ML20150D140
| ML20150D140 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 03/21/1988 |
| From: | Condit R, Garde B GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20150D096 | List: |
| References | |
| 2.206, DD-88-03, DD-88-3, OL, NUDOCS 8803230110 | |
| Download: ML20150D140 (34) | |
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xs 00LKETED U5NFC UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORK COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION 88 NAR 21 A10:25 0FFICE 0; ycc,O AD 00CKE h4G /, 3ERVICf'
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SRANCH
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In the Matter of
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HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER
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COMPANY
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Docket No. 50-498 OL
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(South Texas Project, Unit 1) )
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(DD-88-3)
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APPEAL'OF DIRECTOR'S DECISION ON THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT l
The Government Accountability Project (GAP) hereby appeals the decision of Thomas E. Murley, Directoi of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to deny the January 28, 1988, Petition of GAP filed pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.206 regarding the inspection and investigation of allegations regarding the South Texas Nuclear Project.1/
GAP also requests that the Commission stay the licensing i
vote, currently scheduled for Monday, March 21, 1988, until it l
l has had time to review the 2.206 Petition.
l l
Should the Commission deny this appeal and refuse to I
consider the Petition and the Director's decision prior to the licensing vote, GAP requests that the Commission stay the 8803230110 880321 PDR ADOCK 05000498 O
PDR l
1/ GAP also filed a February 12, 1988, letter on this subject which is being treated as a supplement to the petition.
l 079AA16 - 3 l
l
s effectiveness of its decision for forty-eight hours and provide GAP the opportunity to seek a temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals.
BACKGROUND On January 26, 1988, GAP filed a petition with the NRC Comnissioners requesting specified relief in response to the obvious inadequacy of the ongoing staff inspection to reach a determination on the condition of the South Texas Nuclear Project (STNP) in light of the allegations about the plant raised by concerned individuals.
The petition requested that the NRC delay voting on a full power operating license for the South Texas Nuclear Project (STNP) until a complete investigacion and disposition of all allegations regarding STNP had been conducted and the report of the inspection / investigation effort had been released to the public.
The basis for GAP's request was its belief that the efforts of the NRC's Safety Significance Assessment Team (SSAT) were inherently inadequate to serve as a basis for any assessment of the programmatic implications of the allegations.
Additionally, the petition asserted that the results of the inspection efforts were predetermined by NRC management staff in Washington without the benefit of factual imput for the SSAT's review process, and prior to their development of a position.
On March 8, 1988, the NRC published a notice in the Federal Register that GAP's 10 C.F.R. 2.206 Petition was under consideration.
Late Friday, March 18, 1988, 079AA16 - 2
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after the close of business, the Director issued his decision, and referred it to the NRC Commissioners for review pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.206(c).
Although the decision claims that it was available for public inspection at several public locations in Washington, D.C.,
Austin, Texas, and Wharton, Texas, the decision was not published in the Federal Register nor made available in a timely enough manner to enable members of the public, the allegers, or GAP as petitioners, to respond to the decision prior to the licensing vote on the plant.
Therefore, as a practical matter, the relief GAP requested from the agency has been denied since the Commission cannot possibly conduct a review of the request and the decision prior to the March 21, 1988, scheduled vote on licensing.
I.
THE DIRECTOR'S DECISION IS NON-RESPONSIVE AND THEREFORE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS The Decision is not responsive to the request, is not based on substantial evidence before it, and is therefore, in GAP's opinion, an arbitrary and capricious decision of the agency.
~
The Director's Decision (hereinafter "Decision") relies almost exclusively on the results of the SSAT's examination of the allegations, as reported in NUREG-1306, to deny the petititioner's request to delay the licensing vote.
The Decision also apparently relies on the results of previous staff l
inspections and evaluations as contained in previous SERs to determine that "STNP Unit 1 was built in conformance with
(
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079AA16 - 3
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applicable regulatory requirements and that the systems in the facility would, if called upon, perform their intended safety function."
(Decision at 3-4)
A.
The Petition Asserts a Programmatic Breakdown in Quality.
The petition alleged that the NRC.'s limited review of the STNP allegations jeopardizes public health and safety.
(Petition at 6-7).
The petition, as GAP has repeatedly stated, asserts that the information provided to GAP by the allegers "points to a major quality assurance breakdown at STNP."
(Id., at 6).
The petition provides examples of allegations which indicate a failure in the quality program.
(Id at 6-7).
The petition asserts that it is impossible for the agency staff "to disposition the partially significant generic concerns reflected in the allegations in a four day site inspection."
(Id. at 7).
The petition provides an example of the inadequacy of the team's effort as related to one of GAP's witnesses, John Corder.
(Petition at 7-9).
The assertion of inadequacy, i.e.,
that it would be impossible for the NRC staff to do any type of independent analysis of the the allegations in a four day site visit and a limited document review, is the heart of GAP's petition.
The Director's Decision does not respond to that allegation,'and therefore the decision is not supported by substantial evidence sufficient to justify a staff decision to recommend licensing for the South Texas plant.
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B.
The Petition Asserts that the Team Was Subject to Cost and Scheduling Pressure in Violation of Federal Regulations.
The petition also alleged that the team's efforts were inadequate because of the time pressures and scheduling constraints placed on the NRC team in violation of 10 C.F.R. 50 Appendix B, Criterion I, which prohibits "cost and schedule" pressure to override quality review efforts.
(Id. at 9).
The Director's Decision is silent as to whether the Commission itself is in violation of 10 C.F.R. 50 Appendix B, Criterion I, and asserts instead its overall duty is only to ensure that there is "reasonable assurance" that the plant is designed, constructed, and can operate without endangering public health and safety.
(10 C.F.R. S50.57) (It should be noted that the requirements of 50.57 are much broader than stated in the Decision as to "whether power operation will present an undue risk to the public.")
C.
The Numerical Treatment of the Allegations Is Misleading.
Given the amount of time and resources needed to fully l
investigate nearly 700 allegations, it became clear that the SSAT could not accomplish the task in the time provided by NRC management.
Therefore, it was necessary for the SSAT to reduce l
the number of allegations it was required to investigate to 1
manegeable size by eliminating as many as possible before the site visit.
The SSAT accomplished this feat with some bureaucratic sleight-of-hand.
The SSAT begins with a base number of about 700 allegations from which it deducts 120, claiming these are duplicates.
The SSAT never refers to the allegations or allegation numbers it 079AA16 - 5
w claims are duplicates, so there is no way to review its assessments.
However, assuming that 120 were duplicates or repeats, then 580 are left.
From this number the SSAT deducts 240 allegations of wrongdoing, leaving 340.
It should be noted that most of the wrongdoing allegations reviewed by GAP were determined to have a safety-related component.
Some wrongdoing allegations may have had more than one safety-related component.
As a result, there are likely to be at least 240 safety-related allegations developed from any investigation of the wrongdoing allegations.
After subtracting the wrongdoing allegations, the SSAT deducts 140 allegations, which it refers to as non-safety-related.
In its review GAP only identified 27 non-safety-related allegations.
Unfortunately, the SSAT does not define what is safety-related, nor does it identify the allegations in this category.
Following this deduction the SSAT is left with 200 allegations to investigate.
The SSAT reduces 200 allegations down to 71 by saying that they are representative of the original 200.
Again, the SSAT's reasoning lacks the specificity required to evaluate the basis upon which any allegation is eliminated from review or encompassed by another.
Furthermore, GAP identified at least 333 distinct safety-related allegations for the SSAT to investigate.
Of these allegations the SSAT chose to actually investigate only 61.
Having not received enough information to evaluate the SSAT's allegation review process, GAP has no choice but to conclude that 079AA16 - 6
the team's actions were arbitrary and capricious.
It is critical to note that the SSAT eliminated 639 of 700 allegations (91%) before even interviewing one single alleger, despite the fact that GAP advised the SSAT that the team should not rely solely on GAP's investigative files to determine if an allegation had merit.
GAP's investigative files were prepared under severe time and resource constraints and could not take the place of a complete investigative interview.
(See, Letter from Richard Condit to Jose Calvo dated December 4, 1987.)
The SSAT was apprised of this limitation repeatedly, yet it relied solely upon GAP's files to make a determination on over 9 out of 10 allegations.
This numbers game approach does not provide an adequate response to the assertion that the SSAT was subjected to time constraints which are, by regulatiori, illegal.
The Decision included no affidavit by Jose Calvo or other members of the team that stated that their work was free of scheduling pressures and that they were free to take as long as necessary to complete thorough and adequate inspections with all of the allegations.
It is GAP's position that the staff could not, and would not, be able to sign affidavits to that effect and that, in fact, they l
were continually subjected to time pressure by their management I
to complete their work and issue the report.
l D.
The Petition Asserts That Allegations of Wrongdoing Have Not Been Investigated.
Finally, the petition asserts that none of the 240 allegations of wrongdoing have been investigated by NRC.
(Id. at 9).
The Decision concedes that 240 wrongdoing allegations have 079AA16 - 7
not been investigated by the NRC's Office of Investigation (OI).
The Decision mischaracterizes the facts regarding the wrongdoing allegations.
GAP provided OI investigators access to the alleger files containing "wrongdoing" allegations.
This initial review of the allegations resulted in the SSAT identifying 240 concerns that should be reviewed by OI.
However, OI investigators have identified only 9 issues it was interested in pursuing.
(Letter from Don Driskill to Richard Condit, March 1, 1988).
Most important, however, is the fact that to date no investigations a,t all have been commenced, no allegers have been debriefed, and no other actions have been taken to determine if the issues raised under the umbrella of wrongdoing could impact the ultimate safety of the reactor and endanger the public.
Since the SSAT members would not even allow the allegers to discuss wrongdoing allegations, and therefore had no base of information to pursue, it would have been impossible for the I
staff to assess the safety significance of the allegations for licensing impact.
The allegation that OI had difficulty in attempting to gain access to the allegers and their information is disingenuous, inaccurate, and irrelevant.
In fact, the willingness of the staff to stand on this excuse is prima facie evidence that the i
staff is willing to forgo proper procedures in order to meet a licensing deadline.
The Director's Decision provides no information in its decision to support the conclusory statements that "(T]he safety 079AA16 - 8
significance aspects (of wrongdoing allegations) have been included within the allegations assessed for licensing impact."
No cross-reference is made to NUREG-1306, and no evidence is proffered to indicate that the staff considered intentional management actions with regard to their impact on quality, or that they considered the effects of an atmosphere of harassment and intimidation on the actual quality of the work and reliability of the site documentation.
II.
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE NRC'S INSPECTION EFFORT A.
The SSAT Effort Was Inadequate To Determine the Safety Significance of the Allegations.
Between January and October, 1987, the NRC staff was aware of the fact that GAP was receiving allegations of faulty workmanship, mismanagement, violations of site procedures, and specific breakdowns in isolated areas of construction which rendered the condition of the plant indeterminate.
The NRC attempted to gain access to the information through a compulsory legal process which ultimately failed.
Thereafter GAP, representing concerned individuals, embarked on a voluntary relationship with the NRC that was designed to protect the public health and safety by ensuring that any allegations that affected public health and safety were reviewed, and also to protect the concerned individuals who feared reprisal for cooperating with the NRC.
There is no dispute that by the time the NRC staff was actually in a position to have access to the information and/or have access to the sources of information about flaws in the South Texas Project, the main instruction from staff management 079AA16 - 9
I was to find and fix specific "technical" or "hardwa:e" allegations.
Further, it is not in dispute that the instruction to the staff was to process all allegations in accordance with
-the agency's policy for investigating "late filed allegations,"
as defined in NRC Manual Chapter 0517.
The results of the efforts by the SSAT, therefore, present the NRC staff's best efforts at accomplishing a monumental task in an extremely short period of time.
The staff report admits that the majority of the time that was spent by the staff was processing information.2/ (NUREG-1306, Appendix A at 3).
Of the 3,335 staff and contractor hours expended on this effort, only 1,010 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> were spent in inspection activities, and as is clear from a review of the inspection efforts, the majority of that time was spent reviewing inspections of the allegations by others, interviewing the allegers, and pulling together documentation.
To compare the size of the project GAP draws the Commission's attention to three other similar undertakings in the history of the NRC -- Zimmer, Comanche Peak, and Diablo Canyon.
In 1982, at the William A. Zimmer plant, the NRC staff conducted an inspection and investigation of nineteen allegations raised by one whistleblower over a period of eleven months.
The principal inspection effort occurred from December, 1980, through l
November, 1981, with principal on-site inspections from January 2/ The Staff spent 8 weeks reviewing allegation files, transcribing and categorizing information, collating and collecting information available from other sources.
079AA16 - 10
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t through July, 1981.
The team consisted of approximately twelve inspectors and investigators at various times.
The inspection resulted in the requirement of a comprehensive fact-finding corrective action program to confirm the quality of the entire facility.
In 1984, at the Comanche Peak facility, allegations of poor workmanship, engineering defects, and an atmopshere of harassment and intinmidation plagued the plant for four years before the GAP filed a 2.206 petition requesting the NRC staff conduct a major inspection of only eighteen initial allegations from three allegers.
After a four-day preliminary inspection by a team of eight inspectors in April, 1984, the NRC staff found no significant safety-related defects that would dictate an immediate stop work order.
The staff then took three months to write its report of the inspection, issued on July 13, 1984.
However, the inspection revealed several procedural errors and undetected deficiencies that led the staff to form a comprehensive inspection team of 60 consultants and inspectors that spent four to six months on site, and ultimately reviewed and dispositioned over 1200 allegations by requiring the utility to do a comprehensive reinspection of the entire facility.
That comprehensive inspection has lasted over four years and resulted in major repair and rework of virtually every system at the Comanche Peak facility.
Finally, at Diablo Canyon, an initial inspection effort into approximately twenty allegations raised by one whistleblower resulted in an NRC inspection effort that spanned three months 079AA16 - 11
and resulted in imposition of seven conditions for issuance of the low power operating license.
As a result of those conditions the licensee had to prepare a comprehensive review of its engineering adequacy over the next four months.
Thus, the notion that, as compared to other inspection efforts, this inspection effort was significant in terms of time or resources is not accurate.
The inference here apparently is that 3,300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> spent on this effort is enough.
Indeed, the NUREG is a nice piece of work which describes and digests a discrete body of information provided to the staff in relatively raw form several months ago.
Yet, the report is not a comprehensive or independent inspection effort that sheds much light on the status of the safety of the plant.
- Further, taking credit for the amount of time spent by telephone coerators to put telephone calls together, court reporters to transcribe tapes, and administrative staff to type reports is not the type of staff effort that raises an argument for allaying fears about the safety of the plant.
The fact is that the SSAT's efforts were only focused on identifying some specific technical and hardware deficiencies which had been used as examples of programmatic deficiencies by the allegers.
While it is true that the SSAT needed a high level of specificity to enable them to immediately identify defective components and determine if the symptom had been resolved, the staff's repeated assertion on the lack of specificity asserted throughout the report confirms its weakness.
Quite simply, if an alleger was aware of the specifics of a 079AA16 - 12
hardware deficiency, he or she undoubtedly raised that issue with management, which has long since resolved the issue by reviewing the problem, replacing the component, or making some other technical fix.
It is not these discrete issues that the workers are concerned about as much as the implications for the rest of the plant.
This phenomenon is inherent in the process undertaken by the SSAT.
An example of this phenomenon is given below:
One of the allegers identified an issue that twenty percent of the valves in the plant were installed backwards.
The issue is characterized on page 5-19 of the NUREG.
The NUREG further states that "the alleger provided no additional information about the location or type of valves."
The report also includes the statement that "(t)he only information that the alleger provided was that in an unnamed plant construction progress report, a statement was noted that twenty percent of overall equipment items (pumps, valves, instruments, etc.) had not been completely installed at the time.
The SSAT asked the alleger in a transcribed interview about the report, and the alleger told the NRC that the report itself was available to the NRC on the site and that'a copy of the report was in his file in the GAP office.
That file had been made available to the Staff throughout its review process, and is included as an attachment to this report.
(Exhibit 1)
As is obvious from the attached April 25, 1986, "Summary of Final Inspections Report for Unit 1" there were incredibly high reject rates for Instrumentation; the reject rate was 67 percent.
079AA16 - 13
Significantly, the report indicates that valves were installed reversed 20 percent of the time.
It is also notable that this same report indicates that 100 percent of the engineering inspection point for the small bore hangers was missing or incorrect.
Yet the SSAT did not look at Instrumentation Valves, they only looked valves in other systems. (NUREG at 20)
They never looked at this report, and never looked at the supporting data.
'Another example is the concern that installed equipment is not properly reflected by the as-built design drawings.
(NUREG, at 5-84)
The SSAT claims that they resolved this issue by revieiwng the Reactor Makeup Water (RM) system and the Essential Cooling Water (ECW) systems.
However, there are two problems with that resolution.
First, the NRC physically looked at only a minute section of a start-up system which is inadequate to reach conclusions about the entire plant; but, more importantly, the section of pipe that the staff looked at had already been subjected to various inspections and reviews while the alleger was working according to the original procedures.
Therefore, any problems that would have existed were already identified and corrected.
The facts as explained by the alleger are that on December 4, 1985, EBASCO issued a memorandum which terminated the responsibilities of the final quality review for the N-5 group and changed it to a straight accounting task, eliminating the requirement for verification of correctness, completeness, and the as-built walkdown.
(A copy of the memorandum, which was made 079AA16 - 14
available to the NRC staff is attached as Exhibit 2).
Thus, the SSAT did not reach adequate conclusions on the allegers' concerns about how, if, or when existing problems were identified.
As noted frem these examples, the SSAT efforts were consistent with their charter of only performing a preliminary overview, not a comprehensive investigation.
B.
The SSAT Relied On Documents Which Are Unreliable.
The staff concedes at page three of the Decision that the bases for its conclusions regarding the allegations are 1) the SSAT review, 2) the results of previous inspections, and 3) evaluations that have been documented previously in safety evaluation reports.
NUREG-1306 confirms that the basis for much of the SSAT's conclusions was the review of the work of SAFETEAM investiga-tions, Quality Assurance inspections and investigations, and other documentation prepared by the site owner.
Given the time constraints described above it is understandable that wherever possible the NRC Staff would seek to rely on the efforts undertaken by others to put various allegations to rest.
Yet the actions by the staff in so relying on such internal information defeats the very purpose for which the concerned individuals sought out GAP and the NRC in the first place.
As repeatedly stated since the beginning of its efforts on STNP, the workers who brought allegations to GAP did so because they were dissatisfied with che results of the inspection or investigation i
efforts of the internal or external inspection efforts.
079AA16 - 15 I
A good example is the case of Ronald Goldstein.
Mr.
Goldstein had been a supervisor in the Instrumentation and Control Department of Unit 1 of STNP from 1984 through late 1985.
During the. summer of 1985 he identified a pattern of activity in the I&C department that placed attention to quantity over the attention to quality, cut' corners, damaged expensive'and critical safety equipment, and generally revealed a management attitude that Goldstein believed was dangerous to the ultimate safety of the plant.
Goldstein complained internally up the chain of command to the site EBASCO supervisor, but was not listened to.
After his discovery of falsified documents to accept a critical safety-related thermoweld instrument installation, Goldstein took his I
concerns to the EBASCO Quality Assurance Department.
Thereafter, Goldstein was systematically downgraded, harassed, and ultimately terminated in a layoff made to look legitimate.
In the meantime Goldstein had also gone to the SAFETEAM and made his complaints about the falsification of records, the downgrading of quality-minded management, and the harassment and intimidation that he had suffered.
Interestingly, the EBASCO Quality Assurance Department conducted an internal investigation and concluded that Goldstein had been harassed and that there had been a failure to properly handle the breakdown in quality related to the thermoweld.
- Yet, EBASCO management did nothing about the matter.
Goldstein then went to the SAFETEAM which investigated the same issues and concluded that there was no harassment and did not resolve the 079AA16 - 16
}
issue of the falsified documents.
Eventually, HL&P also received the investigation and concluded that SAFETEAM's report was not supportable.
After Goldstein was terminated he filed a Section 210 complaint with the DOL and contacted the NRC about his allegations, both OI and Region IV.
OI has never conducted an investigation of the issue, notwithstanding the fact that GAP provided substantial evidence to them in Spring of 1987.
After eight days of hearings last year the DOL Administrative Law Judge ruled on March 3, 1988 that Goldstein had been harassed, intimidated, downgraded, and ultimate'y terminated in violation of 42 U.S.C.
S5851.
The NRC did not address any of the issues raised by Goldstein, but also relied orily on the previous inadequate inspection and investigation efforts of Region IV and the SAFETEAM.
And, although they interviewed Goldstein, did not permit him to expand the allegations beyond the issue they instructed him to address, and did not seek access to any of the dccuments available in his DOL litigation file.
Goldstein's harassment and intimidation was known throughout EBASCO.
The supervisor responsible remained as the I&C Department Supervisor for the completion of Unit I.
The "chilling effect" of Goldstein's termination was not only ignored by upper management, it was maintained by actions of Goldstein's supervisor, who put on a blackboard in his office a derogatory statement about Goldstein's whistleblowing so that all who entered his office would know what happened to those employees t
079AA16 - 17
who insisted on identifying quality problems.
Thus, in the only, case where an independent judge has reviewed a worker's charges of improprierty toward him and the facility itself the judge agreed with the worker.
At a plant where there are over 240 allegations of harassment, intimidation, and falsification of records or other intentional violations of NRC regulations, the Goldstein opinion is significant.
A second $210 case has already gone to trial and is pending a decision.
In that case a paint coating quality control inspector alleged that he had been deliberately terminated because he had reported complaints to the NRC about the failure to comply with federal requirements regarding paint coatings.
The case of Daniel Miller follows three other paint coatings Quality Control inspectors who, in 1985, filed Section 210 complaints alleging improper termination after complaining to the i
NRC, which ware never litigated in front of the DOL, and also never investigated by the NRC.
Neither the SSAT nor OI have yet probed the issue of the harassment and intimidation of paint coatings quality control inspectors.
Nor did the SSAT ever probe the specific allagations that Miller, and others, had allegedly been terminated for raising.
The SSAT claims that they "evaluated" all coatings allegations, and that "all the areas and concerns in the paint coatings area were addressed during the inspection of the coating issue."
(NUREG-1360, at 5-74).
Yet, the SSAT interviewed only one of the paint coating quality control inspectors with 079AA16 - 18
4
{.
concerns, and limited him to discussing only some of the supporting information he had.
This limited approach to the allegers' information was continued in spite of the following statements of the one alleger they interviewed:
A Well, you know, it's kind of an ongoing joke among the quality department out there that, you know, there is no quality assurance here.
There is definitely a strong QA breakdown at STP, as far as I'm concerned from what.I've seen and my own experiences.
But, you know, a lot of the things that have been brought to STP's management attention lately has been swept right under the carpet, and it goes through the whole gamut of commodities and hardware.
It's just a, you know, if you talked to some of the inspectors out there at this point you will really hear some horror stories.
Finally, still awaiting hearings are the cases of three other South Texas employees who have alleged that they were terminated because they refused to "play ball" with a management that was sacrificing quality to satisfy the personal financial i
i gains of a senior EBASCO manager.
In the cases of John Rex, John Hodge, and Richard Garcia, the NRC staff has yet to probe the basis for their complaints or the significance of their allegations.
Yet in the 5210 case, ongoing discovery of documents has produced irrebuttable evidence that Mr. Rex was laid off in September, 1986, on the basis of a recommendation by an HVAC superintendent whom he had complained about.
An internal EBASCO investigation confirmed that Restor was violating EBASCO site procedures in regard to misuse of funds, but did not probe the l
079AA16 - 19 l
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quality aspects of the allegations.
The quality aspects of the HVAC allegations were allegtdly investigated by the SAFETEAM, but the SAFETEAM did not probe the qublity aspects either.
Documents obtained through discovery -- and always available to the NRC --
confirm that no overview of the HVAC department work under Restor's supervision was ever conducted.
To illustrate the weakness of the-SSAT's approach the following example is given.
In fall of 1986, an anonymous letter was sent to EBASCO and HL&P management.
It contained, among other things, the following paragraphs.
"Gentlemen:
The success of the South Texas project depends on the combined honest team effort of many people and groups of people.
When any team member for his personal gain manipulates and intimidates people, falsifies records, misuses STP supplied materials, equipment, and skilled craft labor, it is time the situation is brought to the attention of the Partners.
This individual is the HVAC manager, Billy Rester.
In the past Rester has successfully directed his subordinates to falsify records, run through hold points, claimed as installed quantities of ductwork that was not installed, ignored project startup schedules, and violated project rules and procedures, and willfully involved his craft in covering up known violations.
In all cases, for reasons known only to themselves, Ebasco management has participated in whitewashing these flagrant violations, which are well known to many....
The letter then goes on to detail the abuse of corporate funds to make a personal profit from a personal catering service.
According to evidence and testimony from depositions in the Rex case, HL&P conducted a superfluous investigating of the catering 079AA16 - 20
[
l issue only and allowed SAFETEAM to probe the qu ity allegations, Yet the SAFETEAM never inte.7 viewed the key ind viduals who were aware of the falsification of records and que.ity concerns.
Shortly after this letter was received, mor,of the sources of quality complaints were transferred or tr.minated.
When the SSAT identified what allegations they were interested in pursuing they ignored the broadbased concerns of quality and mismanagement, did nothing about the allegations of intentional violations of procedures, and chose only to probe an allegation that the HVAC procedure book was confusing and difficult to interpret.
(See NUREG-1306, at 5-25).
CONCLUSION The information provided to the NRC was of sufficient detail to conduct an adequate inspection if time constraints had not been imposed on the SSAT.
The SSAT did not even scratch the surface of'the truth behind the experiences of these workers.
Frankly, given the time constraints placed on the SSAT, it would have been impossible for the best intentioned team to appropriately undertake the investigation.
However, the Commission has the responsiblity to insure that a Director's Decision is supported by substantial evidence.
This Decision is not.
Therefore GAP respectfully requests that the Commission consider this appeal and stay the licensing decision until such time as it has sufficient evidence upon which to base its final decision.
079AA16 - 21
-..-.---------.________-----J
Respectfully submitted,
'U
'bC.v e
Billie P. Garde
%^ ; d%
L$
Q Richard Condit Government Accountability Project 25 E Street, N.W.,
Suite 700 Washington, D.C.
20001 202-347-0460 Dated:
March 21, 1988 079AA16 - 22
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NARDWARE RELATED l
20 l 5l 0l 1l 24 l 22 l 2l 0l 1l 23 l 78 5l 1g 3[
0 ll 114 l g...............................l.......l.......l.......l.......l.......g.......l.......g.......g.......g.......g.......g.......g.......l.......g.......gg..........l l
PAPER WORE RELAIED l
11 l 3l 0l 0l 1l 4l 0l 0[
0l 0g 0l 5l 3l 0g 0 jg 27 g g...............................l.......l.......l......l.......l.......g.......g.......g......g.......g.......g.......g.......l.......g.......l.......gl..........g l
PERCENT Of INSP. REJtCIED l 171l 301l 01l 51l 31]
14%l 2%l 01l 201l 351l 31l 671l 14%l 31l 01ll 71l
................................................................................................................l l.................
MOT READV FOR tuSPECitou 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 m e s==== --ass--m--=--se-==
o g as-esassamass-su s-s e ssmass==s-s ss=== =- :=--- asus-sss===s-s-=============s s-ass== sass-s-ssssanss= sass-s ss-assass g
201 15%g 10%)
15%l 51) 10%l 101l 51l 151l 51]
51l 5%l 5El 51; 51gl l
l GOALS l ssassa-s ----=-- = -s-s-s--s s s-- = =------ m-a ---=--- -ass-s -as s a-s a mm as se s s ma-a sa s s---as-as-sa--= -as--=-a--s--smos--ass
SUMMARY
Of thPROCESS INSPECTIONS LARE SMALL MVAC NVAC LAag $ MALL C43Lt RAC[ yay p(Cg (L[CJ ggAC MANGERS MANGERS DUCI SUPPORIS TERMS WELDS WELDS IRAY SUPPORT CONDUIT WEC INSvR EQUIP EQUsP EQufP TOTAL g amassassamas sa-asus-ss ass az za ssa m asa s ss s-su s-a s s--sss sssa--s sassamassmussmassma-sessamassansamass ji!IAL INPROCESS INSP MADE l 325 l 24 l 102 l 84l 32 l 412l 367l 0l 0l 8l 72l 0l 16 l 0l 8ll 1450 l g...............................g.......g.......l.......g.......l.......l.......l.......g.......g.......g.......g.......g.......l.......g__.....g.......lg..........g
[thPROCESS INSPECTIONS ACCEPIED l 293 l 22 l 93 l 71 l 30 l 365 l 341l 0l 0l 3l 72 l 0l 13 g 0l 8 ll 1311l
..g g...............................g.......g.......l.......l.......g.......g.......g.......g.......g.......g.......g.......g.......g.......g.......g.......gg......
gluPROCESS INSPECTIONS REJECTED l 32 l 2l 9l 13 l 2l 47 l 26 l 0l 0l 58 0l 0l 3l 0l 0 ll 139g 3................
.........l....
..l.......g...
...l......g.......l.......l.......l.......g.......g.......g.......g...... s.......g.......g.......gg.......
.g l
HARDWARE RELAIED l
14 l 0l 8l 9l 2l 13 g 11 l 0l 0l 5[
0l 0l 1l 0l 0 gg 63 l 3.............................l......i......l......l.......l.......g.......l.......l.......g.......g.......g.......g.......l.......g.......g.......gg..........j g
PAPER WoRc RELAttD 1
14 l 2l 11 4l 0l 34 l i5 l 0l 0l 0g e1 0l 21 01 0 ll rsj g 3.
.....g.......l......g.......l.......g.......g.......l.......l...
... p......g.......g.......g.......g.......jg..........
4 i...............................l....
l PtRCami Of r=Se. atJECitD l 10:1 8tl 9xl 15xl 6si lixl 7xl Org Oxg 63zi ext oxi iexl 0xl 0x11 3021 l=--ass-s------=-----ou---=----s--s==--=-a----s--.s-amoss-se--as---so---------------s----=-a--==
sol CE ADT 9 0R IMsP1C1104 5
0 0
0 0
21 1
0 0
0 0
0 1
0 0
28 PRimitD 30 Ap -86 513.1u5 AS Of 25-APR-86
t.ARGE BORE _ HANGERS 7
i Reject rate - 17% - Finals.
4 ivi - in-Process HARDWARE 32%
Welding a.) Fit-Up b.) Defects c.) Missing d.) Base Metal e.) Undersize Configuration / Location 175 Incorrect Material 25%
165 Hilti/ Bolts r
~e SOFTWARE Eng Info incorrect / Missing 88%
12%
Missing / Wrong Forms i
7 l
l l
l I
I
t SMALL BORE HANGERS Reject rate - 30% - Finals.
85 - In-Process.
HARDWARE Welding 33%
a.) Cefects Base Metal 331 Location / Configuration 33%
SOFTWAg Engineering Inspection Point 100%
Missing or Incorrect i
i
(
L HVAC S'JPPORTS Reject rate - 15% - In-Process.
HARDWARE Welding,
77%
Cenfiguration 23%
riWARE p
No FCR 50%
Wrong Paper 50%
Missing 3'.gn-Offs 8
h 1
i I
i r
t k
J
]
__-,en---nn---
-r-,n-~.,.w,
---,,.--n-,e.-,
LARGE 80RE WELDS
-r Reject raN - 14% - Fir als, 11% - In-Process.
HARDWARE Welding 78%
a.) Fit-Up b.) Final Prep c.) Defects d.) Counterbore
/ m Wrong Material 22%
I i
SOFTWARE PDC /MPDC Incorrect 38%
Missing Dwg, FCR, FCN 28%
Fab Qhecklist Errors 25%
Engineering Info incorrect 9%
CONOUIT Reject rate - 355 - Finals.
- 63% - In-Process.
HARDWARE Not Supported Wrong Destination ho 10 No Term Blocks No Bushings Wrong Size Spring Nuts Wrong Flex Pull Boxes Damaged SOFTWARE 0%
Rejected while card was in QC hands but corrected on the spot and 0
final accepted.
1 l
l l
l l
l I
l
7 INSTRUMENTS r
~
Reject rate - 67% - Finals.
r HARDWARE _
Valve Reversed 20%
Incorrect Installation 40%
Disconnected 20%
20%
Hiltis SOFTWARE Field Sketch Wrong 20%
20%
Cleanness N/A 20%
AWS Weld Report f
Stud. Anchor Report 20%
20%
Report Errors l
l 1
l l
l l
l l
l
T MECHANICAL E0VIPMENT Reject rate - 14% - Finals.
19% - In-Process.
HAR0 WARE 100%
Missing Parts SOFTWARE No Paper in Package 20%
No FE Sign-Off 60%
No Vendor Manual 20%
Ex4(BIT A EBASCO Interoffice correspondence D ATE 12-4-8 5 FILE REF STP-N-5-001C TO Distribution OFFICE LOC ATION 37pggg FROM Ron Staymates OFFIC E LO C ATION STPEGS SUBJECT SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION N-5 SOFTWARE RESPONSIBILITIES The following guidelines are to be utilized when statusing docu-monts for preparation of an N-5 Code Data Report.
1.
Accountability of FW packages /FS packages (excluding Brown &
Root).
This includes accounting for, but not verification of the correctness / completeness of the following:
A.
Code Data Reports 1.
Valves 2.
Instrument valves 3.
Equipment 4.
Hangers, including annotations thereof, based on SIRG review 5.
Spool pieces, including annotations thereof, based on SIRG review B.
Brown & Root CCSR's/CSR's, including annotations thereof, based on SIRG/N-5 review C.
Utilize MLCS 8590 and/or N5 LOG 001 reports for each commodity involved, and assign N-5 ( to those added items not previously assigned.
2.
Accountability of Bolted Flange Connection Reports.
3.
Affix the "N-5 Review Stamp" and N-5 label to document packages as accountability is completed.
4.
CMTR verification will not be performed since this was performed by SIRG.
not the specific 5.
Mark-up a P&ID to reflect the N-5 boundary, commodities involved.
No verification as to the correctness /
completeness will be performed.
6.
Verify that all items listed in item 1A & 1C above appear on the drawing / amendments and certification of as-built /
tabulation of materials (small bore spools / pup pieces must show heat numbers) supplied by resident engineering.
The walkdown reconciliation shall be discontinued.
December 4, 1985 Distribution Page 2 of 2 A.
Verify that heat numbers / heat codes on the Tabulation of Materials correspond to the PDC and/or The Fabrication Checklist.
The above guideline is to be considered as the scope of the N-5 software groups responsibility, and must be worked with the add-itional requirements of QAI-025, with respect to N-5 Code Data Report preparation.
RS:sl cc:
A Cutrona J Narron W Pardee R Peck DISTRIBUTION A M arg J S Martin r
8
4 EX $
Centlemen:
ne success of the South Texas Project depends en the ccmbin When any team member for his effort of many people and groups of people.
fies records, mis-personal gain manipulates and intimidates people, f labor, it is time This individual Partners.
the situation is brought to the attentien of the is the WAC manager, Billy Rester.
falsify In the past Mr. Rester has successfully directed his subordinates to ities of duct-records, run thrcugh hold points, claimed as installed quant d violated wrk that was not installed, ignored project starty schedules, an f in covering project rules and procedures, and willfully involved his cra t up kncun violations.
has par-In all cases, for reascns known only to themselves, Ebasco managene hich are well kncwn to ticipated in whitewashing these flagrant violaticns, wI believe it h
ent of Ebasco to cover up the activities of Mr. Rester relating to t e rec many.
They en-Ebasco cccpany picnic held at Celanese Park June 21st of this year.
Bat is their gaged Mr. Rester to cater this event which Ebasco will pay for.
f What becerres the business of others at STP and t tion STP ewned materials to erect Mr Rester's serving booth and its t tusiness.
to the picnic site in STP :rened vehicles.It is questionable that they intend to re-s the project for these materials. imburse the project for wages 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> Friday i.;ht ported frcxn the Project site (in SU vehicles) to spend about h w these setting up Mr. Rester's facility, since the attached time sheets s o k
He attae. e w
craft man hours are cost coded to KR's, direct, and repair wor.f the time sheets bear the verificatien signatures o involve themseltcs S. Schugardt and the Foreman, T. Swansen, who by so signing, hority B is s6me abuse of aut h picnic Saturday night (June 21) by dispatching 10 sheetmetal craf tsmen in this action to defraud the owners.
Even theuah it was for a shorter period of time, STP veh 2v Saturday work as at premi'.rn time races.
for cleanup.
~...
again used for non-project work.
re also 1::/
sheets for these craf tsren under the directien of ?
1=c h".
niaht hVAC G:ceral Fere:ran is Steve Potvin.a "r. N s.<1.
Re ene who benefited most, of ecune, have any back up data about on-site labor expended to f abric hujesuccess.
D at was free to him also.
serving aids.
3 days His is the same Eilly Rester who caters lunches for Ebasco m d
He food is brought to the site in the SYP l
each week.
king in the sheetnetal craf t laydcan area) in violation of job rules to Mr. Rester.
en site, and is carried to the Ebasco conference rean in a Afterwards the scre l
either Ebasco sheetret01 craft or non-manual persennel.It will b How Ebasco pays pecple remove the refuse.Zaist.to claim they do realize they are e
(
for this food is not the point.
t
It is also kncwn that HLEP's centracts selling anything on the project site.
with all carpanies doing work at STP centain a previsien.that empicyees are Even if Ebasco may have not to engage in cannercial activities en site. selectively waive furnished facilities ticular camercial activity, it is a blatant misuse of STP and skilled craf tsmen for private enrichnent.
If the HVAC discipline can af ford to divert skilled craf t manpower in this Why has their over-way, why are they delinquint in turning over systens? time been times over the plan? (see attachnents).
This is the same Billy Rester stese bet with Tan Robertsen tcck prec over schedulud work.overrime man hours were spent to carplete installation of cer were scheduled for installatien two cenths later, overmnning elec other insta11atiens.
ranager in order to allow Rester to win his bet.The most despicable aspe t was that crafts and "white hats" alike were told just what was at stake.
This is the same Billy Rester who has beasted throughcut the feb that he is He als6 beasts "taking over" the Intermech shcp for fabricatien of duct'.
openly that he has a special privileged relatienship with HL&P's George R Recently an audit of quanticites of ductwork claimed for one week reveale A seccnd audi: r2-50% of sheet metal clat ed was still lying en the ficor.
vealed that of quantities claimed enly ene-fcurth of the material was erecta.
Tnis tco was brushed under the rug with a "scrry, we made a mistake".
Cceple::
This informatien is presented to identify a sericus prcblem at ST?.Many dccumented evidence is unavailable to ce.
and are dcing a geed people are working very hard to carplete rhis project It is grossly unfair that a gecd team, going by the :ules isi henestjob.
to be iudred by tha entics of any' hat this jcb deesn't need is ane:n=r "60'"ihu:es".
perscnal playgrcund.
<.