ML20107A444
See also: IR 05000219/1973010
Text
.
.
.
.
U. S. ATO?lIC ENERGY CO>DlISSION
,
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPGATIONS
!
REGION I
\\a
RO Inspection Report No.:
50-219/73-10
Docket No.: 50-219
Licensce: Jersey Central Power & Light Co.
License No.: DPR-16
Oyster Creek
Priority:
.
Category: C
Location : Forked River , N.J .
Type of Licensce:
1930 MWt. BWR
Type of Inspection:
Special, announced
Dates of Inspection:
May 11, 1973
Dates of Previous Inspection:Jgagini May 2. 1973.
Reporting Inspector:
/C
dd^---
4 >, d3
F.S. Cantrell, Reactor Inspector
Date
.
Accompanying Inspectors:
None
Date
.
Date
..
Other Accompanying Personnel:
}
Reviewed by:
d
b
~
6 /)
D.L. Caphton, Senior Reactor Inspector
Date
.
t
'
.
\\
.
9604120297 960213
DEKOK95-258
.
- -
.
- . -
..
.
-
- _
_ - - -
+
n
,
.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
j
.
'
Enforcement Action
.. .
None
.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items
Not. inspected
3
Design Changes
i
None
. Unusual Occurrences
The condensate drain valve on the B-isolation condenser failed to
open during a surveillance test on April 14, 1973.
(Details, Para. 4)
Other Significant Findings
A.
Current Findings
Seventy-seven fu&l assemblies were identified as containing leaking
fuel pins as a result of water samples taken from each fuel assembly.
The failed assemblies are scheduled to be replaced during the current
U4N
. regular refueling operations. 146 assemblies are scheduled to .be re-
placed.
(Refueling was reported by phone to be completed May 16, 1973).
B.
Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items
Nc" inspected
Management Interview
,
The exit interview was conducted with Mr. Carroll.
The inspector stated that the prime purpose of the inspection was a routine
review of refueling operations, and that the only deficiency identified was
that the key.for the reactor mode switch was left in the switch when the
-
switch was in the " refueling" position. With the key in the switch..the
switch may be technically locked as required'by Technical Specifications,.
,
but practically,-the switch is unlocked. Mr. Carroll stated that the key
would be removed and placed under the control of the shift foreman.
(De-
tails, Para. 2k)
,
l
4
1
e
. .
- - -
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
DETAILS
1.
1.
Persons Contacted
ml;d
Mr. J.T. Carroll, Station Superintendent
Mr. D.L. Reeves, Operations Supervisor
Mr. 1
!. Riggle, Maintenance Supervisor
Mr. L J. Cooper, Shift Foreman
Mr. F. Kossatz, Maintenance Foreman
Mr. J. Young, Control Room Operator
Mr. E. Vetz, Control Room Operator "B"
2.
Fuel Handling
The requirements of Oyster Creek procedure No. 212 (Revision 3 as
modified by a temporary procedure change dated April 24, 1973),
.
Fuel Handling, were inspected to verify compliance with the procedure
a
and the Technical Specification (TS) requirements (paragraph 3.9).
The following information was obtained by reviewing plant records, in
discussions with plant personnel and during observations in the field:
A detailed Refueling Work List was issued by the Technical Super-
a.
visor designating specific fuel moves. This was approved by the
Technical Supervisor as specified in a temporary procedure change
dated April 24, 1973.
445
b.
The steps of the Refueling Work List were being followed and
signed off as completed.
A procedure was available for checkout of refueling equipment,
c.
and records indicated that the procedure was completed prior
to the start of the refueling operaton.
d.
The inspector observed visual and functional checks of some of
the refueling equipment at the start of the 8-4 shift on May 11, 1973
,
as required by procedure 212-5.3; however, no specific record was
made of these checks.
Plants records showed that the refueling interlocks were verified
e.
to be operable weekly as required by TS paragraph 4.9.
f.
Flant records showed that the source range monitors (SRM) were
calibrated prior to refueling, checked each hour, and tested week-
ly.
This schedule met the surveillance requirements of TS para-
graph 4.9.
g.
If any of the source range monitors became inoperable during refuel-
.
.
.,
-3-
.,
ing, the control room operators determined that the SRM nearest
the core alteration in progress was operable (Requirement of TS
paragraph 3.9D).
h.
The surveillance requirements of TS Table 4.1.1 are continued
during the refueling outage in order to a seura that the protec-
tive instrumentation meets the requirements of TS Table 3.1.1.
I2
1.
The Core Spray, the Containment Spray, the Emergency Service
Water, and the Fire Protection Systems are maintained operable
during refueling as required by TS paragraph 3.4.
j.
Secondary containment integrity is verified by the Shift Foreman
at shif t turnover, and he controls the keys to locks on doors that
could breech containment integrity (Ref. TS paragraph 3.5B) .
'
k.
TS paragraph 3.9 requires the reactor " mode switch" to be locked in
the " refuel" position during core alterations. The mode switch was
observed to be locked in the refuel position, but the key was left
,;;
in the switch.
In response to questions, the Station Superintendent
agreed that the key would be removed when the switch is required to
be locked by procedure _or the TS.
The key will be controlled by the
shift foreman who is responsible for equipment or safety lock outs.
3.
Inspection of Control Rod (Position 18-15)
Control Rod in position 18-15 was stuck in the reactor and could~not be
withdrawn on January 10, 1973. The control rod drive (CRD) was re-
placed and a licensee representative stated that Jersey Central plan-
M
ned to examine the drive to determine why the drive was inoperable;
however, because of personnel exposures involved in overhauling
irradiated CRDs, this examination would be performed after the refueling
outage.
The inspector witnessed the removal and inspection of the fuel support
castings and the control rod blade at position 18-15.
The inspection
was performed with an underwater TV camera.
Both appeared to be in
good condition.
A minor scrape was observed on the upper part of the
'
control blade; however, an evaluation by Jersey Central indicated that
the scrape was not connected with the failure of the control rod to
withdraw.
(The control rod operated normally during a subsequent
operability check).
4.
Isolation Condenser Drain Valve
(Letter JCP&L to Licensing dated April 24, 1973)
During a weekly surveillance test with the plant at cold shutdown on
April 14, 1973, the B-isolation condenser condensate drain valve (V 14-35)
failed to open. This valve failed to operate on November 16, 1971 due
'
.
$
,
_4_
-
,i
'
.
to a burned out motor (JCP&L letter dated December 14, 1971), and
also, failed to open when initiated following a reactor trip on
December 29, 1973. The valve was disassembled and inspected; how-
-
ever, no specific :ause was identified for the malfunction. The
'
,.c
switch settings of the valve operator were checked and found set as
-
[i$,.
specified by the manufacturer. The valve operated properly during
D'
each subsequent weekly test.
(Testing frequency was increased from
monthly to weekly because of the failures experienced). Following
the April 14, 1973 failure, a representative of the valve manufactur-
er inspected the valve and concluded that the shape of the disc guider
caused the disc to rotate as the valve approached the fully closed
position.
The valve is mounted in a horizontal position.
In the
horizontal position, the lower guide causes the disc to move up and
down about 1/8 inch just prior to seating. A demonstration with the
stem and disc moved by nand, with bonnet removed, showed that the
disc could rotate as it seated. The corrective action recommended
- c
by the vendor was to remove the hump on the lower guide and build
up the upper guide to prevent this rotation of the disc just prior
to seating.
M
,
l