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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20212A7381999-09-10010 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 174 to License NPF-49 ML20211G9631999-08-30030 August 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20210U0881999-08-13013 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 239 & 173 to Licenses DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20210Q1401999-08-12012 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 238 to License DPR-65 ML20209G3061999-07-13013 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 237 to License DPR-65 ML20209D6581999-07-0202 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 172 to License NPF-49 ML20196J2191999-06-30030 June 1999 SER Concluding That Licensee USI A-46 Implementation Program,In General,Met Purpose & Intent of Criteria in GIP-2 & Staff Sser 2 for Resolution of USI A-46 ML20196H1621999-06-29029 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 236 to License DPR-65 ML20207G6411999-06-0303 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 105,235 & 171 to Licenses DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20206M4631999-05-11011 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Alternative Proposed by Licensee to Perform Ultrasonic Exam on Inner Surface of Nozzle to safe-end Weld ML20206G6221999-05-0404 May 1999 SER Accepting Util Request to Apply leak-before-break Status to Pressurizer Surge Line Piping for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2 ML20205S5341999-04-16016 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 169 to License NPF-49 ML20205N3601999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 233 to License DPR-65 ML20205G0191999-03-17017 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 168 to License NPF-49 ML20204H7131999-03-17017 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That NNECO Provided Adequate Justification for Deviations from RG 1.97,Rev 2, Recommendations,For Instrumentation Monitoring CST Level & Containment Area Radiation at Mnps Unit 2 ML20205G4781999-03-12012 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 231 to License DPR-65 ML20205G8671999-03-11011 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 230 to License DPR-65 ML20204C9441999-03-10010 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Denying Licensee Request for License Amend to Revise Frequency of Certain SRs for Electrical Power Sys ML20205G4591999-03-10010 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 229 to License DPR-65 ML20204E7581999-03-10010 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 228 to License DPR-65 ML20207L2631999-03-0505 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 104 to License DPR-21 ML20207L5961999-02-22022 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Code Requirements,Which Require 100 Percent Volumetric Exam of RPV flange-to-shell, Impractical to Perform to Extent Required & That Alternative Provide Reasonable Assurance of Structural Integrity ML20203D7601999-02-11011 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Millstone 1 Certified Fuel Handler Training & Retraining Program ML20203J3191999-02-10010 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 227 to License DPR-65 ML20199H9181999-01-20020 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 224 to License DPR-65 ML20198S7801998-12-31031 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 223 to License DPR-65 ML20198E1471998-12-18018 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 222 to License DPR-65 ML20198E0571998-12-17017 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 221 to License DPR-65 ML20196B0501998-11-24024 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Re Licensee 960213 Submittal of 180-day Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Plant,Unit 2 ML20155K1981998-11-0909 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Re Application of leak-before-break Status to Portions of Safety Injection & Shutdown Cooling Sys ML20195B8711998-11-0909 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Approving Revised Evaluation of Primary Cold Leg Piping leak-before-break Analysis for Plant ML20155C3781998-10-30030 October 1998 SER Denying Amend to Allow Changes to Fsar.Nrc Found That NNECO Had Not Considered Diversity Provided by Switch in Control Room That Removes Power to 1 of 2 MOV in SDC Sys Flow Path in Evaluation of High Low Pressure Design ML20155C8441998-10-29029 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposal to Withdraw ATWS Test Commitment ML20153D8921998-09-23023 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 163 to License NPF-49 ML20238F2781998-08-27027 August 1998 SER Related to Proposed Rev 20 to Northeast Utilities Quality Assurance Program Topical Rept for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Units 1,2 & 3 ML20237D4681998-08-21021 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 219 to License DPR-65 ML20237D5001998-08-20020 August 1998 SER Approving Code Case N-389-1, Alternative Rules for Repairs,Replacements,Or Mods,Section Xi,Div 1 ML20236Y5601998-08-0707 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 162 to License NPF-49 ML20236U7051998-07-22022 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting All Requests for Relief W/Exception of Requests RR-89-17 (Authorized for Class 1 Sys Only) & RR-89-21.Requests RR-13 & RR-14 Will Be Addressed in Separate Evaluation ML20236K3531998-07-0101 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 218 to License DPR-65 ML20236K6971998-07-0101 July 1998 SER Accepting Third 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan,Rev 2 & Associated Request for Relief & Proposed Alternatives for Plant,Unit 2 ML20249C2541998-06-24024 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Rev 19 to NNECO QAP Topical Rept & Amended Through 980609.Informs That NNECO Exception to Provisions in Paragraph 10.3.5 of Constitutes Temporary & Acceptable Alternative ML20249C0491998-06-22022 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 217 to License DPR-65 ML20249B0751998-06-16016 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 216 to License DPR-65 ML20248K9271998-06-0505 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 161 to License NPF-49 ML20248J0031998-06-0404 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Millstone Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan ML20248M2991998-06-0202 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Approving Application Re Restructuring of Central Maine Power Co by Establishment of Holding Company ML20248A8291998-05-27027 May 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 160 to License NPF-49 ML20248C4131998-05-26026 May 1998 SER of Individual Plant Exam of External Events Submittal on Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3 ML20248A3221998-05-26026 May 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 215 to License DPR-65 1999-09-10
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217P5391999-10-25025 October 1999 Rev 0,Change 1 to Millstone Unit 1 Northeast Utils QA Program 05000336/LER-1999-012, :on 990917,unrecoverable CEA Misalignment Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Noted.Caused by Grounded Coil Wire for Lower Gripper Assembly.Leads Leading to Lower Gripper Coil Were Insulated1999-10-15015 October 1999
- on 990917,unrecoverable CEA Misalignment Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Noted.Caused by Grounded Coil Wire for Lower Gripper Assembly.Leads Leading to Lower Gripper Coil Were Insulated
ML20217C8721999-10-0606 October 1999 Rev 21,change 3 to MP-02-OST-BAP01, Nuqap Topical Rept, App F & G Only B17898, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With B17896, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With B17894, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With ML20216J4341999-09-24024 September 1999 Mnps Unit 3 ISI Summary Rept,Cycle 6 05000336/LER-1999-011, :on 990823,thermal Reactor Power Limit Was Exceeded.Caused by Lack of Conservatism in Procedures & Alarm Setpoints Used to Limit Reactor Power.Revised Operating Procedures1999-09-20020 September 1999
- on 990823,thermal Reactor Power Limit Was Exceeded.Caused by Lack of Conservatism in Procedures & Alarm Setpoints Used to Limit Reactor Power.Revised Operating Procedures
ML20212A7381999-09-10010 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 174 to License NPF-49 05000245/LER-1999-001-02, :on 990810,discovered That Stack Flow Monitor Four H LCO Action Statement Had Not Been Met.Caused by Personnel Error.Frequency of LCO Action Was Increased & Personnel Involved Received Coaching.With1999-09-0808 September 1999
- on 990810,discovered That Stack Flow Monitor Four H LCO Action Statement Had Not Been Met.Caused by Personnel Error.Frequency of LCO Action Was Increased & Personnel Involved Received Coaching.With
05000336/LER-1999-010, :on 990804,noted Failure to Perform ASME Section XI IST on Pressurizer Relief Line Flow Control Sample Valve.Caused by Inadequate man-machine Interface. Planning Personnel Will Be Briefed on QC Program Indicators1999-09-0202 September 1999
- on 990804,noted Failure to Perform ASME Section XI IST on Pressurizer Relief Line Flow Control Sample Valve.Caused by Inadequate man-machine Interface. Planning Personnel Will Be Briefed on QC Program Indicators
ML20211N8401999-09-0202 September 1999 Rev 21,change 1 to Northeast Utils QA TR, Including Changes Incorporated Into Rev 20,changes 9 & 10 ML20216F5141999-08-31031 August 1999 Rept on Status of Public Petitions Under 10CFR2.206 B17878, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Mnps,Unit 1.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Mnps,Unit 1.With B17879, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With B17874, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With ML20211G9631999-08-30030 August 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20210U0881999-08-13013 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 239 & 173 to Licenses DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20210Q1401999-08-12012 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 238 to License DPR-65 B17856, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With B17858, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With ML20211A6561999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2 ML20210J0311999-07-21021 July 1999 Rev 20,Change 10 to QAP 1.0, Organization ML20210E5931999-07-19019 July 1999 Revised Page 16 of 21,to App F of Northeast Util QA Program Plan ML20210C5911999-07-15015 July 1999 Revised Rev 20,change 10 to Northeast Util QA Program TR, Replacing Summary of Changes ML20210A0411999-07-15015 July 1999 Rev 20,change 10 to Northeast Util QA Program Tr ML20209G3061999-07-13013 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 237 to License DPR-65 B17814, Special Rept:On 990612 B Train EDG Failed to Restart within 5 Minutes Following Completion of 18 Month 24 H Endurance Run Required by TS 4.8.1.1.2.g.7.Caused by Procedural inadequacy.Re-performed Hot Restart Via Manual Start1999-07-12012 July 1999 Special Rept:On 990612 B Train EDG Failed to Restart within 5 Minutes Following Completion of 18 Month 24 H Endurance Run Required by TS 4.8.1.1.2.g.7.Caused by Procedural inadequacy.Re-performed Hot Restart Via Manual Start ML20209D6581999-07-0202 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 172 to License NPF-49 ML20209D1881999-07-0101 July 1999 Rev 20,change 9 to Northeast Util QA Program Tr ML20209J0541999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Unit 2 ML20196J1821999-06-30030 June 1999 Rev 21,Change 0 to Northeast Utilities QAP (Nuqap) Tr ML20196A8451999-06-30030 June 1999 Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Rept B17833, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Power Station,Unit 1.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20196K1791999-06-30030 June 1999 Addendum 6 to Millstone Unit 2 Annual Rept, ML20196J2191999-06-30030 June 1999 SER Concluding That Licensee USI A-46 Implementation Program,In General,Met Purpose & Intent of Criteria in GIP-2 & Staff Sser 2 for Resolution of USI A-46 ML20211A6751999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2,providing Revised Average Daily Unit Power Level & Operating Data Rept B17830, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With ML20196H1621999-06-29029 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 236 to License DPR-65 05000423/LER-1999-007-01, :on 990518,discharge Filter Associated with Crss Cubicle Sump Pump 3DAS-8A,was Determined to Be Contaminated.Caused by Back Leakage from Contaminated Drains Feeding Into ECCS Pump.Lines Modified.With1999-06-17017 June 1999
- on 990518,discharge Filter Associated with Crss Cubicle Sump Pump 3DAS-8A,was Determined to Be Contaminated.Caused by Back Leakage from Contaminated Drains Feeding Into ECCS Pump.Lines Modified.With
05000423/LER-1999-006-01, :on 990516,both Reactor Plant Aerated Drains SR Air Driven Sump Pumps Failed During TRM Surveillance.Caused by Inadequate Preventive Maint Program Design.Surveillance Procedure Sp 3635B.2 Will Be Conducted Monthly1999-06-15015 June 1999
- on 990516,both Reactor Plant Aerated Drains SR Air Driven Sump Pumps Failed During TRM Surveillance.Caused by Inadequate Preventive Maint Program Design.Surveillance Procedure Sp 3635B.2 Will Be Conducted Monthly
05000423/LER-1999-004-01, :on 990516,ESFA of Numerous Plant Components on Restoration of a Train Sequencer Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedure Direction.Issued Brief to Operations Describing Inadvertent Sequencer LOP Event.With1999-06-14014 June 1999
- on 990516,ESFA of Numerous Plant Components on Restoration of a Train Sequencer Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedure Direction.Issued Brief to Operations Describing Inadvertent Sequencer LOP Event.With
ML20195H1011999-06-11011 June 1999 Rev 20,change 8 to Northeast Utilities QAP (Nuqap) TR 05000423/LER-1999-005-01, :on 990510,failure to Perform Surveillance on RCS Pressurizer Heater Penetration Breakers Was Noted.Caused by Lack of Mgt Support.Required Surveillance of Identified Ten Breakers Was Completed1999-06-0808 June 1999
- on 990510,failure to Perform Surveillance on RCS Pressurizer Heater Penetration Breakers Was Noted.Caused by Lack of Mgt Support.Required Surveillance of Identified Ten Breakers Was Completed
05000423/LER-1999-003-01, :on 990505,identified That 18 Month EDG Surveillance Test for LOP with ESF Start Did Not Initiate Test.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Regulatory Guidance. a & B EDG Returned to Status.With1999-06-0404 June 1999
- on 990505,identified That 18 Month EDG Surveillance Test for LOP with ESF Start Did Not Initiate Test.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Regulatory Guidance. a & B EDG Returned to Status.With
ML20207G6411999-06-0303 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 105,235 & 171 to Licenses DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20209J0661999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Unit 2 ML20211B7351999-05-31031 May 1999 Cycle 7 Colr B17804, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Mnps,Unit 2.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Mnps,Unit 2.With B17808, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With 1999-09-08
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1 UNITED STATES s
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 306MM001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 95-07. " PRESSURE LOCKING AND THERMAL BINDING OF SAFETY-RELATED POWER-OPERATED GATE VALVES" MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NUMBER 50-336
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Pressure locking and thermal binding represent potential common-cause failure mechanisms that can render redundant safety systems incapable of performing their safety functions. The identification of susceptible valves and the determination of when the phenomena might occur requires a thorough knowledge of components, systems, and plant operations. Pressure locking occurs in flexible-wedge and double-disk gate valves when fluid becomes pressurized inside the valve bonnet and the actuator is not capable of overcoming the additional thrust requirements resulting from the differential pressure created across both valve disks by the pressurized fluid in the valve bonnet. Thermal binding is generally associated with a wedge gate valve that is closed while the system is hot and then is allowed to cool before an attempt is made to open the valve.
Pressure locking or thermal binding occurs as a result of the valve design characteristics (wedge and valve body configuration, flexibility, and material thermal coefficients) when the valve is subjected to specific pressures and temperatures during various modes of plant operation.
Operating experience indicates that these situations were not always considered in many plants i
as part of the design basis for valves.
2.0 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 10 CFR Part 50 (Appendix A, General Design Criteria 1 and 4) and plant licensing safety l
analyses require or commit'(or both) that licensees design and test safety related components and systems to provide adequate assurance that those systems can perform their safety l
functions. Other individual criteria in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 apply to specific systems. In accordance with those regulations and licensing commitments, and under the additional provisions of 10 CFR Part 50 (Appendix B, Criterion XVI), licensees are expected to act to ensure I
that safety-related power-operated gate valves susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding j
are capable of performing their required safety functions.
On August 17,1995, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 95-07, " Pressure Locking and Thermal l
Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves," to request that licensees take certain actions to ensure those safety-related power-operated gate valves that are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding are capable of performing their safety functions within the current licensing bases of the facility. GL 95-07 requested that each licensee, within 180 days of the date of issuance of the generic letter (1) evaluate the operational configurations of safety-9811300234 981124 PDR ADOCK 05000336 G
PDR Fnclosure
_ _~_..._ __ _ _
O related power-operated gate valves in its plant to identify valves that are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding, and (2) perform further analyses and take needed corrective actions (orjustify longer schedules) to ensure that the susceptiole valves, identified in (1) above, are capable of performing their intended safety functions under all modes of plant operation, including test configurations. In addition, GL 95-07 requested that licensees, within 180 days of the date ofissuance of the generic letter, provide to the NRC a summary description of(1) the susceptibility evaluation used to determine that valves are or are not susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding, (2) the results of the susceptibility evaluation, including a listing of the susceptible valves identified, and (3) the corrective actions, or other dispositioning, for the valves identified as susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding. The NRC issued GL 95-07 as a
" compliance backfit" pursuant to 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(i) because modification may be necessary to bring facilities into compliance with the rules of the Commission referenced above.
In a letter of February 13,1996, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) submitted its 180-day response to GL 95-07 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's submittal and requested additionalinformation in a letter dated June 19, 1996. In a letter of August 7,1996, the licensee provided the additionalinformation. During the period of August 4 through 8,1997, the NRC staff performed an inspection to review specific aspects of information summarized in the licensee's responses to GL 95-07. This inspection is documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-336/97-203. The licensee responded to the inspection report findings in a letter dated July 17,1998.
I 3.0 STAFF EVALUATION 3.1 Scope of Licensee's Review GL 95-07 requested that licensees evaluate the operational configurations of safety-related power-operated gate valves in their plants to identify valves that are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding. The NNECO letters of February 13, and August 7,1996, and July 17, 1998, described the scope of valves evaluated in response to GL 95-07. The NRC staff has reviewed the scope of the licensee's susceptibility evaluation performed in response to GL 95-07 and found it complete and acceptable. The criteria for determining the scope of power operated valves for GL 95-07 are consistent with the staffs acceptance of the scope of motor-operated valves associated with GL 89-10, " Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance."
3.2 Corrective Actions GL 95-07 requested that licensees, within 180 days, perform further analyses as appropriate, and take appropriate corrective actions (or justify longer schedules), to ensure that the susceptible valves identified are capable of performing their intended safety function under all modes of plant l
operation, including test configurations. The licensee's submittals discussed proposed corrective
(
actions to address potential pressure locking and thermal binding problems. The staffs l
evaluation of the licensee's actions is discussed in the following paragraphs:
i s.
The licensee stated that the following valves were modified to eliminate the i
potential for pressure locking:
1 2-RC-403/405 Pressurizer Power-Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valves j
2-SI-651/652 Shutdown Cooling Suction Header Valves 4
I
l 1 The staff finds that physical modification to valves susceptible to pressure locking is an appropriate corrective action to ensure operability of the valves and is thus acceptable, b.
During a telephone conversation on November 5,1998, the licensee clarified to the staff its basis for assuring that the containment sump header outlet isolation valves,2-CS-16.1A/B, are capable of opening during a pressure locking event.
The valves are scheduled to be modified during the current outage. The modification involves tne installation of rupture disks that limit the pressure inside each valve's bonnet to 85 psig. A modified industry gate valve thrust equation was used to calculate the thrust required to open these double disk gate valves during pressure locking conditions with a maximum pressure of 85 psig inside the bonnets. The results of the calculation demonstrated that the margin between calculated pressure locking thrust and actuator capability exceeds 40 percent.
As-found valve and stem factors were used to calculate the thrust required to open the valves during pressure locking conditions. The licensee stated that these valves are in an Altemate Test Plan Program which requires that the valve and stem factors be periodically verified. The information provided by the licensee is subject to confirmation during future NRC inspections.
Pressure locking tests sponsored oy the NRC were conducted by Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory on a double disk gate valve. The results of this testing are documented in NUREG/CR-6611,"Results of Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding Tests of Gate Valves." Test data demonstrated that the modified industry gate valve thrust equation trended with the pressure locking test resuits but generally underestimated the thrust required to open a pressure-locked valve. The staff finds that the modified industry gate valve thrust equation provides reasonable assurance that valves susceptible to pressure locking are capable of performing their intended safety-related function provided that the margin between calculated pressure locking thrust and actuator capability exceeds 40 percent. Until more definitive industry criteria are developed, the staff l
concludes that the licensee's action to address pressure locking of gate valves 2-CS-16.1 A/B is acceptable.
c.
The licensee stated that procedures were modified to cycle the following valves following evolutions that could potentially create a thermal binding condition:
2-MS-201/202 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Steam Admission 2-RC-403/405 Pressurizer PORV Block Valves 2-SI-651/652 Shutdown Cooling Suction Header The staff finds that the licensee's procedural changes to require cycling the valves as corrective actions provide assurance that thermal binding conditions are eliminated, and are thus acceptable.
d.
The licensee stated that all flexible and solid wedge gate valves in the scope of Gl. 95-07 were evaluated for thermal binding. When evaluating whether valves were susceptible to thermal binding, the licensee assumed that thermal binding would not occur below specific temperature thresholds. The screening criteria used by the licensee appear to provide a reasonable approach to identify those
s n
. valves that might be susceptible to thermal binding. Until more definitive industry criteria are developed, the staff concludes that the I:censee's actions to address thermal binding of gate valves are acceptable.
4.0 CONCLUSION
On the basis of this evaluation, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has performed appropriate evaluations of the operational configurations of safety-related power-operated gate valves to identify valves at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, that are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding, in addition, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has taken, or is scheduled to take, appropriate corrective actions to ensure that these valves are capable of performing their intended safety functions. Therefore, the staff concludes that the licensee has adequately addressed the requested actions discussed in GL 95-07.
Principal Contributor: S. Tingen Date: November 24, 1998 l
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