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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20211G9631999-08-30030 August 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20196J2191999-06-30030 June 1999 SER Concluding That Licensee USI A-46 Implementation Program,In General,Met Purpose & Intent of Criteria in GIP-2 & Staff Sser 2 for Resolution of USI A-46 ML20207G6411999-06-0303 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 105,235 & 171 to Licenses DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20206M4631999-05-11011 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Alternative Proposed by Licensee to Perform Ultrasonic Exam on Inner Surface of Nozzle to safe-end Weld ML20206G6221999-05-0404 May 1999 SER Accepting Util Request to Apply leak-before-break Status to Pressurizer Surge Line Piping for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2 ML20204H7131999-03-17017 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That NNECO Provided Adequate Justification for Deviations from RG 1.97,Rev 2, Recommendations,For Instrumentation Monitoring CST Level & Containment Area Radiation at Mnps Unit 2 ML20204C9441999-03-10010 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Denying Licensee Request for License Amend to Revise Frequency of Certain SRs for Electrical Power Sys ML20207L2631999-03-0505 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 104 to License DPR-21 ML20207L5961999-02-22022 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Code Requirements,Which Require 100 Percent Volumetric Exam of RPV flange-to-shell, Impractical to Perform to Extent Required & That Alternative Provide Reasonable Assurance of Structural Integrity ML20203D7601999-02-11011 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Millstone 1 Certified Fuel Handler Training & Retraining Program ML20196B0501998-11-24024 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Re Licensee 960213 Submittal of 180-day Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Plant,Unit 2 ML20155K1981998-11-0909 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Re Application of leak-before-break Status to Portions of Safety Injection & Shutdown Cooling Sys ML20195B8711998-11-0909 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Approving Revised Evaluation of Primary Cold Leg Piping leak-before-break Analysis for Plant ML20155C3781998-10-30030 October 1998 SER Denying Amend to Allow Changes to Fsar.Nrc Found That NNECO Had Not Considered Diversity Provided by Switch in Control Room That Removes Power to 1 of 2 MOV in SDC Sys Flow Path in Evaluation of High Low Pressure Design ML20155C8441998-10-29029 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposal to Withdraw ATWS Test Commitment ML20238F2781998-08-27027 August 1998 SER Related to Proposed Rev 20 to Northeast Utilities Quality Assurance Program Topical Rept for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Units 1,2 & 3 ML20237D5001998-08-20020 August 1998 SER Approving Code Case N-389-1, Alternative Rules for Repairs,Replacements,Or Mods,Section Xi,Div 1 ML20236U7051998-07-22022 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting All Requests for Relief W/Exception of Requests RR-89-17 (Authorized for Class 1 Sys Only) & RR-89-21.Requests RR-13 & RR-14 Will Be Addressed in Separate Evaluation ML20236K6971998-07-0101 July 1998 SER Accepting Third 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan,Rev 2 & Associated Request for Relief & Proposed Alternatives for Plant,Unit 2 ML20236K3531998-07-0101 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 218 to License DPR-65 ML20249C2541998-06-24024 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Rev 19 to NNECO QAP Topical Rept & Amended Through 980609.Informs That NNECO Exception to Provisions in Paragraph 10.3.5 of Constitutes Temporary & Acceptable Alternative ML20248J0031998-06-0404 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Millstone Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan ML20248M2991998-06-0202 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Approving Application Re Restructuring of Central Maine Power Co by Establishment of Holding Company ML20248C4131998-05-26026 May 1998 SER of Individual Plant Exam of External Events Submittal on Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3 ML20217M4181998-04-30030 April 1998 Suppl Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee RCS Pressure & Heat Removal by Containment Heat Removal Sys post-accident Monitoring Instrumentation ML20216G7921998-03-13013 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternative to Check Valve Obturator Movement Requirements of OM-10 for SIL Accumulator Outlet for Listed Check Valves ML20203E8521998-02-17017 February 1998 SER Accepting Request for Relief from Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(f) for Performing Required Inservice Testing of Certain Class 2 Components IAW ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section XI for Plant,Unit 3 ML20203E9341998-02-17017 February 1998 SER Accepting Request for Relief from Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g) for Performing Required Exams for Certain Class 1 Components IAW ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section XI for Plant,Unit 3 ML20203E2441998-02-0909 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Re Approval of Realistic,Median Centered Spectra Generated for Resolution of USI-A-46 ML20198R9941998-01-13013 January 1998 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3 ML20202H7461997-12-10010 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Position That Correction of AC-11 Single Failure Vulnerability Unncessary ML20202J0911997-12-0202 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Exemption,Which Meets Special Circumstance Given in 10CFR50.12(a)(2)(ii) ML20198S2411997-10-31031 October 1997 SE Accepting Licensee Request for Deviations from Recommendations in Reg Guide 1.97,Rev 2 for Temp & Flow Monitoring Instrumentation for Cooling Water to ESF Sys Components & Containment Isolation Valve Position ML20212G5991997-10-27027 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 103 to License DPR-21 ML20217K8801997-10-27027 October 1997 Correction to Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 103 to License DPR-21.Phrase or Rod Block Protection Has Been Deleted from Listed Sentence in Staff Associated SE ML20212F1381997-10-22022 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 102 to License DPR-21 ML20217M9301997-08-19019 August 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Continued Operation W/O High Startup Rate Trip by Nene for Millstone,Unit 2 ML20149J2661997-07-23023 July 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Changes & Reanalyses in ECCS Evaluation Models & Application of Models for Plant,Unit 2 ML20141L8821997-05-28028 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 101 to License DPR-21 ML20138A0111997-04-23023 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposal,Not to Perform Type C Leakage Rate Testing on 14 Subject CIVs ML20137V5931997-04-15015 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 100 to License DPR-21 ML20137U3121997-04-10010 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 99,206 & 135 to Licenses DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20134A0331997-01-23023 January 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Proposed Alternatives to ASME Code Requirements ML20133N3401997-01-14014 January 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 98 to License DPR-21 ML20135C4221996-12-0202 December 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternative Described in Relief Request R-1 Re Valve Inservice Testing Program at Facility ML20128P4381996-10-0909 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Review of Cracked Weld Operability Calculations & Staff Response to NRC Task Interference Agreement ML20128L7541996-10-0404 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 97 to License DPR-21 ML20248C5451995-05-0202 May 1995 SER on Millstone Unit 3 Individual Plant Exam of External Events to Identify plant-specific Vulnerabilities,If Any,To Severe Accidents & Rept Results Together W/Any licensee-determined Improvements & C/A to Commission ML20248C5731994-07-19019 July 1994 SER Step 1 Review of Individual Plant Exam of External Fire Events for Millstone Unit 3 ML20059H4991994-01-24024 January 1994 Safety Evaluation Accepting Revised Responses to IEB-80-04 Re MSLB Reanalysis 1999-08-30
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217P5391999-10-25025 October 1999 Rev 0,Change 1 to Millstone Unit 1 Northeast Utils QA Program ML20217C8721999-10-0606 October 1999 Rev 21,change 3 to MP-02-OST-BAP01, Nuqap Topical Rept, App F & G Only B17896, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With B17894, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With B17898, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With ML20216J4341999-09-24024 September 1999 Mnps Unit 3 ISI Summary Rept,Cycle 6 ML20211N8401999-09-0202 September 1999 Rev 21,change 1 to Northeast Utils QA TR, Including Changes Incorporated Into Rev 20,changes 9 & 10 B17878, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Mnps,Unit 1.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Mnps,Unit 1.With B17874, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With ML20216F5141999-08-31031 August 1999 Rept on Status of Public Petitions Under 10CFR2.206 B17879, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With ML20211G9631999-08-30030 August 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20211A6561999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2 B17858, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With B17856, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20210J0311999-07-21021 July 1999 Rev 20,Change 10 to QAP 1.0, Organization ML20210E5931999-07-19019 July 1999 Revised Page 16 of 21,to App F of Northeast Util QA Program Plan ML20210C5911999-07-15015 July 1999 Revised Rev 20,change 10 to Northeast Util QA Program TR, Replacing Summary of Changes ML20210A0411999-07-15015 July 1999 Rev 20,change 10 to Northeast Util QA Program Tr B17814, Special Rept:On 990612 B Train EDG Failed to Restart within 5 Minutes Following Completion of 18 Month 24 H Endurance Run Required by TS 4.8.1.1.2.g.7.Caused by Procedural inadequacy.Re-performed Hot Restart Via Manual Start1999-07-12012 July 1999 Special Rept:On 990612 B Train EDG Failed to Restart within 5 Minutes Following Completion of 18 Month 24 H Endurance Run Required by TS 4.8.1.1.2.g.7.Caused by Procedural inadequacy.Re-performed Hot Restart Via Manual Start ML20209D1881999-07-0101 July 1999 Rev 20,change 9 to Northeast Util QA Program Tr ML20196J2191999-06-30030 June 1999 SER Concluding That Licensee USI A-46 Implementation Program,In General,Met Purpose & Intent of Criteria in GIP-2 & Staff Sser 2 for Resolution of USI A-46 ML20211A6751999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2,providing Revised Average Daily Unit Power Level & Operating Data Rept ML20196A8451999-06-30030 June 1999 Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Rept ML20209J0541999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Unit 2 B17830, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With ML20196K1791999-06-30030 June 1999 Addendum 6 to Millstone Unit 2 Annual Rept, ML20196J1821999-06-30030 June 1999 Rev 21,Change 0 to Northeast Utilities QAP (Nuqap) Tr B17833, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Power Station,Unit 1.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20195H1011999-06-11011 June 1999 Rev 20,change 8 to Northeast Utilities QAP (Nuqap) TR ML20207G6411999-06-0303 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 105,235 & 171 to Licenses DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20211A6631999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2,providing Revised Average Daily Unit Power Level,Operating Data Rept & Unit Shutdowns & Power Reductions B17808, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With ML20211B7351999-05-31031 May 1999 Cycle 7 Colr B17804, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Mnps,Unit 2.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Mnps,Unit 2.With B17807, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Mnps,Unit 1.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Mnps,Unit 1.With ML20209J0661999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Unit 2 ML20206M4631999-05-11011 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Alternative Proposed by Licensee to Perform Ultrasonic Exam on Inner Surface of Nozzle to safe-end Weld ML20206J8351999-05-0707 May 1999 Rev 20,Change 7 to QAP-1.0, Northeast Utls QA Program (Nuqap) Tr ML20206G6221999-05-0404 May 1999 SER Accepting Util Request to Apply leak-before-break Status to Pressurizer Surge Line Piping for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2 B17782, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20205R3531999-04-30030 April 1999 Addendum 4 to Annual Rept, B17775, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3.With ML20205K6141999-04-30030 April 1999 Non-proprietary Version of Rev 2 to Holtec Rept HI-971843, Licensing Rept for Reclassification of Discharge in Millstone Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pool ML20206E2971999-04-30030 April 1999 Rev 1 to Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2 COLR - Cycle 13 B17777, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Millstone Unit 2. with1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Millstone Unit 2. with ML20205Q5891999-04-0909 April 1999 Rev 20,change 6 to QAP-1.0,Northeast Utils QA Program TR ML20205R8751999-04-0909 April 1999 Provides Commission with Staff Assessment of Issues Related to Restart of Millstone Unit 2 & Staff Recommendations Re Restart Authorization for Millstone Unit 2 ML20206T3991999-03-31031 March 1999 First Quarter 1999 Performance Rept, Dtd May 1999 B17747, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
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UNITED STATES s"
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 2065H001
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO RE0 VEST FOR ALTERNATIVE TO THE ASME CODE FOR NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY MILLSTONE NVCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 3 DOCKET NO. 50-423
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Title 10 of the Code of federal Regulatfons (10 CFR) Section 50.55a(g) requires nuclear power facility piping and components to meet the applicable requirements of Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (hereafter r thatareincorporatedbyreferenceinparagraph(b)pferredastheCode)and of this section to the extent practical within the limitations of design, geometry, and materials of construction of the components.Section XI of the Code specifies Code-acceptable repair methods for flaws that exceed Code acceptance limits in piping that is in-service. A Code repair is required to restore the l structural integrity of flawed Code piping, independent of the operational l mode of the plant when the flaw is detected. Those repairs not in compliance with Section XI of the Code are non-Code repairs. However, the implementation l of required Code repairs to ASME Code Class 1, 2 or 3 systems is often I impractical for nuclear licensees since the repairs normally require an l isolation of the system requiring the repair, and often a shutdown of the nuclear power plant.
Alternatives to Code requirements may be used by nuclear licensees when i authorized by the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation if the l proposed alternatives to the requirements are such that they are shown to I provide an acceptable level of quality and safety in lieu of the Code requirements [10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(1)], or if compliance with the Code requirements would result in hardship or unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety [10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(ii].
A licensee may also submit requests for relief from certain Code requirements when a licensee has determined that conformance with certain Code requirements is impractical for its facility [10 CFR 50.55a(g)(5)(iii)]. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(1), the Commission will evaluate determinations of impracticality and may grant relief.and may impose alternative requirements as ,
it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or f the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest l f
10 CFR 50.55a(b) referencesSection III of the ASME Code 9701290145 970123 PDR ADOCK 05000423 P PDR .
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giving due consideration to the burden upon the licensee that could result if the requirements were imposed on the facility.
2.0 BACKGROUND
In a letter to the NRC dated November 20, 1995, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (licensee) requested approval to perform repairs on two 26-inch service water discharge pipes at Millstone Unit 3, using an alternative to Section III of the ASME Code, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(1) and (ii).
3.0 LICENSEE'S RELIEF RE0 VEST 3.1 [gmponents for Which Relief is Reauested Two 26-inch service water discharge pipes, which run from the Engineering Safety Feature building to the circulating water discharge tunnel, are copper nickel material, ASME Class 3, buried underground, and the degraded areas are embedded in an 8' x 4.5' reinforced concrete encasement. During a refueling outage in May 1995, visual inspection of the pipes revealed localized pitting at the inner surface of 90* elbow in each train at the bottom of a 16-foot vertical drop. The licensee believes that the pitting was due to impingement-induced erosion by the waterfall into the 16-foot vertical section of the pipes. The pits were varied in depth with a maximum of 0.25 inch, and the pipe wall thickness in the area is approximately 0.325 inch to 0.331 inch.
Thus, the pitting is severe but not yet through-wall. In addition, subsequent visual inspection verified that the concrete encasement structure remains intact.
3.2 Section III Edition for Millstone Unit _1 1971 Edition of the ASME Code,Section III, through and including 1973 Addenda.
3.3 ASME Section III Code Reauirement Article ND-3640 in Section III of the ASME Code, requires the thickness of pipe walls to meet a minimum value, which is determined based on piping material capability to ensure the pressure retaining function of the pipe.
When minimum wall thickness car..m t be met, replacement or repair to restore Code requirements should be performed.
3.4 Content of the Relief Reauest Relief is sought from replacing the copper nickel liner in accordance with the requirements of Article ND-3640.
3.5 Basis for Relief and Proposed Alternative The licensee indicated that the degraded piping areas are 28 feet below ground surface and located in a place containing buried plant utilities. Access for Code repair would require extensive excavation, as well as destruction and reconstruction of the reinforced concrete encasement. The licensee believes
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i with reinforced concrete encasement remaining structurally sound, the pressure retaining function of the service water lines is ensured. Further, the licensee has committed to inspect the affected service water piping during each refueling outage and during any planned or unplanned outage of greater than 5 weeks duration, and monitor the inside of the discharge tunnel during j every other future planned refueling outage to confirm that no service-related l degradation of the concrete in the vicinity of the expansion joints is occurring. Therefore, the licensee believes that the alternatives described provide an acceptable level of quality and safety and that undue hardship and expense for performing the Code-repair can be avoided without compromising in quality and safety.
4.0 STAFF EVALUATION In a conference call between the NRC staff and the licensee on May 29, 1996, details and root cause of service water discharge piping degradation and recent inspection results were discussed, as well as the technique and the merit of applying the epoxy coating; methods and bases to verify structural integrity of the concrete encasement; and measures to be taken by the licensee to ensure the pressure retaining function of the service water discharge pipes. The licensee documented discussion results and their commitments in a letter to the NRC on July 23, 1996. The following summarizes the staff's evaluation:
4.1 Root Cause of Piping Degradation l The licensee conducted robotics inspecti w of the service water piping and noted the pitting at the lower region of - he elbow at the bottom of the 16-foot vertical section in both trains of tae service water discharge pipes. A subsequent inspection found that the pits were varied in depth and predominantly on the intrados at the upst eam weld and on the extrados at the center of the elbow. An ultrasonic measu ement of pipe wall thickness confirmed that the pits were not through-vall. During normal plant operation, .
the discharge piping receive only minimal flow of approximately 225 gpm. l These elbows are normally under water due to the tide and circulating water !
flow in the discharge tunnel. The licens ie's evaluation concluded that the I waterfall effect of the minimum flow, cascading over the 16-foot vertical drop into the elbow, had caused erosion damage to the elbow, because the soft oxide .
layer on the copper nickel piping can easily be stripped away when exposed to l water impingement attack. A new oxide film will be formed again and be l stripped away again. Thus, this erosion / corrosion process was the root cause of pitting.
Judging from configurations of service water flow path, operating conditions, and piping material properties, the staff concludes that the licensee's evaluation on degradation mechanism appears logical and justified for the pitting locations that were detected.
j 4.2 Repair Technique Used For preventing further erosion / corrosion, the licensee applied epoxy-based Arcor-30 coating to the pitted elbow and adjacent areas in both trains of the service water discharge piping. Additionally, piping areas with potential for flow impingement attack were also coated. The licensee indicated that they have had successful experience over the last 5 years in using the Arcor coating throughout the service water and other piping systems in Millstone Unit 3, and recent inspections had further evidenced that the coating did perform well in places with cavitating and highly turbulent flows.
The staff evaluation has the following concerns: (1) the use of Arcor-30 coating for permanent piping repair has not been reviewed by the NRC, and the licensee has no quantified information in existence by which to gage its effectiveness and to predetermine how long the coating is going to remain effective, and (2) with severely pitted areas coated with Arcor-30, can structural capability of the service water discharge piping be maintained to ensure its design intended function, such as pressure retaining function under normal plant operation conditions and under low probability events such as earthquake, for the remaining life of Millstone Unit 3?
In order to address the first concern, a periodic inspection program more stringent than what the licensee initially proposed was requested by the staff for the service water discharge piping for monitoring its coating performance and for verifying its pressure boundary conditions. As for the second concern, the staff has reviewed the licensee's presentation regarding )
structural integrity and pressure retaining capability of the concrete encasement. The staff's evaluation of these two concerns are discussed in later sections of this report. j 4.3 Inspection Inside the Affected Piping ;
In its letter to the NRC dated November 20, 1995, the licensee indicated that Arcor-30 coating was applied to affected piping areas during the refueling outage in May 1995 as a result of pitting found in the service water discharge l piping. The licensee also indicated that inspection on the coating will be performed during the next refueling outage.
In response to a staff request that the licensee provide an inspection program that will enable the licensee to monitor coating effectiveness at the effected piping are' oy letter dated July 23, 1996, the licensee revised its ;
alternatiu t- committing to perform an inspection on the inside of the l service water'~pioing during each refueling outage and during any planned or unplanned outage of greater than 6 weeks duration. The inspections will be performed using submersible robotics video cameras. The results from the previously recorded inspections, including the areas that were repaired, and the historic condition of adjacent piping will be used in evaluating the ,
results of each inspection. The staff concludes that the licensee's (
commitment on inspection is adequate and acceptable.
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4.4 Functional Capability of Concrete Encasement As discussed previously, the portions of service water discharge pipes that contain pitted elbows are embedded in a 8' x 4.5' reinforced concrete encasement. The pipe is served as a liner and was designed to provide pressure boundary integrity, and the concrete encasement was designed to provide dead weight and seismic capability. As a result of severely pitted elbows, the pipe alone can no longer be counted for pressure boundary integrity. The concern is whether an integrated pipe and encasement assembly is capable of ensuring the pressure retaining function.
Also, in its July 23, 1996, letter, the licensee indicated that the concrete encasement has hoop reinforcing bars adjacent to the perimeter of the pipe.
These bars were intended for additional assurance of pressure boundary integrity and are capable of restraining the hoop stress created by the piping at pressures well above those predicted in any system operating conditions.
In addition, the pits found at the elbow areas were not through the pipe wall, thus, the concrete encasement and reinforcement should not be degraded by the ,
pitted pipes. !
l The licensee had also sent divers to perform inspection of the concrete in the discharge canal and the concrete adjacent to all seven canal expansion joints downstream of the entry point of the service water piping. The inspection found that all expansion joints and the concrete canal are structurally sound.
in addition, the licensee committed by letter dated July 23, 1996, to inspect the inside of the discharge tunnel during every other future planned refueling outage to confirm that no service-related degradation of the concrete in the vicinity of the expansion joints is occurring.
Due to the fact that the service water discharge piping has shown its pressure retaining capability in the current pitted condition, the staff evaluation concludes that such capability is likely to remain if there is no further degradation of the pipes and no damage to the concrete encasement and related structures. In addition, seismic capability of the concrete encasement will not be impaired as long as the encasement is structurally sound. Thus, the licensee's inspection commitments on pipes and on concrete structures will provide assurance for timely measures when needed.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The staff has determined that the licensee's proposed alternatives of (1) applying epoxy-based coating to all the eroded areas, (2) inspecting the affected service water piping during each refueling outage and during any planned or unplanned outage of greater than 6 weeks duration, and (3) monitoring the inside of the discharge tunnel during every other future planned refueling outage are acceptable. Further, the staff has determined that crediting the service water concrete encasement as a pressure retaining structure to satisfy the requirements of the ASME Code is acceptable.
Portions of the affected pipes are encased in concrete and excavation and replacement of the encasement would be required to meet the Code. Because the proposed alternatives provide reasonable assurance of structural integrity, the NRC has determined that compliance with the Code would result in hardship
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. or unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety. Therefore, the staff concludes that the repair proposed by the licensee as an alternative is acceptable. The NRC should be informed, however, if the inspection findings, at any time, show further degradation in j the piping or concrete structures.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(ii), the staff concludes that the l proposed alternatives provide an acceptable level of quality and safety in '
lieu of the Code requirements and are authorized.
Principal. Contributor: S. Hou Date: January 23, 1997 i
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