ML20115A824
| ML20115A824 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/07/1971 |
| From: | Jensch S US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML093631134 | List:
|
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9210150111 | |
| Download: ML20115A824 (3) | |
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UNITEL PTATES Cf A!ECA
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ATOMIC ENERGY CCMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF CON 3OLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YCRK, INC.
DOCKET NO. 50-2k7 (Indian Point Station Unit No. 2)
CERTIFICATION OF QUEST 10NS TO ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD de Atomic Safety and *icensing Board certifies the folleving questions to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board for deter-mination and guidance in this proceeding:
1.
Is there reliable, probative and substantial evidence, reflected in the policy statement on emergency core cooling system criteria, within the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act c
which governs Atomic Energy Commission action, to justify the i=ediate effectiveness of those criteria without the receipt of evidence or co=ent from the public?
I=ediate effectiveness of emergency core cooling system a.
criteria can be justified only upon the basis of an event cr a series of events that will not permit delay in the application of new criteria or new analyses
.r evaluationc.
The interim policy statement on ECCS refers to the engoing review of ECCS since 1967 and also refers to "a large amount of info mation not available at the time of earlier revievs".
This new information is not identified to s
reflect its urgency in consideration and the only specific event mentioned is the Loft Blovdown Semi-Scale tests, which were "taken into account" without mentioning that such te ts demanded immediate action.
The Board is unable to identify the precise basis utilized by the Co=ission for its uirection to immediately apply new criteria for ECCS.
b.
Intervenors contend that there is not adequate legal basis for the criteria.
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The interim acceptance criteria for emergency core cooling i
systems for light-water power reactors enumerate the require-ments that must presently be satisfied in order to provide the Commission with reasonable assurance that the systems vill be effective in the unlikely event of a loss-of-coolant acci-I dent.
Section IV states the four general criteria that shall be used to judge the acceptability of emergency core cooling systems.
Section IV specifies that each reactor shall be evaluated in accordance with the general criteria by use of a 1
suitable evaluation model.
An acceptable evaluation model for.
Westinghause FWR reactors such as the Indian Point Station j
Unit 2 is descr2 bed in Appendix A, Part 3 Appendix A, Part 3, i
states that the analytical techniques to be used are described i
in the topical report," Westinghouse PWR Core Behavior Following
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a loss-of-Coolant Accident", WCAP-Th22-L, with certain excep-tions and constraints that are listed.
1 Evidence developed at the hearings indicates that the cladding of.many of the fuel rods in the core of the Indian Point 2 resctor can be expected to swell and burst early during.the temperature transient of a loss-of-coolant accident.
The swelling and bursting vill occur-at temperatures below the -
2300
- F maximum clad temperature allovable under the interim criteria dna vill result.r blockaSe of flow channels. The interim criteria contain no reference to fuel c.ad swelling and rupture and chr.nnel olockage.
The Pestinghouse eveluation model provides for calculation of the number of fuel rods that l
vill haveErupture cladding, but the amount of channel blockage is not calculated and the phenomenon is not included in the calculation of the temperature transient.
The. Applicant cen-tends that any adverse effects of the channel blockage expected will be more than. compensated by conservative assumptions used in the model.
The Intervenors contend that the channel blockage can be much more severe than is assumed by the Applicant.
Both cite experimentnl data in support of their contentions.
In the absence of documentation of the. technical basis for the interic criteria, the Bc t ed requests guidance in the form of an answer to the following question:
Does acceptance of the Westinghouse evaluation model under Section IV of the interin criteria without excep-tion to the treatment of fuel clad svelling end rupture and flow channel blockage-signify that -this phenomenon
3 need not be cons:dered further in evaluating the per-fo:r4ance of the emergency core cooling systems for Westinghouse PkTis, or is it intended that fuel clad swelling and rupture and flow channel blockage shall
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be considered in depth on a case-by-esse basis in deter-mining whether there is compliance with Criterion 3 of Section lY of the interim criteria?
All parties may have twenty (20) days from the date hereof vithin which to sub=1t initial briefs, including transcript citations and references, respecting these questions and all parttes may cub =1t I
briefs within ten (10) days after the said tventy days for answering the contentions of other parties made in the initial briefs.
4 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICDiSIUG ECARD e
N By Samuel W. Jensch,(4haiman Issued:
December 7, 1971 Gementown, Maryland 4-t I
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