ML20115B803
| ML20115B803 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/01/1966 |
| From: | Mccool W US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML093631134 | List:
|
| References | |
| AEC-R-135-5, NUDOCS 9210160267 | |
| Download: ML20115B803 (2) | |
Text
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l'L tl.., c j a }.,- r by .n r is 3 - *r- ,.c "~ f,'._. .gf p, f l l l- {,li (,- -q I ( fj) l UNITED STATES: OF MERICA ATOMIC ENERGY COMMI8SION In the tutter of ) ) CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY ) OF NEW YORK, INC. ) Docket No. 50-247 ) (Indian Point Nucicar ) Generating Station Unit ) No. 2) ) STAFF'S ANSk'ER TO THE CONSERVATION CEWER'S " APPEAL TROM INITLiL DECISION, EXCEPIIONS AND BRTEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF" Summary i The Conservation Center (Center) sought to intervene in this proceeding. Its petition to intervene was denied by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB). This ruling has been appealed by the Center. In its appeal, the Center requeets the Comission to consider additional allegations which were never presented to the ASLE in the proceeding. l l l 3 ) ay(
i 2-The appeal should be dismissed for the following reasons: 1. Even if ti.e petition to intervene had been timely filed, it should have been denied because it does not meet the requirements of the Commission's Regulations. The additional matters alleged in the appeal in support of the petition do not cure the defect. 8 2. No justification for the late filing of the petition to intervene has ever been provided by the Center. 3. The exceptions to the substantive findings by the ASL3 ar, not properly before the Commission and, in any event, are without merit. I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE On July 29, 1966, the Commission published a notice in the Federal Register that a hearing would be held before an ASLB to consider the issuance of a provisional construction permit to the Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., I l
pup"" f 3 for the construction of a nucicar reactor at Indian Point. The notico provided that the hearing would commence on August 31, 1966, in Buchanan, New York, and that a pre-hearing conference would be held at the same location on August 17, 1966. The notice specified that: 'Tetitions for leave to intervene, pursuant to the provisions of $ 2.714 of the Com-mission's ' Rules of Practice,' east be received in the Office of the Secretary, United States Atomic Energy Commission, Germantown, Maryland, or in the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., not later than August 17, 1966, or, in the event of a postponement of the hearing date specified, at such time as the Board may specify." The notice also provided for limited appearances in accordance with $ 2.715,10 CTR 2, of the Commission's " Rules of Practice." Following the prehearing conference on August 17, 1966, the ASLB, in an order dated August 19, 1966, postpened the hearing unt!1 Septembar 14, 1966, and schedulod another prehearing conference for September 13, 1966. l L
t t -4'. In response to the notice of hearing, the-Conservation. Center wrote a letter to the Commission dated August 13, 1966, (Appendix A hereto) requesting a delay in the proceedings and indicating a poss;' ale desire to participate, The regulatory staff responded to the Cente.r's letter on August 25,1966, (Appendix B) noting that the hearing had already been postponed by the ASLB. Th6 staff's letter provided the Center with a copy of the " Rules of Practice" and-specifically advised the Center that ar.y request to appear in the proceeding should be filed in accordance with the erovisions of the " Rules of Practiet." The Center was also provided the pamphlet, " Licensing of Power Reactors," which describes the Commission's precedures for the evaluation of the rafety of a proposed power reactor and the presentation of such evaluation in a public hearing. In a letter dated September 8,1966, (Appendix C) the Center - requested permission to intervene. Because the letter was not received in time for the parties to make formal reply prior to the hearing, the staff counsel telephoned . Larry Bogart, Director of the Center, to suggest that he attend l J
t - t 4 the prehearing conference so that the catter could be determined on that occasion (Ir. 78 - 79). However, at the prehearing conference the determination of the Center's petition to inter-4 vene.vas deferred because the Center's counsel was not available. In response te a question from the ASLB,- Mr. Bogart ' confirmed that he had been provided a copy of the Commission's '%ules of Practice" and indicated it had been furnished to his attorney (Ir. 77). During the prehearing conference, the Chaire,an of the ASLB and staff counsel outlined the requirements of $ 2.714 of the Commission's rules to Mr. Bogart and pointed out why the Center's letter of September 8, 1966, did not meet these requirements. i The Center's counsel confirmed t tat he understood the requirements for filing a petition to intervene as contemplated 2 by the Coc=irsion's rules and indicated.that he would file j such a ' document for the ASLB's consideration (Ir. 125 - 126). On the second ar.d last day of the evidentiary hearing,-September 15, 1966, the Center presented a document entitled, 'Tetition to Intervene by the Conservation Center, Inc.",-which was filed in 1 L
i 1 1/ ~ the record of the proceeding. The staff, the applicant, and the State of New York each objected to the granting of the patition to intervene on the grounds that it was defective under the Cocnission's rules (Tr. 427 - 446). After further argument' by the Center, the ASLB ruled: "It is the considered opinion of.the Board that the petition is and shall be hereby denied for lack of conformity with the rules of practice of the Atomic Eners;y Cocnission." (Tr. 450) II. EVEN IF TE -IETITION TO IhTERVENE HAD BEEN TIMELY FILED, IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED BECAUSE IT DOES NOT MEET TIE REQUIREMEhTS OF THE ComIISSION'S REGULATIONS. TIE ADDITIONAL MATIERS ALLEGED IN THE APPEAL - IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION DO NOT CURE THE DEFECT, Section 2.714(a) of the Co==ission's " Rules of Practice," 10 CFR 2, sets forth the requirements which govern intervention in any Commission proceeding and provides in pertinent part: L 1/ An examination of this document reflects that, except for ~ the first page and the verification, its contents are d identical to Appendix C. This point was confir=ed by 'q Mr. Bogart (Tr. 427). l
T 4 i 4 ! "$ 2.714 Intervention. (a) Any person whose interest may be affected-by a proceeding and who desires to participate as a party shall file a written petition un.r ~ oath or affirmation-for leave to intervene not later than seven (7) days before the commence-ment of the hearing or within such other time i as may be specified in the notice, or as permitted by the presiding officer. The petition shall set forth the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, how that interest may be affected by Commission 3 action, and the contentions of-the petitioner." The general rule -followed by the Commission concerning the granting of petitions to intervene was' enunciated in the Matter of Walker Truckinc company, l'AEC 103 In denying the petition of one Elliott Earl, the Commission held "13. The Commission's-Rules of Practice require that a person'in order to intervene in an adju-dicatory proceeding, must demonstrate an inter-est which may be affected by' the proceeding. Without any detailed explanation-thereof, the interest or interests alleged by Mr. Earl-in this proceeding involved- (1) his status as an i access permittee of.the Commission; (2) the interests of the Institute of Nuclear Serology in developing a curriculum and-conducting research in the atomic energy field; (3) the ~ fact that he lived with his family within_500 yards of a road'which may be used for the transportation-of waste materials-by the licensee; (4) the statement that. his f amily 'goes down the west side of the river, ' going _ -, _. _.~_
s x 8-to bathe in the summertime' and that he 'would have to change my route if I felt there was a hazard in.taking my children by this proposed plant'; and (5) his ' rights as a citizen and taxpayer and cicctor of Manchester, Conn., a resident of the area in which Walker Trucking may operate, and a person and body politic who has " substantial" interests in this matter.' 1 "14 Neither one nor all of the interests... 4 stated, as presented by Mr. Earl, gave the latter standing to intervene in this pro-cceding. The law is cicar that a member of the public, who may have only an acednmic or technical interest in a proceeding or a common concern for obedience to the law, has not such an immediate and substantive interest as to justify standing to intervene.2/ Mr. Earl's vague statements concerning claimed danger to himscif and his family a?7o do not present such an immediate and.ubs'.otive interest, even in a field where the public health and safety is of paramount importance and where each proposed intervention usually must be judged on its own facts. "2/ Capital Broadcasting Co., 2 Ad. L. (2d) l 704, 706-707. (F.C.C.1952); Kansas State College of Acriculture, 2 Ad. L. (2d) 738, 739 (F.C.C. - 1952); P.ouston Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 15 F.P.C. 1570, 6 /.d. L. (2d) 590 (1956); The Good Music Station, 6 Ad. L. (2d) 930, 931-932 (F.C.C. 1957); accord, Sincer & Sons v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 311 U. S. 295, 303-304 (1940)." 4 i e
v 9-This rule was followed in Matter of Elk River Power Demon-stration Reactor Program Project, 1 AEC 245;; Matter of -Yankee - Atomic Electric Comnanv, 1 AEC 296; 1 AEC 326; Mat'ter of' Pacific Ces & Electric: Company, 2 AEC 173; Matter of Philadelph{a Electric-l Company, 2 AEC 54, Coldberg v. United States,- appeal dismissed i June 5,1962_ (3rd Cir.), ' cert. denied 371 U. S. _902; Matter of-2/ 4 I ~ Atcor. Inc., 3 AEC. , Orderidated June 17, 1966. See also ' ~ Matter of Consolidated Edison Companv, Docket No. 50-3, 'Hemorandum and Order,"Edated November (24,1965,j 3 AEC 4 Matter of Nuclear Fuel' Service, et al.,-2 AEC_305,1306._ i j 2/ Cf. Office of Communication of-the United Church =of -Christ ~ ~ L et al. v. F.C.C. and Lamar Life Broadcastine Co., 38-U.S.L.W. i (C.A.D.C., March 25, 1966),_ which held that representative-i memberstof thet" listening;public" should be: permitted.to_ } intervene in Federal Communications Commission television L i licensing-cases. : This case :is' inapposite because ' the - l Commission's jurisdiction, cnlike_that-oflthe F.C.C.= L which is broadly based-on'the standard of "public: interest," 4 t is limited essentially xquestions of~ radiological. safety 3 and.the common defense and security. Matter of Consolidated? D Edison Company of = New York. - Inc., Docket No. 3 - 0 ' Memorandum and; Order,'l dated: November-24, 1965, 3-AEC-t } I -l 9 ,,;4.--
s 4 10 - 4 In, previous Commission cases attempted intervention by an organization, such as the Center,;has_been denied becaus'c 4 of the failure of the petitioner to demonstrate _that the Committee or corporate entity had an interest which could be affected by the outcome of the licensing action.- In the Matter of Southern California -Edison, et al., 2 AEC 366, a-petition to intervene was, submitted by an organization identified as the "Ad Hoc Committee"rwhose functions, inter alia, included the following: "... to maintain our - country f ree from industrial' radioactive contamination and to protect and preserve the military training potential, the natural recro-ational values and the scenic beauty of Camp Pendicton in the County of San Diego,- State of California and its ocean waters against commercial and industrial intrusion." j Upon objections by the parties that the Committee had made no showing of substantive interest which might-be affreted by the-proceeding, the Board denied its petition to intervene (Matter of Southern California Edison, Docket No. 50-206, Tr.- 25' - 28). A similar petition to intervene was filed by the'Islip Town Democratic Cocmittee in Matter of Lone Island Nuclear m,,, w e
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t ) 4. Eervice Corporation, 2 AEC 55. The petition alleged that members of the Committee-resided on, or near, or in close proximity to the public roads proposed to be used by the applicant, and feared that their health, velfare, life and property might be in jeopardy and in danger in the event the propo cd vaste disposal facilities verc licensed. In denying the petition to intervene by the Committee, the presiding officer held that: " Good' cause has not been shown to permit the intervention in a representative capacity of William E. Stochi as Chairman of the Democratic Committee in this proceeding, i since the interests of the several members-have not been established, nor has.the position of the Committee and its interest as an organization been shown to likely be affected by the outcome or determination of this proceeding," (Docket No. 27-35, Order. dated January 11, 1962, not reported J in AEC Reports.) 4 In the instant proceeding, the Center's petition to intervene filed during the proceeding alleges only that the Center 'Vas organized in an effort to help protect the health, velfare and i safety of the public in the Hudson River Valley Basin as well J I N \\ \\ \\ 3
4 L I i 4 s. 3^ 3 12._ f as in other areas of Eastern United States,Lwhere blight and . (p. 1)- The petition indicates i pollution are present dangers." that reasons supporting its position are' set-forth in the; a i following tenLpages of the petition.= However,:an examination-of this material ~ reficcts that it contains no facts de.1.on-I strating how the interest of the' Center, as such, would Ina i -affected by the. proceeding.- i i The center's." Appeal",- even with the additional _ allegations - 4 I concerning. its membership (see " Appeal", p. ;3 and sttached < ' affidavit and_ list of members), which were not-presented to L r l-the ASLB, does not meet the requirements of S-2.714. Essen-i: j tially, these additional allegations, presented for the first' j time on appeal, are to the _ affect that _ someioflpetitioner's j members reside in the "immediate area of the _ proposed site" i i-Land include : a : list of some members. Even~1f these allegations had been made to the ASLB at' the appropriate? time, the. petition - I would still not demonstrate that t.he interest of_the: Center, as such, is affected by the proceeding and the ~ petition would ~ I be. deficient under_the Commission's authorities cited:above. l n L ~ 1 y'd'-- r p,-., -. - -,.. +.
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4 l t The only authority cited by the Center to support its intervention is Matter of Power Reactor Development ~ Company, 1 AEC 1. It is not clear from a _ reading of that decision, l which involved petitions to intervene from national unions, 5 local unions and members thereof as individuals, whether the Commission considered that it was permitting intervention as.an~ J l exercise of discretion or was granting it as a matter of right, 1 AEC 1. (p. 3) In any event, since the.PRDC case,-the Com-i mission has developed the body of law discussed above which re-quires that a petitioner demonstrate how his interest will be affected before he will be permitted to intervene in a proceeding. 4 It may be noted that in proposing new amendments to the " Rules of Practice" to implement the recommendations.of its Regulatory Review Panel, the Commission published in the - 1 - Federal Register on January 21,- 1966, a '? Statement of General 3/: Policy" (31 F.R. 832) to serve as interim guidance, in which it stated in pertinent part: 1 3/ The Statement of General Policy was formally _ adopted by the Commission without change in the portiorcof the, Statement quoted below, and published in the Federal Register on September 30,1966 (31 F.R.12774). The Statement became . effective thirty (30) days - af ter publication. f' l l a 4 e .-n ,, ~.- + -,,,, - - .-s n.- + e +,
t g . a "It is the Commission's view that the rules governing intervention and limited appearances are necessary in the interest of orderly proceedings. The Commission also believes that through these two methods of public participation all members of the public are assured of the right to participate by a . method appropriate to their interest in the matter. This should be fully explained at the beginning of the hearing.
- In some-cases the board may feel that it must deny an application'to intervene but that it can still accommodate the desire of the person involved by allowing him to take _a statement and raise questions.under the limited appearance rule."
(p. 835)4/- III. i NO JUSTIFICATION FOR TEE LATE FILDiG OF THE PETITION TO DEERVENE HAS EVER BEEN PROVIDED BY THE CENIER. Even if the petition to intervene met other requirements of the regulations, it was properly denied by the ASLB as being filed too late, without any showing to excuse the lateness. A fortiori, intervention shou?d not be permitted j now.- }s 4/ The ASLB and the staff fully explained the difference-g' between intervention and a limited appearance during-the proceedings. None of the parties objected to the Center making a limited appearance and, in fact, suggested that such a course of action be followed CIr. 449 - 450). s- + w ~-4 c-.,
e n : Section 2.714(a) of the " Rules of Practice" also specifies: ... A petition for leave to intervene which .is not timely filed will be dismissed unless-the petitioner shows good cause for failure to file it-on time." The notice of hearing in. this proceeding.specifien -that any petition to intervene in the proceeding must be received not later than August 17, 1966, unless' the time were' extende'd by the'ASLB. Following its usual. procedures, the Commission published the notice of hearing in the Federal Register (31 F.R.10331) A and distributed it to the press in the general vicinity of the proposed facility in New York. As rhown in the Statement of s the case above,-the Center's.first communication'to the Commission-1 demonstrated its awareness of the notice of hearing. (Appendix A) The staff advised Mr. Bogart, the Center Director, of the general procedures for reactor licensing and that, if he wished to appear in the proceeding, the request for any appearance i
i 16 - must be made in accordance with the " Rules of Practice." 4 Mr. Bogart,.in fact, appeared at the second prehearing con-ference and was advised by the ASLB that the Center must l submit its petition in accordance with the requirements of i 2.714 Mr. Bogart appeared with counsel the following day and participated in further discussions concerning the requirements for a petition to intervene. During the discussions with the ASLB during the second prehearing conference and during the hearing.itself, the Center was informed:that under the Com=ission's rules, no late petition to intervene could be considered unicas justi-fication for late filing was provided (Tr. 78 - 84). When the petition to intervene was filed at the evidentiary hearing, the applicant,- the regulatory staff, and the State of New York all objected to the granting of the petition (Tr. 428 - 450). The leading case in the Atomic Energy Commission on the subject of late intervention is Matter of Philadelphia Electric Co cany, supra. In that case, a petitioner sought to intervene after the issuance of an initial decision. The Co=miseion held that: } t
=, t 1 "His present motion is not timely,-and he has offered no explanation of.his delay in moving for leave to intervene... He requests leave to intervene simply as a member of the public, without any showing of such a special interest as would give him standing to intervene. There was adequate evidence to support the Hearing Examiner's conclusion that construction of the proposed reactor will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. In the absence of the assertion of any facts which would justify granting leave to intervene, and after such an unexplained extended delay, to allow intervention and further delay would be an abuse of discretion." This rule was' followed by the Commission in Matter of Elk River Power Demonstration Reactor Procram Project, 2 AEC 245 and Matter of Pacific Gas & Electric Comnanv, 2 AEC 172, 2 AEC 173. The question of late intervention was most recently considered by the Commission in Matter of Nucicar Fuel Service,- et al., 2 AEC 305. In that proceeding, representatives of the photography industry, including one from-the Eastman Kodak Company, participated in the proceedings through limited-4 appearances. At one point in the proceeding, the ASLB advised that "although the Commission's Rules set a time limit on petitions to intervene, the Board would entertain a petition at that i r-- r-
18.- time and in its discretion would grant it for good cause shown." (2 AEC 305, at 306) The invitation was not accepted. Despite these facts, Eastman Kodak Company sought to intervene following a month's recess of the hearing. The ASLB held: 4 "In view of these facts, the Board feels that it gave every opportunity to the photographic industry to develop evidence with respect to the effect of the facility on the industry. Matters of this sort must be brought to some repose. A great deal of monies and' effort have been expended in trying to make a= con-crete reality of this undertaking.. It must have been a matter of public knowledge for at least a year before the present proceedings began. Under these circumstances, the Board feels it would be extremelv unfair at this late date to permit neople who have had ample cocortunity to-nrenare and nresent evidence to enter now into a procedure which would disturb materially the care-fully planned time schedule and the f ruition of year of work. " (Emphasis-supplied.) The situation in the instant proceeding falls within the rule 1 enunciated in the precedents discussed above. Despite knowledge of the need to comply with 5 0.714,.the Center did not justify the lateness of its petition to intervene. Even at this late date, no facts have been alleged by the Center to justify its i attempted late intervention. 4
. IV. THE "EXCEFIIONS" TO THE SUBSTAhTIVE FINDINGS ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE CO) MISSION AND, IN AhT EVEhT, PROVIDE NO JTISTIFICATION FOR ThTERVEhTION In its " Appeal," the applicant also lists four exceptions (Items 4 - 7) which it claims are errors by the ASLB. - The ' four points relate to the findings of the ASLB concerning the sufficiency of the evidence preunted to justify the issuance of a construction permit. Inasmuch as the Center has not demonstrated that it should be permitted to intervene as a party in accordance with $ 2.714, it cmy not now file exceptions to such findings of the ASLB. Matter of Pacific Cas & Electric Company, 2 AEC 172 and 2 AEC 173; Matter of Elk River Power Demonstration Reactor Procram Project, 2 AEC 245. Moreover, the " exceptions" raised by the Center do not reflect any errors on the part of the ASLB. Basically, the " Appeal" fails to take into account the two-stage regulatory sche =c established by Congress for the licensing of reactors _A_
I and tha Com=ission's rules in implemention thereof. Part 5.0 of the Commission's regulations distinguishes between the scope of information required for a construction permit and for an operatir.g license. The regulation governing the issuance of provisional construction permits is 5.50.35. It clearly recognizes that design details need not be provided for a provisional construction permit if there is reasonable assurance that the data vill be provided at the operating 4 i license stage. ' Exceptions 4 - 7 of the '" Appeal" reflect a possible misunderstanding of the requirements for the issuanc.2 of a provisional construction permit. The Ccater argues that the ASLB erred in finding 'that the report of the Advisory Committee 4 on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) concluded that there is reason-able assurance that the proposed facility can be constructed and operated without undue risk to the health and safety of i the public (Joint Ex. A, Appendix A). However, an examination of the ACRS report shows that while the ACRS considered that the development of the final design will require particular e, ,.w-w e
4 h 21 - 4 attention for improving and supplementing protective features of the plant, it believed that these mrJ.tcrs can be resc1ve'd during construction and that the reactor can be constructed 1 at the Indian Point site with reasonabic assurance that it 1 can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety 1 of the public. (Joint. Ex. A ' Appendix A). The other three exceptions also involve this 'same basic point. The-Center argues that (1) the ASLB should not have found that sufficient information was presented to authorize the issuance of the permit, and (2) the architectural and engineering 'dctails i can be developed during construction. As noted above, 5 50.35 permits technical information to be developed and-supplied-during construction of the facility and recognizes that, if necessary, a research and development program can be con-ducted to obtain necessary information. 4 4 In its supporting brief, the applicant argues (" Appeal", l
- p. 9) that the ASLB abdicated _its function in not' requiring its own review of the design detail to be developed in the future. This point misconceives the role assigned to atomic safety and licensing boards by the Cc==ission. That role has been described by the Co= mission as follows:
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~... _. _. i 1 l. . 22-e e. 1- - t 'The board's" role in cases-such' as this is E derived from 10LCFRL5 50.35,:which pre-i scribes the findings for a provisional. construction permit. It must be' found = 8 that the applicant has described the-pro z posed. design of the. facility, including'but; F not-limited to the principal architectural j-and engineering criteria for the design, 'and thns identified the major featuresJon which further. technical information~is, required;- that :this technical' information v'ill'he I' supplied; and that - the applicant haVL p'ro-i posed and will conduct,a research anc; development program reasonably l designed' l to-resolve any safetyLquestions} requiring. -researchiand development.- It must also be: i found that1x1 tha<: basis;ofathese findings 4- - therc~is reasonable assurance.that'the- - safety; questions will'be satisfactorily.
- olved"and thatLthe' proposed facility can be constructed
- and. operated -at the siteLselected without undue risk to.
r public health and safety. It is thus apparent that Secticn 50.35 does not. I require-that all design: details of the 3 facility must be-suoplit$j nor that at j; the construction permit-stace everv safety question shall actually-have been' 4 satisfactorily resolved.. b_ l 'The board considers the expert analyses notes any safety questions that remaini F unresolved,; evaluates the research and i developmentJprogram proposed-tocresolve. them, Land thereupon'comes:to an over-all.: judgment as_to whether'there:is reason- [ abic assurance that the cafety issues 1 will bef resolved 'and the proposed l facility. F can be'constructd. and. operated safely."- ~ ' Matter of Jerst: Central Power &' tight-i- _Comoany, 3 AEL- ,-Decision, May 6, 1965. j (Emphasis supplied) i
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d t The ASLB's decision is fully consistent with the foregoing. CONCLUSION The Appeal" of the Conservation Center should be i dismissed. Respectfully submitted, 3 As (y; cnm.Gn 9 Tro Conner, Jr. Trial Couneel Of Counsel: Howard K. Shapar Assistant General Counsel Licensing and Regulation Dated et Bethesda, Maryland, thia 31' day of October,19_66. S i o
4, APPENDIX "A" g 8% UNrrw NAT!OL E/J',/. KJV YOhi;. N. Y,.voi? 1 J l '- -August 13 1900.-
- -i'
\\ Dk- ?8S L Mr. Glenn T. Scoborg, Chairman Atomic Energy Corxaission .{ h'ashington 25, D. C.
Dear Mr. Sceborg :
I-l Koticc uns recently given by_the Atomic-Energy Corxaission that there vill be a Public l! caring on4 August 31 at Huchanan, Nov York, in ref erence to the proposed construction of a large nuclear power at Indian Point by Consolidated Edison. Li ttle-publicity was given this notice and we find many interested public organi::ations arc.un-i auare of the hearings. The season of the year makes L it difficult for interested parties to do research l in sufficient time to have inforned representatives'- l at the hearing. Because this 'is-such a najor step and there i appear to be conpelling reasons for! questioning the safety of such a plant so close to popujous-areas-ualess snecial precautions are taken, we requestthis hcaring bc_ postponed and sufficient time be allowed in setting. the date for another hearing-to allov l-parties who desire to be. heard a chance to prepare. i i r Sincere 2y, v, i. LU:jd Lt.rry Bocart Dirceter APPENDIX "A" w-h -p S}k .O s
.. _ ~ APTI::::IX "E" ,,Y 'h UNiTID STATES 4 '. C ' 72\\ ATOMIC E.NERGY COMMISSION \\'1.,_*-,*' wAsmr c row, o.c. m4s a.;$ AUG 2 5 533 i 1.r. l.c c ry So; a r t, Director The Canservation Center f.66 United Nations Plaza l New York, New York 10017 In the 1iatter of Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Indian Point Station Unit No. 4) Docket No. 50-247 1, car lir. Bogart : .Your 'etter to Chairman Scabor:: has been referred to me for reply as counsel for the regulatory staff in the cap-tiened matter. For your assistance, I have enclosed a y copy of the pamphlet, " Licensing of Pouer Reactors" uhich 4 describes the Commission's procedures for the evaluation of the safety of each proposed power reactor and the presentation-of such evaluation in a public hearing. In accortance uith the statutory requirements, the notice of hearing was published in the Federal Re;;ister on July 30, 1066. In addition, a public announcement concerning the hearint was made by the Commission-and sent to newspapers in the New York area. In addition, in this particular care, Ccngressman Richard L. Ottin;;cr's office advised i that he nade a press release concerning the forthcoming hcarih;, te newspapers in the vicinity of the plant. The appucation ucc filed December 3,1905, and since then has been under review by the regulatory staff of
- he Comr.iscica and the Advisory Committee on F.eactor dafc3uards.
I have enclosed a copy of the staff's i APPENDIX "B" 1 Ci vm \\ +. ~
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- ,.
"' n.'ety Evaluation" in thi s raatter, wh'ch ineccpN ater t.ir tcport of the *Cl:S as Appc1di:s A. You vill note that many opecial i rceautions have been 'taken tn a:wure tiie rafety i of the plant und that continuine review of the development of these saferuards is provided. It thould also be er.phasized that the issuance e,f a construc-tien permit to an applicant does not authorize operation of the reactor. The applicant may not load fuel into the re tor-4 -entil he has received an operator'c license from the Commission.' Defore approvin:; the issuance of an operatinL license, the-Commission reviews the completed design and construction of the facility. Before such a license is issued. public notice and opportuniti for hearing is provided in acccrdance with the Commission's '%ules of. Practice," 10 CFR Part 2, a copy i of uhich is enclosed. Your letter to the Comaission specifically requested a post-ponement of the proceeding. Such a request could be con sidered formally only upon a proper shouing of cood -cause ' by a party to the proceeding as provided in the " Rules of Practice." However, the Atomic Safety and Licensin; Board-in this pro-ceeding postponed the formal hearing until September 14, 1966. A copy of its 'brder," dated August 19, 1966, is also enclosed. In the event you determine that you wish to appear in the I i proceedins, your request, filed in_accordance with the i-provisions of the ' Rules of Practice," should be addressed to the Secretary, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Kashington,-D. C. 20545, t -Sincerely, -i Orisa$ ped by Tray B. Conner,Jr. } Troy B. Conner, Jr. Trial Counsel
Enclosures:
As stated a' cove Office of the Secrc:ary, w/o encl. ec: / v n E. Upton, Ecquire soseph F. icinto, Esquire { N- -i i i
= - _ f - e p.onvuioa cua n w m<1~y '+Ya. LY. W: 7 Statement for AC Public licaring ' Indian Point Uni: no. r' Cdp tions to S fotv Dmluetion by the Divi e. ion of k ey w I.' c cm e w. 'v7 'b. sonic.:.norgy comission in the mattor of Con-adison Co. o f i:,'.. Indian Point Nuclear Gonorating Unit No. 2, ?ockokill, N.Y. Swff. K n. Co-m? Easic facts: Nao sito is loc:tod 2 5 nilos from the c onter of Pock: kill, U.1"., 1; abd approximotoly 24 nilos north of Now York City." (Pago 5) 1\\' "The Indian Point I facility in the largost reactor that ha been 4I ~' considerod-for licensing to da to. " ( App ondir. A: Advisory Connittco ( on Reactor Saf eguanis, lotter) Obiectiene: I l "In view of tho relatively high population density near the cito and the large t *, o of the roactor, the do61gn objcotive of tho containment vessel is to havo negligible outicakago under accident condicions. This is achioved by a penetration pressurization system, a weld channel proscurization system, and a fluid line 4 I seal water system." (Paso (,'5) After stating similarity in " general design and operating objectivo:." .of Indian Poirit II to Brookwood cnd Connecticut Yankoe facilitios, "However, there are a numbor of respects in which this facility differs from Brookwood and Connecticut Yankoo, the more-important of wnich are tho following: "1. The population distribution in the vicinity of the site for the Indian Point 2 f acility is higher than tha t of the other facilitics. To compensato,' the applicant has propos ed a containment and engincored safeguards systems which are more extensive than tha,t orovided at facilities in -less populated areas.- N. The design objective of the containment vessel is to havo i negligible outleakago undei accident conditions. - To meet this objective, the Penetration Pressurization System -(PPS) and the Isolation Valve Seal Water System (IVSWS) havo been provided to p reclude outleakage at all conte.inment loc ations where leakage - could be expected. (Pcge 10) j The cuestion Since the Indian Point f acility 2 would be the " largest roactor considered for licensing to dato", according to I.CES abovo, and sinco it differs from Brookwood and Connecticut Yankoe in meetint; the objoctive of "negligiblo outloakago" by providing a Penetration ?roccurization System and~ Isolation Valve Seal Water Systen, doesn't thic make Indicn Point D 2 an "oxperimegtal" plant, to far un tha ??S nnd IV0'dS nro conc crned.'.'- Noto statement on Page h7: "A cystem of this type in.which the penetration is continuously pressurized has not been previously proposed for uso in other licensed facilities." s' Also, Pcco 1;S, with regard to IVsus. u m, d sig,..#enture chould + + - ~ %,.~ nato this potential source of lcShaSc." Unat exocrience nc'e been garnerod to support this claie -. ~.
4 Ob$cetiens to Snf ety Evnlustien Pago 2 specific power (up to 20.7 kw/ft) perato at somewhat higher 2 "The Indian Point fuel rods will o and contral fual temperature (up to 4250' F) thia the, other f acilitie s. " -(Page 11) This raises the samo que: ; ion about tho experimental nature of = Indian Point II. 3 "Tho american Standards Association and the Institute of Electronic and slectrical Angineers are ac tivelv enenned in the develooment of standards covernine-the c esinn, testinn, and installation of reactor o rotection systens. bono anG staff memoers are participating cirectly in tais effort to ensure the creation of quality standards 1 and the proper implementation thercof. Evaluation of the Indian Point Unit No. 2 reactor orotection system will 'oe baseo on such' stancares, as tnev nre prooos eo or acontec. " trage 15) The wisdom of even considering a construction licence for a large nuclear reactor, approximately 24 rdles from New York City, when " standards governin protection systems"g the design, testing and ins tallation of reactor hnvo not vet been fully devolooed, and'the fact that the lives, nealth, anc property'of millions of people depend on such standards, makes it clear that there is no " reasonable assurance" of public health and safety in constructing Indian Point II. h-Criterion 1 (b) states: cs "Perfomance standards that will enable the f acility to withstand without loss of the capability to protect the public, the additional 4 forces imposed by the most-severe earthquakes, flooding conditions, i winds ice, and other natural phenomena enticioat ed at the proposed site.3 (Page 16) What about unnnticinated natural phenomena, such as the floods which threatened to knock out ridwest utilities, as reported in the New York Times, April 25, 1965. Philip Sporn was quoted ~in -this N.Y. Times report as saying: "nothinn within a tenth of this severity ever hannened before. The devas ntion hsocaned because 1 we cien't cream it could ever be that bac." If Mr. Sporn, one of our leading utility engineer-enecutives could make an admission like this, can we afford to Gamble with the lives of millions of poople, and the impossible problem of evacuating New York City should something " ten times as severe" as anticipated i occur at the Indian Point II site?
- 5. With regard to Criterion 5, Paso 22 of the "sar.oty Evcluation" reads:
"The applicent intends to continue studies of auch ' instability. Further excerimental informetion should be available from the Sen Onorre enc vonnecticut 1cnnee fccilities by tne time the indian roint 1A facility is to operate. ' Are we to understcnd fro = this that the s af ety of our population will depend in part "on experitental infonmation" being available from atomic plant in California cnd Connecticut Yankee facility, "by the time the Indian Point II facility is to operatef ? I n- --n, -.n -en,~ ~ ..c.~,
j cd < e s t i en t. to S,fotv hveluction FaGc it is difficult to see how Indion Point ~I mect the criterien of a "demone trated perfornance capability and reliability" when 4 Pago 10 of tne Safety Evaluation statos thit f acility would d iffer from brookwood and Connecticut, Yankoo; ?n6o 47 states: "A cystem of this typo in which tho penot. nt ion is continuously pressuri od has not boon previousiv nronosed fer uno in other licenced fucilities," tago ed states: "Furtner experimental inf ormation should bo. availablo from the San Onofre and Connecticut Yankeo facilition by the time the Indian Point II f acility is to operato", 1. Pege 15 states: " Evaluation of the Indian Point Unit No. 2 reactor ~ protection system will be based on such standards, as they aro proposed or cdopted." (referring to_ work now boing conducted to i develop such-standards ), and other saroty considerations hav e been 'reforred to Eby s tating: "We believe that these matterc can be resolved during construction of the facility" (PaSe 30) Is 'it fair to the American public to build the largest atomic plont to be considered for licensing to dato, without great er assuranco of inherent safoty than thia? 4 12 " Solid waste will consist of miscollaneous contaminated rubbish and spent ion-exchanger resins. Those will be packed in suitable containera of stool and concreto and shipped off-site." (Pago 58) In view of the large population in near-by Now York City, and the record of transportation accidents involving radioactivo vastoa, d i the additional accumulation of both solid wastos and liquid wastes referred to in other sections of the Safoty Evaluat i on, rais e additional questions to the wisdom of building Ancian 7oint Unit 2. 13 "...it should be recognized that a conpleto ovaluation of_ potential accident consequences cannot be mado until the final thermal, hydraulic, em' physics parameters of the core have been detormined.. The conseque ses of these accidents will be evaluated by the applicant when final design -dotails are available and will be reviewed by the Staff prior to reactor operation.d (Page 62) 1-How can a construction permit for Indian Point _ II, so close to-a population cf-millions, be justified until all such information is available for evaluation of potential accident consequenocs? - i From an economic viewpoint alone, how can tho. Lavestment of millions of dollars, tunether this-comes from Con-Edison's stock-holders, consumers, or the American taxpayor, through ADO subsidies), be jus tified-- when an oneratinc license may never bo granted beccuse of questions related to safety which have not yet been answerod't Still another economic injustico is the fact that insurance is not available to home and building owners for radioactive contamination donage. Property owncra in the area that would be affooted should a major accident a t Indian Point II occur, (and tnis is admitted to bo ( possible) would stand -to -lose everything they havo--their homes and businesses--in the event of such an accident, with only the inadequato l Price-Anderson Indemnity of 0560 million to cover damages which could exceed S7 billion dollars. I i
d Objectiens to Safetv Evnluttien ?ngo 5 10- "As a backup to tho'no: mal. standby AU power supply described above, diesel generator -sets will be provided with the capability .of starting and supplying the power requirements of tho ensinocred safeguerds as wel' as. tha t equipment required to effect a normal facility shutdown. Thero will be three diesels that will au toma ticolly start on loss of voltage to tho 480. volt. bus stations. yhoso enn su6ely cicetrical eeuer for the encincered sofoguards, or equipment required for a normal snutdown. If only tuo ciesels are assumed to operate, those saf eguards required to precluce i, containment overpreasurizationo and significano circoniua-water reaction can be adequately supplied, a normal shutdown could also 4 3 be effected with two diescis in operation. "All comoonents and structures of the emergency tower sunol! system are vital to snfo snutdown ann isolation of tne renctor, ano are, therefore, designed as Glass 1 in terms of seismic cosign." (pages 51, 52) Sinc e I zm not"an ensinoer, I' do not know whe ther this s ection. of the Safety 1Naluation is questionable or not. But in view of the fact-unat too emergency power supply sys tem is " vital" to-safe shutdown and isolation of the reactor, it should be remembered that following the November 9th blackout, the World-Telegram reported (No". 13, 1965): " Con' Ed officials said they could not exclain why automatio circuit breakers annarently did not cut out in timo to save at-least three power-crained generators in the city from damage. 'You 'll have to talk to the engineers downtown. ' Neubauer (John P. Neubauer, managar-of-system operations) said." 4 According to the Journal-Americcn of Nov. 10, 1965: "A spokesman for con Adison explained today why four of the city's boroughs... slid into darkness at approximately 5:28-o' clock last nigLt. "'What should have happened is that automatic equipment should have cut us off from ths interconnected system with -upstate. 4 The other alternative would have been to disconnec t us mant-ll For some unexplained reason neither of tnese things happenea."y. Would it be possible for the " automatic" equipacnt and other components - and structure of emergency power supply system " vital" to safe shutdown and isolation of the atomic reactor -at Indian Point II to " fail" also- "for some unexplained reason"? 11 " criterion 23 (from Page 35 of Safety Evaluation) "In 'detenmining the suitability of ' a facility for a proposed site the acceptance of the inhorent and engineered safety afforded by the systems, materials and components, and the associatod engineered saf eguards built into the f acility, 3d13 d eo end on their dcmonstrated nerformance escability and reliability and the to which the operability of cuch systems, materials, extent components, and enginoered safeguards can be tested and inspected during the lif e of the plant." -~ ~ * *
- od < e etim te Snbetv =C uttien PEGS U) 6 "The applicant has s tated: 'The principal critorien of control '
ststion-design and-layout is that all controls, instr ncntation disolsys end al::rns required for the _ safe operation and shutdeun of t' he plant are readily availabic, to the operators in the control s l recn.' (Pago 36) d Since Censolidated Edison personnel will be operating the proposed I stonic plant Indian Point II, public health and safety is entitled I to assurance that Con-Ldison is sufficiently responcibic c-'t i efficient, It should be renenbered, in this connection, that tho Federal Tower Connission raised serious questions about tho efficiency of Con-Edison on the night of the blackout, Novenber 9th. The new York Tines of Deconber 12, 1965 reported tha t the F.P.C.. blaned Con-sdison for f ailing to provide more explicit instructions to its engineer, and that had-the Con-241 son engineer on duty noved quickly enough, the New York City area night not have been affected by the blackout. 4 Serious as this failure in' efficiency and responsibility was, a similar failure in the event of ~ an energoney at indian Point II j could be catastrophic. 9 "Also of concern are the potential adverso offects of fires originating in the control and safety systen wiring and/or within the control room itself. In our opinion, a direct, analytical safety analysis relating to the nos c ibility of reactivity excursions: resultine from such fires is, in cractice, incossible cuo to tne rancor nature of fire can2r'e tna tne necriv infinite variety c: t:op ni ble circuit - raulte tsone e unc a ro *, some 'sofe'l whien cot?Td i result.- +++ "h this connection, a literature search was conducted with the assistance of the conputer facilitics at the Nuclear Saf oty i Infornation Center (NSIC) at. Oak nidge National Laboratory, to study the historical record of such excursions. ' USIC has inforned us tha t the were untble to find env recorde of incid it s involvin-resctor cansco as a result or fire.$ ncun eo c r.c u r s i ons. ' (rages,U-j$) The Safety svaluation then continues, with questionatie logic 4 since they have just admitted that reactivity excursions resulting fron firessafety analysis of possible a thct there are no records of previous 1.s inpossible, snd "hsed on the forecoin? exoerience with theso,: c onc id orn ti on s, we b el.* e ve that. C riteri en__ - lo is entisfied." Eow can the AEC, or the public, be s atisfied when potentit.1 adverse effects of. fires are admitted to bo I'of co.c orn", when a safety analysis of then is inpossible, and aben there are no records' of incidents involving reactor damage ne a result of firo-induced excursions, on which to base proper safeguards? i t- .,, _. - -.,.. ~,. -,..
i d i ) i Pacc 3 j Obiectione to 5.fetv Evniuntion l 6 "At the cre$ ent t$re. there ir little carinee q;1 eMr-t d orcssu-1:co water reactors witn nooitive or. Sero temerr W*> 1 cocrficients of renetivitv. ino 12.mived expericnc e to c:.cc han tne maf~roac tor. Thic caporienco hos providcd boon coravou ct support of the snelytioni techniques usod to predict moderator In cddition, temporuture coefficients in plants of this typo. dotallod prior to s tartup of the Indian Point 11 facility,d bo availabic from the han Onofre reactor." (tage 23)quee.houl information to verify analytical tech.ni a l r Again, we find referenco to "littic experience" and depcndoney on the California reactor-to provido information on a criterion of safety for indian Point II. 4 7 "The applicanth orif,inally stated in the Report the t a 5fd circorsiu.- water resotor could occur if two of the three diosclu provided uore available to power the pumps of the cafety injection system. i However, more recent coloulations have indicated that a z,irconiun-water reaction of about 10$ nicht occur under the sano oonditionc. Vndor, these circumatences, about 20A of the fuel pellets would be exposed and could fall to the bottom of the roactor vossol. In our opinion, this amount of coro darcoge would appect to be exocouivo, even though calculations indicato that the integrity of the 3ressure vessel would not be joopardicod. i 1 "In consideration of the foregoina, the ACRS has recomme.sded, and. l the staff agrecs, that tho flow capacity of the sofoty injection . system should be increased and/or is.provemento.-should be mudo in i i other system characteristics, such-as pump discharge pressure. In addition, the forces to be onpected uithin the reactor vossel in the ovent of primary system f ai"ures must be carefully examined to ensure that the capability of. the safety inj ection system is j not impaired under these extremo e inditions. We believe ths t r tnese matters can be reco1ved durine construction of the ra cility'.' j (from tage, 30 of tno baf oty e. valuation o ? -ndian toint II) i It should be noted here that ths,, vf scry Lommittee 1 Henctor ~ Safeguards startled the nuclest inda tty, - acco. din; Uueioonsen, January,1966, by recommending"that sadden, ontast.. Ao failure-of r pressure vessel--since tLe start.of the power re or pro 5 ram 4 classified as an incredible acoident, one that ne ed not be taken into account in reactor-safety analyses, be reclassiflod cs a possible acoident; and that futuro nuclear power station plans - ) design against the possiblo consequences of such rn accident." t i Has this possibility. (of nudden,- catastrophio failure of a pressure vescol) boon taken into account in-the ::.axitum credibic accident 4 ocnsidered in this Safety Evaluation report by AEC's Division of Rcactor Licensing? Is the public interest being served by the beliot of the AEC, as stated on Page 30 of this report, that "these-mattu s crun be resolved. Wring cot 4ctruction of the f acility"? i L --,,_a .,-.--__,_,_,-._._;w--.___,_.,~.._~.._-.J._a-J.,-_,.-_- m,,,
Objections to Snfety Evoluntion Page 7 114 ""The course and consequences of a doublo-ended f ailure of the Maxinum Crodible Accidont prinary coolant piping, the nsxt=um crediblo accident, (%;A), were ovaluated by the applicant., Wo believe that this accident represents the maximum potential for off-site consequences." Page 62 Thero is no mention in this Safety Evaluation of thi estimatoo medo by the AEG in its 1957 Brookhaven Report, "The oretical Possib111 tion and Consequences of Major. Accidents in Largo Uuoloar Power Plants" which estinated naxinumn o'r 3,kOO' killed, h3,000 injured, 07 billion in property danogo, ann 150,000 square niles of land affected, as the result of a singlo najor accioens An na atomic plant of 500,000 kilowatts thermal power. In a ietter dated June 18, 1965, Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairnan of the Atonio Energy Commission statod: "Honotors today are much larger than those in prospect in 1957, their fuel cycles are longer and their fission product inventories are larger. "Therefore, assuming the cano kind of hypothetical accidents na those in the 1957 study, the theoretically calculated damagos-would not be less and under some circumstances would be substantially more than th'e consequences reported in the earlier study." ~ What would be the consequences of a major 'a'ocident of the kind considered in the 1957 Brookhaven Report, at Indian Point II? (in tor =a of people killed, injurod,. property danage, and 1cnd affected7) Again, the brookhaven Report stated- (Pago 9): "Inhabi tant s of portions of the orens~ af f ooted unuld hnve to be evncuated to avoid. _ gerious exoosure." Since Dr. Edward Toller has stated in an articlo, " Energy from 011 and from the Nucleus" (Journal of Petroleum Technology, May,1965) that a" nuclear reactor could out its radioactive toison under a sttble inversion layer eno concentrate it onto a rev nuncret scuare miles in a truly cencly racnion": 1sn't it possible that a naf.npossible task of evacuating New York City--approximately or atomic plant accident at Ancian toint II could create tho 24 niles sonth of the proposed sito for the " largest" reactor yet to be considered for licensing? Pagos 65"68 nontion neveral " Minor Accidental Releases of Radio-activity s sinat of " major" relonson, which however " improbable", are concoded. to be "possible". Can wo affo'rd to take the risks involved, when we remember'the lesson of the " highly i= probable" blackout of Novenbor 9, 19657
~ ~. 4 i j .@ ctions to Safety Evalunti on Pago O te on hvneuntion in the avent of _ o na jor otonic.lant n oc id ent : Frem AEC Brookhaven Ropor* of 1957,' based on 500,000 kw thermal reactor about 30 miles from a major cityt "Inhabitnato of portione - of tho crono affootod would havo to bo evacuated to avoid serious exposure. Access to various crono might j i be denied for differert longths of time, and the subsequent uso of land for agricultural purposes might be ourtailed, with possiblo loss of stending crops." (P. 9,10) l "Tha Volet11e Release Cados 1 Evneuntion, h ximum bl.000 pornenn,.,0205 viillions (Toge 12) 'The 50 Perocnt Release'Caso : Evacuation, hximum ' h60.000 persons $2300 millions (Page 13) 4 i The question must be raisods If a major accident occurs at Indian Point II, isn't it possible that 4 people in the New York City area crould be exposed to " serious" levels of radioactivity'I S'.nce Now York City, and its ten million inhabitants are nerely 214 miles couth of the proposed.sito for Indian Point II, isn't it possible that they night have the " serious exposure" as the i result of such a major accident, which would ordinarily require tho evacuation referred to in the brookhaven Report quoted abovo? If not, how nany people in areas that would. be affected, would requiro i ovacuation--and how great an aron would romain inuccessible or uninhabitable for what length of timo? According to a report, " Planning for the Control o7 Radiation Accidents" prepared by Donald R.~ Chadwick, M.D.; Donald A. Peosok, and Donald J. Nelson Jr., for presentation at a Seminar in Genova, Switzorland, Nov. 16-23, 1963 i "If major accidents should occur-at nuclear recotors, fuoi reprocessing or wasto disposal f acilities, fallout or spill releases to the environment may result. Such accidenta may involve relatively large geographio areas, relatively largo numbers of people-or volatively high exposures. Coordinated planning is essential by all who night be involved operationally at the time of an accident, including the administration of the installation as well as official agencies." (page 11) This raises another questions In-the coordinated planning now' in offect sufficient to meet the emergency that a major accident at Indian Point II could creato? (Ppges 6, 7) The sano report statess Certain competencios in recognizing, reporting and initia12.y controlling a radiation accident are required by polico and fire department personnel who are most likely to be first on the scono." In view of the nood to tranaport highly deadl radioactive wastes f.+om Indian Point II, over public highDays, are our p o{ico end fire departnents prepared to d.oal with nooidenta involving the transportation of radioactive wastos7-
e O 4 I ] cd<cetiens to Sarotv incluntion ?oGC 9 15-In view of the unprecedent crisis which a najor atonic plant accident at Indian Point II would creato, the question of possible sabotoco cannot bo iJnored. At the tine of the blackout, the New Yorg.uses reported on. ovember 11, 1965: ";dlitary N sourcos said that at tho very least the bicchout raised quectionc i of possible enbotono in the future ns o totun for nurorito attney." 1 1 In this instanec, a surprino attack would not be necessary. j As Dr. Edward Teller has pointed out in his articlo, " Energy fron 011 and from the Nucleuc": i "But a powerful nucicar reactor which hac functioned for ncme time has radioactivity stored in it Erentiv in excess of that relcaced fren a cowerful nuclear bonb. Tnore is one-cif f erenco, and tnis i cifference c.a.cos Ino nucicar bomb look like a relatively safe ins trument. In case of an atmosphoric nucicar explosion the radioactivity ascends into the stratosphoro. Relativoly small i amounts are deposited in the immedisto neighborhood. i "a gently coeping nucloor roactor can put its radioactive poison J under a stable inversion layer and concentrate it onto a row hundred square miles in a truly deadly fashion. This is why we i must be exceedingly careful in constructing nucicar reactors, by being careful and also by good luck, we have< so f ar avoided all { serious nucicar accidents." If these facts were widoly recogniaod by ?the public, would they want 4 j to take the chanco this statoment implies To return to the question of possible sobot' age, it is not widely kno,m that soveral attempts were nado to sabotage the nuclear submarino,). 1 Nau t il u s_, (as reported in " Death of the Threcher" by Norman Polmar In addition to the possibility of a najor accident at Indian Point II from humap error, mechenical failure, fire, and more sovero " natural j phenonenn such as earthquakes than has been anticipated, we must also add the possibility of sabotaso to the risks inherent in this atomic plant. l 16-In his book, " Death of the Thresher" Norman Polnar quoted Adniral Rickover extensively on f aults the Admiral had diccovered in nuclear 1 i submarine construction. Admiral Rickover cited several ins tanc es -l of gross negligence on the part of "noarly every major electrodo manufacturer in.the United. Statos". We have only to consider the loss of the Thrqrher, cnd the hi hly ~ 6 [ disturbins facts untovered by the investigatin of this lose: report, York Times of January the aew 10, 1965 reported that the invectigation amounts to an indictment of tne Navyi s t echnio n1 nan:gement, 4 for throughout the hearings there is repeated evidence of poor decign, i violation of design plcnc, poor fabrication, poor ucric.snchip cnd incompleto insp ection. "...to wondor whether American inductry is 4 ,at present capable of offering "renconable assurance" of public i nealth cnd safety in the complex manufacturing processes necessary to the construct.on and oporation of Indian Point II. I i ,_..m_.m. __m-,r._, .m, ,.aa
i 1 i i i owe:tient to SSf'tV EV"1"^ti " - ?c M 1 )
- 17. ndditional objections aro based on the following quotation from a statement by Dr. Theos J. Taonpson at hearings on (bofore the Subco:mittco on Indemnity und donctor safotb* diation of the Joint Conmitteo 1
Xoscarch, Development, and on atomic cncrgy, April 10, 11, 1902, published under titic "Indomnity and Reac tor Saf ety"). 1 Dr. Thompson, a former Chairman of tho Advisory Committee on Heactor Safoguards, statod: "In summary, we are.Mll feeling our way cautiously in developing our fai;h in the reliability of powcr roactor corcs. l t.very reactor that has been oporated to date, unless it has had ] at least one almost exact prototype as is the caso with cuburino i recctors, has demonstrated some r, mall differences from expected i behavior. Almost always those havo not been important, but they seem to indicate that one should be very careful in loentine, a fi:st of its kind (or U so) reactor in a place uncre cnnineered saroty is usca exclusive. y. " pa608 00, 07) (emphasis r.dd od) The proposed Indian Point II atopic plant wou*.d bo the " largest i reactor that has buen considered Jor licensing to dato",,(see Appendix A of Safety Evaluation), and, according to Page 47 of the Safety Evaluation, "A system of this type in which the penetration la continuously pressurized has not been previously proposed for use in othop licensed facilities." These facts, and the f ou years that have passed sinco Dr. f r. smpson i made this stattment, mal:cs his t.dditional warning pertinent "Let us not lose our heads in a pellnoll dcsh for economic power at the expense of safety.*' 16-What system has been set up, and what system could suffice, to 4 i warn the public in the event of a major atomic plant accident at Indian Point 117 The " highly improbable" blackout was self-evident. But how would the evacuation of people in the surroundizg area of Indian Po'nt II be effooted, if this proves necessary? 1 t In conclusion, we do not believe that the Ar crican public would bo satisfied with the conclusicn (3) of the Safoty Evaluation (Page 71): "Research and development as required to resolve the safoty questior.r. with respect to the features and com uhich require research and development, will be conducted."ponent:(e::phasis added) In consideration of all the forosoins, ve cannot agree that there is "reasonablo c.asuranco" that the Indian 1oint Unit 2 can be constructed and operated at the proposed sito without endangering tho health and safety of the public, as concluded on Page 72 of the Safety Evaluctien, i- _-w c,c.y.,~c. ..-y yc. ,,.,m_,,,.._y _,.,,,,.~,_..,#~4, ..e, , _ _.,-,-y 3 y_ c v,-~ ,y n o,,.yy--.w,-
1 s U1!1TED STATES OF A! ERICA AT0!4IC EITER0Y C01@lISSION i l l In the 14atter of C0liSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY Doci:ct flo. 50-247 0F NEW YORK, Dic. j (Indian Point Station Unit No. 2) i 4 i BRIEF OF CONSOLIDATED EDISoll C0!4FANY IN OPPOSITION TO EXCEPTIONS FILED BY CONSERVATION CENTER, D10. 9 f ik n.p \\[? D c s g i p OCT311966 ~ :3 ny 72 [ fA' October 31, 1966 r>ggy 'TT ,,{I,n() ,v v ~ e, .. - -, -,... ~.
4 TABLE OF CONTENTS, E.259. I. Exceptiono Related to Denial of Center 8 0 Petition to Intervene............ 2 A. The board properly exercised its discretion in denying the CenterIn petition to intervene as the petition was not timely filed and petitioner has not shown good-cause for the delay.... 3 E. Petitioner has not alleged in its petition sufficient interest in this proceeding to entitle it to intervene nor haa it demonstrated in its petition how its interent would be affected by Commionion action............ 7 II. The Center's exceptions to the cubstance of the Initial Decision are not justified by the record and are without merit......... 11 III. Conclusion.................. 15 Appendix A - CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS OF ATIEMPT BY THE CONSERVATION CENTER, INC. TO INTERVENE IN THE MATTER OF CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC. DOCITT No. 50-247 Appendix B - MISSTATEMENTS IN EXCEPTIONS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 4 9 ..,-...w -e.,,..
1 UllITED STATES OF AMERICA ATOMIC ENER0Y COMMISSION { 4 i In the Matter of I CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY Docket No. 50-247 0F NEW YORK, IllC. (Indian Point Station Unit !!o. 2) i BRIEF OF CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY Di OPPOSITION TO EXCEPTIONS FILED 3 BY CONSERVATION CE!TTER, INC. In its pleading " Appeal from Initial Decision, j Exceptions aid Brief in Support Thereof," the Conservation Center has filed exceptionsY to the Initial Decision of an atomic safety and licensing board authorizing the issuance to Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. t of a provisional construction permit for its Indian Point No. 2 facility. For reasons to follow, the Commission should, it is submitted, deny all the exceptions filed by the Center. f l/ Whether the Center has the proper status to file these exceptions is doubtful, especially as to the substance of the decision. See Public Service Commission of the - State of New York v. PPC, 284 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1960) t g www +-ww-s<
4 . ) I. Exceptions Related to Denial of Center's Pet 111on to Intervene. J Section 2 714 of the Commission's Rules of Prao-tico and Proceduro governs the filing of petitions to intervene. Subsection (a) of that section roads as fol-lows: affected)by a proccoding and who desires to "(a Any person whose interent may be 'j participate as a party shall file a written petition under oath or affirmation for loave i. t! to intervene not later than seven (7) days y"t before the commencement of. the hearing or within such other time as may be specified in 'jf7 the notico, or as permitted by the prooiding FF e officor. The petition chall set forth the N.. interest of the petitioner in the proceeding,. 6.1l ' how that interest may be affected by Commission action, and the contentions-of the petitioner. A petition for leave to intervene which is not timely filed will be dismissed unicas the peti-tioner shows good cause for failure to file it on - t bne. " The Conter was sent a copy of the entiro Part 2 of the Com-mission's regulations by counsel for the AEC regulatory 4 staff on August 25, 1966. Although the quoted subsection is easy to understand, the petition to intervene served J upon the parties and the-boar'd by the Center on September . 15, 1966 failed to meet two of its three basic requiremento. It was untimely (and the Center did not show good cause for [ the delay), and it failed to state an interest in the ^ proceeding which would justify intervention. _y.- y-m y _..,,,y-~,, ~
1 4 l - ( 4 A. The board properly exercised its discretien in denying the Center's petition to intervene as the petition was not timely filed and petitioner has not shown good cause__for the delay, i 1 The Notice of Hearing, published in the Federal Register on July 30, 1966 (31 Fed. Reg. 10331), specified lD that petitions to intervene in this proceeding should be i filed not later than August 17, 1966. Appendix A to this brief sets forth the chronology of events following the j issuance of this Notice relevant to the Center 8s petition l to intervene. As the Appendix shows, it was not until Sepcomber 15, 1966, the second (and, es it turned out, the inst) day of the hearing that the petition to intervene" i was finally presented to the board and served on the f parties. In spite of this delay of almost a month, the Center sweeps aside the issue of timeliness by ctating in its Exceptions: "We assume that untimeliness in the presentation of the petition was not a basis for the denial since the decision makes no reference thereto." (page 4) This assumption is wholly unjustified. At the 3 hearing both the Staff and Consolidated Edison opposed the petition for lack of timeliness as well as lack of interest. (Tr.428-434,436-439,445). consequently the board denied the petition explicitly for " failure to comply with the Rules of Practice of the Commission." (Tr.450). This . ~...m. "') ~ ~ ~ ~., ~ ~., ,,.7 r _ * ~_ _,
4 4 ground for denial was reitersted in the board's Initial Decision (page 4). In addition to publication in the Federal Register, the Notice of Hearing for this proceeding was distributed to "all of the papero and wire services" (Tr. 83), and i local und state nu,thorities were notified. It is not sur-prising, therefore, that the Center knew of the hearing in t advance and on August 13 requested a postponement of the hearing.! Advised of the three weeks' postponement on Augnst 25 and at the same time also supplied with a copy i j of the Commission's Rules of Practice, the Center did noth-ing although three weeks still remained before the hearing. The Center oc3ka to justify the month's delay in 1 the filing of the petition by alleging: "This petition has not been filed prior to this - time because the petitioner was not in a position to examine and consult advisors about-the Safety Evaluation Report which was inaued August 25, 1966. As the attached illustrates, it was upon a review of this document that a decision to petition for intervention was made, preventing a more timely submission." The Center's allegation that it could not file a petition to intervene until the second day of the hearing, 4 2/ Also, Consolidated Edison'a application had been avail ' abic to the public for several months. It should be noted that the Center has closely followed Consolidated Edisonis activities in the nuclear field. Several months before seeking to intervent in this proceeding, the Center urgod Consolidated Edison not only to con-struct additional nucicar facilities but.to convert its present fossil fuel generatin to nuclear fuel (Tr. 442-443)g stations in New York City -~- r r r ,~m +-,,, - <, - -- --- ,..y-
') n 1.I I because it had to study the sarety evaluation report is implausible if the content of its letter of September B i is considered. Accompanying.that letter was a ten-page l document commenting in detail on the staff safety'cyalua-I tion and indicating thereby'that the Center's review of that evaluation was complete at 1 cast by that date. l It is hardly credible that those who produced a I document as detailed as that of September'B would fail to [ understand and comply with the straightforward provisions j of the quoted subsection of the Commission's Rules of l Practice on interventions. The truth of the matter is that j the sequence of= events following the icouance of the Notice of Hearing indicates-a continuing.and flagrant disregard of the Commission's procedural-requirements. The Commis-i sion should not sanction this disregard.-if it' is to. adhere i to its own statement:of policy which emphasizes 1that-l ... - the rules governing intervention and limited appear-ances. are necessary 'in the -interest.of orderly proceedings." 31 F.R. 8351(January 21,1966)- In the past therCommission has not hesitated-to deny petitions to intervene which were filed after the
. hearing had commenced or had been completed.3*' To grant the Center 8s petition at,this late stage would have a disruptive effect on the proceeding which, considering the Center's delay, would be unjustified. Section 2.714 grants tho' board considerabic discretion in determining the acceptability of a late petition to inter-vene. The board exercised that diacretion after taking i into consideration all'the circumstanece before it by deny-ing the petition to intervene. r In weighing the soundness of the board's exercise of discretion the Commission is entitled to take into account that, as noted by the board, the several questions included in the petition "have been substantially answered by the evidence presented." ! We urge the Commission to uphold the board's exercise of discretion and to give due jp/ In the Matter of Philadelphia Electric Company Memorandun and Order of March 1,1962,2AECSk, _a_ppeal dismissed Goldberg v. United States (3d Cir. Tude 5,1962); cert, denied 371 U.S. 902; In the Matter of Elk River Power Demonstration Project, Memorandum and Order of December 21, 1962, 2 AEC 245; In the Matter of Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., 2 AEC 305 (April 20, 1963); In the Matter of Power Reactor Development Company,1 AEC 65, 67 (December 10,1958); and -the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Inc., Memorar.da and Orders of September 28, 1962, 2 AEC 172, 173. fp/ In. Dec., p. 4, Footnote 2, In this connection it is noteworthy that counsel fer the Center stated that the " intervention is only for the purpose of asking an occasiinal question *** from the standpoint of repre-senting the public. " (Tr. 448)
7 weighttoitsfindingo.5! B. Petitioner has not alleged in its petition suffi-cient intercat in this proceeding to entitle it to intervene nor has it comonstrated in its petition how its interest would be affected by Commission action. In its petition to intervene the Center anaerted the following intercat: " Conservation Center was organi cd in an effort to help protect the health, welfare and safety of the public in the Hudson River Valley Basin as well as in other areas of Eastern United States, where blight and pollution are present dangera. "The outcome of the present proceeding, and any increase in levels of radioactivity by the opera-tion of the type of plant proposed manifestly affects the intercato of the petitioner." By this statement the Center has set itself up as a self-appointed protector of the health and safety of the general public. On its face this statement does not conotitute a show'ing of such an immediate and substantive intercat as to justify intervention in this proceeding. The pj/ Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in holding that an agency erroneously disregarded the findings of its examiner, stated: "We do not require that the examiner's findings be given more weight than in reason and in the light of judicial experience they deserve.... We intend only to recognize that evidence sup-porting a conclusion may be less substantial when an impartial, experienced examiner who has observed the witnesses and lived with the case has drawn conclusions different from the Board's than when he has reached the same conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496(1951).
. second paragraph is nothing more than a conclusion without a demonstration. The granting of intervention in administrative proceedings is not a light matter, for it means an increased burden on the agency, as.well as delay and additional effort for exicting parties. The requirement of a showing of interest stems from Section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act which permits intervention by "any person whose interest may be affected bytheproceeding."b This section does not authorize intervention by l anyone with an interest in the proceeding no matter how remote that interest may be. The Commission has consist-ently required the showing of a-aubstantive and-immediate 4 interest before permitting intervention. In the Walker Trucking Company proceeding the Commission, in denying 4 a petition to intervene, said: "The law is clear that a member of the public, who may have only an academic c.* technical interest in a proceeding or a common concern for obedience to the law, has not such an Unmediate and substantive i \\ \\ g/ 42 Usc 2239(a).
9-interest as to justify standing to intervene."1[ (citations omitted) The Center's alleged interest in protecting the "public" must also fail because the public is already adequatelyrepresented.S! Such representation was pre ided by the presence of the State of New York as a party to the proceeding and the participation of the New York State Department of Health. (Tr. 356-358). Members of the pub-lic residing in the particular area where the reactor is to be constructed were also represented by the Mayor cf Buchanan, by the chief executive and administrative officer of Westchester County and by a representative of the How York City Department of Health. (Tr.163-169, 366-367, 464-469). All these participants supported the issuance of the conctruction permit. l 2/ In the Matter of Walker Trucking Company, Memorandum and Order of March 3, 1959, 1 AEC 103, 106. Other Com-mission decisions denying intervention becaune of inade-quate or no showing of interest include: In the Matter of Yankee Atomic Electric Co., Order denying Petition to Intervene, Feb. 26 1960, 1 AEC 296; In the Matter of Philadelphia Electric Company, Memorandum and Order of March 1, 1962, 2 AEC 54; appeal _ dismissed, Goldberg v. United States (3rd cir. June 5, 1902); cerc. denied, 371 U.S. 902; In the Matter of Elk River Power Demon-stration Project, Memorandum and Order of December 21, 1962, 2 AEC 245; In the Matter of Power Reactor Development Company, 1 AEC 65, 67 (December 10, 1958); In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Inc., ' Memoranda and Orders of September 28, 1962, 2 AEC 172, 173; and In the Matter of California Nuclear, Inc. Memo-randum and Order of Sept. 10, 1965, 2-CCHpar.11,b72. 8/ Intervention-may properly be denied when the interests of petitioners are otherwise adequately represented. Semi-Steel Casting Co. V. N.L.R.B., 160 F.2d-388, 393 (Bth Cir. 1947) cert. denied, 332 U.S. 758.
0 . 4 In its " notice of appeal" the Center alleges for the first time a new interent in the proceeding -- that of a representative of its individual membero residing in'the New York area. Thio new allegation, made more than a month after completion of the hearing, should not properly be considered in reviewing the board's ruling on the inter-vention.![ The board did not have the benefit of this argument at the time of the hearing, and its decision should be. judged upon tne record before it at that time. Even if the Center's neu assertion of interect is recognized despite its tardiness, it does not follow that it is nufficient. There la no indication that the " local membero" have authorized the Center to represent their private and separate social and economic interests. What in involved here is not the status of these individuals to intervene but the right of an organization of general ( 9/ See International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. United States, 280 F.2d 645 (D.C. cir. 1960),-reversed on other grounds, 367 U.S. 396 i (1961). In that case the court refused to allow the intervenor to assert a new interest not alleged in its original petition to the Commission. Id. at 647. This was one application of the well-known rBile that review. of an administrative determination is limited to the record before the body making that determ$ nation. Radio Corporation of America v. United States, 95 F. Supp, 660 (N.D. Ill. 1950); aff'd 341 U.S. 412.
a l purposesandvagueaimstoactforthem.1S! II. The Center's exceptions to the substance of the i Initfal Decision are not just11'ied by the record and are without merit. In its exceptions, the Center has made several assertions which purport to be matters of fact; many of them are flatly contradicted by the record of the hearing. Some of the misstatements and distortions are listed in Appendix B to this brief. Apparently, the Center either does not understand or does not wish to understand the nature of the provision-al construction permit procedure. A plant need not be completely designed to entitle an applicant to a provisional construction permit. All that is required is that 10/ The Center, mistakenly relying upon the case of International Union of Electrien1, Radio and Machine Workers v. United States (supra, note 9), states that the union in that case was allowed to intervene on a showing that some of its members lived in the area of the proposed reactor..A careful reading of that case and of the petition-there involved reveals that several other and more direct interests alleged by the. union supported the order permitting interven-tion. These included (1) possible im collective bargaining agreements; (2)pairment of its possible injury _ or reduction in value of union-owned real estate and other property in the area; and (3) possible imperil-ment and destruction of the establishments at which its members were employed. The union's allegations as to intercer were not contested by the parties. Id. at 647.
0 3 - i tha design be described: This has been done. (Tr. 287-8 et seq.)b1[ 9 the principal architectural and engineering criteria for the design be stated: This has been Jone. (Tr. 287 - I2 et; neh.) the major features and components on which further technical information io required be identi-fled: This has been done. (Tr.287-15etseq.) the safety features or components requiring research and development (and a related program)1E[ be identified: Thishasbeendone.13[ (Tr.287-38). Under the language of Section 50.35 of the commission's 11/ Some of the evidence in this proceeding was prepared in advance of the hearing and was incorporated into. the transcript of the hearings as though read. Therefore the first number in the transcript reference is to the page of the transcript where the document was incorporated and the accond 'oference following the hyphen is the internal page number of the docu-ment. 12/ The Center implies (Exceptions, p. 7) that the neces-aity for such a program is peculiar to this facility which of course it is not. 13/ The AEC regulatory staff agreed that all these condi-tions of the regulation were natisfied by Consolidated Edison. (Tr. 353'- 71-72)
. 4 regulationc,b! the foregoing factors and only the forenoinn factors are to be taken into account by a board in deciding whether the requisite reasonable assurance exists. There is thereforo no contradiction between the board 8 s finding of reasonable assurance and an identification of design facets deserving further exploration. Indcod, one of the purposes of a provisional construction permit proceeding is to provide guidance to an applicant about matters which should receive special attention as the design evolves. Thi,s guidance flows from the hearing itself and from pre-hearing comments by and conferences with the AEC regulatory 14/ Subsection (a) of the regulation read as follows: "Sec. 50.3. Issuance of provisional construction permits. - (a When an applicant has nos supplico initially all of the technical information required to complete the application and support the issuance-of a construction permit which approves all proposed design features, the Commission may issue a provi-sional construction permit if the Commission finds that (1) the applicant has described the proposed design of the facility, including, but not limited to, the principal architectural and engineering criteria for the design, and has identified the major features or components on which further technical in-formation is required; (2) the omitted technical in-formation will be supplied; (3) the applicant has proposed, and there will be conducted, a research and development program reasonably designed to resolve the safety questions, if any, with respect to those features or components which require research and - development, and that (4) on the basis of the forego-ing, there is reasona' ole assurance that (1) suon safety questions will be satisfactorily resolved at or before the latest date stated in the application for completion of construction of the proposed facil-ity and (ii)tained in Part 100, taking into consideration the site criteria con the proposed facility can be constructed and operated at the proposed loca-tion without undue risk to the health and safety of the public." g@nphasis supplieg
1 i staff and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards ("ACRS"). Thus it is to be expected that the ACRS would, as it did, emphasize those matters which in its opinion called for further study, and at the same time conclude, without qualif1 cation,b ! that the requisite reasonable assurance existed. The Center han not by any citation to the record demonstrated how the evidence presented by the Applicant failed to satisfy the requirem?nts of Section 50.35. Nor has it demonstrated how the board's finding failed to comply with Section 50 35 which controlled the board's deliberations. If there is any "exerciso in semantics" as alleged by the Center, it is in the regulation rather than in the board's decision, which is. precisely accommodat-l ed to the intent of the regulation.. 1 13/ Although the board referred to the ACRS letter of August 16,1966 (Initial Decision,_ p.12) as reflect-ing "a concern not heretofore expressed...," the fact is that the ACRS on the same day wrote a very similar letter on another large reactor facilitye In the Matter of Commonwealth Edison Company, AEC Docket No. 50-249. 16/ The Exceptions (page 2, Exception No._4) nasert that the board " assumed" that the ACRS reached such a conclusion and imply that such an assumption was mistaken. There was of course no " assumption," and no mistake. The ACRS explicitly reached the conclusion. (page 4 16, 1966, Tr. 353 - App. A), ACRS Letter of August ,,. ~ _ _..m,
III. Conclusion a For the reasons hereinabove stated, all - the i Exceptions filed by the Conservation Center, Inc. ohould be denied. Roopectfully submitted, a I i /s/ Arvin E Upton Arvin E. Upton Attorney for Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. i Of Counsel LeBoeuf, Lamb & Leiby i October'31, 1966 l ). 5 4 2'.
Appendix A Page 1 i CHRONOLOGY OF LVENTS OF ATTEMPT BY THE CONSERVATION CENTER, INC. TO INTERVENE Di THE MATTER OF CONSOLIDATED EDISON COM"ANY OF NEW YORK, INC. DOCKET NO. 50-247 Date Nature of_ Communication August 13, 1966 Letter from Larry Bogart, Director of Conservation Center, to Chairman Seaborg requesting that "this hearing be postponed and sufficient time be allowed in setting the date for another hear-ing to allow parties who desire to be heard a chance to prepare." August 25, 1966 Lettep from Troy B. Conner, Jr., Trial Counsel of AEC Staff, replying to Conservation Center letter of August 13. Conner letter enclosed Part 2 of AEC Rules of Practice and letter concluded with these paragraphs: "Your letter to the Commission-specifically requested a postpone-mont of the proceeding. Such a request could be - considered formally only upon a proper showing of good i j cause by a party to the proceeding as provided in the 8 Rules of Practice.8 4 "However, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in this proceeding postponed the f ormal hearing until September 14, 1966. A copy of its 80rder8, dated August 19, 1966, is enclosed. "In the event.you determine that you wish to appear in the proceeding, your request, filed in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Paactice, should be addressed to the Secretary, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D. C. 20545." 4
Appendix A Page 2 September 8, 1966 Letter from Conservation Center to Secretary of Commission requesting permission to intervene in Indian Point No. 2 proceeding. Attached to the letter were ten pages of " objections to the Safety Evaluation [of the AEC Staff /'s which we would like to have made a part of the t record at the public hearing." Septanber 13, 1966' L. Bogart was present at second pre-i hearing conference (Tr. 77) before the Safety and Licensing Board. In response to questions from its chairman, Mr. Bogart stated that his counsel had copies of AEC Rules of Practice and ho hoped his attorney would be present at September 14 hearing. Chatrman advised Bogart of his rights and suggested he confer with AEC Staff counsel on pro-cedures of the Commission (Tr. 78). At pp. 79-80 of the transcript'AEC staff counsel set f orth the formal defi-l ciencies of September 8 letter as a petition to intervene. September 14, 1966 At the initial sessions of the hearing, the Center was represented by counsel (Tr. 124). Asked if a petition to intervene had been filed, counsel replied that "I have not, Your Honor. I was just retained last night and met my clients for the first time this morning." Counsel for Conservation Center said he would "like to be heard at this time." In reply to this the Chairman of the hearing Board said he would " prefer" to have a formal petition to intervene presented. Counsel said he could make a " quick petition at this time, but if you give me a few da s, I can make a formal petition.y'
= _. - _. = Appendix A Page 3 September 14 1966 Chairman then asked councol if he had (conttd.h a copy of the AEC Rules of Practice and understood them and counsel for the Conservation Center answered both questions in the affirmative. The Chairman then said, "If you will prepare a formal petition, we will again give consideration to your petition." (Tr. 126) September 15, 1966 During a morning recess of the hear $ng, the petition to intervene was served upon the parties and the Board. The l petition consisted of a-single page pleading with the same ten pages of objections attached to it as were attached to the Center 8s letter of l September 8. In its petition, the Conservation Cente alleges, among other things, that "this petit' n has not been filed prior to this time because the petitioner was not in a position to examine and consult advisors about the Safety Evaluation Report which was issued August 25, 1966. As the attached illustrates, it was upon a review of this document that a i decision to petition for intervention l Was made, preventing a more timely L submission. Nevertheless the i Commission's rules -expressly endow l the Hearing Examiner with broad l latitude to permit intervention at this time. That this is a proper case for the exercise of that latitude is readily apparent from the importance of the issues involved and the need for assurance that all points of view can be considered by the Commission in evaluating the company's application'and subsequent developments." l l
-..= - - - -. Appeudix B 141SSTATEiEiTS In EXCE1TICUS ge1 1 2 3 Assertions by Conservation Center Eccord References for tactual in Appeal from Initial Decision Facts Statements ende in Column 2 ] Ibge 6 - Initial decision of Atocic Board did not reach this finding. Initial Decision of Atomic Safety Safety and Licensing Board finds Site is not considered a metropol-and Licensing Board, Oct. 3, 1966. cite in most densely populated area itan area. See discussion of population, p. 5 j of United States. Tr.155 1 - 3 t
- Page 7 - Proposed and existing facil-The total dischar6e of radio-ities will discharge polluted liquid activity from both facilities into Hudson River and in event of would be within limits established Tr. 287 - 7, Tr. 516 - 7 cerious accident, radioactive mter-by the AEC. Releases of radioac-ial vould reach Chelsea Pumping tive material to the river vill l
Station of New York City rater-nect the permissibic m its for cupply. drinking vater as they leave the site. No effect on radioactive environwnt due to existing facil-Tr. 287 - 6 ity operation has been detected by i continuous monitoring of environ-I ment by applicant and State of l N.Y. Even in event of serious l j accident the resulting concentra-Tr. 287 - 6, Tr. S1T - 8 tion of radioactivity at the Chelsea intake vould ba far belov those permitted by AEC Regulations.- t Page 7 - Proposed reactor is m terial-Proposed reactor has many features I 'ly different from any other and there similar to other pressurized Tr. 287 28 is lack of experience in construc-vater reactors in operation or tion and operation of such a reactor. under construction. Any differ-Tr. 382-382, 512, 513 5 ences are well within the range of rear-onable extrapolation. 9 1
r.
- 1 i
~. Appendix D Page 2 1 2 3 Assertions by Conservati. Center Record References for Fectual in Appeal from Initial Decision Facts Ste',ements ende in Colur:n 2 Pages 7 Because ACE 3 has request-Applicant has agreed to develop the ed further information on core information required by ACBG during Tr. 323 - 7 L cooling and structural meribcro inside the course of the detailed plant the reactor vessel, a seriour-design and has presented a program Tr. 267 45 inadequacy in design is inferred. for accomplishing a fin:rl plant design and construction. ACBS believes the iter.s men-Tr. 353 - APP-As P 4 tiened in their letter can be resolved during construction. Page 9 - The ACBS request for addi-That additional mensrres should be : Sedtion 50 35, AEC Regulations . tional measures to be taken to review taken dor' not reflect inadequacy design and fabrication: techniques, of des 1; -t rather the prelin- ~ quality. control and provisions for inary.J >f the design at this o in-service inspection is-construed stage of T,be regulatory process. to indicate serious inadequacles in the design and construction of the facility. Page 11 - Lbanticipated natural The hazards asswinted with flooO., phenomena such as floods and other earthquake, vindstonns, ice, te Tr. 237 - 32 catastrophic.inclder.ts have not perature and other deleterious Tr. 353 - T-9 been considered as safety barards. natural phenomena have been con-sidered and the plant vill be Tr. 527-530 designed and constructed to withstand them safely. l e g
Appendix B Page 3 1 2 3 Assertions by Conservation Center l Record References for Factual in Appeal from Ini' ial Decinion Facte Statements mde in Colu n 2 c Page 11 - Failure of reactor vessel Such failure has been taken into Tr. 39b400 should be considered and design consideration and the plant con-Tr. 353, App. A, p. 2 chould provide against it as tainment would not be breached recomended by ACBS by such an accident. Page 11 - Population within 25 Projected population within 25 Joint Ex. A, Item 1 rSAR, miles of the site exceeds 10 miles of site is 2.8 million Section 1.4 million. Beyond 10 miles of site the effect of radiation on population from tbc mxicum credible accident would Tr. 287 - 4 be negligible. Page 12 - Reactor could spread dead-In event of the maximum hypotheti-Tr. 538-554, 455-458 17 radiation over a few hundred cal accident ani under the vorst cquare miles and mjor accident would meteorological conditions the Tr. 287 23 result in untoLi loss of life. public exposure anywhere is shown to be well within the limits of AEC regulations. The merits ' t an underground Tr. 330-381 Ib6e 12 - Alternative of underground a plant van not considered by the design were considered by the Bevtrd. Board. Such a design is untried and would be more " experimental" than the containment proposed by applicant; many features of under-ground plant design would require a large amount of study and evaluation before acceptance. I
o 4
- p UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ATOMIC ENER0Y COMMISSION l
In the Matter of CONSOLIDATED EDISON CCSIPANY OF Docket No. 50-247 NEW YORK, INC. (Indian Point Station Unii No. 2) l CERTIFICATE OF S~ TIE I hereby certif, that I have this 31st day of October, 1966, served copies of the foregoing "Briof of Consolidated Edison Company in Opposition to Exceptions Filed by Conservation Center, Inc." upon' the following persons by mailing a copy thereto, postage prepaid and properly addressed: Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq. Trial Counsel United States Atomic Energy Commission Washington 25, D.C. Joseph F. Scinto, Esq. New York State-Office of Atomic and Space Development (1 fred E. Smith State Office Building albany, New York Irving Lemov, Esq. I?5G Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10019 i L /s/ Eugene B. Thomas, Jr. Eugene B. Tnomaa, Jr. b --w w v c-- w .-mm. .,.w,.,# -T,we ,-.,.w. -c e
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,.., n,..g ..~ e . e vn + ,5'; 4 + y '. , 7... m. c ' had ceremie (UQ2) cyunaars la a dry eminnnent. The tests of metallic elesertts have been conducted on pins-pre.iradiated up to 0 9 m/o burnup. The results indicate that the higher the burnup the less spectacular is the ejectica of the se't. ten fuel teon failures in the el*Amt. The clad with stainissa steel and tantalus, have failed by release of interraleersne'fi'as, pttssun and than a gross colltpoe of the el*A*g frca loss of strength due to high temperature. Additional tests are PaM for metallic elements in flowing astbar than statio sodium. 'Dr given-to.the possibility of damage pros. Thompson suggested that attention be agation, especially from f1w blockage one to molten ~ fuel 00 sing into the flav 3ath. type of esperianat say be limited boosuse of the limited number of fuel pins available. Fast 7> actor Befety C. Omves (United Enclaar Corporation) related to reactor safety.tf50 is carrying out various samlytical and survey wo This is intended to:
- 1) Make availabla a casability to review information related to fast reactor safety.
- 2) Becounted additional work necessary to 1,em the state of the art.
- 3) Burvey and susmarise available information on fast resctor safety.
Several topical reports on appropriate subjects bave been developed as a result of 1 and 3 above. ~ conclua' ico. review by the A!23 involves Vaste' Disposal and related Em Engineering. Safety Research and to avview the total Safety Benearch pr sppresentativaan appearse desirsble. /* amers. l ~
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Ser/Moemmisarshle discussson over the apparent 2ack of av real limitation thir sover=y the siting cuides. Shore appoore-to be enough riezibility amans f =wa*.b 1 theters conoidorni so that alcost any sito is suitable for pperation of the M2 2A even thsuda nome ~ct the factern tW1vos (e.g.,_ leak rate, filter efficiency) are Earticularly reotrictivo. DoIGR ystatives dislikci the une of the term critcria for the pides since i they roeuy present a M@ia y.vcs2in's for mecie.snt ovaluction ~M~' use of varicas imagineesnt safspr.rds rather than a oct of "go - no go" para. i tartars.., A crew shaltarisroa is to be proviisi so that the etw can xcruin efter ca socident to occ; plate vtatover action vill be acquired for cperation of memecency syntec. It was noted tunpover trat the tiras avnilable for cperation i vill bs quito li=ited because of the hida radiatica icvela en tbo vessel. j l y e,- ror tastins na eparation ses i sistans testins August 290 l criticality acptacher290 captain nudklin zwiuvaa the mia 2atter.an1 the Ja:3 zwport issuoi fa 1.usust 2S62 ans comentes on the various.gpostions amised at that time. q, a;- : ; a .um rattar a.
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r.. .oxe thsenal p.e+ = = rcumins the same at:15 8 ft. .4 .-c l Pressurisins system - no plant now unec an operator actuated errey "'C [ syntas raiber then a self snau:ea system. r. c um core carstr system - no chances have been unce. l RucIcar Test:1msntation. Cbatenticaal systen v w.ye that period cerocs sa the startie emes may to =11=icatoa. I Ioss of F1W Aceht = the of Criffith ani Watindhouse bten.out 2 cornlations (;1ve dia'ferent resulta concerning burn out conditions, }zwever no fini atW damage la anticipatei en a result of the loca i of ficer ar**M. / \\ Spent fuel tards reifef cyntes = 3:13af valves will be set at 30 psi and ~sizca to rel.ieve sno*yoltme that vould result fztm a cyntaa prcosure of l 150 pale j meuenns. A s stem will bo.prwiced for m19 wolinc cf the fuel traratcr coak by.uso of quick-coccoct couplica. /.nalycia of i "cank drop" @"to N4Mtes that da:: ace to the cans n:x1 the stactor would not be excessive. s \\' 1 1 L. u
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%2Tuans,.. Wrmi = Che151A deafen will 11-whete a vent mM*ation tan w cacn.zol recrocess texz poir.ta of hida enticipated lenhoco. A ' atector vill be prcvidod'in the contaiment, Ibdrocen addition d s totthe primary r/ston vin be by une of'high Inessure "bmbo' to 2 tnimine the Wiw 4ty of Icah80s fc: : this opurce, a 7; a I' centairrent tech T:sto Occiffentions_ - 6Lsoussed durird tho acting, r + p i -mintain ecetaitrnnt interuity durin,iplant cynation - plan to oceply. i Maition of rartientato a51[ halogen filters in ths een'.*frmmt rni 1 cea:2to, ventaitdics cynte::n - A h:ac;;:n s'11tcr tua been ahd, in t,he courmes, Antor:xu, cican up r/ntes. A zarticulato filter to pinL:ni for the Cc:nral ventilation'cysten but na hsiccon filter 10 pinnnoi. her.,wer, cines the ewNs mquiroihrouLi tuvo en therso cffect on vcssal etability. Tilter testing pin cod vin be a differential pressure . check onoo or twice a vcek. i j h_st cf In 1A - 11ms: mat vill be by twing.
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shs pmblan of exterm1_nceide=ts (e.g., mi14=4~, cmumling, etc.) was then j, l a--4 list of 15. She asastor vill be ah'*As and the ' con'*ho discussed. Gho 121-1A viu, be devic:xd to oporate to o roll cf 22 or a e! 4- .w isolated autc=2+4m"yt: ben a ron of EQo is sonebed-Dr, Ecato cucsostoa i ( .:.that this li=1t bo 4" int ~1 in the 151A operstits specifiestions. Ebo j ren': tar aniszt:nry plant azo deafcnod to remain structurn11# eccuro.at. licts - V' thmach SKP'tp tot 1000 (15 c). An accolcrating forco of 0 3 a 'in beina used I, for mn eni tecvg considerations ' -Cho 1:norbotton of the bensc1 win be - i ei,n.ugthened to resint feroca due to grounding. Sho cac+"4""t vin be denicoal to vie-'M c=ter:n1 pressums to a depth of 150 foct without ~ e1im. A "el choch design factor Las beca incitrh1 in the pl::.ut to l precluio fciluro frxs f W it of tho rcactor f.ws,wi.t.nt. Befetty will be neccct14aW ct.wavne ports tf..ich have boca cynlmtod vitio respoct to rcruoling as von as cp;;rntional accidento. l l Cgrater trafning conciato of 12 nceths at Fort Italvoir broken acun as I folicvos A % cenths - Cencral reactor theory 4 Exmths - on t1:a Job traicing at the 051 reactor 4 m +ha - specialty tr*4n4,5 in zninternaco, cporation, etc. Dach operator zuot then qmlify en the pinr:t bo 10 to o?cruto an1 s can c:huco to tho Iuoition of Chift Cupervic':'.a. Sto Chift Sqperviccr 13 in i'u.E r3 arcs of cach operchin.; :.rmy pinnt. Ik, Kouts su r:nriced by acting that the follwinc arens appcer to be naJor unresolved areas of intercat 1 o L
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