ML20203J319
| ML20203J319 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 02/10/1999 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203J311 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9902230359 | |
| Download: ML20203J319 (4) | |
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UNITED STATES gi Ij NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 227 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-85 NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-336
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Dy letter dated October 22,1998, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licenses), submitted a request for changes to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station l Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications (TSs). The licensee is proposing to change TS 3.3.2.1,
" Instrumentation - Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation"; 3.4.9.3,
" Reactor Coolant System - Overpressure Protection Systems"; and 3.5.3, " Emergency Core Cooling Systems - ECCS Subsystems - Tavg < 300' F." In Licensee Event Report (LER) 98-013-00, " Shutdown Cooling System Could be Over Pressurized by inadvertent High Pressure Safety injection Pump Start," dated June 25,1998, the licensee reported that additional measures should be taken to reduce the potential for shutdown cooling system (SDCS) overpressurization due to an inadvertent start of a high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump.
The licensee's amendment request addresses the concem raised in this LER. The amendment allows the licensee to prevent an automatic start of any HPSI pump when the SDCS is in operation (Mode 4 and below). An inadvertent start of an HPSI pump could result in overpressurization of the SDCS.
2.0 EVALUATION To reduce the potential for SDCS overpressurization due to an inadvertent start of an HPSI 1
pump, the licensee proposed TS changes that will no longer require an HPSI pump to start automatically foilowing the generation of a safety injection actuation signal (SlAS) when the plant is operating in Mode 4 or below. The licensee is also replacing the HPSI breaker control switches with switches that have the pull-to-lock capability. These changes will allow the control room operator to place the HPSI pump breaker control switch in the pull-to-lock position prior to alig,ning the SDCS to the reactor coolant system (RCS). With the breaker control j
switch in the pull-to-lock position, the pump is not capable of starting automatically, but can be 3
manually started by the control room operator. The proposed TS changes, and the staff's j
corresponding evaluations, follow.
1 9902230359 990210 PDR ADOCK 05000336 P
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2.1 Technical Specifications 3.3.2.1 and 3.5.3
- a. Table 3.3-3, " Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System instrumentation," will be revised by replacing Table Nots'. ion (d). This change will state that it is acceptable in Mode 4 for the HPSI pumps not to start automatically on an SIAS. The automatic SIASs on low pressurizer prer.sure and high containment pressure are not required to be operable in Mode 4. Hewever, the manual safety injection pushbuttons are required in Mode 4. This wi!! allow the operable HPSI pump control switch to be placed in the pull-to-lock position without affecting the operability of that pump.
- b. Page 3/4 3-12 (i.e., page 1 of Table 3.3-3) was previously revised by License Amendment No.15 and License Amendment No. 63. These amendment numbers will be added to the bottom of the page.
- c. A new footnote (-) will be added to TS 3.5.3. The footnote will state that the HPSI pump required in Mode 4 is not required to start automatically on an SIAS. (The automatic SIASs on low pressurizer pressura and high containment pressure are not required to be operable in Mode 4. However, the manual safety injection pushbuttons are required in Mode 4.) This will allow the operable HPSI pump control switch to be placed in the pull-to-lock position without affecting the operability of that pump.
The proposed changes to TSs 3.3.2.1 and 3.5.3 will no longer require the HPSI pump, which is required to be operable in Mode 4, to start automatically on an SIAS. (The automatic SIASs on low pressurizer pressure and high containment pressure are not required to operable in Mode
- 4. However, the manual safety injection pushbuttons are required in Mode 4.) This will allow the operable HPSI pump control switch to be placed in the pull-to-lock position without affecting the operability of that pump. All HPSI pumps will be prevented from automatically starting when the plant is in Mode 4 and the SDCS is aligned to the RCS. This is to prevent an inadvertent start of the HPSI pump, which could overpressurize the SDCS. However, the HPSI pump can be manually started by the control room operator. These changes will not reduce the requirement for at least one HPSI pump to be operable in Mode 4. In Mode 5, no HPSI pumps are required to be operable to meet TS requirements. However, the licensee stated that the management of shutdown risk will ensure sufficient inventory makeup capability is available, The licensee stated that the proposed changes will have no adverse effect on plant operation. Based on the staff's review cf the information provided by the licensee, the staff finds the TS changes to be acceptable because they will correct the problem the licensee identified in LER 98-013-00.
The editorial correction to TS page 3/4 3-12 corrects an editorial error. Therefore, this change is acceptable.
2.2 Technical Specification 3.4.9.3
- a. The wording of Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.4.9.3.2 will be modified for clarity.
This is an editorial change only.
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- b. SR 4.4.9.3.3 will be modified to allow the use of the new pull to-lock feature of the HPSI pump control switches to satisfy low temperature overspressure protection mass input requirements. In addition, the wording will be modified to be consistent with the modified wording of SR 4.4.9.3.2.-
The licensee stated that the proposed change to TS 3.4.9.3 and SR 4.4.9.3.3, will allow the i
use of the pull-to-lock feature of the HPSI pump control switches to satisfy low temperature overpressure protection mass input requirements. This will not affect either the low temperature overpressure protection HPSI pump mass input restrictions or the level of control j
to ensure the HPSI pumps are not capable of injecting into the RCS. The licensee stated that 1
the proposed changes will have no adverse effect on plant operation. Based on the staff's review of the information provided by the licensee, the staff finds the TS changes to be acceptable because they will correct the problem the licensee identified in LER S3-013-00.
The editorial change to SR 4.4.9.3.2 improves the clarity of the TS and is, therefore, acceptable.
2.3 Technical Soecification Bases The Bases of the applicable TSs will be revised to reflect the proposed chan0es. Since the Bases changes appropriately reflect the above changes to the TS, they are acceptable.
2.4 Evaluation Summary On 'he basis of the staff's review of the TS changes and the supporting information provided in the licensee's October 22,1998, letter, the staff concludes that the licensee's proposed TS changes to (1) delete the automatic start of the high-pressure safety injection pump upon receipt of a safety injection signal in Mode 4, and (2) perform editorial corrections, are acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Connecticut State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.
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4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
j The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility, component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (63 FR 66600, December 2,1998). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmentalimpact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendmat.
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5.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the l
Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors: H. Balukjian F. Gee Date: February 10, 1999 i
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