ML20154F722
| ML20154F722 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/09/1988 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154F710 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8805240044 | |
| Download: ML20154F722 (45) | |
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g NRC STAFF REVIEW OF NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM VENDOR OWNERS GROUPS' APPLICATION OF I
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THE C0 MISSION'S INTERIM POLICY STATEMENT CRITERIA
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INTRODUCTION On February 6,1987, the Comission issued its Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements (S2 FR 3788). The Policy Statement encourages the industry to develop new Standard Technical Specifications (STS) to be used as guides for licensees in preparing improved Technical Specifications (TS) for their facilities. The Interim Policy Staterent contains criteria (including a discussion of each) for detemining which regulatory requirements and operating restrictions should be retained in the new STS and ultimately in plant TS.
It also identifies four additional systems that are to be retained on the basis of operating experience and [?obabilistic risk assessments (PRA).
Finally, the Policy Stateren.t indicates that risk evaluations are an appropriate tool for defining requirements \\ that should be retained in the STS/TS where including such requirements is consistent with the purpose of TS (as stated in the Policy Statement).
Requirements that are not retained in the new STS would generally not be retained in individual plant TS.
Current TS requirements not retained in the STS will be relocated to other licensee-controlled docurents.
One of the first steps in the program to implement the Comission's Interim policy Statenent is to detemine which limiting Conditions for Opervtion (LCOs) contained in the existing STS should be retained in the new STS. An early decision on this issue will facilitate efforts to make the other improvements (described in the Policy Statenent) to the text and Bases of those requirenents that rust be retained in the new STS.
EachNuclearSteamSupplySystem(NSSS)vendorOwnersGrouphassubmitteda report to the NRC for review that identifies which STS LCOs the group believes should be retained in the new STS and which can be relocated to other licensee-centro 11ed docunents. These four NSSS vendor subnittals are as follows:
l (1) Letter dated October 15, 1987, R. L. Gill, B&W Owners Group, to Dr. T. E. Murley, NRC,
Subject:
"B&W Owners Group Technical Specification Committee Application of Selection Criteria to the B&W Standard Technical l
Specifications."
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,,i,, < (2) Letter dated November 12, 1987, R. A. Newton, Westinghouse Owners Group, to NRC Document Control Desk,
Subject:
"Westinghouse Owners Group MERITS Program Phase II, Task 5, Criteria Application Topical Report."
(3) Letter dated December 11, 1987 J. K. Gasper, Combustion Engineering Owners Group, to Dr. T. E. Murley, NRC
Subject:
"CEN-355, CE Owners Group Restructured Standard Technical Specifications - Volume 1 (Criteria Application)."
(4) Letter dated November 12, 1987, R. F. Janecek, BWR Owners Group, to R. E. Starostecki, NRC
Subject:
"BWR Owners Group Technical Specification screening Criteria App 1'ic'ation and Risk Assessment."
These submittals provide the rationale for why each STS requirement (e.g.
Limiting Condition for Operation) should be retained in the new STS or why it can be relocated to a licensee-controlled document. They also describe how each Owners Group used risk insights in determining the appropriate content of the new STS.
2.
STAFF REVIEW The NRC staff focused its review on those requirements identified by the Owners Groups as candidates for relocation. The staff evaluated each of these requirements to determine whether it agreed with the Owners Groups' conclusions.
During the NRC Staff's review, several issues were raised concerning the proper interpretation or application cf the criteria in the Comission's Interim Policy Statement. The NRC Staff has considered these issues and concluded the following:
(1) Criterion i should be interpreted to include only instrumentation used to detect actual leaks and not more broadly to include instrumentation used i
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' to detect precursors to an actual breech of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or instrumentation to identify the source of actual leakage (e.g.,
lease parts monitor, seismic instrumentation, valve position indicators).
(2) The "initial conditions" captured under Criterion 2 should not be limited to only "process variables" assumed in safety analyses. They should also include certain active _ design features (e.g., high pressure / low pressure system valves and interlocks) and operating restrictions (e.g., pressure-temperatureoperatinglimitcurves),neededtoprecludeunanalyzedaccidents.
In this context, "active design features" include only design features under the control of oper'htions personnel (i.e., licensed operators and personnel who perfonn control. functions at the direction of licensed opera-tors). This position is consistent with the conclusions reached by the Staff during the trial application of the criteria to the Wolf Creek and Limerick Technical Specifications.
(3) The "initial corditions" of design-basis accidents (DBA) and transients, as used in Criterion 2, should not be limited to only those directly "monitored and controlled" from the control room.
Initial conditions should also in-clude other features / characteristics that are specifically assumed in DBA and transient analyses even if they can not be directly observed in the control room.
For example, initial conditions (e.g., moderator temperature coefficient and hot channel factors) that are periodically monitored by other than licensed operators (e.g., core engineers, instrumentation and control technicians) to provide licensed operators with the infonnation required to take those actions necessary to assure that the plant is being operated within the bounds of design and analysis assumptions, meet Criterion 2 and should be retained in Technical Specifications.
Initial conditions do not, bewever, include things that are purely design requirements.
(4) The phrase "primary success path," used in Criterion 3, should be interpreted to include only the primary equipment (including redundant trains / components) l to mitigate accidents and transients.
Primary success path does not include l
backup and diverse eouipment or instrumentation used to prevent analyzed
',..,, - accidents or transients or to improve reliability of the mitigation function (e.g., rod withdrawal block which is backup to the average power range monitor high flux trip in the startup mode, safety valves which are backup to low temperature over pressure relief valves during cold shutdown).
(5) Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation that satisfies the definition of Type A variables in Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident," meets Criterion 3 and should be retained in Technical Specifications. Type A variables provide primary information (i.e.,informationthat'ilessentialforthedirectaccomplishmentofthe specified manual actions (incbding long-term recovery actions) for which no automatic control is provided and that are required for safety systems to accomplish their safety functions for DBAs or transients). Type A variables do not include those variables associated with contingency actions that may also be identified in written procedures to compensate for f ailures of primary equipment.
Because only Type A variables meet Criterion 3, the STS should contain a narrative statement that indicates that individual plant Technical Specifications should contain a list of Post-Accident Instrumentation that includes Type A variables. Other Post-Accident Instrumentation (i.e., non-Type A Category I) is discussed on page 6.
(6) The NRC's design basis for licensing a plant is the plant's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) as qualified by the analysis performed by the staff and documented in the staff's safety evaluation report (SER). Because the I
staff's review and resulting SER are based on the acceptance criteria in the NRC's Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800, SRP), the dose limits used in licensing a particular plant may be "some small fraction" of those specified in the Commission's regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 100 (10 CFR 100). Accordingly, the SRP limits should be used to define the equipment in the primary success path for mitigating accidents and transients when developing the new STS.
These types of conservatisms are required to compensate for uncertainties in analysis techniques and
e 5-provide reasonable assurance that the absolute numerical limits of the regulations will be satisfied.
On a plant-specific basis, systems and equipment that are identified in the NRC staff SER and assumed by the staff to function are considered part of the licensing basis for the plant and are captured by Criterion 3 (e.g.,
radiation monitoring instrumentation that initiates an isolation function, penetration room exhaust air cleanup system).
(7) DBA and transients, as.used in Criteria 2 and 3, should be interpreted to include any design-basis ' event described in the FSAR (i.e., not just those events described in Chapters ( and 15 of the FSAR). For example, there may be requirements for some plants which should be retained in Technical i
Specifications because of the risks associated with some site-sper,1fic characteristic (e.g., although not normally required, a Technical Specifi-cation on the chlorine detecticn system might be appropriate where a sig-nificant chlorine hazard exists in the site vicinity; similarly, a Tech-nical Specification on flood protection might be appropriate where a plant is particularly vulnerable to flooding and is designed with special flood protectionfeatures). Criteria 2 and 3 should not be interpreted to in-clude purely generic design requirements applicable to all plants (e.g.,
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the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 for control room design).
The NRC staff has used the Commission's Interim Policy Statement and the conclusions described above to define the appropriate content of the new STS.
The staff plans to factor these conclusions into the Final Policy Statement on 1
Technical Specification Improvements that will be proposed to the Comission, j
l The staff reviewed the methodology and results provided by each Owners Group i
to verify that none of the requirements proposed for relocation contains j
l constraints of prime importance in limiting the likelihood or severity of accident sequences that are comonly found to dominate risk.
For the purpose
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p of this application of the guidance in the Comission Policy Statement, the staff agrees with the Owners Groups' conclusions except in two areas.
- First, the staff finds that the Renote Shutdown Instrunentation meets the Policy State-ment criteria for inclusion in Technical Specifications based on risk; and second, the staff is unable to confirm the Owners Groups' conclusion that Category 1 Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation is not of prime importance in limiting risk.
Recent PRAs have shown the risk significance of operator re-covery actions which would require a knowledge of Category 1 variables.
Furthermore, recent severe accident studies have shown significant potential for risk reduction frcm accident. ganagement. The Owners Groups' should develop further risk-based justification in support of relocating any or all Category I variables from the Standard Technii:a1 Specifications.
As stated in the Comission's Interim Policy Statement, licentees should also use plant-specific PRAs or risk surveys as they prepare license amendnents to adopt the revised STS to their plant. Where PRAs or surveys are available, licensees should use them to strengthen the Bases as well as to screen those Technical Specifications to be relocated. Where such plant-specific risk surveys are not available, licensees should use the literature available on risk insights and PRAs. Licensees need not complete a plant-specific PRA before they can adopt the new STS. The NRC staff will also use risk insights and PRAs in evaluating the plant-specific submittals.
3.
RESULTS OF THE STAFF'S REVIEk' Appendices A through D present the detailed results of the staff's review of the Babcock and Wilcox, Westinghouse, combustion Engineering, and General Electric application of the selection criteria to the existing STS.
Each Appendix con-sists of two tables. Table 1 identifies those LCOs that must be retained in the new STS. Table 2 lists those LCOs that may be wholly or partially relocated to licenste-controlled documents (or be reformatted as a surveillance requirement foranotherLCO). Where the staff placed specific conditions on relocation of particular LCOs the staff has so noted in the Tables.
As a part of the
f plant specific implementation of the new S15, the staff plans to review the location of, and controls over, relocated requirements.
In as r>ch as practi-j cable, the Owners Groups should propose standard locations for, and controls over, relocated requirements.
For each LC0 listed in Table 1, the criterion (criteria) that required that the LCO be retained in Technical Specifications is identified.
If an LCO was retained in Technical Specifications solely on the basis of risk, "Risk" appears in the criteria column. Where an Owners Group determined that an LCO had to stay in Technical Specificatio,ns (because of either a particular criterion or risk) and the Staff agreed that the LC0 should be retained in Technical Specif-ications, the staff did not, in geeral, verify the Owners Group's basis for retention. However, in several instances the Owners Groups cited risk consider-ations alone as the basis for retaining Technical Specifications and the staff disagreed with the Owners Groups.
In these instances, the staff's basis for retention appears in the criteria column of Table 1.
Any LCO not specifically identified in Table 1 or Table 2 (e.g., an LCO unique to an STS not addressed in the Owners Groups submittals such as the BWRS STS) should be retained in the STS until the Owners Group proposes and the staff makes a specific determination that it can be relocated to a licensee-controlled document.
Notwithstanding the results of this review, the staff will give further consideration for relocation of cdditional LCOs as the staff and industry proceed with the developrent of the new STS.
4.
CONCLUSION The results of the effort of the Owners Groups and of the NRC staff to apply the Policy Staterrent selection criteria to the existing STS are an important step toward ensuring that the new STS contain only those requirements that are censistent with 10 CFR 50.36 and have a sound safety basis.
As shown in the
8 tollowing tables, application of the criteria contained in the Comission's Interim Policy Statement resulted in a significant reduction in the number of LCOs to be included in the new STS. The development of the new STS based on the staff's conclusions will result in more efficient use of NRC and industry resources. Safety improvements are expected through more operator-oriented Technical Specifications, improved Technical Specification Bases, a reduction in action statement. induced plant transients, and a reduction in testing at power.
i GENERAL BABCOCK COMBUSTION ELECTRIC LCOs WILC0X WESTINGHOUSE ENGINEERlhG Bj'R4/BWR6 Total Number 137 165 159 124/144 Retained 75 92 87 81/86 Relocated 62 73 72 43/55 Percent Pelocated 45%
44%
45%
35%/40%
We are confident that the staff's cor.clusions will provide an adequate basis for the Owners Groups to proceed with the development of complete new STS in acccrdance with the Comission's Interim Policy Statement.
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APPENDIX A RESULTS OF THE NRC STAFF REVIEW l
BABCOCK 8.glLCOXOWN'.RSGROUP'SSUBMITTAL RETENTION AND RELOCATION OF SPECIFIC TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l
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APPENDIX A TABLE 1 LCOs TO BE RETAINED IN BABC0CK & WILCOX STAhDARD TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 5 CRITERIA LCO 3.1 REACTIVITY C0hTROL SYSTEM 3.1.1.1 Shutdown Margin (Note 1) 2 3.1.1.2 Moderator Temperature Coefficient 2
3.1.1.3 Minimum Temperature for Criticality 2
3.1.3.1 Group Height - Safety and Regulating Rod Groups 2
3.1.3.2 Group Height - Axial Power Shaping Rod Group 2
2&3 Safety Rod Insg(rtion Limit 3.1.3.6 Regulating Rod nsertion Limits 2
3.1.3.7 2
3.1.3.9 Xenon Reactivity 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.1 Axial Power Imbalance 2
3.2.2 Nuclear Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor 2
3.2.3 Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor 2
3.2.4 Quadrant Power Tilt 2
3.2.5 chb Parameters 2
3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1 Peactor Protection System Instrumentation (Note 2) 3 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation (Note 2) 3 3.3.3.1 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation (Notes 2 & 3) 3 3.3.3.5 Remote Shutdown Instrumentation (Notes 2 & 4)
Risk 3.3.3.6 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation 3
3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3.4.1.1 Startup and Power Operation 3
3.4.1.2 Hot Standby 3
3.4.1.3 Hot Shutdown 3
3.4.1.4 Ccid Shutdown Policy Statement (DHR) 3.4.3 Safety Valve - Operating 3
3.4.4 Pressurizer 2&3 3.4.5 Reliet Valve 3
2.4.6 Steam Generators - Water Level 2
.4.7.1 Leakage Detection System 1
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B&W-TABLE 1_(Continued)
CRITERIA LCO 2
3.4.7.2 Operational Leakage 2
3.4.9 Specific Activity 3.4.10.1 Reactor Coolant System Pressure / Temperature Limits 2
2 3.4.10.3 Overpressure Protection System 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) 2&3 3.5.1 Core Flooding Tanks 3.5.2 ECCS Subsystems - T,yg t,(305)*F 3
3 ECCS Subsystems - T,yg <(305)'F 3.5.3 2&3 3.5.4 Borated Water Storage Tank 3.6 CONTAI4MENTS'YSYEMS 3.6.1.1 Containment Integrily 3
3 3.6.1.3 Containment Air Locks 2
3.6.1.5 Internal Pressure 2
l 3.6.1.6 Air Temperature 3
3. 6.1. 8 Containment Ventilation System 3
3.6.2.1 Containment Spray System 2&3 3.6.2.2 Spray Additive System 3
3.6.2.3 Containment Cooling System 3
3.6.3 Iodine Cleanup System 3.6.4 Centainment isolation Valves 3
3 3.6.5.1 Hydrogen Analyzers 3.6.5.2 Electric Hydrogen Recombiners (Note 5) 3 3.6.6 Penetration Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System 3
3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3
3.7.1.1 Safety Valves 3
3.7.1.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System 3.7.1.3 Condensate Storage Tank 2&3 2
3.7.1.4 Activity 3.7.1.5 Main Steam Line Isolation Yalves 3
3 3.7.3 Component Cooling Water System 3.7.4 Service Water System 3
3.7.5 Ultimate Heat Sink 3
3.7.6 Flood Protection (optional) 3 3.7.7 Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System 3
3 ECCS Pump) Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System 3.7.8 (optional A-2 l
B&W-TABLE 1_(Continued)
CRITERIA LCO 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3
3.8.1.1 A.C. Sources - Operating 3.8.1.2 A.C. Sources - Shutdown PolicyStatement(DHR) 3 3.B.2.1 A.C. Distribution - Operating 3.8.2.2 A.C. Distribution - Shutdown Policy Statement (DHR) 3 3.8.2.3 D.C. Distribution - Operating 3.8.2.4 D.C. Distribution - Shutdown Policy Statement (DHR) 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 2
3.9.1 Boron Concentration 3
3.9.2 Instrumentation 2
Decay Time 3.9.3 3.9.4 ContainmentBuihdingPenetration 3
3.9.8.1 Residual Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation -
All Water Levels PolicyStatement(DHR) 3.9.8.2 Residual Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation -
Low Water Levels PolicyStatement(DHR) 3.9.9 Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System 3
3.9.10 Water Level - Reactor Vessel 2
2 3.9.11 Water Level - Storage Pool 2
3.9.12 Storage Pool Air Cleanup System Notes:
1.
Required for Modes 3 through 5.
May be relocated for Modes 1 and 2, 2.
The LCO for this system should be retained in STS. The Policy Statement criteria should not be used as the basis for relocating specific trip functions, channels, or instruments within these LCOs.
3.
The staff is pursuing alternative approaches which would allow relocation of some of these LCOs on a schedule consistent with the schedule for development of the new STS. The staff is also initiating rulemaking to delete the requirement that RETS be included in Technical Specifications.
Because fires (either inside or outside the control room) can be a significar.t 4.
contributor to the core melt frequency and because the uncertainties with fire initiation frequency can be significant, the staff believes that this LCO should be retrained in the STS at this time. The staff will consider relecation of Remote Shutdewn Instrumentation on a plant-specific basis.
5.
This LCO will be considered for relocation to a licensee-controlled document on a plant-specific basis.
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I 1ABLE 2 (Note 1)
BABCOCK & WILCOX STANDARD TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCOs WHICH MAY BE RELOCATED LCO 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.2.1 Tiow Paths - Shutdown 3.1.2.2 Flow Paths - Operating 3.1.2.3 Makeup Pump - Shutdown 3.1.2.4 Makeup Pump - Operating 3.1.2.5 Decay Heat Removal Pump - Shutdown 3.1.2.6 Boric Acid Pumps - Shutdown 3.1.2.7 Boric Acid Pumps - Operating 3.1.2.8 Borated Water. Eource - Shutdown 3.1.2.9 Borated Water Sburce - Operating (Note 2)
Position Indication. Channels - Operating (Note 2) 3.1.3.3 Position Indication-Channels - Shutdown 3.1.3.4 3.1.3.5 Rod Drop Time (Note 2) 3.1.3.8 Rod Program 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.3.2 Incore Detectors 3.3.3.3 Seismic Instrumentation 3.3.3.4 Meteorological Instrumentation 3.3.3.7 Chlorine Detection System 3.3.3.0 Fire Detection 3.3.3.9 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitor (Note 3) 3.3.3.10 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitor (Note 3) 3.3.4 Turbine Overspeed Protection 3.4 P.EACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3.4.2 Safety Valves - Shutdown 3.4.6 Steam Generators Tube Surveillance (Note 4) 3.4.8 Chemistry 3.4.10.2 Pressurizer Terneratures 3.4.11 Structural Integrity ASME Code (Note 4) 3.4.12 RCS Vents 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.2 Containnent Leakage (Note 5) 3.6.1.7 Containrent Structural Integrity (Note 2) 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS I
3.7.2 Steam Generator Pressure / Temperature Limits 3.7.9 Snubbers l
3.7.10 Sealed Source Contanination l
A-4
B&W-TABLE 2 (Continued)
LCO 3.7.11.1 Fire Suppression Water Sys'.em 3.7.11.2 Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems 3.7.11.3 CO, System 3.7.11.4 HaTon System 3.7.11.5 Fire Hose Stations 3.7.11.6 Yard Fire Hydrants and Hydrant Hose Houses 3.7.12 Fire Barrier Penetrations 3.7.13 Area Temperature Monitoring 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.5 Comunications 3.9.6 Fuel Handling Bridge 3.9.7 Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building 3.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3.10.1 Shutdown Margin (Note 6) 3.10.2 Group Height Insertion Limits and Power Distribution Limits (Note 6) 3.10.3 Physics Tests (Note 6) 3.10.4 Reactor Coolant Loops (Note 6) 3.11 RADICACTIVE EFFLUENTS (Note 3) 3.11.1.1 Concentration 3.11.1.2 Dose 3.11.1.3 Liquid Ra6 waste Treatment System 3.11.1.4 Liquid Holdup Tanks 3.11.2.1 Dose 3.11.2.2 Dose - Noble Gases 3.11.2.3 Dose - Iodine - 131 Tritium and Radionuclides in Particulate i
Form 3.11.2.4 Gaseous Radwaste Treatnant Systems
)
3.11.2.5 Explosive Gas Mixture i
i 3.11.2.6 Gas Storage Tanks 3.11.3 Solid Radioactive Yaste 3.11.4 Total Dose 3.12 RADI0 ACTIVE ENVIRONMEhTAL MONITORING (Note 3) 3.12.1 Monitoring Program 3.12.2 Land Use Census 3.12.3 Interlaboratory Corparison Program A-5
B&W-TABLE 2 (Continued)
Notes:
- 1. Specifications listed in this table may be relocated contingent upon NRC staff approval of the location of and controls over relocated requirements.
- 2. This LC0 may be removed from the STS. However, if the associated Surveillance Requirement (s) is necessary to meet the OPERABILITY requirements for a retained LCO, the Surveillance Requirement (s) should be relocated to the retained LCO.
- 3. The staff is pursuing alternative approaches which would allow relocation of some of these LCOs on a schedule consistent with the schedule for develop-ment of the new STS. The staff is also initiating rulemaking to delete the requirement that RETS be included in Technical Specifications.
- 4. This LCO may be relocated.out of Technical Specifications. However, the associated Surveillance Requir; ment (s) must be relocated to Technical Specification Section 4.0, Surveillance Requirements.
- 5. This LCO may be relocated. However, Pa, La, Ld, and Lt must be either retained in TS or in the Bases of the appropriate Containment LCO.
- 6. Special Test Exceptions may be included with corresponding LCOs.
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l APPENDIX B RESULTS OF THE NRC STAFF REVIEW WESTINGHOUSE OWNERS GROUP'S SUBMITTAL RETENTION AND RELOCATION OF SPECIFIC TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l
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APPENDIX B TABLE 1 LCOs TO BE RETAINED IN WESTINGHOUSE STANDARD TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CRITERIA LCO 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 200 deg. F (Note 1) 2 Shutdown Margin - Tave>2 200 deg. F (Note 1) 3.1.1.1 2
Shutdown Margin - Tave 3.1.1.2 2
3.1.1.3 Moderator Temperature Coefficient 2
3.1.1.4 Minimum Temperature for Criticality 3.1.3.1 Moveable Control Assemblies - Group Height 3
2 3.1.3.5 Shutdown Rod Insertion Limit 2
3.1.3.6 ControlRodInsprtionLimits 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 2
3.2.1 Axial Flux Difference 2
3.2.2 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor 3.2.3 RCS Flow Rate and Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel 2
Factor 2
3.2.4 Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio 2
3.2.5 DNB Parameters 3.3.
INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation (Note 2) 3 Feature Actuation System 3
Engineered Safety (Note 2) 3.3.2 Instrumentation 3.3.3.1 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation (Notes 2 & 3) 1&3 3.3.3.5 Remote Shutdown Instrumentation (Notes 2 & 4)
Risk 1
3.3.3.6 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation 3
3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3.4.1.1 RCS Startup and Power Operation 3
3 3.4.1.2 RCS Hot Standby 3.4.1.3 RCS Hot Shutdown 3
3.4.1.4.1 RCS Cold Shutdown - Loeps Filled 3
3.4.1.4.2 RCS Cold Shutdown - Loops Het filled 3
3.4.1.5 RCS Isolated Loop (Optional) 2 3.4.1.6 RCSIsolatedloopStartup(Optional) 2 3.4.2.2 RCS Safety valves - Operation 3
3.4.3 Pressurizer 2&3 3.4.4 Relief Valves 3
3.4.6.1 Leakage Detection System 1
2 3.4.6.2 Operational Leakage 2
3.4.8 Specific Activity 3.4.9.1 Pressure / Temperature Linits - RCS 2
3.4.9.3 Overpressure Protection Systems 2
B-1
W-TABLE 1(Continued)
CRITERIA LC0 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3.5.1.1 Cold Leg Injection Accumulators 2&3 3.5.1.2 Upper Head Injection Accumulators (STS REV-5) 2&3 3.5.2 ECCS Subsystems. Tavg,,350 deg F 3
3.5.3 ECCS Subsystems, Tavg,,350 deg F 3
2&3 3.5.4.1 Boron Injection Tank 2&3 3.5.5 Refueling Water Storage Tank 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3
3.6.1.1 Containment Integrity 3.6.1.3 Containment Air Locks 3
3.6.1.4 Containment Isolation Valve and Channel Weld 3
Pressurization tystem (Optional) 3.6.1.5 Internal Pressure 2
2 3.6.1.6 Air Temperature 3.6.1.8 Containment Ventilation System 3
3.6.1.9 Shield Building Air Cleanup System (Ice Condenser) 3 3.6.2.1 Containment Quench Spray System (Sub-ATM Containment) 3 3.6.2.1 Containment Spray System 3
3.6.2.2 Containment Recirculation Spray System (Sub-ATM 3
Containment) i 3.6.2.2 SprayAdditiveSystem(0ptional) 2&3 3.6.2.3 Containment Cooling System (Optional) 3 3.6.3 Iodine Cleanup System (Optional) 3 3.6.4 Containtrent Isolation Yalves (minus response time) 3 3
3.6.5.1 Hydrogen Monitors 3.6.5.2 Electric Hydrogen Recombiners (Note 5) 3 3.6.5.3 Hydrogen Control Distributed Ignition System (STS 3
REV-5,IceCondenser) 3.6.5.4 Hydrogen Mixing System (Optional) 3 3.6.6 Penetration Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System (Optional) 3 3.6.7 Vacuum Relief Valves 3
3.6.7.1 Ice Bed (Ice Condenser) 2&3 3.6.7.3 Ice Condenser Doors (Ice Condenser) 2&3 3.6.7.5 Divider Barrier Personnel Access Doors and Equipment 2&3 Hatches (IceCondenser) 3.6.7.6 ContainmentAirRecirculationSystems(IceCondenser) 2&3 3.6.7.7 Floor Drains (Ice Condenser) 2&3 3,0.7.8 Refueling Canal Drains (Ice Condenser) 3 1
3.6.7.9 Divider Barrier Seal (Ice Condenser) 2&3 3.6.8.1 Shield Building Air Cleanup System (Dual) 3 3.6.8.2 ShieldBuildingIntegrity(Dual) 3 B-2 i
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I W-TABLE 1 (Continued)
CRITERIA LCO 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3
3.7.1.1 Turbine Cycle Safety Valves 2&3 3.7.1.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System 2&3 3.7.1.3 Condensate Storage Tank 2
3.7.1.4 Activity 3.7.1.5 Main Steam Line Isolation Valves 3
3 3.7.3 Component Cooling Water System 3
3.7.4 Service Water System 3.7.5 Ultimate Heat Sink (Optional) 3 3.7.7 Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System 3
3 3.7.8 ECCS Pump Roon Emergency Air Cleanup System ELECTRICAL P0. Ep SYSTEMS W
3.8 3.8.1.1 A.C. Sources - Operating 3
3.8.1.2 A.C. Sources - Shutdown 3
3.8.2.1 0.C. Sources - Operating 3
3.8.2.2 D.C. Sources - Shutdown 3
3.8.3.1 Onsite Power Distribution - Operating 3
3.8.3.2 Onsite Power Distribution - Shutdown 3
3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.1 Boron Concentration 2
3.9.2 Instrumentation 3
2 3.9.3 Decay Time 3.9.4 Containment Building Penetrations 3
3.9.8.1 Residual Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level Policy Statement (RHR) 3.9.6.2 Residual Heat Renoval and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level Policy Statenent (RHR) 3.9.9 Containrent Purge and Exhaust Isolation System 3
3.9.10 Water Level - Reactor Vessel 2
3.9.11 Water Level - Storage Pool 2
3.9.12 Storage Poo' Air Cleanup System 3
Notes:
- 1. Required for Modes 3 through S.
Hay be relocated for Modes 1 and 2.
- 2. The LCO for this system should be retained in STS. The Policy Statement criteria shculd not be used as the basis for relocating specific trip functions, chanriels, or instruments withic these LCOs.
- 3. The staf f is pursuing citernative approaches which would allow relocation of scte of these LCOs en a schedule consistent with the schedule for develop-ment of the new STS. The staff is also initiating rulenaking to delete the requirement that RETS be included in Technical Specifications.
E-3
W-TABLE 1 (Continued)
Notes:
I
- 4. Because fires (either inside or outside the control room) can be a significant contributor to the core melt frequency and because the uncertainties with fire initiation frequency can be significant, the staff believes that this LCO should be retained in the STS at this time.
The staff will consider relocation of Remote Shutdown Instrumentation on a plant-specific basis.
- 5. This LCO will be considered for relocation to a licensee-controlled document on a plant-specific basis.
\\
J B-4
TABLEz(Note 1)
WESTINGHOUSE STANDARD TECHNICAL SPECIF} CATIONS LCOs WHICH MAY BE RELOCATED LCO 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.2.1 Flow Paths - Shutdown 3.1.2.2 Flow Paths - Operating 3.1.2.3 Charging Pumps - Shutdown 3.1.2.4 Charging pumps - Operating 3.1.2.5 Borated Water Sources - Shutdown 3.1.2.6 Borated Water Sources - Operating (Note 2)
PositionIndicationSystem-Operating (Note 2) 3.1.3.2 Position Indication System - Shutdown 3.1.3.3 3.1.3.4 Rod Drop Time (Note 2)
~
3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.3.2 Movable incore Detectors 3.3.3.3 Seismic Instrumentation 3.3.3.4 Meteorological Instrumentation 3.3.3.7 Chlorine Detection Systems t
3.3.3.8 Fire Detection Instrumentation 3.3.3.9 Loose-Part Detection Instrumentation 3.3.3.10 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation (Note 3) 3.3.3.11 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation (STS REY - 5) (Note 3) 3.3.4 Turbine Overspeed Protection 1
3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3.4.2.1 RCS Safety Valves - Shutdcwn 3.4.5 SteamGenerators(Note 4) 3.4.7 Chemistry
)
3.4.9.2 Pressure / Temperature Limits - Pressurizer 1
3.4.10 RCS Structural Intgerity (Note 4) i 3.4.11 Reactor Coolant System Vents (STS REV-5) j 3.5 EMERGENCY CCRE COOLING SYSTEMS i
3.5.4.2 Heat Tracirg i
l l
B-5
,l W-TABLE 2(Continued)
LCO 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.2 Containment Leakage (Note 5) 3.6.1.7 Containment Structural Integrity (Note 2) 3.6.1.S Shield Building Structural Integrity (Ice Condenser) (Note 2) 3.6.4 Containment Isolation Valves (response times) (Note 2) 3.6.5.1 SteamJetAirEjector(Sub-ATMContainment) 3.6.5.2 Mechanical Vacuum Pumps (SUB-ATM Containment)
Hydreden Purge Cleanup System 3.6.5.3 3.6.7.2 IceBedTemperatureMonitoringSystem(IceCondenser) 3.6.7.4 Inlet Door Position Monitoring System (Ice Condenser) 3.6.8.3 Shield Building Structural Integrity (Dual) 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.2 SteamGenerat'oAPressure/TemperatureLimitation 3.7.6 Flood Protection (Optional) 3.7.9 Snubbers 3.7.10 Sealed Source Contamination 3.7.11.1 Fire Suppression Water System 3.7.11.2 Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems 3.7.11.3 CO2 Systems 3.7.11.4 Halon Systems 3.7.11.5 Fire Hose Stations 3.7.11.6 Yard Fire Hydrants and Hydrant Hose Houses 3.7.12 Fire Rated Assemblies 3.7.13 Area Temperature Monitoring 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.4.1 A.C. Circuits Inside Primary Containment (STS REV-5) 3.8.4.2 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Davices 3.8.4.3 Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Protection and Bypass Devices 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.5 Comunications 3.9.6 Manipulator Crane 3.9.7 Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool i
I 3.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS (Note 6)
B-6 4
4 W-TABLE 2(Continued)
LCO 3.11 RADI0ACTIVEEFFLUENTS(Note 3) 3.11.1.1 Liquid Effluents Concentration (STS REV-5) 3.11.1.2 Dose (STS REV-5) 3.11.1.3 LiquidRadwasteTreatmentSystem(STSREV-5) 3.11.1.4 Liquid Holdup Tanks (STS REV-5) 3.11.2.1 Dose Rate (STS REV-5) 3.11.2.2 Dose - Noble Gases (STS REV-5) 3.11.2.3 Dose 1-131, 1-133. Tritium and Radioactive Material In Particulate Form 3.11.2.4 GaseousRadwasteTreatment(STSREV-5) 3.11.2.5 ExplosiveGasMixture(STSREV-5) 3.11.2.6 Gas Storage Tanks 3.11.3 Solid Radioactive Waste (STS REV-5) 3.11.4 Total Dose (STS REV-5) 3.12 RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING (Note 3) 3.12.1 MonitoringProgram(STSREV-5) 3.12.2 Land Use Census (STS REV-5) 3.12.3 Interlaboratory Comparison Program (STS REV-5) t!otes:
- 1. LCOs listed in this table may be relocated contingent upon NRC staff approval of the location of and controls over relocated requirements.
- 2. This LCO may be removed from the STS. However, if the associated Surveillance i
Requirement (s) is necessary to meet the OPERABILITY requirements for a retained LCO,theSurveillanceRequirement(s)shouldberelocatedtotheretainedLCO.
- 3. The staff is pursuing alternative approaches which would allow relocation of some of these LCOs on a schedule consistent with the schedule for develop-1 ment of the new STS. The staff is also initiating rulemaking to delete the requirerrent that RETS be included in Technical Specifications.
- 4. This LCO may be relocated out of Tect nical Specifications. However, the associated Surveillance Requirement (s) must be relocated to Technical Specification Section a.0, Surveillance Requirements.
- 5. This LCO may be relocated. However, Pa, La, Ld and Lt must be either retained in TS or in the Bases of the appropriate containment LCO.
j
- 6. Special Test exceptions 3.10.1 through 3.10.4 may be included with corresponding LCOs which are retaining in Technical Specificaticns. Special Test Exception 3.10.5 may be relocated outside of Technical Specifications along with LCO 1
3.1.3.3.
B-7 t
3
(
h 4
r i
APPENDIX C RESULTS OF THE NRC STAFF REVIEW COMBUSTION ENGINEERING OWNERS GROUP'S SUBMITTAL
~\\
RETENTION AND RELOCATION,0F SPECIFIC TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l
h i
^
f i
I 4
i i
1 i
l l
1 i
I
)
d 3
.-,,~n,---
-- r -, - -
.r-,.-
,.,-,,,,,,,v--
I APPENDIX C TABLE 1 LCOs TO BE RETAINED IN COMBUSTION ENGINEERING STANDARD TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CRITERIA LCO 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.1.1 Shutdown Margin --Teoid. > 210F Note 1 2
3.1.1.2 Shutdown Margin - Teold. E 210F Note 1 2
3.1.1.3 Moderator Temperature Coefficient 2
2 3.1.1.4 Minimum Temperature for Criticality 2&3 3.1.3.1 CEA Position'.,
2 3.1.3.5 Shutdown CEA Intertion Limit 2
3.1.3.6 Regulating CEA Insertion Limits 2
3.1.3.7 Part length CEA Insertion Limits 3.2 PCK'ER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 2
3.2.1 Linear Heat Rate 3.2.2 Planar Radial Peaking Factors--Fxy 2
3.2.3 Azimuthal Power Tilt -- Tq 2
2 3.2.4 DNBR Margin 2
3.2.5 RCS Flow Rate 3.2.6 Reactor Coolant Cold Leg Temperature 2
2 3.2.7 Axial Shape Index 2
3.2.8 Pressurizer Pressure 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1 Reactor Protective Instrumentation (Note 2) 3 3.3.2 ESFAS Instrumentation (Note 2) 3 3.3.3.1 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation (Notes 2 8 3) 3 3.3.3.5 RemoteShutdownSystem(Notes 2&4)
Risk 3.3.3.6 Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation 3
3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 2&3 3.4.1.1 Startup and Power Operation 2&3 3.4.1.2 Fot Standby 2&3 3.4.1.3 Hot Shutdown 3.4.1.4.1 Cold Shutdown - Leops filled 2&3 3.4.1.4.2.
Cold Shutdown - Loops not filled 2&3 C-1
CE-TABLE 1(Continued)
CRITERIA LCO 3.4.2.2 Safety Valves - Operating 3
3.4.3.1 Pressurizer 2&3 3.4.4 ReliefValve(PORYOnly) 3 3.4.6.1 Leakage Detection Systems 3
3.4.6.2 Operational Leakage 3
3.4.8 Specific Activity 2
3.4.9.1 Reactor Coolant System 2
3.4.9.3 Overpressure Protection Systems-LTOP 2
3.5 EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS) 3.5.1 Safety Injection Tanks 3
3.5.2 ECCS Subsystems -- Teold. > 350F 3
-- Tcold. 2 350F 3
ECCS Subsystems'6 Tank 3.5.3 Refueling Water 3
3.5.4 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS'-
3.6.1.1 Containment Integrity 3
3.6.1.3 Containment Air Locks 3
3.6.1.5 Internal Pressure 2
3.6.1.6 Air Temperature 2
3.6.1.8 ContainmentVentilationSystem(Optional) 3 3.6.2.1 Containment Spray System 3
3.6.2.2 Spray Additive System (Optional) 3 3.6.2.3 Containeent Cooling System (Optional) 3 3.6.3 lodineCleanupSystem(Optional) 3 3.6.4 Contt.!nment Isolation Valves 3
3.6.5.1 Hydrogen Monitors (Note 5) 3 3.6.5.2 ElectricHydrogenCombiners(Note 5) 3 3.6.5.4 Hydrogen Mixing Systen 3
i 3.6.6 PenetrationRoomExhaustAirCleanupSystem(Optional) 3 l
3.6.7 VacuumReliefValves(Optional) 3 3.6.8.1 ShieldBuildingAirCleanupSystem(Optional) 3 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.1.1 Safety Valves 3
3.7.1.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System 3
3.7.1.3 Condensate Storage Tank 3
3.7.1.4 Activity 3
3.7.1.5 Main Steam Isolation Valves 3
C-2
i CE-TABLE 1(Continued)
CRITERIA LC0 3.7.3 Component Cooling Water System 3
3.7.4 Service Water System 3
3.7.5 Ultimate Heat Sink 3
3.7.7 Essential Chilled Water System 3
3.7.9 ECCSPumpRoomAirExhaustcleanupSystem(Optional) 3 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1.1 A.C. Sources - Operating 3
3.8.1.2 A.C. Sources - Shutdown 3
3.8.2.1 D.C. Sources - 0)erating 3
3.8.2.2 0.C. Sources - $1utdown 3
3.8.3.1 Onsite Power Distribution Sources - Operating 3
3.8.3.2 Onsite Power Distribution Sources - Shutdown 3
3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.1 Boron Concentration 2
3.9.2 Instrumentation 3
3.9.3 Decay Time 2
3.9.4 Containment Building Penetrations 3
3.9.8.1 Shutdown Cooling and Coolant Circulation -
High Water Level 2
3.9.8.2 Shutdown Cooling and Coolant Circulation -
Low Water Level 2
3.9.9 Containment Purge Valve Isolation System 3
3.9.10 Water Level-Reactor Vessel 2
3.9.11 Weter Level-Storage Pool 2
3.9.12 Fuel Building Air Cleanup System 3
Notes:
1 1.
Required for Modes 3 through 5.
May be relocated for Modes 1 and 2.
2.
LCOs for this system shald be retained in STS.
The Policy Statement Criteria should not be used to relocate specific trip functions, channels, or instruments within these LCOs.
3.
The staff is pursuing alternative approaches which would allow relocation t
of some of these LCOs on a schedule consistent with the schedule for develop-ment of the new STS. The staff is also initiating rulemaking to delete the requirement that RETS be included in Technical Specifications.
4.
Because fires (either inside or outside the control room) can be a significart contributor to the core melt frequency and because the uncertainties with fire initiation frequency can be significant, the staff believes that this LCO should be retained in the 515 at this time. The staff will consider relocation of Renote Shutdown Instrumentation on a plant-specific basis.
5.
This LC0 will be considered for relocatien to a licensee-controlled document on a plant-specific basis.
C-3
TABLE 2 (hote 1)
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING STANDARD TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCOs WHICH MAY BE RELOCATED ME 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.2.1 Flow Paths -- Shutdown 3.1.2.2 Flow Paths-Operating 3.1.2.3 Charging Pumps -- Shutdown 3.1.2.4 Charging Pumps-Operating 3.1.2.5 Boric Acid Makeup Pumps -- Shutdown 3.1.2.6 Boric Acid Makeup Pumps-Operating 3.1.2.7 Borated Water Source - Shutdown 3.1.2.8 Borated Water Sources - Operating 4
3.1.3.2 Position Indicator Channels-Operating (Note 2) s 3.1.3.3 PositionIndicatorChannels-Shutdown (Note 2) 3.1.3.4 CEA Drop Time (Note 2) 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.3.2 Incore Detectors 3.3.3.3 Seismic Instrumentation 3.3.3.4 Meteorological Instrurientation 3.3.3.7 Fire Detection Instrumentation 3.3.3.8 Chlorine Detection Systems 3.3.3.9 Loose Part Detection Instrumentation 3.3.3.10 RadioactiveLiquidEffluentMonitor(Note 3) 3.3.3.11 Radioactive Gaseous Effuent Monitur (Note 3) 3.3.4 Turbine Overspeed Protection 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3.4.2.1 Safety Valves-Shutdown j
3.4.4 Relief Valves (Non PORV) l 3.4.5 Steam Generators (Note 4) 3.4.7 Chemistry 3.4.9.2 Pressurizer Heatup/Cooldown Limits 3.4.10 Structural Integrity (Note 4) 3 t. 11 Reacter Coolant System Vents 3.6 CONTAlhMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.2 Containment Leakage (Note 5) 4 3.6.1.4 Containment Isolation Valve and Channel Weld Pressure System 3.6.1.7 Containment Vessel Structural Integrity (Note 2) 3.6.5.3 Hydrogen Purge Cleanup System 3.6.8.2 Shield Building Integrity j
3.6.8.3 Shield Building Structural Integrity (Note 2)
I C-4
,l CE-TABLE 2 (Continued)
LCO 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.2 Steam Generator Pressure / Temperature Limitation 3.7.6 Flood Protection 3.7.8 Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System 3.7.10 Snubbers 3.7.11 Sealed Source Contamination 3.7.12 Fire Suppression Systems 3.7.12.1 Fire Suppression Water System 3.7.12.2 Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems 3.7.12.3 C02 Systems 3.7.12.4 Halon Systems 3.7.12.5 Fire Hose Stations 3.7.12.6 Yard Fire Hydrasts and Hose Houses 3.7.13 Fire-Rated Assenblies 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SY3TEMS 3.8.4.1 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Device 3.8.4.2 Motor-Operated Valves-Thermal Overload Protection 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.5 Comunication 3.9.6 ManipulatorCrane(RefuelingMachine) 3.9.7 Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Pool Building 3.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3.10.1 Shutdown Margin (Note 6) 3.10.2 Group Height, insertion, and Power Dist. (Note 6) 3.10.3 Reactor Coolant Loops (Note 6) 3.10.4 CEA Position, Reg CEA Ins, and Cold leg Temp. (Note 6) 3.11 RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENTS (Note 3) 3.11.1.1 Liquid Waste Discharge to Evap. Ponds -
Concentration 3.11.1.2 Liquid Waste Discharge to Evap. Ponds 1
l Dose 3.11.1.3 Liquid Holdup Tanks 3.11.2.1 Gaseous Effluer.ts - Dose Rate 3.11.2.2 Gastcus Effluents - Dose-Noble Gases
)
3.11.2.3 Gaseous Effluents - Dose--l-131,133 Tritium & Radionuclides 3.11.2.4 Gaseous Radwaste Treatrent 3.11.2.5 Explosive Gas Mixture i
3.11.2.6 Gas Storage Tanks i
3.11.3 Solid Radioactive Waste 3.11.4 Total Dose C-5
CE-TABLE 2(Continued)
LCO 3.12 RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING (Note 3) 3.12.1 Monitoring Program 3.12.2 Land Use Census 3.12.3 Interlaboratory Comparison Program Notes:
- 1. Specifications listed in this table may be relocated contingent upon NRC staff approval of the location of and controls over relocated requirements.
2.ThisLCOmayberemovedfrohtheSTS.
However, if the associated Surveillance Requirement (s) is necessary to swet the OPERABILITY requirements for a retained LCO,theSurveillanceRequiremeht(s)shouldberelocatedtotheretainedLCO.
- 3. The staff is pursuing alternative approaches which would allow relocation of some of these LCOs on a schedule consistent with the schedule for develop-ment of the new STS. The staff is also initiating rulemaking to delete the requirenent that RETS be included in Technical Specifications.
- 4. This LCO may be relocated out of Technical Specifications. However, the l
associated Surveillance Requirement (s) must be relocated to Technical Specification Section 4.0, Surveillance Requirerents.
- 5. This LCO may be relocated. However, Pa, La, Ld, and Lt must be either retained in TS or in the Bases of the appropriate containment LCO.
i 6.
Special Test Exceptions ray be included with the corresponding LCOs.
1 1
il j
i r
C-6 4
j I
1 APPENDIX D RESULTS OF THE NRC STAFF REVIEW BWR OWNERS GROUP'S SUBMITTAL RETENTION AND RELOCATION OF SPECIFIC TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
't l
l l
APPENDIX 0 TABLE 1 LCOs TO BE RETAINED IN GENERAL ELECTRIC ST ANDARD TECHNICAL 5PECIFICATION5 REPORT PLANT
- CRITERIA LCO ITEM 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.1 1
Shutdown Margin H GG 2
3.1.3 Control Rods 3
Control Rods Operability H.GG 3
5 Max'im\\m Scram Times (BWR/6)
GG 3
6 Average Scram Times H
3 7
Fastest T-out-of-4 Scram H
3 Times 8
Scram Accumulators H,GG 3
9 Control Rod Drive Coupling H.GG 3
10 Control Rod Position H.GG 3
Indication 11 Control Rod Drive Housing H,GG 3
Support l
3.1.4 Control Rod Program Controls i
l'd Rod Worth Minimizer (BWR/2-5)
H 3
13 Control Rod Withdrawal (BWR/6)
GG 2
14 Rod Pattern Control System GG 3
(BWR/6) 15 Rod Sequence Control Systems H
3 16 Rod Block Monitor H
3 3.1.5 17 Standby Liquid Control System H,GGPolicyStatement(SBLC) 3.1.6 18 Scram Discharge Volume Vent H
3 and Drain Valves 3.2 PCKER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.7.1 19 Average Planar Linear Heat H.GG 2
Generation (APLHGR) l 3.2.3 21 Minimum Critical Power Ratio H,GG 2
(MCPR) 3.2.4
??
Linear Heat Generation Rate H,GG 2
(LFCR)
- H-Hatch Unit 2 GG-Grand Guit D-1 l
BWR-TABLE 1(Continued)
REPORT g
ITEM PLANT CRITERIA 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation (Note 1) 23 Average Power Range Monitors H.GG 3
(APRM) 24 Intemediate Range Monitors H,GG 3
(IRM) t 25 Vessel Pressure - High H,GG 3
26 Reactor Vessel Water H.GG 3
Level - Low (Level 3) 27 Reactor Vessel Water GG 3
Lev.el,- High (Level 8) 28 MSIV Closure H.GG 3
29 MSL Radia} ion - High H,GG 3
(RPS Inst:)
30 Drywell Pressure - High H.GG 3
31 SDV Water Level - High H.GG 3
34 Mode Switch H.GG 3
35 Manual Scram H,GG 3
3.3.2 Isolation Actuation Instrumentation (Note 1)
Primary Containment Isolation 36 Peactor Yessel Water H
3 Level - Low (Level 3) 37 Reactor Vessel Water H,GG 3
Level - Low (Level 2) 38 Reactor Vessel Water H,GG 3
Level - Low (Level 1) 39 Drywell Pressure - High H.GG 3
40 Containment and Drywell GG 3
Ventilation Exhaust Radiation - High High Main Steam Line Isolation 41 Manual Initiation GG 3
(Prinary Containtrent) 42 Reactor Vessel Water GG 3
Level - Low (Level 1) 43 Main Steam Line Radiation -
H.GG 3
High (MSL1) 44 Main Steam Line Pressure -
H.GG 3
Low 45 Main Steam Line Flow - High H.GG 1&3 D-2 i
)
BWR-TABLE 1 (Continued)
REPORT PLANT CRITERIA Q
ITEM 46 Condenser Vacuum - Low H.GG 3
47 Main Steam Line Tunnel H.GG 1&3 Temperature - High 48 Main Steam Line Tunnel GG 1&3 Differential Temperature -
High 49 Manual Initiation (MSLI)
GG 3
50 Turbine Building Area H
1&3 Temperature - High Secondary Containment Isolation 51 Rea'cter Building Exhaust H
3 Radiation - High 52 Reactor Vessel Water H.GG 3
Level - Low (Levc1 2) 53 Drywell Pressure - High H,GG 3
54 Refueling Floor Exhaust H
3 Radiation - High 55 Fuel Handling Area GG 3
Ventilation Exhaust Radiation - High High 56 Fuel Handling Area Pool GG 3
Sweep Exhaust Radiation -
High High Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation 57 Manual Initiation GG 3
(SecondaryContainment)
SS Differential Flow - High H.GG 1&3 59 Differential Flow Timer GG 2
60 Equipment Area H.GG 1&3 Temperature - High 61 Equipment Area Differential H.GG 1&3 Temperature - High 62 Reactor Vessel Water H,GG 3
Level - (Level 2) 63 Main Steam Line Tunnel GG 1&3 Temperature - High 64 Main Steam Line Tunnel GG 1&3 Differential Temperature -
High 65 SLCS Initiation H.GG Policy Statement (SBLC)
D-3 t
e.
BWR-TABLE 1(Continued)
REPORT PLANT CRITERIA LCO ITEM High Pressure Coolant injection System Isolation 66 ManualInitiation(RWCS)
GG 3
67 HPCI Steam Line Flow - High H
1&3 68 HPCI Steam Supply H
3 Pres 3ure - Low l
69 HPCI Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure - High H
3 70 HPCI Pipe Penetration Room H
1&3 Temperature - High 71 Suppression Pool Area H
1&3 Ambignt Terrperature -
High 72 Suppression Pool Area H
1&3 Differential Teeperature -
High 73 Suppression Pool Area H
2&3 Temperature Timer Relays 74 Emergency Area Cooler H
1&3 Temperature - High 76 Logic Power Monitor H
3 Reactor Core Isolation i
Cooling System Isolation 77 RCIC Steam Line Flow - High H.GG 1&3 78 RCIC Steam Supply HGGPolicyStatement(RCIC)
Pressure - Low 4
79 RCIC Turbine Exhaust HGGPolicyStatenent(RCIC)
Diaphragm Pressure - High 00 RCIC Equipnent Area H GG 1&3 Terperature - High 81 Suppression Pool Area H
1&3 Ambient Terperature - High 82 Suppression Pool Area H
1&3 Differential Temperature -
High 83 Suppression Pool Area H
2&3 Terperature Timer Relays CS Logic Power Monitor H
3 t
i 86 RCIC Equipment Room GG 1&3 t
Differential Temperature -
i High 1
87 Main Steam Line Tunnel GG 1&3 Terperature - High 88 Main Steam Line Tunnel GG 1l3 Differential Temperature -
High r
D-4
ol e.
l BWR-TABLEfl(Continued)
REPORT PLANT CRITERIA LCO ITEM 89 Main Steam Line Tunnel GG 3
Temperature Timer 90 RHR Equipment Room GG 183 Temperature - High 91 RHR Equipment Room GG 1&3 l
Differential Temperature -
High 1
92 RHR/RCIC Steam Line GC 1&3 Flow - High RHR System Isolation 93 Manua,1 Initiation (RCIC)
GG 3
RHR Et uipment Area GG 1&3 94 l
Temperature - High 95 RHR Equipment Room GG 1&3 Differential Temperature -
1 High 96 Reactor Vessel Water H.GG 3
Level - Low (Level 3) 97 ReactorYessel(RHRCut-In H,GG Policy Statement (RHR)
Pemissive) Pressure -
High 98 Drywell Pressure - High GG PolicyStatement(RHR) 99 Manual Initiation (RHR)
GG 3.3.3 ECCSActuationInstrumentation(Note 1)
RHR(LPCI/LPCS/CoreSpray) f 100 Reactor Vessel Water H.GG 3
Level - Low (Level 1) l 101 Drywell Pressure - High H,GG 3
t l
102 RHR Pump Time Delay H.GG 3
103 Manual Initiation GG 3
RHR(LPCI/LPCS/CoreSpray) 104 Reactor Steam Dome H,GG 3
Pressure - Low 105 Reactor Vessel Shroud H
3 Level - Low 106 Logic Power Monitor H
3 Auto:natic Depressurization System 106A Lontrol Power Monitor H
3 107 Reactor Vessel Water Level H,GG 3
Low (Level 1) 10B Dr>> ell Pressure - High H.GG 3
(
109 ADS Initiation Tiner H GG 3
i 110 Low Water Level Tiner H
3 0-5 l
I BWR-TABLE _1 (Continued)
REPORT LC0 ITEM PLANT CRITERIA 111 Reactor Vessel Water Level H GG
?
Low (Level 3) 112 LPCI/LPCS/ Core Spray H,GG 3
Discharge Pressure - High 112A AD3 Bypass Timer GG 3
High Pressure Core Spray 112B Manual Inhibit (ADS)
GG 3
113 Manual Initiation (ADS)
GG 3
114 Drywell Pressure - High GG 3
115 Reactor Yessel Water Level GG 3
Low (Level 2) 116 Reactor Vessel Water Level GG 2
High (Level 8) 117 CSTLhvel-Low GG 3
118 Supp. Pool Water GG 3
Level - High HPCI 119 Manual Initiation (HPCS)
GG 3
120 Drywell Pressure - High H
3 121 Reactor Vessel Water H
3 Level - Low (Level 2) 122 Reactor Vessel Water H
2 Level - High (Level 8) 123 Condensate Storage Tank H
3 Level - Low
}
124 Suppression Chamber Water H
3 Level - High 106 Logic Power Monitor H
3 ECCS Inst.
125 Loss of Power GG 3
l 126 Reactor Pressure - High H
3 (Low low Set Interlock) 3.3.4 Recirculation Pump Trip Actuation Instrumentation 127 E0C-RPT H.GG 3
128 ATWS-RPT H,GG Policy Statenent (RPT) 3.3.5 RCIC Instrumentation 129 Reactor Vessel Water H,GG Policy Statement (RCIC)
Level - Low (Level 2) 130 Reactor Vessel Water GG Policy Staterent (RCIC) t Level High (Level 8) 0-6
BWR-TABLE 1 (Continued)
REFORT PLANT CRITERIA LC0 ITEM 131 CST Level - Low H,GG Policy Statement (RCIC) 132 Supp. Pool Water Level - High H GG 3
133 Manual Initiation (RCIC)
GG 2
3.3.6 Control Rod Withdrawal Block Instrumentation 134 Rod Pattern Control Sys'em GG 3
136 RBM H
3 141 Reactor Mode Switch GG 3
Shutdown Position 3.3.7 Monitoring Instrumentation 142-Radia' tion Monitoring Instrumentation (Notes 1 & 2) 150 153 Remote Shitdown Instrumentation H,GG Risk (Notes 1 A 3) 154-Accident Monitoring 181 lestrumentation H,GG 1, 2 & 3 182 SRM H,GG 2
3.3.6 Plant Systems Actuation Instrumentation 190 Drywell Press (Cont. Spray)
GG 3
191 Cont. Press (Cont. Spray)
GG 3
192 Water Level 1 (Cont. Spray)
GG 3
193 Tiners (Cont. Spray)
GG 3
194 Water Level 8 (FW/TT)
GG 2
GG 3
195 Drywell Pressure (Supp. Pool Makeup System-SPMS) 196 Level 1 (SPMS)
GG 3
197 Level 2 (SPMS)
GG 3
GG 3
Supp. Pool Level (SPMS) (SPMS) 198 Supp. Pool Makeup Timer GG 3
199 200 Manual Initiation (SPMS)
GG 3
3.3.10 201A Neutron Flux Monitoring GG 2
H 3
3.3.11 202 Degraded Voltage 3.4 REACTOR C00LAKT SYSTEM 3.4.1 203 Recirculation loops H,GG 2
H GG 3
204 Jet Pumps 205 Idle Recirculation Loop H GG 2
Startup 206 Recirculation loop Flow GG 2
)
0-7 l
J
BWR-TABLE 1 (Continued)
REPORT PLANT CRITERIA LC0 ITEM 3.4.2 207 Safety / Relief Valves H,GG 3
208 S/RV Low-Low Set H,GG 3
3.4.3 209 Leak Detection Systems H,GG 1
3.4.3 210 Operational Leakage Limits H,GG 1
3.4.5 212 Specific Activity H,GG 2
3.4.6 213 Pressure / Temperature Limits 214 Resctor Steam Dome Pressure H CG 2
3.4.9 217 RHR - Hot Shutdown GG Policy Statement (RHR) 218 RHR - Cold Shutdown GG Policy Statement (RHR)
EME'RGINCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS 3.5 3.5.1 219 HPCI H
3 3.5.2 220 ADS H
3 3.5.3 221 CSS H
3 222 LPCI H
3 3.5.4 223 Supp. Pool H,GG 3
224 ECCS - Operating ilG 3
3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1 Primary Containment 226 Cont. Integrity H,GG 3
228 Air Locks H,GG 3
229 MSLIV-LCS H,GG 3
231 Structural Integrity H GG 3
232 Cont. Internal Pressure H.GG 2
233 Cont. Air Temp GG 2
234 Containment Purge System H,GG 3
3.6.2 Drywell 235 Drywell Integrity H.GG 3
236 Drywell Air Temperature H.GG 2
237 Drywell Bypass Leakage GG 2
238 Drywell Air Locks GG 3
239 Drywell Structural Integrity GG 3
240 Drywell Internal Pressure GG 2
1 241 Drywell Vent and Purge GG 2
D-8
BWR-TABLE 1 (Continued)
REPORT PLANT CRITERIA LC0 ITEM 3.6.3 Depressurization Systems 242 Cont. Spray GG 3
243 Suppression Chamber (Pool)
H GG 2&3 244 Suppression Pool Makeup GG 3
245 Suppression Pool Cooling H,GG 3
3.6.4 246 Isolation Valves H,GG 3
3.6.5 247 Supp. Chamber - Orywell VB H
3 2t.8 RB - Supp. Chamber VB H
3 249 Drywell Post LOCA VB GG 3
3.6.6 Secondary Containment 250 SeconharyContainment H,GG 3
Integtity.
251 Auto Isolation Dampers H,GG 3
i 3.6.7 Containment Atmosphere Control 252 SGTS H,GG 3
253 H Recombiner (Note 4)
H GG 3
254 H Mixing System H
3 255 0 Conc.
H 3
256 H Ignition System GG 3
3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.1 258 RHR Service Water H
3 259 Standby Service Water GG 3
260 Plant Service Water H
3 261 HPCS Service Water GG 3
262 Ultimate Heat Sink GG 3
3.7.2 263 Control Room Environmental H
3 Control 264 Contrel Room Emergency Filter GG 3
3.7.3 265 RCIC H.GG PolicyStatement(RCIC)I 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 274 Electrical Power Systems H.GG 3
(AC/DC Sources, On-Site Distribution)(6 Sections) 3.8.4 277 Power Monitoring of RPS H,GG 3
Protection D-9
..J BWR-TABLE 1 (Continued)
REPORT PLANT CRITERIA LC0 ITEM 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.1 279 Mcde Switch H,GG 3
280 Instrumentation H,GG 2
3.9.3 281 Control Rod Position H,GG 2
3.9.4 282 Decay Time H,GG 2
3.9.5 283 Secondary Cont. - Refueling H
3 Floor 284 Sec'ondary Cont. Isolation H
3 Dampers 285 Standby Gas Treatment System H
3 3.9.8 288 Crane Travel Soent Fuel Pool H,GG 2
3.9.9 289 Water Level Ructor Vessel H GG 2
290 Water Level Spent Fuel Pool H,GG 2
292 Coolant Circulation -
High Water Level 293 Low Water Level GG Policy Staterront (RHR) 3.11 RADICACTIVE EFFLUENTS 3.11.2 307 Main Condenser H,GG 2
Notes:
- 1. LCOs for these systems should be retained in STS. The Policy Statement criteria should not be used to relocate specific trip functions, channels or instrument within these LCOs.
- 2. The staff is pursuing alternative approaches which would allow relocation of some of these LCOs on a schedule consistent with the schedule for develop-ment of the new STS. The staff is also initiating rulemaking to delete the requirement that RETS be included in Technical Specifications.
- 3. Because fires (either inside or outside the control room) can be a significant contributor to the core melt frequency and because the uncertainties with fire initiation frequency can be significant, the staff believes that this LC0 should be retained in the STS at this time. The staff will consider relocation of Remote Shutdown Instrumentaiton on a plant-specific basis.
)
- 4. This LC0 will be ccnsidered for relocation to a licensee-controlled document on a plant-specific basis.
0-10 l
J..
BWR-TABLE 2 (Note 1)
GENERAL ELECTRIC STANDARD TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCOs WHICH MAY BE RELOCATED REPORT PLANT LCO ITEM 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.2 2
Reactivity Anomaly (Note 2)
H GG 3.1.3 4
Maximum Scram Times (7 Sec)
H 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.2 Isolation Actuation Instrumentation 75 Drywell Pressure - High (HPCI)
H 84 DryveilPressure-High(RCIC)
H,GG 3.3.6 Control Rod Withdrawal Block Instrumentation 135 APRM H,GG j
137 SRM H
i 138 IRM H,GG 139 SDV Water Level H,GG 140 Reactor Coolant System GG
)
Recirculation Flow-Upscale 3.3.7 Monitoring Instrumentation 151 Seismic Monitors H,GG 152 Meteorological Inst.
GG 183 TIP H,GG 184 Main Control Room H
Environmental System (Chlorine and Amonia) i Detection System 186 Fire Protection GG 187 Loose-Parts GG 188 Radioactive Liquid Effluent (Note 3)
H.GG Monitoring Instrumentation 189 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent (Note 3)
H.GG Monitoring Instrumentation 3.3.9 201 Turbine Overspeed Protection H GG 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3.4.4 211 Chemistry H,GG 3.4.8 216 Structural Integrity (Note 4)
H GG 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1 227 Containment Leakage (Note 5)
H,GG D-11
'. ol BWR-TABLE 2 (Continued)
REPORT PLANT LC0 ITEM 3.6.2 230 Feedwater Leakage Control GG 3.6.7 257 Combustible Gas Control GG Purge System 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 266 Snubbers H,GG 3.7.5 267 Sealed Source Contamination H,GG 3.7.6 268 Fire Suppression Systems GG (6 Sections) 3.7.7 269 Fire Rated Assemblies GG 3.7.8 270 Area Temp Monitoring GG 271 Settlement of Class 1 H
Str'ucture 3.7.9 272 Spent Fuel Pool Temp GG 3.7.10 273 Flood Protection H,GG 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.2 275 AC Circuits Inside Containment H
3.8.3 276 Overcurrent Protection Devices H,GG 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.6 286 Comunications H,GG 3.9.7 287 Refueling Equipment H,GG (3 Sections) 3.9.10 291 Control Rod Removal (2 Sections)
H,GG 3.9.12 294 Horizontal Fuel Transfer GG System 3.10 295 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS (Note 6)
H,GG 3.11 RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENTS (Note 3) 3.11.1 296 Liquid Effluents H,GG 297 Liquid Effluents Dose H,GG J
298 Liquid Waste Treatment H,GG 299 Liquid Holdup Tanks H,GG 3.11.2 3CG Gaseous Effluent Dose Rate H,GG 301 Gasecus Effluent Dose -
H,GG Noble Gases 302 Gaseous Effluent Dose -
H GG Other than Noble Gas 303 Gaseous Radwaste Treatment H.GG 304 Total Dose H,GG j
D-12
i l
.,n.
BWR-TABLE 2 (Continued)
REPORT LC0 ITEM PLANT 305 Ventilation Exhaust GG Treatment System 306 Explosive Gas Mixture H,GG 3.11.3 308 Solid Radwaste System H,GG RADIOLOGICALENVIRONMENTALMONITORING(Note 3) 3.12 309 Environmental Monitoring H,GG (3 Sections)
Notes:
- 1. LCOs listed in this table nhy be relocated to other licensee-controlled document contingent upon NRC staff approval of the location of and controls over relocated requirements.
?. This LC0 may be removed from the STS. However, if the associated Surveillance Requirement (s) is necessary to meet the OPERABILITY requirements for a retained LCO, the Surveillance Requirement (s) should be relocated to the retained LCO.
J
- 3. The staff is pursuing alternative approaches which would allow relocation of some of these LCOs on a schedule consistent with the schedule for develop-ment of the new STS. The staff is also initiating rulemaking to delete the requirement that RETS be included in Technical Specifications.
- 4. This LC0 may be relocated out of Technical Specification. However, the associated Surveillance Requirement (s) must be relocated to Technical Specification Section 4.0, Surveillance Requirerents.
- 5. This LC0 may be relocated, however, Pa, La, Ld and Lt must be either retained in TS or in the Bases of the appropriate containment LCO.
i
- 6. Special Test Exceptions may be included with the corresponding LCOs.
D-13
.-