ML20237D468
| ML20237D468 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1998 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237D464 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9808260212 | |
| Download: ML20237D468 (4) | |
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UNITED STATES g
,, j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM:SSION o,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20666-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 219 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65 NORTHEAST NUCi EAR ENERGY OOMPANY THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-336
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated April 6,1998, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee),
submitted a request fct changes to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes would modify the TSs by: (1) adding a surveillance requirement to verify pressurizer heater capacity to TS 3.4.4, "Reector Coolant System -
Pressurizer,"(2) moving the identification of the location of the containment air temperature j
detectors from the surveillance requirements portion of TS 3.6.1.5, " Containment Systems - Air Temperature," to the TS Bases for Containment Systems, Section 3/4.4.6.1.5, " Air Temperature,"
and (3) modifying the action statements and surveillance requirements of TS 3.7.1.5, " Plant Systems - Main Steam isolation Valves." The TS Bases would also be updated to include the list of containment air temperature detectors and reflect the proposed changes.
2.0 EVALUATION 2.1 TS 3.4.4, " Reactor Coolant System - Pressurizer" The limiting condition for operation (LCO) Of TS 3.4.4 specifies a specific amount of water volume and two groups of pressurizer heaters each with a capacity of at least 130 kW and capable of being supplied by emergency power. The current TS 3.4.4 has a surveillance requirement (SR 4.4.4), to verify the water volume. However, there is no SR to verny the pressurizer hecter requirements specified in the TS LCO. The licensee proposes to add an SR to verify at least once per 92 days that: (1) there are at least two groups of pressurizer heaters, (2) they are supplied by emergen0y power, and (3) each of the groups have a capacity of 130 kW. The existing SR will be renumbered as 4.4.4.1 and the new SR requirement will be 4.4.4.2.
The addition of the SR to verify that all the LCO requirements of TS 3.4.4, including the heaters, are maintained will provide reasonable assurance that the safety-related function of the pressurizer to maintain the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure will be available and operable.
9808260212 980821 PDR ADOCK 05000336 P
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The proposed frequency of the SR to verify the pressurizer heater re;uirements, at least once per 92 days, is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG - 1432, Rev.1, " Standard Technical Specifications for Combustion Engineering Plants," dated April 1995 (STS-CE).
I The staff has determined that the cddition of the SR, as detailed above, is consistent with the current guidance provided in the STS CE and will provide reasonable assurance that the l
pressurizer will be capable of performing its safety-related function and is, therefore, acceptable.
j 2.2 TS 3.6.1.5,
- Containment Systems - Air Temperature" The licensee proposes to change the current SR 4.6.1.5 by removing the details relating to the location of the containment temperature monitors and relocating them in the associated TS Bases. In addition, the details of the location of the temperature detectors will be expanded and corrected to be consistent with the plant terminology relating to locations within the containment.
The wording of SR 4.6.1.5 will also be changed to clarify the SR and eliminate redundant wording.
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Although the licensee indicated that it was relocating the list of containment temperature
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detectors from the SR to the TS Bases, the SR o.)ly identifies the location of the temperature i
detectors and does not list the detectors. The physicallocation of components or other items i
that are identified in the SR sections of the TSs are normally not included in the TSs. Moving the identification of the location to the associated TS Bases is appropriate. The location of the temperature detectors is identified as the 38 foot elevation of the southeast and southwest walls.
l The correct containment floor elevation is 38 feet 6 inches, which will be the location included in j
the associated TS Bases The TS Bases will also indicate that the detectors are located approximately 6 feet above the floor at that containment elevation.
The inclusion of the containment temperature limit of equal to or less than 120 degrees Fahrenheit and the deletion of arithmetic average, which is redundant to the already stated average temperature in the LCO and SR, provides needed clarification.
The staff has determined that removing the location details from thc, TSs and including the corrected location details in the associated TS Bases is consistent with the guidance in the STS-CE and are, therefore, acceptable. The staff has also determined that providing the needed clarification is also acceptable.
2.3 TS 3.7.1.5, Plant Systems - Main Steam Isolation Valves" The primary purpose of the main steamline isolation valves (MSIVs) is to protect the RCS from an overcooling event on excess steam demand. They are designed to automatically isolate the steam generators in the event of a rupture of the downstream piping. The MSIVs also ensure that at least one steam generator will be available as a heat sink to remove decay and sensible heat from the RCS on an upstream rupture of a steam line. The licensee proposes several changes to TS 3.7.1.5 relating to the MISVs. The changes include: (1) modifying the action i
statement for Mode 1 to require the plant be placed in Mode 2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> instead of Mode 4 (hot shutdown) within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, (2) modifying the action statement for Modes 2 and 3 to address l
more than one inoperable MSIV with an action time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to either restore the valve (s) to an operable status or close the valve (s) and verify their closure at least once per 7 days; and modifying the requirement from being in Mode 4 within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to being in Mode 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in Mode 4 in the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, (3) deleting the words "that is open"in
. SR 4.7.1.5, (4) deleting the requirement for MSIV partial stroke testing, (5) changing the requirement to perform testing of the MSIVs from "during each reactor shutdown" to "during each plant stariup," and (6) adding an exception to TS 4.0.4 to allow entry into Mode 3 in order to establish plant conditions that are necessary to perform MSIV testing.
The current TS 3.7.1.5 action statement for Mode 1 allows 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to restore an inoperable MSIV to operable status or to close the valve, otherwise the plant is required to be in hot shutdown, Mode 4, within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. The licensee proposes to modify the action statement for Mode 1 to require the plant to be placed in Mode 2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, instead of Mode 4 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. This change would match the appropriate mode and action requirement. The proposed change to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is consistent with the time allowed by TS 3.0.3, which allows 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to reach Mode 3, and it would also allow sufficient time to shut down the plant from 100 percent power.
Once the plant is in Mode 2, then the action statemt nt requirements for Modes 2 and 3 would apply.
The licensee also proposes to expand the scope of the action statement for Modes 2 and 3 to address more than one inoperable MSIV, which would eliminate the need to enter TS 3.0.3 if both MSIVs are inoperable. The reference to continued operation in Mode 1 would be removed since the action statement does not apply in Mode 1. An action time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> would be added to restore the inoperable valve (s) to operable status or to close the affected valve (s). The licensee chose 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> since it was a reasonable time to allow the valve (s) to be repaired, or to establish the plant conditions to close the valve (s). The requirement to be in Mode 4 within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> would be modified to require that the plant be in Mode 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 in the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The licensee proposes to increase the mode transition time from 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> in the action statement for Modes 2 and 3. This increase is reasonable for the plant operators to accomplish a controlled transition to a lower mode and is consistent with the time allowed by TS 3.0.3. In addition, the phrase in the action statement for Modes 2 and 3, " maintained closed," would be modified to "rnaintained," and the phrase "and verified closed at least once per 7 days," would be added to provide additional assurance that the inoperable MSIVs are closed. In addition, a note (*) would be added to state that the MSIVs may be opened to perform SR 4.7.1.5 to allow MSIVs that are in the closed position to comply with the action statement.
The licensee proposes to remove the v.ords "that is open"in SR 4.7.1.5 to expand the scope of the SR to each MSIV regardless of its valve position. If the valves are not operable, the proposed changes to the Modes 2 and 3 action statement would allow continued plant operation if the valves are closed since it is the accident position of the MSIVs. The licensee also proposes to delete SR 4.7.1.5.a which is the MSIV partial stroke test. Partial stroke testing would still be required by TS 4.0.5, which invokes the Millstone Unit 2 In-service Testing Program, in proposed SR 4.7.1.5.b, MSIV full stroke testing would become SR 4.7.1.5. The requirement to perform this test would be changed from "during each reactor shutdown" to "during each plant startup" since it is more important to verify equipment operability prior to plant operation instead of after plant operation. Also, it could be difficult to perform this test at the conditions specified if a rapid shutdown of the unit is required.
An exception to TS 4.0.4 would be added to SR 4.7.1.5 to allow entry into Mode 3. This is necessary to allow plant startuo to proceed with equipment that cannot be verified to be operable until the appropriate plant conditions for performing the test have been established. After entering Mode 3, and establishing the necessary plant conditiKs, as defined in the proposed surveillance, the MSIVs would be declared inoperable if SR 4//.1.5 has not been performed L
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within the required frequency and the propesed action statement for Modes 2 and 3 would be entered.
The staff has determined that the proposed TS cnanges provide needed clarification and are consistent with the guidance provided in the STS-CE. The staff also has determined that the proposed changes would not adversely affect the operability requirements of the MSIVs, the MSIVs would still function as designed to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents,.
there would be no adverse effects on how the associated systems or components function to prevent or mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents, and there would be no adverse effects on any design basis accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the staff has determined
' that the proposed TS changes are acceptable.
3.0
SUMMARY
The staff has determined that the proposed changes to TS 3.4.4, " Reactor Coolant System -
Pressurizer," TS 3.6.1.5, " Containment Systems - Air Temperature," and TS 3.7.1.5, " Plant Systems - Main Steam isolation Valves," are acceptable. The staff has also determined that the proposed update of the TS Bases to include the location of the containment air temperature detectors end to reflect the proposed changes is also acceptable.
4.0 STATE CONSULTATION
l in accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Connecticut State official was notified of j
the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.
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5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
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The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed findna that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (63 FR 25113 dated May 6,1998). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the hdth and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors: V. Ordaz D. Mcdonald Date: August 21, 1998
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