ML20137W488

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Proposed Tech Spec Changes Removing All Refs to Chlorine Detector Monitoring Instrumentation Sys
ML20137W488
Person / Time
Site: LaSalle  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 02/07/1986
From:
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20137W481 List:
References
NUDOCS 8602200179
Download: ML20137W488 (15)


Text

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ATTACHMENT B INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PAGE SECTION 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 3-1 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROT ECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3/4 3-9 3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION..........................

3/4 3-23 3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION......

3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ATWS Recirculation Pump Trip System Instrumentation.......... 3/4 3-35 End-of-Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip System 3/4 3-39 Instrumentation............................................

3/4.3.5 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION 3/4 3-45 INSTRUMENTATION............................................

3/4 3-50 3/4.3.6 CONTROL R00 WITH0RAWAL BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION.................

3/4.3.7 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation......................... 3/4 3-56 Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation........................... 3/4 3-60 Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation.................... 3/4 3-63 Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation................... 3/4 3-66 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation.......................... 3/4 3-69 Source Range Monitors........................................

3/4 3-72 Traversing In-core Probe System.............................. 3/4 3-73 3/4 3-74 l

- Chkri re =d Ammonia Detection System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Instrumentation............................... 3/4 3-75 Fire Detection

. Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation....... 3/4 3-81 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation...... 3/4 3-86 3/4 3-91 Loose-Part Detection System..................................

3/4.3.8 FEE 0 WATER / MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM ACTUATION 3/4 3-92 INSTRUMENTATION.............................................

V LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3

INSTRUMENTATION C;;LORINE ANG AMMONIA DETECTION SYSTEM

.  ?

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.7.8 Two independent ch!erine and ammonia detection system subsystems shall be OPERABLE,* each with two ch!:r'ne 2nd two ammonia detectors, with their alarm / trip setpoints adjusted to actuate at e arg 1 e_ C'!crine cencentratier ef less-than er equ ! te 5 pp , and

-b. (I Ammonia concentration of less than or equal to 25 ppm.

APPLICABILITY: All OPERATIONAL C0ftDITIONS.

ACTION:

a. With c^e ch!cr'ne and/er one ammonia detector in either detection subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable detector (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or, within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, initiate and maintain operation of at least one control room charcoal filter system train in the recirculation mode of operation.
b. With both ch!cr ne and/er ammonia detection subsystems inoperable, i I within one hour initiate and maintain operation of at least one control room charcoal filter system train in the recirculation mode ,,,,

of operation.

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.7.8 Each of the above required 5!:r'n: Ord ammonia detection system subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

alhe normal or emergency power source may be inoperable in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5.

w.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 3-74

l INSTRUMENTATION l

BASES MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) 3/4.3.7.5 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess important variables following an accident. This capability is con-sistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations".

3/4.3.7.6 SOURCE RANGE MONITORS The source range monitors provide the operator w'th information of the status of the neutron level in the core at very low power levels during startup and shutdown. At these power levels, reactivity additions should not be made without this flux level information available to the operator. When the inter-mediate range monitors are on scale adequate information is available without the SRMs and they can be retracted.

3/4.3.7.7 TRAVERSING IN-CORE PROBE SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the traversing in-core probe system with the specified

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minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this equipment accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribu-tion of the reactor core.

3/4.3.7.8 -GE G M E-# G. AMMONIA DETECTION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the chlorine and ammonia detection system ensures that an accidental :M ' : :nd!:r ammonia release will be detected promptly and the necessary protective actions will be automatically initiated to provide protec-e',, tion for control room personnel. Upon detection of a high concentration of co W r' : rd/:: ammonia, the control room emergency ventilation system will D 'o automatically be placed in the recirculation mode of operation'to provide the y r required protection. The detection systems required by this specification are

,k.fF9 consistent with the recommendations of nRegulatory m inr;. r in;t k cit ata? Guide

" W : i.% "Mte Nuclear Power Plant Control Room "duRWG A d;ostundeel Hecordous chemeal

% Release", S rur, M M.

9 3/4.3.7.9 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires. This capability is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early stages. Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety-related equipment and is an integral elemcnt in the overall facility fire protection program.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 0 3/4 3-5

PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. At least once per 18 months ## or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the train by:
1. Verifying.that the train satisfies the in place testing acceptance criteria and uses the test procedures of Regulatory Positions C.5.a, C.S.c and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the train flow rate is 4000 cfm 10%.
2. Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.
3. Verifying a train flow rate of 4000 cfm + 10% during subsystem operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.
c. After every 720** hours of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Positon C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.
d. At least once per 18 months by:
1. Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 8 inches Water Gauge while operating the train at a flow rate of 4000 cfm

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+ 10%'

a sirud.dd neomo deleac., sig el

2. Veri f ying that on wh-of-th*-below-cee4ccul404**-whet *4trW tnt s hPwhr-the recirculating charcoal filter automatically switches to the recirculation mode of operation and the isolation dampers close within 6 seconds .

< a) Chlorinedetection,anc}'s o b) . - j(

Ammonia detection, x

WM This surveillance shall include the recirculating charcoal filter, " odor eater,"

in the normal control room supply filter train using ANSI N510-1975 as a guide to verify > 70% efficiency in removing freon test gas.

"Except that recirculating charcoal filter samples shall be removed and analyzed at least once per 18 months.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 7-5

- . - . - - - - - - - ----- _ J

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION .

3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION.................... 3/4 3-1 3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-9 3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION...... 3/4 3-23 3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ATWS Recirculation Pump Trip System Instrumentation.......... 3/4 3-35 End-of-Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip System Instrumentation............................................ 3/4 3-39 3/4.3.5 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION............................................ 3/4 3-45 3/4.3.6 CONTROL R00 WITH0RAWAL BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-50 3/4.3.7 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Radiation Moni toring Ins trumentation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-57 Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation........................... 3/4 3-60 Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation.................... 3/4 3-63 Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation................... 3/4 3-66 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation.......................... 3/4 3-69 Source Range Monitors........................................ 3/4 3-72 Traversing In-core Probe System.............................. 3/4 3-73 C5!:r'n: --1 Ammonia Detection System........................ 3/4 3-74 l Fire Detection Instrumentation............................... 3/4 3-75 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation....... 3/4 3-81 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation...... 3/4 3-86 Loose-Part Detection System.................................. 3/4 3-91 3/4.3.8 FEE 0 WATER / MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION............................................. 3/4 3-92 LA SALLE - UNIT 2 V

INSTRUMENTATION

-4WLG24NE AND AMMONIA DETECTION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.7.8 Two independent th!:r're 2nd ammonia detection system subsystems shall be OPERABLE," each with tre ch!cr'n: :nd two ammonia detectors, with their alarm / trip setpoints adjusted to actuate at -at- en

' Ch1^*4^= ceaccatratie.a-ef-!255 th2n er e^"21 te 5 pp , 2nd

-br CAmmonia concentration of less than or equal to 25 ppm.

APPLICABILITY: All OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS.

ACTION:

a. With : : ch!:r'n: 2nd/cr one ammonia detector in either detection subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable detector (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or, within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, initiate and maintain operation of at least one control room charcoal filter system train in the recirculation mode of operation,
b. With both ch!:r'r: :rd!:r ammonia detection subsystems inoperable, l within one hour initiate and maintain operation of at least one control room charcoal filter system train in the recirculation mode of operation,
c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLMCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.7.8 Each of the above required ch!:r' r ::1 ammonia detection system i subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 da'sy and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

"Ine normal or emergency power source may be Inoperable in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-74

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INSTRUMENTATION t

j BASES i

l MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) i 3/4.3.7.5 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION .

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that J sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess important variables following an accident. This capability is con-sistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations".

i i 3/4.3.7.6 SOURCE RANGE MONITORS

} The source range monitors provide the operator with information of the

status of the neutron level in the core at very low power levels during startup and shutdown. At these power levels, reactivity additions should not be made l

without this flux level information available to the operator. When the inter-

mediate range monitors are on scale adequate information is available without 1 the SRMs and they can be retracted, i

j 3/4.3.7.7 TRAVERSING IN-CORE PROBE SYSTEM I

! The OPERABILITY of the traversing in-core probe system with the specified j minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from

. use of this equipment accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribu-l tion of the reactor core.

l 3/4.3.7.8 CMOS!'" ^"O AMMONIA DETECTION SYSTEM j j%

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i The OPERABILITY of the chlorine and ammonia detection system ensures that an accidental :M er' : rd/:r ammonia release will be detected promptly and the

{ Q^$$ necessary protective actions will be automatically initiated to provide protec-kh tion for control room personnel. Upon detection of a high concentration of Cb eM er're r d/er ammonia, the control room emergency ventilation system will

%g(f,%*/

i lC3e, automatically be placed in the recirculation mo

  1. $requiredprotection. The detection systems required by this specification are 9 consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide b M -W estect! n-ef /,76 g

Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Op: rater; q:let = Ace 44eeki-Okrf r l Release",- W r j 1975. Owriq a f)osM44ccl Hatard ous dkmic41 1

! 3/4.3.7.9 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION i OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate i warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires. This

capability is required in order to' detect and locate fires in their early j stages. Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to l

safety-related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.

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! LA SALLE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-5 1

PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. At least once per 18 months ## or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber' housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone

, communicating with the train by:

1. Verifying that the train satisfies the in place testing acceptance criteria and uses the test procedures of Regulatory Positions C.S.a. C.S.c and C.S.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 2, March 1978, and the train flow rate is 4000 cfm 10%.
2. Verifying within 31 days af ter removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.
3. Verifying a train flow rate of 4000 cfm + 10% during subsystem operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.
c. After every 720** hours of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Positon C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.
d. At least once per 18 months by:
1. Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 8 inches Water Gauge while operating the train at a flow rate of 4000 cfm i 10%.

Q Jamulded a>+woMa clekchon 58 9 MI

2. Verifying that on -- ' ^' " ' '- --- ' " ^ ' --"- - ^----

0::t :ig;i , the recirculating charcoal filter automatically switches to the recirculation mode of operation and the isolation dampers close within 6 secondst, a) Chlorine detectio D d b) Ammonia detection.

    1. This surveillance shall include the recirculating charcoal filter, " odor eater,"

in the normal control room supply filter train using ANSI N510-1975 as a guide to verify > 70% efficiency in removing freon test gas.

    • Except that recirculating charcoal filter samples shall be removed and analyzed at least once per 18 months.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 7-5 h _w _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _

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l ATTACHMENT C

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l l SIGNIFICiNT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Commonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed Technical Specification Amendment and determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. Based on the criteria for defining a significant hazards consideration established in 10 CFR 50.92, operation of LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because: the chlorine detectors are not used in the analysis mitigation or detection of any accident analyzed in Chapter 15 accident analysis.
2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because: chlorine gas does not contribute to or cause or change any type of accident for which an analysis is provided in Chapter 15.
3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because: the protection was originally installed beyond requirements. The HVAC system still has the ammonia detection and automatic transfer ability as well as manual transfer to the recirculation mode.

The likelihood of any chlorine release in the vicinity of LaSalle County Station is negligible and the likelihood of any release reaching the control room ventilation is also considered negligible as no known bulk shipments or storage of chlorine exists within a 5 mile radius of LaSalle Station. In addition, the citing of LaSalle is favorable in that prevailing winds would tend to carry any toxic gas away from the plant, the Illinois River is greater than 4 miles from the plant and 200 feet lower in elevation.

Based on the preceding discussion, it is concluded that the proposed system change clearly falls within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system reaching component, the consequences of previously evaluated accidents will not be increased and the margin of safety will not be decreased.

Therefore, based on the guidance provided in the Federal Register and the criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c), the proposed chango does not constitute a significant hazards consideration.

1217K

..~ ATTACHMENT D SURVEV OF CIILOPINE FIIIPMFNT IN Tile VICINITY OF LASALLE_ COUNTY STATION Introduction The licensing of the LaSalle County Station required a survey of industries and transportation routes in the site vicinity, which may use, store and/or transport hazardous chemicals.

This information was then used to evaluate the control room habitability at the LaSalle County Station. One such survey, conducted in 1975, revealed that anydrous ammonia and probably chlorine were transported by barge on the Illinois River. The information gathered during this survey was not ccmplete enough to conclude that chlorine was not shipped in larue quantities by barge on the Illinois River.

A new survey was conducted in January-February 1986 to supplement the information obtained from the 1975 survey. The purpose of the new survey was to determine if chlorine is a hazard to the control room habitability. The following discussion describes the Regulatory Guides which form the basis of the control room habitability evaluation, the results of the two surveys and the conclusion regarding chlorine as a hazard. Based on the infor-mation collected to date, it is concluded that no special protection provisions are required for chlorine at the LaSalle County Station.

Regulatory Guides ,

Regulatory Guide 1.78, " Assumption for Evaluating the liabitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Contrcl Room During a Postulated IIazardoun Chemical Release" identifies chlorine as a hazardous chemical and requires a control room habitability analysis in case there is an accidental chlorine release from stationary or mobile sources near the plant. Regulatory Guide 1.95, " Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Roon Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release" specifically addresaes onsite accidental chlorine release. Ilowe ve r , it can also be used in analyzino effects of an offsite chlorine release.

Regulatory Position 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.78 states that chlorine stored or situated at distances greater than five miles from the control room would not be conaidered in evaluating habitability of the nuclear power riant control roon during a postulated chlorine release. Regulatory Guide 1.78 alno specifies frequency, distance, and quantit*/

of chemicals transported or stored with respect to the control room that require a control room habitability analysis. The 1

1 i

l Regulatory Guide also specifies three modes of transportation of chlorine manufactured, stored or used by the industries

! in the vicinity of the control room: railroads, highways, j and waterways.

l 1975 Survey of Chlorine _ Shipment The LaSalle Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 2.1.1 describes the location of the plant site and the transpor-tation routes near the site. The FSAR Section 2.2.2 describes the nearby industrial, transportation, and military facilities.

All indu$ trial facilities are located outside of a five mile radius of the plant; therefore, chlorine used or stored at

these facilities need not be considered in evaluating control l room habitability. A survey of these industries was conducted l in 1975 to determine the shipment of chlorine by the three l modes of transportation. U.S. liighway 6 and State IIighway 47, l the nearest highways'to the station used by these industries l and the Chicago Rock Island and Pacific, the nearest railroad,

[ are all located fartl'er than five miles from the station.

l Therefore, transportation of chlorine by these two modes of transportation need not be considered in the control room habitability analysis.

[ The FSAR Section 2.2.2.4 describes the rive.r traffic on the Illinois River passing the site. Section 2.2.3.1.C concluded that the only transportation route carrying chlorine within five miles of the station is the Illinois River, which is located approximately 4.7 miles north of the station. A review of the 1974 data on commodities transported on the Illinois River (FSAR Table 2.2-4) did not differentiate barge shipments of chlorine from other chemicals. In addition, the survey also revealed that although small quantities of chlorine were being used by the Illinois Nitrogen Corporation located at river mile 248.7, approximately five miles north of the station, sufficient information was not available to determine that it was not receiving its chlorine supply by barges. Therefore, in order to expedite the licensing process, chlorine detectors were provided in the control room ilVAC system intake air ducts.

1986 Survey of Chlorine Shipments  !

To supplement the 1975 survey and to obtain additional specific information on chlorine shipment, a survey was conducted during January-February 1986 to determine if chlorine is still transported in barges on the Illinois River.

For this survey, information was obtained from the Chlorine Institute, a national trade organization with headquarters in 2

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New York, whose members are mostly chlorine producers. The

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Institute carries out research, produces literature, and in general, maintains the most up-to-date information on chlorine in the United States. ,

In 1975, the Institute supplied a list of the active chlorine 1 barge operators in the United States (Reference 1) . As a 4

part of the January 1986 survey, all the barge operators

, that travel on inland waterways, were contacted. The 1975 i list was used (Exhibit 1) , since the Chlorine Institute j stated that no new chlorine barges have been built in the ,

i U.S. in 16 years. All, but one, of the barge operators stated that they do not operate on the Illinois River. One operator, E. I. du Pont refused to provide any information on the whereabouts of its chlorine barges. Despite the lack of

information from the one barge operator, information from other_

barge operators and agencies indicates that no chlorine barges operate on the Illinois River.

l In addition to the Chlorine Institute, the following govern-ment agencies were also contacted for information on the j shipment of chlorine on the Illinois River:

l The U.S. Coast Guard, Washington, D.C.;

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Rock Island, Illinois (for the Lockmaster at Dresden); and The Lockmaster at Marseilles Lock and Dam.

i These agencies regulate, or are responsible for gathering ,

, data on the transportation of chemicals on inland waterways.

To determine if chlorine would be transported in barges other than chlorine barges, the U.S. Coast Guard in Washington, D.C.

(Reference 2) was contacted. The Coast Guard stated that the U.S. Department of Transportation does not prohibit

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chlorine from being transported along with other cargo on other types of barges, other than chlorine barges. Iloweve r ,

according to the U.S. Coast Guard , since chlorine in bulk quantity is transported by barge only, if there are no 1 producers or bulk users of chlorine along the Illinois River, it would be highly unlikely that chlorine is being shipped t on the river. Small industrial users of chlorine are not likely to transport chiarine by barge. The 1986 survey also indicated that a previously identified small industrial user, Illinois Nitrogen Corp. (See FSAR Table 2.2-3), is not listed j anymore in the 1985 Illinois Manufacturers Directory (Befer-

! ence 3). Illinois Nitrogen Corporation's facilities were purchased by Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Company in 1981.

Kaiser does not receive, ship, store, or une chlorine at thlu  ;

site (Reference 4) . In addition, there were two dock and l 3 i

I

I 4 h l

l anchorage facilities (Seneca Port District and Conti-Carriers &

Terminals) identified on the Illinois River within five miles of the LaSalle site. However, these do not receive, ship, store, or use chlorine (Reference 5 and 6).

Since the Chlorine Institute keeps records of chlorine activi-l tres, they were contacted to determine if there are any chlorine l producers or bulk users along the Illinois River. The Chlorine Institute is not aware of any chlorine producers in Illinois, or any bulk users along the Illinois River (Reference 7) .

i In addition, the lockmasters at both the Dresden and Marseilles l

locks indicated that in the years they have been working at the locks (approximately 16 to 20 years), neither of them

.has ever seen a chlorine barge on the Illinois River (Refer-ence 8 and 9).

l Conclusion l The habitability of the LaSalle Units 1 & 2 control room was i evaluated using the procedures described in Regulatory Guides 1.78 and 1.95. As indicated by the 1986 survey, no l offsite storage or use of chlorine occurs at any industry or l is transported on any routes (highway, waterway, or railroad) within five miles of the control room. There is no onsite storage of chlorine; sodium hypochlorite biocide system is used, thus eliminating an onsite chlorine hazard. In accordance l with plant emergency plans and procedures, self-containing i breathing apparatus is provided for assurance of control room habitability in the event of occurrences such as smoke hazards, naced on the 1986 survey, it in our conclusion that chlorine is not shipped in bulk quantities by highway, railroad or river near the LaSalle County Station. We, therefore, conclude that chlorine detectors are not required for the LaSalle County

! Station.

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References

1. Chlorine Institute, New York, Mr. Michael E. Lyden, Personal Communication with Sargent & Lundy, November 1975.
2. U.S. Coast Guard, Washington, D.C., Lt. Mott Querry, Personal Communication with Sargent & Lundy, January 23, 1986.
3. Illinois Manufacturers Directory,-Manufacturers News, Chicago, Illinois, 1985.
4. Kaiser Agricultural Chemicals, Mr. D. Kelly, Production Supervisor; Personal Communication with Sargent & Lundy, February 3, 1986.
5. Seneca Port District, Mr. G. MacDonald, Personal Communication with Sargent & Lundy, February 4, 1986.
6. Conti-Carriers & Terminals, Mr. G. Lamb, Terminal Manager; Personal Communication with Sargent & Lundy, February 3, 1986.
7. Chlorine Institute, New York, Mr. Robert L. Mitchell, President; Personal Communication with Sargent & Lundy, January 21, 1986.
8. Lockmaster, Marseilles Lock & Dan, Mr. Walter Getza, Personal Communication with Sargent & Lundy, January 22, 1986.
9. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Rock Island, Illinois, Ms. Sherry Serland, (for the Lockmaster at Dresden Lock and Dam), Personal Communication with Sargent & Lundy, January 22, 1986.

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EXtlIBIT 1 ACTIVE CHLORINE BARGES IN TIIE U.S. AND CANADA REPORTING NOM. C12 OWNER MARKS /NAME BARGE NOS. CAP'Y (T)

Diamond Shamrock ( 7) None 601-604 & 612 (4 x 153) 608-609 None 605-607 620 (4 x 155)

DACO 1106-1109 1100 (4 x 275)

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (4)a EIDC 201-204 1100 (4 x 275)

Georgia Pacific ( 1) Foss b 260 1200 (4 x 300) liooke r ( 3) GRIFFNIP b 265 400 (2 x 200)

FOSSb 600 (2 x 300)

Metlakatla b 900 (3 x 300)

PPG Industries (16) PPG 150-158 600 (4 x 150)

(except 154)

PPG 301 900 (6 x 150)

PPG 400-405 1100 (4 x 275)

Pennwalt ( 3) PSC 401,402 1100 (4 x 275)

TYEEb 1200 (4 x 300)

I Source: The Chlorine Institute, 1975 (Reference 1) , supplied a list of active chlorine barge operators in the U.S. This list was updated in January 1986 to show current barge ope ra tors . Inactive operators have been deleted from the original list.

U E.I. du Pont de Nemours will not divulge the whereabouts of their chemical baryon.

b Coast-wise barges operate in Pacif ic Northwest , rest on inter-coastal waterwa'/s.

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