ML20118D257
| ML20118D257 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 10/07/1966 |
| From: | Young J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Seaborg G US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML093631134 | List:
|
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9210120043 | |
| Download: ML20118D257 (4) | |
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COMPANY 875 CURTNtm AVENVE S AN JOSE.CAurORNIA S Sits JAM ES F. YOUhG wtCE PRE S'Ot 47 AN D C th t # AL **8 NAGC#
hvCttaa tuttav Devist0m October 7,1966 i
\\ br. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairmag.
United States Atomic Energy Commission 1717 H Str eet, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
20545
Dear Dr. Seaborg:
Our experience to date in participating with our customers in licensing proceedings for our boiling water reactor power plants has led to a number of conclusions and recommendations which I would like to ask you to consider.
The pre.em involved is illustrated by the recent AQRS
, review and finding relative to the Dresden 2 and 3 stations of the Qommon-wpalth Edison Q9mpany. At this review, goncern was expressed about the effectiveness of engineered safeguards in protecting the fuel core against overheating that could result from a possible loss of coolant accident.
Q9ngern was also expressed over the ability of the primary and secondary gontainments to accommodate an overheated core without substantial release of fission products to the environment. The ACRS observed quite properly that the rapid increase in reactor ratings over the past few years has focused attention on the substantial amounts of decay heat associated with fuel cores of present design.
During the course of the ACRS review, there was consider-able discussien of the reliability and redundancy of the various emergency cpoling sys tems. In consequence of the discussions, General Electric and Qommonwealth Edison concluded that. in order more fully to meet the objectives and reliability principles expressed by the ACRS, several changes and additions to the emergency cooling systems would be made. The cooling system, changes were such as to further reduce the possibility of c. ore over-heating and would lead to the expectation that the heat removal requirements and the fission product loading of the containment sys: ems in the accident case would be s9:antially reduced, s
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Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg October 7,1966 During the course of the review, however, there was not sufficient time to deal with optimizations to interrelated safeguards features.
In other words, actions that resulted in more conservatism in the " preven-tive" safeguards were not followed by compensating adjustments to the
" consequence limiting" safeguards.
Since the August 12 ACRS review, our engineers have carried out design and analytical investigations of the effects of the cooling system changes on the " consequence limiting" safeguards. We have con-cluded that changes to these features could be made without reducing the intrinsic overall safety of the system. Acceptance of these changes will involve some modifications in several of the boi?ing water reactor safety criteria developed by the AEC staff during the past several years.
It seems to us that there are two ways to secure under-etanding and acceptance of these changes la boiling water reactor safety criteria. One such procedure - and to our way of thinking the less effective and desirable mechanism - would be the case-by-case approach through Staff, ACRS and Licensing Board reviews of future license applications.
The other approach would be a specific program for the review and approp-riate modification of the criteria.
It does not seem appropriate to use the project licensicg procedure to develop changes in the basic safety criteria.
It seems to us that in view of:
1 The basic nature of the safeguards systems and their interrelationships, 2
The large numbers of projects that will be affected by the changes, and 3.
The keen interest of applicants in estimating their licensing risks in advance, that the\\ second alternative is much the betu r epproach, More specifically, let me suggest for your considerat'or the following neycin plan of action:
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O Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg October 7,1966 1.
If desir ed by yourself and the Commissioner s, we would meet with you to characterize and define the problem as we see it.
2 Meetings of a few of our senior technical and n.ai sgement people would be held with members of the AEC fegulatory staff and the ACRS, separately if desired, to establish the nature of the anomalies in present criteria and to explore a course of modi-fica tion.
3.
At the conclusion of these meetings, we would propose to meet with the Conunission staff to plan j
the details of a seric $ of working level meetings that will lead to the preparation of amended safety criteria.
4.
It would be our suggestion that the working Icvel g
meetings take place in a semi-continuous manner in Washington or Bethesda and that the ACRS be invited to s end an observer to the meetingr,. The scope of the working 'aevel efforts would include (a) generation of amended boiling water reactor safety criteria by the working group, (b) a series of technical reviews before appropriate members of the AEC regulatory staff, and (c) a presentation to the full ACRS grot.p with appropriate participation by both General Electric and the staff.
5.
Finally, formal adoption by the AEC of the amended boiling water reactor safety criteria.
Pending completion rf this program, we would propose that 1; ense applicationa presently under review rett.in their conformance to established safety criteria and these be altered, if feasible, only following the issuance of the amended criteria.
We would be reluctant to suggest tny precise time schedule, for this activity or press for a hasty sclution. On the other hand, the solu-tion of the prf,'
c ould be applicable to quite a.- uber of plants. We
I Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg 4-October 7,1906 would plan to assign senior personnel to the work who recogd:c t'ie impor-tance of expedition in their deliberations to the development and growth of a sound nuclear industry.
I would gr eatly app; eciate your reaction to this suggestion.
Sine e r cly,').j 7
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