ML20199K548

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Proposed Ts,Adding Automatic Primary Containment Isolation on Ambient & Differential Temp High for Rwcs Pump,Pump Valve,Holdup Pipe & F/D Valve Rooms & Eliminating RHR Sys Steam Condensing Mode Isolation Actuation Instrumentation
ML20199K548
Person / Time
Site: LaSalle Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 11/24/1997
From:
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20199K523 List:
References
NUDOCS 9712010151
Download: ML20199K548 (25)


Text

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ATTACHMENT B PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE LICENSE / TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NPF - 11 3/4 3 -12 Insert A 3/4 3 - 13 3/4 3 -15 Insert B 3/4 3 - 16 3/4 3 - 17 3/4 3 -18 Insert C 3/4 3 -19 3/4 3 - 20 Insert D 3/4 3 - 21 3/4 3 - 22 B-1 D

TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued)

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATI0ll YALVE GROUPS MINIMun nPERA8tE APPLICA8tE OPERATED BY CHAfOlELS PER TRIP FUNCTION- OPERATIONAL SIGNAL - TRIP SYSTEM (b) C0191T1018 ACTiell l-

3. REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM IS"JLATJgg '
a. A Flow - High 5' 1' 1, 2, 3 22
b. Heat Exchanger Area Temperature - High 5 1/ heat 1, 2, 3 22 exchanger
c. Heat Exchanger Area Ventilation AT - High 5 1/ heat I, 2, 3 i 22

, exchanger

. SLCS Initiatler 5'" NA 1, 2, '3 22 ph e. Reactor Yessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 5 2 1, 2, 3 22

4.  ;

REACTOR CORE ISOLATI0ll COOLIIIG SYSTEM ISei.ATION

a. RCIC Steam Line Flow - High, A 1 '

1, 2, 3 - 22

b. RCIC Steam Supply Pressure - Low 8, 9'" 2 1, 2, 3 22
c. RCIC Turbine Exhaust ,
Diaphragm Pressure - High 8 2 1, 2, 3
  • 22
d. RCIC Equipment Room Temperature - High 8 1 1, 2, 3 22 ,
e. RCIC Steam Line Tunnel Temperature - High 8 1 1, 2, 3 22- -
f. RCIC Steas Line Tunnel i A Temperature - High 8 1 1, 2, 3 - 22 i
g. Drywell Fressure - High 9'" 2 1, 2, 3 - 22
h. RCIC Equipment Room A Temperature - High 8 1 1, 2, 3 22  :

LA SALLE - UNIT I 3/4 3-12

. Amendnent No. 102 i

ATTACHMENT B -

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE LICENSEITECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS I

INSERT A*

VALVE GROUPS MINnfURE OPER;.BLE APPUCABLE OPERATED BY CHANNELS PER OPERATIONAL TRIP FUNCTION ' SIGNAL TRIP SYSTEM (b) CONDmON ACTION

f. Pump and Valve Area Temperature - High 5 ilatea 1,2,3 22
g. Pump and Valve Area Ventilation AT - High 5 11 area 1,2,3 22
h. Holdup Pipe Area ,

Temperature - V'_;h 5 1 1,2,3 22 i '

l. Holdup Pipe Area Ventilation AT-High 5 1 1,2,3 22-J. Filter!Demineralizer Valve Room '

Area Temperature - High 5 1 1,2,3 22

k. Filter /Demineralizer Valve Room Area Ventilation AT - High 5 1 1,2,3 22 l I. Pump Suction Flow - High 5 1 1,2,3 22
  • Headings in Italics are provided for information only.

, i

')

B-2 '

JABLE-3.3.2-1 (Continued)

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION TRIP FUNCTION hhdh VALVE GROUPS ODEPATED Ef MINIMUM OPERABLE CHAseIELS PER APPLICABLE SIGMAL OPERATIONAL TRIP S MTEM (b)

5. _CONUITION_ ETIM I RHR SYSTEM STEAM CONDENSING MODE ISOLAT!0N
a. RHR Equipment Area A Terperature - High 8 1/olgt area 1, 2, 3 22
b. RHR Area Temperature -

High 8 1/1HL area 1, 2, 3 22 i

c. RHR Hea" . Exchanger Steam i

Supply Flow - High 8 1 1, 2, 3 22 6.

PHR SYSICM SHJTDOWN COOLING roue ISOLATION

a. Reactor Vessel Water level - low, tevel 3 6 2 1, 2, 3 25
b. Reactor Vessel (RHR Ctt-In Peralssive)

Pressure - High 6 t

1 1, 2, 3 25

c. RHR Pump Suction Flow - High 6 1 1, 2, 3 25

[d.

RHR Area Temperature -

High 6 i 1/RHR area 1, 2, 3 25 Q. _

RHR Equipment Area AT - High 6 1/IHL area 1, 2, 3

8. 25 MAhUAL INITIATION
1. Inboard Yalves
2. Outboard Yalves I,2,5,6,7 1/ group 1, 2, 3 i
3. Inboard Valves I4},,5,5 g 1/ group 1, 2, 3 26
4. 1/ group 26 Outboard Valves 4 "" *3 1, ?, 3 and **,f 26 1
5. Inboard Valves 1/ group -1, 2, 3 and * ,# 26
6. 3, 8, 9 1/ valve '

Outbcard Valves 3 ,8. 9 1, 2, 3 26

7. Outboard Valve 3 1/ valve 1, 2, 3 26 8 1/ group I, 2, 3 26 t i

LA SALLE - UNIT I 3/4 3-13 An*ndment No.120 i

IMLL l-Z 150LAT10N ACTU4T10N INST ET NTATIGN KIP 91 NIX 1Rlf FINK 110N AtteluteLE 1 RIP SEIPolNT _ VALMF '

A. M TestTIC INITIATION i

I.

PRIA4RY CMTAIEEENT ISOLATION

a. Ileacter Vessel Water Level
1) Low, Level 3
2) Low Low, tewel 2 1 12.5 laches* '2 11.8 leches
  • Low Low Low, Level 1 1 -50 inches
  • 1 -57 inches *
3) 2 -123 laches*
b. Drywell Pressere - High 2 -136 I d es*
c. s 1.69 psig s 1.09 psig Main Steam Line
1) DELETED
2) Pressere - Low 2 854 Psig 1 834 psig
3) Flow - High s lit psid
d. DELETED s 116 psid
e. Main Steam Line Tennel a fesperatore - High s 65*F f.

Coadenser Vecome - tow > 7 laches Ng vacuum 5 7t*F

> 5.5 inches Ng veceum 2.

I SECNEMY CONTAlleENT 150ULTICE s 1

a. Reacter tullding Vent Exhaest 1

Plenum Radiation - High s le ar/hr i b. Drywell Pressere - Nigh s 15 ar/br i

c. Reacter vessel Water s 1.69 psis s 1.09 psis Level - Low Low, Level 2
d. Feel Peel Vent Enheest 2 -50 inches
  • 2 -51 inches
  • j Radiatten - Nigh 5 le ar/hr s 15 mr/hr

! 3. REACTOR HATER CIF ~~

5Yiint 150tATIr11 i a. A Flow - High
b. 5 70 gym Heat End g c Area Temperature s 37.5 &

149 fygg

c. Heat changer Area Ventilatten

-t d.

,- ni,h s e5 r SLCS Initiation IIA s ,i ,

e. Reactor Vessel Water Level - NA Low Low, level 2 -

l 1 -50 larhes* 2 -57 inches

  • LA SALLE - l#fli 1 3/4 3-15 -'

I -t an. ..e 1

l

ATTACHRAENT B PROPOSED A!2NDRAENTS TO THE LICENSEITECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS INSERT B*

ALLOWABLE TR9P FUNCTION TRfP SETPONT VALtM

f. Pump and Valve Area Temperature - High s 201*F s 209 7
g. Purep and Valve Area Ventilotson AT-High s 86Y s 92.5T
h. Holdup Pipe Area Temperature - High s 201T s 209 7
1. Holdup Pip Area Ventilatio;; a T - High s 86 7 s 92.5T J. Filter /Deminerakzer Valve Room Area Tempeh - High s201T s 209 7
k. Filter /Deminerakzer Valve Room

. Aree Ventilshon AT- High s SST s 92.5 7

1. Pump Suctics Flow - High s 500 gpra s 550 gym
  • Headmgs in Italics are provided for information or.ly.

i

4 .

i '

i l ,

E g .

TAetE 3.3.2-2 (Continued) i k ISOLATION ACTunTION INSTR 18ENTATION SETP9INTS i 1

  • TRIP FWNCTION E

TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWROLE

! . p 4. vatgE .

i sa _REALTER CORE ISOLATICII COOLING SYSTEN ISOLATION '

s. KIC'Steen Line Flow - Nigh i i
b. KIC Steam Supply Pressure - Lew i 290E of rated flew, 178* N 8
c. > ST pois Z 1 - KIC TortIno Exhemst 8iaphreyn E53psis< 295E of rated flow 185* Ng Pressere - High
d. ACIC.Egulpment Acca i 18.9 psig l -

i 29.8 psig  ;

Temperature - High

e. 1 200*F

- KIC Steam Line Tunnel Temperature - High i 296*F f.

KIC Steam Line Tunnal 1 200*F  ;

A Temp ratwre - Hi i 296*F  ;

g 3 Drywell Pressere gh High i 117*F i

h. KIC Egelpment Nees i 1.69 psig i 123*F  !

y

., A Temperature - High i 1.99 psig

  • < 120*F
5. __ < 125*F  !

M SYSTEM STEAN CSIBEltSII5 te10E ISOLATION ,

t

a. M Egoipment Aree l ,

A Temperature - Nigh 1 50*F

b. M Aree Cooler Temperature - i 56*F Nigh i 200*F .
c. M Nest Emchanger stese i 296*F Supply Flow - Nigh - . i i 123' N29 -

i 128* N2 '

f f i6 i I ,

N 4 e,- , . - . - - ..-. _ . _ _ ~ _ . -. . _ _ - _r__s---- _.

~

h TABLE 3.3.2-2 (Continued)

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRINEIITATION SETPOINTS '

. m -

g e 1

TRIP FUNCTION ALLIRNGLE TRIP SETPOINT i K VALUE I w 5.

! t -4 34 SYSTEM $NIITootst C00LINE MDOE ISOLATION I "

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -  :

Low, Level 3 1 12.5 inches

  • 1 11.9 Inches *

~

l b. Reacter Vessel (IWIR Cut-in Permissive) t Pressare - HIsh 1 135 psig** ,

i 145 psfg**

l g

. c. IIMIt Pump Sectlen Flow - Migh 1 100* N '

2 I I" 4

g d. "Z' i

a IIHR Area Cooler Teerature -

HIgh @

1 200*F i 20E*F f l  !

(s. IIHit Epfpeent Area AT - Nigh i 50*F i 56*F S. 194EUAL INITIATION l

Met App 11 cable lest Appilcable

1. Ideerd Valves 2.
Outbeerd Valves
3. I eoord Valves .
4. Outbeerd Velves
5. Inboerd Valves -

, . 5. Outbeerd Valves i

7. Detbeerd Velve

?

  • $ee Beses Ffgere B 3/4 3-1. .

E ** Corrected for cold wter head wlth reacter vessel fleeded.

s l

E 4.

i I

1

TABLf 1.1.f-3 ,

150LATIM 1YSTEM Ilt1TRigtENTATitur RESPfMtil TIPI IggJggJg RESPONSF TIMf ISecondsW t

A. AllTM4 TIC.1MITIAT10N

1. PRIMARY ColffAlletfMT 110LATitui
a. Reacter Vessel Water Level 1 Low, Level 3 N/A

!)) Low Law, Level 2 N/A 33 Low Low Low, Level 1 g 1.P. N  ;

b. Drywell Pressure - High N/A
c. Main Steam Line i Il DELETED I

th Pressure - Low $ t.P. N '

3h Flow - High i 0.5*, N

d. DELETED
e. Condenser Vacuum - Low N/A
f. Main Steam Line Tunnel ATemperature - High N/A
2. SECONDARY CONTAlletENT ISQLATION N/A
a. Reacter Building Vent Exhaust Plenum Radiation - High
b. Drywell Pressure - Hieh
c. Reacter Vessel Water level - Low, Level 2
d. Fuel Peel Vent Exhaust Radiation -'High REACTOR WATER ctEANUP SYSTEM ISOLATf0N N/A
a. AFlow - High
b. Heat Exchanger Area Temperature - High I
c. Heat Exchanger Area Ventilation AT-High b d. SLCS Initiation e .. Reacter Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 '
4. REACTOR ener 1ta ATION CfDLINC SYSTEM 150LATf 0N N/A l
a. RCIC Steam Line Flow - High
b. RCIC Steam Supply Pressure - Low  !
c. RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure - High
d. RCIC Equipment Rons Temperature - High
e. RCIC Steam Line Tunnel Temperature - High
f. RCIC Steam Line Tunnel ATemperature - High
g. Drywell Pressure - High
h. RCIC Equipment Room ATemperature - High
5. RHR SYSTEM STEAff CONDENSING MODE 110LATf0N N/A l
a. RHR Equipment Area ATemperature - High I b. RNR Aret Cooler Tetwerature - High
c. RHR Heat Exchanger Steam Supply Flow - HIph LA SAL -

1 3/4 3-18 Amendment No. 115

.i.--., - .,-..r..., .,m .% .

E 4

i ATTACHWiENT B

. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE LICENSEITECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS i-d INSERT C -

4 l f. Pump and Vahre Area j- Temperature - High j  ;

g. Pump and Valve Area
Ventilation AT-High 4
h. Holdup Pipe Area f
Temperatum - High  !

i i

1. Holdup Pipe Area  !

i, Ventilation AT- High J. FHterfDeminerakzer Valve Room j

' Area Temperature - High i

} k. FilterfDemineralizer Valve Room l Area Ventilatien AT - High i i 4

I. Pump Suction Flow - High ,

F i

l I

)

4 6

TABLE 1.3.f-1 (Continued) '

fefW Affam sysTEN fiffTaLeariffAffoN Aresneer TINF Trip MadCT10N RESMMir TIttf flacondsi'

6. RIE SYSTEM SillTDoldM COOLfliG BEME 130LATIM N/A
a. Reacter Vessel Water Level - Lew. Level 3
b. Reacter Vessel (RNR Cut-In Permissive
t. Ret --- Suc';1on Flow -) NishPressure - His -

~

ff.~ RS Area Cao' er Temperature - High_

(s. RNR Equipment Area AT - High S. NAIREL IM171AT10p N/A

1. Inboard Valves
2. Outboard Valves
3. Inboard Valves *
4. Outboard Valves
5. Inboard Valves
6. Outboard Valves
7. Outboard Valve 4

TABLE.NOTATIMS

! solation system instrumentation response time for MSIVs only. No diesel generator delays assumed.

  1. 1 Isolation system instrumentation response time specified for the Trip Function actuating the M5!Vs shall be added to M5!V isolation time to obtain ISOLATION 5YSTEM RESPONSE TINC for each valve.

5ensor is eliminated from response time testing for the MSIV actuation logic circuits. Response time testing and conformance to the administrative relay logic are required. limits for the remaining channel including trip unit and 4

N/A Not Applicable. '

. LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 3-19 Amendment No. Ils j

e.-- - . --m. yy .r .- .-...---_,,-m.-,, ,.--.v.,e+.--,-_,-,--,.....----+-w.-- - - - . - , ~ ~ , - . . . - - - , - - -_

"V G 3.2.1-1

]S0 TAT 10ll ACIMil0N INSTMNIENTATION SINtVElltium.E REmili; Dam 15 CHMNIEL CHANNEL IUNCil0IIAL OPEMileML TRIP FUIICTICII CHMNIEL CCEDITIONS FM IWilCII CHECK ILIT CAllBAllM A. 3mTElll M E E WlE B Mist 4 TIC INITIATIGIt 1.

PRIMARY CGITAlleENT ISOLATICII

a. Reacter Vessel Water Level
1) Low, Level 3 5
2) Low Low, Level 2 ~ 4 R I, 2, 3 IIA q
3) Lew Low tow, tevel I 5 R 1, 2, 3
b. g R Drywell Pressure - High IIA q I, 2, 3
c. Main Steam Line q I, 2, 3
1) CELETED
2) Pressere - Low IIA i
3) Flow - Nigh 4 4 I 1

IIA

d. DELETED 4 R 1, 2, 3

.e. Condenser Vaceae - Low IIA 4 f.

Main Steam Line Tur:nel 4 1, 2*, 3* t

& Temperature - High NA q 2.

R 1, 2, 3 SEColWARY C M IAlleENT ISOLATION

a. Reacter Building Vent Exhaust

~

Plenum Radiat i en - Nigh 5

b. Drywell Pressere - High 4 R 1, 2, 3 and **

IIA q

c. Reacter Vessel Water q 1, 2, 3 Level - Low Low, Level 2 IIA
d. Feel Peel Vent Exhaust 4 R 1, 2, 3 and
  • Radiation - Nigh 5 4 i 3.

R 1, 2, 3 and **

REACTM MTER [1F^~T SYSTEII IsotATlet i

a. A Flow - Nigh  !
b. 5 4 Heat Exchanger Ares R 1, 2, 3 Temperatore - Nigh NA y c. Ileat Exchanger Area 4 4 1, 2, 3

\/ Ventilation AT - Nigh NA

d. SLCS Initiation IIA 4 ,4 1, 2, 3
e. R Reactor Vessel Water IIA I, 2, 3 Level - Low Low, tevel 2 i.

HA q R I, 2, 3 i

! LA SALLE - IINIT 1 I 3/4 3-29 S c i ..t k nic

I i

i-ATTACHMENT B PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE LICENSEITECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS t 3

. INSF'T D*

CHANNE2. OPERAT9ONAL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDfiiONS FOR wH9CH ,

TRFP FUNCTION CHECK TEST CALJ8 RAT 10N SURVEJLLANCE REQUIRED 1

f. Pump and Valve Area .

T__.g. _ ^_ __ e - High NA Q Q 1,2,3

g. Pump and Valve Ares  ;

Ventilation AT-High NA Q Q 1,2,3 i

  • I
h. Holdup Pipe Aree T_..e. ^m - High NA Q Q 1,2,3 L Holdup Pipe Area Ventstation AT-High NA Q Q 1,2,3 l J. FilterfDermnerahzer Valve Room

. Area Temperature - High NA Q Q 1,2,3 i k. FilterfDemineralizer Valve Room Area Ventilshon AT- High NA Q Q 1,2,3 ,

l t

I. Pump Suction Flow - High S Q R 1,2,3 t

  • Headings in N are provided for ireformation ony.

P I

B-5 l t

r 4

. . .# -., , . . . _ ._.m .c. ,m -

s r.,,m ,. ,..,_s . m. , + - . ,.-. ..v., , .-m,- .-- .

IAstm 4.1.2.1-I IContinuedi ISOLATION ACTUATION Ivn--- ==71M SURTEIM. REnEIRm i CHANNEL OPRRATICE CMP.MNEL FUNCTIONAL N TRIF FUNCTION CONDITIONS FOR tetICH

_.CHECE _ TEST CALIBRATIM SERYEI N BanN1BER i 4.

REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEN Iw2TIOtt

a. RCIC Steen Line Flow - High MA
b. Q Q 1. 2. 3 RCIC Steam Supply Pressure -

Low NA Q Q 1. 2. 3

c. RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphrage Pressure - MIgh 10 4
d. RCIC Equipment Roce Q Q 1. 2. 3 Temperature - High NA Q i
e. RCIC Steme Line Tunnel Q I2 3 '

Temperature - High NA Q

f. RCIC Steas Line Tunnel Q I. 2. 3

& Temperature - High NA Q

g. Q I. 2. 3 Drywell Pressure - High MA Q
h. DCIC Equipment Rece Q 1. 2. 3

& Temperature - High MA Q Q I. 2. 3

$. RNE SYSTEM STEAN CungdJusING MOOK ISOIJLTION

a. DMR 74ulpeent Aree A Temperature - High MA Q Q I. 2 3 g
b. RHR Area Cooler Temserature -

High NA Q 1

c. RHR Heat Exchanger Steam Q I. 2 3 l

' Supply Flow - High NA Q Q '

I, 2, 3 i

t

- I i

i i

l LA SALLE - UNIT.I 3/4 3-2I Amendment No. 104 i

TARLE 4.3.2.1-1 (continuedi  !

IIDLATIDif_ACTUATIQtLIESTRUserarTATIOGf EURVEI'f "E amaaetz- .,

LN OPERATICIIAL CHANNEL M CTIONAI, CM48ENEL TRIP FUNCTIDff CllECK COIIDITIcess FOtt wit!CW TEST CALI m TIgg ggBVEI M REDEIRER 6.

RMR SYSTDI SHUTDOWIf COO. LING MODE ISOLATIOff i

s. Reactor vessel water Level -

Low, Level 3 s b.

Q R 1,2,3 Reactor Vessel (RNR Cut-in Permissivel Pressure - High MA Q

c. RAIR rump suction Flow - High Q 1,2,3 MA Q
d. WHIT Area Temperature - Hisph Q 1,2,3 an Q Q 4, 4,
e. RHft Equlpeent Area AT - High NA Q Q 1, 2, 3 J

B. MANUAL INITIATIOff

1. Inbcard valves MA R
2. MA 1, 2, 3 Outboard valves NA R
3. 3e4 1, 2, 3 Inboard valvss MA R
4. MA 1, 2, 3 and **,8 Outboard valves MA R
5. Inboard valves IIA 1, 2, 3 and **,5 MA R
6. Outboard valves DEA 1, 2, 3 M4 R IIIL i
7. Outboard valve 1, 2, 1 NA R MA 1, 2, 3
    • tehen reactor steen pressure > 1943 peig and/or any turbine stop valve le opea.

tehen a handling potential forirradiated drainingfuel theinreactor the secondary vessel.containment and during COltE ALTERATI000s and operations with I S

During CottE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

l 1A SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 3-22 Amendment No. 104

l 4 ATTACHMENT C SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed) proposes to revise Appendix A, Technical Specifications of Facility Operating License NPF 11, LaSalle County Station Unit 1. The proposed changes include changes to tho Technical Specifications (TS) which:

4

Pump, Pump Valve, Holdup Pipe, and Filter /Demineralizer (FID) Valve Rooms;

! - High;

  • revise the ambient and differential temperature isolation setpoints in the RWCU Heat Exchanger Rooms;
  • eliminate the ambient and differential temperature alarm and Isolation functions for the RHR Syster., shutdown cooling mode.

j Currently the RWCU pump rooms have no temperature monitoring because they contain " cold" piping. A design modification that restores " hot" suction to the RWCU pumps detormined that the RWCU pump rooms and associated new pump valve room require leak detection isolation instrumentation. The setpoints for the heat exchanger rooms are being changed as a result of new design basis calculations. The new ambient and differential temperature leak detection for the RWCU holdup pipe area and the FID valve room and the RWCU pump suction high flow switch are balng added to minimize the impact of line breaks in these areas The steam condensing mode of RHR system is no longer util!.ted. Area temperature monitoring of the RHR shutdown cooling mode lines Is being deleted because the system mode has been recognized as a moderate energy line and because area temperaturo monitoring is not effective since the energy in these lines is not sufficient to increase the area temperatures to detectable levels. These lines are in service in Cold Shutdown or .at low reactor i

pressures in Hot Shutdown.

C1

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ATTACHMENT C SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERAYlON Comed has evaluated the proposed Technical Specification Amendment and determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration.

Based on the criteria for defining a significant hazards consideration  ;

established in 10 CFR 50.92, operation of LaSalle County Station Unit 1 in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

1) Invo've a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because:

a) There is no effect on accident initiators so therc is no change in probability of an accident. A line break in the subject areas, would consist of an instantaneous circuinferential break downstream of the outermost isolation valve of one of these systems. The leak detection isolation is only a precursor of a break, and thus does not affect the probability of a break.

l b) There is no or minimal effect on the consequances of analyzed accidents, due to changing the leak detection ambient T or AT ,

i setpoint and allowable values to detect 25 gpm equivalent leakage.

The addition cf more ambient T and AT leak detection monitoring, along with the addition of the hlCb flow break detection will actually decrease the consequences of the usociated accidents. The worst case accident outside the primary containment boundary is a main steam line break which bounds the dose consequences of all lino breaks and therefore bounds any size of leak.

The deletion of the RHR steam condensing mode isolation actuation instrumentation trip functions from the LaSaile TS does not increase the probabil!ty or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, because this mode of operation of the RHR system has been deleted from the LaSalle design basis and the lines that were previously high onergy line are Isolated during unit operation, including Operational Condition 1 (Run mode), Operational Condition 2 (Startup mode), and Operational Condition (Hot Shutdown)

The deletion of the RHR shutdown cool!ng mode leak detection T and AT ,

isolation actuation instrumentation trip functions from the LaSalle TS does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, because the leak detection is only a precursor of a T

C2 1

_ _ _ _. _ . . _ . . . _ , _ - , _ . - . . _ . . , - _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ . . . . . _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ . . _ . _ , _ . . , _ _ . . _

ATTACHMENT C SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION  !

l

)

break, and thus does not affect the probability of a break. Also, there are two remaining different methods of detecting abnormalleakage and

! isolating the system in technical specification trip functions A.6.a. Reactor i Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 and A.6.c, RHR Pump Suction Flow -  !

High. In addition, other means to detect leakage from the RHR system, l such as sump monitoring and area radiation monitoring, are also l available. In accordance with TS Administrative Requirement 6.2.F.1, LaSalle has a leakage reduction program to reduce leakage from those portions of systems outside primary containment that contain radioactive fluids. RHR, including piping and components associated with the shutdown cooling mode, is part of this program, which includes periodic visual inspection for system for leakage. The sump monitoring, radiation monitoring and periodic inspections for system leakage makes the probability of a leak of 5 gpm going undetected for more than a day very low.

Also, due to the low reactor pressures (less than 135 psig) at which RHR shutdown cooling mode is able to operate, reactor coolant makeup and outflow la very low compared to normal plant operation. A change in flow balance due to a leak la thus more readily detectable with reactor coolant water level changes and makeup flow rate, and thus precludes a j significant leak going undetected before break detection instrumentation would cause automatic isolation.

Therefore, there is not a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because:

The purpose of the leak detection system, as it applies to the RWCU and RHR system areas, is to provide the capability for leak detection and automatic isolation as necessary of the system in the event of leakage in these areas. This change maintains this capability with at least two different methods of detection of abnormal leakage for protection from the flooding concerns of a significant leak or line break when the RHR system is operating in the shutdown cooling mode, so that redundant systems will not be affected.

C-3

_ _ - _ - ,_ _ _ _. _ . _ . _ _ , . - ~ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _. ._ _ _ , .__ _ . _ _ , _ . _ _ _ _

ATTACHMENT C SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION This change also maintains or adds primary containment isolation logic for the leak detection isolation based on temperature monitoring in RWCU areas and break detection based on RWCU pump suction flow high. The additional instrumentation and the associated Isolation logic is the same or similar to existing Instrumentation and logic for containment isolation .

actuation instrumentation, so no new failure modes are created in this I way. l I

Therefore, there the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated is not created.

3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because:

The change to the automatic isolation setpoint for high AT leak detection in the heat exchanger rooms is based on current configuration calculatedl analyzed response to a small leak compared to a circumferential break.

The increased leakage rate in the RWCU heat exchanger rooms that is necessary to actuate isolation on high temperature during winter conditions, does not adversely affect the marg!n of safety. This increased leakage rate is below the critical crack leakage r.ite as represented in UFSAR Figure 5.211. Additionally, differential temperature leak detection is conservative under these same conditions, and will actuate isolation at t a leakage rate less than the established limit. The leak detection isolation

! logic is unchanged and thus remains single failure proof.

The addition of automatic primary containment isolation on Ambient and Differential Temperature ( AT) High for the Reactor Water Cleanup System j (RWCU) Pump, Pump Valve, Holdup Pipe, and Filter /Demineralizer (FID)

Valve Rooms and the addition of the RWCU Pump Suction Flow High line break isolation add to the margin of safety with respect to leak detection and line breaks in the RWCU system, because the system isolation diversity is increased and the amount of system piping monitored for leakage is increased.

The setpoints for the ambient temperature and differential temperature leak detection isolations being changed or added and the RWCU pump I

suction flow high are set sufficiently high enough so as not to increase i the possibility of spurious actuation. In the event that a spurious j actuation does occur, little safety significance is presented since the l

C-4 u _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ .._ _ . _ _ .. _ _ _ _ . _ .. _ _ _ _ _- _ _ _ _ _ ___

i L

ATTACHMENT C  !

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION RWCU system performs no safety function. The setpoints and allowable l values for the proposed changes also assure sufficient margin to the analytical values and high enough to prevent spurious actuations based '

on calc'alations consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.105.

The deletion of the RHR steam condensing mode isolation actuation instiumentation does not effect the margin of safety, because this mode is no longer utilized by LaSalle in Operational Conditions 1,2, or 3 (Run mode, Startup mode, or Hot Shutdown). ,

The elimination of the temperature based trip functions for the RHR 4

shutdown cooling mode area is based on the determination that i temperature is not the appropriate parameter as it does not provide mesningful indication and will not provide setpoints that would be sufficiently above the normal range of ambient conditions to avoid spurious isolations.

There are two remaining different methods of detecting abnormal leakage and isolating the system in technical specification trip function A.6, namely A.6.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level Low, Level 3 and A.6.c, RHR Pump Suction Flow - High. In addition, other means to detect leakage from the RHR system, such as sump monitoring and area radiation  ;

monitoring, are also available. Also, in accordance with TS Administrative Requirement 6.2.F.1, LaSalle has a leakage reduction program to .edisce leakage from those portions of systems outside primary containment that contain radioactive fluids. RHR, including piping and components associated with the shutdown cooling mode,is part of this program, which includes periodic visual inspection for system for leakage.

Tim previous evaluation of diversity of isolation parameters, as presented Iri Table 5.2 8 of the UFSAR remains unchanged. Adequate diversity of isolation parameters is maintained because there are at least two different methods available to detect and allow isolation of the system for a line break, as necessary.

Therefore, this requested Technical Specification amendment does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

C5

ATTACHMENT C SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

\

Guidance has been provided in " Final Procehres and Standards on  !

Significant Hazards Considerations" Final Rule,51 FR 7744, for the application of standards to license change requests for determination of the existence of

. significant hazards considerations. This document provides examples of ,

t amendments which are and are not considered likely to involve significant hazards considerations. These proposed amendments most closely fit the example of a change which may either esult in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previous analyzw accident or may reduce In some way a

safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within the
acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component specified in the  ;

applicable Standard Review Plan.

This proposed amendment does not involve a significant relaxation of the criteria used to establish safety limits, a s!gnificant relaxation of the bases for '

the limiting safety system settings or a significant relaxation of the bases for the

- limiting conditions for operations. Therefore, based on the guidance provided in the Federal Register and the criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c), the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration.

I i

C-G

ATTACHMENT D ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT STATEMENT APPLICABILITY REVIEW Comed has evaluated the proposed amendment against the criteria for identification of licer, sing and regulatory action requiring environmental assessment In accordance with 10 CFR 51.21. It has been determined that nie pl .' posed changes meet the criteria for a categorical exclusion as provided under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). This conclusion has been determined because the changes requested do not pose significant hazarde considerations or do not involve a significant increase In the amounts, and no significant changes in the typen, of any effluents that may be released off site. Additionally, this request does not involve a significant increase in Individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

4 D1

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ATTACHMENT E

SUMMARY

OF SARGENT AND LUNDY (S&L) CALGULATIONS FOR REVISED HEAT LOADS FOR THE RWCU AREAS AFFECTED BY THE MODIFICATION THAT CHANGES THE RWCU SYSTEM FROM A COLD SUCTION TO A HOT SUCTION J

E1

l l

l (Note that the "Menanine Area" as referred to in th* attached calculations is the

, same as the holdup pipe area for RWCU)

Summary of Sargent and Lundy (S&L) calculations for revised heat loads for the l RWCU areas affected by the modification that changes the RWCU system from a  ;

cold suction to a hot suction.

Cooling Load Requirements and Supply Air Flowrates for the RWCU Pump Valve i Room and the North and South Pump Rooms; Cooling Load Requirements and Supply Air Flowrates for the RWCU Menanine Room; and Cooling Load Wequirements for the RWCU Heat Exchanger and Valve Rooms Summary. l it should be noted that the RWCU Filter /Demineralizer Valve Room was not affected by the change to hot suction for RWCU pumps, so original calculations for heat balance are not t*fected and were performed similar to the discussion below.  ?

Sargent & Lundy (S&L) Calculations L 001325 (Rev. O,9/19197), L-001332 (Rev. O, 10/02/97), and L-001374 (Rev. O,11/5/97) calculate revised heat loads for the areas affected by the modification that changes the RWCU system from a cold ,

suction to a hot suction. A'r flowrates necessary to maintain the room design temperature are calculated cased on the new heat loads. These heat loads and air flowrates are used as input to the RWCU area ambient temperature and differential temperature (T and AT) leak detection calculation.

For piping heat loads, values for the heat loss per foot of pipe length are obtained through the use of program ilEATLS Version 1.0 (S&L Program No.

0.7.290 1.0). The input data for the program includes the pipe outer diameter, insulation thickness, ambient room temperature, pipe emissivity and the temperature of the fluid inside the pipe.

Then, the heat gain due to the heat loss from the piping, loads equipment (such as the pump motor for the pump rooms and heat exchanger for heat exchanger rooms) and lighting are calculated.

Finally, based on the heat load and room design temperature, the required supply air flowrate to the three rooms is calculated.

E2 i

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Summary of Results: .

l l

Trip Function Trip Function (Stulhr) ('F) (CFM) areas or rooms subareas or rooms Head Design Airflo i Locks Temperatur w e

f RWCU Holdup l Pipe (Mezzanine) 17,602 122 889 RWCU Pump and Pump V'alve Room '~lY,928 122 905 Pump Valve Room North Pump Room 33,840 122 1709 South Pump Room 33,840 122 1709 RWCU Heat South Hx 34,142 122 1724 Exchanger Room North Hx 37,953 122 1917 South Valve 13,119 122 663 North Valve 13,189 122 666 E-3 j