ML20203D887

Submits Written Response Detailing Disagreements &/Or Agreements with Staff in NRC Proposed Denial of Ohern Operating License

ML20203D887
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	02/11/1999
From:	Ohern S AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	Bloch P, Cole R Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#199-19988 99-753-01-SP, 99-753-1-SP, SP, NUDOCS 9902170017
Download: ML20203D887 (10)

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Peter B. Bloch, Presiding Officer Dr. Richard F. CoreFRi..., e a

Administrative Judge :

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.yJ AdministrativeJud debinglioardPanE Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Atomic Safety U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington,D.C. 20555 i

In the Matter of f

l Shaun P. O'Hern.

(Denial of Reactor Operator License)

ASLBP No. 99-753-01-SP Docket No. 55-32442-SP

Dear Administrative Judges:

Pursuant to the Presiding Officer's Order ofJanuary 28,1999 (Order) and 10CFR 2.1233, I am submitting the attached written response detailing the disagreemcns and/or agreements with the Staffin the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's proposed denial ofmy O.

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AWavit of Shaun P. O'Hern Shaun P. O'Hern, being duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:

I, SHAUN P. O'HERN, candidate for a Reactor Operator License for the Fermi-2 facility, i

hereby affirm under oath that the statements in the attached response are true and correct i

to the best ofmy knowledge and belief.

Shadn P. O'H(n i

i Subscribed and sworn to before me the 11 Feb

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l Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Attention: Rulemakings ael Adjudications Staff (plus two copies)

Office ofCorJnission Appellate Adjudication U.S. Nuclear Regulttory Conusssion Washington D.C.20555 Susan L. Uttal, Esq.

Office of tho General Counsel Mail Stop 15 B18 -

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 O

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RO QUESTION 7 On page 21, paragraph 34 ofMr. Peterson's Affidsvit it states "In his Presentation, Mr. O'Hern argues that placing the Rea: tor Mode switch in the SHUTDOWN position is, in effect, not neo:

'sy." My prameneahan did not state or infer that placing the Reactor Mode switch in SHUTDOWN was not mane==ary. In fact, as you will note from my written presentation for this hearing, I have Wacally stated that "the second part of answer (d), verify Nue group scram lights are OFF was incorrect." Also in my original informal appeal package (HF ltem 5) I stated that ifI was. wigned as the P603 Operator that given the conditions stated in the question the Mode Switch would be.eced in shajown. My position is that the second part of the answer, verify Nue group scram lights are Off, is incorrect. With any portion of the answer incorrect, the entine answer nest be raamulared incorrect There are several comments regarding multiple sensor, sensor relay, and contact failures in the NRC Staffs sesponse; twasi, the question stem does not address that any of these types cf failures have occurred.

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In paragraph 27, page 13 of the Staffs response there is a discussion of an ATWS caused by a hydraulic lock. However, the discussion does not mention that if the ATWS was caused by a hydraulic lock that the same conditions given in the stem of the question would occur and that the RPS circuitry would function as designed. If RPS fimetions as designed then, even though the control rods fail to pioperly insert, the Nue group scram lights would be offprior to repositioning the Reactor Mode switch. 'Iliis is further evidence that the second past of answer (d) is incorrect, i

la paragraph 29 on page 17 of the Staffs response they address other inethods for verifying the Reactor Mode switch has responded properly when placed in SHUTDOWN. These insiemnons were also addressed in niy Initial Informal Appeal (HF leem 5). However, these methods were not listed as an msilshle answer for this question. The quesuon clearly stated "wiuch inchcation MUST be observed to verify proper response " Answer (d) only included the Nue group scram lights and not any of the other lO e

svailable msthods.

O In paragraph 31 on page 18 the Staff states that manual operation of SRV's is required only if any SRV is cycling. This statement is incorrect. In my written permentarkA I clearly highlighted the "NO" leg of the daciamn block for SRV's cychag which immediately puts me at the Sedulive RPV press < 1093 PSIG that i

allows the une of Mn Turb B/P valves or Systems from Table 4. If the Mn Tub B/P valves were availahle they are only capable ofpassing 25% Reactor Power, the quentum stated the reactor was at 48% power so 1

a system from Table 4 would need to be ured to stamine piessure. Table 4 lists the SRV's as an avmishie system to use to stabilize pressure Therefore I am allowed to use them at this time. The aratament clearly says to Stabilize Press < 1093 PSIG, it does not say that I have to wait for pressure to reach 1093 PSIG prior to taking any actum. The need to control pressme at this time is further endenced trj the statement that the SJ has included in paragraph 30, page 18 of their nesponse. It states that " current values and trends of parameters and the status of plant systems and equipment dictate the relative unportance of i

individual RPV Control steps and the reistive priority with which they should be===nphahed". It is O

4 clear that the trend given in the quesuon for Reactor pressme (increasing slowly) would regare action to be taken to stabilize the Reactor.

RO QUESTION 54 Paragraph 43 on page 28 of the Staft's response states that I arbitrarily selected i saman Objecdve 0104 (Hearing File Item 38, page 5). This objective was not selected arbitrarily but selected har===e the lesson Otyctive clearly ambcates that the EOP graphs would be used to deternune appropnated operator masons based on the given parameters This is why I felt I was being tested to a higher standard than seqsaved for Reacto: Operators because the graphs were not prmidad dunng the ev=== nation.

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i NUREG 1021 Appen&x B (Hearing File Item 19) on page 5 of 26 clearly states that a level 3 question involves the amiti-part memal process of assembhng, sorting, or integrating the parts (informahon bits and their i = " ';--) to pre &ct an event or outcome, solve a problem, or create sammhing new. 'Ihis is d

why I feel that the tnpping of the Recuc Pumps being listed in the stem of the question was important. In order to identify which action needed to be performed I had to use all the informnina pnmded and i

deternune why they occurred in order to detenmne which steps of the EOP flow chants were apphcable I do not feel that seinething as important as the Recuc Pumps would be listed in the question without a l

reason for why they tnpped. I do not believe it was placed in the <penw= to drive me farther down the Pbwer14g of the EOP's.

'though I agree with the Staffs defimtion of the term " Confirm" in footnote 7 of their response I &sagree with the fact that the lack ofinformation as to the position of the ATWS/ARI valves in the question make the answer I scioceed inconect. The definition says to use avaitshie saacanana and, as appropnate, phyncal observauon to marshhah that the WW acuan has occuned. 'Ibe only in& cation that was O

made avmme to me was.c fact.at.e Rec,re e.m,s i.d tr,,,od iiso.e EoP riow ci.rt states io confirm ARI not to initiate ARL I agree that the tenn " confirm" does imply that I am to initiate the accon ifit has not occurred after I have check the indications, so in reahty if answer (b) is to be onaaviated correct it should have used the word confirm instead ofinitiate. As far as using the inac=tiaan available in the quesnon to deternune if ARI had already initiated there was also the need to use acquired knowledge to desernune the plants status to pre &ct the events outcome or solve the prnhiem Throughout the tranungweah and observed on simulator senarios that if a 100% load reject occaned, combined with an A'IWS, that the pressure tsnamient would cause SRV's to liR. The lowest SRV liRs at 1135 PSIG and ATWS/ARI activates at 1133 PSIO. I feel that with the knowledge of hcw the plant will respond and the infor==naa provided in the queshon.at there was =hiew ia&caruwt for me tojusefy that ARI had in fact "rtisted and that the next oprator action would be to insect Stamby Liquid Connol(SLc).

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O RO QUESTION 59 On page 30 in paragraph 48 the Staff pnmdes a quote from trCFR55.41(a) and lesson objective 01-10 1

(Hearing File item 41, page 7) to prove that queshon 59 was an allowable question to be asked to a Reactor Operator. However, the Staff does not discuss how the Fermi training organnanon trains the licensing class to meet this objective or how the objective would meet the 10CFR55.41(a).

We were trained to recognize that a piece of equipment or an instnanent was Tech Spec relat.J and then, using the Fermi Techmcal Saa-ine=*== to deterunne the appropnate LCO. We were not expected to maa=tze each piece of eqmpment and each instrument and determme entry into an Acuon Statement.

In fat.t the use of references such as procedures sind Techmcal ha inen* ion, etc., for deternuning proper operabons and regulatory reqmrements is required by Reactor Operators.

On page 31, which is a continuation of paragraph 48 the Staff prmides a quote from ODI-007 (Staff Exhibit 8) which pnmdes a description of an NSO's r==panmhilitian There is no reference to Technical h i% in this reference pertaining to the NSO. However,in the esenaman of the NSS and NASS in Section 2 of 0D1007 it states, "these two Senior Reactor Operators are responable for tiu safe operanon of the reac2r and for the implementauon ofg t. and instrucuons to ensure compliance

. with all operating and s,.;i.;e.y limits." R;.g :.; cay limits are found in the CFR's and Techmcal h ine**iaan I do not wish to make it sound like I have to responsibility for safe reactor operanon ami comphance with sequuements, because I do. My responsibility for safe operauon of the reactor is captured in theanc= aman of the NSO's responsabili*ies where it stases that an "(NSO's) need to <====mnie with i

(nonnally) the Nuclear Ammaamar ShiA Supervisor and recerve direcuan (normally) from the Nuclear Assusant Shin Supervisor."

l On page 33, paragraph 50 the Staff makes a masemaer that the quashon does not require detailed unemormaban of Tar *=nl W I feel this enemment is incorrect. There are numerous 1

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instrmnents luted in the Techmcal Sa~ 'A=a==

With the information prended the only way to get the correct answer, according to the erammatian answer key would require snemonzation unless a reference was prended. In this paragraph there is a reference to the amount ofknowledge I possess. 'Ihis mainnent j

is incorrect, unfair and totally nac=11*d for. The requisite knowledge was demaamrated by the fact that I i.

chose answer (a) because of the fact I was in Cr. r-=: Condition 2(Startupmt Stan6y). This included any temperature and pressure (as stated by the Staff on page 32, paragraph 48) and that I had the.

opermiaani system and procedural knowledge to know that the ADS System was not regered to be operationalbelow 150 PSIG.

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. On page 32, paragraph 48, the Staffs contentions are wrong, answw (a) is a e answer.

However, the fact remains that 10CFR$5.43(b)(2)==~ iamny states a Semor Operator will be examined on technical==~ iE=*== and their bases. The same reference cannat be found in the 14 items listed for a Reactor Operatorin 10CFR55.41.

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On page 32, paragraph 49 the Staff uses the argument that because the facility beensee submitted Form ES-201-2 of NUREG-1021 (Exhibit 11) that thisjustifies that the question was appropriate and not in excess of the legal requirements. I do not feel that this is true. Sometimes mistakes are made or items are aussed in the review cycle and does not mean that everything is totally correct. 'Ihis would be eddenced

_ by the fact that there were 10 questions submitted for changes in the post exanunation comments by the facility limsee and that other gaestions were deleted or changed during the informal review process.

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LO RO QUESTION 87 On page 40, paragraph 61 the Staff states that I neither r:ferenced nor pamded the information pertaining to the te.nperature changes that would occur to a Reactor Recirculatio i Pump seal. I fully agree with the Staff on this, this was my mistake. This is one of the reasons why I felt not all the questions had been=4Tataly addressed during the informal nmew and wiry I iW this hearing. Now the information has been pnmded and I beheve solidifies the fact that there were two correct answers for this -

question As stated on page 36, paragraph 56, the facility hoensee made a post eraminatma =nment that l

answer (b) was also correct. On page 41, paragraph 63, the Staff again asked the linannae for their l

position on this quesuon and they again replied answers (b) and ( c ) were correct. The Staff failed to acknowledge as I stated in my wntien presentauon, that thisammanian included engineering repreaantatives who were brought in to explam why both answers are correct 19 U

On page 36, paragraph 58, the Staff agrees that the Appeal Panel gave me credit for answer (b) but it was for a reason other than the reason I stated in my informal appeal I disagree that it was for a different reason. The Appeal Panel accepted both answers dae to a lack ofinformation pnmded in the stem of the l~

quesuon. My argument is that because of the lack of other alarm (s) status in the quesuon that answer (b) was also correct. The way I stated my case and the Appeal Panels position both indicate that more information was required to determme which answer was correct and, because this informauon was not provided, both answers are correct.

It is clear several ddienst people agreed that two anemers should ne accepted for this quesuon and that only Mr. Peterson and, afteraamanian. (HF Item 44), Mr. Munro disagree. I would like to also note that Mr. Pteerson wrote notes to Mr. Munro on the exact page of the Student Text that I failed t

to subaut with my iriformal appeal package pertaining to seal ^w but did notinclude this 1.

infonannon in the corrampandrana with Mr. Llunro.

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General Comments Mr. Pescreonin thelassmannence of each of his summary sente===n= for the contested queshons (paragraphs 34,45, 50, and 65)' made some rather harsh =*=semansa portaimag to my knowledge level and 'alutinen to operate a nuclear power plant. "Ihese statements were unnecessary and without justificanon. Mr. Peterson does not know what my tiraght process was dunng the erannnahan. Yet, he coss== ally states that I was only able to provide this information aAer Airther review of prnreawal requirememe and Ludent Text. Mr. Peterson is wrong. My appeal and request for heanng were based on the thought process I used during the examinsuon. Also this heanng was to determine if the written er==nahan was graded correctly or if tywsnmns on the exam met the legal requiremente not Mr.

Peterson's openen of my abilities. He states I have a cor ti ming lack of understanding of what actions I need to take for esmergency plant conditions. I beheve he is basing his conchamons on a couple of exam questions that I feel I answered w.m.ily. To vahdate Mr. Peterson's conclumons one must also consuler the operating portion of the ernminahan where the EOP's were '

' ipassed the operating portion of the exanunahon and, in fact, no rvunnwsms were made by the er= miners indemhug any apparent lack of knowledge or ability to effectrvely --?

the emergeux:y iwea. la fact, I passed with grades well atxne the mimmum reqmrement (IF Item 3). 'Iherefose Mr. Peerson's conclusion regarding my understanding of emergency actions is inconect.

On page 2, paragraph 5 and 6, there is a short discusson of my background. I am not sure why this was included in this response but it doesn't discuss anything but the fact that I was a radioactive waste super-visor. 'Ihis was a postion in the Operations department at Fermi 2 that regated supervision and opershon of plant eqmpment and the coordination of work actidties to ensure that the radwaste systent was available to support other plant actmties. Prior to this I held possoons as a Radiauon I

Protection Tachmeian, Radianon Prosecuan Supemsor, and as the thant==nnatian Supervisor.

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Prior tojoining the Detroit Edison Company in 1983 I spent eight years in the U. S. Navy in the Nuclear Poew Program. Dunng this time I spent three years as a training instructor at the DIG Nuclear Pmtatype and qualified as Engine Room Supesvisor (ERS), Fa-iHag Watch Supenisor (EWS), and Engineenns Ollicer of the Watch (EOOW). 'Ihe EOOW was respnamihie for overall safe Reactor and plant operation similar to an SRO in the conumercial nuclear industry. These ?=iines, notjust being a radwaste supenisor were the reasons I was selected by the Detmit Edison Company to l

obtain a Reactor %*~a I weane I have Ma8 to clanfy my position on the questions that are part of this heanng based on the response i

of the NRC Staff to the Presuhng Olticer. Hopefully I how provided enough information so the Presuhng Officer can come to the appropriate decision If there is any other infornuwian or references that are required I will be happy to provide them in a timely manner 1

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