condition 2 (Control Rod withdrawal block on APRM High setpoint in Operational Conditions 2 and 5) and to much less than 1 %

power when all control rods are fully inserted in Operational Condition 3 after initial thermal power decay due to decay heat following reactor shutdown. The Turbine bypass valves can not be opened with condenser vacuum low (approximatei/ the same as the isolation setpoint, but different instrumentat!on). The Turbine Stop Valves remain closed with condenser vacuum low due to a turbine trip on low condenser vacuum.

Therefore, the remaining bypass interlocks assure that the isolation of the main steam lines will occur when needed to prevent overpressurization of j the main condenser when vacuum is low or gone.

The change to the position information in the TS Table notes for the TSV 7

bypass interlock corrects misinformation in the TS. The design has always used contacts from the auxiliary relays associated with the "not- ,

full-open" limit switches for the MSIV closure scram. Therefore, the !

setpoints are the same as the MSIV closure scram in TS 2.2.1. The !

setpoint in the notes

are made approximate to avoid conflict with the -l RPS setpoints, which are controlling. Also, this will allow surveillances for the RPS function for TSV closure scram will continue to be performed ,

per TS 4.3.1 at the frequencies specified in TS Table 4.3.1.1-1.

The_setpoint for the TSV interlock is not a critical parameter for the i

-isolation bypass interlock, since the normal position of the TSVs with low condenser vacuum is fully closed. Therefore, the use of an approximate value is sufficient, since th.: actual setpoints and surveillances are controlled by other specifications.

The reactor pressure switches being removed from the above bypass circuits are not used for the mitigation of any analyzed accidents or

1 transients and may actually decrease the probability of a scram or l

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ATTACHMENT C l SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION i isolation in Startup mode due to the potential for misoperation. Also, the i correction to the TSV position in the bypass notes is more consistent with !

the actual setpoints, which are controlled by the Limiting Safety System !

Setting, . for RPS trip function due to TSV closure.

The rewordirig of Note

In TS Table 4.3.2.11 to be more like Note

In TS Table 3.3.21 helps avoid confusion due to wording differences and is an administrative type change.

l Therefore, there is no significant increase in the proba'ollity or '

I consequen es of an accident previously evaluated.

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2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated bocause: l 1

1 The removal of the reactor pressure switches from the bypass logic for the MSIV closure scram function and the condenser vacuum . Iow MSLIV isolation function with a setpoint eqml to the reactor pressure scram setpoint is not a significant change and does not alter the reactor modes !

in which the trips are or can be bypassed. When not in RUN mode, ,

j energy levels are low compared to events that could occur at rated power !

levels. These pressure switches only slightly change the bypes logic and do not affect the scram and isolation circuitry such that e new or different kind of accident would occur.

The correction of the TSV position interlock for the bypass function fer the condenser vacuum -low MSLIV isolation is not a physical change to the plant, so no failure modes are affected or created.

The rewording of Note

In TS Table 4.3.2.11 to be more like Note

In TS Table 3.3.21 helps avoid confusion due to wording differences and is an administrative type change.

Therefore, the possibility of a new or different kind of accident is not created.

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e ATTACHMENT C

. . SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because:

The removal of the reactor pressure switches from the bypass logic of the MSIV closure scram function and the bypass logic from the condenser vacuum low MSLIV lsolation function does not reduce the rnargin of safety, because the setpoints were not established from analyses that have been performed. The setpoints were set at the value of the reactor scram on high reactor pressure as a convenient setpaint out of the way of normal plant operation, rather than initially removing the bypass Interlock.

Also, the hign reactor pressure scram is required to be operable in Operational Conditions 1,2, and 3, and has no Installed means of bypass, so the removal of the MSIV closure scram in Operational Conditions other than mode 1, Run mode becoming active due to high reactor pressure does not reduce the margin for reactor pressurization events.

The remaming bypass interlocks, associated with TSV position for the bypass of the condenser vaco'sm -low MSLIV isolation, assure that the main condenser will be prote ed from overpressurization events with low condenser vacuum. The TSVs are closed due to a main turbine trip with low condenser vacuum, so if the TSVs were to fall open, the MSLIV will occur in Operational Conditions 2 and 3 when required. The removal of the reautor pressure bypass Interlock and the correction to the TSV position will not be a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The rewording of Note

In TS Table 4.3.2.11 to be more like Note

in TS Table 3.3.21 helps avoid confusion due to wording differences and is an administrative type change.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Guidance has been provided in " Final Procedures and Standards on No Significant Hazards Conciderations," Final Rule,51 FR 7744, for the application of standards to license chenge requests for determination of the existence of significant hazards considerations. This document provides examples of amendments which are and are not considered likely to involve significant hazards considerations. Those proposed amendments most closely fit the C-4

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ATTACHMENT C

. SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION l

example of a change which either result in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident or may reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within the ,

acceptance criteria with respect to the system or component specified in the Standard Review Plan. i This proposed amendment does not involve a significant relaxation of the criteria used to establish safety limits, a significant relaxation of the bases for the limiting safety system settings or a synificant relaxation of the bases for the limiting conditions for operations. Therefore, based on the guidance provided in ti:e Federal Register and the criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c), the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration.

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e ATTACHMENT D

. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT STATEMENT APPLICABILITY REVIEW Commonwealth Edicon has evaluated the proposed amendment against the criteria for identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessment in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51.21. It has been determined that the proposed changes meet the criteria for categorical exclusion as provided for under 10 CFR Part 51.22(c)(9). This conclusion has been determined because the changes requested do not pose significant hazards considers.tlons or do not involve a significant increase in the amounts, and no significant changes in the types of any effluents that may be released off site. Additionally, this request does not involve a significant increase in Individual or cum'ulative occupational radiation exposure.

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ML20203G505

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