ML20126H080

Affidavit of G Klopp Re Rorem Subcontention 1(c),supporting Adequacy of Emergency Medical Treatment Plans & Procedures. Only Two or Three Plant Personnel Likely to Be Exposed to Radiation Dose Greater than 100 Rems in worst-case Scenario

ML20126H080
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	06/13/1985
From:	Klopp G COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20126G862	List: ML20126G857 ML20126G897 ML20126G944 ML20126G978 ML20126H032 ML20126H061 ML20126H080 ML20126H111
References
OL, NUDOCS 8506180242
Download: ML20126H080 (6)

Text

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ROREM SUBCONTENTION 1(c)

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V UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

) Docket Nos. 50-456 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) 50-457

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(Braidwood Nuclear Power )

Station, Units 1 and 2) )

AFFIDAVIT OF GEORGE KLOPP (Rorem Contention 1(c))

George Klopp, being duly sworn, deposes and states:

1. I am a Section Engineer with Commonwealth Edison Company (" Ceco") . I have a B.S.M.E. and M.S.M.E.

(nuclear option) degrees from the University of Kentucky. I have been with Ceco since 1965, except for two years of military service, and I have been involved with engineering, operation, engineering management, and safety analysis relating to nuclear plants during my entire career.

2. My past and current responsibilities include:

(1) Technical Director of CECO's Zion Probabilistic Safety Study ("PSS") . In this capacity I participated in the development of new techniques to model containment effects and performed certain calculations. After submission of the PSS to the NRC, I was involved with training and licensing activities and with plant design and operating modifications related to the Zion PSS.- (2) Lead engineer for CECO's technical participation in the Industry Degraded Core Program

V (IDCOR). (3) Technical director for the Byron Risk Study.

My responsibilities included establishing scope and methodology of the study, reviewing study calculations, performing verification calculations, participating in report writing and conducting a review of the report with senior engineers at Westinghouse Electric Co. (4) Acted as CECO's representative to the technical writing group of the industry /NRC Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide Program. (5) Acted as technical advisor on the Clinch River Breeder reactor plant probabilistic risk assessment program. (6) Acted as CECO's representative to the Department of Energy Working Group on Probabilistic Risk Assessment. (7) Acting as pressurized water reactor technical advisor to CECO's Generating Stations E.9ergency Plan program. (8) Acting as a technical advisor to other groups or departments within CECO on matters related to nuclear safety, risk assessment and degraded core phenomenology.

(9) In October, 1982, I also became responsible for licensing, pre-operational and start-up test review and NSSS management for Byron and Braidwood reporting directly to the Director of Engineering for those plants. (10) Acting as lead Nuclear Engineer, in CECO's Engineering Department, for the Zion Station project during design, construction and initial start-up. (11) Acting as the Project Engineer for the first two years of the Byron Braidwood Project Development. (12)

Serving as an Operating Engineer in the radioactive waste disposal area at the Dresden Station. (13) Serving as a

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o Project Engineer for the Station Nuclear Engineering Departments Reliability and Design Engineering Group.

3. This affidavit is made in support of CECO's motion for summary disposition of Rorem Contention 1(c).

That contention challenges the adequacy of medical arrangements for personnel of the Braidwood Station who may suffer a radiological injury. M/ affidavit will explain the number of Braidwood Station personnel that could ever be expected to be exposed to a dose of radiation of such magnitude that hospitalization wculd be required to treat the resultant injury. I understand this to mean a dose of about 100 rem or greater.

4. I have considered two basic groups of scenarios which I believe encompass all possible accidents that would result in radiation exposure to Braidwood Station personnel.

The first group of scenarios are those reviewed in the FSAR, or those accidents which the plant is designed to contain and remedy without resulting in any releases in excess of federal regulations. The second group of scenarios are the " severe" accidents or Class 9 accidents which exceed the design bases for the plant. Severe accidents would likely be initiated by a design basis accident followed by a subsequent multitude of failures of the systems designed to mitigate the design basis accident.

5. In.a design basis accident, I do not believe it would be possible for more than two or three personnel to

receive the postulated radiation dose. Such an accident would necessarily occur in an area with a significant radiation source present such as within the containment. As a matter of course, access to such areas is restricted in order to minimize the occupational dose received by workers. Visits to these areas by personnel are thus periodic and limited in duration, and the number of personnel in such areas at any given time is kept to a minimum. Maintenance and surveillance crews rarely involve more than three or four people in the restricted areas when the plant is at power. Not all of these personnel would necessarily receive the full dose in the event of an accident due to shielding, exposure time and other factors. When the plant is not at power it is even less likely that significant exposures could occur involving even one person. To receive the postulated dose, the personnel would necessarily have to be in close proximity to the radiation source. Considering their close proximity and the nature of these types of accidents, it is possible that the workers would also suffer traumatic injury. But in no event would the postulated dose be received by any personnel except those in the immediate vicinity of the accident.

Thus, I conclude that no more than two or three personnel could be expected to suffer the postulated dose.

6. With regard to the severe accidents or Class 9 accidents such as a core melt accident, these accidents, as I mentioned, would probably be initiated by a design

o' basis accident. Thus, there may be the two or three exposed personnel discussed above. Beyond the design basis accident, the events leading to a severe accident would require several hours to days to develop. This time would permit personnel to leave the affected area. As the accident developed, unnecessary personnel would be evacuated from the site and remaining personnel would be in areas sheltered against radiation exposure. Thus, I would expect that in a severe accident at the Braidwood Station, no additional personnel would suffer the postulated dose, beyond those two to three personnel exposed during the initiating accident.

7. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the foregoing information is true and correct.

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\/ 4EORGE KLT@P Subscribed and Sworn to befcro me this 13th day of June , 1985.

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