ML20214P285

Motion & Memo to Quash Subpoena.* Bp Garde Motion That Commission Quash V Stello 870520 Subpoena

ML20214P285
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	05/29/1987
From:	Roisman A, Rubinton D GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
CON-#287-3635 OL, NUDOCS 8706030292
Download: ML20214P285 (116)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:.- 7 .fp ($l h UNITED STATES OF-AMERICA 'JUN -119875 NUCI EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .'. gggo -8 g SEGY-NBC p/ 4 6 In the matter of: ) ) Houston Light iog and Power Company ) ) 'DocketNo.50-498-db To: Ms. Billie Pirner Garde ) 50-499 ) ) MOTION AND MEMORANDUM TO QUASH SUBPOENA Anthony Z. Roisman, Esq. 1401 New York Ave., N.W., Suite 600-4 Washington, D.C. 20005 { (202) 628-3500 l David S. Rubinton Richard E. Condit Staff Attorneys, GAP 1555 Connecticut Ave.,NW Washington, D.C. 20036 l (202) 232-8550 l l l i 563 8706030292 870529 l PDR ADOCK 05000498 l G PDR (

Y UNITED' STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter.of: ) ) Houston Lighting and Power Company ) Docket No. 50-498 ) 50-499 To: Ms. Billie Pirner Garde ) ) MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA Billie P. Garde, Esq. (Movant) hereby moves that the Commissioners of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) quash the subpoena issued by Victor Stello, Jr. (Executive Director for Operations) on.May 20, 1987, The specific grounds for quashing the subpoena are as follows: (1) Compliance with Mr. Stello's command would compromise the health and safety of the public. (2) There is no authority for Mr. Stello to issue the May 20, 1987 subpoena. (3) The information and identitites of Movant's clients are ) protected by the attorney-client privilege. Movant requests the opportunity for an oral argument on this Motion. r

p l i Respectfully. submitted, /(O lVf -D$[ / ~ . Anthony Z. Roisman, Esq. 1401 New York Avenue N.W.

1. 600 Washington,.D.C. 20005 (202) 628-3500

&l4 ' Richard E.'Condit David S. Rubinton Staff Attorneys Government. Accountability Project 1555 Connecticut Avenue N.W. 4200 Washington,. D.C. 20036 (202) 232-8550 Dated: May 29, 1987 079a06 2-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of: ) ) Houston Lighting and Power Company ) Docket No. 50-498 ) 50-499 To: Ms. Billie Pirner Garde ) ) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA [ Oral Argument-Requested] I. Introduction Victor Stello, without power or authority, has sought to compel an attorney, Billie Pirner Garde, Esq., to divulge the names of her clients and information provided to her by her clients in direct violation of the conditions of her representation of these clients and of her obligations under the Legal Code of Professional Responsibility. The information sought was obtained by Ms. Garde, and investigators working for her and under her supervision and control, directly from her clients and relates solely to information required by Ms. Garde to properly represent those clients. See Attached Affidavit of Billie Pirner Garde, Esq. Ms. Garde has been retained by these clients to assure'that their concerns about the safety of the South Texas Nuclear Plant are properly investigated and resolved by the NRC. In an attempt to assure that the concerns were properly investigated, Ms. Garde sought from the NRC creation of a competent and independent investigation unit. See accompanying Petition Pursuant to 10.CFR .t.

l S2.206. In order to be able to properly' advocate the concerns of her clients to such a competent and independent investigation team, Ms. Garde obtained from her clients their technical'and expert opinions that formed the basis for their safety concerns. Mr. Stello's attempt to obtain this:information is for the purpose and/or would have the effect of defeating the very concerns that motivated Ms. Garde's clients to retain her. -It is Mr. Stello and Region IV whose past and present conduct (fully documented by OIA reports and other investigations) that have convinced Ms. Garde and her clients that only an independent investigation team can properly evaluate and act upon the concerns of these workers. These workers have already taken substantial risks to pursue safety concerns which, when raised at the job site, were ignored. Fearful of job discrimination and mindful of the consequences suffered by others befcre them, they refrained from further pressing their concerns with Houston Power & Light (HP&L), but have nonetheless come to Ms. Garde and enlisted her assistance in assuring that their safety concerns are properly evaluated by the NRC. Their experiences and those of other workers, all documented by OIA and others, convince them and Ms. Garde-that allowing either Region IV or Victor Stello to be in charge of the ' investigation will severely compromise their safety concerns and substantially increase the risk that their identities will be disclosed to HP&L. If this Commission were nonetheless to order Ms. Garde to divulge this information to the very persons whom these workers least trust, it would create incalculable harm for -

6 'the cause of safety at every nuclear facility in the country. ~ t (Although Ms. Garde will not violate her duty to her clients, the Commissioners action would be properly viewed as aligning.the power of the highest levels of this agency with proven and 4 unrepentant miscreants (Stello and Region IV) and-against the workers'in the nuclear industry and the public health and I safety.). As the accompanying $2.206 Petition makes clear, there is a1far better course for the Commissioners to follow to both assure the proper and prompt investigation of the safety concerns and to assure concerned nuclear workers everywhere that they will' never be forced to choose between silence on the one hand.and ineffective-safety investigations by incompetent and ill-motivated NRC investigators on the other. } II. Facts Beginning in 1985, Billie P. Garde has been contacted by 1 workers at the South Texas nuclear power plant. These contacts-A have raised concerns ranging from specific complaints about harassment and intimidation for identifying safety problems at the plant, to general complaints about violations of federal and-state laws by certain individuals and subcontractors at the plant. In some cases Ms. Garde was-retained to represent'these employees in discrimination complaints against their employers; i in others, she was contacted regarding the substantive concerns about the plant. Ms.' Garde's representation of employees at the South Texas Nuclear Plant is. formalized by a written attorney-client a r

4 .ag'reement. Her. obligation under the agreemen't~is.very clear. .She may not, without-her clients' approval, provide either the-L identity of her~ clients or any information to the NRC, to Region IV of the NRC, or to the current Executive Director of Operations, Victor Stello, Jr., for the purposes of the ' investigation of the concerns. Ms. Garde has, since January 1987, attempted to fulfill her obligation to her clients by obtaining a competent, non-Region IV investigation / inspection' commitment by the NRC. On January 20, 1987, she announced her preliminary investigation of STNP I allegations through a letter to th'e State of Texas Attorney-General's' office and to Mr. Stello. She requested that the-NRC. provide an independent inspection effort to review her clients' allegations. t Within a week officials at Houston Power and Light responded to her letter indicating a desire to work with GAP attorneys in investigating allegations. Subsequent correspondence and discussions with HP&L, unfortunately, did not prove productive. On February 18, 1987, Mr. Stello responded to the concerns about Region IV's inability to conduct an independent and competent investigation by advising her of the following: The South Texas Project is within the jurisdiction of Region IV and that Region is the appropriate organiza-tion to review the concerns of your clients. I have-confidence that Region IV will properly pursue this-reponsibility. I have been in contact with Mr. Robert D. Martin, Regional Administrator for Region IV, and he assures me that his staff is thoroughly prepared to commit the resources required to appropriately resolve J the issues which your clients might raise. Any further communications _you may have regarding this j matter.should be directed to Mr. Martin in Region IV. 1 : I

On March 4, 1987, Ms. Garde responded to Mr. Stello's blind vote of confidence in Region IV. She referenced a long history aof problems with Region IV inspection. efforts of which she is confident Mr. Stello is well aware an'd again requested an independent investigation for her clients' concerns. On March 10, 1987, Mr. Stello affirmed his previous position and urged Ms. Garde to bring forth "any information" she has on deficiencies which would have bearing on nuclear safety to NRC or HP&L -- or advise her clients to do so. On March 23, 1987, Ms. Garde again requested that Mr. Stello address directly her request for an independent individual or task force to investigate the concerns'being raised by her i clients. On April 6, 1987, HP&L officials wrote to Ms. Garde and informed her that they were "taking steps to request appropriate government officials to obtain from you or your organization information which could potentially affect the safety of the South Texas Project." On April 8, 1987, Mr. Stello, who upon information and belief responded to HP&L's plea for assistance, placed Ms. Garde under threat of legal action if she did not provide the information to the agency. On at least three occasions in March and April, 1987, Ms. Garde initiated conversations with Mr. Tom Rehm of the Executive Director's office to explain her legal obligations and her interest in providing access to the workers and their information

to an independent and competent team or individual within the NRC. The conversations apparently bore no fruit, although Ms. Garde was led to believe that Mr. Rehm, and possibly others, would discuss the general nature of the allegations and inform her of the agencies' decision regarding the processing of the allegations. Ms. Garde has spent six months attempting to get the NRC to act responsibly regarding the allegations raised by her clients. Her obligations to her clients have not changed. She must either provide them with a competent government investigation or she must remain silent and not endanger the safety of the public by an incompetent NRC investigation, nor endanger the professional future, reputations and/or source of income of her clients. There is a substantial basis for the workers' position and Ms. Garde's own professional opinion that neither Mr. Stello nor Region IV are competent government officials capable of conducting an inspection of worker allegations at the South Texas plant in accordance with NRC Chapter Manual 0517, Processing of Allegations. Region IV's conduct in the widely publicized events surrounding the harassment and intimidation of NRC inspectors at Comanche Peak was done with the approval or at the urging of Victor Stello. Furthermore, Mr. Stello has steadfastly stood behind Regional Administrator Robert D. Martin and Region IV officials throughout the most devastating evidence of misconduct, imprudence, incompetence, and dereliction of duties. According to Mr. Stello's testimony before the Senate hearing and his May 1,'1987 letter to Senator John Glenn, he was concerned with the . morale of the people in Region IV. Clearly he meant the people who were the " targets" of the investigation, not the NRC inspectors who had gone through bureaucratic " Siberia" as a result of trying to do their job. Mr. Stello approved a monetary bonus for one of the Region IV officials then under investigation, only to pull it back at the insistence of the OIA. Additionally, Mr. Stello recommended another Senior Region IV official implicated by the Region IV investigation for a senior staff position in Washington shortly before the report became public. Mr.'Stello's public and private support of Region IV's worst offenders and his failure to take any corrective action regarding the agency employees who have actively engaged in conduct that is I a violation of.NRC Regulations and practices is understandable only if he condones such activity. As a result of Mr. Stello's repeated failure to demonstrate any acknowledgement of the NRC's own regulations regarding the processing of allegations and interfacing with alleger, while simultaneously being the de facto operative of the utility from which the workers need protection, requires that she comply with her professional obligation to her clients and protect them from Mr. Stello and Region IV. III. Legal Argument 1. The Executive Director for Operations has no authority l l to issue the subpoena. i l ! l l

Pursuant to the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as-1 amended, and 10 C.F.R. S1.40, the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) is appointed by the Commission and performs such functions as the Commission may direct. In directing the EDO to perform numerous functions in 10 C.F.R. S1.40 (a-q), the Commission specifically did not include the issuance of subpoenas or commandments to appear within the scope of the Executive Director's duties. This omission is especially significant when one notes that the Commission specifically delegated subpoena power to the Office of Investigations (10 C.F.R. S1.36 (g)). While it may be possible that Mr. Stello could have been given the authority to issue a Commandment To Appear (or subpoena) in this instance no such claim of authority has been expressed. On the contrary, Ms. Garde was commanded to appear by a document which cited no legal authority whatsoever. [See 3]. In fact, the caption of the document discloses the basic flaw in the legal authority. If, as the document asserts, this is a subponea in the matter of Houston Lighting and Power, then it would have to be pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Part 2. The staff does not have the authority to issue subpoenas without Board approval. The mere fact that no Hearing Board is sitting does not expand the staff authority. Instead it requires the staff to seek a subpoena from some other lawful authority, i.e., the Commissioners, with an adequate showing to justify its conduct. Of course, the staff has not done this. Victor Stello should have made a timely request to the,

4 - i 1 Commission for a1 subpoena. Perhaps he didn't make such.a request because he.was~ aware that he would have to-explain the r

circumstances surrounding his request to the Commission and that' 3

he might thereforeLlose control of the information sought from Ms. Garde's clients. Movant'is.also perplexed by_the inclusion at the bottom of. -i this Commandment of procedures.for the quashing of a subpoena. 1 -[See' Attachment 13]. Like_the Commandment, the procedures for 3 -quashing'a. subpoena do not cite to any rule, regulation or law of 4 L-l the'NRC,-theLAdministrative Procedure Act.or the United States of i ] America. However, the provision is repeated verbatim (minus the-last sentence which directs such motions to the Secretary of the Commission):in 10 C.F.R. S2.720, the provision for a Board-issued i j subpoena.~ This procedure clearly applies to adjudications within the context of domestic licensing proceedings. Movant does not 4 understand why this particular provision is contained within this Commandment. This Commandment makes no mention of;any 1 adjudication'and Movant is not currently engaged in any litigation involving the South: Texas Nuclear Project. Therefore, the inclusion of the' procedures to quash at the bottom of thel 1 Commandment was inappropriate and, to the extent that this document. does not: appear to - be a subpoena at all, it was 4 I 'I . erroneous. To the extent that there is no authority for_the-issuance of-0 such a: Commandment, Ms. Garde-asserts her right to disregard'it. {

To-the extent that such a document.might be construed to be a n

~ subpoena; requiring a Motion To Quash,'this Memorandum supports i e

_ 9 _

3-s c D

lf l ,Vy ll L that Motion. 2. The Attorney-Client privilege prevents Movant from divulging the requested information to Mr. Stello. The information sought in the subpoena is absolutely protected. Movant is ethically bound to preserve the confidences 1'i and secrets of her clients.. Disciplinary Rule (DR) 4-101 of the ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility,and Rule 1.6 of 4 the ABA Model Rules prohibit a lawyer from revealing information relating to the, representation of a client. Specifically, DR 4-101(B) states that ". a lawyer shall not knowingly. [r}eveal a confidence or secret of his client." The information sought in this subpoena involves communications made by STNP employees to Ms. Garde of safety concerns'at STNP. These employees requested Ms. Garde's assistance upon the understanding that their identities would remain confidential. These clients also requested that the information they communicated to Ms. Garde would remain confidential. Ms. Garde investigated their concerns so that she could have effectively argue for an independent investigation of their concerns. Ms. Garde's investigation into her clients' allegations was at all times linked to her clients' interest in having a proper investigation done. In recognition of an attorney's' ethical requirements the law has recognized certain privileges which legally permit an attorney to refuse to disclose information about her client or information prepared or formed during the course of her legal.

i duties. Of these privileges, the attorney-client privilege recognizes the right'to keep communications made between the client and the attorney confidential. In addition, the work product doctrine protects from disclosure documents and mental impressions generated by an attorney during the course of the attorney-client relationship. There can be no question that the attorney-client relationship exists. Movant has express oral and written agreements with her clients. -[See Attachment 1]. A claim of privilege can be made if several factors are met. First, the holder of the privilege is a client. Second, the -communication being protected was made to a member of the bar in her capacity as an attorney. Third,-the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed by her client'for the purposes of securing legal services. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 89 F.Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950); Coleman v. American 2roadcasting Corporation, 106 P.R.D. 210 (D.C.D.C. 1985). The communications at issue here are clearly within the scope of the attorney-client privilege. The United Shoe standard supports the availcbility of the privilege in the instant case. The asserted holder of the privilege, STNP employees, became clients of Ms. Garde; Ms. Garde, the person to whom communications were made, is a member of the bar of the State of Wisconsin; and, in connection with the employees' communications concerning safety. conditions, Ms. Garde was acting as a lawyer in that she served to formulate a legal strategy to protect her clients' reputations and careers while seeing to it that their allegations were properly resolved. In fact, in a case very similar to this one, the U.S. Supreme Court held that communications made to an attorney in the course of a factual investigation being conducted for the purposes of providing legal advice, must remain confidential. Upjohn v. United States of America, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). In Upjohn, corporate attorneys conducted investigations to determine if Upjohn's payments to certain foreign officials were in violation of the law. Upjohn attorneys conducted interviews with employees to determine the extent of payments in order to provide legal advice, Upjohn at 394. When the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) learned of the payments, through a company disclosure, it began an investigation and issued a summons requiring Upjohn to produce the relevant documents. Upjohn refused to comply with the demands of the IRS, and the agency brought an action to enforce the summons. In supporting Upjohn's refusal to reveal communications with the attorneys the Court stated: Consistent with the underlying purposes of the attorney-client privilege, these communications must be protected against compelled disclosure, Upjohn, at 395. In the instant case, like Upjohn, Movant conducted a factual investigation in order to provide her clients with legal advice. The facts developed through oral communications with the clients pertained to problems at the STNP. Movant analyzed the clients' information and advised the clients accordingly. Clearly, these communications are privileged under the Supreme Court's holding in Upjohn. 3. The work product doctrine prevents Movant from divulging the requested informationoto Mr. Stello. All the.information received by Ms.. Garde-regarding problems at the STNP were received in the course of communications with her clients. As such, these communications are clearly protected by the attorney-client privilege. However, in the event.that these comnunications are not found to be protected, Movant asserts that this information is protected by the. work product doctrine. It is well established that an attorney's notes or summaries regarding oral conversations with third parties and/or witnesses are absolutely protected under the work product doctrine. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973); U.S. v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412 F.Supp. 943 (E.D.Pa. 1976). Only in very limited circumstances can a party compel that work product materials be disclosed. Even if the information is required to be disclosed under one of the limited exceptions, impressions of the attorney cannot be disclosed. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (b)(3); 10 C.P.R. S2.740(b)(2). In this case Mr. Stello would be unable to establish a substantial need for the information. Neither Mr. Stello nor Region IV can be expected to use any information to protect the public's health and safety. In fact, it is likely that any information released to Mr. Stello on Region IV would either be covered up or inappropriately shared with STNP officials. ), -w n..

Regarding the work product doctrine, the Upjohn court stated: The notes and memoranda sought by the Government here, however, are work product based on oral statements. If they revealicommunications, they:are, in this case, protected by the attorney-client privilege. To the extent they do not reveal communications, they reveal the attorneys' mental processes in evaluating the communications. As Rule 26 and Hickman make clear, such work product cannot be disclosed simply on a showing of' substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship. Upjohn, at 401. Furthermore, the work product doctrine applies to investigations done by third parties at the request and/or direction of an attorney. Alltmont v. U.S., 177 P.2d 971 (3rd Cir.), cert. den., 339 U.S. 967 (1950). In this case, any records or documents in the possession of Movant pertaining to the safety of the STNP are work products developed from oral communications with her clients. In addition, the documents and notes in question contain the thoughts and impressions of Ms. Garde. Therefore, these documents are clearly exempted from disclosure under the work product doctrine. Conclusion What this subpoena seeks to do is to force Ms. Garde to go against one of the fundamental principles of her profession -- to betray the confidences of her clients. Ms. Garde was retained for the express purpose of maintaining the confidences of her clients, while seeking to provide a proper mechanism for the resolution of their safety concerns at STNP. In pursuit of that, _

'Ms. Garde has attempted to persuade Victor Stello to help her find such=a mechanism. Failing at that, Ms. Garde has filed this ~ day a petition with the NRC pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S2.206 to order the proper investigation of her clients' concerns. We believe.that there is no legitimate basis for Billie P. Garde to appear pursuant to Mr. Stello's May 20, 1987 Commandment. Therefore, we hereby request that the Commandment to appear be quashed. Respectfully submitted, ( +m Anthony Z. Roisman, Esq. 1401 New York Avenue N.W.

1. 600 Washington, D.C.

20005 (202) 628-3500- , GV5 L Ri' chard E. Condit David S. Rubinton Staff Attorneys Government Accountability Project 1555 Connecticut Avenue N.W.

1. 200 Washington, D.C.

20036 (202) 232-8550 079a05 15 - .n_ -J

= _ ). XG OX T E COPi m 295 ; 5-29-87; 2: 15 AM;- 414 731 7881 + 202*283473 ; #1 W 29 '87 12:15 APPLETON.WI 414 731-7831 P.1/7 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ', s' 3t In the Matter oft Q y.' r~ Houston Lighting and Power 2 Company Dkt No. 50-498/499 % ;.,;g; 7.. c ', South Texas Nuclear Plant, J., Units 1 and 2. AFFIDAVIT 1. My name is Billie Pirner. Garde. I am an attorney with the Government Accountability Project (GAP). I am currently the Director of GAP's Midwest Office, located in Appleton, Wisconsin. I am also co-director of the Environmental Whistleblower-Protection Clinic. 2. Since 1985 I have been retained by a number of employees at STNP, some of who raised safety concerns that they wanted pursued by the NRC. As part of my work I and other GAP attorneys began, in January 1987, a preliminary investigation of STNP. 3. Currently both GAP attorney Richard Condit and I represent STNP employees in individual discrimination cases. In j these situations, we were retained to represent employees in litigation against their employers and/or to provide advice regarding disputes and potential disputes with their employers. l l In other cases we were retained for the purpose of assuring that the employees substantivc concerns were properly acted uPon by the NRC and that the employees identity was protected from disclosure in order to protect their job and theic Euture employment possibilities. (See, Attachment 1.) 4. The STNP employees that contacted us did so as a result _j_

-a w un ga w uesen asu. " ~ + - * * ~ ~ - " ~ ~ ' * * ' t1AY 29 '8712:16 ffPLg0a,uI 411731 ~551 P.2/7 of their inability to obtain an adequate resolution to concerns they had about the design, construction, management, and potential operation of the South Texas plant. Although each individual clients experience is unique the key clements of their dilemma is'the sames a. The client raised a discreet concern or concerns to his management, either on " deficiency _ paper" (i.e, nonconformance reports, deficiency reports, etc.), by documenting the concern in memoranda to supervision, by raising the concern orally to site supervision, or by taking the concern to the site SAFETEAM or the NRC. b. The concern of the client was not resolved to her satisfaction. This may have been because of inaction on the issues raised, or action on the concern that did not ally the fears of the client. c. The client then began to suffer some sort of reprisal as result of having raised the concern, or is fearful of. suffering a reprisal if he pushes the' concern. d. The client, believing that she had a duty to insure that she does et'erything in her power to insure that the public health and safety is protected, retained GAP attorneys to get her concerns into the hands of individuals that will put the ultimate issue - the protection of the public -at the forefront of resolution of the issues of concern to the client. 5. Acting on the requests of our clients we began a series of contacts with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to establish an avenue for our clients to come to the NRC, present their information, protect their confidentiality, and be assured that their concerns would be investigated by officials that would l l indewd put their obligation to tne public health and safety first. (See, generally correspondence between Billie Pirner Garde { and Victor stello attached to this affidavir.) 6. Our criteria to insure that our clients l'nterests were protected and their goals were accomplished was to insure that l - - - ~ - - - - - -- 1

m .u, NY 29 87 12'16 M' Nall 414 731-7551 p,3f7 independent and competent NRC employees process the allegations l l according to the DRAFT MANUAL CHAPTER 0517, " Management of j Allegations," which we recognize and understand to be the policy of the agency for processing allegations. (Although we recognize that the manual chapter has some weaknesses we acknowledge that it is the current policy of the agency regarding allegations.) 1 7. Mr. Stello has steadfastly refused to discuss our clients concerns and has rejected any attempts I have made to come up with an arrangement that resolves the needs of all of the tiillit1HirikSli,gggjagyggigngglyg,ghjigjg{Y[j,jg[,,,, resource intensive effort. 8. Mr. Stallo's position as detailed in his letter does not acknowledge the restraints within which he and I are operating. ) I have been retained to insure that my clients information is properly and thoroughly investigated and that their current and future employment interests are not endangered. 9. Mr. Stello's duties and responsibilities, according to the March, 1986, version of Manual Chapter 0517, Section 031, is to Set policy and procedures for the receipt, processing, control, and disposition of allegations in conjunction with the Director of OI...(and) implement policy for protecting the identity of those who provide information to the NRC. 10. It is important to underscore the fact that the clients that have come to me have come voluntarily because they have a sincere concern about the improper resolution of a safety related concern, and have no confidence that direct contacts with the - _ _

~ . XEROX TELECOPIER= 295 ; 29-07: 2:17_AM: 414 731 7881 + 2026283473 ; 84 MAY 29_'87:12:17 ffPLETCN UI.414 731-7831-p.4/7 7 agency will provide them the assurances needed to justify the risk they are taking with their careers and reputations. 11. It is fair to state that the current situation at South Texas is a direct result of the repeated violations by Region IV's of the NRC's own policies and regulations. ( See, para. 37 to 40, and see attached Memorandum in Support of the Motion-to Quash and Petition of the Government Accountability Project Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206.) 12. It is critical that the Commission acknowledge that there are consequences attached to having a single inspector, or an entire region, that has lost the faith of the public as a result of the conduct and regulatory record of the Region. In this case the actions of Region IV over the past decade have destroyed its credibility. 13. It is irrelevant to a resolution of the current issue whether the past inappropriate actions of Region IV inspectors or i managers were a result of deliberate misfeasance or gross incompetence. The damage to the public interest by an improper investigation and " resolution" of our clients concerns plus the damage to our clients financial well being, personal reputation i or career opportunities will most likely be significant. We have no choice but to fully advise our clients of the risks associated with reliance on Region IV employees to comply with NRC rules, regulations, or practices in the conduct of an investigation. 4. 14. As delineated below by way of example the consequences 1 of NRC malfeasance can be catastrophic. Some employees never recover from the personal, emotional, and financial havoc caused i

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i in their lives by providing information to a government agency in good faith and becoming, essentially,'the " target" of a government investigation. For example, I i

a. If an employee is contemplating' bringing suit against his ~

employer.for illegal discrimination, violation of the public policy exemption to the at-will doctrine,. defamation, intentional interference with contract, or other causes of action, a negative NRC report presents an additional complication and expense to a client. Frequently the consequences of a negative report present an evidentiary burden that cannot be overcome because of the lack of resources available to an employee to oppose the NRC's technical conclusions or because of the taint created by the j NRC's inadequate work effort.

b. This is even more true if the NRC is attempting to reach a determination on the central discrimination issue, that i

is, was the employee harassed and/or intimidated because of his engaging in protected activity as defined by the Act. i c. Protecting the interests of the employees at nuclear j plants in Texas is made even more complicated by the holding of Brown and Root v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1984), which holds that employees are not protected under Section i j 210 of the Act unless they have contacted a competent organ of government with their concerns and have initiated a " proceeding" under the Act. Additionally, under state common i law, in order for an employee to prevail on a wrongful discharge tort theory she must prove that refusing to violate a federal or state law /or following a federal or 4 state law in violation of direct orders to the contrary was the " sole reason" for the termination.

d. The NRC investigations and inspections are not the results of a legal proceeding in which both the worker and the alleged offender are given an opportunity to present j

their evidence under rules of discovery in front of a neutral decision maker with technical competence and j engineering experience and judgement.

e. If the inspector is incompetent, succumbs to time or 4

political pressure, violates the confidences of the witness, 1 or engages in other " shortcuts" to eliminate the employees 4 concerns the consequences of his efforts are often catastrophic for individual employees.

15. Additionally, there is no avenue for appeal and review of NRC findings which may be' damaging to the employee.

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practical matter there is no adequate means for an employee to be i

compensated if NRC officials violate his confidentiality or impugn his integrity or competence. 16. As a result of.the situation as described above GAP attorneys have an. obligation to advise employees who contact us for legal advice regarding how to proceed in insuring their allegations are properly investigated and protecting themselves from further reprisals and retaliation. in si ai

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asswus=ym represent generally two types of employees - those who originally trusted the system with their concerns and are now engaged in-fighting the reprisals against them, or those who have information that they want revealed to competent government officials without endangering their professional lives and careers. 18. Our representation is formalized by either a written attorney-client relationship between the employee and myself or another attorney or based on a clear understanding between the employee and the attorney in connection with the representation. A copy of the standard attorney-client representation form used for these workers is attached to this affidavit. (Attachment 1) 19. Our obligation under the agreement is very clear We may not, without our clients approval, provide either the identity of the clients or any information to the NRC. ( See, p. 2 of the agreement.) 20. We may not provide the information to Region IV of the NRC for the purposes of the investigation of the concerns (See.

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tugese:J473 ; o7 l M Y 29 '87 12: 19 MFLETC44 WI 212 731-7551 p,777 I l

p. 3 of the agreement.)

21. We may not provide the information to the current Executive Director of Operations, Victor Stello, Jr., for investigation. ( See, p.4 of the agreement.) 22. We have, since January 1987, attempted to fulfill our obligation to our clients by obtaining a competent, non-Region IV, investigation / inspection commitment by the NRC. 23. On January 20, 1987, we announced c2r preliminary investigation of STNP allegations through a letter to the State of Texas Attorney General's office and to Mr. Ste!lo. We requested that the NRC provide an independent inspection effort to review our clients' allegations. (See, attachment 2) 24.' Within a week officialn at Houston Power and Light responded to our letter, not even addressed to them, indicating a desire to work with us in investigating allegations that were provided to us. Subsequent correspondence and discussions with HP&L, unfortunately, did not prove productive. (Correspondence between mysalf and HP&L ic provided as Attachment 9 a g.)

27. On February 18, 1987, Mr. Stello responded to our concerns about Region IV's inability to conduct an independent cnd competent investigation by advising us of the following:

The South Texas Project is within the juriudiction of Region the concerns of your clients.IV and that Region is the appropriate o IV will properly pursue this responsibility.I have confidence that Region contact with Mr. Robert D. Martin, Regional AdministratorI have been in for Region IV, and he assures me that his staff is thoroughly prepared to commit the resources required to appropriately resolve the issues with your clients might this matter should be directed to Mr. Martin in Region IV,-

XEROX TELECOPIER 295 ; 5-29-87; 2:20 AM; 414 731 7861 + 2026283473 ; O1 ) m Y 29 '87 12:20 f,PFLETC& WI 414 731-7581 p,;f7 (See, Attachment 3) 28. On March 4, 1987, I responded to Mr. Stello's blind vote of confidence in Region IV. I referenced a long history of urnblems with Realnn TV inspectinn affnrre t.rhinh T im nnnFident Mr. Stello is well aware and again requested an independent investigation for our clients concerns.( See, Attachment 4) 29. On March 18, 1987, Mr. Stello affirmed his previous position and urged me to bring forth "any information" I have on deficiencies at STNP that would have a bearing on nuclear safety to NRC or HP&L - or advise our clients to do so. (See, Attachment 5.) 30. On March 23, 1987, I again requested thar Mr. Stello addrese directly my request for an independent individual or task force to investicar.m the nnneerns haine rale =A hu nne alinn&a. (See, Attachment 6.) 31. On April 6, 1987, HP&L officials wrote and informed me that they were "taking steps to request appropriate government officials to obtain from you or your organization information which could potentially affect the safety of the South Texas Project." (See, Attachment 9 ) 9 32. On April 8, 1987, Mr. Stallo, who upon informahlon and belief, responded to HP&L's plea for assistance, placed me under direct threat of legal action if I did not provide the information to the agency within 30 days. (See, Attachment 7.) os, un at least tnree occasions in March and April, 1987, I initiated conversations with Mr. Tom Rehm of the Executive Director's office to explain our legal obligations and our . i 1

m XER0x TELECOPIER 22 ; o-a e ie 6 4

• e.

+N sJa - 'cos + aaaa4ra ; ee ) MAY 29 '87 12:21 MFLETGblC 414 731-7851 P.2/7 1..L .. L 1.. y wsidiuy avve== 6u Lue wurners ano enelr inrormation ) ( to an independent and competent. team or individual within the i NRC. The conversations apparently bore no fruit, although I was toa w w... v. suas at. nwum anu posslory ocners, woula discuss I the general nature of the allegations and inform me of the agency's decision regarding an avenue for processing of the allegations. 34. As the facts demonstrate I have spent six months attempting to get the NRC to act responsibly regarding our clients. Our obligations to our clients have not changed. We must eithee provide them iaith a eomre L...L yvv aumma:L investigation to assure them that their safety concerns will be properly addressed or we must remain silent and not endanger the safety of the public by allowing an improper investigation to permit cover up of safety problems and to net endanger their professional future and their source of income and reputation. 35. There is substantial reason to doubt that, if Region IV officials were given the responsibilley of the investigation into our clients concerns that the effort would be conducted in accordance with CHAPTER MANUAL 0517 manual. .u. unw ww=um.auners cnemselves nave perhaps the best knowledge of the basis of our belief regarding Region IV officials because they alone are the recipients of all of the I ) l various reports, investigations, and inquiries conducted over the years by the Commission staff into Region IV fiascos. (A mote complete list is provided in the 2.206 Petition filed today by i GAP on this issue, however, the following example is included to -g_

' XEROX.TE EC3 IER 295 :- 5-29-W: 2:22 AM; 414 TJ1 7681 + 2026 83C 3 : *3 f1AY 29 ?S712:22 AFDLETOM4I 414 731-7521 P. 3n demonstrate that Region IV has not learned from its errors.)

37. In October, 1983, the NRC's Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA) finished two investigations of charges of impropriety of certain Region IV officials at the comanche Peak plant.

In a January 3, 1984, memo from then EDO William J. Dircks to Chairmhn Palladino on the OTA repnrrn nir,ke def'anded Region IV's actions in

1) not determining the full extent of an allegors allegations because "at that time it appears to have been i'

reasonable not to have contacted [the allegor] despite his 5 allegations to the press of a cover up. Hindsicht would have made that contact desirable but would not likely have i changed the ultimate findings en the matter." -2) defended Region IV's reliance on the utilities findings regarding the allegations, noting that "Acain, with the advantage of hindsight, one could say that Region IV } sm a. m.....t. 7 1.w w 1 J 1. w e a.wM~d che saww u M E 5 De C1 5 1 7 attention to the matter and to ao beyond a review of someone 1 .I s .C Yf;...., w A ven Tn3mi uv.cioN tr1T eXTsTW5' rne f actionsTRegion gappear,t;_Q reasonable ~4IId correct.3'-~ 3) acknowledged the impropriety of the actions of Region IV inspector R.G. Taylor in not conducting a " thorough investigation" in IER 50-445/82-14. and indicated that "I intend to emphasize the need for thorcugh inspections of-allegedleficiencies to Famd Regional Administrators to avoid repetition _of_ tfiese proBTems." l 4) explained away the triple breach of an allagers' identity by stating that "...NRC policy on confidentiality t was less than clear in 1980 and not executed similarill in a U regions. Our poIIcy in this area is belnq revisked aiid ...:_.,.. A6 1., ._..... An nin 1:mr wrp u.c 4omr or i allegers E regard g confidentialty be, fulfilled. " (All emphasis is added) i 38. There is substantial basis for our clients' position and our own professional opinion that neither Mr. Stello or Region IV are competent government officials capable of I conducting an inspection of worker allegations at the south Texas l ! - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ -

l XEROX TELECGPIER ist 4 '"' '"'i AEU4D *

• 4

)- MY 29 '67 12 23 FF IOH' G I '?El~= 1 P* '7 plant in accordance with NRC Chapter Manuel 0517, Processing of Allegations. The basis for the opinions of our clients is a variety 39. of experiences and impressions formed by tne actions of Region IV inspectors responsible for the plant. 40. One of my clients, Mr. John Hodge, has authorized me to include the following examole as the latest demonstration of f Region IV's insensitivity, incompetence, and refusal to follow NRC's own chapter manual instructions regarding allegations. (The example is already on the public record.) 4. On November 22, 1986, John Hodge filed, pro se, a complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor against EBASCO alleging that he had been discriminated against for. going to SAFETEAM and for disagreeing with his management over violations of site criminal laws, federal rules and site procedures. Mr. Hodge also claimed that he had only recently I become aware of his rights under Section 210 of the Energy l Reorganization Act, and that there was no copy of the law i nngrad anmahara nn the ciba 3ss41shla ha bi= b. The U.S. Department of Labor rejected his complaint because it was not filed within 30 days of the discriminatory act. I c. On December 22, 1986, on behalf of Mr. Hodges, I appealed the determinacio.. w: L t.. ways a.d nwus Divielvu. d. On February 6, 1987, there was a conference call between the law Judge. yer for ESASCO, myself, and the Administrative Law During that conference call it was decided that before any litigation would be commenced on the merits of the discrimination complaint that a preliminary issue had to be decided. The first issue was whether or not Mr. Hodges had constructive knowledge of the Act by a determination of the aernal pnerinco nF eh. une ce,- 2 a. .w. .ts.. .w... i was no written order memorializing this issue, e. On April 28, 1987, the Region IV Allegations Coordinator wrote to Mr. modges and informed him thac Region IV had conducted an investigation into his technical concerns and concluded that they were not substantiated. I The only g concern addressed by Region IV was the single issue in the proceeding, that is - whether or not the NRC believed that Form 3's had been posted. >

---.u-, r;u 2? '5712:23 i-F:LET @,u ! 414 721<331 ) P. L 7 l f. interviewed Mr. Hodges.No NRC inspector, investigator, or coordinator had ever ) Region IV had absolutely no idea'of the proof that Mr. Hodges had himself gathered to l demonstrate that the Form 3's were not, in fact, posted. g. Region IV also completely ignored the technical allegations raised initially in Mr. Hodges complaint regarding wrongdoing issues and his safety-related concerns. l ) h. They completely ignored, either deliberately or because k *[w) $ai? lAll }D889Fil"alataat w!?Ri"allecer pgnese EC r determine issues, proof substantiate the concern,s. evidence, and any thing to ( ) i. The inspector, R.G. Taylor, is the same inspector reviously cited by OIA for conducting inadequate nspections. Apparently Mr. Dircks lessons from hindsight were not communicated to Mr. Taylor, or already forgotten. f I (See, paragraph 37 (3), supra.) 41. Susequent communications between myself and Region IV 1 has not produced any remedy, (See, Attachments 8 a-d for a record of the correspondence on this example.)

42. Mr. Stello has steadfastly stood behind Mr. Martin and

.. ino ro e,,i-..,. es..e .s..... a....<1.., .. o... x j misconduct, imprudence, incompetence, and dereliction of duties. \\ According to Mr. Stello's testimony before the Senate hearing and his May 1, 1987 letter, to Senator John Glenn, Mr. Stello was concerned with the " morale" of the people in Region IV. It in my personal belief that he was referring to the same people that OIA had concluded were quilty of years of ignoring quality issues at l Comanche Peak, and whose names figure prominently in each of the OIA inventinarinns ra,.re.d

• a 4a *wt-4titas.

=. s--ts, confident that Mr. Ste11o's concern did not run to the morale of Lne lumpvutars wno had been sentenced to bureaucratic Sib eria as o result of trying to do their job. ( I base my cpinion, in part, ' l ) i { I h

XEROX TELECOPIER 295 ; 5-29-87; 2:24 AM: 414 731 7861 - + 2026283473 ; 86 $Y'29 '87 12:24 fFPLETOfb MI 414 731-73?1 P. 6 '7 f 1 nn the farr Phar Mr Crallo initially ay,.. .a,,,,,,t,,, g,,,,, t for Region IV official Tom Westerman, only to pull it back at the insistence of OIA, and because Mr. Stello had recommended another senior Region IV official, Mr. Paul Check, implicated by the Region IV investigations and the history of ignoring quality . problems at Region IV plants, for a promotion to a senior staff position in Washington. 41. Mr. Stallo's public and private support of Region IV's worst offenders and his failure to take any corrective action regarding the agency employees who have actively engaged in ennAnek Whah is a violetten.E Hnc.ww 1.Livu. end psautluww La ] understandable only if he in fact condones the activity. 42. As a result of Mr. Stallo's repeated failure to j demonstrate any acknowledgement of the NRC's own regulations regarding the processing of allegations and interfacino with allagers, while at the same time being the de facto operative of f the utility from which our clients need protection, we have no choice but to comply with our professional obligatien to our clients and protect them from the NRC. 43. I am confident that the Commissioners themselves will j sne the dilemma i am la 'ad e-td. 'w* 21--- 1-2---*r { Provided by the Director of Licensing when a similar problem crose in early 1984 regarding the Waterford and Comanche Peak plants. 44. It is important that the Commission realize that I am ) very anxious for the resolution of this issue and look forward to turning the investigative responsibility of the concerns of my l i a, 1 ,. _ - _.. - - - - - -m -_,w.c,~_.___,_.-._...-__.,,r,._.-,, ,.c ~-.~,_e

'EROX TELECCPIER' 295, 5 eW M5 m m 731 "351 + 2026283473 ; o7 X $Y 29 '67 12:25.~.FFLE*0f'..C 414 711-7.551 p,7,7 l = l l gg,nyg pn f.nmpatane W /' me=FF membora uho ha o ....l...u..a.s integrity and fairness, and will abide by Chapter Manual 0517. (The Chapter Manual is attached to this affidavit as Attachment 10.) However, I must comply with the restrictions that my cli'ents have put me and other GAP attorneys under regarding their individual concerns. OO. A b- _ 4 e n. _, Billie Pirner Garde, Esquire Subscribed and sworn to me this 29th day of Ma l .4-g. Outagami County, Wisconsin

ssstrus,

,.. ""....m"'?>,,, ?. JU ,.'g, NCTA,1Y \\*Nb a g PUBLIC ! c; ic Ts i

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~ Attachment #1 REPRESENTATION AGREEMENT (Client), residing at hereby agree to retain the Government Accountability Project (GAP) to perform legal services and represent me in the matter of my allegations regarding problems at the South Texas Nuclear Project (STNP). For the purposes of this agreement these services do not include litigation, unless specifically stated, or provided for in a previous or subsequent written agreement. 7 1. Staff Attorneys Billie Pirner Garde and Richard E. Condit will be responsible for representing the Client'in this matter. The Client will accept the reprecentation of other members of the GAP staff as deemed appropriate. The Client cuthorizes the responsible staff attorneys to do all things reasonably necessary or desirable to ensure that the concerns of the Client regarding the STNP will be investigated by competent government officials. These services shall be rendered pro bono. The Client agrees that s/he will not waive any rights to recover attorneys' fees if provided for by statute or regulation. 2. The Client understands that GAP will keep the identity of the Client and the information provided regarding the South Texas Nuclear Project confidential. GAP will only release the Client's identity or information with the oral or written cpproval of the Client. However, the Client understands that once his/her identity or information is released to any source, GAP will no longer be responsible for maintaining the Client's i 1-

1 L Rspresentation Agreement. Pcge Two confidentiality. GAP will not be responsible for maintaining the confidentiality of Client once the Client discloses his/her information or identity to any other person. 3. GAP understands that the Client does not want Region IV of the Nuclear' Regulatory Commission (NRC) to investigate this matter due to the Client's belief that Region IV officials are incompetent or unwilling to investigate the Client's concerns. 4. gap understands that the Client does not want Victor Stello, Jr. (NRC, Executive Director for Operations) to investigate or participate in an investigation or review of his/her allegations. It is the belief of the Client and GAP that Mr. Stello approves of Region IV's actions. 5. GAP understands that it is the Client's goal to have her/his allegations properly and fully investigated by a competent governmental body. 6. GAP will advise the Client of the results of any investigation into the Client's allegations as the results become available. 7. The Client is retaining GAP in this matter because s/he is sincerely concerned about violations of regulations and/or procedures at the STNP. To the best of the Client's knowledge, all of the information provided to GAP is known by STNP management or has been raised through proper channels. 8. The Client agrees to cooperate fully with the t 2-

Representation Agreement Page Three responsible staff attorneys and to respond promptly to~-telephone calls and correspondence. Client agress to promptly notify the responsible staff attorney of any change in home or work address or telephone number. Client' authorizes GAP and its attorneys to-review any and all files and records, wheresoever situated, in the conduct of this representation. Client acknowledges receipt of a copy of this agreement. a Client Dated: Accepted on Behalf of the Government Accountability Project 4 by: Louis Clark Executive Director (079a03) 3

m_ Attachment #2 ~ CO'ARNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT 1555 Connecticur Avenue N.W.. Suite 202 Washington D.C. 20036 (202)2324550 January 20, 1987 Victor Stello, Executive Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 James Mattox Attorney General for the State of Texas Supreme Court Building 14th & Colorado Austin, Texas 78711 Re: South Texas Nuclear Project

Dear Messrs. Stello and Mattox:

This letter is to inform your respective agencies that the Government Accountability Project (GAP) has formally begun preliminary investigat on into worker allegations at the South Texas nuclear project. Since 1980, GAP has played a significant role in advocating on behalf of whistleblowers and concerned citizens on issues involving safety-related problems at various nuclear power facilities. Our approacn to nuclear power has been steadfastly the same: to ensure tnat the government enterces the nuclear safety laws and regulations. As a result of GAP's efforts (alone or in concert with otner organizations) to expose safety-related problems, the construction and/or operation of several nuclear power facilities - previously thought to be fit to operate -- were cancelled or postponed for furtner review. The cancelled facilities include the 98 percent completed Zimmer nuclear power plant and the 85 percent c:mpleted Mtdland p' ant. Those which were postponed for furtner review include me Comanche Peak, Three Mile Island, Diablo Canyon, and Waterf:rd fact'. ties. GAP currently either represents or is ~0rking with approximately 36 current and/or former empicyees of the South Texas project. The allegations from the workers range from grand theft of nuclear grade steel to engineering defects in several major safety components. The allegations concern the failure of Houston Light & Power to guarantee subcontractor compliance with industry and federal safety requirements, including but not limited to: defects in ene instrumentation and control division; defects and lack of compitance with federal regulations in the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning system; lack of compliance with quality standards in the area of soils compaction; failure to complete required QA or QC documentation; falsification of required QA or QC documentation; and harassment and intimidation of persennel who attempt to adhere to federal safety standards.

l January 20, 1987 - Page Two i Additionally, and of specific concern to the State of Texas, there are allegations that include deliberate actions of some of the subcontractors at STP to overcnarge Houston Light & Power for goods and services by " charging off" their own unacceptable work to Brown & Root, Inc. There is also information which suggests that subcontractors have fraudulently charged STP for manhours not worked, and for portions cf the project which were not completed as claimed. GAP is currently conduct:ng interviews with both current and former workers who are concerned about the South Texas project. GAP investigators are accepting calls from workers at our Washington, D.C. office and our Midwest office. Once our preliminary investigation is complete, we plan to issue a formal public report. Unfortunately, in the interim, we cannot advise our clients or those we work with to provide their concerns to the Region IV office of the NRC. Our experience has been (and recently released internal agency reports confirm) that the Arlington office :s either unable or unwilling to comply with its regulatory requirements as outlined in governing agency procedures. 1 Thus, unless the NRC :s w:lling to provide independent inspectors to process tne allegations pursua-: to internal "RC regulations, GAP will provide the allegations directly to the state Attorney General office, and/or to the appropriate congressional committees, and/or to otner reculatory or municipal bodies which have an interest in ensuring tra the South Texas plant is designed, constructed, and financed tn a manner that protects the public. Please direct any inquiries aboe CAP's S:uth Texas investigation to Richard Condit, Staff A:::r ey :nvestigator, 202-232-8550, or Billie Garde, GAP M d-est :ff.ce, 4;4-730-9533. S;mcere.;. 3 ;;;e P:rner Garde 4 Direct:r, M dwest Office Richard Ccndit Staff Attorney cc: Chairman Lando Zecn BG/RC:C30

Attachment #3 4.fg%'o f, UNITED STATES T'., NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION !..N j E W ASHING TON. D C. 20555 %sj / r.:. ' M1 iPockst~Mo. 50-498 -Ms. Billie Pirner Garde Mr. Richard Condit Government Accountability Project a Suite 202 1555 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Ms. Garde and Mr. Condit:

I am in receipt of your January 20, 1987 letter directed to me and the Attorney General of Texas. Your letter describes ir.vestigative activities you plan to undertake relative to allegations you have received from approximately 36 current and/or fonner employees of the South Texas Project. Your letter also identified the general nature of some of these allegations which' appear to i fall within the safety and regulatory responsibilities of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Your letter also states that you cannot advise your clients to provide their concerns to the Region IV office of NRC. You assert that your experience has been that Peqion IV does not comply with its requirements as outlined in agency procedures. Moreover, you demand

• bat unless NRC provides other inspection personnel to process these allegations,'you plan to provide 4

those allegations to other individuals or organizations. The South Texas Project is within the jurisdiction of. Region IV and that Region is the appropriate organization to review the concerns of your clients. I have confidence that Region IV will properly pursue this responsibility. I have been in contact with Mr. Robert D. Martin. Degional Administrator for i Region IV, and he assures re that his staff is thorcuohly prepared to commit the resources required to aporopriately resolve the issues which your clients 1 might raise. As you are aware, NRC is the responsible federal agency for ensuring tl.at safety significant issues are addressed where appropriate. Therefore, I urge you to bring forth promptly, or advise your clients to do so, to NRC or Houston Lighting and Power, any information you have on deficiencies which would have a bearing on nuclear safety. To retain them until your own report is prepared and published would not be in the best interests of assuring the prompt resolution of legitinate safety concerns. I

O 9-Multiple ~ Addressees ): Any further comunications you may have regardino this matter should be directed to Mr. Martin in Region IV. Sincerely, sP' s ~#b7?l. (, Victor Stello, Jr g Executive Director for Operations cc: The Honorable James Mattox Attorney General State of Texas Austin, Texas 78711

1. e

m*maa Attachment #4 1 . GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT 1555 Connecticur Avenue, N.W., Suite 202 (202)232-8550 iWashington, D.C. 20006 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT MIDWEST OFFICE 3424 MARCOS LANE APPLETON, WISCONSIN 54911 1 March 4, 1987 Victor Stello Executive Directcr Operations [ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 RE: South Texas Investigation

Dear Mr. Stello,

Your letter of February 18, 1987 regarding our South Texas investigation states that any fether communications regarding South Texas should be directed to Mr. Bob Martin, Regional Administrator. Your letter also urges us to bring forth any issues regarding safety to Region IV promptly. Given the history of incompetence in Region IV regarding issues of nuclear safety and the more recent evidence of impro-priety in Region IV I am surprised that you would continue to cdyise us to take allegations of nuclear safety to your present regional management. Your professed faith in the Regional management can only be bureaucratic posturing, as I seriously doubt whether even you can ignore the seriouness of the impro-prieties confirmed in the recent and continuning investigation by the Office of Inspector and Auditor. Mr. Stello, at some point you must assume responsibliity for the operation in Region IV to insure that the public health and safety around the Region IV facilities is protected. You apparently are willing to sacrifice that assurance in order to give the public appearance of support for Mr. Martin et.al. Your error in judgement is incredible. Within the past 18 months we have j ceen evidence and testimony of the improper release of a draft l inspection report on the Sequoyan Fuels Corporation fatal accident to Kerr-McGee officals, the harassment and intimidation of resident inspectors, the deletion items from inspection reports, the improper manipulation and/or release of inspection report results l to enchance the possibility of licensing, the destruction of documents, the failure to comply with statutory requirments under the Freedom of Information Act, the failure to properly investigate allegations of engineering, technical or hardware deficiencies at reactors in Region IV, the release of confidentiality of site cmployees that have come forward with concerns, the cooperation i

l ? ) with utility officals to discredit whistleblowers, and a total disregard for public accountability. For'all of the'above reasons we would be irresponsible if we led.more whistleblowers blindly to the slaughterhouse of your Arlington office. At some point you must choose between protecting and defending the egos of your staff and protecting 3 the public health and safety. You are paid by the taxpayers and citizens to do the later. We will not participate.in your doing the former. I hope you are able to find an independent team.to review the South Texas allegations. I Sincerely, 4 Billie Pirner Garde f-4 l/ ) cB cc: James Mattox Attorney General State of Texas w/end. OIA Report 86-10 ho l I \\ t },_ 1 4b

'****t b A h p [f Io, 5 UNITED STATES - Attachment #5 3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION L 3,, i C WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 \\ E l MAR i 01987 i Ps. Billie Pirner Garde i Government Accountability Prn.ier* 1555 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite P02 Washington, DC 20036

Dear Ms. Garde:

I have received your letter of Marcn 4, 1987. It prompts me to remind you that NRC is the responsible federal agency for ensuring that safety significant views are appropria'.ely addressed. I therefore urge you to brino forth promptly any infornation "ou have on deficiencies which would have a bearing on nuclear safety to P:RC or to Houston Lighting and Power - or advise 4-your clients to do so. To withhold such information would not be in the best interests of assuring the prompt resolution of legitimate safety concerns. Sincerely, s h A . } --${kA. Victor StelM, Jr.j Executive Director for Ooerations 4 -Q-

Attachment #6 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTADIUTY PROJECT 1555 Connecncut Avenue. N.W. Suite 202 Washington, D.C. -20036 (202)232 8550 MIDWEST OFFICE 104 E. WISCONSIN AVENUE APPLETON, WISCONSIN 54915-8605 March 23, 1987 i Victor Stello, Jr. Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulstory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 RE: South Texas Investigation

Dear Mr. Stello,

Your letter of March 18, 1987 sidestepped the issue of whether or not you are going to appoint an individual or a task force from NRC's Washington office to accept and/or investigate allegations concerning the safety of the South Texas Project. We are very concerned about the safety allegations known to us. We are so concernedthat we intend to insure that they are properly investigated. We do not believe that Region IV is either capable or willing to do that type of investigation. Please advise. Sincerely, su C-Q Billie Pirner Garde cc: Richard Condit es

Attachment #7 [sesnac,Io o UNITED STATES

y i

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i l 3.- t W A$MINGTON. D. C. 20565 ~ o April 8, 1987 Ms. Billie Pirner Garde I Government Accountability Project 1555 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 202 Washington, DC 20036

Dear Ms. Garde:

I have received your letter of March 23, 1987. I accept your characterization of the allegations you have in hand as bearing on the safety of the S. Texas Nuclear Power Plant in a significant way. I urge you to bring these issues to NRC for our review. As to where and how within NRC they will be addressed is my responsibility. Assignment within NRC cill be governed by the nature of the allegations. I can assure you they will be handled properly, both in regard to technical review and in regard to confidentiality. By the nature of significant safety issues, they must be addressed promptly. Your letters imply that you have had this info #1 nation for some time. Therefore, if we do not receive full information on the allegations within 30 days we will be constrained to take steps to acquire it by other means. Sincerely, ) / C Vi r Stello, Executive Director for Operations i I I i

i )- N'N

1. ga E8 Coq UNITED STATES

-Attachment #Sa ,4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Ij REGION IV ' 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE. sulTE 1000 t +...,o ARLINGTON, TEXAS 78011 John H. Hodge Sr. 2917 3rd St. N c '. Bay City, Tx 77414

Reference:

Allegation No. 4-87-A-007 7-This refers to our inspections into your technical concerns regarding the South Texas Project. Our inspection regarding this matter has been completed and our findings are documented in the enclosed report. This concludes the Regional Staff's activities regarding this matter. With regard to the violation of requirements identified during this inspection, HL&P is required to inform us in writing of the corrective actions they have taken, or plan to take. Our inspectors will continue to observe such actions to ensure proper resolution. I assure you that we will follow up such actions 3 thoroughly to ensure full compliance with regulatory-requirements. Should you find the term " unsubstantiated" in the inspection report, this does not necessarily mean that we find the facts as you stated them to be untrue; rather, it means only that we were unable to obtain objective evidence to corroborate your statements through interviews, document reviews, and/or direct observation. The NRC has objectively reviewed your concerns which ensures our decisions and conclusions are based on fact, and that any action based on these facts can be legally enforced. We have benefited from hearing about your concerns and feel that our actions in-this matter have been responsive to those issues. We take our safety responsibilities to the public very seriously and will continue to do so within the bounds of our lawful authority. Sincerely, Mark Emerson Allegations Coordinator

Enclosure:

as stated cc: Allegation File ) J

APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM ISSION REGION IV NRC Inspection Report: 50-498/86-38 Construction Permits: CPPR-128 50-499/86-38 CPPR-129 Dockets: 50-498 Category: A2 50-499 Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P) P. O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Facility Name: South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: South Texas Project, Matagorda County, Texas Inspection Conducted: November 17, 1986, through January 30, 1987 ~ Inspectors: M' 3 f4/f1 R. G. TayJor, Reactor Inspector, Project Odte/ Section C, Reactor Projects Branch au/w sInIn W. ~ M. Mcljeill, Reactor Inspector, Project Odte/ Sectioh A, Reactor Projects Branch a/N 3lsl17 j J L. Kelf9, Senior Resident Inspector 0'ati NomancheTeakTaskGroup ) Consultants: J. Brammer, Mechanical Engineer, Energy Technology Engineering Center R. Hagen, Electrical Engineer, Energy Technology Engineering Center i t

2 l Y TIik3 Ofte / / G M ab W Project Section C Reactor Projects Branch Inspection Summary InspectionConductedOovember 17, 1986, through January 30, 1987 (R: port 50-498/86-38 50-499/86-38) Routine, announced inspection of licensee actions on previous inspection findings, review of IE Bulletins and Circulars, followup on licen "Artas Inspected: rcported significant construction deficiencies, inspection of electrical 4 components, and followup on allegations. Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were Results: identified. 4 r

f 25 A review of the weld inspection records found all inspectors were qualified as American Welding Society (AWS) welding inspectors as required. There was one. exception when magnetic particle testing was performed during.a repair. The magnetic particle testing was performed by a qualified nondestructive testing inspector. This perturbation of the normal process could appear to be bases for the allegation. The FCR in question was revised and superseded by FCR EL-01149. The changes were mostly editorial in character. The new FCR was closed in December 15, 1986, in accordance with standard procedures. This allegation was not substantiated. (Closed) Allegation 4-85-A-118 This allegation was that Ebasco and Bechtel had falsified the qualifications records of an Ebasco inspector. The information was stated as hearsay in character. Attempts by the NRC to obtain direct and I detailed information have been unsuccessful. Neither the individual nor identified associates were found to have presented this allegation to the SAFETEAM. The subject of this allegation has not been addressed by a SAFETEAM investigation. The NRC inspector reviewed the qualification records that had been t allegedly falsified. There was verification of the information in the qualification records by Ebasco. There did not appear to be any questionable information. Personnel department records were compared to the qualification records to see if there were any inconsistencies. This allegation was not substantiated. I (Closed) Allegation 4-87-A-007 I This allegation is that information about filing discrimination complaints was unavailable to site craft personnel. A tour of the site by the NRC inspectors found that the NRC Form 3 with directions on filing discrimination complaints with the Ocpartment of Labor was posted at numerous locations such as outside the NRC office, in the " Communications Center" near the north gate where most construction workers exit and in the Ebasco personnel office. The NRC inspector has observed that these forms have been widely posted for the past several This allegation was not substantiated. years. 7. SAFETEAM Activities SAFETEAM is a franchised management system implemented in Septes6er 1984 and supplied by contract from Syndeco, Inc. (Subsidiary of Detroit Edison). The SAFETEAM program is described in the "SAFETEAM Ipstruction Manual." By the end of 1986 approximately 25,000 contacts had' been made )

) Mn j GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTADILITY PROJECT Attachment #8b 1555 Connecticut Avenue. N.W., Suite 202 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202)232-8550 i i May 8, 1987 ) Robert D. Martin, Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011 RE: Allegation No. 87-A-007

Dear Mr. Martin,

Last week two of my clients received a letter from Mr. Mark Emerson of your office. The letter included an excerpt from Insepction Report 50-498/499-30, dated March 26, 1987 and signed by Mr. R.G. Taylor. The letter from Mr. Emerson states that it refers to "our inspections into your technical concerns regarding the South Texas Project." It goes on to conclude: i We have benefited from bearing about your concerns and feel that our actions in this matter have been responsive to those issues. We take our safety responsibilities to the public very seriously and will continue to do so within the bounds of our lawful authority. This letter goes to new lengths in perverting the image of Region IV as a competent and unbias regulator. First, Mr. Emerson has never talked to or interviewed either Mr. Hodges or Mr. Garcia. He has no idea of whether they have any technical concerns or not, and if they do, he has no idea of what they are. Second, the information that Mr. Hodges or Garcia had any concerns or problem with the South Texas project could have only come from Houston Light and ) Power or EBASCO, or through the SAFETEAM. In either case it is clear that the version of facts that the NRC received has nothing to do with the facts as known to Messrs. Hodge and Garcia. That might be of some concern to an inspector that had any commitment to a search for the truth or a respect for the accuracy of his work. Since the inspection report is signed by Mr. 1 R.G. Taylor, however, we are not surprised that the conclusion is a statement that serves the utility regardless of the facts.

Robert D. Martin Page two It was our experience with Mr. Taylor at Comanche Peak and Waterford that convinced us that_the reliability of his conclusions on any subject werequestionable. Mr. Taylor has demonstrated a.long history of resentment to employees who have any safety concerns and a penchant for releasing inspection [ report findings that bear no resemblence to the factual ) matters that he was to investigate-or inspect. Neither the letter nor the inspection report are accurate or based on anything other than information provided by the utility. In this case we believe that the utility prompted the entire issue in order to have an NRC finding to utilize in the Department of Labor cases of Messrs. Garcia and Hodges. i Although we are not surprised by that either we are a. bit offended that Region IV would write a letter with such blatantly false information. I have already brought this matter to the attention of the Executive Director's office. I have also filed a' Freedom 4 of Information Act Request on this issue, a copy of~which is enclosed for your office. Please process this FOIA as soon as it is received in your office. Sincerely, t Ws Billie Pirner Garde Director, Mid-West Office t cc: V. Stello J. Hodges R. Garcia i f f i

i g# %4 UNITED STATES g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 611 RYAN PL ZA D iVE. SUITE 1000 %,,",(. # ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011 - Attachment #8e l MAY l 91987 l Mr. John H. Hodge Sr. 2917 3rd Street Bay City, Texas 77414

Reference:

4-87-A-007 In response to recent comunications between your attorney and NRC, I wish to clarify my April 28, 1987, letter to you. On January 29, 1987, I received a letter from the United States Department of Labor, dated December 16, 1986, which included your hand written statement citing harassment, intimidation and discrimination. You also stated that employee protection provisions of the Energy Reorganization Act were only posted at one location at the South Texas Project which was "off limits" to craftsmen. I routinely review documents sent to NRC by many organizations and agencies, including the Department of Labor, in the attempt to identify areas which might fall within the jurisdiction of NRC. In accordance with our procedures, I assigned allegation number 4-87-A-007 to your complaint sent to COL. We track these issues in our Allegation Management System. Hence, my letter to you was intended to notify you of our review of your complaint and to ensure that you are aware of your opportunity to inform NRC of any safety significant concerns that you have. I regret any confusion my initial letter may have caused you. As your lawyer is aware, if you have any remaining safety concerns, you can call me collect at (817)860-8245 during normal business hours. Sincerely, / [, m [ Mark Emerson ) Allegations and Investigations i Coordinator cc: Billie Garde 104 East Wisconsin Avenue Appleton, Wisconsin 54915-8605

Attachment #8d - GOVERNMENT ACCOt aTADIUTY PROJECT 1555 Connecticur Avenue, NW., Suite 202 (202)202-855" VosNngton, D.C. 20006 l MID-WEST OFFICE 104 E. Wisconsin Ave.-B Appleton, Wisconsin 54911 (414) 730-8533 May 22, 1987 Robert D. Martin Regional Administrator 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011 RE: Allegation 4-87-A-007 Decr Mr. Martin, On May 19, 1987, Allegations and Investigations Coordinator Mark Emerson wrote to Messrs. Hodge and Garcia to " clarify" his April 28, 1987, letter to each of these gentleman regarding Insepction Report 50-498/499-38. His letter clarified, that is it explained, the misrepresentations in his previous letter to my clients; however, it did not resolve the substantive complaint raised to you in my May 8, 1987, letter. The fact that Mr. Emerson may h6ve received the allegations of harassment, intimidation and discrimination from a copy of a complaint to the Department of Labor regarding the same and then ignored all of the issues but the one whose resolution would assist the utility and EBASCo in defeating the DOL case on procedural matters is either deliberate misfeasance or gross negligence of duty. Mr. Emerson's actions in ignoring the complaint of harassment and discrimination are not surprising. We understand that Region IV inspectors routinely ignore any In fact, complaints of harassment and intimidation by workers. Region IV's abysmal handling of the allegattions of harassment and intimidation by employees throughout Region IV is what let ) to the development of Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization and more recently to the development of Chapter 0517 Act, in part, of the NRC manual. Examples like the ignoring the request for 2 assistance of the quality control inspectors at Comanche Peak during the T-Shirt incident and mishandling of the concerns of paint coatings inspectors is why harassment and intimidation issues should be handled by the Office of Investigations. Mr. Emerson's letter does not clarify whether or not he referred the allegations to OI. We assume he did not. More importantly, Mr. Emerson offers no explanation for why he made no attempt to contact Messrs. Hodge and Garcia to determine i e d

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that what evidence that Messrs. Garcia and Hodge had to prove their were no postings in locations available to them of NRC We are not surprised'Inr the lack of follow through Form 3. We are surprised that.you would not by your inspectors. review Mr. Emerson's "clarifica tion," to insure that he had I 1987, letter. - addressed all. of the issues raised tyr my May 8, 3 We officially request that you open up a proper inspection of the issue of the NRC Form 3 Posting and that you do an adcquate inspection, according to the NRC manual chapters, to reevaluate your previous, inaccurate, finding. Thank you for your attention to this matter. Sincerely, 6L s Billie Pirner Garde Director, Mid-West Office cc: V. Stello J. Hodges R. Garcia ) ".l.

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~ Attachment #9a The Light it u ii""" ii""""" i* - " ""' * 22.-2 ' ' EmPuy si"" ""'ix'"'"x & i""<- l January 26, 1987 M3 Billie Garde Director Of The Midwest Office p, -ng t l,7 Government Accountability Project ' 'd* 3424 N. Marcos Lane Appleton, Wisconsin 54911 DeOr Ms Garde: Articles in the Austin American-Statesman on January 20, 1987, state that 1987, and in the Houston Post on January 21, GAP has announced it will investigate safety issues at the South Texas Project after reviewing complaints "from about three dozen present or former employees at the project". (Copies enclosed). According to the articles, you have said that "several employees had told GAP they were harassed and intimidated by Ebasco Services, Inc., the project constructor and several subcontractors for raising safety questions". Mr condit, of GAP in Washington, has stated that "the safety allegations to be investigated included defects in instruments and controls, problems in the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems, poor soil compaction, failure to com-plete required quality assurance or quality control documents, and falsification of quality assurance or quality control Although Mr Condit acknowledged that a number of documents". these issues bave been investigated at South Texas in the he remarked that "it appears from what we have been p ct, The hcaring that the problems have not been resolved". articles indicate you stated that "after a preliminary in-v00tigation of the South Texas Project lasting three to six months, GAP will decide whether to continue with the inquiry or just issue a report on its findings to that point". As you may know, Houston Lighting & Power Company has taken extraordinary steps during the past few years to en-courage employees to come forward with any safety concerns to that they may be promptly investigated.

l Ununon Lighting & l'ower Cornpany Ms Billie Garde January 26, 1987 1 5 In addition to various investigations conducted by HL&P and Ebasco management, in 1984 we established a SAFETEAM program to actively solicit and investigate quality or safety-related allegations from former and existing employees, and provided an opportunity for such individuals to identify their concerns outside HL&P and Ebasco investigative programs. Whenever an allegation investigation is conducted by HL&P, Ebasco, or SAFETEAM, the anonymity of the alleger is protected at the alleger's request. We believe that the program has been very successful in investigating and resolving every concern that has been brought to our attention by employees. We are also pleased that every employee who has come to SAFE-TEAM in confidence has had his identity effectively protected from disclosure unless the employee chose to make his or her identity known to the public which has recently occurred in one situation. l The principal reason that we undertook the SAFETEAM I program is that we view with the utmost seriousness our res-ponsibilities as an NRC licensee and as the Project Manager on behalf of the co-owners. It is HL&P which has the ultimate responsibility for building a safe nuclear power plant, not 4 the construction contractor or his subcontractors. We are particularly proud that, although our program predates the Commission's adoption of a Statement of Policy concerning " Handling of Late Allegations" (March 19, 1985), it fully 2 implements the Commission's encouragement of "the establish-ment of programs by utilities for the purpose of identifying and resolving allegations affecting safety in a timely manner as design and construction of a nuclear facility proceeds". In view of the steps we have taken to encourage employees to inform us of any safety concerns, we are very disappointed l and concerned that any employees may have chosen to provide information to GAP, rather than to us. But if, for whatever f reason, thsy have done so, it is still important to us to l obtain that information so that we can assure that appropriate concerns are addressed and the plant, accordingly, is com-pleted safely. Your action in apprising us of this information would be consistent with the provisions of the Commission's Statement of Pclicy which urges that: "Any concerns bearing on the safety of a facility should be brought promptly to the attention of the applicant or licensee." Timely identifica-tion of problems is often critical to effective corrective action.

l . Ilouston Lighting & Power Company ) ! Ms Billie Garde January 26, 1987 Moreover, if employees of Ebasco or any of its sub-contractors have harassed or intimidated other employees "for raising safety questions", it is critical that these matters be identified promptly so that we can assure they are fully i resolved. If any employees have been guilty of harassment or intimidation, which on this project is a clear violation of project policy and prescribed work practices, we need to investigate their period of employment at South Texas to assure that all instances of any such misconduct have been investigated, and, further,-that such persons are not currently employed on the project. We take effective steps to protect the identity of any ( individuals who provide this type of information to us and would do the same for persons who have provided such informa-tion to GAP. If necessary, you may prefer to provide the relevant information to us without revealing the identity of l your informants. This may make it more difficult for us to i investigate and resolve any questions they have raised, but we i gladly assume that burden because of our overriding concern 4 for the safety of this plant and in turn, the public. 1 Failing all else, we urge you to bring your information i promptly to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission so that it can j review these questions immediately and take such action as may be appropriate, including advising us of any corrective actions required. Again, this would be consistent with the provisions of the Commission's Statement of Policy which, in instances where notification of the applicant or licensee is unsatisfactory, advises "any person to bring such concerns directly to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission". I should emphasize that since I was placed in charge of the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station in 1980, I have personally taken an active interest in assuring that svery safety concern raised - whether in the routine perform-ence of the construction of the South Texas Project or as information provided by employees through other available mechanisms - is fully and thoroughly explored and resolved. Nevertheless, as Mr condit acknowledges, safety issues of the types he mentions have occurred and have been investigated at the project in the past. If, notwithstanding all of our offorts, you have information concerning existing or potential safety concerns of which we may not be aware, I urge you, as a matter of public responsibility, to provide that information i now to us or to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ) \\

) llumton 1.ighting & 1%er Compam -4_ 1 Ms Billie Garde January 26, 1987 I further understand that you have sought to meet with a member of our Security Department on behalf of one of the employees you represent. Mr James E Geiger, Manager of our ) Nuclear Assurance Department (telephone 512 972-8620) will be our contact with you on such matters and I have asked him to call you to set up a meeting immediately. For the reasons described above, I hope you will provide him with any information GAP possesses concerning safety related concerns at South Texas. As you know, the Commission's Statement of Policy notes that persons with allegations of the type ascribed to you in the press have a duty to bring such matters to the Commis-sion's attention as promptly as possible, in part, to avoid unnecessary licensing delays. While we share this concern, we clso urge you to come forward now because of our moral and legal responsibility to assure the safety of the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station and, in turn, the public. We hope you share this concern and therefore encourage you to cooperate with us and/or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission toward this end. We would appreciate your earliest response. Sincerely, 'k J H Goldberg Group Vice-President, Nuclear JHG/aks Enclosures cc Chairman L W Zech (NRC w/encis) Commisioners K M Carr ( ) T M Roberts ( ) J K Asselstine ) F M Bernthal ( ) Exec. Dir. V Stello ( ) Reg. Admn. R D Martin ( ) Dir. I&E J M Taylor ( ) Owners T V Shockley (CP&L ) A vonRosenberg (CPSB ) M B Lee (COA ) i

a-- Attachment #9b l The Light @OIII Ilonuon I iglome & l'eiwei i lie 170n lie, nnin. le a 7 70iil 71 ti 22:v u t i l February 11, 1987 Ms. Billie Garde Director of the Midwest Office Government Accountability Project 3424 North Marcos Lane Appleton, Wisconsin 54911 D ar Ms. Garder This is to document our telephone conversations of January 30 and February 7, 1987, regarding the investigation of allegations at the South Texas Project (STP) which might be brought to the attention of Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P) by workers or other persons represented by the Government Accountability Project (GAP). My understanding of your suggestions is as follows: If HL&P and GAP coilld agree upon a mutually acceptable independent contractor who would perform any investigations, then any detailed discussion of the interview and investigative process would be unnecessary. Assuming that HL&P performed the interview and investigative process, then that process would incorporate the following features: (a) A written agreement on confidentiality to protect the identity of the worker would be necessary with a breach of the agreement by HL&P entitling the worker to sue. (b) The identity of the investigators would be provided to the concerned worker for hia review and comment. 1 (c) GAP would provide the worker's concern in the form of an affidavit or make the worker available for an interview. (d) If an interview was performed, a transcript would be maintained and the worker would have representation, presumably by GAP, during the interview. (e) SAFETEAM would prepare an investigation plan for the concern that included specifics, e.g., what hardware would be reinspected, which individuals by nmne would be interviewed, etc.

l l Ilmnum l.ighting k l'mwr Lompim Ms. Billie Garde l February 11, 1987 Page fwo b (f) SAFETEAM would then submit the investigative plan to GAP and to the worker for their review and comments. (g) SAFETEAM would then perform the investigation and, if necessary and appropriate during the investigation, the worker would have the opportunity to come to the site and identify specifics which he ) could not do otherwise, i.e., without a visit. (h) The draft of the SAFETEAM investigation report would be provided tu the worker for his comments and opportunity to provide rebuttal information. You stated that, if HL&P would agree to these features (or the indepen- ) d2nt contractor alternative), GAP would be willing to try out the process with one of the allegations it has received. In considering the following responses to your suggestions, you will want to take into' account discussion of our SAFETEAM program as outlined in i Mr. Goldberg's letter of January 26, 1987. I believe we have had extraordinary success in using this program to investigate and resolve concerns brought to our attention by employees, and I believe the program generally enjoys a reputation for integrity and effectiveness on the part of the work force at STP. I am confident that the program _would be fully effective to address concerns brought to our attention under the aegis of GAP. I believe the best way of conveying the reasons for this sense of confidence is to respond to each ) of your points, describing in that context, the organization and process of the SAFETEAM program. As to the suggestion regarding the use of an independent contractor for conducting investigations, this is already a feature of the SAFETEAM program. All initial interviews and investigations are conducted by personnel employed by independent contractors who have successfully completed a psychological evaluation and a background check before assignment to the South Texas Project SAFETEAM. Given the success and reputation achieved by our program, I do not believe that it is necessary or desirable to introduce yet another independent contractor to investigate concerns which might be brought to our attention by i GAP. As to the series of proposals dealing with the investigative process, I believe the intent of these suggestions is already satisfied by the SAFETEAM program and, with some modifications, could generally accommodate your proposals as follows: (a) Confidentiality: As I explained, it is established, written SAFETEAM policy that the wishes of concernees desiring anonymity will be respected, and our program is structured in a way which assures

... ~. _. ll'e,nu.,n 1.ighting & thei C.,injuns fis. Billie Garde February-11, 1987 Page Three that the concerned employee who requests anonymity has every reason to feel a high degree of confidence.that his identity will not be ' disclosed. We take very strict protective measures, which I described to you, toward this end. There may be situations where i the. investigative process, itself, may lead with reasonable certainty to the identification of the concerned employee. In our 3-experience, however, we-have never had an employee _ requesting anonymity who has complained to us that his/her identity was not -effectively protected. Given this record, we see no reason for l formal agreements including the right to sue, etc., of the type j suggested. I suggest instead that GAP try out this system, and determine for itself its effectiveness. (b) Identification of Investigators: As I understand your concern about the identity of the investigator, it is based on the assumption that HLAP employees conduct the investigations. As I indicated above, all investigative personnel are employees of independent contractors and have been subject to intensive screening. If you have any doubt concerning the qualifications, partiality, and independence of the investigators, I suggest again that you try the system and determine y for yourself the effectiveness of these individuals. (c) Availability of the Worker: As I mentioned, we believe that investigations can be conducted more effectively and efficiently.if the concerned individual appears for a personal interview, and this is normal SAFETEAM practice. We would be willing, however, to 4 attempt investigations initiated on the basis of affidavits, reserving the right to terminate any such investigation if it appears that the inquiry cannot be fruitfully conducted without a personal interview. Our judgment in the matter, however, would not preclude you from pursuing the matter with the NRC or other appro-priate government agency and particularly if the allegation related-to safety concerns, we would encourage you to do so. (d) Transcript of the Interview: It is standard procedure to prepare a transcript of the initial interview with the concerned employee from a recording of the interview. Although such transcripts are not usually furnished to the employee, we will make copies of the ) transcripts of interviews with persons contacting us who are represented, or directed to us by GAP and provide them to the employee and/or GAP. We have no objection to having GAP (or any other personal or legal representative) attend any such interview; this is consistent with present policy. (e) Preparation of Investigative Plan: As required by our present program, SAFETEAM investigators prepare an investigation plan, generally identifying: ) e

1hitnnm 1.ighiing & ther compain Ms. Billie Garde Febr_uary.11, 1987 "Page Four 1. identification of concerns to' be investigated, 2. questions to be answered by the investigation, 3... persons to be interviewed, and 4. documents to be examined. SAFETEAM is receptive to suggestions by the worker with respect to matters which should be included in the investigation plan. (f) Comment on Investigative Plan: Although' not presently a part of our program, we will afford to the concerned _ worker represented-by GAP, a reasonable period to suggest in writing specific comments on the plan, as-developed, to investigate the allegations which he/she has ~' brought to the attention of SAFETEAM. Such comments will_be consid-ered, and the worker will be advised of the disposition of his/her comments. Investigations, however, will be conducted in accordance with plans which represent the best judgment of SAFETEAM. officials. Investigation plans may be modified from time to time as information is developed;-such changes must likewise reflect the best judgment of SAFETEAM officials. (g) Site Visit: We would expect that during the course of the interview or the development of the investigative plan', it shoul_d become obvious as to whether it is necessary for the concerned individual to meet with the investigator to point out some specifics. If that is necessary in SAFETEAM's judgment, we will make the necessary arrangements for such a meeting at a convenient location whether it g be the site or elsewhere. (h) Review of the Investigative Report: As I mentioned,'itIis important that the concerned individual receive the " feedback" of the investi-gation initiated in response to his/her concern, and this is a standard feature of SAFETEAM. - We do not and will not make drafts of investigative reports available because that could impair the i investigative effort; but, I believe that our standard practice, which I described to you, meets the intent of your suggestion. A letter sumarizing the' investigation results.and corrective actions taken (if any) is sent to the concerned individual. ) As a standard feature, the response letter advises the concerned individual to contact SAFETEAM by letter or by phone (toll-free numbers are identified) if the individual believes that the concern .in question has been misunderstood, or if he/she has further questions or additional concerns.. I believe this practice meets the intent of your suggestion regarding input or coments by the ). employee after review of the investigative report. )

l ' I hmstori 1.ightirig & 1% cr (:nmp.ms t l Ms. Billie Garde February 11, 1987 Page Five In short, I believe our existing practice meets the intent of your suggestions, particularly as supplemented by the relatively simple modifica-tions I have described. During our conversation of February 9, 1987, you indicated that the workers you are in contact with are dissatisfied with the performance of SAFETEAM. Based on that dissatisfaction, you stated that the use of SAFETEAM as an institution to perform investigations of the worker's concerns was not an approach you were willing to recommend to these workers. To alleviate your concern with that approach, let me make a suggestion. From time to time, I have directed that an independent third party review be conducted of a specific and particularly sensitive investigation that SAFETEAM has completed. The purpose was to obtain an independent contractor's perspective of the effectiveness of SAFETEAM. My suggestion would be for me to select an independent third party to conduct a review of a sample SAFETEAM investigation performed ts a result of concerns received from GAP or workers represented by GAP. The resu?ts of this review would be forwarded to the worker with the response letter. I assure you that I will be intimately involved in the investigative process and the selection of the independent third party. Additionally, I will personally review the independent third party report to assure its credibility. In short, I will maintain control over the activities associated with concerns forwarded under the aegis of GAP to assure that you have a single j knowledgeable comunication link. Accordingly, I would like to get the process moving. In our January 30 conversation we discussed a " test" case or concern -- one which would lend itself to objective analysis; that is, a hardware or technical issue which could be resolved by engineering evaluations or reinspection. We are ready to start now using the guidelines described above and would very much appreciate your cooperation. Sin .}cerelyyours, .a !] < f4f1,c.: /[ J. E. Geiger ) JEG:Jkg )

a rsumurm ammmmmmm== 1 ~ Attachment #9c GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTADILITY PROJECT 1555 Connecticut Avenue. NW., Suite 202 (202)232-8550 Washington. D.C. 20036 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT MIDWEST OFFICE 3424 MARCOS LANE -APPLETON, WISCONSIN 54911 February 19, 1987 James E. Geiger Houston Light and Power P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Re: South Texas Investigation

Dear Mr. Geiger,

Thank you for your February 11, 1987 letter. Your letter accurately summarizes our several conversations regarding the potential of working together to reslove worker allegations of hardware or technical concerns. As I recall we are still in disagreement on two issues: 1) providing a draft of the final report to the allegor prior to the issuance of the report and 2) the use of the SAFETEAM to do the investigation. a Your letter indicates that HL&P will not make available to ) the allegor a draft of the final report prior to issuance because it could " impair the investigation effort." We of course, do not want to impair the investigative process. To the contrary, these procedures are to enchance the investigative process and insure that the final report accurately states the allegation (s) and also includes all of the information which accurately reflects the ) investigative process and the basis for the conclusions. Since the draft report we wish to review is the same draft that circulated to members of management regularly after the investigation is completed it is unlikely that it would be possible to impair the investigation. Please reconsider your position on this issue. ) Your suggestion to bring in a third party reviewer to audit the SAFETEAM report as a method of insuring the credibility of the report has some possibilities. However, I would still be in the position of recommending to the allegors that they risk going to an entity that has no credibility and trusting that organization on the basis of an independent audit at the end of the investigation. I think that ) there must be someway to insure the worker that this SAFETEAM investigation is different from the bad experience he had previously with the SAFETEAM at the beginning of the process. Please consider this problem. )

I also would like to get this experiment. underway; however,' -I'must be-satisified that the effort is sincere and wi11' result in a thorough investigation of the worker allegations which it k is designed to investigate. - I look forward-to meeting you next week. Sincere y, Billie Pirner Garde,Esq. I 1. k i k i i s I ) f )' 'l J 9d ~ The Light company n.. -..~,..._, m m-u...~..... m..ca,e,,m .c o March 5, 1987 l Ms. Billie Garde Director of the Midwest Office Government Accountability Project 3424 N. Marcos Lane Appleton, Wisconsin 54911

Dear Ms. Garde:

i This is to summarize our discussions during the last week or so regarding the investigation and disposition of concerns about the South Texas Project (STP) brought to our attention by the Government Accountability Project (GAP). In previous discussions I advised you that HL&P is unwilling to depart from our basic SAFETEAM approach to handling such matters at STP. I have offered several enhancements / modifications to that basic approach in response to your suggestions. I also committed to be intimately involved in GAP-forwarded matters to assist in lessening any apprehension you or your clients may feel about the effectiveness of SAFETEAM. Lastly I reiterated my offer to have a sample of such investigations and results subjected to 3 review by a third party that I would select for this purpose. As to drafts of reports of investigations, I advised you, and I believe it is well recognized in similar circumstances elsewhere, that if persons preparing drafts of reports know that their drafts may be divulged to third parties, especially GAP, this could have a " chilling effect"on the investigative process. I believe that a similar philosophy is reflected in 3 investigations of serious airline and other transportation accidents. Where matters of public safety are concerned, we simply cannot take that chance. To address your concern, I suggested that, in connection with matters brought to our attention by GAP, I would assure that SAFETEAM provided a y response letter which included a more detailed description of the investigation process and rationale for the investigation conclusions than is routinely provided to concerned employees at the conclusion of typical SAFETEAM investigations. We agreed that I would, by way of example, review a letter to a concerned employee in a case already closed and expand it to l reflect the type of additional material we would furnish under a possible j understanding with GAP. )

limnion 1.ighting & Power unnp.nn Ms. Billie Garde March 5, 1987 l Page 2 l I think it is imperative, however, that we set a deadline for t \\ commencing investigation for matters of concern to employees represented by GAP or matters brought to our attention by GAP. We are genuinely concerned that matters possibly affecting the safety of a nuclear power plant not become the subject of protracted procedural discussions. That risk is unacceptable to us; we also believe that the NRC would likewise be concerned; and finally, that GAP's interest in safety would be poorly served. We have agreed to meet again on Monday, March 9, 1987. At that time I will give you a sample of the expanded letter we would propose to use to inform a concerned employee represented by GAP of the results of the investigation of his/her concern. I am prepared to work with you as late as required next Monday and, if necessary, into Tuesday to review this material and get your agreement. I trust that, if we agree to try an investigation under the ground rules I've described, you will simultaneously provide me with at least one allegation which you believe represents a significant safety concern and which we can begin to investigate.' If this demonstration is successful, I would expect that all other similar matters of which GAP is aware will be immediately brought to me for consideration, investigation and i disposition under these ground rules. If this cannot be arranged and you advise us that matters possibly important to safety remain undisclosed, it would be our intention to ask for an appropriate investigation by government officials. Conversely, at any time that you believed our investigations were inadequate and we could not otherwise agree on corrective measures t which provide assurance that such matters are properly investigated, we would expect you to refer such matters immediately to appropriate NRC officials. I want to underscore that HL&P is deeply committed to assuring that STP is reliable and safe. We therefore intend to press for the prompt identification and resolution of any concerns related to safety which may be 3 in the possession of any person. I look forward to meeting with you and initiating this program next week. cerely yours, ~ .CfM ft,i /J.E. eiger i JEG:dbe ) m 1

" Attachment #9e The Light l company n_m m.mm._, i-i-u...-m..o-, amemo March 18, 1987 Ms Billie Garde Director of the Midwest Office Government Accountability Project 3424 N. Marcos Lane Appleton, Wisconsin 54911

Dear Ms Garde:

We have been in touch with you as a representative of GAP concerning allegations regarding the Scuth Texas Project by you and Mr. William Condit since the first appearance of those allegations in the press on January 21, 1987. In writing to you on January 26, 1987, I sought your cooperation in bringing these matters to our attention using the SAFETEAM program which has a proven record of success at the South Texas Project. To facilitate your cooperation I offered the services of Mr. James Geiger, one of my most seasoned and trusted managers and head of our Nuclear Assurance Department. Mr. Geiger contacted you immediately and conveyed repeatedly to you over the next several weeks our sincere interest in resolving the allegations which had allegedly been brought to your attention by employees at the STP site. Mr. Geiger considered carefully the reservations you expressed ) concerning use of SAFETEAM and offered to modify these procedures in an effort to accommodate your concerns. His letters of February 11 and March 5, 1987, documented those conversations, including urgent requests that you submit at least one of the allegations of which you have knowledge for investigation using these modified SAFETEAM procedures on a " trial basis." You have been unresponsive to these suggestions and, in recent weeks, have not even returned Mr. Geiger's telephone calls. We must therefore regretfully conclude that GAP has no interest in proceeding further with these discussions. We cannot, however, let matters rest at this point since this is not merely a disagreement between private parties. Larger matters of the public interest are potentially affected. Beyond the allegations of safety concerns, the implication of statements attributed to you in the press is that federal and state laws may have been violated in the construction of STP. l ) J

Houston Lighting & Power Compans Ms Billie Garde March 18, 1987 I It is anomalous to us that an organization purporting to ' represent the public interest could show such little regard for I that< interest by withholding information of potential significance to the public health and safety. We will not be a party to such " games." We will urge federal and state officials to seek from <you.and your organization every scrap of information which could potentially relate to the safety of the South Texas Project. If ) any such information in fact exists and is made available to us, we will immediately pursue it to its resolution. We can then leave to the citizens of Texas the judgment as to which of us truly represents the public interest. Sincerely, Y. J H Goldberg Group Vice-President, Nuclear JHG/am cc Chairman L W Zech (NRC) Commissioners K M Carr ( ) T M Roberts ( ) J K Asselstine ( ) F M Bernthal ( ) I Exec. Dir. V Stello ( ) Reg. Admn. R D Martin ( } Dir. I&E J M Taylor ( ) Owners T V Shockley (CP&L) A vonRosenberg (CPSB) M B Lee (COA) ) ) )

j3 Attachment #9f ' GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT 1555 Connecticut Avenue. N W. Suite 202 Washington. D.C. 20036 (202)232-8550 ) March 27, 1987 ) ' Jerry H. Goldberg Group Vice President, Nuclear Houston Lighting & Power Corp. P. O. Box 1700 ( Houston, Texas 77001 RE: ' Investigation of the South Texas Project by the Government Accountability Project ?

Dear Mr. Goldberg:

Your widely distributed letter of March 18, 1987 was a surprise to me. Please be assured that the Government Accountability Project (GAP) has not made any final decision regarding possible cooperation with HL&P on allegations. As Mr. Geiger and your counsel were well aware, I was in trial the week of March 9-14, 1987 in Houston, litigating a South Texas related Department of Labor case, Goldstein v. EBASCo, 86-ERA-36. The following week I was on a personal / professional break while moving both my home and my office to new locations. ) y I did call Mr. Geiger and specifically informed him that I was not working from March 16 to 21, 1987, and that I would contact him regarding the proposals during the following week. Therefore, your conclusion that " GAP has no interest in i proceeding further" with negotiations is insincere and appears to ) I be deliberately taking advantage of my one-week " working" ) vacation. I am uncertain whether HL&P is terminating negotiations on a potential working relationship. If so, please notify us of that I in writing. If you are not, let me summarize where the negotiations are apparently mired. HL&P, through Mr. Geiger, has informed us that allegation investigations would have to be done by the SAFETEAM, but has cgreed to a number of modified procedures to alleviate some of ~ our concerns. He has indicated, however, that HL&P is not willing tc make additional concessions which would assure us that ) our clients are legally protected from reprisals, that the investigation properly pursues the correct allegation, and that on adequate investigation was conducted once completed. )

i l As I carefully explained to Mr. Geiger, the employees we represent have no faith in the credibility of the SAFETEAM. Their individual and collective experiences have demonstrated that the SAFETEAM is not independent, does not protect or defend employees from harassment and discrimination, is neither able nor willing to reach truthful conclusions, has no authority to 7 require or implement corrective actions, does not generate deficiency paper in compliance with federal regulations, does not report allegations or findings of wrongdoing to the NRC, and is institutionally incapable of processing significant safety-related concerns. The employees' experiences were confirmed by the information we-recently obtained from HL&P in discovery in the Goldstein For example, one SAFETEAM investigation contained case. allegations of harassment.and intimidation, violations of hold points, and significant defects in the quality of work in the* Reactor Control Building (RCB). A comparison of the interview of the engineer making the serious allegations with the results of that investigation prove that the SAFETEAM did not even understand the allegations, did not investigate the allegations given to the SAFETEAM of serious construction and quality defects in the RCB, and had no basis for its conclusions. In any event you should be aware that GAP understands its obligations to ensure that allegations of safety concerns are investigated. In that regard, we have a proven history of discovering massive safety problems and seeing that they are addressed. We would gladly match our history of demonstrated concern for public health and safety with any other organization, and feel confident that the comparison would reflect quite favorably upon us. As for the South Texas Project, HL&P and/or EBASCo and/or Bechtel have been made aware of serious safety concerns through internal processes. We have also been in contact with the NRC and other appropriate government bodies regarding processing of allegations about South Texas. Recently, Region IV of the NRC received extraordinary criticism from the NRC Office of Inspector ) and Auditor (OIA) regarding the handling of allegations at the Comanche Peak facility. Therefore, it is not appropriate to submit allegations to Region IV until some adequate resolution of the concerns raised by the OIA has been completed. We have asked the NRC for guidance as to how to proceed, given Region IV's lack ) of credibility. To date, we have not received a response. So as you can tell, we are attempting to ensure that any information which comes to us about the South Texas plant is properly investigated, and that the appropriate corrective ) ?

I' measures will result. We are not " withholding" information or -playing " games," as you suggest. We are merely seeking the proper forum to ensure that the workers' complaints do not again fall upon deaf ears. Unless additional safeguards are provided we I will not turn over information to internal, site-based programs like SAFETEAM, which have already been proven to be ineffective. Our paramount concern is that the South Texas plant, if and with state and federal law.when completed and operational, will be safe and in ) However, public expressions of concern are hardly adequateWe hope th clients are waiting to see effective action before they will. risk . Our their careers and jobs by working within your " system". Ultimately, action not words will determine who is representing the public interest! i Sincerely, .L k. CL b'f Billie P. Garde i Director, GAP Midwest BPG:079D01 cc: NRC Chairman L. W. Zech NRC Commissioners K. M. Carr i T. M. Roberts J. K. Asselstine' P. M. Bernthal NRC Executive Director V. Stello NRC Dir. I&E J. M. Taylor T. V. Shockley, CP&L ) A. vonRosenberg, CPSB M. B. Lee, COA 1 ) ) ?

~ Attachment #9g The Light ~ company u...~...m.m.~.._.. ~.. m..e u...~...o. _ m m.2 m April 6, 1987 Ms. Billie Garde i Director of the Midwest Office Government Accountability Project 3424 N. Marcos Lane Appleton, Wisconsin 54911 D:ar Ms. Garde: In response to your letter of March 27, 1987, please be advised that Houston Lighting & Power Company is very skeptical that any further dialogue with GAP would be constructive. Although we are ready to utilize our SAFETEAM organization to perform investigations of any concerns related to nuclear safety or quality at the South Texas Project, we believe that protracted discussion with your organization is wasting valuable time that 3 could be better spent investigating such matters. Your obvious low regard for SAFETEAM, which is consistent with the manner in which CAP has criticized other nuclear projects, prompts us to again urge that you immediately share your concerns with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Your letter suggests that you have sought " guidance" from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission but "have not received a response". That statement is puzzling. In fact, you have received a response from Mr. Stello by letter of February 18, 1987 (available in the Nuclear Regulatory Coninission public document room) in which you were assured of the availability of Nuclear Regulatory Conmission resources to resolve issues ) your clients might raise. That letter concluded that failing to bring forth information promptly "would not be in the best interests of assuring the prompt resolution of legitimate safety concerns". Your letter states that Houston Lighting & Power and its contractors have been made aware of serious safety concerns through internal processes. ) The innuendo is that nothing has been done. To the best of our knowledge, every such matter brought to our attention or those of our principal contractors has been investigated and resolved or is the subject of a p:nding investigation. If you have information to the contrary, please tell us. ) The statement in your letter concerning information obtained during discovery for the Goldstein case and and the conclusions which you have drawn from that information are presumptuous at best. Contrary to your statement, a comparison of the interview transcript and the investigation report reveals that each of the issues raised during the interview were understood, investigated, and conclusions drawn based upon the facts. In ) any event, as you well know, the Goldstein case has been adjourned. When it resumes later this year, the defendant will present its case and a conclusion will be retched based upon all the evidence. )

Ib. An.n 1.ighiing & n.uri e ioni on [Ms. Billie Garde April 6, 1987 i Page 2 I reiterate our suggestion that you try our SAFETEAM system as l modified to meet your_ concerns with respect to~any matter of potential- ~ safety consequences. In the meantime, however, we are taking steps to ( request appropriate government officials to obtain from you or your organization information which could potentially affect the safety of the f South Texas Project. :If such information exists and is furnished to us, we will spare no' effort in pursuing its resolution. In closing,'let me add at the risk of being immodest, that the South-Texas' Nuclear Project is managed by experienced professionals of the highest, p' integrity..0ur concern for public safety is of paramount importance. Any suggestion by your organization to the contrary is not supported by the-record. -Our concern for protecting the public and the plant is demonstrated by our dogged determination to unearth weaknesses wherever they can be found end~ dealing with them. SAFETEAM is but one of many techniques that we utilize in that effort. While our SAFETEAM program is not perfect, I believe it to be among the very best in the country. Very truly yours, .Y. e J. H. Goldberg Group Vice-President, Nuclear JHG/JEG/sd cc: Chairman L. W. Zech I -Commissioners K. M. Carr T. M. Roberts J. K. Asselstine F. M. Bernthal Exec. Dir. V. Stello Reg. Adm. R. D. Martin Dir. I & E J. M. Taylor Owners T. V. Shockley A. vonRosenberg M. B. Lee I 1 h

- dMM %)/N T, ).A March 17, 1986 6 Note to: Richard C. Brady, Sr. 1 Program Manager for Allegations, NRR

SUBJECT:

DRAFT MANUAL CHAPTER 0517 Our office has reviewed the advance copy of 0517 which you provided to i We have a few minor comments which are marked on the attached copy of us. the manual chapter. If you have any questions please give me a call. (b Karen Cyr Regional Operations and Enforcement Division, OELD cc: E. Shomaker, ELD L. Chandler, ELD '.s l 1 ? S IA-8t.-2/C 3/7

i '1 f~ q \\v O' r v*u- <hv 0 / \\ n 'y ' f h ' V h \\' y ' @ f ( r \\ U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC MANUAL Volume: 0000 General Administration Part : 0500 Health and Safety NRR CHAPTER 0517 MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS 0517-01 COVERAGE h'- ' ; ;r ~ 'J+ This chapter and its appendices define the policy and procedures fo 7 vu~ m./- 3. proper receipt, processing, control, and disposition'of allegations re r the f for resolution by NRC offices that concern NRC-regulated activiti ceived c/4' ' ' by NRC licensees and their contractors, the policy alnd proced es conducted with individuals who provide infomation to the NRO%and the policy ures for dealing cedures for the referral of matters which the staff h L pro-potential wrongdoing to the Office of Investigations (OI etermined involve 0517-02 OBJECTIVES 021 To establish the policy for the receipt, processing, control i disposition of allegations and to define procedures by which the , and receipt, status, and disposition of allegations are tracked b, through the Allegation Manageent System (AMS), thereby assuri q, that: ng safety significance to permit ranking and re a. i manner; b. and made available to NRC Offices and Region e basis; ) all allegations not resolved by other formal means are c. processed in accordance with these procedures and the resolution of all allegations is properly documented; 022 To assure that individuals making allegations to the NRC are ) properly treated, their identity protected where appropriate and \\ possible, and notified of the resolution. / /' t I )

^ NRC-0517-03 MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS 023 To assure that issues raised are promptly and adequately investi-gated. 024 To establish the policy for requesting and setting priorities for investigations of matters which involve potential wrongdoing and to define the procedures for referral of such matters to 0I. ) 0517-03 RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES 031 Executive Ofrector for Operations (EDO) Set policy and procedures for ^he receipt 4 and disposition of allegations, in conjunc, tion with theprocessing, contro), Director. 01, implement the policy for initiation, establishment - of priorities and termination of investigations, request investi-gations of matters involving potential wrongdoing identified by the Headquarters staff, and in conjunction with the Directors of i the Office of Investigations and the Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA) implement policy for protecting the identity of those who provide information to the NRC. For those matters with-in the purview of OI and OIA, only set policy and procedures governing their interfaces with other Offices and Regions. 032 All Office Directors /Recional Administrators Establish internal procedures so that all employees are aware of a. requirements for receipt, processing, control, and disposition of allegations and for the accurate and timely updating of the Office. status of those allegations for which their office is the Action v b. Appoint'an Office Allegation Coordinator (OAC) who serves as administrative point of contact for employees and other Offices and the Regions. The OAC will: i 1. Ensure that the appropriate parts of the Allegation Data Form (NRC Form 307, Exhibit 1) are completed for all allega-tions received within the Office or Region and that the data are accurate and timely. 2. Determine the appropriate Action Office and,- if applicable, i coordinate with the OAC of the affected Office or Region on each allegation received. 3. Forward the Allegation Data Form to the respective Action Office OAC when the Office or Region is not the Action Office. I 2

MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS NRC 0517-032b5 4 When the receiving Office or Region is the Action Office, ensure that the allegation is entered into the AMS within 10 working days of receipt. (For power reactors, during the period from 30 days prior to the construction completion date until the Commission meeting on full-power authorization, the Receiving Office or Action Office for any allegation will, Manager of its receipt and the identification of th Office in addition to entering the allegation into the AMS. 5. Ensure that allegations received from other Offices or Regions are entered into the AMS within 10 workdays of receipt. \\ 6. Acquire input data on new allegations (including those - and ensure this information is entered in the AMS. 7. Ensure that all open allegations in the AMS are reviewed and updated as necessary on a monthly basis. 8. Part IX, 4g. and h. Ensure the preparation of reports as described 9. Maintain records of individuals granted confidential source who have been found to have a need to know inf would reveal the identity of a confidential source. u., 10. Maintain secure files.when such files contain infomatio would reveal the identity of a confidential source. '{. Detemine the safety significance and oeneric implications of c. b I lity of that Office or Region and establish schedule ,.t processing of allegations with the objective of resolving them ~ as promptly as resources allow and prior to any applicable ifcen-i 1 sing decision date. d. Review those allegations for which it is the Action Office for NRR or NMSS. potential board notification and recomend such notification to Refer all matters where there is a reasonable basis for belief I e. wrongdoing and for which the staff determines an investigation is necessary to detemine whether regulatory action is required, except those involving NRC employees or NRC contractors, to the Office of Investigations in accordance with the guidance herein and in Appendix 3 to this manual chapter and provide technical assistance to 01 for investigating allegations as requested. f. Refer all allegations of wrongdoing by NRC employees or NRC con-tractors to the Office,of Inspector and Auditor. Manual Chapter 0702).' (

Reference:

NRC ) 3

l l - i MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS l f NRC 0517-032i g. Prior to ta4*g a major action such as a licensing d / escalated enforcement, review the status and resolution of ecision or allegations for that project in the AMS especially those r to the action. e ated h. For technical concerns with generic implications AE00 for operational data, RES for concern i , consider the n (e.g., activities, etc.) research 1. For discrimination complaints received concerning p refer the complainant to DOL and promptly ossible i their awareness of the complaint and to detemin c, investigative intent.7etermi a 'onwf=th ensurp e 00L's fvestM t h.-,msts m4h 4h-Mr a f 5 ele,4 lei ~ w-4' h l, ghdAtL %ck ry. " ' ' ~~ ' f C'j M j. Ensure that the C6mmission's Policy Statement on Confid j is implemented and that all NRC personnel take all n i entiality steps to protect the identity of confidential sources and ecessary able steps to protect the identity of other allegers reason-k. Resolve those matters within area of responsibilit an investigation because of its resource cons y initially n ucting 033 D_irector, Office of Investigations T [ a. and NRC contractors referred'to it by the stafInv employees responsibilities with the Offices and Regions as deConduct v b. scribed herein. Implement, in conjunction with the Executive Direct protecting the identity of those who provide in or for Operation's , policy for c. Implement, in conjunction with the Executive Direct on to the NRC. i of investigations set forth in Appendix 3 of th ermination 034 chapter. Director, Office of Inspector and Auditor and the Director of the Office of InvestigationsIm a. ) of Operation tecting the identity of those who provide informati, policy for pro s b. on to the NRC. Investigate allegations of wrongdoing by NRC employe contractors. this manual chapter and are not entered in the AMSSu es and NRC t

s i NRC-0517-04 MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS 035 Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement i sible office including those that involve vendors or th a. generic in nature in coordination with NRR or NMSS. I b. Monitor the allocation of resources for allegation management by the Regions. Monitor the investigations being conducted within the IE area of c. responsibility to assure that an investigative priority or schedule d. Director, Office of Investigations me~ets regulatory need Mo n'd. e -4te-- w,ij.. c,' " % " Q,2fo,$$ Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regul2ionA. 036 f, [' Propose to the ED0 for approval agency-wide policy and proce-c) 4 a. dures regarding the processing of allegations. For those allegations that fall under the purview of 01, propose policy y, i and procedures governing their interface with other Offices Q, and Regions. b. Review alleg'ations concerning NRR licensees in coordination with the Action Office for potential board notification and make such notification, if required. f Evaluate implications of allegations relative to licensing deci-c. sions and plant safety concerning NRR licensees in coordination with IE and the Region (s). ~ / d. Resolve those allegations pertaining to reactor licensing issues i assigned to NRR. Maintain the AMS and any necessary improvements to modify its e. capabilities, in coordination with RM. f. Conduct programatic reviews of all action offices to assure 1 implementation of NRC policy on allegations. Monitor the investigations being conducted within area of respon-g. sibility to assure that an investigative priority or schedule requested by a Regional Administrator and established by the of rector, Office of Investigations meets regulatory needs. 1 037 Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Review allegations concerning NMSS licensees in coordination with a. the Action Office for potential board notification (ind make such notification if required. ) J ) 5

MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS ~ NRC 0517-043 [~~ b. Evaluate implications of allegations relative to licensing deci-sions concerning NMSS licensees in coordination with IE and the Region (s), -Resolve those allegations _ for which NMSS is the action office. c. F d. Monitor the investigations being conducted within area of respon-sibility to assure that an investigative priority or schedule Director, Office of Investigations meets regulatory needs 038 Office of Resource Manacement (RM) t Provide ADP support to maintain the AMS. a. ~ b. Provide special reports to Offices and Regions as requested. Provide assistance to the NRR Program Manager for Allegations in c. 4 making modifications and improvements to the AMS. 039 Office of the Executive Legal Director and Regional Counsel Provide legal counsel in resolving allegations as necessary. a. I ' Review' referrals of matters to the Office of Investigations, as b. requested. Provide legal counsel on confidentiality agreements as requested c. a 0517-04 DEFINITIONS 5. 041 Action Office. The NRC Office or Region that is responsible for reviewing and taking action, as appropriate, to resolve an allega, tion. l 042 Action Office Contact. is assigned the responsibility for resolving an allegation.The s 043 Allegation. A declaration, statement, or assertion of impro-validity of which has not been established.priety or inadequacy This includes all viduals or organizations outside the NRC, and techni{ i _- ) efforts from Federal, State or local government offices regarding activities at a licensee's site. definition are matters being handled by more formal processesExcluded

• >, * *q such as 10 CFR 2.206 petitions hearing boards, appeal boards etcIAllegauons thaTmay resu,lt from these fonnal processes,and

.\\ 1 *. are not resolved within these processes shall be subject to treatment under this manual chapter. , f' / 6

I l' l I' NRC-0517-0410 -MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS 044 Allegation Management-System (AMS). A computerized infomation system that contains a sununary of significant data pertinent to each allegation. i 045 Alleger. An _ individual or organization who makes allegations. ) The individual or organization may be a concern,ed private citi-zen; a public interest group; a ifcensee, vendor or contractor employee; or a representative of a local, State, or Federal agency.. (NRC employees should be aware of procedures for pre-senting differing professional opinfor.s, NRC Manual Chapter 4125). i ' l046 Confidentiality. The term that refers to the protection of data that directly, or otherwise, could identify a confidential source by name. It is not intended to deny staff members access to 'the identity of a confidential source when such identification is required by staff members to evaluate and resolve allegations. t 047 _ Confidential Source. An alleger who has executed, or has orally represented that he/she will execute, a Confidentiality Agreement. (Exhibit 2). 048. Inqui ry. An activity involving minimal effort to determine the appropriate response to infomation reported to the NRC. Typi-cally, an inquiry entails the use of'the telephone or written t correspondence rather than fomal interviews or other investi-gative measures; however, fomal interviews will be conducted if required. ' t., 049 Inspection. For purposes of this Manual Chapter, a special investigatory activity norm' ally conducted by EDO Offices and Regions t that may be used to evaluate and resolve an allegation. 0410 Investigation. For the purposes of this Manual Chapter, an activity nomally conducted by the Office of Investigations that may be used to evaluate and resolve an allegation. 0411 Office Allegation Coordinator (OAC). A designated staff member in each Office or Region who serves as the administrative point of contact for that Office or Region regarding the processing of allegations. t 0412 Receiving Office. The Office or Region that initially receives an allegation. In some cases, the Action Office and Receiving Office will be the same if the allegation falls within the ' functional responsibility of the Receiving Office. 0413 Safety Significant. For purposes of this Manual Cha allegation will be considered safety significant if'pter, an the allegation would, if true, (1) raise a significant question about the ability of a particular struct$re, system, or component to perform its 7

) MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS l NRC 051/ h intended safety function or (2) raise a significant question of management competence, integrity, or conduct or about implementa-tion of the quality assurance program, sufficient to raise a legitimate doubt as to the ability to operate the plant safely. -A44egaMons-whish-are-not-safety-s4gni44eant "" be m6:d i the-nomakeour4e-of-burr 4 ness-indejFendent of iicense issuance. b 0414 Sanitization. The process of ensuring that any NRC document developed as a result of an allegation does not reveal the identity of the alleger. 0415 Secure Files. access is controlled on a need to know bases. Files The files shall be marked "Contains infonnation which would reveal the identity of a confidential source" and controls shall include a ~ sign-out procedure. 0416 Wrongdoing. Wrongdoing consists of both intentional violations of regard of or reckless indTfference to regulatory requ amounting to intent. A reasonable basis for belief of wrongdoing exists when, from the circumstances surrounding it, a violation of a regulatory requirement appears more likely to have been intentional or to have resulted from careless disregard or reckless indifference than from error or oversight. 0517-05 BASIC REQUIREMENTS 051 Appitcability. applicable td, and shall be followed by, all NRC employ t 052 Wrongdoing. t belief of wrongdoing, as opposed to those involving t and for which the staff concludes an investigation is necessary to

• i determine whether enforcement or other regulatory action is requiredi should be referred to the Office of Investigations following the pro-cedures set forth in Appendix 3 of this manual chapter.

t of wrongdoing by NRC employees or NRC contractors fall within the Allegations purview of CIA and are not entered into the AMS. requester within 30 days whether the matter has been accepted forOI wf11 investigation and, if so, the priority of the investigation and the estimated schedule. the requester with the basis for its decision.If a request is not accepte t between the staff and OI on the need for or priority of an investi-Any differences gation shall be resolved in accordance with the process described in Apper. dix 3 of this manual chapter. enter allegations of wrongdoing into the AMS using informationThe Off received from the alleger or provided by 01 (see Ap art IX.2 of th.is manual chapter). or a sunnary offits findings of those matters which[pendix 1 it investigates I&*7 o

>~

z N I ,/ 8 _ _ _ _ _ ~. _ _.. _. _ _ _ _ _ _.., _ _. _ _ _. _., _ _ _. _ _. ~

l. NRC-0517-055 MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS ) to the requesting Office or Region. Allegations involving wrong-doing for which a Region is the Action Office will be coordinated by the Region OAC with the 01 Field Office Director in that Region. Allegations involving wrongdoing for which a Headquarters Office is ) the Action Office will be coordinated with 01 Headquarters (see also Appendix 1, Part IV.6). 053 Action Office Assianments. Allegations submitted by any source concerning NRC-regulated activities should be transmitted by the Receiving Office OAC to the OAC in the appropriate Office or Region for processing. 054 Identity of Allecers. As a general rule, the need-to-know principle should be implemented for allegers. Generally, this*means svoidance of unnecessary use of the identity of the alleger and other identifying infomation in discussions and in documents. With the . exception of reports prepared by the Office of Investigations, reports should nomally not contain information which would reveal the identity of an alleger. Individuals using documents containing infomation which could reveal the identity of an alleger are responsible for controlling such documents, such as by placing them in closed storage when not under the individual's personal control. If asked whether a person is an alleger, NRC staff should respond that it is NRC policy not to identify an a11eger unless it is clear that the individual concerned has no objection. Higher standards of control are to apply when an alleger has been granted confidential source status. Confidential source status is i granted when a Confidentiality Agreement (Exhibit 2) is executed by the NRC and the alleger. Guidance with respect to grinting conff-dentiality, revoking confidentiality, and providing the identity of a confidential source outside the NRC is contained in Appendix 2. The identity of a confidential source must be protected by not referring to the name or other identifying information in internal NRC discussions unless absolutely necessary, and by expurgating i the name and other identifying information from documents before providing them to authorized / assigned NRC staff members. File's and documents which contain information which could reveal the identity of a confidential source are to be marked "Contains information which would reveal the identity of a confidential source " and may not be reproduced without the authorization of the OAC. Information which can reveal the identity of a confidential source may be withheld under the Freedom of Information Act from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR i 9.5(a)(7)(iv). Infomation which could reveal the identity of an alleger who has not been granted confidential source status may also be withheld under appropriate circumstances, but this may not always be the case., i e' 9

l l NRC-0517-057 MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS i 055 Confidential Files. Confidential files must not be compromised inadvertently. All infomation relating to cases where confiden-tiality has been fomally granted, by signed agreement, must be kept in a secure file cabinet or safe to which extremely limited access controls apply. These files must be physically separated from the nomal allegation files due to the special acce'ss controls on the infoma tion. A log system must be utilized to clearly identify all personnel who had access (observation or personal possession) to these files and the time during which access was granted. The Office Director or Regional Administrator will, by written dele-gation, specify the responsible office person (s) who may pemit access to this file. These designated persons must a) restrict access to authorized NRC personnel, b) verify the "need to know" of the individuals requesting access and so note on the log by their signature, c) ensure that no unauthorized reproduction (+eep.%( gI cr__other c6p7) of the information is made - multiple copies made for simultaneous review must be returned to the file, d) ensure, by an informal briefing of the requestor, that infomation is kept in a secure location while outside of the central file and is returned in a timely manner. 056 Staff Generated Infomation. Staff generated infomation relating to evaluations or inspections of allegations where confidentiality has been formally granted must be sanitized such that no information is included that could, through any path, lead to the identification of the alleger, or, such staff generated infomation must be kept in the confidential files. The'0AC should provide case specific instructions to NRC staff personnel who generate and review such infomation concerning sanitization of documents and all unsanitized documents generated must contain a cover sheet that is clea-ly marked D' to indicate its sensitivity. Oraf ts of staff generated infor"t4 g for such cases should be destroyed upon finalizatio[n xik'fE : u.17g% i 0 enncurronea ~ t he_ " t10e = t: >!' M c-et!ra . n-f ed w to de-I T 1 .- 3Mhad 2 rra e r +c t h 2 ty t ! = ' 2 - 'a fem 2 t !% Confidential files should { be complete, containing all infomation related to the resolution of the issues identified, similar to the nomal allegation files. Con-fidential files may be referenced in the nomal allegation files, but no more than a cross reference with the effected projects and 1 l status, should be kept in the normal allegation file enclosure. 057 _ Responding to A11egers. Those who provide allegations to NRC staff must be treated with respect, consideration, and tact. Under no circumstances should they be dealt with brusquely or abusively. When allegations are received in writing, a prompt ' attempt to make personal contact must ordinarily be made in each case either by a j letter, telephone call or personal meeting. Contact should be t earnest and professional. The a11eger should.:: promptly advised of the results of followup action and, in instances of, unusual delay in providing the results, should be advised of the status periodically 4 so that there is an awareness that the allegation is being pursued. I 10

l NRC 0517-058 L MANAGEMENT-0F ALLEGATIONS I i 058 Processing Allegations. The Action'0ffice should resolve all allegations in a manner which is timely under the circumstances - (taking -into consideration the schedule and/or sta Except as discussed below (Late-filed Allegations)ge of licensing). , all allegations received prior to issuance of an initial Ifcense should be resolved 7 ~ before the license is issued. - Allegations having relatively high safety significance should be addressed first and with expedition. Less significant allegations should be addressed as priorities and resources permit, but usually within 6 months of receipt. For purposes of this Manual Chapter, an allegation will be considered safety-significant if the allegation would, if true: 4 r (1) raise.a significant question about the ability of a particular structure, system, or component to perform itt intended safety function or (2) raise a significant' i question of management competence, integrity, or conduct or about implementation of the quality _ assurance program, i sufficient to ' raise a legitimate doubt as to the ability to operate the plant safely. i Allegations should be screened as promptly as possible to assure the proper identification of safety-significance. As a result of screening, it may be possible to c1cse out some allegations early in the process for logical reasons (e.g., af ter initial inquiry, the allegation is frivolous or too vague or general in nature to permit further followup). Appropriate docamentation of such determination. should be provided. In any event, while the safety-significance of an allegation is important in determining the extent and promptness of staff resource commitmerits, it should not affect the treatment of the alleger as discussed in section 057, above. Followup of allegations, whether they are general or specific, should focus not only on the particular allegation but on the overall area of concern, including the potential for vneric implications as well as wrongdoin ) allegation directed toward a non g. In this regard, note that an safety item or activity may, as a result of generic implications, affect a safety item or activity. When a number of allegations point to or reinforce indications of a broader problem, prompt action to broaden the scope of the inquiry should be taken to determine the extent of the problem. r .If it is appropriate, an inspection should be made. A plant visit with the person making the allegation may be made if necessary and if the individual is willing to make such a visit-to find the exact location of a problem. Access issues should be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Travel costs for the individual only can be offered,'if necessary, and are borne by the Office or Region y extending the offer. Care should be taken to avoid embarrassment or abuse of the individual, e.g., schedule ~ visit on off-shift / weekend, etc. .*e 11

MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS NRC 0517-059 059 Late-filed A11ecations. a particular facility will be resolved before any license is authorized., If, however, because of the number of allegations a timeframe consistent with reasonable an action, it may be necessary to give priority'to those allegations which, because of their potential impact on safety, must be re before licensing action can be taken. must be alert to the possibility that late-filed allegations ma impact on upcoming licensing decisions. tion and consultation between Action Offices and the appropria -licensing office is required in carrying out t l manual chapter. whether, if true, the allegations are materi decision in that they would require dental of the license sou the imposition of additional conditions on such license analysis or investigation. If it ap , or further be material to a licensing decision, pears that the allegations may determination on materiality and assist the A mining further appropriate action. e er-The Action Office also has office, if warranted. responsibility to recommend Board Notifica Allegations which, even if true, are not material to any licensing decision or which on their face or after initial inquiry are determined to be frivolous or too vague general in nature to provide sufficient information for the staff or investigate will receive no further consideration and may be c out on this basis. e As to allegations which are material to the licensing decisio Action Office will next determine whether the information pre n the' is new in the sense of raising a matter not previously conside ne tending to corroborate previously received but not yet res l or allegations. I to the NRC will be considered, including that prev o ved an applicant or ifcensee and that obtained by the Agency in the e y j course of its review and inspection efforts or from its investigation of prior allegations. already available to the NRC may be sufficient to resolve certa In some cases, information allegations. ) However, if an allegation is found to be both material and new, the staff will investigate the allegation further. Action Office detennines that, as a result of the number of If the allegations or the timeframe in which they are received it app likely that full consideration of all allegations cannot be accomplished consistent with reasonable and timely Comission of the allegations to detennine their significa ) ng ) 12

\\_ i. NRC-0517'0510 MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS therefore what priority should be assigned relative to the activity to be authorized. The following screening criteria will be considered: 1. The likelihood that the allegation is correct, taking into consideration all available information including the apparent level of knowledge, expertise, and reliability of the individual submitting the allegation in terms of the allegation submitted and the possible existence of more credible contrary information. 2. The need for prompt consideration of the allegation If the staff determines that an allegation raises arecogni significant safety concern (as defined in section 058 above) of a facility or about quality assurance or control orreg management conduct, which brings into question the safe operation of the facility at a given stage of operation, the allegation must be addressed prior to authorizing that stage. Allegations which are not safety significant will be resolved in the normal course of business independent of ifcense issuance. i Note that the screening called for by this section is to be conducted to determine which late-filed allegations must, because of the initial screening called.for by section 058 above hand, is intended to facilitate the allocation of staff resources based on safety-significance irrespective of license issuance and is necessary in all cases. 0510 1_nvolvement of Licensees or Other Affected Orcanization. for allegations involving a potentially significant and irrediate impact on the public health and safety should be promptly infomed to assure p, roper and timely action.the af For other allegations, once information from allegers is received by the Office Director / Regional Administrator, the lic should be advised specifically by letter of the area of concern and should be requested to address it minimize the expenditure of NRC resources.NRC to en In all instances, . h however e identity of an alleger should not be revealed unless it1 clear he has n o gations/ inspections ections and the effectiveness of investi-D not be compromised releasing or appearing to release an NRC inspe,ction report (notesuch as exceptions discussed below). i The alleger must be infonned that p#.ht r is nddh:-df g a matter ever te the affected organizatio NRC will review and evaluate the activities as necessary p at 6 gov % affected organization should be informed regarding the resolution ofg. The the allegation if appropriate (See Appendix ! Part VI!!). f 13

~ 1 MAriAGEMEtiT OF ALLEGATIONS NRC 0517-0511 i As noted above, there are two exceptions to the involvement of the licensee or vendor in the resolution process. The first exception is where the information cannot be released in sufficient detail to be of use to the licensee or vendor without compromising the identity of an alleger. In such cases release should normally not be made unless the release is necessary to prevent an irruninent threat to the i public health and safety. The E00 shall be consulted in all cases where it appears there is a need to release the identity of a con-fidential source and the appropriate Regional Administrator or Office Director shall be consulted in the case of all other allegers. The second exception is where a ifcensee/ vendor could compromise an i investigation or inspection because of knowledge gained from the release of information, especially if wrongdoing is involved. In these cases, the decision to release the information to the licensee M IN shall be made by the Director of the Action-Office, the Regional Administrator or the Director of the Office of Investigations. 544 A p,.gO In determining whether to refer the allegation to a ifcensee, considera-L( tion should be given to the licensee's past record in dealing with Nl g allegations, that is, the likelihood that the licensee will effectively identify, investigate, document and resolve the allegation. 4

.,,g Release of information to a licensee / vendor is expected to be the exception for 0! investigations.

4 g* Hote that 10 CFR 19.16(a), involving radiological working condi- "g tions, requires that a worker's request for inspection be in writing and be made available to the. licensee no later than at the time of -32 ^ l'"! tion, and that confidentiality be provided at the worker's r ' reques ,. f,,v'- In addition to expurgating names and other identifying information, protection of confidentiality could also involve > is " retyping an alleger's handwritten notice. In the event the , a. e.- . b :> /y potential for wrongdoing is involved, the matter should be co-ordinated with OI prior to the inspection and providing any infor ~ mation to the licensee. 0511 Appendix 1. This appendix provides procedures for receipt, control, processing, and disposition of allegations assigned to NRC Offices or Regions and the procedures and guidelines used to record the receipt, status, and disposition of allegations in the AMS. 0512 Appendix 2. This appendix provides guidance for granting and revoking confidentiality and for disclosing the identity of a con-fidential source outside of the NRC. 0513 Appendix 3. This appendix provides guidance for initiating, establishing priorities for and terminating investigations of matters involving potential wrongdoing. 9 14

MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS APPENDIX 1, NRC 0517 PROCEDURES FOR RECEIVING, SCREENING, ASSESSING, AND CONTROLLING ALLEGATIONS AND FOR THE { Part I: Generai This part establishe:; procedural guidance for receiving { These functions are to be established within each R control of an individual Office Allegation Coordinator (OAC), or a pa e under the staff persont.el or other appropriate staff. provide the rer.uired training to ensure that their s regarding the proper management of allegations. rmed Allegations pertaining to NRC-licensed facilities and activities m to the attentfon of the NRC staff by telephone, letter me or by direct verbal contact at sites, in offices, at meetings, and eve , news media reports, social functions. All allegations, no matter how originated, are subject to processing in accordance with this manual chapter fessionally, promptly, and with consistent treatmentthat ssed pro-not recognize the term "off-the-record."It is very important to no , the NRC does off-the-record information must be clearly advised that infonnatio Allegers who wish to provide I tant to safety cannot be treated off the record will be accepted officially and acted upon as ne,cessary.t the information but tha with the protection of an alleger's identity.As a general ru ality Agreement ng Exhibit 2 However, unless a Confidenti-dential source, a(n alleger)'s identity may have to be revea ) Confidentiality Agreement to an alleger wf11 provide the maximum Extending a regarding an alleger's identity. followed in extending or revoking a Confidentiality AgreementThe guid c on may be revealed outside of the NRC. Appendix 2 also provides g I entity NRC employees, particularly residert and regional inspectors tions, should become fully familiar with the prescribed , regional dures to ensure that the required actions are performed. ) n proce-It is the responsibility of all employees who receive allegations to take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that an appropriate OAC informed. Whenever possible, the person making the allegation should be referred to either the OAC, other individuals as designated by the R Office, or arrangements should be made for the OAC or designated st 3 to recontact the individual. ember ) Al-1 I

3. NRC 0517, APPENDIX 1 MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATION Part II: _The Office Allegation Coordinator (OACl 1. The initial responsibility of the OAC is to identify the proper A t Office to which the allegation should be assigned for evaluation c on resolution in coordination with other 0ACs (either in the n or Regions). t 2. The OAC serves as a focal point for administrative processing a trol of all allegations assigned to the Regions and Offices n-is responsible for: The OAC

a. Entering allegations into the AMS; i

b. Tracking allegations from initial receipt to final resolution;

c. Assuring establishment and maintenance of files that clearly identify allegations assigned to the Region or Office;

e. Ensuring that management and cognizant staf i

f. Maintaininginformed of allegations under their purview;

g. Ensuring that the final resolution of allegations isthe properly documented.

t 3. The OAC assists technical staff members who are reviewing a information, primarily in the form of coordinating activities neces n sary to resolve issues formulation of a course. In addition, the OAC may assist in the of action to resolve issues. 4. A panel, which includes the OAC as a membe ) assigned and, properly evaluated, and that the actions taken to r p y the allegation, as well as the resolution, are properly document d transmitted to the alleger and the affected organization as appro e and priate. ) 5. Labor on matters involving discrimination unde the Energy Reorganization Act and will coordinate as necessary w 01 and the Enforcement Staffs. Part III: Receipt of an Allegation 1. Allegations Received by Telephone or Personal Visit Any NRC employee who receives a telephone call from someone to make an allegation should have the caller transferred to the OAC or appropriate technical staff member in the Office or Region. ) Likewise, if an individual appears in person at an NRC Office individual should be referred to the OAC or other techn , the member. Technical employees, when unable to refer the telephone call or the visitor as described, shall obtain as much information as Al-2

MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS APPENDIX 1, NRC 0517 i possible from the individual (see item 3, below). When unable to locate the OAC or other technical staff member, administrative em-ployees should refer an individual to a technical staff supervisor. 2. Allegations Received by Mail Personnel responsible for distribution of mati will forward cor-respondence that appears to contain an allegation to the OAC. Both letters and envelopes will be forwarded and no copies will be made. An employee who receives direct correspondence, including internal NRC memoranda, that contains allegations shall forward the correspondence to the OAC. All personnel who may come into possession of this type of correspondence also should be made aware that correspondence con-taining information which could reveal the identity of an alleger thould be transmitted in a sealed envelope marked "To Be Opened b Only;" for expedited transmittals (e.g., electronically), y Addressee should be deleted from correspondence. such information 3. Discussions with Allecer Any employee receiving a telephone call or visit, as discussed in item 1 shall attempt to obtair, as much information as possible from the individual. It is crucial to identify: i a. full name b. complete mailing address telephone number where the ' individual may be contacted c. d. position or relationship to. facility or activity involved nature of allegation e. If the alleger declines to provide the above information, attempt to establish the reason (s) using the following guidance: Explain that Public Law 95-601 affords protection to the alleger by pr',ohibiting an employer from discriminatf ag against an employee for contacting the NRC. If the alleger continues to be reluctant to provide sufficient information to evaluate his/her concern or expressly requests confidentiality, a Confidentiality Agreement (Exhibit 2) may be extended in accordance with the guidelines in Appendix 2, Part II. Basic Require-ment 054 provides further information regarding protection of confidentiality. The alleger may be informed that the NRC employee with whom he/she is in contact does not have the capability to evaluate the information, to determine follow-up action therefore, it may be necessary, or to establish NRC jurisdiction; for additional information. that someone else contact the a11eger The alleger should be informed also, that--unless an objection is i the allegation. registered--he/she will be recontacted as soon as possible regard a letter to the alleger, at an address desiThis may be done by telephone, perso acknowledge the receipt of the allegation. gnated, which will also This process will permit Al-3

NRC 0517, APPENDIX 1 MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS the alleger to review the infomation with the NRC to provide maximum assurance that the infomation has been correctlz interpreted and understood. If the alleger persists in not offering identification after the above explanations, document the allegation in as much detail as possible and l advise the alleger tha member in 30 days or a.t he/she may contact the OAC or designated staff i ny other agreed upon period. for information on i 1 the status of any actions being taken on the information suppifed.- For allegations of discrimination that fall under Section 210(a) of the' Energy Reorganization Act, inform the allegers that NRC will look-l into the complaint and any safety concerns identified by the alleger. and that appropriate enforcement actions will be taken against the employer if the allegation is substantiated. To assure personal employee rights are protected, advise the a11eger that the complaint must be filed with the Department of Labor within 30 days of the occurrence of the discrimination event. allegations received by telephone.to allegations received b Part IV: Action by the Receivino Employee and the Office Allegation Coorcinator (OAC) 1. When an allegation concerning an NRC-regulated activity is received, the employee receiving the allegation will provide the information obtained to the Receiving Office OAC who will complete an NRC Form 307, Alle-gation Data Form. The Action Office is then ' identified and the 1 completed form and all documentation regarding the allegation will be ) forwarded by the Receiving Office OAC to the Action Office OAC. 2. The Action Office OAC will enter the pertinent infomation in the AMS in' accordance with these procedures. All allegations must be entered into - the AMS. In this way an " audit trail" will be established so that NRC 1 actions can be properly monitored and completed. I The OAC or other designated staff member will ensure that the alleger is properly contacted to acknowledge receipt of the allegation and to confirm the specifics of-the allegation. Depending on the nature of an allegation, the OAC will provide copies of the sanitized allegation documentation and the letter sent to the alleger (with the alleger's identity and identifying informa-tion concealed) to the co y and initiation of action.gnizant technical staff supervisor for evaluation To the extent NRC staff need to know the iden-tity of an alleger, a need-to-know deteminatinn must be made. 1 a11eger is a confidential source, the determination must be documented. If the See Appendix 2. When responsibility for the handlin } transferred from one organizational unit to another,g of an allegation is the alleger should be notified of the new point of contact (name and telephone number) by the )' individual who is relieved as contact in order to assure

• continuity.

single point of contact should be the rule. A l ) Al-4 \\

MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS APPEN0lX 1, NRC 0517 The OAC will follow up on the allegation with the cognizant technical staff supervisor at periodic intervals until the matter has been satisfactorily resolved. be made to that effect in the AMS.When the case is closed, an update should 3. The OAC will coordinate allegation information with the technical staff and may assist in. determining whether the infdrmation is suffi-cient to identify the issues. insufficient, the OAC or designated staff member will assist inIf the info further contact with the alleger. A single point of contact with an alleger provides a means of better controlling comunications, aids in developing rapport, establishes continuity in the flow of infonnation between the Regions and other NRC Offices, and aids in protection of the alleger's identity. 4. The OAC assists the cognizant technical staff in identifying and separating the issues involved in an allegation into one of the follow-ing ca tegories: s Allegations that involve technical matters, such as: a. inadequacies in procedures, qualifications, or training; inadequate implementa-tion of procedures; or inadequate corrective actions; or over-exposure (s) to radiation. 1 b. Allegations where there is a reasonable basis for belief of wrong-doing and for which the staff determines an investigation is necessary to determine whether regulatory action is require such as: record falsification; willful or deliberate violations; material false statements; discrimination under Section 210(a) of the Energy Reorganization Acts or othe'r improper conduct. I Allegations that involve matters outside the jurisdiction of NRC. c. 5. Technical issues in category 4a involving failure to meet requirements have the potential for being willful or deliberate violations. in the absence of specific allegations of willfulness or deliberateness,

However, i

such issues will normally be trac resolved using program resources.ked separately as technical issues and If an allegation covers issues that affect other Regions or Offices, follow-up activities will be coordin-OAC will contact the affected Offices which should result agreement as to which Office or Region should have the lead. ) ment cannot be reached at the OAC level, then the Regional Adminis-If agree-trators or Office Ofrectors will resolve which Office or Region should take the lead. 6. Allegations in category 4b, except for those involving NRC employees or 1 NRC contractors (see 10, below), should be referred to O! Field or i Headquarters Offices in accordance with the guidelines in Appendix 3 of this manual chapter. Requests for an investigation by OI must be 1 made using the " Request for Investigation" fann (Exhibit 3 to this 1 Al-5

r NRC 0517, APPENDIX 1 MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS manual chapter) and distributed as indicated on the form. Upon receipt of the completed form, OI will evaluate the request and conduct con- "4 sultations as necessary with the requesting office. If a request is not accepted, OI will provide the requester with the basis for its decision. Any differences between the staff and OI on the need for or priority of an investigation shall be resolved in accordance with the process described in Appendix 3 of this manual chapter. '7. When applicable and after coordination, the Action Office should notify other agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, DOE, etc. _ in dealing with allegations in category 4c. Notification to other Federal law enforcement agencies and State and local jurisdictions is the responsibility of the appropriate OI Office or the Office of. Inspector and Auditor (for matters falling within its purview only). 8. Allegations involving discrimination under Section 210 should be entered in the AMS. The OAC assures that a complainant is advised that any dis-crimination complaint under Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act must be filed with the Department of Labor within 30 days of the dis-crimination. Complaints should be filed with the Office of the Adminis-trator, Wage and Hour Division Employment Standards Administration, U. S. Department of Labor, Room 53502, 200 Constitution Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20210. The OAC also maintains awareness of DOL's in-vestigative intent, and ensures NRC consideration of the need for its own investigation by timely referral to 01. The OAC will take reasonable steps to facilitate 00L's investigation by assisting 00L in obtainin access to licensed facilities and any necessary security clearances.g Regional Counsel or OELD/ROED should be contacted on access problems. 9. If an allegation is determined to have generic implications, uther ~ Offices and/or Regions with responsibilities that may be affected will be appropriately notified by the Action Office (e.g., AE00 for opera-tional data, RES for concerns affecting research activities, etc.) A11'egations regarding suspected improper conduct by NRC employees and 10. p NRC contractors will be brought to the attention of appropriate management for possible referral to the Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA). (

Reference:

NRC Manual Chapter 0702). Allegations of this nature are not e ) Part V: Documenting Allegations 1. When an allegation is received and the action office identified, a working file should be established to contain all related documentation ' concerning the allegation, including all correspondence, memorandum tJ files, interviews, and summaries of telephone conversations, discus-sions, and meetings. This (fle shall be maintained in the official files of.the Action Office in an officially designated location. The confidential files, those with extremely limited access, will be / Al-6

MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS APPENDIX 1, NRC 0517 physically separate from the nomal allegation files, but will'contain the documentation similar to that kept in the non-confidential allega-tion files.- file and clearly marked with the allegation number.The allegation s To ensure proper allegation. evaluation, full,and complete infomation should be documented abo be made-to expand and clarify the information so that the i L defined. All allegations, regardless of source or how received, must be i documented. Access to the official files is to be controlled. to be locked when not in use. Files are In addition, records or files containing the name of a confidential source or other identifying infomation should be stamped "Contains infomation which would reveal the identity of a ? confidentia_1 source" and access should be controlled with a sign-out pro-cedure. The information in these files shall not be reproduced without authorization of the OAC. originals. The same controls apply to copies as to 2. There will be occasions when the allegations obviously have no sub-stance and appear to represent a distortion of facts. in these cases, documentation is necessary that identifies the con-However..eve tact, the general content of any comunications, and the basis for a conclusion that the matter need not be pursued. Instances such as the OAC to ensure proper disposition.these wf11 be coordinated w 3. The importance of obtaining and documenting all pertinent information. about an allegation cannot be overemphasized. Evaluation and' screen-ing of the allegation, as well as the proposed ceurse of action that will be adopted to resolve the issue, will be based primarily on this information. alleger may be warranted.In some cases, a personal interview with the I In these cases, the OAC will consult with NRC management to determine the best way to obtain the details re-quired. Depending on the nature of the allegation and the time sensi-tivity, assistance from the Office of Investigations (OI) or other resources may be requested. 4. As soon as possible after receiving an allegation or becoming aware of information that indicates inadequate or improper activities, the person receiving the allegation shall notify the OAC. action will be taken to verify the validity of the allegationNormally, no shall such matters be discussed with licensees J' necc:r - after the OAC or designated staff member has briefed approp,riate NRC / p management. 5. all information received in conjunction with an allegation a ensuring that management and cognizant technical staff members are fully informed. Al-7

.l l NRC 0517, APPENDIX 1 l MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS 6. Allegations normally should not be addressed in Preliminary Notifica-tions (PNs) or Daily Reports (DRs); however, if it is detennined that PN or DR entries are appropriate, the approval of an Office Director l or a Regional Administrator should be obtained. 7 If allegation documents which would reveal the identity of an alleger must be sent to other NRC personnel, the documents should be securely wrapped and marked "To be Opened by Addressee Only." The sender must ensure that the recipient has a need to kno.. In the case of a confi-w dential source, the sender must verify the recipient is included on the list of individuals with a need to know maintained by the OAC. All t NRC ~ personnel are to take reasonable steps to ensure.that the identity of an alleger is not revealed and all necessary steps to ensure that the identity of a confidential source is not revealed. (See Basic Reqdire-ment 054.) Part VI:. Evaluation by Cognizant Technical Staff 1. When an allegation package is received, the technical staff within the Office or Region will review the documentation to determine if there is a safety concern that requires imediate action. The technical staff is responsible for development, initiation, and follow-through on corrective actions. Allegations or documents containing a substantial number of allegations once entered in the AMS can be screened using the following criteria: Is,there an immediate safety concern which must be quickly a. addressed? V i b. Is the allegation a specific safety or quality issue or a gener-alized concern? Has the staff previously addressed this issue? c. i d. Does the allegation package contain sufficient information for a thorough evaluatfori? If it does not, identify the additional infonnation that is needed. Are all aspects of the allegation adequately defined and described e. to permit or allow a meaningful and extensive evaluation. ) This is a screening process that may result in a decision not to consider the allegation further. If the latter is the decided course of action, the alleger should be so informed in a courteous and diplomatic manner along with the rationale for not considering it further. The potential for adverse publicity must be recognized when taking this action. I f. Is;the identity of. the a11eger necessary for a' thorough evaluation? What specific issues are involved in the allegation? g. be adequately addressed,.by a technical inspection? Can the issues / k, Al-6 s/ i ' /

x, ~ ,3 ~ MIMMMENTOFALLEGATIONS i;. APPENDIX 1, NRC 051; h. a scheduled inspection?Can the allegation be examined and resolv way to address the issues. If this is not possible, determine the best t i. Can ifcensee/ vendor resources reasonably be used in resolving the allegation to conserve staff resources? Consider potential proble associated with involving the licensee in the resolution process. ms J. Does the allegation have the potential to require escalated , enforcement action? t k. i What is the time sensitivity of the allegation, and what intned-iate actions are necessary? 1. Will investigative assistance be needed? Identify peripheral issues that could develop. m. Are any licensing actions or board proceedings pending which could n. be influenced or affected by the allegation. When an allegation involves a case pending before a Ifcensing or appeal board or the Commission, infonnation concerning it should be provided to NRR or NMSS as soon as possible to assist in the determination of whether or not a board notification should be made. This decision must be made promptly by NRR or NMSS in accordance with office procedures. Should other NRC Offices be, notified? o. As soon as possible after the receipt of an allegation and the p. relevant information has been reviewed and evaluated, the Action i Office will make a preifminary detennination of the safety signi-ficance of the item and the need for immediate regulatory action. Establish a schedule for the resolution of each allegation which q. is consistent with the licensing schedule, if applicable. ) Notify the OAC or designated staff member when the status changes r. or action (s) is complete. 2. It is the responsibility of the technical staff within the Office or Region to resolve each allegation that falls under its jurisdiction, and subsequently, to notify the OAC or designated staff member of the y action taken so that the status of each allegation can be tracked to closecut. Final resolution of an allegation shall be documented and placed in the working file along with all supporting documentation. final report should state the facts clearly, in a style that does notThe belittle or disparage the a11eger. 3. For those allegations resulting in the need for corrective action, the affected organization (s) shall be properly informed recognizing the need to protect the identity of the alleger. * ,/ f Al-9 1

NRC 0517, APPENDIX I MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS I 4 A reasonable effort must be made to notify all allegers of the NRC's disposition or resolution of their concern (s). The official file must contain documentation of this effort. Part VII: Allecation Resolution Documentation 1. Allegation resolution documentation officially closes the file for that case and shall be placed in the working file which now becomes a closed case file. 2. A final report or document should be prepared that sets forth the facts ) about the allegation and its resolution clearly and conclusively.,The final report can be a memorandum for a relatively minor matter, a report of investigation plex or major gen,eric matter.an inspection report, or a technical paper for a com-allegations proximate to 01. issuance.It can be an SER supplement for multiple Requirement 054).or material that could be used to identify, the alleger (S ) 3. The final report should include a sumary of the concern, a descrip-tion of the evaluation performed and the conclusions drawn. be written in a style that does not belittle or disparage the alleger It should 4. Appropriate entries should be made in the AMS to close out the allega-tion.

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5. When the final report has been approved (i.e., the case is closed), all allegation documentation is subject to release under the FOIA with appropriate precautions to protect confidentiality. ) all allegation documentation is exempt from release under the FOIA in Until that time, accordance with 10 CFR 9.5 Exemption (7) due to actual, or the potential. for, law enforcement action. An FOIA request received during the open stage, however, will " freeze" those documents in the file at that time ~ i for FOIA processing. freely review case files when an allegation is closed and retain 3 those documents necessary to account for official action. 6. Reports issued by the Office of Investigations will be complete reports suitable for referral to the Department of Justice (00J) or NRO Offices or Regions for enforcement action. mation which would reveal the identify of confidential sources andAs such, ) allegers. Transmittal letters referring OI reports to the Department of Justice should clearly indicate that the reports reveal the identity of confidential sources and allegers and request that 00J closely control the reports. Memoranda to the E00 and Regional Administrators should also clearly indicate if a report contains information which would reveal the identity of a confidential source or alleger. ) The EDO and Regional Administrators will make determinations regarding further distributions of such reports on a need-to-know basis. Determinations regarding a confidential source shall ef documented. Al-10 0

1 ) MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS APPENDIX 1, NRC 0517 ) In addition, OI reports which would reveal the identity of a conf'dential source should be stamped "Contains information which would reveal the identity of a confidential source

• 1 5

Part VIII: Dissemination of Final Report 1. priate, to the affected outside organization (s).A copy of the fin A transmittal letter may be needed to summarize the matter. 3 2. As in Part VII.1 above, copies of the final report shall be placed in identity of the alleger.the NRC records system, and should be treated so a ~ 3. The foregoing does not apply to OI investigative reports. allegation,. the a11eger should be provided with a sum However, if ) PART IX: A11ecation Management System 1. General For purposes of the Allegation Management System (AMS) the defini-a. tion provided for an allegation is very general and broad. during the Action Office review and follow-up activities. s The 1 l is to be no screening of al. legations for possible deletion prior There ~ l ) to entering thet into the system (except of course for duplication of entries). i e AMS should provide a vehicle for collecting, storin tions.g and retrieving all key infomation regarding all allega- 'The Action Office detcrmines the necessary action to be taken based upcn the specifics of the case. be received and closed out the same day. Some allegations may b. The AMS provides basic descriptive and status infomation and serves as a referral system. to contact for more specifics on an allegation.It identifies the office and staff keeps the staff informed as to how the allegation was resolvedAdditionally, it and provides reference to the close out documentation. ) When an allegation is received, it is not necessary to identify c. by separate entry into the AMS every component or subset of the allegation. sists of 15 separate concerns of wrongdoing and technical de the description of the allegation should include the numb ) separate concerns and their subject area. be a distinct grouping of concerns, for example, in two areas suchIn some as training and qual y assurance. In such a case it may be Al-11

NRC 0517, APPENDIX I MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS ) appropriate to enter two allegations. A main objective is to ensure that the receipt of an allegation is entered and tracked in the system. An allegation is not completed and closed until an Action Office supervisor determines that appropriate action has been taken. )' d. Sensitive information such as the names of pers*ons making allega-tions shall not be entered in the system. All infonnation entered on the form shall be unclassified and shall not contain any safe-guards infonnation or any proprietary or commercial (2.790) infor-mation. Some allegations may require action by two or more offices. e. For purposes of entering the allegation into the AMS either separate entries should be made for each Action Office for their assigned on the lead Action Office for followup of the allegation. actio should be so indicated in the " remarks" section.another Office i If 2. _ Interfaces with the Office of Investications The Office of Investigations has jurisdiction over all allegations a. where there is a reasonable basis for belief of wrongdoing and for which the staff determines an investigation is necessary to determine whether regulatory action is required except those involving NRC employees or NRC contractors and will forward all allegations of a technical nature to the appr' priate Office or Region. o Region will be responsible for entering all allegatiens--even those The Office or under the purview of OI--irito the AMS using a Region or Office AMS I number. b. employees or NRC contractors, assigned to the Region o ~ I (1) The Region or Office OAC will coordinate with the OI Field Director or OI Headquarters representative to determine if sensitive information is included which should not be placed into the AMS. and the word " sensitive" put in its place.All sensitive information is to should be made to previde descriptive material to assist theHowever an attem AMS user to the maximum extent possible. ) (2) The Regian or Office OAC will assign a Region or Office AMS number. The OI assigned number should be entered in the AMS as a cross-reference. } (3) The name and phone _ number of the OI Field Director or OI Headquarters representative will be placed in the appropriate l

ection of the form as the Action Office contact.

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MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS APPENDIX 1 NRC 0517 (4) The OI Field Director will keep the Region or Office OAC apprised of the status of the allegation investigation and significance of the allegation to appropriate Region i Office management and for use in updating the AMS. i I i i (5) The allegation will be considered closed when the investiga-tion report has been issued and as long as no technical issues remain. allegation remains orien, reference-is made to the te report or OI investigation report if either is complete, and a schedule for resolution of the allegation is placed in the AMS. For allegations of wrongdoing received by 01, the 01 Headquahdrs c. or Field Director will coordinate with the respective Office or Region OAC to complete the items 2.b(1) through (5), above. d. For allegations of a technical nature received by 01, the 01 Head-quarters or Field Director will contact the respective Office or Region and follow the procedures as indicated in item 3 below for the Receiving Office, OI's review of allegations for potential wrongdoing shall be docu-e. mented in the allegation case file. 3. Receiving Office

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Upon receipt of an allegation involving an NRC-regulated activity, tive to the allegation (see Exhibit 1) to the OAC who w I steps required to identify the Action Office and to enter the alle-gation into the AMS. priate Action Office, coordinate with the Action Office ( concurrence from the Action Office before transfer of responsibility. 4 Action Office. The Action Office shall : Complete that portion of the Allegation Data Form marked " Action a. Office,". assign an allegation number to 'it, and enter the allegation 3 into the AMS within 10 working days of the date of receipt of the allegatior.. b. Review and, where necessary, update the status of all open allega-tions in the AMS on a monthly basis. As soon as possible after the receipt of an allegation and relevant c. determination of safety significance and the need f latory action. / 1 Al-13 ,,-m w=v

MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS APPENDIX 1, NRC 0517 d. Schedule the resolution of each allegation to be consistent w the licensing schedule and-the safety significance of the all gation. e-Make a determination regarding the need for a board notfficatio e. i to NRR or NMSS. in nature, a follow-up notification is sent to boards n uation is completed, or whenever significant relevant informa-tion is identified during the course of evaluating the allegatio This determination should be made as soon as possible in n. accordance with the Action Office board notification procecures. f. Develop and maintain a working file for each allegation contain all related d , which will of multiple concerns,ocumentation. For those allegations comprised separate working-files may be needed for each Concern. Thirty days prior. to the construction completion date (appli g. cant's estimate) for each pending OL, each Action Office will forward to the appropriate licensing organization in NRR uation of the safety significance of all allegations not scheduled , an eval-to be resolved before the construction completion date license.ying issuance of (or otherwise restric , with a for dela (See 059.) h. power operation, a report similar to item g., above, wf11 beThirty days prior to a Commiss prepared. / 1. requested, assure that the added controls in are implemented. 5. NRR OAC In addition to the normal OAC responsibilities, the NRR OAC: In coordination with ORM, is responsible for the maintenance and a. upgrading of the AMS. b. AMS database for use by individuals other tha i allegation resolution. of the policies and procedures in this Manual Cha c. on i Al-14

MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS APPENDIX 3, NRC 0517 ) GUIDANCE FOR INITIATION, ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIORITIES TERMINATION OF INVESTIGATIONS PART I: General On January 10, 1986, Staff and the Office of Investigations for initiationthe Commission appr proposed by the priorities and termination of investigations. , establishment of priorities for investigations and that staff views on th priority of an investigation were an integral part of the inv a s ing e or and cess. The following procedures are to be followed in impleme tiestiga tion, pr guidelines. n ng the I PART II: Referral of Matters for Investication by the Staff 1. Regional Administrators and Office Directors gation all matters where:E00, shall refer to the Office of Investigation I wrongdoing, as that term is defined elsewhere in this Manual C e investi-I and 2) the staff determines an investigation is necessary for it decide whether enforcement or other regulatory action is apter; Matters for which there is not a reasonable basis t to required. e eve wrongdoing investigation would be unnecessary to determine the app ) u or which an action should not be referred to' 01 for investigation ropriate course of a licensee discovers that a low-level employee deliberately viol t For example, where requirement or falsified a document, disciplines the empl ae a appropriate corrective action which the Staff ha oyee and takes. conclude that further NRC action is unnecessary.s reviewed, the Staff may ) 2. All referrals to OI shall be made using the " Request fo ,. j. _-d form Exhibit 3 to this Manual Chapter. M w,ill be assigned to the requested inve gA priority of hy, norrr r Investigation" set forth below as guidance. regional counsel or OELO as appropriate.Each request + n using the examples coordinated with fanns shall be distributed as indicated on the formCopies of the completed reques j 3. As indicated above, the staff will recommend a high priority for each matter referred to 01. , normal or low these examples are just that. serve as guidance in assigning priorities.The Judgment must still be exercised in eachIt should case to assure that the appropriate priority is established ) b ,/ A3-1

1 MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS APPENDIX 3, NRC 0517 ) High A. deliberate violation of requirements having high s cance, e.g., continuing potential for unnecessary radiation exposure j to employee's or members of the public. B. Suspected tampering with vital equipment at a power reactor C. Allegations of falsification of records available for NRC inspection or submittals to the NRC or deliberate withholding of information g required to be reported to the NRC, where the situation involved presents an immediate and continuing health and safety concern e.g., 1. falsification of records having high safety significance as falsifications which conceal a repeated failure to perform a , such required test; 2. criteria information for an operating facility; or. alleg 3. level of individual involved in the alleged withholding of the willingness of management to conduct safe o raised. D. Allegation of falsification of records available for NRC insp or deliberate violations of NRC requirements concerning an area of ection significant safety' concern for licensing. ) E. Allegations of wrongdoing where immediate investigation is necessar to ensure preservation and availability of evidence or which a y some other way time perishable. re in ) Norma l A. Allegations of intimidation or harassment of OC inspectors or worke on safety-related equipment at a facility under construction.rs B. Allegations of deliberate violations of NRC requirements where the e is no indication the violation is recurring or causing immediate and r direct health and safety impact on the general public or employe es. C. or deliberate violation of NRC requirements of saf licensing process. ,/ A3-2

MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS. APPENDIX 3, NRC 0517 Low A. Allegations of deliberate violations of NRC requirements, falsiff-cation of records or submittals to NRC, or harassment or intimidation of workers where the licensee is aware of the allegation and has already undertaken corrective action. An NRC investigation is needed to determine the degree of culpability only if there is evidence of a deliberate violation of NRC requirements. B. Allegations of deliberate violation of NRC requirements at an operating facility where there is no near-tenn safety concern, e.g., the reactor is in long-term shutdown. \\ 4. Program offices are responsible to the EDO for assuring that within their areas of responsibilities necessary investigations are conducted. If the program office believes that a priority for a matter should be different than that. requested by the region, the region should be contacted immedi-ately to resolve the matter. OI should be contacted within 15 days of i the original referral if the priority is changed from the initial request. 5. Once a matter has been accepted by OI for investigation, if the an. investigation has changed, that information will be prov Director, OI for his consideration. PART III: Initiation of an Investfoation by OI 1. Upon receipt of the " Request for/ Investigation" form, OI will evaluate the request and conduct consultations as necessary with the requesting office. OI will initiate an investigation if: The staff has found that the alleged wrongdoing has had or could a. have an impact on the public health and safety, the common defense- ~ and security, protection of the environment, or antitrust laws provided that these matters are within NRC jurisidiction; and i b. The Director, 01 determines that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the matter involves wrongdoing; and The Director, OI determines that there is sufficient information c. available to support the allegation.to warrant initiation of an ) investigation. 2. If upon review of the request, there. is a reasonable belief that the alleged wrongdoing is solely a prodect of careless disregard or reckless indifference, OI will not normally conduct an investigation unless the requester indicates that the matter requires application of OI resources ) because there are' major regulatory implications and the Director, OI concurs with this judgment. ,/ i A3-3

i MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS APPENDIX 3, NRC 0517. 3. OI will seek Connission approval prior to initiating an in~ estigation relating to the character / integrity of an individual within OI v jurisdiction. 4 O! will notify the requester within 30 days of receipt of the request l whether the matter has been accepted for investigation and, if so, the priority assigned to the matter and the estimated schedule for completion. If. a matter is not accepted for investigation, OI will provide the requester with the basis for its decision. Copies of OI correspondence on scheduling and priorities will be sent to all'those who received a copy of the original request as indicated on the request form. P4 ART IV: l Resolution of Differences Between Staff and OI 1. Following OI notification of its action on a request for i assigned to the matter or the declination of OI to investigate at all, he shall promptl his concern. y notify the Director of the appropriate program office of 2. The Director of the responsibic program office will review disputed' matters referred by the Regional Administrator and the priorities and 4 schedules assigned on matters referred to OI directly by the program office. If the Director determines that an investigation priority or schedule established by OI or the lack thereof does not meet regulatory needs, and the matter cannot be resolved with the Director, OI, he wf11 promptly notify the EDO. / L 3. The EDO will resolve all differences over the need for and priority and schedules for investigations 'with the Of rector, OI or seek Commission resolution. PART V: Termination of Investigations i 1. The decision by OI to tenninate an investigation which has been initiated wf11 normally be made outside the context of the investigative priority /threshhold system. OI will normally continue an investigation to its conclusion if there is a reasonable basis for a belief that the matter being investigated involves a deliberate violation of NRC require- ) The decision to terminate an investigation will be a case-by-case ments. assessment by the Director, OI of such issues as whether the relevant facts necessary to resolve the matter under investigation have been gathered, whether allegations of events or conditions are so old that witnesses are unavailable or could no longer be-expected to recall I pertinent information, or whether continued investigation would be non-productive or otherwise not serve the agency's interests. [ t A3-4

1 MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS APPENDIX 3. NRC 0517 2. detennines that the need for or priority of an inv that infonnation will be provided to the Ofrector, OI for his consideration. 3. For low and normal priority cases, OI may close a c'ase if its projection of resource allocations indicates that the investigation could not be initiated within a reasonable period of time which will generally be six months. time OI is able to make a projection of its resource allo case would not be initiated within a reasonable period of time, e.g., six months. 4. of lack of resources to pursue it.OI will notify the staff in writing w Part VI: _ Resolution of Those Matters Returned _to the Staff By 01 Without Investigatior. 1. Those matters which are returned to the Staff by OI without investigation (see V.3) will be handled by the staff as part of its normal process to resolve inspection findings. This may include additional between the staff and ifcensee or proceeding with e appropriate on the basis of the original or supplemented inspection findings or such other actions as appropriate. supplemental informattortor_ reassessment of the original findingsIf, af ' ve:tfy tion 'e / inveTrigatTon in accordance with the procedures in this cha i / staff will not use its resources to conduct an investi ation of h[e he matters referred back to the staff by %. OI St % or q

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v. MANAGEMENT OF-ALLEGATIONS EXHIBIT 3, NRC 0517 LIMITED DISTRIBUTION -- NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Request _No. (Region-yea r-No. ) TO: FROM REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION .i Licensee / Vendor / Applicant Docket No. ~ Facility or Site Location Regional Administrator / Office Date A. Request What is the matter that is being requested for investi 4 B. _ Purpose of Investigation 1. rongdoing (be as specific $ suspected; explain the basis for this view as possible). t LIMITED DISTRIBUTION-- NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE W ,/' E3-1 Approved: ~

MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS- _ _ EXHIBIT 3, NRC 0517 LIMITED DISTRIBUTION -- NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE 2. What are the potential regulatory requirements that'may have been violated? 3. If no violation is suspected, wha't is the ' specific regulatory concern? 4. If allegations are involved, is there a view that the allegation occurred? likely occurred not sure If likely, explain the basis for that view. C. Requester's Priority 'e m I. Is the priority of the investigation high, normal, or low? I 2. What is the estimated date when the results of the investigation are needed? 3. What is the basis for the date and the impact of not meeting this date? (For example, is there an immediate safety issue that must be addressed or are the results necessary to resolve any ongoing regulatory issue and if so, what actions are dependent or, the out-come of the investigation? i LIMITED DISTRIBUTION -- NOT FOR FU8LIC OISCLOSURE W/0 OI AP ,/

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• MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS EXHIBIT 3, NRC 0517 LIMITED DISTRIBUTION -- NOT FOR PUBLIC OISCLOSURE i l

' D. Contact I. Staff members: 2. A11egers identification with address and telephone number if not confidential. (Indicate if any confidential sources are involved and who may be contacted for the identifying details.) F. Other Relevant Information i \\ t Signature ~ cc: OI (B. Hayes) */ EDO NRR/NMSS as appropriate */, **/ IE */ ***/ OELD, Regional Administrator **/, ***/ i

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    • / If generated by NRR/NMSS LIMITED DISTRIBUTION -,NdT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE W/0 OI APPROVAL

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w a - jas,: 40VEM4DIT ACCOUNTASEffY MOJECT a F~ f JimConnecnasur==.nv.sime202 - Attachment # 11 WWPmgscn DC 20036 (2GD 2334Sel0 o ' f 8 TS:The Weretterce at the Souta Temae Noclear Cemefraction Prefect f pteum: Sinie Pireer Garde and Richerit Can69 of ttee Severnment Accounta4Naty Preisef M [ ?ggAp) (U O@. Re TheGAPinvestigottenof STP (f) r s t On March e,1tg7 the management of 5T P pubilshed f alse information about the cn _.. _ _... 32 6 AccountabiJity Project (GAP) to the workforce through a publication distributed to the f cc e L empeovees entitled "The bettent ilne." The safe management has refused to correct the infor-matlan through "ths hottom iine"and wehavochosen mis method to correct me misinforma-p} i tien puetinhed about GAP. t ( CAP is a non1lrofit putpic interest organisation mat represents employees who have bean 7 fired. harassed,intim 6 dated.or suffered discrimination ci any sort for attmopting to do their 4 lcb and, by doing saw protect me pubiic heaath and safety. GA P is funded both by orfvatofots> f 9 detions and individuais who support first amendenent and workers rigtas issues and who are { concernedwrtnehesafetyof aparticularcommunityandbytheattorneystoesandexpenses l' wceeved from successfuliy defending and protecting employees who have been wrongfuity l l gnrmigerggpresseongrafneq dentrari tetherepresentationsof managemer t,GAf'hasnoposAISek J " _ i .1 We.

1. are iawyers and we are ethically tourisse repreeens the interests of sur cManes.Wimin the s

g 1 ~ past sia years we have represented hundreds of umployees of the nuclear induerry-craft-l, g P { j smen, engineers,securityguards secretaries,quaisfycontrolinspectors,documentcontrol y g clerks, foremen, and audisors of utilitees, contractors, sut> contractors, vendors, manutac- -{ g )4 turers and even employees of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. To the extent that the 9 .g g q debate over nucie, power ia reeevent. our clients are virtually an "prew cseer." sut our J ' clients all have something meers in common than being blindsy pro nuclear, they are pro-l he safety and tweve tvu f psents are supposed to be built in compliance wim me reguistione wnichgeoemmaconseructiencinucie-po rpeets. unfortunate #ymeyaisonaveanomer E thirg.'non-they ran into a person or a situation in which they had techoose tecompty I g g with. 1_ anser preemenos - seen me of nor way and ignore me requirements. ) M, u l They &_ _sh rtsht tfting and1 hey riched their lete. their panelone, their careers toerr 4 k.* 'E sec = g sureshet the reguleMons and procedures were compHed ertths 3. We represent these employees in front of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Carmersedan, whirfils g j. I mr-a=d to investigate worker allegations but frequentty sides wim the wury in ignoring protwems and meriters, and we represent them in front of the U.S. Department of Labor g which is responsable for enforcing me ernp60yes lirotection provtsions of the law. A3 c See j "The hoftem line* ericouraged employees to take their safety concerns to the siteSAP ETE AM or to the N R C and oromised mat there would be no reprisals for going to the SAFETE AM with their concerns. However, the newsletter did not feel the empicyees the g f acts about the SA P ETEAM or acout the protections availaihe to mem. y ne Although the information and hype presented to the workforce ind6cate that it is, the N SAP ET E AM is nat an independent investigating agency. it is a management tool to provede employees somewnere to turn wim their concerns. The program is operated by Houston Q Ughtbng & Power using Consultants for interviews and investigators. No respones to any allegation is mailed out wimout gomg through areview committee of HLA P and E BASCOof-ficials. Houskm Ugting & Power and EBASCO have taken the position in current Department of Lamor hearings that employees who are laed ots, terminated or harassed for going to 5AF ETEAM pra. net iegnity protected under me whistiebdower protection bin. Because the . Courts haue not yet decided whether going to the SAFETEAM is protected acitvity ernpieyees shouid be aware that they are only assured of iegal protection in the followmg f CiruCmstances* (1) If an emp.cye assists or participates or is secut to assett or participate in an N R C pro-CepeNnt suWn at a Scaneirsg hearing or an N RC inspection; or g o,u.anendyeeassists-p-ticipam,rn.aoouttoasa,,e.rparticiamina,oep-tment is, w is to 4 3 o, p,eces.ng. f-e.a. e o.p., n,of Lab. ,i,,g - inve., iga o, g cgyee y or participam in.ny omer action whien furmers me ACT. I g in. wtCo.,,o, Appe.is h.,vi.d,ha,w,, ting en NC..,ome,,eg a,,,,e.

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~~ a. a /y m'o UNITED STATES I 4 8 i .wUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS:. 4 Attachment #12 _ 2 E W ASMNGTON, D. C. 20555 'jAN 0 3 B84 f y.0 V M / MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino FROM: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

OIA REPORT (1) COMANCHE PEAK - MARKEY LETTER RE: REGION IV INVESTIGATIONS / INSPECTIONS AND (2) REVIEW OF CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY CASE ABOUT CONDUCT OF RIV INVESTIGATIONS / INSPECTIONS By memo of November 16, 1983, you requested my comments on the reports, and my views on what actions might be necessary. My review leads me to the conclusions outlined below. A. October 20, 1983 OIA Report " Comanche Peak - Markey Letter re: Region IV Investigations / Inspections." 1. I do not believe that Region IV should be criticized for failing to contact Dillingham initially. Not only did Region IV take the initiative to investigate allegations made in the press - as opposed to acting on an allegation brought directly to NRC's attention - but the region was aware that Mr. Dillingham had signed the B&R review of the same allegations in apparent agreement with those findings. Region IV as discussed in item 2 also reviewed the B&R and TUGC0 findings. At that time (1982), in that situation, it appears to have been reasonable not to have contacted Mr. Dillingham directly despite his allegations to the press of a " cover up." Hindsight would have made that contact desirable, but would not likely have changed ultimate findings on the matter. Mr. Dillingham was furnished a copy of the final inspection report on June 15, 1983 with a request that he contact RIV if he had more to report. He did not take advantage of the offer. 2. RIV's investigation of the allegation took the fann of a separate review of an investigation performed by B&R and TUGCO. OIA feels that this was not an adequate manner by which to address the issues. The Region IV review of the B&R and TUGC0 findings was independent, careful and included cross-checking' where necessary; i.e., it was not simply a matter of noting B&R findings. Again, with the advantage of hindsight, one could say that Region IV management should have recognized the need to give special attention to the matter and to go beyond a review of someone else's work. However, given the situation as it existed the actions of Region IV appear reasonable and correct. ) 2C y.

i: t, 3. 01A'further notes that RIV did conduct an independent investigation of three allegations made in the news article - these allegations were not covered in the B&R report, therefore.an inspection was made. Two of these allegations were issues-concerning which Mr. Dillingham had only second hand knowledge.. Thus, the primary sources (Messerly & Whitt) were contacted. The third was sufficiently 4 obvious that no further information was needed..and.a notice of violation was in fact issued by RIV'on this matter. 4 .In regard to the CASE letter (received via-Congressman Markey's letter) which included an affidavit from Mr. Dillingham, no action had been taken, as 0IA notes, because no new information was presented that had not been looked into otherwise,. B. October'20, 1983 OIA Report " Review of Concerns Expressed by Citizens Association for Sound Energy About Conduct of Region IV Investigations / Inspections. 1. OIA investigated the circumstances related to the issuance of two versions of Region IV Inspection Report 50-445/82-14. This report was revised after a licensee 50.55e letter had been received indi-cating that the licensee found a deficiency which a regional in-spection had overlooked. The underlying cause appears to be inadequate followup by the regional inspector of the allegations on welds in pipe whip restraints. Had the original regional inspection been more thorough, the defective welds could have been identified. 'I intend to emphasize the need for thorough inspections of alleged f' deficiencies to OIE and Regional Administrators to avoid repetition 1 of these problems. 2. The issue at point here from OIA's standpoint is that of the breach of an alleger's confidentiality. The situation out of which this evolved was fairly complex. An investigator did identify the alleger after he was released by the licensee in April 1982, and RIV staff testimony before the ASLBP in July 1982 again breached that j confidentiality. The same alleger's testimony before the same ASLBP seems to make an open admission of his providing information to NRC. More to the point, NRC policy on confidentiality was less than clear in 1980 and not executed similarly in all regions. Our policy in this area is being reviewed and revised, as it is essential that the expectations of allegers in regard to confidentiality be I fulfilled. t __ - - _a____.

s . i I In summary, I believe Regio 1 T'i's actions in these matters could have been better executed. I have initiated steps to assure that the lessons to be learned from this experience in Region IV are learned by all segments of the staff. Our policy on protection of confidentiality is being reviewed and revised to strengthen its implementation. The need to treat allegations l in a sincere and thorough manner is a frequent topic of many of our senior management discussions. I intend to maintain my personal involvement in this area in order to insure that continued improvement is achieved in the staff's handing of allegations. ~\\{ %s/ William. Dircks Executive Director for Operations cc: Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal SECY OGC OPE B. Hayes, OI G. Messenger, 01A J. Collins, RIV i i

13nitch 9tates of America-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i 0 in the matter of: Houston Lighting and Power Company > DOCKET NO. 50-498 50-499 l TO t's. Sillie Pirner Garde j Government Accountability Project 1555 Connecticut Avenue, fi.W. l Suite 202 i Washington, D.C. 20036 YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear at Room 6507, Nuclear Regulatory Comission, 7735 Old Georgetown Road, Bethesda, Maryland on the 26th day of May 1987 at 9:00 o' clock A.M. to continue as necessary for the purpose of testifying before NRC personnel concerning allegations of current and/or former employees of the South Texas Project concerning the safety of the South Texas Project, as described in your letter of January 2J 1367 to Messrs. Victor Stello and James l'attox, and any other allegations which you have received concerning the safety of the South Texas Project, and to provide any records or other docunents in your possession or under your custody or control concerning such allegations. 4 g ctor St o J Executive Director for Ooerations RNulatoryCnamission 77A/ 9 /), 1987 Nu o .m a r.n1 m rg f ums (301) 492-7619 t On motion made promptly, and in any event it or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance by the person to whom the subpoena is directed, and on notice to the party at whose instance the subpoena was issued, the Comission may (1) quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable or requires evidence not relevant to any matter in issue, or (2) condition denial of the motion on just and reasonable tems. Such motion should be directed to the Secretary of the Coeurission. Washington. 0.C. 20555.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the cert) addressees listed below. Service was accomplished by hand delivery on May Iwe I, SS, 1987. ,O .j 7 A /p*<r W N

l. NRC Comunissioners:

L.W. Zech, Jr., Chairmen Thomas M. Roberts James K. Asselstine Fredrick M. Bernthal Kenneth M. Carr U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comunission 1717 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C.

2. Bill Paton, Esq.

U.S. NRC 1717 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C.

3. Secretary, U.S. NRC 1717 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

4. Jack R. Goldberg, Esq.

U.S. NRC 1717 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. I I i}}