ML20137E215

Forwards ACRS Rept Identifying Three Areas Where Failures Due to Seismic Shaking May Cause Plant Failure That Would Cause Difficulty for Operator.Response Requested.W/O Encl

ML20137E215
Person / Time
Issue date:	12/21/1982
From:	Savio R Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:	Goodwin E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20136A555	List: IA-85-363, Submits Topics for Discussion at Commission 830708 Meeting W/Acrs.Topics Include Seismic Design Margins ML20136A550 ML20136E176 ML20136E418 ML20136E423 ML20136E621 ML20136E929 ML20136F618 ML20137D336 ML20137D440 ML20137D455 ML20137D472 ML20137D477 ML20137D494 ML20137D511 ML20137D540 ML20137D551 ML20137D557 ML20137D562 ML20137D570 ML20137D576 ML20137D583 ML20137D588 ML20137D598 ML20137D601 ML20137D609 ML20137D616 ML20137D621 ML20137D627 ML20137D635 ML20137D641 ML20137D646 ML20137D652 ML20137D659 ML20137D665 ML20137D670 ML20137D849 ML20137D867 ML20137D881 ML20137D911 ML20137D924 ML20137D951 ML20137D978 ML20137E016 ML20137E026 ML20137E044 ML20137E056 ML20137E065 ML20137E075 ML20137E098 ... further results
References
FOIA-85-363 ACRS-GENERAL, NUDOCS 8508230170
Download: ML20137E215 (1)

Text

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f re:u UNITED STATES

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8' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o

U ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS WASHINGTON, D. C 20655 s,*****/

December 21, 1982 MEMORANDUM FOR:

E. Goodwin, Technical Support Branch, NRR

[. b W FROM:

R. Savio, Senior Staff Engineer

SUBJECT:

SEISMIC DESIGN OF NUCLEAR PLANTS A recent study by a Senior ACRS Fellow, at the request of Dr. Okrent, has identified three areas where failures due to seismic shaking may cause failure in a nuclear power plant, which in all probability would be difficult for the operators to deal with from an operational standpoint. These include the following:

1) Simultaneous failure of pressurizer pressure and level systems resulting in a " solid" pressurizer.

2) Possible loss of operating fleability resulting ' rom a combination of no primary PORV's in some niants and a letdown system which is not seismically qualified.

The possibility of a failure in the unmonitored chilled water system 3) that supplies the primary sample system heat exchangers, permitting undetected primary system leakage.

Dr. Okrent has requested that the NRC Staff provide a response to these concerns particularly as to whether or not they warrant futher examination and, if so, how should this be accomplished.

An excerpt from the report of the Fellow is attached. John MacEvoy, Tom McCreless and myself are available if additional discussions would be helpful.

Please let me know when you expect to respond so that I can schedule a discussion with the ACRS as appropriate.

cc:

M. Ernst R. Fraley M. Libarkin G. Quittschreiber p g82 g 0 850722 DELL 85-363 Pop C/Br

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