ML20132C323

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Forwards Util 840530 & 0615 Ltrs Re SER Open Items.Addition of Fourth Steam Generator Level Channel & Accumulator Isolation Valve Position Indicator Considered Backfit Requirements.Meeting Requested
ML20132C323
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 07/19/1984
From: Knighton G
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Rosa F
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML19283C868 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-84-926, FOIA-85-926 NUDOCS 8408010014
Download: ML20132C323 (1)
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UNITED STATES c

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Faust Rosa, Chief

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George W. Knighton, Chief A

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Licensing Branch No. 3

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Division of Licensing

SUBJECT:

Beaver Valley-2 Backfit Items

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Two of the open items in the Beaver Valley-2 draft SER have been identified by the applicant as backfit requirements. The issues concerning the addition of a fourth steam generator level channel and the addition of an accumulator isolation valve position indicator are discussed by Duquesne Light in appeal letters dated May 30, 1984 and June 15, 1984 respectively (Attachments 1 and 2).

Before continuing with appeal procedures, I would appreciate meeting with you to discuss your branch position on these issues. Marilyn Ley, the BVPS-2 Project Manager, will be contacting you to arrange a convenient meeting time.

Sincerely, 1

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George W. Knight n, Chief Licensing Bran No. 3 1

Division of Licensing cc w/o attachments: Robert W. Houston k)N (b D \\ CC' \\ f yt J

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2NRC-4-068 Hiri ter-st4i Telecopy 1 8

wuet,coneiruction oweJon May 30, 1984 Roomson Pleas, Guilding 2, Suite 210 Pittsburgh, PA 15205 United States Nuclear Reg 21 story Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:

Mr. Darrell C. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

Beaver Valley Power Station

. Unit No. 2 Do cke t No. 50-412 Identification of Backfic Requirement Nusber 9 Gentlemen:

In Draft SER Se ct io n 7. 3. 3.12 ( a t t ach ed ), the NRC identified the concern that the steam ge nerato r level control design did not meet the requirement s of Paragraph 4.7 of IEEE 279.

Duquesne Light Company (D14) res ponded to this c on-cern in le t ter 2NRC-4-032 to G.

W.

Knigh ton da t ed March 28, 19 84.

In the r es pons e, DLC explained that compliance with IEEE 279 is not required in this case because core pr ot ect ion is maint ained even if the ve ry s pe ci fic failur es pos tulated by the NRC were to occur.

The NRC responded to this in a letter fran Mr. G.

W. Knighton to Mr. E. J. Woolever dated May 8,1984, indicating that DIE would either need to modify the steam generator level control design to comply with IEEE-279 or need to provide an analys is showing that the cons eque ns es of

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feedvater addition are not safety significant.

The BVPS-2 PSAR describes the standard Westinghouse three channel design.

This document provides the basis fo r the issuance of the BVPS-2 cons truct ion permit.

Ad di tional ly, despite the existence of IEEE 279 since 19 71, nume rous CPerating Westinghouse PWR's have steen generator level sys tems s imilar to that provided for BVPS-2.

Therefore, it ap pe ars that Mr.

Kn igh to n's May 8, 19 84, letter transmits a new requirement wi tho ut full implementation of NRR procedures based on 10CF1t50.109; Generic Idttter 84-08; and NRC Manual, Ch ap t er 0514.

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D14 requests that the proposed requirement be submitted to NRC management for approval, in accordance with the Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) procedure for management of plant specific backfitting, prior to transmittal as a liceas ing requireneat.

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY By E.VJ. Woole v e r Vice President At t achment cc:

Mr. B. R. Denton (w/ attachment)

Mr. G. W. Kn i gh to n, Ch ief (w/ at t achme nt )

Ms. M. Ley, Project Manager (w/ attachment)

Mr. M. Licitra, Project Maneder (w/ attachment)

Mr. G. Walton, NRC Resident Inspector (w/ attachment) p

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7.2.3. 3 1::a-Ga. era :

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Three staa:: 3:nsrat:r level cnannels art used in a two-cut-of-three legte f:?

iscla ten of f:acwatar on hign steam generat:r level.

Cne of :ne three :eu cnannel s i s used for control.

This casign for actuation of feecwater isola-tion c:es not meet the requirements of Paragrann a.7 of *EEE 279, "C:ntrol at:

Pr :ac-ica System Interaction," in that the failure of the level channel use:

f r c:nt-:1 c:uld requirt protective action anc :ne rtmainder of ne pectact :-

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sys em enannels woulc not satisfy the single-f ailure criterion.

The a:;li w :

nas act res; ncac so tais c:ncern.

This is an c;en item, i

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' II 5 'ietin 50-05 requests a review of all systems serving safety-rt'a'Eac fu :-

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j jtionst.ensurtthatnocevicewillchangepositionsolelybecaus o f the re; r.

? of a E3F a ation signal.

The, applicant was encuested to res,nc to IE I

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I Bulletin 80-0.

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i l The staff has revi the applicant's response in F R Amencment 4 anc fin::

that the applicant has f ewed only the specifi

,,otential problems listec :: [

3 IIEBulletin80-05. TheinktofIESulletin

-06 and NRC ouestion 420.3 u'

':srecuireallsafety-elatedhstemstob enviewec.

This item is caen veti:

N l 4 ccmsleta response is provided by' the plicans.

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l 7.3.3.*.4 Incesencence Setween Ma al ari Automatic Ac: tons I'

" Al l :: rcu t : y f e r ::r E Eulletin 80-05 gtes:

jTheanglicant'sresponseto Jonents ac uatac by an ~'

actuation signal have. en castqnec suca :.at :.t' E3F signal cannot be erriccan manually or aut:matic 11y with an !!F ac.an-signal present.

coanonent say be, reset by first resetung :ne ESF actua::E signal and the manually resetting the component."

The sta'f 's revt ew c f :. ',

transfer f the control room to the E37 revealec :nat safety jec :en :S cannot b stopped manually if $1 is initiatec af ter the transfer.

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7 staff is concernec that, uncer accident c=ncittees, as.et a s

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  • e, 2NRC-4-082 (412) 7s7-$141 Telecopy 8-muewer conervenen owwon June 15, 1984 neomeon Piaza, svuewe 2. swi rio Putosurgh, PA ISas United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:

Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l

SUBJECT:

Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412 Identification of Backfit Requirement Number 5 J

Gentlemen:

In Draf t SER Section 7.3.3.15 (attached), the NRC identified the concern that certain unt or-operat ed valves, such as those for cold-leg accumulator isolation, could have circuitry dich could have a nondetect-able failure.

Duquesne Light Company responded to this concern in letter 2NRC-4-032 of March 28, 1984, by proposing a circuit modification. The NRC responded to this in a letter from Mr. G. W. Knighton to Mr. E. J. Woolever dated May 8, 1984, describing even more circuit modifications idnich would be necessary to satisfy the staff's tsiderstanding of IEEE-279.

D14 has re-

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evaluated the design as described in letter 2NRC-4-076, dated June 8,1984, to the NRC and concluded that the existing design complies with IEEE-279 in that the valves are administrative 1y controlled and monitored to insure j

that no " protective action" is required.

I Historically, the design of the valve control for this type of valve has included provisions to administrative 1y remove the power to the valve operators in order that the valves were not inadvertently shut stien i

accumulator avaiability was required.

In addition to adminis trative control of power removal, the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 design includes provision to continuously monitor the valve position.

The staff

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position that the circuit should be designed agains t a nonde t ect able j

failure appears to cons titut e a new interpretation of IEEE-279.

10CFR 50.109, GNI.R 84-08, and NRC Manual Chapter 0514 identify such a requirement as a backfit.

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United Stctes Nuclocr R23ulctcry Commissien

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Mr. Darro11 C, Eiscnhut, Dircctor Pcga 2 DLC requests that the proposed requirement be submitted to NRC management for approval, in accordance with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) procedure for management of plant specific bac kfit t ing,

prior to transmittal as a licensing requirement.

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY By l

E. $/. Weiolever

!"3' Vice President At t achme nt cc:

Mr. R. R. Denton (w/a)

Mr. G. W. Knighton, Chief (w/a)

Ms. M. Ley, Project Manager (w/a)

Mr. M. Licitra, Project Manager (w/a)

Mr. G. Walton, NRC Resident Inspector (w/a) l O

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s ex ntrol could lead to consequential damage of safety-rel or prevent initiation ton systems.

The ndependence between manual and automatic safe

'ans and believes that a safety-significant is e introduced if the operator is prove exercis-N

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7.3.3.15 Power Lockout for Motor-Operated Valvcs Ceruin motor-operated valves, such as those for cold-leg accumulator isolation, require power lockout (removal) to meet the single-fat. lure criterion.

The power lockout scheme used by the applicant uses an additionai, manually controlled (via removable banana plugs) contactor.

The staff has concluded that a short or relay failure in this circuitry could constitute a nondetecuble failure and thus violate the single-failure criterion. The staff has expressed this con-corn to the applicant and considert this itse open subject to its review of the applicant's pending response.

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4 Conclusion i

Later.

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l 7.4 Systems Recu for Saft Shutdown 7.4.1 Description

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This section describes the equipmen nd asso 'ated controls and instrumenution of systems required for safe shutdown.

also describes controls and instru-mentation outside the main control that nable safe shutdown of the plant in case the main control room be evacuated.

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i 7.4.1.1 Safe Shutdown stems

,l Securing and ntaining the plant in a safe shutdown concision ca be cone Dy appres ate alignment of selected systems that normally serve a var ty of eper onal functions.

The functions that the systems requirec for safe s

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I n must provide are ntni,sa 7 13 BGVER VALLEY 2 OSE:t SEC 7

f (1) prevent the reactor free achievfng critica11'ty 7

'(2) provida,aa adequata heat sink? s's that the design and safety limits of the

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reactor coolant systas tamperature and pressure are not exceeded M To perfore the above functions, the systems required for safe shutdown must provide the fo11 swing:

(1) boration b

(Z)' adequate supply 'of auxiliary feedwater I

(3) residual heat removal In addittoa ta the eMration of systans required to provide these functions to achieve and maintata safe shutdown, the following conditions are assitcante:

,3-(1) The turtise.is tripped _(f a. addition.ta avtamatic. trip this can be accom-

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plished assually at the tuttine as well as free the control reen).

e (2) The reactor is tripped (f a addition to automatic trip this can also be acessplished manually at the reactap trip switchgear tr well as from the control rees).

(3) A1,1 automatic protection and, control systans are functientag (see Sec-tions 7.2.and 7.3).

The monitoring indicators for maintaining het stancery are as follows:

(1) water level for each steam generstar i

(2) pressure for each staas generstar (3) pressuritar water level

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(4) pr'ssurizer pressure e

i 32/21/84 7-34 SEAVER vau.P 05!.9 !I: *

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