ML20138D284
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April 11, 1983 MD10RANDUM FOR:
C. K. Nulsen FROM:
Carl Sawyer
SUBJECT:
PROTECTION OF SPENT FUEL. SHIPMEhTS FROM NONPOWER REACTORS Now that the rulemaking process for protection of power reactor spent fuel shipments is well advanced. I have been giving some thought to the question of appropriate requirements for the protection of nonpower spent fuel shipments.
The problem is nore complicated than for power reactor spent fuel shipments because the power levels of nonpower reactors and hence the fission products contained within the spent fuel vary over a broad range. tiy tentative con-clusionsis that the matter deserves some substantive study (which I along with other me.ters of the NRC staff could carry out), possibly supported by some experiments. Such a project, if undertaken, should be decoupled from and kept independent of the current spent fuel rulemaking process so as not to provide an unintended basis for delaying that project.
I have enclosed a tentative plan to serve as a basis for discussion, with a view toward later scoping and budgeting for a program acceptable to SG.
M Carl Sawyer
Enclosure:
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OVERVIEW 0F A PROPOSAL FOR DEVELOPMENT OF PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPMENTS OF SPENT FUEL FROM NONPOWER REACTORS Q:.
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O Justification Work toward troderation of protection requirements for shipments of spent fuel has been based on' the characteristics of spent fuel from power reactors.
This approach appears quite proper because it is believed that the consequences of successful sabotage of.a power reactor spent fuel shipment sets the upper limit of consequence from shipment sabotage. We are now in a position to take into account that during some years a large fraction of the shipments referred to nominally as spent fuel shipments are from nonpower reactors.
Curie content per unit volume of this fuel is different from and likely lower than curie content of power reactor spent fuel.
Nonetheless, because nonpower shipments are described simply as spent fuel, the same public anxieties arise as for shipments of power reactor spent ' fuel.
In fact, little is known about the consequences of sabotage of a shipment of spent fuel from a nonpower reactor. There is essentially no published comprehensive information on the subject.
Application of requirements for power reactor fuel to nonpower reactor fuel probably cannot be justified on other than an interim basis. A program is therefore needed to develop appropriate pennanent requirements for protection of shipments of non-power reactor fuel.
Lack of a meaningful and comprehensive program of this kind could lead to the criticism that NRC requirements for protection of shipments of sp'ent fuel from nonpower reactors are arbitrary, unnecessarily conservative, and without a sound technical basis. There follows the outline of a work plan to satisfy-the need for permanent requirements.
Objective To determine what protection requirements, if any, should apply to shipments of nonpower reactor fuel.
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( d Work Needed Develop data to allow. calculation of consequences of sabotage of a shipment of nonpower reactor fuel in a heavily populated area, calculate consequences, and use consequence calculations as a basis for wnat, if any, requirements should apply to the shipments.
Work Plan The attached work flow chart shows the overall project in terms of a series of work modules to be carried out by HRC staff for each of at least four tyoes of nonpower reactors.
Ideally, these modules would be supported by contract tasks for computer aided detennination of nuclide concentration in nonpower reactor spent fuel and experimental determination of respirable release.
In' practice,
/G each of the modules would be expanded into several flow blocks to define sub-
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projects, each with a defined, concrete product.
Resources Needed Carl Sawyer estimates that he could carry out the project in 1 staff year of his time spread over a period of two years. The cost of computer-generated estimates of nuclide concentrations, if called for, would likely lie in the range of $20K -
$30K. Scaled experiments to estimate respirable release, if called for, would likely cost $50K - $100K.
Program Independence The nonpower fuel program should be set up and administered independent of the current spent fuel project to avoid delaying the current project.
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Use already-developed power reactor Specify reference spent fuel event, unless good cause basis event otherwise
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PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPMENT OF PROTECTION REOUIREMENTS 4 reactor types considered:
FOR SHIPMENTS OF SPENT Define reference AGN, TRIGA, POOL, TANK FUEL FROM NON-POWER reactor operation REACTORS e
20 Possible contract Calculate nuclide nuclides for computer runs concentration gms, consid-curies ered b
v Specify cask Obtain from C. Hillman data Modify safekuards requireme ts N/
Number assemblies cooling.
From C. Hillman data.
S~pecify cask content Possible experiment contract Compare calculated effects with similar e
consequences already decided v
O Calculate
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Calculate health respirable release effects Geometric ay,ument - # curies release of each significant isotope