ML20137J887
| ML20137J887 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 11/07/1984 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17198A292 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-85-59 NUDOCS 8512030060 | |
| Download: ML20137J887 (180) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. /i 'i i 3 b ' '.1 .s i .~a 2 y 2 P e-6. I 9 1 s 8 s, 10 VOLUIC II 11 12 NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO?D4ISSION 1 't Technical Review Tear Staff 11 l.". in l l~ Is ~ i .* s. l i 320 s 93 ~ + E 22 l ~. 21 .! 1 Never@er 7,1964 Taken by: Carmen Gooden, CSR, RPR .y3 0512030060 851106 PDit FOIA CARDE85-59 PD3 'h6e
91 1 would be ene, would it not, where they should have had 4000 ' i 2 FSI, or should they just have had 2500? 4 MR. SHAO: All the structure concrete is 4Uue. l 4
- 4 MR. WALSH:
You mentioned something about using this 't 5 2500 filling a cavity-- 6 MR. SHAO: Yes, filling-- t 7 'MR. WALSH: Was any of it to fill cavities within the 8
- building itself, for example?
9 MR. SHAO: As I understand, all the 2500 is not structure 10 concrete. Mainly'it's a filling concrete, like I said-- i: 11 MR. WALSil: I know about the filling, but if they're l ' I i 12 using that, I don't know how you came up--to find out where 13 l they used the 2500, but maybe they designed it at 2500 r.ix, i 14 yet the engineer is trying to say we want 4000 and they just 15 put it in there, I don't know where the stuff was used. 16 MR. SHAO: Your concern is maybe the 25 and I 1 } 17. when they're doing the analysis, they assur.e it's 4000. l l 1$ MR. h ALSil: It was written in the NCR. If they screwed .f-19 up one way, they can also go the other way. i. I 20 MR. SHAO: Let me understand your concern. His concern I f 21 is the concrete is 2500 PSI, but the analyst thought it was .i U 4000 and then in the calculation they are assuming 4E00, ~ 22 i 23 right? l i MR. WALSH: (Nods) 24 l 25 MR. SHAO: I'll check that out for you.
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92 F7. P!;ILLEO: I can't preclude that happening. I i 2 wasn't there.. As they lined up each pour, there was entered l into the record ahead of the pour a request for a particular 3 4 number of mix and that wa's what we were going with. So*they I 5 actually--they consciously asked for a three-hundred-and-6 something mix'when they go.t 2500 PSI mix concrete. They may l havd asked for the wrong thing, but.somebody asked for that ' particular concrete. g I 9 MR. SHAO: I did ask the applicant the question: Where' I 10. is'the 2500 PSI used? He said only in the non-structured I i concrete. 3, l A prob'em that I have found in the past two MR. WALSH: l 12 l 13 years with the NRC is they go and ask the applicant a l y4 j question and the applicant tells them what they-want to hear, and that's the end of it.. The NRC doesn't go one step h. further and check to see if the applicant is telling the g i truth or not. rcr example, the ceiling in the control room; g g they asked the applicant and the applicant told thet, ano 33 they wrote a report justifying it; didn't even think. l 39 i MR. SHAO: I saw the report; I have no comment. s .20 t MR. WALSH: If it's not required to be seismic, don't .[ 2 'I. trake the damn thing seismic. Change the NSR. 'If the no applicant says we used it here and no one checks, everyone o 23 l
- believes what the applicant said.
The applicant can make 24 l I 25 l a mistake when they're discussing stuf f with the NRC. I l + aa
93 I think that's happened quite a bit; I don't know if it's on i 2 purpose or by accident, but a lot of thinos get slipped by having-- l l 4 MR. NOONAN: LEt me talk that just a little bit. I 5 understand your concern. I know where you're coming from. i 6 Larry will go back and he'll look to see what he can find out t 7 as to where this concrete was used and that it was the proper 8 analysis. 9 MR. SHAO: I understand your concern; I will check into l I it. 10 I MR. NOONAN: We will core back and tell you just what g, l g we did just so we can see what--the procedure that we used I 13 l to go back and verify that he did what he was supposed to do.g ! We'll corre back and we will tell you that. 34 IR. WALSH: Again, that was just one exarple, the control b 16 We have the thing with the analysis of the Richmond i r m. i I inserts and bending the bolt. The applicant says--and this l 7 is in the SIT report--they reviewed so many supports and only g9 one out of sixty was in danger. Now, when they go to do their Motion for Sumnary Disposition, they find that they 20 I , :l have a problem. But the staff accepted what the applicant ij had said and didn't go any further. 22 MR. NOONAN: When you say "the staff", can you tell ne i s who? 24 MR. WALSH: SIT report. 25
r 94 I 1 MR. SHAO: Fhen you go looking for the 2500 PSI, make i 2 sure in the calculations they used 2500 PSI allowable, not a . 4000. ME. ELLIS: Also, anytime you're looking at calculations,- 5 one thing that we've come across a lot in answers to discovery 6 that we've gotten regarding the Summary Disposition Motions 7 is that many times they haven't kept their original calcu-8 lations, and we'd be interested in knowing whether these are 9 the original calculations or not. 3p MR. SHAO: We don't want new calculations. MS. VIETTI: Mark, before you carce in, I think Jcse may 11 l g2 have mentioned that it has been our practice with this I 13 l 'lechnical Review Team that the basic philosophy was not just ; y. to look at the paper and just talk to the applicants. he 15 askeo people to go.'.eyond the paperwork and kick the tires, l g quote-unquote, go see what is actually there in the plant, I l t and that's why we had people on site for eight to ten weeks j i
- g so that they were there on site and not only could get the 39 paper but could go into the plant and look, too.
So that 20 was something that we were doing when we were on' site. MR. SHAO: Essentially, we took a different approach ,, 3 i" ~ ~ from what you're used. to. 22 ~ MR. CALVO You mentioned a particular report from '3 I Region 4 and, again, I grant you that Region 4 did a limited ! review. They didn't ask the right kind of question, and the l l ~ e o -- e s .-e. no , o J 4e a-g- e p-e p 4-. p a
95 g question was iti showed the analysis that was to be appli-2 cable. I believe we went up there to the ceiling--well, only I 3 partially--but we truly saw it, and we lookec.i at it and ther were some questions about it. I believe what Region 4--they, weretoldtherewasaproblemandwhattheydid--Ithinktheh 5 6 would have done this similar to what you see in others 7 because it was not easy to get there. I think they took that' I g as the basis that if it was good in there, it would have 9 been good up there. I think it was a mistake on their part. 10 They did not ask one more question. That one more question is: Show me the analysis. And the other question: Let rc 3j l I 12 go ahead and see it to see if I agree with you. but', again, 1 they did a limited audit. Keep in mind we all do audits and j 13 l y the depth of it is depending on how much time we had and how serious we feel about that particular one, so I'm sure--you i5 i l have brought things to our attention. We'll focus into it. g 4 l I g If I would-have been reinformed and started over again and ~ 1-i b know what I had to do, I would have concentrated r.y audit 39 maybe in those areas that appear to be of more significance 3 there. t ,,0 l MR. PHILLEO: This particular iss0e hadn't come to my attention when I was on site. This came up in your' letter 22 the first time I was aware that.this sort of thing was in I issuc. 24 !!R. KEI!!IG: Let me n.ake one clarification for the [ b l
v 96 I record. The Special Inspection Team inspection that was l 2 conducted at Coranche Peak was not a Region 4 inspection.. l It was a Region 2 inspection, and if ry reory serves : c a a ' correctly, that inspection was done to try to get a feel for i 5 how serious the problems were at Comanche Peak, not to look } = 6 in depth at any problems that came up or that were previously' 7-known. It was kind of a foundation for this TRT; is that I I 8 not correct? 9 ! MS. VIETTI: I think you're confused. lie's talking i 10 about a regional inspection report that was done-- i MR. CALVO: lie also was talking about the April 1964 ); l l 12 ; special review tear-- MS. VIETTI: No, that's the special review team report. 13 l t la MR. CALVO: If that's the case, then what you say g 15 doesn't apply. It sounds good, but it doesn't apply. l MR. WALSH: There was two reports:. a SIT report and a 6 16 g-CAT report. l J s' !1R. CALVO: Then we must have misunderstood you because I understood the same thing he understood, that the special 39 g review team, that happened somewhere around April 1984, and l 20 3 g 2f that preceded the TRT, and if he's not talking about that-- ,i 1 MS. VIETTI: No, he's not talking about.that. l MS. ELLIS: Let me clarify for the record. The SIT 23 f report was the result of the testimony in the Septerier 1962, l perating license hearings where the Special Inspection Team, 25 l l 1
97 1 ! or SIT, went out and reviewed things regarding allegations. I' 2 of Mossrs. Walsh and Doyle, known as the Walsh-Doyle alle-1 I 3 gations. This was separate from the CAT team report which 4 was the Construction Appraisal Team report which came out in 5 February or March of 1983. That was a separate thing i 6 entirely. He's not talking about the CAT report; he's talk, i ing about the SIT report. 8 MR. SHAO: The SIT report consists of four members: Jce' 9 Tappia, Bob Taylor, Paul Chen, and another man from India, E 10 ; Dr. Rajan.- And that's the report you're talking about. I I 33 MR. WALSE: Yes. l MR. pilILLEO: If you want to get back to cylincer 12 i 13 strength again, havina dismissed the standard cured cylinders' l y l as not being deficient, there remain 108 field-cured cylinders l i y u ci.ted which, in fact, did not weet specification require-: 15 ments. I say specification requirements, not specifications,' 16 I l t j g-because both the job specification and the ACI code require-l ment are that if the field-cured cylinders fail to ecct a ig g9 specified value, then the contractor must improve protection. l s l They don't say the concrete has failed; they say the con-I 20 L., I f g tractor must improve the protection. And so that is the status of these 108, but of these 108, only three were in t the structural flexural mode that are really required by this' ,3 l l specification, and the code there is that in this ten digit 24 pour number, the first digit in the middle group of four 2a. _l 5
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90 1 gives the type structure, and if that is a seven, it is a i 2 bearer slab; and there are only three in this whole document-- l 3 there are only three tnat have the digit seven. iney're the 4 only ones for which this more stringent requirement is really, 5 necessary. They are in the Safeguards Building and the I 6 Auxiliary Building, and they're all on page 33 it turns out, Sotwoofthed 7 and their strengths were 3891, 3407 and 3956. 4 a 8 are so close to 4000 that I don't think anybo.dy would worry 9 about the safety implications, so that just leaves one, the i 10 3407 that would be a ratter of some concern. That was the 11 suspended slab that had by 28 days failed quite a bit to meet l + 12 the design strengths, and that was the only place in your 13 l whole document that it seems to me that the Schmidt hammer i 14 ; was really relevant. We needed something to find out if-15 that concrete was behaving well, and the hammer test indicates i i 16 I that it did gain strength all right. So for the type of con-8 l } 1; creto represented by the other 105 cylinders, the ACI cold j ls weather standard merely requires that first the laboratory-19 cured cylinders be adequate to show that the concrete that L i 20 went in was all right and that the concrete merely be pro-i i 21 tected from freezing for three days. Beyond that it's g assumed it will gain enough strength. So this whole business 22 about retesting to ensure that the strength was obtained is 23 l really a OA-QC commitment that CA-CC will have to wrestle 24 I with, but it doesn't really impact the safety cf that 23 I O n e en
99 1 strQcture, except for that one slab that had low strength. 2 That was one that screbody needed to worry about and they did. 3 l I think the testing shows that it was all right. 4 MR. WALSH: Now, you were relying on the Schmidt hammer? I ~ 5 MR. Pl!ILLEO: As a comparative test; where you have 6 questionable concrete, to compare that with concrete that's not'in question. 7 8 MR. WALSH: I'm working on a job right now. We're putting up a 15-story hotel. They had a seven-day test. It, 9 10 l was below strength. It's a fast-track job so they wanted to, 11 l avoid tearing a column down, so. they went to use the Windsor l f probes but the purpose of using the Windsor probe was to 12 l ~ If it failed l 13 determine if they needed to take a core sample. 3 I 14 the Windsor probe, then they'd tear the column down, no I 15 reason to do a core sample. If it passed the 1:indsor probo, l then they were going to go to a core sample to verify ti.e 16 l ^l 1-l strength. It's apparently--in essence, my concern here is Is they're going to use--they used an inadequate--you know that 19 that test is no good. They get 7000-pound concrete using i 20 a Schmidt hammer. .t 21 11R. PHILLEO: That's using a standard calibratio,n. ( .i MR. WALSH: Yes; that's not useful, i 22 I 33 MR. PHILLEO: No. I admit that's completely not useful, to do that. The manufacturer puts a calibration on the side' 24 25 of the hammer that people are inclined to use. All I ever i
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r 100 l' want reported is just rebound numbers. If you have two f l 2 concretes of approximately the same age, configuration and I i 3 roisture content, and. one has passed all the tests, ycu nave 4 no question about it. If you make a statistically adequate 5 number of tests on that one and a statistically adequate i 6 number of tests on the concrete that has your concern, if 7 those numbers are equal, I think you're entitled to say that 8 the strengths are equal. I would not tell you what the 9 strength is. I'd just say the strength in this area that ? 10 i. we're concerned about is as good as the strength over there I l where we're not concerned. 11 Don't use the' 12 MR. SHAO: only for comparative purpose. i 13 l nanufacturing calibration. You get extra strength; that's ja the wrong number. If you compare the sace age, same e isture, then you can know the uniformity of the concrete. 15 That's the purpose of Schmidt hammer. l g l MR. P11ILLEO: I will not accept that as an acceptance j g I test for concrete, but in concrete in place, I think it's g useful for that type of comparative testing. 39 MS. ELLIS: When you do this Schmidt hammer test, though-- 20 l Well, I think there are several concerns that we have. First 21 .L thing is you have to know what you're doing,.and I~think there is a big question in our minds as to whether or not 23 I they knew what they were doing to start with when they did l the Schridt harmer test. There is sorething else that I dont .a w-e.*e m-
i? : ' 101 1 know if y'all are faniliar with or not. A lot of these tests I i and things were done by Hunt Corpany. Now, I'd be hard-3 pressed at tais point to go back and finc tnis, and I'm nct U -sure if there was anything official filed or if it was just a 5 in the paper when it happened, but it's my recollection that 6 back--I want to say '79 or so; I'm not sure if that's right-- 7 that basically they removed the Hunt Company from the job ~. 8 and the Utility took over doing this. There were also a 9-lot of allegations about defective concrete at that tire, 10 which Region 4 looked at, and we don't think they looked at i i gj it adequately that tirc; but I think that there's a strong l 12 question in our minds as to the validity of any of those 8 13 l test results that they have attached to these nonconformance ; i ja reports. 15 MR. PliILLEO: I can't vouch for the accuracy of the i testing. I can only say I think there are relatively few I { g places where the tests are real pertinent. This one slab-- that slab is still available for testing,_so they're going h g9 to have to do some testing and they can go back and pump t that one again. There were several cases where there was sore N 20 i concern about early freezing of the concrete, and they used 5 21 i the Scheidt harmer there, but these cases were--again, it was a Procedural, a OA-OC item,that in the seventh day the con-23 crete was exposed to air and the ten.perature was 12 degrees l i That was a violation of curing l out or something. l 3~ 4 m W
102 I specifications, but once concrete is three days old, it's b l 2 immune.to freezing, so it couldn't have-been harred even if : j the allegation was correct that the protection care off and l 3 4 it got exposed to 12-degree air. So there they did a fair i 5 arount of Schridt hammer testing to prove that the concretc 6 hadn't frozen. That's fine, but I think it was unnecessary. 7 It's conservative; it's on the safe side, but physically I 6 the concrete couldn't have been damaged even under the horror ~ 9. story that was told about the absence of protection, so I i 10 think we 're not hanging our hat on very much Schr..idt hammer g testing. I think mostly it boils down to this one Safeguards 33 12 ! Luilding slab which could be tested anytime as far as that's ' I I 13 concerned. .E. ELLIS: Back to this deal about the Reactor Nc. 2 14 cavity wall. Is that 2500--is that designed for 2500 strength? g3 1 i MR. PHILLEO: I doubt it. 16 I I ELLIS: It's on page 2 through 4 of Attacnment D. j 37 g I MR. Pl!ILLEO: Is that the 0352755-- 33 MS. ELLIS: The number is 2015781001. 39 I MR. PHILLEO: If I'm lucky, we may have looked that one i 20 up. Yes, 2015761001. That was 4000 pounds. That was nix .5 21 204, so we have confirmed that one. MS. LLIS: It wasn't clear--okay. Apparently, what 3 they said in this nonconformance report was that there were l ~ neerns about this. There's nothing to indicate that it was 25 l
103 1 ever retestec after their concerns-- 2 MR. PliILLEO: This is where the concerns were that the 1 field cylinuers got r..ishandled and no longer rcpresentec tl.c 3 ~ parent concrete, and they finally had to conclude that once 4 5 this was discovered it was too late to do anything about it; 6 the information was all lost. Again, this was the sort of concrete that was not loaded early in the flexural mode so 8 while there is, again, a OA-Oc problem, there's not a tech-9 nical problem because it's the kind of stuff that only has 10. l to be protected from freezing for three days and then it will l* j; gain strength when the warm weather cores. So there's paper l 12 work to be resolved but there's no safety prcbler., I think. I 13 l MS. LLLIS: What I'm concerned about is: What is the i y strcngth of that concrete? !!R. PHILLLO: Well, it's 4000 PSI concrete as verifiec 15 I g by laboratory strength and after it's been subjected to l suf ficient hich ter perature the field concrete will be that l gg strong or stronger. t 39 MR. WALSH: Even at the surface, after it's been frozen't MR. PHILLEO: Yes. Once it's gotten to 500 PSI com-20 j pressive strength, it's not going to be daraged by freezing. 21 L 'MR. WALSH: From what I read from these documesits was 22 1 field-cured cylinders, even if mishandled or whatever, repre-23 sented the concrete in the field. 2s f MR. PliILLEO: That's the purpose, cf course. In this I I
a_- 104 l particular case, apparently they didn't; but that's what 1 2 they're there for. i l MR. WALSH: There was nothing on here saying that they 3 did not represent what was in the field, and the design of 4 l 5 the buildings is more disflexural; it's compressive strengt... 6 And they're taking a gross section when they design the i I 7 buildings and if they've got a problem with the field-cured i S cylinders, they shouldn't have gone to a'11 this mass of paler 9 work. I mean, it wasn't within one day; this is over almost 10 l a whole year they had a problem like this, and then to find 11 l out it's only 2500-pound concrete and create all this work. I I 12 Then they say that these field-cured cylinders, it's going to l i 13 Le representative of what's going on in the field. k MR. PHILLEO: I think their paper work problem was they ja 15 had a specification requirement to regularly rake and test i field-curc6 cylinders. This was a little case of overkill. 16 i } ' j-j rer c.ost of the concrete that wouldn't be necessary, but they b were stuck with it in the specifications. So they had to 39 dispose of ther one way or the other, so they had to make and s 20 test field-cured cylinders. Presumably when they failed to [ n.ake 85 percent of the laboratory-cured, the contrac, tor was 21 1 obligated to irprove the protection. That, again, was a case y of overkill. There was no real reason to overprotect, but i , 1
- they wrote the specifications around the high-class buildinc,
requirements. ~ l .a I l g yc. ..,.,m 9 --...e
1-105 1 l MR. WALSH: I guess a little bit of concern on this is: l 2 Did they have protection on the building itself when they 3 l made this? l 4 MR. PHILLEO: Well, yeah, the minimum requirements of 5 the ACI cold weather stancard would only give you about 50 6 percent of the 28-day laboratory-cured strength at 28 days, 7 so'a field cylinder that satisfied all requirements of the 8 ACI cold weather standard for non-flexural members could 9 only have 50 percent of the 28-day strength. 10 ; So really, all you need is some assurance that, first, 11 ! the laboratory-cured cylinders met this strength and, second,' 12 there was three days of protection against freezing. If i 13 those are met, the stuff will eventually gain strength. It I may take it until April but it will eventually get to 4000 la 15 or better. fir. ShAO: I think Mr. Philleo is saying that it is a 16 ; j 17 l violation of procedure but technically, as far as safety is j 13 concerned, so all you need is 50 percent. There will be no l 'l 19 harm to it. .l 20 PS. VIETTI: Let me just mention something that you ,j 21 mentioned about falsification of records that were being 22 done at the Hunt Company--or you said the Hunt-- 21 MS. ELLIS: They were allegations about-- ME. VIETTI: Right. i.e, as I said when we rade this 24 9 25 comprehensive list, reviewed a lot of the inspection reports
v s 106 1 that the Region did and' incorporated those allegations or 2 ~ concerns into our tracking system, and they have been i 3 revisited; so I know that Larry Shao's group has done wor). l 4 on it. It's one of the open issues that was in the September 5 18th letter where the documentation was not there that gave ! 6 us the assurance when we asked for additional information, 7 and that's being pursued. We have followed up on that. 8 ?UI. SHAO: I want to make sure that Mark--50 percent, 9 85 percent, about freezing--do you have any more questions i 10 in this area? We agree with you tnat there'is a violation i l I j; procedure, but I think mainly Bob is talking about safety-- I 12 MR. PHILLLO: I realize there is a OA-GC matter invcived 13 l there. l 14 ; MS. ELLIS: There are two different things we're looking 15, at. I 16 MR. SHAO: There's no question about a violation. l i l i 't - ), ..R. PHILLEO; I'r just talking about structural safety. i i 15 MS. ELLIS: The reason this all cane up, as you know 19 from reading our answer to their Motion for Summary Dispo-20 sition, is because of the applicant's statement-- i l s s' 21 MR. PHILLEOs --all the concrete was 4500 or 5000. I i t-wasn't too crazy about that statement. I don't work.for 22 23 the applicant. f MS. LLIS: "The manufacturer's tests were conducted 24 i 25 .with concrete which had a strength of between 2850 and 3220 l l )
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PSI (approxirately 3000 PSI). While the concrete at Corancne y - reak'isLdesigned for 4000 PSI, it actually ranges frcr 45C0 to above 5000 PSI." 3 MR. PHILLEO: What is implied here--and I am ot in a 4 l i 5. Position. to say whether the implication is correct--is that 6 I .the< anchors are only in 40003 pound concrete. .I i I 40R. WALSH: They did their tests in 5000-poun4 concrett, 7 .g. though. That was in our answer. I don't know if you're 9 involved witn that answer or not. i:R. Pli1LLEO :' No, I'm not, but I suspect thdt that's 39 correct;.but I can't state on the record that all the y, anchors are in the 4000 PSI design concrete. I doubt if thc .g
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trutn -is otherwise, but I'm not in a position tc say that. MF. LLLIS: Okay. 7.t any rate, I think it's obvious that' their statement at a very minir.ur. needed qualificatier.. l a. t.R. PhILLLO: Ti.at' statement is not quite corrcet as it g stands; to say that Cor.anche Peak concrete was designac for g 400s is an oversimplification. Scr.c of it was cLvica:ly 15 =, designed for'2500, but it may well be that all the'cencretc 39 I r ~ + 20 i ".ining anchors was designed for 4000. MS. LLLISt. I guess on mos} of this, rather than gois.t. through this item by item, it would be better to wait for ~ your report and then we can ask questions after we get the report. I think taat wculd Lo a lot sirpler on a lot of thic, with one exception. Page 32 of Attachrent D below all the 6e ennae m ee ne e quee. e ee*****, e oe 6 eme e .we. e = a,ee ,e e = eg.e . ep 9 - - = =
n 10E 1 sets of numbers there, there's a note that ene of these con ' l 2 crete pours is the pour in which the crack in the base nat I a occurred. One of our concerns there was that tnis was l I 4 apparently not retested, certainly not according to the 5 documents that we had, and it was not clear--well, there 6 were several problems with it. One thing is that the 7 original NCR that had to do with this particular concrete t 8 pour was not available for file. Another thing is that 9 most of the testing that was done they had two sarples, two 10 groups of samples rather, that they used, like field-cured I 11 cylinders and laboratory-cured cylinders. In that particular l 12 one--maybe we should take a break while I'm looking through g 13 l these. 14 (A short break was taken.) t is, MR. NOONAN: Let's go back on the record. I think I'll 16 I let you pick up where you left off. I l- "S. ELLIS: Okay. I think I've decided not to pursue l ] is the crack in the base mat at this point. We'll go ahead with 19 some of the other things and get back to that hopefully. I s 20 guess why don't you go ahead with what you were saying about i 21 what y'all had looked at for Mark's benefit? 4 MR. PHILLEO I think unless Mark has some questions 22 that I've worn out this business in Attachrent D on the 23 I cylinder strength, but I'll be clad to pursue it to any ,4 1 lengths you want. 25 l
= 109 1 MR. WALSH: Not at this tine. I 2 l MS. ELLIS: We'll go ahead and defer this until later. 3 l MR. NOONAN: Is that all we have? l 4 PS. ELLIS: Yes, I guess, on the concrete. I 5 MR. NOONAN: Do you want to go to the control room? 6 MR. WALSH: Sure. 7 MR. SHAO: In the control room--I think you 're f amiliar 8 with Regulation 129-- MR. NOONAN: Larry, excuse me. Maybe you can explain, 9 i l
- maybe go back in a little more deteil for Mark as to your 10 3,
j involvement and Jose's involvement. 12 !!R. SHAO: Okay. I think originally allegations core I I 13 from you. Let ne read your allegation here. I think the y i original allegation is "The fuel run conduit, the drywall ! and the lichtino installed in the area above the ceiling panel 15 l in the control room are classified as non-seisnic and arc 16 supported only by wires, and these items may fail as a result [ 3j f a seistic event." It was originally handled by Jose in 16 I this area mainly because a lot of electrical components, and 39 i f then I think Jose and his cohort, GeorgeMyer,wentuptothe; 20 l ntrol room, look at the ceiling, and he said this allegaticr. I 21 t is valid. But he said maybe he should involve my group to look at it because my group do a lot of seismic work. l My pecple start looking into it, and we agreed that the l The recaon it's valid is Comanche Peak' l allegation was valid. .) l m p--
110 1 is committed to design according to Regulatien 129. Regu-2 lation 129 is so-called seismic classification. Regulation 129 said that classifications of two types: one is seismic 3 l l 4 ~ category one and non-seismic category one. The seismic 5 category one is defined as those components and structures 6 that are required for safety functions. Non-seismic category 7 one are those components that are not safety related; they're. S called non-seismf.c category one, but also Regulation 129 9 said for these non-category one they should be designed in i 10 such a way that failure would not adversely affect the l 11 safety function of safety-related components or cause injury. l 12 ;- to operators. 13 l We looked into this, but we didn't believe what the I la control room had' said about this paragraph. In the control 15 room--on the top of the control room there is seismic category - l 16 ' one, seismic category two and non-seismic. In Comanche.reak i j [ 17 they introduced another term called seismic category two. i i 13
- 2 hey do a 'so-called damage study.
Khen they do a damage 19 study, they look at the physical geometry of the component, i and do a little bit simplified dynamic study to make sure j 20 l l if the component fail if it can affect the safety function 21 I f category one components, they call it catego'ry two. 22 i MR. WALS!!: When they did that study, did they consider 23 two over one, a projectile; for example, going horizontally-- ~y l 1 MR. SHAO: They did a projectile. 25 e =* -
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111 1 MR. WALSil: Was that done by the Structural Group? 1 2 [ MR, SRAO: They are a special group headed by kest. l There's a special group called West; done by West. They're 3. 4 called Damage Study Group. i 5 MR. WALSH: I'm concerned if the people were qualified ' 6 to do it. I 7 MR. SHAO: It's a very simplified--it's a very simple 8 prognosis you're talking about. It's not very fancy. 9 MR. WALSH: .They had unstable pipe supports out there I 10 ; so I wculdn't doubt that. I'm concerned that even the l. 13 sinplest stuff gets overlooked. 12 l MR. SHAO: Let me get into--I have some concern with 13 their calculations later on. Okay. As you said, they'do a l y j damage study again. They nar.ed a class category two or non-I seismic. For a non-seismic they do nothing, right, because 15 I i 16 according to their analysis it would not affect any other i l -{ 3-ccmisonents. For category two they are ' supposed to do a l j 33 seisric analysis to show that it would not fail. ihey're 39 supposed to do that. .I have no problem with the criteria, i i j-20 but.I do have a problem with implementation. Okay. l l At the top of control room ceiling there are three 21 1 P Pes. They're heating, ventilating and air conditioning ^ i 22 and safety-related conduits. They're considered as seistic 23 category one so they have to de a full-blown dynamic analysis. For non-safety-related conduits, light fixtures, they're 25
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112 l considered to be a seismic category two component; and for 1 I 2 sloping suspended drywall ceiling, acoustical suspended I 3 ceiling, louvered suspended ceiling, they are classified as 1 4 non-seismic. I said, "Why do you classify these as non-- I 5 seismic?" They claim these are very small pieces. In their i 6 judgment if they fall it would not hurt the operator or would 7 not affect the safety function of the safety-related com-8 ponent. We say we don't agree because operator can.be hurt 9 by quite a small piece of element go into his eyes and may 10 j affect it. So we don't agree that classification as non-l seismic. 33 I 12 Also, on seismic ~ category two we look at their calcula-l tion. I 13 i They do a so-called equivalent study analysis. They co not do a dynamic analysis. i MR. *dALSE: This is where they had a problem before. 15 -i 16
- v. hen they did tneir cable trays they did not take into multi.
l motor responses which is an increase by 50 percent when you're g j_ using-- Ib MR. SHAO: Yes. I wrote that position ten years ago. 39 k The reason the 1.5 is to account for the motor mode and also i 20 the other uncertainties, but our question is beyond this. g ' When they do a category two analysis, there is a non-seisr.ic-- they're interaction effect also. You can take interaction effect. 24 I MR WALSH. Okay. I understand. , a. l
113 1 COURT REPORTER: I couldn't understand what you just l 2 ! said. MR. PHILLEO: Interaction is the key word. l 3 l 4 MR. SHAO: The interaction between the so-called l 5 category two and non-seismic items. 6 When they do a dynamic analysis they not only have to 7 worry about category one and category two, they also have S to include so-called non-seismic item in the-dynamic calcu-9 ; lation. Othe rwise, the calculation is no good. I l 10 i I also have a problem with their implic'ation practice. i 11 l So for that reason we wanted to look at-the whole problem i 12 I again. First, look at a classification, whether this should 13 be category two or non-seismic. For the category two they la I have to redo the calculations ~to make sure they do it right. I 15 One is dynamic inplication factors; one is interaction effect. l l l 16 In addition to control room, another question is they i I i {. 1-should core up with a study. If you have a probler. here,- i 15 maybe there's a probler somewhere else in the plant, the t 19 same type of problem. So far, the program plan they sub-i i 20 mitted they addressed the control ceiling, but they didn't address adequately elsewhere in the plant. So we are,to l i 21 l f llow up on this. 22 MR. NOONAN: We took one other action on this one. 23 They're in the process of replacing the ceiling cut there. 24 I understand they're doing it on the Unit Two side of the l 25 t em,ga g,g
114 control roon, but we plan to go,back. 1 i I i 2 MR. SHAO: I think it's a good idea. Let's have a meeting first before _they_do all of this. 3 l ~ _. __ _ _.. l ~ 4 MR. NOONAN: We'll probably come out there and have a 5 meeting with them and have people go in there and see what 6 they're doing before they get too far along. We've taken 7 that as an action, and we will do that. i 8 MR. CALVO: Mark, in one of those items, I guess, in the i 9 other arcas of the plant is the conduits that are less than 10 two and greater than two. They look like--the rule they I 11 use, if it was less than two we don't have to do anything wit : l l 12 it, but if implications vill be less than two inches conduit 9 13 l their failure, if it happened to be in a seismic category l one area which tests safety-related equipment and also is 14 l i 15 inhabited by the operator, so they got to consider the con-i i m duit. I i Also, the greater than two inches the question is:
- Yes, i
gf j they had done--they look like they had.the heaviest cable 39 restraints to hold it, but, again, do an analysis again--I i 20 think maybe you saw evidence to the effect they had attached l an analysis; whether it has been approved by the mechanical i 21 s group or not I don't know. 33 MR. SHAO: We should have the analysis. 23 l ~ MR. CALVO: That's how the conduit entered the picture, 4 n t only in the control room ceiling but all.ov.er the plant.j I 25 .es..- en
~ .__.e_ 115 1 i MR. hALSH: Another concern--it's got to do with the l \\ 2 cable trays--but I've worked with Ecchtal and I know how l these companies work. You have one organization that does 3 4 i a certa'in item and people go from--they way be in a 5 strui:tural group but they'll do cable trays for six months 6 and then go to conduit support and then maybe H&V supports. 7 Here they didn't do H&V but it's all within the same structural e S group which is Gibson Hill. 9, When CYGNA came out with their report, CYGNA hadn't 10 considered the 50-percent increase for multi-motor responses-- l MR. SHAO: When they do an equivalent static load 11 l 12 ! analysis. l MR. WALSH: --which is, from what I understand the I 13 i 14 ; original calculations were based on, the equivalent static load r.ethod. CYGNA did not notice it, Gibson 11i11 had not 15 } 16 ; done it, on the cable trays, and the concern that I have now I i is I don't think anyone from that structural group, when i g-they used the equivalent static load method, used the 50-33 I l percent increase. They didn't know about it. 19 I l MR. SHAO: That 50 percent is an NRC provision. They 20 I have to do that. j 21 MR. WALSH: Gibson Hill is trying to come back and say-- ^ 22 MR. SHAO: Alternatively they can do that. They don't 23 have to use the 50 percent if they do a full dynaric test. MR. WALSH: I understand that position, but that has not ,)5 e eo en m.ee. o -. a- --e eo
116 1 been done. It was not done in the original calculations. 5 i' 2 Nou, if you just go and look at cable trays and say that we can qualify; all the cable trays are using a rore cont.li-a a cated or a more precise dynamic analysis, they'd have to do 5 it for every damn tray in there or go back and start pulling 6 off their conservatism load or wnatever. 7~ Now, we've got the-cable trays saved, but they forgot 8 to do it for conduit supports,. Now they have to do it for .9 conduit supports. Then you've got other items in that build-10 ing, maybe stairs, they forgot. I !!R. CHAO: Well, you think the whole plant they did not l 12 use the 1.5 f actor? MR. itALSH: It came out of the structural group. Some-13 l 14 ene should have noticed it. If I had worked in designing i 15 of the stairs for Gibson Hill and I used a 50-percent increasc, 16 l when I go to do a cable tray support,. I'm going to use that i l-I- g same 50-percent increase. E i ^ i n MR. SliAO: CYG'.1A didn't do that, too. You say Gibson l 19 didn't do that; CYGNA didn't-- 20 MR. WALSH: And when CYGNA went to review the calculation, You canl't e 21 they didn't notice it. CYGNA did an inadequate job. I r rely on.CYGNA to come up with valid conclusions. I' don't knou 22 ) ,3 why they didn't notice the applicant did not consider that i i i 50-percent increase. Like you said, it's the staff's positio'n ,4 to do it. 9'# j. l
117 1 MR. SHAO: I wrote the provision so I know this was l l-l 2 thc standard review plan, but they adnit they didn't use that' 3 60 percent on cal.le' trays? 4 MR. WALSH: It's in the report. 5 MR. SHAO: I see. Can you think of the particular 6 record? 7 MR. WALSH: It's May of this year. 8 MS. ELLIS: It's Thursday. morning; May 1st or 2nd. MR. SilAO: May 1st of 1984. i 9, i 10 MS. ELLIS: Yes, in the trans'cript of the operator's I t i3 license. [ l l MR. WALSH: It sort of shocked me when he ca:te out and 12 l 13 said they were going to look into it, but I haven't heard -l 14 anything about it. If they did it for the cable-trays--and 15 - l I know how these corpanies operate, these people--they r.ay i 16 have also done it for all'the other structures, that they I l g-used the equivalent static load rethod. I MR. SHAO: The 1.5 factor is extra-conservative. If g 39 you want quick and dirty, you want extra-conservative, so j there's another factor to be accounted for. 20 l MR. WALSH: The way they did their calculations I - j 21 i w uldn't call it really conservative. They assumed'o'ne 22 span 1 ading and they just used that; they did not consider 23 i i multi-nodal. f !'.R. SHAO: But they used a peak response plus 1.5. 25 l ..wo..e- ...e
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118 j MR. WALGil: We're also assuring cverything is rigid. 2 If you're goinc to go to the peak, that's fine. MR. SHAO: Uc have donc a lot of analyses, and we uscG. 3 l l peak response plus 1.5 using enevelope, all kinds of 4 I ~ 5 responses. I 6 MR. NOONAN: The concern here is they didn't use the i 7 position. l g MR. SHAO: We will pursue that. We should do some o calculations. MR. NOONAN: When you say "we" should do it, you nean 10 i wc " ? gg MR. ShAO: NRC. 39 l l MR. CALVO: What you're looking for is that the analysis, 13 consistency and adequacy are essentially the same, noth for y i conduits, cable trays, or-- l a. MR. SHAO: He said the whole plant. y I i l MR. EALSI:: The Gibson liill, yeah. You tahc one 3 le l sample froc Gibson 1:ill cable tray supports and find out the structural group didn't do it there. That's the only 39 i evidence you have. a 20 { MR. SHAO: Any indication you have not done this else- ~ - 1. ( where.in the plant? MS. ELLIS: The implication is definitely there. 23 l l MR. ZUDANS: Wait a minute. Are you saying just Gibson 21 \\ l' l hill? 25 l ~ l
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119 I .Am. WALSH: That's what the CYGNA report was at. Look-i I l 2 ing at the structural, the only thing we saw was cable tray i 3 supports and tacy cidn't do it. .4 liR. SHAO: But why CYGNA didn't pick it up I don't under-5 stand. 6 MR. WALSH: I question their credibility. They should 7 have picked it up. 8 MR. CALVO: Mark, why did we miss it? Because I am 9 looking into the cable tray supports and we look at a cable i 10 i tray loading, 50 percent, and we want to know what kind of 11 seisnic calculations will be done because of additional l 1 12 loacing, anc looking at the paper work, is there sene kind 13 j of way to call our attention that this thing come up? -14 MR. NOONAN: The audit should have said that. MR. WALSH: The other problem is when they dic their 15, l cable tray designs, they used a generic design. They did l 16 i i i 1-one. They said, "This cable tray is going to be used j is throughout the plant." And it is used throughout the 19 plant. The thing is that when they did their allowable l 20 stresses, they used the allowable stresses for the Auxiliary, I 21 Build _in_g,.whi.ch_ allows the stresses to exceed' yield. MR. SHAO: For SSE or-- 22 MR. WALSH: For.SSE. According to their FSR that's '3 l ~ acceptable for their cable tray supports to exceed the yield 24 for the Auxiliary Builcing and the Safeguard, but not for i 25 l ,em. .-.m. w e. ....,n. WT&g, e** =9s sumum 4
120 I i the Containrent Quilding.' The supports that were genericallyg I 7 2 designed are used in the Containment Buildinc as well as the 3 Auxiliary Building and the. stresses-are above the yield l 4 because~they are a generic design. They were designed for I 5 the Auxiliary Building, but they.'re used within the contain- ~ 6 rent. I 7 MR. SHAO: What do you mean by allowable stresses in 8 this case? i 9 MR. WALSH: Their allowable stresses are-- t 10 MR. SHAO: Is it.7 ultimate? What number did they use? l1.2 yield? i 11 12'i MR. WALSH: 1.5 normal operating which puts the allowable i 13 above yield. l MR. SHAO: Usually, normal allowable is 230 yield, so 14 I 15 1.5 is just 7 yield. l I 16 MR. 2CDANS: That's exactly at yield; 1.5 tires two-i l { 1- . thirds. 4 l 'g3 MR. i:ALSE: It's above yield, though. 19 MR. SHAO: Unless it's stainless material. i I [ 20 MR. WALSH: It's common steel. ] MR. SHAO: Common steel, 1.5 shouldn't gc. Common steel, og g the original allowable is 230 yield, according to Section 3.
- 2 MR. WALSH:
If yor 1 k at the CYGNA report-- 23 1 MR. NOONAN: Just at the-- i y l 35 MR. WALSH: Phase 1 and 2. Look what they 'use for the ammeae we n.eme...+ = --en-: .=,see.. p ~ w -- *~ --v e e, g m-p., g, e-. w.,w-w-r
121 1 allowable stresses for cable tray supports, and those are I 2 the sare stresses they used in the Containrcent Building. I 3 think that should clarify what the problem is. 4 MR. WALSH: I don't have the numbers on hanc. 5 MR. SHAO: Your concern is that allowables go beyond 6 yield? 7 MR. WALSH: In the Containrent, yes. It's a generic ~ i 8 design. They did not consider that this generic design is e not rcoting the FSR requirerents for the Centainrent Duilding. 9 '10 Tnat was not within CYGNA's scope, so they did not address it and they did not. see anything. wrone with it. 'Ihey didn ' t 33 12 l go any further. 13 l MR. SHAO: What do you mean the CYGNA report didn't-- MR. NOONAN: Dave Turro is reviewing'that CICNA report y-and we just took the Phase 3 report and we're sending it out l a. .to Idaho to let them review it. It's going to be donc under - 16 I l Gunther's. group, but Tor.Eridges is going tc be the nar.c o'f j 3 j the 1.erscn who is coing it. That's l'hase 3, thouch. Phase i b 1 and 2, I think, was no ~ by the staff. C 39 I 1R. CALVO: It was done by the staff. i 20 PR. SHAO: Does the staff mean Dave Turro? y .g MR. NOONAN: Dave Turro would be the one~that looked at 22 I that. ~ ,3 t i MF. ELLIS: 24 That's where that,.would have been--the catic I trays would have been Phase 1 and 2. If y'all have any j 2a. A + e w m e-em. m.m ee .ee.em op- =- ee
122 1. problers finding sors of this stuf f, yell and s:c 'll try to I i 2 find it. 3 } MR. EllAd: I'm not clear about your concern yet. You j 4 I say they ' re using-- i 5 MR. WALSE: The allowables for the containment are rorc' 6 strict than for the Auxiliary Building. The supports were 7 designed for the Auxiliary Building which was a higher 8 allowable-- 9 "R. S h7.0 : They're using allowable for the ?.uxiliary 10 :. Building or Auxiliary Building supports? 11, i MR. UALSH: The support is used throughout the plant, 1 O 1 12 ; but.they're using allowables as if they're only in the 13 Auxiliary Building. I 14 l '4R. S LAO : Building, not Auxiliary Building support. d 13 MR. WALSli: Cable tray support within the Auxiliary l i 16 Suilding. l i j j-MR. SliAO : Let ce ask the question again. You say the allouable f'or the cabic tray support is used as allowable j is 19 for Auxiliary Building? i I 20 MR. NOONAN: No. l MR. PHILLBO: The Auxiliary Building is permitted--the [ 21 !'~ 8uPPorts are permitted to exceed yield. In containment 22 they are not. They're using a common design throughout. 23 "3. U7. LEE: The thine is only acceptable within the ., 4 1 Auxilia ry 'T uilding.- 25 .q i l
191 1 MR. NOONAN: The Auxiliary Building is--the allowable I for the supports in that Luild j 2 ' stresses for those supports, l sar.callowables.l 3. ing, they're using also in the containr.cnt; 4 .MR. SiiAO: Containment support allowables are the sare 5 as the Auxiliary Building supports. 6 MR. NOONAN: Yes. 7 MR. S!!AO: In the FSAR they're supposed to'be different. 8 I think I understand it. I think the reason containment sup-port at a lower allowabl'e may be they treat containment sup- ! 9 10 port as a so-called energency function; they treat it like a ' I 11 nor.al allowable. l l 12 MR. WALSh: I don't know why they came up with it. I ' r.. 13 l not saying I agreed with what they're doing in the Auxiliary j 1-1 huilding. I thought they couldn't exceed.5 of yield, but 15 they're not reeting their FSAF requirements., j f, MR. NOONAN: Let's go back and look and see what the i l I FSAR says; then ue'll go back and see what the CYGNA rer. ort }- s I y says-- t i 19 MR. WALSH: CYGNA did not address the containment. . i MR. SHAO: His concern is the containment support. 20 f Containment support is supposed to have a lower allowable, i 21 ~~ but they use the sane allowable. 22 MR. NOONAN: What Larry is thinking about is there is 23 g j a possibility taat could be okay. he's thinking about a I case where you might be allowed, but we'll go back and check.I 3 -.am-m=
- =. ..~ 124 1 ' MR. WALSH: Then when they attached the support to the l l 1 2 cable tray, to the cable tray to support the structural steel', 3 they. drill a hole through the flange cf the channel-.~ost cf l therr. are channels--and that hole through the channel reduces 4 5 the section modules.. 6 MR. SHAO: It goes through a web or it goes through a 1 7 flange? - --~~ - ~.. ~ 8 MR. WAQlli~ Through the flange. That reduction has no Y 9 been accounted for in the calediations, and* accordtntr~td't. e 10 code, steel code, if it exceeds 15 percent of the flange, l you've got to reduce it. It's considerably more than 15 l I think half of the flance is cissine because it's l 12 percent. - I 13 a channel, 'it's only on one side, aind wnen you.'re drilling a i 14 three-quarter-inch bolt on an inch-and-a-half flange, there's i 15 not rauch lef t. l -~ MR. SHAO: That's also in the CYGNA report? i 16 5 l I 1-MR. W1.LSl!: Mc, that was not considered by CYGNA either.! I MR. SliAO : That's in the-- j i 19 MR. WALSH: Everything on the cable tray supports cage. i 20 out,of the CYGNA report, yeah..-. l We did look at the cable tray attachments MR. CALVO: - - i 21 i to the seismic supports. I guess the concern was that they 22 were not being installed according to the design. We 23 i inspected 60- of those cable tray attachments in the Safeguards g ; b Building, and we-found.in the sample we selected it was in 25 S 1 g .g -*p=.sg w-w -a--+y-- ,m-m-rt,.y- -,y+y--w.. m-e-,-- y, .--.i e ,-+m pe
19s I accordance with the design. I 1 2 MR. Pl!ILLFO: It's the design he's questioning. i MR. !!ALSI.. I'r not questioning if they were Luilt richt 3 4 or wrong. What I'm saying--I'm saying it was built inj 5 MR. CALVO: 6 accordance with'the drawings. 7 MR. SHAO: His question is on analysis. 8 MR. CALVO: Okay; analysis. 9 MR. SHAO: I understand the concerns. MS. ELLIS: You didn't realize you were opening Pandora's 10 I Cox. You see what happens when you let this engineer finc 33 l l 3, sorebody that he can talk to that will listen. Seems like i 13 L l they want to do something about it. MR. ShAC: I understand. y l MR. :iOONAN: I guess I'n just thinking out loud, Lu-l a. l y u're g ing to bring people out here to look at what they're 16 l doing on that ceiling. Maybe we could also have ther. walk l i i i 1 out and check scre of those cable supports. 15 t MR. SHAO: I'll get one laboratory to do this. 39 f NR. NOONAN: He speak of the laboratory. Ke deal with 20
- {
the Department of Energy Laboratory. We're talking about i ~ Idaho; Brookhaven; Livermore, California; Sandia. 'These arc 22 laboratories that we use--utilize as consultants. l 23 MR. SliAO: Fcr the Govern.nent. They don' t work for 24 industry. They only work for us. 2,a l em. = e eyw w w+
126 i 1. 1:R. NOONAN: .They're strictly Governrent laboratories. 2 he use those all the tir.e as consultants, and they're a i j source of manpower tnat we don't normally have in the agency. 3 4 i MR. SilAO: They have very good talents in' terms of I 5 analysis. 6 MR. NOONAN: What we try to do is select a lab that's 7 more suitable for the application, like we use EG&G-Idaho .8 a lot because they built their own facility out there and i 9. they do ti.eir own piping work and-they do their own suppcrt i 10 work. They do it for thensclves, so they're good people; 11 i they'vc got the hardware experience. I I 12 ! MS. ELLIS: They should have stuck to the technical l l 13 I stuff and not gotten into the intimidation area. I i t MR. NOONAN: They're a lab; they're not part of the :;ht. l 14 i 33 he pay ther; we pay them-for their services, but they core i i 16 in with a report and it's their report. We don't go throuch . I I } i 3-and edit it out. It's their report. l i is
- n. 51;;.O.
Anytning else? l MR. WALSH: This is our own allegation I made some tirc j9 i 20 ago on the liner plate. I MR. ZUDANS: I have two itors here that are written on i 21 this list that are liner plates, and you need to tell me.if 2., 1 these are the ones. One is incorrect fit of one stainless ~ '3 steel liner in the Reactor Euilding and Fuel Building, and .y ~ l ther one is liner plate weld sears do not notch drawing l tne 'S
- w-*e=.**
.---,.-..:......-.2-.-.... _. e 127 1-t locations on floor around Unit One Reactor Luilding. Those.! l I 2 are not the ones? !!R..G.LF;. : Sc. The enc I'r talkinc abcut is therc i: .l-l 4 a-in the containrent they have a piping syste:r that goes 5 up, I think it's the containment spray, and MPSI has attached 6 to a plate that sticks out from the liner plate--it's a 1 7 horizontal plate; I think it's three-eighth's inch thick i I 8 plate--it's cantilevered off the line. It's the thick part 9 of the liner. .s j \\ ' 10. l 'Uhen I was working out there, I was working the STRUDL l 3j Group analyzing, so what I did was I called the support point, l i i 12 the liner plcte itself, and I rodeled in this three-cighth's i. 13 inen horizontal cantileverec plate that they had attached. j, When we analyzed the support, that plate had 100 ESI stress ~ y _ l on it.
- 1. hen l'took it back, I gave it to "ISI and I let tl
>L 15 1 16 j know. They said, "We'll have Gibson Hill look at it. ' ,/ I 'I Gibson's reply was that "It's part of our design" be se i { 3 \\ i it's part of tne liner plate--they had alread- .tached it-- y -33 Nand for us not to code it in anygore. 39 N X MR. SHAO: The 100 KSI due to what loading? 20 MR. WALSH: I forget what loading combination it was. l ,33 ~ i MR..SHAO: SK loading or-- 22 MR. WALSH: I think it was--I'm not sure; I'd say OBE, ,,3 ~ Lut 100 KcI-- 24 i MR. SHAO: The use strength is only 30 KSI. ,,a I I -...m. e -, w ypp. +w a +--e,d-_. ep., v -
e_.. 12'o 1 : MR. WALSil: -The yield was 30. I i 2 MR. SHAO: The yield strength was 30 KSI. '3 l MR."WALSH: So we were told not to model that part in l I ~ 4 anyrore because it'was Gibson Hill's design, so we analyzcG 5 the support not without the threc-eighth's horizontal plate. 6 That's the way it was lef t. 7 MR. NOONAN: When you said you were told that, who told S you that? i 9 MR. WALSh: I don't want to get the guy in trouble. MR. NOONAN: No, just-- 10 ; / ~~n 11 l MR. WALSli: PSSI; it was an MPSI support.) j 12 MR. St.AO: Okay. We can locate the place you're talking' I 13 about. ~ ja MR. WALSH: I forget the elevation. You can see the 15 dore; whatever elevation you're at, it's the common eleva-tion so you can see the done, the cranc, the top floor 16 ; elevation. You can see the piping going up the side and j= g7 [ it's those supports that are attached there; you'll see a 33 39 plate' sticking out. They have a tube steel member on top of i the plate and below the plate. I forget how it's attached 20 l to the plate, but there is a plate that sticks out. They're J, 21 sing--I think it's a three-eighth's inch plate. --l 22 MR. SHAO: Maybe a cantilevered plate. Do you think 21 it's an :7SI support or Gibscn Eill design? 24 ! i MR. WALSH: The three-eighth's inch plate is a Gibson j 25 i ee he.eee = V 4A n % 9 r
129 I ) Eill design; the tube steel is MFSI. i 2 MR, SilAO: If we locate the plates, is it possible to-- 3 MS. ELLIS: I coubt it. Get back in touch with n.e or 4 i I'll get in touch with Mark. We can do something. 'We'll try i 5 to figure out how to peint you to it, 6 MR. WALSH: I think it was in the newspaper. MS. VIETTI: Had you raised this before in the hearings? S Where did it appear? 9 MR. WALSil: I told it to Joe Cinto; I rcrer.ber that. 10 F3. VIETTI: At a hearing? Do you think it would have i l appeared in a transcript or anything? 33 i MS. ELLIS: I don't think it was in the hearing. 12 l 13 l MR. WALSH: I remember speaking to Joe Cinto and he-- I forget what his reply had been because I had drawn a dia-y ; gram f r hin, a picture of what-- 15
- 15. VIETTI:
I was just trying to see if we could y I locato--I was trying tc figure out because I was one of the { 3-i peor.le that put this ccr..prehensive list together, and it did not sound familiar to me. I was trying to see where 39 we may n t have picked it up from, whether it was in a trans-20 l [ cript or special report or-- g i MR. CALVO: Let me help you with this. Y6u have the 22 i physical arrangement drawings for Coranche Peak where you 3 pinpoint the area by looking at it. 1; hen you nave th,e FSAR, i do you have a Section One; do you have ^ lCASEhastheTSAR, l 2>, e .+-. w .e ame a e,.w,e.,sa + *. e
.g i 130 l' the physical arrangement drawings? Ey looking at it, I l 2 think you can indicate the location, the quadrant, and every-' 3 - l thing else. j 4 i MR. SHAO: If you can pinpcint an area for us, we would 5 appreciate that. 6 MR. WALSH: I wouldn't be able to say, you know, how 7 r.any pipes do they have going up the side of the liner to 8 the top floor. It can only be, like, five or six. This was 9 in~ pretty much like a generic. You're looking at ITSI, so i i 10 f ind out how many of those piping syster.s were done by MPSI t and you've found your item. -11 I 12 j tis. ELLIS: It's not the kind of thing you can tell by 13 l looking at a drawing. j 14 l MR. WALSE: I don't think so. I'd look'out and I'd 15 say, "Every one of those. Pick ther. out." And you'd do ti.e i 16 sare ' thing, because they're not going to show the pipe I l } I; support configuration on these drawings. Grinnc11. has get } .ls . sor.cthing in there; r.aybe Grinnell did the containtent spra). E 19 This is another. system that's in there. -i 20 MR. SHAO: Let us try. I may have to core back to you l .1 ~ to see where we can find the location. i 21 'E Va. ELLIS: Could you find it? 22 23 MR. WALSH: Just as easily as anyone else. I don't _3 -think it would be that difficult to look, 25 MR. SHAO: We can go through the plant and look. l O = .=e. w. 44-+ + - - - -,..,-4 -y ii----..r-
^ 131 1 MR. WALSE: There was no kickers to hold the support l 2 up, not at the tir.e I'was there. 3 .MR. ShAO: Lut taat problem can be easily fixed if you nad a bracket. 4 l 5 MR. WALSH: Exactly. But it's their position of solvinc 6 the problem. That's what gets me. Hell, they told me not to model it.anymore. That's how we solve our problem. If the thing is over 100 KSI and you don't model it, fine. What 8 9 other things are we not going to model so we don't have a 10 problem? a 3;, Uc r.ay hcvc to go to the plant and take a MR. SHAO: p look at it. I'll'cet somebody to look at it. MS. ELLIS: Let us know if you need help. l -13 ; MR. S.'IITH : The top operating level;.80, 90, I think it g4 is-- l a. MR. WALSH: It's about 60 feet to the top of the dome, 3 1 40 fcct; it's that level. j 3-i MR. SMITE: I've got a piece of the arrangement for 832 p 39 level with me here, but I don't think that would help you, i Y u're talking about all the way up. 20 l MR. WALSH: On the top level, the air conditioning level, i ~ They have a large air conditioner on that floor. I don't 22 i know if it was for construction or for operation, but I ,3 l i remember there was a large air conditioning unit er something like that on that levcl. 2a_ j j . - + + + .w..
131 ?~M. Li.; O : lc 'll follov up or. it. .'.U.. NOONN;: Do we Ue.nt to de ar.'; thing : cre with Larr7
- 6 na.6 area.
3 I*S. ELLIS:
- 1. hat else were you--
4 3 ,, MR. SHAO: - This liner plate--u. i s 1 ~ 6 - MS. ELLIS: We interrupted you when you were trying tc l tell us about sorething. w . r., t MR. SHAO: I think I finished the control room. I S finished the control room, right? ! T. 1-:ALSli: I think so. au "'. MOONN;: Is thcre anything cisc, Mar).7 .l i F.K. Ci.AO : The only area we have is the icse r.at craci. j., MR. NOONAN: I would like to go into the base n.at crack, g icu talked to rce on thc I. hone the other day al.out th:t. I g would li).c to reake sure we understand tnat. ?!R. UALEH: You guys aren't going to discuss pipe 3 i L i sur crts, are you? ? *.L.. S hl- 0 : !;ct the surr.ary dispositicn. MR. NOONAN: Excuse me. We have two people back in ths ,9 4 5 i NRC,'dchn Finneran and Dave Terao, working this. These are a 20 +. l r e l-NRC people. They're working' the sumrtary dispositibn. hhey .~ i .u_. couldn't come today, but we thought if there's something yoa 22 wanted to tell us, we can take it back to them and we'll hcVe tner. look at it. I dor't have the right people here to go into the octails of what you're talking about., '1 hey briefec. .e.e e e . w w. u m -em.
133 me the other day on supports and particularly the one that 1 I 2 you were talking about, the stability of it. I wanted to get 3 an understanding of what that was, and they talked to me l l 4 about that. I don't know the background. I don't know all i 5. the details, but I will make them available in the near 6 future, I'll say that. I'm trying to keep my schedule going 7 and I'll try to rake ther available to' talk to you. We do 8 plan to come back here a number of times yet to talk to other 9, people in this area who have expressed cone' erns. We can i 10 .have them come back and talk to you directly about that par-l 11 ticular issue, but if.there is anything you want us to look '. I i 12. i into or check that we don't already know about, just say it 13 l and we'll at'least put it on the record and we'll have the i 14 people look at it. 15 MR. WALSH: I can't think at this time. If it comes 16 to ry rind, I'll tell Juanita and Juanita will let you know. ! .i i g.- ; The probice is~when I was out there, I didn't write everythiny j- ~ that's down. t'aybe I shculd have. The last week I was there, .g3 39 when I should have started doing it, but I didn't~ start until i 20 Kednesday and by that time it was too late. Even then, a ~1ot. l of this stuf f, like the control room, when I testified, I ,3 J forgot all about it. MR. NOONAN: Let me.ask a question. How long ago has 23 it been since you've been out there? 4 MR. WALSH: Almost two-and-a-half years. 5
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1 \\ 134 1 MS. ELLIS: June '82. 2 MR. "CONAI: It's not irrortant. I just wcnderec' how long it has Lccr.. 4 MR. KALSE: I'm sure there have been changes because 5. the.y'ye revised their PSE manual now. MR. NOONAN: When we look,ah things, we need to know 6 7 how long it's been since you've looked at it so if w'e see s a. 8 ! things differently we can start asking questions based on 9 what you tell us and what we see. 10 MR. L'AL5H: Therc is one other item. One of the things is the--yeu were saying about the Seisric Category One and "vc structurcs. ' hen I was cut thcrc, I rcrcrLcr goir.;--it 13 was adjscent to the Containment Euilding and you went through 1; a door and it looked like the Safeguards Building was 1,, integrally attacned to the,containrent Suildine. Lhere it's 16 ' located I don't know, except it's at a doorway. I don't know if it's One or Two. It drew my attention because I knew it was the Containrent Luilding. I knew therc was suppcsed 19 to be a gap there or some type of barrier or foar., dependinc. 20 i ' MR. SliAO: Okay. I understand your concern. If you l 3 2 notfce, our question to the' applicant or licensee of wkh'tever 21 it is, we not only worry about Category One structufds, we 22 I ~ 23 worry about adjacent Category One and Non-Category 0 e structurcs, if they're supposed tc have a gap, too, because ,3 y, you knew dynamic analysis. If there's no gap--even though '4.mw 4e=+ ,p+me-w,.- q e -us w,e4 m e +
135 1 I non-seismic, it ray affect the.seisric part of it. If you 2 look at our question very carefully, we say gap between con-1 3 cretc structure. Le dcn't say Letween Catescry vne structurc=. 4 Eo we uculd also worry between Category One and Non-Category ' 5 One. 1 a. 6 MR. WALSH: This did not appear to even have the foam. 7 MR. SHAO: Doesn't have a gap at all. There's an area 8 we found that had no gap at all. We want to see the calcu-9 ' lations and see why. It's in low elevation. They have no gap. 10
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I don't know where the elevation is-- 12 MR..9HAO: Uc realize there is an area they P. ave no gap. 4 MS. ELLIS: I think most. of the rest of that is in the 13 J 14 stuff that we gave to Billie so you should have it. s MR. h005A6: It was on Moncay, I believe, we received 15 16 i the CASE comments. Do you have a copy? i h I 37 MR. SHAO: The attachments were not compldted; a lot cf i jg attachnynts that I couldn't find. 39 MS. ELLIS: I haven't received ry copy of this yet. It r looks like they retyped it. i t ,0 l i { 21 MR. SHAO: They said attachment; I couldn't find the i attachrents. \\ MR. NOONAN: Did you look at the other package that care? 3 l } MR. CALVO: I found the sare thing; the attachnent was ! tissing. I got that-- ) i e g e e m + .ow en he.
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136 1 FJ. SliAO: I got it yesterday. 2 MR. NOONA:!: I also sent you the stuff that GAP gave us. It was a thicker package. j 3 l 4 MR. SHAO: I never received that. 5 MR. NCONAN: You didn't receive it either' 6 MR. CALVO: No, no. I got the thicker package, but the 7 attachments mentioned in that was not in ny package. 8 MR. NOONAN: I guess I need to go back and see what i 9 that attachment is that's referenced in there and where it is, i 10 MF. VIETTI: I don't know what we're looking at. i MR. NOONAN: -This is what we sent out yesterday. l 11 l 12 i MS. ELLIS: I don't have their copy of that. I assume it's the same stuff, but it.may be in different order. 13 14 l MR. NOONAN: This is the CASE response tc the program j; plan. Darrell asked Billie Gar 6cto submit the comments to i to us within the week after.the last meeting we hcd. Ce got I-17 the package, what we call the GAP package, but the CASL stuff 1 n was not included. We got that yesterday. That's what this ] 19 is right here. It looks like an attachment is missing. Ee Ii 20 need to go back and double-check that. I i 21 MS. ELLIS: I think those are the same and everything., t but I think they're in different order, so I really need to i 22 23 get a copy of_that and compare it and then-- MR. SliAO : You can keep this copy. 4 l 25 j MS. ELLIS: That will be good. I'll double-check and i I ~ w-w tkM v-
137 l ! make sure we sent them the attachments, first of all'. ^ 2 MR. SH70: It said attachrent. I couldn't find it. 3 MR, CALVO. I read all this; I got the same problem. l 4' MR. NOONAN: There's an attachment that's missing. j i 5. ' MS. ELLIS: I'll double-check; we might not have sent 6 them all the attachments. j 7 MR. WALSH: A few more things. Was your group looking 8 into the NCR program,'how it's used? l MS. VIETTI: Our. Quality Assurance-Quality Control Group 9 j 10 l is part of the TRT, but they're still evaluating some of the l results. They were one of the last groups to leave the site.' . 11 i 12 .They went for a 5th session. They're still evaluating some of their results, but our team leader isn't here toda'y.- 13 1 11 ' MR. NOONAN: Let re tell you what we are doing. The i g Quality Assurance Group basically has gone through a lot of 15 f 16 ' ! the things. They looked at a lot of the allegations that a } 17 I.were made and they're evaluating those. They're in the i 15 process of finalizing what we call safety evaluations. he - 19 have a small report out for each allegation. They're in 1 i 20 the process of doing that. What we want to do next is take I that group of people and bring them down here and have them ;
- j 21 a.
- -
talk to the people that have made these allegations and do i . 22 the sane thing as we're doing right here, the same exact, I y3 24 j identical format..We'll have a reporter, we'll have the l l-technical. people here, and then the people that are involved 25 l I -'er-64*um 4 e .aweum*=g g,e.m.e.a.-e. ,,.gme w g, o g,g g,9 go, p ,,,jg y-4 a n. n. -o. 4 v ~~
._-e-. 136 1 I with the allegations or who made the concerns; we'll do this 1 2 ' kind of talking to show ther what we did. We'll try to do this Lcfcrc wc give this to the Utility. i.e want to talk tc l 4 the people who are involved in the allegations before_we 5 give it to the Utility. 6 Now, I'm trying to do that--I'll give you a tentative 7 date--I'm trying to do that next week. We're in the process + 8 of calling people who have made allegations, trying to set 9 up times with them, and it would be.done in Granbury.where 10 l they would be accessible, probably at one of the hotels down ' there. If you want to talk tc, that group, just let ce know 3, I i 32 and we'll set up a tinc. i i MR. WALSH: I don t-know if it's a proper procedure or 13 l j4 not,'but there's an NCR thct Juanita has that sh'e~'sg otten l n bovery---I call it the J. Patton NCR--and in this MCR 15 1 s 16 l he wrote down what the allegation was, that they were-in 't' l w i violation of 10CFR50.55(e). ^ 3 l l'R. NOONAN: It's called the J. Fatton-- j 33 MR. WALSH: I call it the J. Patton. I don't know what 39 l l the NCR number is on it. That was Revision 0. In Revision 1 20 f the applicant has gotten rid of the violation and has written 21 it for their own purpose, and.everything was okay 'a's is. They retyped the whole NCR and answered what they wanted to. ,)3 To me, I don't think that's proper. They should have left g It's obviously l the original as it was and not retyped it. l ~3 ~ * - **
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139 1 retyped. l 2 '15. VILTTI: I'll tell you we've had nur.erous allega-3 tions on vara.ous..cR's, anc I know tnat our LA ut Group is 4 locking at it in a programatic. 'Ihey have specific examples '5 like you just cited. I'm not sure that that's one of ther, 6 but they have specific examples that they looked at and then i they took a percentage of them and were going through ther. ~ g to see whether their doeurent system was working as it 9 should. 10 So I kn'ow that that is an area that is being looked at, ! l 3; MCF 's specifically--that 's a category--and we have r.u: crouc l l g2 allecations, specific allegations, that were being looked at i 13 l in that category. I'In not sure that that specific NCR had l, 14 been looked at, but I know that our group is addressing hCR's' 15 anc the program in general, MR. NOONAN: In order for me to follow up on this, can y I I have Ji-Gagliardo--he's ry deputy, but he's been Icoking l y p at all these things in the GA-OC arca--ceuld I have hir talk I to you so you can give'hir a little bit better inferration 39 I k that he can go back and check? 20 MR. GALS!!: Juanita, you know the CASE cxhibit numbers. g .i MS. ELLIS: I've got a note here. I MR. N NAN: I' have Jim Gagliardo call. 1.culd tomorrb 23 1 + i Le okay? e i I MS. ELLIS: Yes. . l I 23
1 140 l i l' MR. NOCMAN: I'll try to have hir call ycu tororrc : and + 2 you can tell hin. directly what it is so wc can gc back and J see whetner.we lookec at it or not. I don't know the answer; 4 right now. 4 5 MR. ZUDANS: That is a nonconformance report on a 6 10CFR50. 55 (e) that they did not report' 7 MR. WALSH: Correct. They rewrote it and there's ) 8 nothing in Revision 1 of the NCR that they were in violaticn. l 9 I think-- n 10 MS. LLLIS: I don't know that they said it was 50.55 (e), 11 did they? I I 12 MR. WALSH: They said it was a hreakdown of the Cuality 13 j Assurance prograr., and he said what it was in violation of l 14 and he said the AS'1 code and the 10CFR and they took that l 15 ; out. Maybe they wrote down 10CFR and they changed the I 16 violation to the AFME code. 8 I MR. "UDANS: The only reasen I asked that is becausc i 1; i is 10CFR50.55(c) is reporting of construction deficiencies. f 19 That's the log. That's reporting construction deficiencies. I og To find a deviation in the work that you're doing in the 'l j 21 P ant, you have to notify the NRC if that could pose a l i significant safety hazard if it was not correcteh luring the 22 .23 lifetire of the plant.- I'm keying in on 10CFR50.55 (e) 4 24 j specifically because you said it. .I'm just wondering because. j l and you wouldl that would core out of--right out of the plant, 5 l e .m. es -e.-== e m.+ w .e -m.. .n. +**ew. .-.%=.
e 141 1 =l see it. 2 MR. SMITH: I was going to ask a sir.ilar question. Do 3 l you recall the NCR saying that someone violated 50.55 (e) l or ~. 4 in failing to report something-- 5 21R. hALSii: The way they were handling the prcLler.. was l 6 in violation. For example, they were using a CMC and the 7 document said there was a weld there, and they were doing it, S so fast the weld never was~put in. It was signed off by GC 9 ; 'as being there. There was other problems. lie had listed I like 12 iter.:s that were wrong, and because of these he said 10 j g -11 l that this is what you're in violation of and it was like a l l i 12 generic-type item, and they had revised it to say you were l in violation-of the AS?'I code. 13 j 14 ! MS. VIETTI: If we can focus on the 1;CR, we can get l L l i 15 the inforration we need to investigate it. I i MR. hALSI:: It's in my file. It's on the '.;uality 16 l i 17 l Assurance program. It's in that file. j 13 !*R. NO.ONAN : I'll hcvc Cin call you tomorrow. I guess 19 with that, are we done with the civil area right now? I 20 MR. SHAO: Do you have anything more on civil area, g civil-mechanical? t 21 i E MS. ELLIS: I think that's it. 22 ( 23 MR. NOONAN: Why don't I let you take the lead. What } I i cisc do you want to tell us? ,,4 l l 25- ! MS. ELLIS: Okay. There's on e thing that I know Mark I
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e e 142 1 is interested in and that was the part about the hot l i 2 functional test and stuff. Do you really want to get into 3 that tonight? j ~ 4 l MR. WALSH:.From what I read of their hot functional ~ 5' tests, they didn't have the anubbers in, a lot of them, when 6 they tested, when they did the hot functional tests, and 7 they were binding a lot of them or the piping wasn't roving i 8 as it was calculated. They're supposed to move the right picr i 9 that was going.to ~ the lef t and that was what was causing the 1 1 10 ~ problers. It's more of an engineering philosophy and it 11 would indicate that--because this is just a thermal loading l l wnich shoulo 'c highly predictable, but because of the way 12 c 13 l they 've designed the pipe support-- i 14 MR. SHAO: Is that a mechanical snubber or-- 15 ; MR. WALSH: Mcchanical, I believe, that they're using y out there. I don't know if--I have not seen anything frcr I I i 17, the staf f requiring the applicant to - address why this is 1 i 33 cccurring, what's wrong with their analysis, not to go cut .{ 39 there and fix the snubber so it won't bind, but what's wrenc ii 20 with their analysis that they can't predict this because .~ they're not going to be able to, in the event of a dynamic-21 [ load, go out there and fix the snubber becaus~e'their analysis, j. isn't worth two cents. 23 .ihat the problem is is the stiffness of their supports 24 i i is wrong is why the. things aren't moving, and there's 3.a. j 89e=== e ep w e em ~= -+m. a**7m-W-e.-- ---v w --,v s-- --+-
143 1 l something wrong with their as-built program that the 2 supports are getting these binding and are not moving in the l predicted fashion they should be. To go through the 7914 l 3 4 Bulletin requirements they should be able to predict the i 5 novament through the thermal loads. That's all this was, 6 and dead load. Unless there was--maybe that thing was, the 7 piping system, was put in under pressure and now they've S got a load in there because it was pushed in or used the 9 polar crane to move it and get it in place. Now youve 10 prestressed your' pipe and it's not going to move until you 11 i remove that prestressing force which throws the calculations l I i 12 off because there's no prestress force input.in the pipe 13 stress analysis. Maybe that's the problem. I haven't seen 14 anything from the staff requiring the applicant to address 5 i 15 why this was occurring. !!R. Ei.AO : Have you addressed this issue? 16 i j 17 i MR. SMITli: In the first place, they had a lot of pipe i 16 supports, either out and documented or that did not pack as a 1 I 19 predicted, as you say. That's the purpose of the therrel
- 1i 20 expansion-test, to prove that what you calculated is, in j
8 fact, true. It's normal and it's expected. For that. reason 'i 21 ~: we don't consider any of.those supports operable until they j 2 have nducted this test. What's made the HFT incompletc l 23 l i is that t!.ey had a lot of those supports gonc cr that were I binding. They removed them to remove the stress that it was ~' l l -.~. h s. y a .e m -cy, ~ J 'w-----
144 1 I causing and ended up with a very long list of approxitately l 2 50 percent of supports, snubbers and so on that had to be { 3 l retested, in many cases redesigned, because the moverent l 4 4 was not as' anticipated. I don't think you were here,when we l l ~ 5 centioned it, but they are getting ready to corrence another 6 HFT and all of the supports and snubbers based on figures 7 that they were able to get during the first HFT are now S installed, are identified in the test procedure by computer' I 9 run and in the containment versus white flags and tags and i l so on, and this HFT will complete that test; that's. the deal. 10 11 l Whether or not everything was covered with so many [ 12 !- supports rissing remains to be seen. I fully expect when I 13 they finish the I:FT,this tire around, they'll still have 14 I some areas that have to be justified or replaced in terms I 13 of supports. Again, you're talking about a very, very i I complex piece of retal there with the piping systcrr, ant le ; 17 j you can calculate within practical limits what it's going js to co; but you never really know until you do it. 19 MR. WALSH: Their philosophy was'"Let's see how well i i 20 your prediction was." What I had seen out of their tests 4 21 was it was not doing what they had anticipated, and on rest f I l of the items that they found it was written down that they'll 22 23 install it prior to fuel load. There was no indication they, i were going to be retested. 34 ! l MR. SMITH: That may be the impression, and that was 25 I i
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145 1 because they had planned to defer these until af ter fuel 2 loading and do 'it during the next expected lift. Now, from 3 l a historical standpoint, that's practical to an extent, [ 4 depending on the amount of testing you're planning on doing 5' after fuel loading. In this case, with the course of eventt 6 here, they found it practical and smart to go ahead and heat 7 up now and do this testing prior to fuel loading; and that 8 makes a ' lot of concerns go away because now you're putting 6 9 the fuel in the pot with.more of this stuf f done. 10 So we have looked at the--we. mentioned this before you 11 l came in--we looked at what testing was completed, looked 12 I at the records, looked at the documentation.they had to show I 13 which was not installed, which bound on them, which needed 14 ' ' ~ redesign; am.d we are now--in fact, I have just completed ~15 a review of the new thermal expansion test which is going to l le ce under the initial start-up program, precorc as they call 17 l it, and I. reviewed that as a ' resident inspector a: d 'we will j. 15 Le t..onitcring-the test as it progresses through this next \\ 19 30 or.40 days. 'i 20 Do you have any specific questions? I r 3 21 !!R. WALSli: Not in regard to the hot functional test. .i I remember some tiro ago I had reviewed the information on j 22 23 .the original HFT, and it seemed to be d,eficient, their j ,I I' analysi.s was deficient, and retesting it with snubbers in 24 l I I so it wouldn't bind, they had still not chanced the prediction. 25 l l 4 ~* '" " **** ee meeem.m.e. - e.. e %-e, e. '9%S c+hWD m ,.m
~146 i 1 Their calculation still said the pipe moves to the right when in reality it goes to the left. In that cold spring, 2 i l in effect, that'will also work under the dynamic condition, 3 4 but since' they're going to be redoing it, maybe they'll 5-correct some of those problers so it will go in the right 6-direction, the piping. 7 MR. NOONAN: What other problem--not just Coranche i 8 . Peak but any plant--when they do these kinds of things, they i 9 run.the.se analyses, they use the most sophisticated code 10 they can come up with, super pipe or whatever, and they do 11 these calculations but, in fact, you get out there and you l 12 1, see the way it's actually built, things are not quite done l 13 the way it's analyzed; so the movements don't come out to I ~ 14 l be the same. Parts of--you mentioned 7914. I was involved t 15 in that one. The concern we had was basically that computeri l l 10 analysis didn't match what was done in the fiele, and we i I i 1; made that a Lulletin. We made these plants go back out and-- l 15, 7914 you have a problem because a lot of 1:R. SHAO: construction systems analyzed and actually they are !.ur the .1 19 i i i 20 same, so we asked them to redo them. 1 MR. NOONAN: The as-built is a big probler to us. gg l i _ Industry-wide as-builts are problems with us. 22 MR. WALSH: The applicant's position was we're going to ; 23 rely everything. on the as-bu'ilt program, so there should be 24 I l no problere since they have got an as-built program. That's l 25 l 9 -****am h. es we e--- a _e-4 9., .), e ** n.,, -, -.,. _,, ~+ ~ ; *^
147 ~ 1 i what they're relying everything on. They have a CMC program t 2' l that isn't worth two cents, but there's going to be no prob-3'.l.lembecausewe'regoingtohaveanas-builtprogramthat l i 4 I takes care of everything. Then they go to hot functional i ~ 5 test'and'they can't work it out. 6 MR. SilAO: Sometimes these kind of supports, it's very 7 difficult to simulate the stiffness, but if you use son.ething. 8 raw stiffness sometimes the definition would not be the sare. 9 That's where the hot functional test will tell you whether i 10 the calculations are right or wrong. He have sore experirents i we have to do. We do it many times. Even the simple piping,; 11 ; 12 piping flexibility. analysis, sometire you can't get the i i 13 ' definition right because maybe the stiffness forr.ula may not I.: I be the sare. 15 MR. WI.LSH: That was ry concern. l "R. SOONAS: As.I told Juanita, I caroc out of the acrc 16 l We did a lot of modeling there, a lot of l space industry. 17 j 33 dynarde analyses. he'd go out and test and scretir.es it l wasn't so good, and we'd go back to the drawing board; but, 19 you know, we missed, the stiffness wasn't right or we didn't .I 20 j ' ' have the model-- ,.s - 21 t MR. WALSH: Like you said, you go back to the drawing i 22 board. There was no indication that they were going to go 23 Lack. ,4 1 i, l MR. NOONAN: We've got to go back to the drawing board. l "~* = n.. , w =' ee"Bue nd*e- 'g surgse ag
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14C 1 Anything else in the testing area? 2 MR. HALSH: Nc. MR. NOONAN: Then I guess, Juanita, why don't you just-- l 3 4 let's proceed. 5 MS. ELLIS: I know y'all are going to starve before I 6 get through. t 7 The crack in the base mat: I've got most of this in S written form for you, so'I think that will help.- I'll try 9 to just go through this kind of quickly because I've got most i 10 of this stuff that I'r going to be talking about written down 'ne've always been very concerned with this crack in-th l here. 11 base nat. One of the reasons we've been concerned is that 12 13 ! all the documentation that was ever introduced by anybody, 14 ! and most of it was introduced by us, indicated that the crack in the base rat--they had a vertical crack that extended g i 16 corpletcl/ through the seven-foot thich mat near the center i ~l of its ridspan across the cavity; not the radiation shicid I 17 on thc cide, across the cavity. I've got a lot of docur.ent: [ Is l here and so on that I want to leave with you, but the bottor. 19 i line is we have been hearing for years from a lot of different I 20 pe plc, sore of whor we haven't even been able to get in ,j 21 ~ t uch with again, that this crack was wider than what-it's. 2, t been represented to be, that it went not just on the radiaticn' 23 . part on the side, but also underneath the reactor cavity .,4 I itself and all the way under the reactor and on to the other 25
149 1 l side, all the way, the.whole pour, in other_vords. I l 2 It was considerably larger than what it was indicated 3 to be, and there are several things about tnat tnat have I \\ 4 bothered us through the years. One thing is-that in testi-I 5 fying during-the hearings, most of the people had never seen 6 the crack. Most of the applicant's witnesses had never seen I 7 the crack. Joe Tapia with the NRC staff testified in Junc 4 8 '82 hearings--this is to the best of~my recollection because i 9' I didn't have tire to look up the transcript--he had spent i 10. about eight hours investigating the crack in the base mat. 11 That investigation revealed documentation which, liho I say, 12 ; nost of that we had, and talking to the applicant's witnesses 13 or the applicant's people on site. I think--I'm not positive; 'la about -this at all without checking the transcript--that the t. 15 only one that testified he had seen it was applicant witness. l 16 LaGrange, I believe it was. I'm not positive about that. i I l t i' g One of the things that bothere6 us was if you lech j j p through tae nonconfermance reports, you'll find that alrost 19 all of the=, or most of them anyway, where there is any i E 20 question as to dimensions or location or anything like that, l j 21 they have.a drawing attached. There was never any drawint f the crack in the base cat, no drawing at all. On dis-22 I i c very the applicant provided us with a copy of a drawing 23 l that semebody had backtracked and made just to give us an 24 i idea of where it might be. ~5 t
= 150 1j There was just an engineer there on site--not at the 2 ! time it happened, but at the tir.e of discovery. This is l,CASEExhibit28whichweusedinoursummarydisposition j 3 t 4 motion, and that's this document right here. You'can't sec 5 it too well. They showed with.a line where it had gone 6 across here.and across here, but this was just somebody's i. 7 estimate on. site. It wasn't really documentation by any 8 umeans. '9 MP.. Fl!ILLEO: You can see where it is fror. the tcp. 10 It's been patched which has no structural significance. You - 11 l can see the top of it. f 12 MS. ELLIS: Now, the other thing is the applicants in I 13 the hearings--I didn't have time to pull all these drawings 14 l and I didn't have time to pull the applicant's document-- g-introduced a drawing, not of the crack, just a drawing, and i l ~ ever body stood.around the board up thcro and tried to j go 'I I I 17 figure out where-the-Sam-liill the crack was. l Is
- m. PI:ILLEO:
There was some confusion on the mirrcr 39 image there. I read-that transcript. They came back an Ii 20 hour later with a new drawing, which things were reversed i 5 21 again. t - ~ d2 Ms. ELLIS: It was sort of Twilight Zone time. It was 23 a very strange sort of proceeding there. l My point is that the Board didn't make any ruling lased 4, n documentation. They made their ruling based on testimony, 25 I i s-e== engse eeeepe we. - $ s p.- e e e aus p ene.* 4 "m r ~ t w w-,-m,, e3st -- -,v,. i.,-% .m w-- g y e----,-*-t w - e-4 ?"w'-em-y* -~'-"YT'
- 151, I
and the.decurentation which they were supplied all says the I 2 sar1e thing, like I said before. There's no docun.entation to-i 3 support what tne applicant said about this being just on the 4 sides. 'There's none whatsoever that I've seen or that they I ~ 5 ever produced. Another thing is that allegations keep coming 6 up about_this, and I probably would not have brought it up l i 7 again now except for two things. One thing is--or both of i '8, these actually were investigation reports which we -)ust got 9 recently from the Office of Investigation, and one of ther is' ~ 10 Report No. Q4-84-016, and I'll give you copies of these. The i 33 other cnc is CASE No. 4-83-00C. There are twc things note-l 12 wortny about these. One is: On-this first report--let's take. 13 l then in reverse order. The second report first: 4-83006. l y ,.In 1963, after these hearings were held--the hearings were 15 held in June 1982, by the way, and not in 1981 as it' states in this report. I could go into some detail about the i I i g deficiencies of this report, but I wen't take a lot of tire q is to do that. Eut apparently the Utility told ther. that this j 19 had been done in 1981, and they didn't check and took their i word for it. It says that it was examined before the I l 20 i i l' f Li ensing Board in early 1981 and no problers were found. 21 i That is not correct. This could be important because one l f the statements made by the investigator at the bottom of 23 l the interview with Ronald Tolson on page 8 of this report states that basically they didn't ask him the specifics abotn.' 3 1__.'___d __.i_. _a
l'52 I the alleger's concerns because of the confidentiality prob-l l 2 let, and they said, "Inasruch as Tolsen's staterents regard-a ing.hcR ' blankand its revisions are substantiated Ly the 4 I;CR ' blank' documentation p'ckage, there appears to be no a 9 5 factual basis on which to substantiate ' blank's' claim that 6 another revision to NCR ' blank' was made in ' blank' 1981, 7 more than ' blank' after the corrective action was accomplisheh 8 -and months after the' issues were examined before ASLE." 9 So part of the conclusions of the investigator are based on this erroneous information that was given to ther. 10 : l 11 to start with. .l I 12 Another thing: The purpose of this investigation was to 13 j determine whether documentation relative to cracks discovered la in the concrete base mat of Reactor Containment Bui'lding One 15 at Comanche Peak was -altered, falsified or contained forged 16 signatures, so apparently this alleger on March 8, 1983, 8- [ 1-alleged that there had been falsification of documentation. i l 13 _ They went through here and for various reasons decided that I 19 that was'not true. I i i I-20 As I stated, I think their report was deficient in i several ways. I've got little yellow tags on here for you 2, ..i that'have notes on them to point you to specific page's. One' i 22 23 think that's in question in my mind on page 7 is what the j i investigator looked at. It states, for instance, that g records disclosed that the NCR such-and-such which was 25 l l 6
153 1 originally submitted on such-and-such was revised on three l i' 2 occa'siens. That's not correct. It was revised on four 3 cccasions and, in fact, there were two Rcvisicn l's anc t:.at's l 4 in the record. 5 It's not clear to me from this report--I would assume 6 that they saw the originals--I mean the original documents 7 that were signed by the people and so forth. t 9 Another thing that was not noted is that the concretc 9 ' pour card for this particular pour was lost, and this is I i. l documented. I have a copy of the document here. It was 10 h ad.-itted into evidence in cur hearings. The concrett pour I I 12 card for this was lost. It's also interesting to note that 13 l the original nonconformance report where the compressive i 14 strength tests on this particular pour were done was lost, was not available for file. I don't have a complete package 15 here--there are pages missing from this report even; I don't ' 16 i i have all the pages even, and I've indicated this in that, to o'. j-l 1
- S. VIETTI:
We have access to those reports. l MS. ELLIS: Y'all could find these, I know. On page 9 39 i there's a note that says, "Due to ' blank '--the alleger's-- i ~$ 20 l request for confidentiality of a personal nature of his l 21 ~ ' blank' 1983 conversation with ' blank', no interview of . blank' was conducted." This is something that I'd feel a l 23 l lot better if y'all locked into as I thi.nk whoever he was i i i supposed to have talked to there should be talked to becauseI f l ~ ~.. ~...... _. ~
E ~ 154 1 apparently the OI didn't even talk to whoever he had spoken 2 with abcut this. It might be that they might be able to 3 l shed some light on whether or not'there was actual falsi-l 4 fication of documentations. 5 One reason that I'm concerned about this is that even 6-this by itself might not have been enough for me to bring 7 this back up except there's also the other OI report, Q4-84-010, S where on February 28, 1984, OI received a phone call fror. 9 Scott Seaborn, a forr.er brown and Root electrician, and onc 10 of his concerns which is listed here involved cracks in the gj concrete pad at the bottom of the reactor core. I can't read 12 what sore of the others are here, but that particular one-- 13 MS. VIETTI: We have been in contact with them. Let y l re just tell you one thing real quick. When we started com-4 15 piling this list, myself and Dick Wessean picked out in red l i ( all the v1 reports that had been issued to date and then the 16 i j j7 j ones that hadn't been issued Dick went and -reviewed the j 33 information that was available'to the date that we cor.;iled lthelisting;.andwhatwewerelookingforwerenotthewrc..c-39 t 20 doing intimidation issues, which is what OI handles; we were, Ei 21 looking for the technical issues or the intimidation,, issues -that could be implied technical issues. If this guy was-intimidated, what could it have affected, okay, that he had 23 I been working on? So we have access to those reports, and the 4 l technical issues were pulled out and put into our listing, i 25 l i r=, w** -* =+ .+.r... ,,,w
155 1 and our guys have been working on these particular allega-i 2 tiens. 3 MS. ELLIS: So you're familiar with these already. 4 MS. VIETTI: Yes. That particular individual we had 5 interviewed and, in fact, Dick Wessman went to interview hir 6 with one of Larry Shao's people. These issues were discussed, etc., so I want you to know that we have looked. This isn't 8 new information to us. 9 MR. NOONAN: Let ne ask a question. Have we talked to-i 10 this person here? l 33 MS. VIETTI: Ycs. l l l Fm. HOONAN: Recently? 12 ; l i 13 l MR. SHAO: Last week, yes. He was happy with that; he i i _14 g was satisfied with that finding. 15 t 21R. NOONAN: Was this a telephone interview? I 16 MR. SHAO: Telephone interview. It was a very good I i- .i l i finding. L l ~ 1 p Ms. VIETTI: t.'e had talked to hir initially to clarify ,.~ ; 39 the allegation that was made in three OI reports to make I sure that yes, we're going in the right direction. 20 f MR. SHAO: We closed out with.him last week. 21 'l . You're going to address that in your SER? MR. NOONAN: We.re geing to say.e ta1xee to the a11eger. ; .,s. SxAO: i ME. ELLIS: One of the things that we've always been -lt i ld, too, is that--by several people--is that this particular ,5 I 1 1 I 6 e
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156 1. concrete pour was done on a weekend which is not consistent i 2 with the revised or the second copy of the ccncrete pour 3 carc.' Tne concrete pour card shows.that it was en March-- 4 21st--okay. This is the replacement concret.e pour card, anc 5 it states on here, "This card issued to replace card under i 6 same number which was lost. This concrete pour states " mat at 812 and renainder of mat in center of cavity Containment i-g No. 1." The date of the pour initially was 3-21-77. That 9 was marked out and it was marked on there 3-21-77. ~ 10 MR. PHILLEO: I think--I went through that whole pour n packagc. This is a trerendous' pour and there's about 300 3; l 32 cf the slips from cach truckload, all of which were dated, t l so I think that date is correct. 13
- p..
!!S. ELLIS: You think it was 3-21-77. Chay. There's another reason why.I.had tended to pince sore credibility l a. 6 in that and that is because of a staterent that was rade-- and at this point in tire I'm not sure who rade it--but I 1-recall-when we had gonc down to the plant to go through the g plant--I believe it was when Commissioner Roberts was there-- 39 and during the conversation when we were driving around the 20 ' f P ant, one of the Utility people who was in the front seat l 21 with Cormissioner Roberts--we were in a little -van ' th'ing-- they were talking about the concrete pour and Comrissioner ~ 23 I Roberts said son.cthing about the concrete pour, and this _a fellow said sorething about it was poured on a weekend and l l l
157 1 that they had changed their procedure for the second unit l 2 because it had scro problems. And that's ancther reason why 3 I han thought that very probably what we had hearc from 4 people on site was perhaps correct. 5 We've also been told by many people--there's affidavits 6 and stuff on the record that even mention thiu, I think-- 7 that anytir.e anybody wants to get somethi'ng done that they 8 don't want watched too closely, that-they do it on a weekend 9 when there are less OC people arround. This is what we've i I 10 been told happened with this particular concrete pour. l 11 Many of our concerns I'll hand to you in written forr. I 12, so I won't have to go through all of ther.. You need to keel, 13 l in mind the tir.e frame when we're doing these. Part of them l are from our original answer to the applicant's Motien for 14 i i 15 Summary, Disposition dated June 2, 82, and part of tner are 16 from CASE's Provisional Proposed Findings and Facts dated i i 17 February 24, 1983. The information is pretty ruch ti.c sarc l 3 j 13 in both of ther, and it goes into a little core detail as to 19 each specific item. I'll just leave that with you on most i of it. i i 20 I e There are a couple of things that are noteworthy, though. 21 t One thing is that applicants hadn't planned for this" ~ kind of ~t 22 crack. Even though they testified that this wss a very 23 I common sert of occurrence, it happened all the tire, but y, l apparently they hadn't planned for it. They stated that the l ., a. j I = de==e * +-ee=* +=.>.e,amm**--
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156 1 job specifications didn't address cracks relative to any 2' . acceptance criteria. This was an unusual situation because l it states in the documentation which we've got attached l 3 4 here that a copy of the remo was handcarried to Ronald Tolscn i 5 whc was the 2C Site QA Supervisor on April 26, 1977. Just 6 from a logic standpoint, it does not make sense to us that 7 for something that is so common that there's no problem wit',.a 8 you don't handcarry a memo to the head QA guy on site the t 9,. Cay you fin 6 out about it. That just doesn't rake any sansc to us. 10 I 11 i-And then there are no dimensions really other than what, i 12 I have gone into and what are attached to these documents l 3 13 which is also very unusual for NCR's. You usually have 14 dirensions specified very precisely on NCR's, and there was fneveranystudyoranalysisoranything.likethatintroduced 'l ge into evidence about it. 17 l In addition to these two things,.there was another j is allegation which was rade in Inspection Peport 7926/7925, I 19 and this was never investigated by the NRC. This was one, I Ii 20 I Lelieve, which was done by--I think that was done by Mr. I .i 21 Taylor. .g. MR. ' PIIILLEO: What was.the nature of the allegation? 9, l MS. ELLIS: It was cade about the cracking of the floor l 23. slaL concrete. I've got a copy of the inspection report ,4 right here. He was told that this was general cracking of 25 _ _. ~
159 1 l the floor slab concrete in the plant buildings, and one of j 2. the interesting things about this particular document is 3 l. that the definition here of a hairline crack given'by the l 4 NRC in this particular report on page 7 under Allegation 41. 5 does'not sect to fit the definition of a hairline crack whic1. 6 was given in the hearings. It appears from this, it states, 7 Such cracking is usually very tight and when investigatec 8 extends only into the concrete to the most exterior layer.of 9 reinforcing steel, typically.one to two inches below the 10 surfacc." But in the testimony in the hearings, the testi-33 l rony stated--I can't find it right now, what the testirony l 12 itself stated, but at'any rate-- 13 MR. PilILLEO: Are you looking for testimony on the crack 34 in the base rat? i MS. ELLIS: Yes; right. 15 l- .MR. Pl!ILLEO : And comparing that with the ficor craci.s? 16 ; MS. ELLIS: Khat I'm saying is that there have been [ 3-j allegations for years about cracks in the base mat, cracks is in all of these places, and generally what's happened is 39 -{ 20 that the reports that have been investigated--first of all, j ,[' the general cracks.were not investigated at all. That part 21 i was not investigated at all, and it states that in the report. The main part of interest about that particular report g i = is the definition of the shrinkage cracks. But there have 24 1 j been allegations for years about this crack in the base n.at, i 1 i w q 7-------~v-yv-wryw t- ---yrvy w e e vg* wew- - - - + -TetP --Tww- -P----s-* ++---I -g-= ye-y---pe--e, -*w e-4--- w ---**--V-y
16C 1 l and the documentation which has been introduced indicates 2 to us that it coes all the way under the reactor itself, 3 ! contrary to what the testimony was. l 4 I guess what I'm saying is I'd like for somebody that 5 1 I have so:ne confidence in--or that CASE has some confidence 6 in--to look into this thoroughly and to look at this docu-7 mentation and then to sit here and look me in the eye and 8 say that based on documentation and based on what I know i l 9 I personally and not just what' the Utility told me, I can tell 1 10 j you that that crack doesn't ge ander the reactor. That's 11 l basically what I'rn askine, I guess. 1 12 MR. NOONAN: Let me ask a question. Bob, did you go 13 into the Centainment and look at the base r at? 14 MR. PHILLEO: Uhat can be seen of it. til-you can get I 15 at now is the top, but in general this is all quite heavily j 16 ; reinforced and cracks in reinforced concrete aren't nearly 17 i the concern for safety as they are in unreinforced. Most of j is my background is in -r, ass concrete structures where we worry ~19 a whole lot about cracks because they destroy the stability i i 20 of the structure, but' reinforced concrete is designed in a l 8 ' ~j 21 cracked condition because it has to crack in order to work: i r 22 so it's only diagonal shear cracks that we get pretty 21 excited about in reinforced concrete, and this all appears I i 24 be in a vertical plane and it's at the center of the span. t 23 Uhere it is in this beam over the cavity it's at r-idspan and e e y seem. e,.e. e e.e ,e
i _e_ e _._ e_ 161 1 I that's where you like to have the cracks because there's 2 practically zero shear there; so when you put constructicn l 3 joints in you put them in at midspan because all the forces l I 4 'are normal forces and you have no shear. I 5 Even if all we were concerned with was the beam effect, 6 the ' crack is right where we would want it. I say the thing 7-that really protects us in this is that the critical design 8 stress in this is the accident load that puts pressure on the 9 j inside, and there everything is carried by the steel. The f 10 ' ; ' concrete is given no credit at c'1, for the tension that's 11 l produced by the accident. So the crack is immaterial in the : 12 rest critical loadine condition, and relatively unimportant 13 in the flexural condition which is the normal surface.lcad 14 condition. 15 half the beam is in compression and half is in tension.. I 16 l Tnc compression part closes up when it's loaded. The tension i j7 l part has to crack and if there is a wide crack there, it j 13 terely changes the distribution of cracks. Instead of having ' I 19 a lot of very small ~ cracks, you may have one larger crack, . k 20 but the total crack is a determinable constant in either case. t i 21 .So just in the nature of the structure a vertical c,ra,ck isn't f mu h safety concern. i 22 !!R. SHAO: Technically, I don't think there would be a 21 I conccrn because, as Ecb said, the reinforced steel--we count l 24 l n the steel taking all the load. I 25 l l e e e, eee ...,m. e me. me.. .-one.-e a e -,. + e- [s
162 1 MR. Pl.ILLEO : There's even a further case that the 2 dir.ensioning of this thing was deterreined by shielding require-3 ments rather than structural, so the whole thing is bigger j 4 I than it needs to be structurally.just'to get enough mass in 5 there for shielding, so the stresses are quite icw. 6 MR. NOONAN: I was wondering whether or not we could get 7 in the area, if the area is accessible. 8-MR. SI;AO: The area is not accessible anymore. It was poured in '77. '9 I 10. MR. iiOONA:I: 1; hat I'm thinking is to n.ake one corc I atterpt to go in there and see what we can sec. 11 l 12 { MR,. Pl!ILLEO: I don'.t believe you can get at anything i l except the top--the top they just repaired for operational 13 14 [ reasons. I g MR. SHAO: F; hat do you want to see about it? The I in crachs-- I I l l 37 g MR. 1;OO;;Id;: Yes, to get-- MR. Ei.AO: Lut you need an accounting of the crack. The is i l 19 steel is doing the work. I 20 MR. NOONAN: I understand the technical part'of it. l MR. SE1.0: The steel is doing the job. I 21 MR. NOONAN. Let ce take the package and-- 22 i MR. SHAO: tic'll go look into that-- 23 I MR. Pl!ILLEO: There are a lot of paperwcrk issues-- I I 'le'll go look at paperwork, but technically NR. SHAO: 3 l l . -. ~. _
163 I we're not that-concerned because it's heavily reinforced 2 I ' concrete structurcs. 3 l MR. PHILLEO: Partofthethingthatyoujustdiscussed-f I this'was an extraordinary pour. It did create all sorts of 4 i They did a lot of planninc 5 . organizational problen.s on site. 6 for this as I read the record, and they amassed a big 7 _ quality control organization for this.one day that ran about 8 20 hours or sornething--I forget how long it took ther.--it-9 i'-was a big deal in which they had to amass a whole bunch o' 10 i quality control people, a whcle bunch of crafts people to jj l-get.this big-thing in. The contractor exercised the option jo of doine it all in one pour. If they had done it in two ] i 13 pours as was the other optien, they'd just have a construction joint where the crack is. y !!R. NOONAN: We'll take the information and we'll go 15 l look at it, he'll con:c back and tell you whether we can do 16 ; g ' j. ; anymore or-- 115. LLLIS : There's one more thing that I'd like to have Ib included--not'necessarily everybody--you said they had a 39 i k large QA bunch of people there. It would make us feel a lot 20 ? better if you would check or at least spot-check sor.e of the 21 people who supposedly were there on that day just to see if-they were there on the weekend. g
- R. Pl!ILLEOi The're were tuo allegations on the testing '
24 ! l l cn that pour. One was that all the required testing wasn't i l
164 done. l We could confirm that the records show every required 1 2 test was run, Lut there was a second allegation that some of J 3 l the tests were falsified, and that's been addressed. I 4 MR. SHAO: We'll check to see if March 21st was on a I 5 weekend. 6 MR. ZUDANS: We know that that's a Monday. 7 MR. SEAO: March 21st was a Monday. 8 MR. PHILLEOr That's no longer in contention. 9 MR. ZUDANS: Is al] the information that you-covered l 10 in here? j MS. ELLIS: There's some more here. One of our prob-jj l i jo lets with the hearinos is that we had no expert witnesses I, or anything like that. They had witnesses to testify.
- t. c 13 y l had lost touch with the witnesses a long time ago because 15 these pours were done several years before we had the i
I 16 hccrings probably, and we lost touch with sote of the i j 37 j witnesses that would have testified about all this. There Ib have been so many people over c.he years that have told us j9 about it and talked about it. Ke're still concerned about i it' 20 j -{ MR. PHILLEO: Certainly there's no contention about 21 I whether the crack existed or not. It is there. I can't say for sure what the extent of it is, but I haven't really been 33 I concerned. The type structure it is, it could crack all the ,4 way under and it wouldn't be a safety matter. t ,3 ~ l i
g 165 1 MS. ELLIS: Now, you have the reactor and under the I 2 reactor you have the shielding and so forth. You have the 3 retal shield--does that cover everything? 4 MR. PHILLEO: Yes, I think that's part of the probler. 5 in gettine a look at it. There's steel between-- 6 MS. ELLIS: Between everything; it is totally enclosed. 7 So there would not be a problem if there were a leak of 8 radioactive water or anything like that seeping through the 9 concrete because it would have to get through the steel 10 first; is that the idea? f MR. PHILLLO: Yes. jj # l i 12 1 MR. SRAO: I don't-think there is liner there. l MR. PHILLEO: I know the crack goes to a steel liner on ! 13 14 one end. I forget the exact configuration. MR. NOONAN: We'll go back and look to make sure and 15 i I 16 l we'll tell you what we found. I I i'. ELLIS : This is a copy--if you need it--tnis is 2 i 17 I just a copy of all tr.e stuff. I guess you've got all the g jg stuf f on the Richmond insert stuff and the Attachment D and j9 2, all that. There is one additional one that I don't think that 20 l y u've g t that has to do with this NCR that we referenced, .,j 21 but I didn't attach because it was already in' the record,.but ~ 22 it's a copy of the NCR that has this particular one about-- 23 I that the crack in the base rat was contained in. It's NCR i 1 24 l G42. .a l a
c-166 I bm. PliILLLO: I con't tnink I've seen it. 650 is the d 2 one that always cets cited in connection with the base mat 3 l crack. l 4 MS. ELLIS: This is the deal with the Richmond inserts ~ i 5 that was ecntioned in that. Coincidences always bother us, 6 too; like coincidences like the original concrete pour card 7 being lost, like the original missing of this particular NCR S .where this particular concrete pour is included. These I 9 things always bother us. here these are. I've got ther i 10 j tagged for you. 11 l Another thing that bothers me with that particular NCR I 12 is if you'll notice, that--I want to say in all other I 13 instances, but I'm not positive that's true, but I think it 14 is--in all other instances in that nonconformance report, 15 they take two sets of samples. 'There's only one sample in I i 16 there for that particular concrete pour. That locks funny, i 1-l 4 t00-16 Like I say, a lot of tir.cs coincidences may be just j9 coincidences, but when you keep getting little things like that that keep on popping up, they get to be worrisome. [ 20 I MR. MOONAN: All that is associated with that ene pour? j 21 2*. !G. ELLIS: Right. y, MR. PilILLEO: It was the biggest one on the job. 23 1 i MR. SHAO: How nany? I l 1 MR. PHILLEO: Three-thousand-and-something. l 25 l l
167 1 MS. ELLIS: In addition--still regarding concrete but i 2 a little bit different area, different concern--I have pulled' specific prcule:..a with l several nonconferr,ance reports about \\ a 4 tne concretc, and one of the reasons I did this is because ~ ~ 5 it doesn't seem that anyone has ever really addressed why 6 there appeared to be so much defective concrete, how that-7 happened, again, the root cause of these things. Even if 8 they went back and corrected them and some of them they 9 corrected by using' as-is; but why these things kept happenint: - i 10 ' no one ever seems to have addressed that or tried'to look at ' I 11 it, and I think--I d:n't knew whether it will Lc as startlint l 1 12 to you as it was to us when we first saw those, but I thir.). I 13 l that the extent of some of the voids in the concrete and the 14 defectivc concrete, the extent of the probler out there i 15 really surprised us; and I have attachec sor..e taere--that's 16 something that I'd sort of like to have addressed in some j i I way. l i j is MR. Pl!ILLEO: We have addressed a number of these. I 19 don't know if they're the same one that you have or not, but i i 20 we have several allegations on that general area. I guess what I'm getting at is not so much hs. ELLIS: i 33 .t 3 the individual ones but the ones where it seemed like~ therc 22 is so much and where there is such a large problem with a 23 ? g ; particular pour where you have so many voids in it and so forth. 9.a m-mp
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168 1 l MR. PHILLEO: The problers are almost primarily wczkr.an-2 ship at the placer.cnt. As I say, all the concrete is judged 3 l by the laboratory-cured cylinders.- It was okay, but there l 4 were sore cases of honeycomb and internal voids and we've l 5 addressed all that have core to our attention. 6 tiR. NOONAN: Was it not considered excessive, in your 7 opinion--that you looked at?' S MR. PliILLEO: No. The workmanship didn't r.atch the 9 general quality of the concrete, but the number of those i I didn't seen excessive for the size of the project. There 10 ; 11 l were sor.e that were inexcusable and they had to remove sor.c 12 concrete in scr.e places, but it was about run-of-the-rill I l t. 13 for--I think tho. concrete quality was quite good, the product b 14 i that came out to the form. The problems were almost entirely l workranship at the fern. That wasn't as. good as the con-15 t I crete quality, but probably fairly typical in that kin 6 cf 16 17 work. l 1s l'i. LLLIS: I've got--I guess I'll just read this list 19 and then give these to you. These are: CASE Exhibit 487, I which is NCR 836; CASE Exhibit 490, C1112; CASE Exhibit 492., ; 20 Cll70; CASE Exhibit 500, Cl335; CASE Exhibit 502, Cl389; -j 21 CASE Exhibit 503, Cl367; CASE Exhibit 506, Cl303; CASE j Exhibit 507, C1294; CASE Exhibit 528, C571Rl; CASE Exhibit l 23. 533, C723; CASR Exhibit 535, C1336; CASE Exhibit 536, C1766;! 24 CASE Exhibit 537, C1766, Revision 1; CASE Exhibit 538, C1766 e 25 0
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.=_.e. 169 1 Revision 2; CASE Exhibit 539, C1764, Revision 1; CASE Exhibit h I 2 540, C1784; CASE Exhibit 541, C1784, nevision 2; CASE Exhibit 3 542, C1784, Revision 3. l 4 These I've included all the revisions so you'll get the 5 corpletc picture. 6 MR. PHILLEO: I expect most of those we haven't looked 7 at because those were not in the contentions, I guess. incre I 8 are no allegations made on many of those, so we didn't loch 9 at all I;CR's, of course. MS. ELLIS: I think our concern, like I say, is sort j 10, i 11 l of the overall quality just didn't seem to be there in n.any l
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Now, those are not all of them, obviously, but i 13 I think they'll kind of give you an idea of some of our j4 i concerns and some of the specific types of problems that they I 15 were encountering, too. l 16 In scne areas, even if they went back and tried to i I g 37 repair the void that they had found, I guess. our question is:: 33, Where you have some of the problems of the magnitude they've 39 got, how do you go back and really repair them without just i .h starting over? l 20 '[ MR. PHILLEO: In some cases, they did start over, but 21 i I'm probably not familiar with these cases. If there was -- 22 3 ln allegation in connection with them, I didn't see them. I j l won'tcorrent. 24 I MS. ELLIS: I m aim st through. i 25 I 9 em ea m-e. p - = .e,e e.. e ..w==ees.
..~._. 170 1 l MR. NCONAN: Larry, may I ask for the record: How do l 2 - you plan to handle this? I '.R. S lJ.0 : ~ c!. is the best guy tc work on it. The 3 l trouble is he's scheduled--for the next three weeks he's 4 5 everywhere. He's busy, but he's the right guy to work on 6 this. 7 MR. NOONAN: Is there any kind of work we can do for s you, Bob, as far as some of the things that we can look at 9 for you; any way we can help you? i MR. PHILLEO: My answer is like hers: I'll get to it 10 l 1 l as soon as I can. 33 l 1 g, .1E. ELLIS: Cne of the things that richt be helpful for l 1 13 i somebody would be to sort of group those for hir because I i think that I just had ther in order as I pulled ther out of j4 my file. ihey're not grouped or anything lihc thct. l a. j l I have a copy here--for whatever benefit it might be gg i I if anybody is lookinc at this part of it--it just has to dc i with the Board's order as to what happened about this par-y g ticular matter. I just tagged that part that addresses 39 ~, s j j that just so you'll be familiar with the background. This 20-I I ' f is on the crack in the base mat. I tagged just that part of .a ~~ it. 22 MR. NOONAN: It's marked here. It's Proposed Addition 23 i Decisien., MS. ELLIC: There's one thing that I've got copied for i. 23
171 1 l you here that I know you'll be delighted to have, and this l 2 is CASE's October 18, 82 response to the Board's directive f regarding CASE's exhibits. This is where we had to cut down l 3 4 on some of the exhibits that we introduced into evidence. '~ 5 The only reason I'm attaching this is because this has listec 6 some nonconformance reports, not just the ones that'I've '7 attached here, but aise some others that I didn't have tine 8 to pull, and also some that we withdrew; but if you find a ] problem with any of the things, you night want to look at 9 t l it a little further and these are sort of grouped as to 10 11 l subject matter so you could find a nonconformance report i you might want to go to and follow up on it. I have those 12 : -13 attached. I Plso, in renard to this, there's another area that 14 I'm still concerned about.and' CASE is still concerned 'about 15 l and-our wit esses are still concerned about, and that is 7l ' 16 17,.' l wi dge minimum wall violations at Ccmanche Peak, where s 64V~l i 15 / the pipe they have ordered has core in where it is less l t than what minirum wall specifications are supposed to bc. j 19 I 1 There were numerous items about that that were introduced- ,-j-20 'i 21 .into evidence.. I didn't have tire to bring those all_. Ti.g/ ,/ i N. / last.timewesawthenonconformancereportsonthisij3fl'982, l- -2, ss the appi'i' cants had withdrawn--or had closed out several non-o3 l-Y ~ conformance reports, and there were various revisions of 24 DCA's, Design Change Authorizations, which had been done l 25 l l G w. +. ymi m er -*-T-' D--=v-- Pq y 9- = ' -r-- '+- -e Tge-7-T y --t*e
172 which roo ened a lot of C.cse riCR's. 2 hey hac crroneously 4 r 2 closed ther. out based on certain assurptions. Sorebody 3 looked at those assumptions and apparently saic, "You can't a do this." They went back and reopened these under one non-s 5 confork.ance report which was roughly 12 inches deep when ! 6 saw it last. This was somethihg that in the hearings we weren't really ever able 'to pursue adequately and ser:.ething 'S that has been a concern of ours and our witnesses for a lone 9 tire, but we'd like to have somebody take a' loch at it and 10 find out what-the-Sam-Hill ever happened about the rinimum wall violations. What we're concerned about is that they may jj 12 have gone ahead and closed out these itens without having Il adequate calculations to justify closing out the problem with 34 the minimum wall violations. In other words, we're concernet j; that sor.e of the pipes out there may be--the walls roay be too thin. That's basically what our better.-line concern is g i with that one. tie..;OON.TN :. Larry, did any of your peopic look at any-g thing like that? 39, j j~ 20 ,11R. SHAO: No. o c. <n .MS. ELLIS: This was one that was--I think Chuck Atchisen 33 a brousht it up in his testimony. That may be'even addressed -~ p. s mewhere in that Board order. I think it is, but anyway, 23 there wasn't really that ruch in the record about it. The Board didn't do anything aLout it, but it's something that
173 we'vc Loen ccnccrned aLout for a long tire and our witnessec 2
- 1. ave been, too.
If they do have calculatione, we'd like tc a have somebody check. them to r.ake surc tney support what s' ^ 4 they're supposed to support, especially since we've had so 3 5 much trouble with it all.. .I 6 - Another of our concerns in this regard is when you have \\ s 7 that rany things, if you find out that your calculations are l 8 j. wrong and Lhat these won't pass, that they're not up to snuff, o what are they going to do about them all? It's the kind 6f pi thing that we're concerned that might be casy to get glosscc 11 over. 12 ME. VIETTI: tie have been in contact with Mr. Atchison 13 on several occasions so you can talk--I would check, though, 14 and see because we've talked to him several tines. jg MS. ELLIS: Chuck knows so n.any things that went on out there. ir.. SEAO: !ic gave us quite a few--around a hundred 3 I n allegations--and we sarpled ther. 19 MS. ELLIS: This is one he probably forgot all about. i R. ZUDANS: Is there a document you want to-- i 20 s l Okay; yes. his is the document I was T 2! US. ELLIS: -l-j talking about. On the summary of-our documents that we 22 s-1 introduced into evidence. there is some infornation on-- 23 : MR. SHAO: You said nainly on the pipe wall thickness? y. FE. ELLIS: Right; and on the concrete, too. There arc .a ..~, , -. + -
174 two ti.ings I've got en the front, what pages t'.'.cy are both. en. 3 ?!R. NOONAN: The pages are marked, Larry. There are 4 i yellow slips of paper there'. 5 MS. ILLIS: There's an'other 'nStter which we haven 't t 6 really been able to address in the hearings that was brought l C- =, up in'an A'il report, Author'3. zed Nuclear Inspection Report, ,a e. ~ sl and I'll give you a copy of all of these. The reason I'm i giving you all of these is that this is one of our overall o 10 QA-UC concerns, and we've got--what I'll be giving you is 33 CASE's Motions regarding ANI document dated August 14, '84, y and the attachments. In the attachments we go into some 33 detail about our concerns and reference the specific docu-34 ments that are attached that have to do with these concerns. 15 Trem a OA-0C aspect wc're concerned with these particu-lar documents, and with the trends that we think they show p, i l l 3-according to the documents and according to what we say is here, we've got cach one of ther summarized. l'.e 39 ; In addition, there is included in here a section about ' "> 0 miniyum wall violations, and we referenced some specific o
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s ~j docupents.that are attached here so that needs to sort of be' included with the minimum wall part here. o g, There's one other small problem here that I want to call your attention to here specifically that has to do witn reclassification. There were several supports that . _7 _ -.... - _ =. - -.... - -
t 175 1 were upgraded fror-Class 2 to Class 1, and these are 2 apparently RTS in-corc instrument supports; and in addressing 3 this the ANI wasn't really looking at the concern tr.at we'rc 4 i concerned about. They were looking at something a litt,le .. G
- 3. -S e 5 l different.
Our conceau <is when thmee were upgraded,j, were os r v. ,, y 6 l the'oalculations upgraded? I don't.know exactly what calcu-a t. p \\ 7 laticins are normally done tih the in-core instrument supports. y4 6v s 8 On tlie pipe supports I 3dn'oE that the Class 1 supporti'are 9 included in their stress problems and so forth, and I don't 10 know if that's true with these; but that's our prir.ary con-11 cern, if they have been properly included and the calculatiens l.: are right for that inclusion, if they do such a thing wit.~. them. 13 14 That particular one that I was talking about on thc 15. reclassification is CASL Exhibit 1056, SIS Report 371. 1 (, There's one other one included in these documents which is i [t I-LAG Exhibit 1054, SIS nepert 10-03, and it has to do with is a problem that was perceived by the 1/il, and let r..e just l quote passages from this.-.wh.ich wou,ld...probab.l.y,be the'1'astest 19 ya' @c', j !?: 6-s. g, -g 20 a. b. 9g VH JI had requested that tb.g. g.s.r. , g,. 7 g, . disposition address #[orrective 21 a y. ,, g g ~ use myctiontoprecluderepetitionoftheunautherhks 22 ? e z., - n g. 23 : of a porta-power to spread the horizontal membe.r,s..of a .w box support in order to achieve required clearance. I g have been inforced that Pipe Support Encineering takes 25 e-o-- . sm e - w w w. m
17L I exception to any corrective action. Apparently Engi-2 neering clairs to ' factor' in stresses in. posed on weld-3 men and pipe support mer.bers by forceably ' springing' those members. This rationale is not acceptable'"t6 the V' ~4 ~ c.,:. w e G w 3 Ig
- ENIA.
It is otE Tp[nien3ha't*use c'f power e$uYpienk ~ ~ M ' :- ,, sr y 6 dges, etc., to correct $tisf abrication is a 'c'e'nstridcticn s .:, a. A ? g,. 7, p rocess as defined ig S.ection 10 of Brown and,Rgog',,s vie. k a, C ~ ** p 8 Failure to address this problem will result i.n.perp4tu-a.... 9 ation of craft perscnnel using applied force and issuance 10 of nonconformance reports by QC." This is similar to the concern raised by Bob Messerly 11 i 12 about the use of the polar cranc to force the 32-inch main 13 stear line into position. Apparently it is quite a problen 14 at the plant as identified by the ANI. In fact, on the 15 second page there is a remo, handwritten remo, to Gordon 16 Purdy f ror. Jay Ryan. lic discusses this, and he says. [ 17 "The subject NCR was dispositioned use-as-is whicn f Ib indicates that this practice is not a problem. To 1
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- - c19 ithe contrary-it4s very similar to using fityp clamps s
J2 ..,- &cn piping to align the. internal.. diameters or the use i Q,,Oec >0 -Q,. r, s y p.. 49.:' ?.u,. -- ~ -i '21 "of hydraulic jacks to allgn large diameter piping'for _. n. ,4
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22
- " Tit-up.
This latter item was also documented"en en SIS t w t. 23 years ago when we were having problems fitting upaa 30-inch Sk pipe weld and was satisf actorily closed with no 2-1 corrective action since it was industry practice. As 25
177 i I 1 in this case, we plan to take no corrective action cs 2 what we're doing is acceptable to Lngineering as docu-3 mented in NCR 1180!s." ~. 4-_i We don't have that NCR, by the way. The ANI clemed v) s. I e&a 4 tem out " based on PSE. Chief engineer Jay Ryan assurint F 5 ( ic, - e e-4 '6 re8Ponsibility." e-A es + e .x t.+ ~ 7 P tur concern is that iE' appears that they may be Moing % s: s-c.., b. ~ ~ 8' this all over the plant,,an'd have been doing it for 'ye'g. eliir's, 9 anc it's been brought to their attention ~ before by the ANI's 10 and it's been dispositioned before, and they're going to con-33 tinue doing it. he'rc concerned because of the stresses anc 12 so forth that are put on tne equipr.ent and on the supports i 13 when they do this sort of thing. We don't feel that it's y adequate to close it out like the ANI did based on the say-sc 15 of an engineer at the plant. This is cur conccrn there. 16 MS. VIETTI: I can tell you briefly on the one particular I allegation about the coil-sprung pipc--I think it was the g3 main stear line?--Larry's group is doing an investigation of ., y9 l that. He has performed.an investigation of that. That is ng that we had lo$k.ed at specifically. Now, 't..hl,s is .',0 + so
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.y, % p., 'Y- +. y-c p,,y - .y s met.hing we'll have to look at in more detail. 21 ec v. e, .) 22 ^ d MR. NOONAN: I.think that Livermore's people ought to g g, o see some of this, too. 23 MS. ELLIS: I'm afraid instead of y'all clearing up a lot of things.that you just ended up with a lot more work. ,, a. l - ee ow.m e.%-.*Mr.o.Df W 9 W'-
3 a 178 1 MR. NOONAN: The purpose of coming down here to talk to 2 you is basically to get this kind of feedback. he want to 3 make sure that we look at the concerns as you have identified "' d them to us, and also I'll make an offer that'if yciu--thIs is 4 o .e. 3 - s :.s er m .a ~ ~ e,. e e, v .u-5 the y,we want to handle future meetings like this with
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M-g v.. 6 otM apeople; maybe not this A'ig of a group-- n-7' I E J45 ELLIS: --or th&s late at night. a 9,- t l C S MR. NOONAN: If you feel that this is adequate..or inac.e-y quate, we'd like to have that kind of feedback. MS. ELLIS: I think this is great. I think this is a 10 really wonderful way to handle this. I will say again how 3j 12 much.I appreciate all of you staying so late--without dinner. 13 MR. NOONAN: Are we finished for the night? MS. ELLIS: Yes, I think so. 3.g MR. NOONAN: I want to thank you very ruch and you, tec, 15 Je m, f r sitting threugh all of this, t.e'll take this 16 i back. I'll make arrangements for typing up the transcript 17 and having it available as soon as possible. i Ib . g :r - s,e MS. ELLIS: I think that would'be"a bi~g*h'elp. gg ( 44 L A 9 g+ 30 :.g s; g. SHAO:. Also,.i.t' 8 very good,-!4, talk to. Maf,. f,i.e st-
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r li i y 9 v hagdpouthisconcerns. 21 M'S. ELLIS: Yes,Ithink,thak!.shelpful. I tII1nk'..it .2
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makes him feel a lot better, too. 23 e MR. NOONAN: With that, I think we'll close out the 24 1 meeting. I guess one other thing I want to say to you is ,, a. ,w....,.- y.
e a a 179 1 we'll probably have another meeting sitilar to this for the 2 OA-QC stuff. We are trying to have the pe'ople come down and 3 talk to the people that made allegations. We will do the 4 } same thing with you basically, have the people here to talk G V - l ' f.d 'abou't the QA-QC."' 'I 'in'o'O 'th"a't'$ *of interes t to y% 5 - ou. v-t>. w ic a 6 .. I;LLIS : Yes,definipiy.. q, r 7 g:.MR. NOONAN: With tgatj.I'll close. g f l S (This reeting was recessed at 10:30 p.ra.) 9 10 11 i 12 13 14 15 10 l 17 i. 15 3; 39. ! j,
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T \\ E 180 1 CERTIFICATE OF PROCEEDINGS l 2 This is to certify that the attached proceedings before 3 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission i g~~ 4 ; 4s 't} " E'...
- i In the Matter of:. CQMANCEE'.WEbK TECHNICAL ' INTERVIEW 5'~l' e ** #D ***~
^
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'} 8' Bate
- of Proceedings:
November 7, 1984 6 Y* .x '
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- 'g%)dc%t of Prodeedi:tgs: %drt $81'th, Texak-4 e en a s e,.s a+
~.*~ a.- g g S were.heldashereinappears,andthatthisistheorihinal 9 transcript for the file of the Corrission. 10 11
- i 12 Carmen Gooden Certified Shorthand Reportcr 13 '
7 d. 14 / / ./ ) 15 83%.cJ M N O~f % Certified Sh6rthand Reporter 16 i i 17 i 15
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49 l. s w ( S 9 1 e i 20 Le ..; g .t 65 'i 21 '~ I' 8- .e g- .t. 3 5A 4; ~y q ge 0 23 a-24 9 1 25 l .-m.4.
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