Letter Sequence Approval |
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Results
Other: B10927, Provides Summary of Reevaluations of LOCA Based on Identification of Several Assemblies Containing Leaking Fuel Pins & fuel-related Damage Which Necessitated Rev to Cycle 6 Core Loading Pattern, B11486, Forwards Small Break Loca/Eccs Performance Analysis W/Axial Shape Index of -0.10. Encl Analysis Amends Loca/Eccs Analysis Provided in Per 10CFR50,App K-II.1.b. Previous Reviews Re Effects of Reloads Remain Valid, B11561, Forwards Reload Safety Analysis in Support of Cycle 7 Reload.Core Reload Will Not Adversely Affect Plant Safety, B11568, Forwards Results of Core Barrel Insp Performed During Cycle 7 Refueling outage.Through-wall Cracks at Thermal Shield Support Lugs 4 & 5 Not Propagated, B11570, Highlights Recent Major Milestones in Fuel Performance Program.Three Investigations Conducted During Last Half of Cycle 6 Operation & Weld Defects Probed.No Significant mfg- Related Failure Mechanisms Noted, ML20107A012, ML20115J066, ML20126C726, ML20126J181, ML20128D276
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MONTHYEARB10927, Provides Summary of Reevaluations of LOCA Based on Identification of Several Assemblies Containing Leaking Fuel Pins & fuel-related Damage Which Necessitated Rev to Cycle 6 Core Loading Pattern1983-11-0202 November 1983 Provides Summary of Reevaluations of LOCA Based on Identification of Several Assemblies Containing Leaking Fuel Pins & fuel-related Damage Which Necessitated Rev to Cycle 6 Core Loading Pattern Project stage: Other ML20107A0121985-02-0606 February 1985 Proposed Tech Spec Changes for Preliminary Reload Safety Analysis Re Cycle 7 Refueling Project stage: Other B11437, Application for Amend to License DPR-65,consisting of Proposed Revs to Tech Specs for Preliminary Reload Safety Analysis Re Cycle 7 Refueling1985-02-0606 February 1985 Application for Amend to License DPR-65,consisting of Proposed Revs to Tech Specs for Preliminary Reload Safety Analysis Re Cycle 7 Refueling Project stage: Request B11486, Forwards Small Break Loca/Eccs Performance Analysis W/Axial Shape Index of -0.10. Encl Analysis Amends Loca/Eccs Analysis Provided in Per 10CFR50,App K-II.1.b. Previous Reviews Re Effects of Reloads Remain Valid1985-04-11011 April 1985 Forwards Small Break Loca/Eccs Performance Analysis W/Axial Shape Index of -0.10. Encl Analysis Amends Loca/Eccs Analysis Provided in Per 10CFR50,App K-II.1.b. Previous Reviews Re Effects of Reloads Remain Valid Project stage: Other ML20115J0661985-04-30030 April 1985 Small Break Loca/Eccs Performance Analysis W/Axial Shape Index of -0.10 Project stage: Other B11561, Forwards Reload Safety Analysis in Support of Cycle 7 Reload.Core Reload Will Not Adversely Affect Plant Safety1985-06-0505 June 1985 Forwards Reload Safety Analysis in Support of Cycle 7 Reload.Core Reload Will Not Adversely Affect Plant Safety Project stage: Other ML20126C7261985-06-11011 June 1985 Proposed Revs to Tech Spec Sections 3.2.1,Page 3/4 2-1 & 3.2.2.2,Page 3/4 2-6 Re Cycle 7 Reload Project stage: Other B11570, Highlights Recent Major Milestones in Fuel Performance Program.Three Investigations Conducted During Last Half of Cycle 6 Operation & Weld Defects Probed.No Significant mfg- Related Failure Mechanisms Noted1985-06-11011 June 1985 Highlights Recent Major Milestones in Fuel Performance Program.Three Investigations Conducted During Last Half of Cycle 6 Operation & Weld Defects Probed.No Significant mfg- Related Failure Mechanisms Noted Project stage: Other B11568, Forwards Results of Core Barrel Insp Performed During Cycle 7 Refueling outage.Through-wall Cracks at Thermal Shield Support Lugs 4 & 5 Not Propagated1985-06-11011 June 1985 Forwards Results of Core Barrel Insp Performed During Cycle 7 Refueling outage.Through-wall Cracks at Thermal Shield Support Lugs 4 & 5 Not Propagated Project stage: Other B11569, Application for Amend to License DPR-65,revising Tech Spec Sections 3.2.1,Page 3/4 2-1 & 3.2.2.2,Page 3/4 2-6 Re Cycle 7 Reload,Based on Discussions W/Nrc1985-06-11011 June 1985 Application for Amend to License DPR-65,revising Tech Spec Sections 3.2.1,Page 3/4 2-1 & 3.2.2.2,Page 3/4 2-6 Re Cycle 7 Reload,Based on Discussions W/Nrc Project stage: Request ML20128D2851985-06-19019 June 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 99 to License DPR-65 Project stage: Approval ML20128D2761985-06-19019 June 1985 Amend 99 to License DPR-65,revising Tech Specs Re Allowable Region of Operation When Core Power Distribution Monitored by ex-core Detector Monitoring Sys Project stage: Other ML20128D2631985-06-19019 June 1985 Forwards Amend 99 to License DPR-65 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Revises Tech Specs to Modify Allowable Region of Operation When Core Power Distribution Monitored by ex-core Detector Monitoring Sys.Revs Reflect Changes in Cycle 7 Project stage: Approval B11590, Forwards Supplemental Info Describing Zone Enriched Assembly Configuration Implemented in Feed Fuel Regions for Cycle 71985-06-25025 June 1985 Forwards Supplemental Info Describing Zone Enriched Assembly Configuration Implemented in Feed Fuel Regions for Cycle 7 Project stage: Supplement ML20126J1811985-06-30030 June 1985 Cycle 7 Final Reload Safety Analysis Project stage: Other 1985-06-11
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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20211G9631999-08-30030 August 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20196J2191999-06-30030 June 1999 SER Concluding That Licensee USI A-46 Implementation Program,In General,Met Purpose & Intent of Criteria in GIP-2 & Staff Sser 2 for Resolution of USI A-46 ML20207G6411999-06-0303 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 105,235 & 171 to Licenses DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20206M4631999-05-11011 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Alternative Proposed by Licensee to Perform Ultrasonic Exam on Inner Surface of Nozzle to safe-end Weld ML20206G6221999-05-0404 May 1999 SER Accepting Util Request to Apply leak-before-break Status to Pressurizer Surge Line Piping for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2 ML20204H7131999-03-17017 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That NNECO Provided Adequate Justification for Deviations from RG 1.97,Rev 2, Recommendations,For Instrumentation Monitoring CST Level & Containment Area Radiation at Mnps Unit 2 ML20204C9441999-03-10010 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Denying Licensee Request for License Amend to Revise Frequency of Certain SRs for Electrical Power Sys ML20207L2631999-03-0505 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 104 to License DPR-21 ML20207L5961999-02-22022 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Code Requirements,Which Require 100 Percent Volumetric Exam of RPV flange-to-shell, Impractical to Perform to Extent Required & That Alternative Provide Reasonable Assurance of Structural Integrity ML20203D7601999-02-11011 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Millstone 1 Certified Fuel Handler Training & Retraining Program ML20196B0501998-11-24024 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Re Licensee 960213 Submittal of 180-day Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Plant,Unit 2 ML20155K1981998-11-0909 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Re Application of leak-before-break Status to Portions of Safety Injection & Shutdown Cooling Sys ML20195B8711998-11-0909 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Approving Revised Evaluation of Primary Cold Leg Piping leak-before-break Analysis for Plant ML20155C3781998-10-30030 October 1998 SER Denying Amend to Allow Changes to Fsar.Nrc Found That NNECO Had Not Considered Diversity Provided by Switch in Control Room That Removes Power to 1 of 2 MOV in SDC Sys Flow Path in Evaluation of High Low Pressure Design ML20155C8441998-10-29029 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposal to Withdraw ATWS Test Commitment ML20238F2781998-08-27027 August 1998 SER Related to Proposed Rev 20 to Northeast Utilities Quality Assurance Program Topical Rept for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Units 1,2 & 3 ML20237D5001998-08-20020 August 1998 SER Approving Code Case N-389-1, Alternative Rules for Repairs,Replacements,Or Mods,Section Xi,Div 1 ML20236U7051998-07-22022 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting All Requests for Relief W/Exception of Requests RR-89-17 (Authorized for Class 1 Sys Only) & RR-89-21.Requests RR-13 & RR-14 Will Be Addressed in Separate Evaluation ML20236K6971998-07-0101 July 1998 SER Accepting Third 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan,Rev 2 & Associated Request for Relief & Proposed Alternatives for Plant,Unit 2 ML20236K3531998-07-0101 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 218 to License DPR-65 ML20249C2541998-06-24024 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Rev 19 to NNECO QAP Topical Rept & Amended Through 980609.Informs That NNECO Exception to Provisions in Paragraph 10.3.5 of Constitutes Temporary & Acceptable Alternative ML20248J0031998-06-0404 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Millstone Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan ML20248M2991998-06-0202 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Approving Application Re Restructuring of Central Maine Power Co by Establishment of Holding Company ML20248C4131998-05-26026 May 1998 SER of Individual Plant Exam of External Events Submittal on Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3 ML20217M4181998-04-30030 April 1998 Suppl Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee RCS Pressure & Heat Removal by Containment Heat Removal Sys post-accident Monitoring Instrumentation ML20216G7921998-03-13013 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternative to Check Valve Obturator Movement Requirements of OM-10 for SIL Accumulator Outlet for Listed Check Valves ML20203E8521998-02-17017 February 1998 SER Accepting Request for Relief from Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(f) for Performing Required Inservice Testing of Certain Class 2 Components IAW ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section XI for Plant,Unit 3 ML20203E9341998-02-17017 February 1998 SER Accepting Request for Relief from Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g) for Performing Required Exams for Certain Class 1 Components IAW ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section XI for Plant,Unit 3 ML20203E2441998-02-0909 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Re Approval of Realistic,Median Centered Spectra Generated for Resolution of USI-A-46 ML20198R9941998-01-13013 January 1998 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3 ML20202H7461997-12-10010 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Position That Correction of AC-11 Single Failure Vulnerability Unncessary ML20202J0911997-12-0202 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Exemption,Which Meets Special Circumstance Given in 10CFR50.12(a)(2)(ii) ML20198S2411997-10-31031 October 1997 SE Accepting Licensee Request for Deviations from Recommendations in Reg Guide 1.97,Rev 2 for Temp & Flow Monitoring Instrumentation for Cooling Water to ESF Sys Components & Containment Isolation Valve Position ML20212G5991997-10-27027 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 103 to License DPR-21 ML20217K8801997-10-27027 October 1997 Correction to Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 103 to License DPR-21.Phrase or Rod Block Protection Has Been Deleted from Listed Sentence in Staff Associated SE ML20212F1381997-10-22022 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 102 to License DPR-21 ML20217M9301997-08-19019 August 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Continued Operation W/O High Startup Rate Trip by Nene for Millstone,Unit 2 ML20149J2661997-07-23023 July 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Changes & Reanalyses in ECCS Evaluation Models & Application of Models for Plant,Unit 2 ML20141L8821997-05-28028 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 101 to License DPR-21 ML20138A0111997-04-23023 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposal,Not to Perform Type C Leakage Rate Testing on 14 Subject CIVs ML20137V5931997-04-15015 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 100 to License DPR-21 ML20137U3121997-04-10010 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 99,206 & 135 to Licenses DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20134A0331997-01-23023 January 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Proposed Alternatives to ASME Code Requirements ML20133N3401997-01-14014 January 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 98 to License DPR-21 ML20135C4221996-12-0202 December 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternative Described in Relief Request R-1 Re Valve Inservice Testing Program at Facility ML20128P4381996-10-0909 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Review of Cracked Weld Operability Calculations & Staff Response to NRC Task Interference Agreement ML20128L7541996-10-0404 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 97 to License DPR-21 ML20248C5451995-05-0202 May 1995 SER on Millstone Unit 3 Individual Plant Exam of External Events to Identify plant-specific Vulnerabilities,If Any,To Severe Accidents & Rept Results Together W/Any licensee-determined Improvements & C/A to Commission ML20248C5731994-07-19019 July 1994 SER Step 1 Review of Individual Plant Exam of External Fire Events for Millstone Unit 3 ML20059H4991994-01-24024 January 1994 Safety Evaluation Accepting Revised Responses to IEB-80-04 Re MSLB Reanalysis 1999-08-30
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217P5391999-10-25025 October 1999 Rev 0,Change 1 to Millstone Unit 1 Northeast Utils QA Program ML20217C8721999-10-0606 October 1999 Rev 21,change 3 to MP-02-OST-BAP01, Nuqap Topical Rept, App F & G Only B17896, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With B17894, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With B17898, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With ML20216J4341999-09-24024 September 1999 Mnps Unit 3 ISI Summary Rept,Cycle 6 ML20211N8401999-09-0202 September 1999 Rev 21,change 1 to Northeast Utils QA TR, Including Changes Incorporated Into Rev 20,changes 9 & 10 B17878, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Mnps,Unit 1.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Mnps,Unit 1.With B17874, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With ML20216F5141999-08-31031 August 1999 Rept on Status of Public Petitions Under 10CFR2.206 B17879, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With ML20211G9631999-08-30030 August 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20211A6561999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2 B17858, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With B17856, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20210J0311999-07-21021 July 1999 Rev 20,Change 10 to QAP 1.0, Organization ML20210E5931999-07-19019 July 1999 Revised Page 16 of 21,to App F of Northeast Util QA Program Plan ML20210C5911999-07-15015 July 1999 Revised Rev 20,change 10 to Northeast Util QA Program TR, Replacing Summary of Changes ML20210A0411999-07-15015 July 1999 Rev 20,change 10 to Northeast Util QA Program Tr B17814, Special Rept:On 990612 B Train EDG Failed to Restart within 5 Minutes Following Completion of 18 Month 24 H Endurance Run Required by TS 4.8.1.1.2.g.7.Caused by Procedural inadequacy.Re-performed Hot Restart Via Manual Start1999-07-12012 July 1999 Special Rept:On 990612 B Train EDG Failed to Restart within 5 Minutes Following Completion of 18 Month 24 H Endurance Run Required by TS 4.8.1.1.2.g.7.Caused by Procedural inadequacy.Re-performed Hot Restart Via Manual Start ML20209D1881999-07-0101 July 1999 Rev 20,change 9 to Northeast Util QA Program Tr ML20196J2191999-06-30030 June 1999 SER Concluding That Licensee USI A-46 Implementation Program,In General,Met Purpose & Intent of Criteria in GIP-2 & Staff Sser 2 for Resolution of USI A-46 ML20211A6751999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2,providing Revised Average Daily Unit Power Level & Operating Data Rept ML20196A8451999-06-30030 June 1999 Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Rept ML20209J0541999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Unit 2 B17830, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With ML20196K1791999-06-30030 June 1999 Addendum 6 to Millstone Unit 2 Annual Rept, ML20196J1821999-06-30030 June 1999 Rev 21,Change 0 to Northeast Utilities QAP (Nuqap) Tr B17833, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Power Station,Unit 1.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20195H1011999-06-11011 June 1999 Rev 20,change 8 to Northeast Utilities QAP (Nuqap) TR ML20207G6411999-06-0303 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 105,235 & 171 to Licenses DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20211A6631999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2,providing Revised Average Daily Unit Power Level,Operating Data Rept & Unit Shutdowns & Power Reductions B17808, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With ML20211B7351999-05-31031 May 1999 Cycle 7 Colr B17804, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Mnps,Unit 2.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Mnps,Unit 2.With B17807, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Mnps,Unit 1.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Mnps,Unit 1.With ML20209J0661999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Unit 2 ML20206M4631999-05-11011 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Alternative Proposed by Licensee to Perform Ultrasonic Exam on Inner Surface of Nozzle to safe-end Weld ML20206J8351999-05-0707 May 1999 Rev 20,Change 7 to QAP-1.0, Northeast Utls QA Program (Nuqap) Tr ML20206G6221999-05-0404 May 1999 SER Accepting Util Request to Apply leak-before-break Status to Pressurizer Surge Line Piping for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2 B17782, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20205R3531999-04-30030 April 1999 Addendum 4 to Annual Rept, B17775, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3.With ML20205K6141999-04-30030 April 1999 Non-proprietary Version of Rev 2 to Holtec Rept HI-971843, Licensing Rept for Reclassification of Discharge in Millstone Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pool ML20206E2971999-04-30030 April 1999 Rev 1 to Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2 COLR - Cycle 13 B17777, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Millstone Unit 2. with1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Millstone Unit 2. with ML20205Q5891999-04-0909 April 1999 Rev 20,change 6 to QAP-1.0,Northeast Utils QA Program TR ML20205R8751999-04-0909 April 1999 Provides Commission with Staff Assessment of Issues Related to Restart of Millstone Unit 2 & Staff Recommendations Re Restart Authorization for Millstone Unit 2 ML20206T3991999-03-31031 March 1999 First Quarter 1999 Performance Rept, Dtd May 1999 B17747, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
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. .
y ff g UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION L 7j WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT N0.99 TO DPR-65 NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT N0. 2 DOCKET N0. 50-336
- 1. INTRODUCTION In Refererice 1, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) submitted a license amendment request and the preliminary Reload Safety Analyses (RSA) in support of the Millstone Unit;No. 2, Cycle 7 reload. The final Reload Safety Analysis was provided in Reference 2. As indicated in these submittals, the bases on which the Cycle 7 reload was analyzed were documented in a " Basic Safety Report" (BSR) (Ref. 3), and in the Cycle 6 Reload Safety Analysis (Reference 4). The BSR, as supplemented by Reference 5 serves as the reference fuel assembly and safety analysis report for the use of Westinghouse fuel at Millstone 2 (a Combustion Engineering plant). Reference 6 documents the NRC staff's rev,iew
! and acceptance of the BSR. The analysis and evaluation of the reload was accomplished using the methodology of Reference 7. This methodology was ,
approved in Reference 8.
l In Reference 1 NNECO informed the Staff that due to the elevated levels of radioactive iodine and other fission products identified during Cycle 6 operation, NNEC0 anticipated the discovery of a number of fuel assemblies with leaking fuel rods during the refueling outage for Cycle 7.
Since that time, NNECO performed fuel sipping identifying 16 fuel assemblies with failed fuel rods. In addition, visual examination revealed-several fuel assemblies to have broken holddown springs. NNECO is replacing all leaking fuel assemblies with a combination of reconstituted and previously discharged fuel assemblies. These changes have necessitated a revised loading pattern (Reference 2) for Cycle 7 operation.
8507050075 85'0619 PDR ADOCK 05000336 P PDR
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4
- 1.1 General Description I The Millstone 2 reactor core is comprised of 217 fuel assemblies. Each fuel I
assembly has a skeletal structure consisting of five (5) Zircaloy guide thimble tubes, nine (9) Inconel grids, a stainless steel bottom nozzle, and a stainless steel top nozzle. One hundred seventy-six fuel rods are arranged in the grids to form a 14x14 array. The fuel rods consist of slightly enriched uranium dioxide ceramic pellets contained in Zircaloy-4 tubing which is plugged and seal welded at the ends to encapsulate the fuel.
Nominal core design parameters utilized for Cycle 7 are as follows:
CorePower(MWt) 2,700 SystemPressure(psia) 2,250 ReactorCoolantFlow(GPM) 350,000 CoreInletTemperature(*F) 549 i AverageLinearPowerDensity(kw/ft) 6.065 (basedonbestestimatehot, densified core a*ierage stack height of 136.4 inches)
The feed fuel for the Millstone 2, Cycle 7 core consists of twenty-four (24) zoned-enrichment interior feed assemblies, each containing sixty (60) fuel rods at 2.62 w/o U235 and one-hundred sixteen (116) fuel rods at 2.91 w/o U235, and forty-eight (48) zcned-enrichment peripheral assemblies, each containing sixty (60) fuel rods at 2.91 w/o U235 and one-hundred sixteen (116) fuel rods at 3.29 w/o U235. The zoned-enrichment assembly configuration contains 12 lower enrichment fuel pins around each of the five control rod water holes. The feed fuel will replace twenty (20) Combustion Engineering (CE)BatchAassemblies,one(1)CEBatchBassembly,andfifty-one(51)
Westinghouse Batch F assemblies. An additional five (5) Westinghouse Batch F assemblies will be discharged from the end of Cycle 6, and will be replaced by five (5) Westinghouse Batch F assemblies which were removed from the core 2
. - _ --_ - _ - - - =_--___ - . - __ -
w_. . . . - . .. . - . . . . . . . .
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at the end of Cycle 5. Due to fuel defects in Cycle 6, and subsequent symetry considerations, fourteen (14)WestinghouseBatchGassemblies,seven(7) West-inghouse Batch F assemblies (these Batch F and G assemblies were removed from the core at the end of Cycle 5), and fo'ur (4) -CE Batch A assemblies (discharged at the end of Cycle 1) are needed as well. As a result of fuel reconstitution, l the fuel rods from seven (7) Westinghouse reload assemblies to be used in Cycle 7 have been placed in Combustion Engineering (CE) skeletons. Also, twenty-one l (21) fuel rods have been replaced with stainless steel rods in Cycle 7. The twenty-one stainless steel rods are distributed among eleven (11) fuel assemblies, with the number of stainless steel rods in each of these assemblies ranging from one to five. A sumary of the Cycle 7 fuel inventory is given in Table 1.
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TABLE 1 Millstone Unit 2 Cycle 7 Core Loading i Initial % Theoretical BOC**
Number of Enrichment Density Burnup Average Region Type Assemblies w/oU235 (MWD /MTU)
A CE 4 1.93 95.0 15960 F1 g 4 2.70 94.5 25200 F2 W 5 3.30 94.9 22200 F2 g* 3 3.30 94.9 21560 G1 y 19 2.72- 95.0 23470 G2 y 32 3.19 94.7 19290 G2 M* 4 3.19 94.7 9970 l H1 g 30 2.73 95.2 13790 H2 g 44 3.22 94.8 9560 J1 y 24 2.62/2.91 95.2/95.1 0 J2 g 48 2.91/3.29 95.1/95.2 0 I
- Westinghouse fuel reassembled using CE skeletons.
- EOL Cycle 6 burnup assumed: 11,500 MWD /MTU.
3
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- 2. FUEL SYSTEM DESIGN The fuel system design for Millstone Unit 2, Cycle 6 is the same as that
! approved (Ref. 6) for Cycles 4, 5, and 6. That-is, approval of the BSR constituted approval of the use of a mixed core of Combustion Engineering and Westinghouse fabricated fuel assemblies. The replacement of CE fuel with Westinghouse fuel at each reloading would eventually lead to a core with all Westinghouse fuel.
As described in Reference 2, the reload redesign utilizes a combination of 1
reconstituted and previously discharged fuel assemblies to replace leaking fuel assemblies. Since this redesign uses previously approved fuel assembly types, and since~the redesign and the reinserted CE assemblies will not receive greater than design exposure,the redesign is acceptable from the L e1 system point of view.
At the end of Cycle 5, NNECO identified broken holddown springs on 15 fuel assemblies. Initial plans were to effect replacement of the broken holddown springs. The procedure developed was utilized successfully on one fuel assembly.
However, NNECO decided that the irradiated fuel repair procedure involved a high risk with the potential for damaging fuel assemblies, particularly fuel
[ pins, during the repair.
NNECO therefore reached the conclusion and provided supporting analysis (Ref.
- 10) that operation of Cycle 6 with 9 fuel assemblies, each with a single broken holddown spring, was acceptable and prudent. The analysis provided by NNECO characterizes the breaks to the holddown springs, provides justification that the breaks were caused by excessive vibratory motion during reactor operation, discusses fretting wear, loose parts, control rod jasming and the probability of multiple fractures, and concludes that operation of Cycle 6 with the 9 assemblies having broken holddown springs would be acce,ptable.
This is primarily because the number of active turns of the spring's is only slightly decreased by the types of breaks observed. Future new fuel would have newly designed springs. We found this acceptable.
4
l Nine assemblies identified to have broken holddown springs at the end of Cycle 6 will be reloaded for Cycle 7 operation. In addition 4 assemblies from Cycle 5 needed to provide symmetry in the loading pattern and which have broken holddown
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springs will be utilized. ~ We find this acceptable based upon the finding for Cycle 6 and the lack of any problems observed in operation of Cycle 6 with 9 fuel assemblies having broken holddown springs. No broken holddown springs were identified in Batch H fuel at the end of Cycle 6 operation. Batch H fuel had a new top nozzle design intended to eliminate the problem, which has proven to be the case for the one cycle of exposure of the 74 assemblies in Batch H.
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- 3. NUCLEAR DESIGN The nuclear design procedures and models used for the analysis of the Millstone Unit 2 Cycle 7 reload core (References 1 and 2) are the same as those used for Cycle 6. These are documented in the Millstone Unit 2 Basic Safety Report (BSR),
(Reference 3) and have been approved (Reference 6) for the analysis of the Mill-stone Unit 2 core using Westinghouse reload fuel beginning with Cycle 4. In addition, the methods described in Reference 7 document the methodology used by Westinghouse for performing this as well as other reloads. This methodolog'y was approved in Reference 8.
The physics analysis of the reload specifically included the zoned-enrichment fuel assemblies, the 21 stainless steel rods in reconstituted fuel assemblies, and the loading pattern of the various fuel types described in Section 1.1 above, in order to determine maximum linear heat rates achievable in normal operation, control rod worths for the shutdown margin evaluation, and the Cycle 7 kinetics l characteristics for use in the accident evaluation. Also included in the analysis is substitution of full strength control rods for part strength control rods in theleadcontrolelementassembly(CEA) bank. This hardware change was implemented during the refueling outage. Because these calculations were performed with approved methods, they are acceptable.
In Reference 2, Table 2, the kinetics parameters for the Cycle 7 reload redesign are given. These are all within the current limits with a small exception in the 4
5
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ll least negative above 30% power Doppler temperature coefficient and in the maximum delayed neutron fraction. Both of these parameters had the same values in Cycle
- 6. The conclusion there was that no reanalysis was necessary because the potential effects were small. This was found acceptable for Cycle 6 and continues to be acceptable for Cycle 7. Two accidents were reanalyzed for other reasons, and are discussed under Accident Analysis, Section 5.
The control rod worths and shutdown requirements for the Cycle 7 design are presented in Table 3 of Reference 2 and compared with previous Cycle 6 values.
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At EOC 7, the reactivjty worth with all control rods inserted assuming the highest worth rod is stuck out of the core is 6.26% and assuming a 10% re-duction to allow for uncertainty. The reactivity worth required for shutdown, including the coritribution required to control the steamline break event at E0C 7, is 5.89%. Therefore, sufficient control rod worth is available to accommodate the reactivity effects of the steamline break at the worst time i in core life allowing for the most reactive control rod stuck in the fully I
withdrawn position and also allowing for calculational uncertainties. We have reviewed the calculated control rod worths and the uncertainties in these worths based upon comparison of calculations with experiments presented in the BSR and in previous Westinghouse reports. On the basis of our review, we conclude that the NNECo's assessment of reactivity control is suitably con-servative and that adequate negative reactivity worth has been provided by the control system to assure shutdowa capability assuming the most reactive control rod is stuck in the fully withdrawn position.
- 4. THERMAL-HYDRAULIC DESIGN Millstone 2 Cycle 7 utilized the Basic Safety Report (Ref. 3) which was approved by the staff in Reference 6. The Basic Safety Report was also used as the basis for Cycle 4, 5, and 6 operation.
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i As discussed in the BSR, the Westinghouse fuel assemblies have been designed and shown through testing to be hydraulically compatible with all resident Millstone 2 fuel assemblies. The stainless steel rods in the reconstituted
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fuel assemblies were treated as heated rods in the THINC DNB analysis. This is conservative since it results in higher subchannel enthalpy predicti.ons.
No significant variations in themal margins result from the Cycle 7 reload.
The Cycle 7 analysis takes a partial credit of 3.0% of the net conservatism which exists between convoluting and suming the uncertainties of various measured plant power parameters in tems of power. This partial credit was applied in previous cycles and its approval is discussed in more detail in the Cycle 4 Reload Safety Evaluation Report (Ref. 9); therefore, we find operation of Cycie 7 acceptable.
- 5. ACCIDENT ANALYSIS As a result of the change to full strength CEAs in the lead CEA bank, the value of the ejected rod worth for the HFP ejected rod accident for Cycle 7 increased to 0.28% ak/k. The licensee therefore provided a reanalysis of this event.
The results show that the energy deposition increased from 171 cal /gm for the reference analysis to 185 cal /gm for the Cycle 7 analysis. This is below the j criterion of 200 cal /gm established as a limit for this accident in the BSR, and
! is therefore acceptable.
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The split enrichment fuel assembly design flattens the power peaking by placing slightly lower enrichment fuel pins around the large water holes in the fuel assembly. In order to assess the effect of this flattening on a limiting DNB event, the loss of flow accident for Cycle 7 was reanalyzed. The results show the MDNBR to be 1.30, which is acceptable.
In Reference 11, the licensee provided a reanalysis of the small ttreak LOCA.
This was done because there was an inconsistency between the Technical Specifi-cation requirement on axial shape'index (ASI) and the ASI assumptions used in the approved small break LOCA analysis. The inconsistency was documented in Millstone Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 85-001-0.
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The most negative ASI input to the approved analysis was an ASI of 0.14. The Technical Specifications allow the 100% power ASI to be no more negative than
-0.10. If the 0.06 ASI uncertainty is introduced into the analysis, the most negative upper bound to ASI becomes -0.'16, which is inconsistent with the -0.14 ASI input to the small break LOCA model. Reference 11 provides the results of a small break LOCA analysis which allowed the ASI value to be -0.16. The calculated peak clad temperature increased from 1971*F to 2035*F. This is below the acceptance criterion of 2200*F for the small break LOCA, and is therefore acceptable.
- 6. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Technical Specification changes proposed by the licensee in Reference 1 and as clarified in reference 12 are acceptable as follows:
The main Technical Specification change proposed by the licensee trades range in radial peaking for more range in axial shape index (ASI). For monitoring of the power distribution with excore detectors, the maximum radial peak is specified in the Technical Specifications by a limit on the total planar The maximum axial peak is specified by limits radial peaking factor, Fxy.
on the ASI. The product of the radial and axial peaks is the core peaking factor, which is proportional to the maximum peak linear heat rate. The maximum allowable peak linear heat rate in turn is limited as a result of the LOCA analysis to 15.6 kw/ft in nomal operation of the powerplant. A decrease l in the allowable value of Fxy can be offset with an increase in the allowable value of ASI without changing the limiting achievable linear heat rate.
The current Millstone Unit 2 Technical Specifications define an allowable ASI envelope for Fxy i l.791. Also defined is a power derate curve if the Fxy limit cannot be met. The proposed Technical Specification change defines an expanded allowable ASI envelope and an appropriate power derate envelope if Fxy 11.62.
The licensee has indicated in Reference 1 that an analysis was perfomed to verify that the current envelope is unaffected by the hardware change in the 8
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lead CEA bank. The licensee further indicated that an additional analysis was performed to verify this for the new derate envelope for F,y<_1.62, and that the appropriate ASI envelope for ,this F xy was calculated with the approved methods of Reference 3. -
The licensee also proposed to delete the indexing parameters M and N. These parameters specify allowable power levels when less than all reactor coolant pumps are used and when excore detectors are used for monitoring and the Fxy limit is exceeded. Reference 12 contained a page which was inadvertently left out of the Reference 1 submittal. This page deleted reference to the
- ' indexing parameters H and N. These parameters had previously been deleted 4
on another page submitted with Reference 1. An additional technical specification page was included with Reference 12 which corrected a typo contained in the " Reference I submittal. The way the revised Specifications have been written makes the change administrative, and it is therefore acceptable.
Since the' proposed Technical Specification changes were calculated and evaluated with approved methods, and since they do not alter the maximum peak linear heat rate achievable in normal operation of the powerplant, the changes are acceptable.
- 7. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20.
The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The l
! Comission has previously published a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public
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comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 951.22(c)(9)'.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 551.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
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- 8. CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in.the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Conunission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and. safety of the public.
Da t'e: June 19. 1985 Principal Contributor:
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- 8. REFERENCES
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- 1. W. G. Counsil (NNECO),' letter to J. R. Miller (NRC), with " Cycle Refueling-Preliminary Reload Safeth Analysis," February 6, 1985.
- 2. W. G. Counsil (NNECO), letter to J. R. Miller (NRC), with " Cycle 7 Refueling-Reload Safety Analysis," June 5,1985.
- 3. " Basic Safety Report," Westinghouse proprietary report for Millstone Unit 2 Docket N4mber 50-336, submitted via letter, W. G. Counsil (NU) tor.Reid(NRC), March 6,1980.
- 4. W. G. Counsil (NNECO), letter to J. R. Miller (NRC), November 17, 1983.
- 5. W. G. Counsil (NNECO), letter to R. A. Clark, November 17, 1981.
- 6. L. S. Rubenstein (NRC), memorandum for T. M. Novak, "SER Input on Millstone Unit 2 BSR," February 16, 1982.
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- 7. Bordelon, F. M. et.al., " Westinghouse Reload Safety Methodology". WCAP-9272, March 1978.
- 8. C. O. Thomas (NRC), letter to E. P. Rahe, Jr. iW), " Acceptance for Referencing of Licensing Topical Report WCAP-9272(P)/9273(NP)",
May 28, 1985.
- 9. W. G. Counsil (NNECO), letter to R. A. Clark, June 3, 1980.
- 10. W. G. Counsil (NNECO), letter to J. R. Miller (NRC), December 1, 1983.
- 11. W. G. Counsil (NNECO), letter to J. R. Miller (NRC), April .1{,1985.
- 12. W. G. Counsil (NNECO), letter #B11569 to J. R. Miller (NRC),
" Proposed Revisions to Technical Specifications", June 11, 1985. ,
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