ML20101E816

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Power Recovery Probabilities for Quad Cities Ipe
ML20101E816
Person / Time
Site: Quad Cities  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 11/22/1993
From: Barklund R
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20101E796 List:
References
QC-CN-93-003, QC-CN-93-003-R00, QC-CN-93-3, QC-CN-93-3-R, NUDOCS 9603250225
Download: ML20101E816 (30)
v • d • e


Text

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.. i ATTACHMENT l-1 f

OC-CN 93-003 Page 1 of 15 CALCULATION NOTE COVER SHEET .

Section To Be Completed By Author (s):

Calc-Note Number: OC-CN 93 003 Revision Number: 0

Title:

POWER RECOVERY PROBABILITIES FOR QUAD CITIES IPE Project: QUAD CITIES IPE Shop Ortier: N\A .

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Purpose:

TO DOCUMENTTHE SOURCE OF THE PROBABIOTIES USED FOR IN THE PLANT QUAD TREES.

RESPONSE CITIES LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND STATION B Results Summary:

THE QUAD CITIES STATION IS CONSIDERED TO BE IN THE O POWER RECOVERY CLUSTER GROUP #2. ACTUAL PROBABlUTI NOT RECOVERING SECTION 4. POWER AT SPECIFIC TIMES ARE SHOWN IN Author (s):

Name: (Print or Type) Completion I Signature

' Date l RODGER BARKLUND _

[ M 8JM l

Section to be completed by Verifier (s): '

Verifier (s):

Name: (Print or Type) Signature .

Date ROBERT BUELL' f!J!? 2 Section to be completed by Manager:

Approving Manager:

Name: (Print or Type) Approval Signature Date f A. &An h b.

- - , - ufx wR3 ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 16 of 45 '

9603250225 960315 PDR ADOCK 05000254

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4 ATTACHMENT l-1 OC CN 93-003 Page 2 of 15 4

CALC-NOTE NUMBER: OC-CN-93-003 REV. O i

CALCULATION NOTE METHODOLOGY CHECKLIST 4

CHECKUST TO BE COMPLETED BY AUTHOR (S):(CHECK APPROPRIATE RESPONSE)

1. Is the Subject and/orthe Purpose of the i

Design Analysis Clearly Stated? NO  !

2. Are the Required inputs and Their Sources Provided?

hNO N/A j 3. Are the Assumptions Clearly Identified and Justified?

hNO N/A

4. Are the Methods and Units Clearly identified?

hNO N/A

5. Are the Results of Literature Searches, i

if Conducted, and Other Background Data provided?

hNO N/A i 6. Are all the Pages Sequentially Numbered and i identified by the Calculation Note Number?

hNO

7. Is the Project or Shop Order Clearly identified? YES N
8. Has the Required Computer Calculation Information Been Provided?

YESNOh

9. Were the Computer Codes Used Under Configuration Control? . YES NO /A
10. Are the Results and Conclusions Clearly Stated?

hNO

11. Were Approved Design Controlled Practices i

Followed Without Exception? ES NO

NOTE
IF 'NO' TO ANY OF THE ABOVE, PAGE NUMBER CONTAINING JUSTIFICATION:

't ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 17 of 45

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ATTACHMENT 1-1 l

l CC CN 93-003 Page 3 of 15 i

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1

Section Page '

1.0 Introduction 4 ;

2.0 Determination of Offsite Power Cluster Subgroups 4 2.1 Grid Reliability / Recovery Group 6

i 2.2 Severs Weather / Recovery Group 7

2.3 Extremely Severe Weather Loss of Offsite. Power 8

Frequency Group 3.0 Determination of Offsite Power Cluster Group 8 4.0 Probability of Not Recovering Power at Time X (ROP 1) 8 5.0 References 10 Appendix A Relevant Tables 11 ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 18 of 45

ATTACHMENT 1-1 QC-CN 93-003 Page 4 of 15

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this calculation note is to document the source of the p two nodes in the Quad Cities Loss of Offsite Power and Station Blacko Tree notebooks (References 1 and 2). The two nodes in question are:

ROP 1 -

Recovery of Offsite Power in Time to Preciude Core Damage (LOO ROP 2 -

Recovery of Offsite Power in Time to Preclude Core Damage (SBO)

The methodology used to determine these probabilities is contained in this based on the information found in NUREG-1032 " Evaluation at Nuclear Power Plants" (Reference 3).

The steps to determine these probabilities include:

~

Determine the "Offsite Power Cluster Group" that Quad Cities should b implementing the selection criteria found in NUREG-1032.

Determine the probability of recovering power in time to prevent core dam (ROP 1/ ROP 2) using the frequency distributions contained in NUREG-1032.

Each of these steps will be discussed in detail in the following sections.

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2.0 DETERMINATION OF POWER CLUSTER SUBGROUPS The Offsite Power Cluster Grouping is an attempt to account for any relationship b switchyard design characteristics, local weather, power recovery procedures, and the dur of loss of offsite power events at a given plant. The methodology used to determine the appropriate Offsite Power Cluster Group is based on the selection criteria found in Tables A.2, A.3, A.6 and Tables A.8 through A.11 of NUREG-1032. The Offsite Power Cluster ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 19 of 45 j

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. s ATTACHMENT 1-1 QC-CN.93-003 Page 5 of 15 Group is determined by the un!que combination of four subgroups. These subgroups, defined by grid design and local weather, are shown below:

1. Switchyard Configuration Group (11 , 12, 13 )
2. Grid Reliability / Recovery Group (G1, G2, G3, G4) i
3. Severe Weather-Induced Loss of Offsite Power Frequency / Recovery Group (SR1, SR SR3, SR4, SR5, SR6, SR7, SR8, SR9, SR10) l i
4. Extremely Severe Weather-Induced Loss of Offsite Power Frequency Group (SS1, i SS2, SS3, SS4, SSS) '

Two factors, grid and switchyard design, are potentially significant with regard to frequenc and duration of loss of offsite power events. The impact of these design factors is  !

determined by the blend of responses (yes/no) to the following statements. The unique blend of yes and no responses define the impact of these features and the subsequent Switchyard Configuration Group to which the plant belongs.

A. Independence of offsite power sources to the nuclear plant.

1. All offsite power sources are connected to the plant through one switchyard.

YES

2. All offsite power sources are connected to the plant through two or more switchyards, and the switchyards are electrically connected. NO
3. All offsite' power sources are connected to the plant through two or more switchyards or separate incoming transmission lines, but at least one of the AC sources is electrically independent of the others. NO B. Automatic and manual transfer schemes for the Class 1E buses when the normal sou of AC power fails and when the backup sources of offsite power fall.
1. If the normal source of AC power fails, there are no automatic transfers and there is one or more manual transfers to preferred or attemate offsite power sources. NO ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 20 of 45

ATTACHMENT 1-1 l

QC-CN-93-003 Page 6 of 15 i

2. If the normal source of AC power fails, there is one automatic transfer but no manual transfers to preferred or attemate offsite power sources. NO
a. All of the Class 1E buses in a unit are connected to the same preferred power source after the automatic transfer of power sources. YES
b. The Class 1E buses in a unit are connected to separate offsite power

. sources after the automatic transfer of power sources. NO

3. After loss of the normal AC power source, there is one automatic transfer. If this source fails, there may be one or more manual transfers of power sources to preferred or alternate offsite power sources. YES
a. All of the Class 1E buses in a unit are connected to one preferred power source after the first automatic transfer. YES
b. The Class 1E buses in a unit are connecthd to separate offsite power sources after the first automatic transfer. NO
4. If the normal source of AC power fails, there is an automatic transfer to a preferred '

source of power. If this preferred source of power fails, there is an automath transfer to another source of offsite power. NO

a. All of the Class 1E buses in a unit are connected to the same preferred power source after the first automatic transfer. NO
b. The Class 1E buses in a unit are connected to separate offsite power sources after the first automatic transfer of power source. NO ,

l The responses to the above statements are based on information contained in the Electric Power Systems Notebook (Reference 4) and show that Quad Cities falls into Switchya ConfigurationGroup 13.-All group-designations-based on design factors are shown in Table 1 of Appendix A. -

2.1 Grid Reliabirrtv/Ramvery Group _.. _ _ _ . _ - . . . _.

The Gridfleli. ability / Rec _overy Group co_mbines into a single factor the inherent relia the local _ power _ grid _and,the ability of the plant,to rapidly recover from the loss of power.

ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 21 of 45

ATTACHMENT l-1 l QC CN 93-003

, Page 7 of 15 From the Quad Cities initiating Events Notebook (Reference 5), the frequency of grid related losses is 2.7E-3 per year. Quad Cities has never experienced a grid related loss of offsite power. NUREG-1032 implies use of a grid loss frequency of 1E-2 per year if no loss of power events have occurred at the individual site. However, use of either frequency will place Quad Cities in Grid Group G1. Table 2 of Appendix A shows the relationship of grid loss frequency to Grid Group.

The next step in determining the Grid Reliability / Recovery Group is to identify the recovery group. The recovery group qualitatively identifies the plant's ability to recover power within 1/2 hour following a grid blackout. The plant must have the capability and procedures to recover offsite (non-emergency) AC power to the site within 1/2 hour following a grid blackout to be considered in the R1 group. By default, all other plants not in the R1 group are i

contained in the R2 group. Quad Cities does not have specific procedures in place for recovering power in this time frame and thiiefore falls into the R2 recovery group. This combination of factors leads to a Grid Reliability / Recovery Group of GR5 as identified by

, Table 3 of Appendix A.

2.2 Severe Weather / Recovery Group The severe weather / recovery group combines into a single factor the likelihood of loss of offsite power due to severe weather events with the ability of the plant to recover from the event in a rapid manum. FranrtheCuad Cities initiating Events Notebook, the frequency of severe weather-related-loss-of offsite power events at the Quad Cities station is 8.1E 3 per year. This frequencydn-combination with the recovery group R2 identified earlier in saction 2.1, defines a Severe Weather / Recovery Group of SR7. Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix A show the manner in.whigtulevere weather frequency and plant recovery ability are grouped to arrive at the SR7 group designation.

ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 22 of 45

ATTACHMENT l-1 QC CN 93-003 Page 8 of 15 2.3 Extremely Severs Weather Loss of Offsite Power Frequency Group This group is determined strictly by the frequency of extremely severe weather, postulated in this case. This event consists of losses of offsite power caused by extreme weather such as hurricanes, very high winds (greaterthan 125 mph) and major damage to switchyards due to tornado strikes. Restoration of offsite power following these events is assumed to require at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The Quad Cities initiating Eve'nts Notebook gives a frequency of 2E-4 p year for this type of event. The group designators associated with each occurrence frequency range are shown in Table 6 of Appendix A. With an occurrence frequency of 2E '4, Quad Cities is considered to be in group SS1.

3.0 DETERMINATION OF OFFSITE POWER CLUSTER GROUP The subgroups previously defined in section two permit determination of the offsite power cluster group. These subgroups 13, G1, SR7 and SS1 can be inserted into the matrix shown in Table 7 of Appendix A to determine the proper cluster group. The results of this process show that Quad Cities should be included in Offsite Power Cluster Group 2.

4.0 PROBABILITY OF NOT RECOVERING POWER AT TIME X (ROP 1/ ROP 2) .

NUREG-1032 gives frequency distributions for durations of loss of offsite power events for each of the cluster groups (table A.11 of Reference 3). The probability of not recovering power at each hour was derived using the median values of the frequency distribution data contained in this table. The frequency at.each time interval was divided by the frequency at time = 0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> to normalize the values and thus render probabilities. Since the information contained in NUREG-1032 did not have values for-every hour, values for each missing hour through 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> were obtained by using log. extrapolations, which provide a good fit to the to the loss of offsite power frequency duration curves presented in Figure A.15 of NUREG-1032. The values for each of the intermediate hours not given was estimated by the ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 23 of 45 O

, , l ATTACHMENT l-1 QC-CN 93 003 Pa0e 9 of 15 following equation:

i m+mn P=10 2 where x = probability at previous hour given and y = probability at the itaxt succeeding hour given This equation gives a value for a point midway between two known times x and y. The results of applying this equation can then be used again to determine a new intermediate value and the equation reapplied until all the unknown values are determined. This information is summarized in the following table for Offsite Power Cluster Group 2 for events of up to 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> duration.

DURATION Loss of offsite power frequency Probability of not  !

(HR) (Table A.11 of NUREG-1032) recovering power l

' ~ ~ ~ frgg Normalized 0 0.1040 1.000E+00 1.000E+00 1/2 N/A N/A 6.068E-01 l 1 N/A N/A 3.682E-01 2 0.0141 1.356E-01 1.356E-01 3 N/A N/A 9.553E-02 4 0.0070 6.731E-02 6.731E-02 -

5 N/A N/A 5.852E-02 6 N/A N/A~ 5.088E-02 7 .N/A... . -_..-.N/A 4.424E-02 8 0.0040 3.846E-02 g . _- 3.846E-02 yfg .N/A"-- ~ ~ - ' ' ' ~ - "

" 3.569E '02 10 N/A N/A_

. 3.312E-02 .

11 N/A N/A 3.074E-02 12 - - - - -

--- N/A - N/A 2.852E-02 --

13 N/A N/A 2.647E-02 14 N/A N/A 2.456E-02 15 N/A - .N/A 2.280E-02 16 0.0022 2.115E-02

__ 2.115E-02 ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 24 of 45

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ATTACHMENT l-1 QC CN 93-003 Page 10 of 15

5.0 REFERENCES

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1. Loss of Offsite Power Event Tree Notebook, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2, prepared by IPEP, August 1993, Rev. O.
2. Station Blackout Event Tree Notebook, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and l 2, prepared by IPEP, date and rev. to be provided.

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3. Baranowsky, P.W., et. al., " Evaluation of Station Blackout Events at Nuclear Power Plants", U.S. NRC Report NUREG-1032, June 1988.
4. Electric Power Systems Notebook, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2. I prepared by IPEP,.date and rev. to be provided.
5. Initiating Events Notebook, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2, prepared by IPEP, date and rev. to be provided.

e ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 25 of 45

ATTACHMENT l-1 OC-CN 93-003 Page 11 of 15 I

APPENDIX A I

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ESK-96-031, Attachment. Page 26 of 45 e

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ATTACHMENT l-1 k

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Page 12 of 15

TABLE 1 '

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DEFINITION OF SWITCHYARD CONFIGURATION GROUP GROUP FACTOR

11 A1, A2, or A3 and 84

) 12 i

A1 or A2 and 82b or 83

13 A1 or A2 and B1 or B2a TABLE 2 '

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DEFINITION OF FREQUENCY OF GRID GROUPS GROUP

FREQUENCY OF GRID LOSS PER SITE YEAR G1 less than 1.67E-2 G2 4 1.67E-2 to 5.0E-2
G3 5.0E-2 to 0.167 G4 equal to or greater than 0.167 1

TABLE 3 I

i DEFINITION OF GR GROUPS j

FREQUENCY GROUP RECOVERY GROUP j  ;-

GRID l RELIABILITY / RECOVERY i GROUP (GR)

G1 R1 GR1 G2 R1 i GR2 4

G3 R1 GR3 G4 R1 GR4 G1 R2 GR5 G2 R2

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GR6 G3 R2 GR7 ESK-96-031, (ttachment, Page 27 of 45

ATTACHMENT 1-1 i

QC-CN 93-003 Page 13 of 15 TABLE 4 i i

i DEFINITION OF FREQUENCY OF SEVERE-WEATHER GROUPS GROUP FREQUENCY PER SITE YEAR S1 less than 3.0E-3 S2 -~-- - ---

-- --3:0E-3 to 1.0E-2 S3 1.0E-2 to 3.0E-2 S4 3.0E-2 to 0.1 S5 0.1 to 0.33 TABLE 5 DEFINITION OF SR GROUPS '

l FREQUENCY GROUP RECOVERY SEVERE-WEATHER / RECOVERY  !

l GROUP GROUP  !

l S1 R1 SR1 S2 R1 SR2 S3 R1 SR3 S4 R1 SR4 .

l S5 'R1 SR5 S1 R2 SR6 I S2 R2 SR7 S3 . R2 SR8

~ " ~

S4 R2 SR9  !

i S5 R2 SR10 ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 2 8 of 45 1

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ATTACHMENT l-1 QC-CN 93-003 Page 14 of 15 TABLE 6 DEFINITION OF EXTREMELY SEVERE WEATHER-INDUCED GROUPS GROUP FREQUENCY PER SITE YEAR SS1 less than 3.0E-4 SS2 3.04E-4 to 8.3E-4 SS3 8.3E-4 to 3.0E-3 SS4 3.0E-3 to 1.0E-2 SS5 greater than or equal to 1.0E-2 -

TABLE 7 l

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFSITE POWER CLUSTER GROUPS CLUSTER I GR SR SS I GROUP 1 1,2 1,3.5 1,2,6,7 1,2 1,2 1,3,5 1,6 3 1,2 1,3,5 3 1,2 2 1,2 1,3,5 8 1,2,3 1,2 1,3,5 4 1-4 1,2 1,3,5 2,3,7 3,4 1,2 1,3,5 1,6 4 3 1,3,5 1,2,6,7 1-4 3 1,3,5 3,8 1,2 3 1,3,5 3 3,4 3 1,3,5 4 1-4 3 same as cluster 7 same as cluster same as cluster 2 and 1 2 and 1 2 and 1 4 1,2,3 1,3,5,7 10 1-5 ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 29 of 45 t_.___ - - - - - _ _ _ - --- - - - - -

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ATTACHMENT l-1 QC-CNo93-003 4

Page 15 of 15 l NUREG 1032 DISTRIBUTIONS

PROBABILITY OF NOT RECOVERING POWER CLUSTER GROUPS j TIME 1 2 3 4 5 4

0 1.000E+00 1.000E+00 1.000E+00 1.000E+00 1.000E+00 1 2.481E-01 3.682E-01 4.105E-01 4.663E-01 6.622E-01 2 6.154E-02 1.356E-01 1.685E-01 2.174E-01 4.385E-01 l 3 4.267E-02 9.553E-02 1.198E-01 1.668E-01 3.567E-01

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4 2.959E-02 6.731 E-02 8.509E-02 1.279E-01 2.902E-01 5 2.463E-02 5.852E-02 6.648E-O'2 1.184E-01 2.393E-01 6 2.050E-02 5.088E-02 5.194E-02 1.097E-01 1.974E-01 l I 7 1.706E-02 4.424E-02 4.058E-02 1.016E-01 1.628E-01 8 1.420E-02 3.846E-02 3.170E-02 9.403E-02 1.343E-01 l

9 1.273E-02 3.569E-02 2.725E-02 8.462E-02 1.142E-01 j

10 1.141 E-02 3.312E-02 2.343E-02 7.615E-02 9.717E-02 li 11 1.023E-02 3.074E-02 2.014E-02 8.265E-02 7.030E-02

! 12 9.167E-03 2.852E-02 1.731E-02 6.167E-02 7.030E-02 13 8.217E-03 2.647E-02 1.488E-02 5.550E-02 5.979E-02 1

14 7.365E-03 2.456E-02 1.279E-02 4.994E-02 5.086E-02 15 6.601E-03 2.280E-02 1.100E-02 4.494E-02 4.326E-02

! 16 5.917E-03 2.115E-02 9.455E-03 4.044E-02 3.679E-02 17 5.304E-03 1.963E-02 8.128E-03 3.640E-02 3.130E-02

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i 18 4.754E-03 1.822E-02 6.987E-03 3.275E-02 2.662E-02  :

i 19 4.261E-03 1.691E-02 6.007E-03 2.948E-02 2.264E-02 4 '

20 3.820E-03 1.569E-02 5.164E-03 2.652E-02 1.926E-02 21 3.424E-03 1.456E-02 4.439E-03 2.387E-02 1.638E-02 1

22 3.069E-03 1.351E-02 3.816E-03 2.148E-02 1.393E-02 l ,

23 2.751 E-03 1.254E-02 3.280E-03 1.933E-02 1.185E-02 24 2.465E-03 1.63E-02 2.820E-03 1.740E-02 1.008E-02 ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 30 of 45

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QUESTION 11

! 11.

The common cause failure values used in the IPE are lower than tho used in other IPE/PRAs. For example, the beta factor for failure of 2 MOVs i factor of 5 to 9 lower than the beta factor typically used and the beta factor f j DGs is a factor of 10 lower than the beta factor typically used. Screening J cause data for plant specific applicability questionable approach because common cabased on expert cpinion is a ra j use events address classes of events as opposed to specific events as typicdly are screened for applicability.

4 (a)

Please provide the justification for the low common cause factors used in the IPE.

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i RESPONSE TO QUESTION 11 (a) 1  ;

l " Common cause" describes multiple failures of functionally identical componen

a single, shared cause. Common cause analysis (CCA) evaluates the effects of th
dependencies accident. that may affect the ability of a system to prevent or mitigate a sev i

The Quad Cities CCA modeled common cause failures at the basic event j the Multiple Greek Letter (MGL) method as defined in NUREG/CR-4780, " Proce i,

Treating Common Cause Failure in Safety and Reliability Studies."

j A generic common cause failure database was developed from EPRI NP-396

" Classification and Analysis of Reactor Operating Experience involving Depe supplemented with events from the September 1990 EPRI draft report, "A Database o Common Cause Events for Risk and Reliability Evaluations" (EPRI TR-100382)

! This common cause failure database was screened to insure that the approp of temporal coincidence was present and to make it specific to Quad Cities. Becau all of the listed (" generic") failures are applicable to Quad Cities, the common caus j factors were naturally reduced. The expert opinion employed in the screening was needed to accurately determine the applicability of the data to the Quad Cities' components.

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ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 32 of 45

j 3.0 DISCUSSION CM-COA-92-470-R0 PAGE 6 l

To support the generation of values for the MGL factors I a common cause database was developed. Discussions with respect to that dat b a ase and the calculation of component specific conditional probabilities are contained in the sections which follow.

3.1 DATABASE DEVELOPMENT The EPRI database includes common cause o events owing components:on the f ll ,

COMMON CAUSE COMPONENT ADDITIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTIONS INDEPENDENT PLG-0865 PAGE # EVENTS Diesel Generators High Head Safety Injection Pumps 3- 6 to 3- 20 566 Residual Heat Removal Pumps 3- 33 to 3- 39 70 ,

l containment Spray Pumps 3- 42 to 3- 49 63 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 3- 52 to 3- 59 30 Standby Liquid Control Pumps 3- 61 to 3- 70 131 HPCI and RCIC Pumps 3- 75 to 3- 76 3 Service Water Pumps 3- 78 to 3 .82 94 Component Cooling Water Pumps 3- 86 to 3- 94 105 HVAC Chillers 3- 98 to 3- 98 22 Containment Cooling & HVAC Fans 3-101 to 3-102 33 Motor Operated Valves 3-104 to 3-121 66 3-124 to 3-163 784 Standby Liquid Control Relief Valves 3-182 to 3-183

  • Two-Stage Target-Rock Relief Valves 19 Electromatic Relief Valves 3-185 to 3-197 11 Check valves 3-199 to 3-210 19 Circuit Breakers 3-212 to 3-220 77 Reactor Trip Breakers 3-223 to 3-237 98 3-241 to 3-247 47 Eliminated from review; component not part of Ceco systems .

Information provided for the EPRI database of multiple fail ures includes:

component, plant, date, plant status, .

event description, failure mode, shock type, population size, j and impact vector values. All events considered for inclusion in the common cause database used in thisse evaluation n Table 1.are This li t d i table indicates if the event was applicable (A) or not (N) applicable to each of the four CECO sites. If an event was deemed by the expert applicable, review panel to be not Appendix A.

a reason was provided and recorded on the event record sheets in l

l ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 33 of 45

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  • TABLE 1:

LASALLE IPEs. COMMON CAUSE EVENTS AND APPLICABILITY ,

BRAIDWOOD, QUAD CITIES IWD TO BYRO CAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAt 0 APPL-RATIONALE 8 TYPE 8 ID

  • A BY
  • BR
  • DG .AAAAAAAA7 a STATUS
  • DG -02 -01 ** N-14 A *A ' N-14
  • N-14 ' N-14
  • P/B
  • Peach Bottom 2 8 Browns Ferry 1 * *February 1978 January 1980 *8 14 Power *

-03

  • N-148 N-14: N-14' N-14
  • 8 Zion 1 Refueling D 8

DG 8 DG N-24' N-24a N-24a N-24 8 Hadam Neck 8

July 1974

  • D
  • a og a DG -06 -05 8 N-108
  • April 1968
  • 744 Power
  • D *
  • A a N-10'*AN-10*a N-10
  • Cook 1 A
  • Power a DG
  • A
  • Yankee Rowe
  • December 1977 8 100% Power D 8
  • August 1977 * *
  • DG Refueling D
  • N-01* N-07* N-078 N-07
  • Arkansas-1
  • August 1979
  • DG -09 -00 ** N-078 A 8 A N-07** A N-078 N-07
  • Dresden 2
  • May 1973 8 100% Power
  • 8 A
  • D
  • Salem
  • Power *
  • July 1977 a D *
  • DG -11 -108* N-248N-11*N-24:

N-118 N-118 N-11

  • Millstone 2
  • May 1977 Hot Standby
  • DG N-24: p.24
  • TMI-1 *
  • Power 8 D
  • March 1978 * *
  • A-23* A-238 A-238 A-23
  • Quad Cities8
  • May 1973
  • D

-14 N-10

  • N-10 8 N-108 N-10
  • Brunswick
  • 1 Power
  • N-048 N-048 N-04* N-04
  • Dresden 2,3 January 1977 D
  • September 19728* 326 Power *
  • a HH
  • HH -01
  • N-33' N-33 8 350 MWt/ Cold Shutdown 8 D

8 0

8 HH

  • HH HH * -02
  • N-30' N-308 N-33' N-33
  • Salem 1, 2
  • HH N-308 N-30 ' Point Beach 2
  • November 1979 : Shutdown *
  • HH
  • HH -03 8* N-108

-04 N-12' N-12 ' N-12' N-12

  • September 1978* 1004 Power
  • D
    • January 1982
  • 84% Power HH
  • D HH a HH -05
  • N-318 N-31a N-10' N.31a N-10' N-10 p.31 a
  • North Anna 1 April 1979
  • D 5 HH Robinson 2 *
  • Cold Shutdown

-06

  • N-078 N-078 N-078 November 1977
  • Startup a

p a,

  • N-07
  • Robinson 2 8 July 1973
  • D
  • RH 8 RHSI-01 a
  • Power a

RH

  • RHSI-02
  • A g.14* g.14: N-14' N-14 8 }
  • D 8
  • Beaver Valley 1
  • January 1978
  • A * '

RH

  • A *A
  • Power
  • Rh31-03*
  • N-10' N-10 A *A
  • Monticello ' 8 D
  • RH a RHSI-04 Browns Ferry 1
  • September December 1972
  • Refueling i
  • N-10' N-108 1974 a
  • D a 8 RH ' RHSI-05
  • N-31a y.318 AN-10' N-10
  • Beaver Valley 1
  • January 1981 : Cold Shutdown a o a RH RHSI-06
  • N-10' N-108 A
  • N-31 ** Peach Bottom 2 8 April 1978 Startup
  • RH 8 RHSI-07 * *A 8 D 8 Brunswick 1
  • April 1979 95% Power
  • D
  • AAAAAAAAAAAA7
  • A-19* A-19 8 A-198 A-19
  • Brunswick 2 8 April 1979
  • 30lPower
  • N-108
  • Refueling a p a CS
  • CS N-10' N-10' N-10 8 Robinson 2
  • October 1978
  • CS -04 -035* N-12' N-12' N-108N-12' N-10
  • Davis N-10' BesseN-IP ** JanuaryOconee
  • January 2
  • Startup 1975
  • P
  • CS N-12' N-12 ' H-10' N-10
  • Cook 1978
  • 8 P
  • 2 Hot Shutdown CS : CS -05
  • N-12* N-128 N-10* N-10
  • Farley 8
  • May 1978
  • 8 P 8 8

-06

  • N-128 N-12' N-108
  • Hot Shutdown * *
  • September 1978* Hot Shutdown CS 8 P CS -07
  • A aA N-10
  • Robinson 2 November 1977 8 Startup
  • P 8
  • N-108 N-10
  • Kewaunee *
  • l a

AEW

  • AfW -01
  • AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA7 Oct-Dec 1977 8 1006 Power
  • P
  • i
  • P a
  • N-108 N-108N-108 N-108 N-10' N-10 8 Kewaunee * '
  • AEW
  • AEW -03
  • N-078 N-10' N-10
  • Ginna a November 1975 8 Shutdown *
  • l D
  • AEW
  • AEW -04
  • N-108 N-07
  • N-07
  • N-07
  • Turkey Point 3
  • December May 1974 1973 8
  • Critical
  • D 8
  • A[W
  • AfW -05
  • N-118 N-10* N-10* N-10
  • Point Beach 1,2
  • April 1974 986 Power
  • D 8
  • AEW 8 AfW -06
  • N-108 N-108 N-ili N-11* N-11 8 Zion 2 8 Cooldown * *
  • AEW 8 AfW -07 N-10' N-10
  • Zion 1,2
  • September 19818 Shutdown
  • D D 8 a AEW
  • N-108* N-10' N-10 ' N-10 ' N-10
  • November 2
  • December 1981 1981
  • Low Power Testing 8

D 8 N-10' N-108 Power AAAA7 AEW -09

  • N-31: N-318 N-318 N-10 N-31 ** Arkansas Trojan 2 a
  • April 1980
  • On Power 8

D *

  • January 1976
  • 150 MWe 'D 8
  • HPRC8 HPRC* HPRC-01 HPRC-02 8 N-10' 8 N-10' N-108 N-10'N-108 N-10 N-14'8 N-14 *
  • July Brunswick1982 8 1
  • Browns Ferr) 1 8 April 1980 55% Power *
  • HPRCa HPRCs HPRC-04 HFRC-03
  • Brunswick 2 8

53% Power 19808 Shutdown B

B

  • N-10' N-10 8 N-148 N-14
  • Brunswick 2 a July 1982 8 a

B a 55% Power a g a

)

U i

ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 34 Of 45

a -

D CN-COA-92-470-R0 PAGE 8 TABLE 1 (Continued): COMMON CAUSE EVENTS AND APPLICABILITY TO BYRON, BRAIDWOOD, QUAD CITIES AND LASALLE IPEs.

C 1

a APPL-RATIONALE 8 C

TYPE Ip a BY a BR 8 QC 8 LS a L PLANT a DATE

  • STATUS 8

?/ B 8 8

SWCC8 SW -01 a N-148 N-148 N-148 N-14 a Farley 1 8 Y SWCC8 SW December 1978 a 100% Power

  • O 8
  • -02
  • N-10' N-10' N-108 N-10
  • Deaver Valley 1
  • October 1976 Preop. Testing SWCC8 SW

-03 8 N-15' N-15' N-158 N-15

  • Palisades 8
  • D 8 SWCC8 SW July 1982 8 43% Power
  • 8

-04

  • N-088 N-0Ba N-088 N-08 8 Pilgr.im 1
  • D SWCC8 SW -05
  • N-08' N-088 N-00' N-08 : Pilgrim a December 1975
  • 556 Power 8 0
  • a SWCC8 SW -06 8 N-08* N-088 N-088 N-08
  • Pilgrim December 1974 5 100% Power
  • D
  • SWCC8 SW -07 8 8

May 1974

  • Power
  • D *
  • N-31' N-31' N-31a N.31 a TMI Unit 1 SWCC8 SW -08 a y.2 9 N-29' N-29' N-29
  • Oyster Creek
  • August 1978 8 1004 Power
  • D
  • November 1978
  • Refueling
  • D 8 8

CHIL8 CHIL-01 8 W P-13' P-138 P-138 P-13

  • Calvert Cliffs
  • Jul, Sep 1980
  • 90-100% Power 8 8 D
  • FAN 8 FAN -01 8 N-148 N-148 N-14' N-14 a Crystal River 3
  • Nov/Dec 1978 a
  • 986 Power
  • FAN D 8 8 FAN -02
  • N-29' N-29' N-298 N-29 ** Three Mile Is 2
  • 8Jan/Dec 1982 FAN 8 FAN -03 8 N-10s N-108 A 8

Cold Shutdown 8 0 8

  • A Dresden 2 & 3 November 1974
  • 65% Power
  • FAN
  • FAN -04
  • Three Mile Is 2
  • February 1982 8 Shutdown D 8
  • 8 8 FAN
  • FAN -05
  • N-14' N-148 N-14' N-14 " Susquehanna 1 8 Aug/Oct 1982
  • Preop & Startup
  • D 8

FAN

  • FAN -06
  • N-008 N-088 N-088 N-08 ' D 8 8

FAN a McGuire 1

  • July 1983
  • 100% Power 8 D a FAN -07
  • P-19' P-198 P-198 P-19 8 Quad Cities 1 8 February 1978 8-83% Power
  • D ,*
  • FAN
  • FAN -08 8 N-278 N-278 N-27' N-27 8 Three Mile is 2 8 July 1980
  • Shutdown
  • FAN a FAN -09 8 N-108 N-10' N-108 N-10 a Salem 1 *
  • D a September 19808 Cold Shutdown
  • D 8
    • FAN
  • FAN -10 8 N-108 N-108 N-108 N-10 8 Three Mile Is 2
  • August 1981 FAN
  • FAN -11
  • N-148 N-les N-14' N-14
  • Shutdown 8 D 8 8 Arkansas 1 8 November 1977
  • 100% Power
  • D 8
  • FAN 8 FAN -12
  • N-108 N-10s N-108 N-10 8 Susquehanna 1  : Aug/Sep 1983 8 100% Power
  • FAN
  • FAN -13 a y. iga y.14s N-14' N-14
  • Calvert Cliffs l' Feb/Dec 1982 8

D

  • FAN
  • FAN -14
  • N-27' N-278 N-278 N-27 a Kewaunee 8 1004 Power
  • D *
  • FAN
  • FAN -15 8 N-14' N-148 N-148 N-14
  • a October 1975
  • 99% Power
  • D
  • 8 Browns Ferry 2 8 July /Aug 1983
  • 95-97% Power
  • D 8 FAN
  • Dresden 3
  • August 1978 8 904 Power
  • FAN
  • FAN -17
  • N-128 N-12' N-12' N-12
  • Kewaunee 8 March 1984
  • D
  • AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA a 834 Power 8 D 8

.AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAE 40 ESK-96-031, Attachinent , Page 35 of 45

r l . - m l

CM-COA-92-470-RO PAGE 9 TABLE 1 (Continued):

CITIES AND LASALLE IPEs. COMMON CAUSE EVENTS AND APPLICABILITY TO BYRON, BRAIDWOOD, QUAD D

  • L APPL-RAT 1oNALE
  • CAAAA TYPE 8 ID BY
  • BR
  • QC e Lg a PLANT
  • L DATE 8 STATUS
  • AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAArAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA7 6 P/B '

MOV

  • MV -01 8 N-148 N-14: N.14a N-14 * '

MOV

  • August 1981 8 1005 Power
* -02
  • N-2 9' N-2 9' N-2 9 8 N-29
  • Turkey Point 3
  • April 1979 * ' D *

! 8 MOV

  • MV 03 ' N-068 N-06 N-06* N-06
  • April 1980 Refueling
  • D '

MOV ' MV -04 8 8 1004 Power

  • A N-058 N-058 N-058 N-05
  • Zion 2
  • October 1975
  • 83% Power
  • D
  • A
  • A 8A
  • 8 0 8
  • MV Oconee 2
  • October 1975 *

-06 a N-308 N-308 N-308 N-30

  • Zion 2
  • Cold Shutdown
  • D
  • A 8A 8A 8A
  • December 1976
  • 754 Power
  • D
  • 8 Turkey Point 3
  • April 1979
  • MV -08
  • D
  • l a

goy a MV April 1980 8 1001 Power

  • -09
  • N-068 N-068 N-06: N-06 8 Oconee 2
  • October 1975
  • a D 8 r

Mov

  • MV Cold Shutdown
  • D l

8 MOV

  • MV -10 8* N-058 N-058 N-058 N-05

-11

  • August 1981 8 1004 Power 8
  • N-058 N-058 N-058 N-05
  • Zion 2 *
  • D a MOV 8 MV October 1975 a 831 Power
  • D
  • l 8

Moy

  • MV -12 a N-108 N-10' N-10' N-10
  • February 1975 8 604 Power *

-13 88 N-16 D 8 A '8N-16 ' N-16 ' N-16 8 *Vermont Yankee MOV

  • MV -14 A
  • A February 1976 8 976 Power *

' A Browns Ferry 2

  • December 1974 8 Shutdown D

-15

  • N-108 N-10' N-108 N-10 8 Pilgrim
  • September 19748 954 Power 8

0 *

  • Davis Besse a December 1977
  • Power Esc. Test '

D

  • -17
  • N-098 N-098 N-09 N-09 8 Kewaunee
  • September 19758 614 Power D 8
  • MoV
  • MV -18 8 N-058 N-058 N-058 N-05
  • MV October 1976 8 58% Power 8

0 *

-19 8 A 8A

  • A
  • A
  • Pa11sades
  • D 8 8 a January 1971
  • After Fuel Loading *
  • N-08* N-08* N-088 N-08
  • North Anna
  • August 1978 8 D 8 956 Power * *
  • Mov Mov *8MVMV -21

-22 *8N-055 A N-058 N-05* N-05 * *Rancho Seco aA November 1976 8 Shutdown

  • D
  • aA
  • A Cook 2
  • MV -23
  • A *A *A
  • January 1979
  • 21 Power
  • I
  • A Monticello
  • July 1972
  • Cold Shutdown
  • MV N-078 N-078 N-07" N-07
  • Browns Ferry 2
  • D 8

-25

  • N-148 N-148 N-148 N-14 8 Robinson 2
  • December 1979 ** Cold Shutdown
  • D 8 8

Mov ' MV January 1981 64 Power MOV

  • MV

-26

  • N-11' N-118 N-11' N-11 8 Surry 2
  • July 1981 8
  • D 8

-27

  • 100% Power *
  • N-088 N-088 N-00s N-08 8 Dresden 2
  • August 1973 8 Power
  • D
  • N-08* N-088 N-088 N-08 8 Dresden 3
  • September 1975* Power D 8 Mov 8 MV -29 8 N-148 N-148 N-148 N-14
  • Browns Ferry 1
  • D '
  • September 19748 Cold Shutdow Mov 8 MV -30 8 N-088 N-08* N-088 N-08
  • Hatch 2
  • D 2
  • September 19788 Shutdown Mov
  • MV
  • Mov 8 MV -31
  • N-148 N-148 N-148 N-14 a Pilgrim *
  • D *

-32

  • P a p July 1977 8 1004 Power
  • P a p a Hatch 2
  • May 1980
  • Startup
  • D 8 Mov
  • MV -33 a A *A 8 A *
  • 0 8 l 8 MOV 8 MV -34
  • A a A Hatch 2
  • May 1982 a 994 Power
  • A
  • A
  • A
  • Dresden 2
  • D
  • 8 Mov a MV May 1975
  • Refueling *
  • -35 : N-18' *A N-188 N-18' N-18 8 Vermont Yankee *
  • A 8 A 8 September 19768 Shutdown 8 D 8 8
  • A Dresden 2
  • August 1973 1 MOV
  • MV -37 8 A *A *A
  • A 8
  • 8 Power
  • D 8 '

8 Pilgrim April 1973

  • l Mov 8 MV -38 8 Power
  • D
  • MV -39 8 A N-30' N-30' N-308 N-30 8 Dresden 2 a october 1973 *8 Power
  • l *A *A 8 A 8 Cooper D 8
  • October 1980 986 Power
  • O 8 l O l

l l

1 ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 36 of 45

f_ , . .

TABLE 1 (Continutd): CN-COA-92-470-RO PAGE 10 CITIES AND LASALLE IPEs. COMMON CAUSE EVENTS AND APPLICABILITY TO BYRON, BRAIDWOOD, QUAD l C )

8 1 APPL-RATIONALE

  • Q
  • TYPE' ID 8 BY ' BR 8 QC 8 LS *
  • PLANT DATE *
  • 1 STATUS P/B 8 e SLRV8 SLRV-01a
  • N-14' N-148 N-14 ' N-14 '

Hatch 2

  • May 1984
  • a a a a a

Cold Shutdown

  • B
  • e a
    • SRV a TRRV-01 a N-108 N-10' N-10* N-10
  • Millstone 1 a June 1983 * - * *
  • N-10' N-10' N-108 N-10
  • Brunswick 2
  • Nov 85-May 86
  • Refueling
  • B a

SRV B SRV **TRRV-04 TRRV-03

  • N-108 N-10* N-108 N-10 a Brunswick 1
  • i a N-108 N-10' N-108 N-10
  • Pilgrim October 1982 8 4 6 Power
  • B a '

April 1984 a SRV 8 TRRV-05

  • N-108 N-108 N-108 N-10 8 Pilgrim
  • Refueling '

B

  • TRRV-06 November 1981 : Refueling a
  • TRRV-07
  • N-108 N-10' N-108 N-10
  • Hatch 1
  • July 1982 B

) 8 1004 Power 8 *

  • 8 N-108 N-10' N-10' N-10
  • Hatch 1 8 April 1981 * -
  • B  !

!

  • TRRV-08
  • N-10 8 N-10' N-10' N-10
  • Hatch 1
  • June 1983 '

On Power

  • 8 '

I

  • TRRV-09
  • N-10s N-10' N-10' N-10
  • Hatch 2
  • 8 '

SRV

  • TRRV-10
  • N-108 N-10s N-10' N-10
  • Fitzpatrick
  • November 1980
  • Refue..ng
  • B
  • TRRV-11 8 N-10' N-10' N-10' N-10
  • Brunswick 2 March 1985
  • Refueling 8 8 8 i 8

l 8 Nov 85-May 86

  • Refueling *
  • TRRV-12 : N-108 N-10* N-108 N-10 8 Pilgrim
  • April 1984 B 8

SRV

  • EMRV-01 8 Refueling 8 B *
  • SRV ' N-108 N-10' N-14' N-10
  • Nine Mile Point
  • May 1972
  • Shutdown
  • 8 l 8 EMRV-02 8 N-10' N-10s N-14* N-10
  • EMRV-03 *
  • April-Nov 1970*
  • EMRV-04
  • N-10sN-10' N-10' N-148 N-10 8 Quad Cities 2 '

Oct, Dec 1980 8 17% Power / Shutdown

  • B a

N-10s A  :

N-10

  • Oyster Creek
  • B
  • SRV ' EMRV-04 8 N-10a N-108 A
  • N-10
  • Oyster Creek 8 November 1984 8 121 Power
  • B
  • j November 1984
  • 124 Power 8 8 d
  • EMRV-06 EMRV-05'
  • N-108 N-10' N-148 N-10
  • Dresden 2
  • June 1975
  • Startup
  • N-los N-108 A
  • N-10
  • Quad Cities 1
  • a g a SRV ' EMRV-07
  • N-10' N-108 A 8 N-10
  • Arnold
  • November 1976 8 774 Power a B *
  • March 1977
  • N-10' N-108 A
  • Shutdown *

, 8 N-10

  • Quad Cities 1,2 8 March 1979 8 24 Power B 8

! 8 SRV

  • EMRV-09 8 N-10s N-10' N-148 N-10
  • Oyster Creek
  • January 1980
  • Shutdown 8

SRV*

  • EMRV-10
  • N-los N-10' N-268 N-10
  • Dresden 1 8 B
  • SRV May 1970 * -
  • EMRV-11
  • N-10s N-10' N-14' N-10 a Oyster Creek 8 B 8 AAAAAAAAAAA7JAAAAAAA.uAAAA December 1972
  • 1830 MWt 8 8 8 8

CV 8 CV i

  • CV 8 CV -01 8 N-088 N-088 N-082 N-08
  • Zion 2
  • November 1985
  • Refueling
  • D 8 l
  • CV
  • CV -02
  • N-108 N-108 A-348 N-10 8 Brunswick 2
  • March 1975
  • 5t Power
  • a CV *

-03 8 N-078 N-07' N-078 N-07 a Cook 2

  • D
  • CV

-04 8 A-19a A-19' A-198 A-19 ' Crystal River

  • November 1978 8 Shutdown 8 D 8 l
  • CV
  • CV April 1980 8 Cold Shutdown
  • CV 8 CV -05
  • N-108 N-10' N-108 N-10 8 Trojan 8 8
  • D March 1983 Shutdown
  • l

-06 8 N-108 N-108 A-348 N-10

  • Trojan
  • CV
  • CV -07
  • N-108 N-10' N-108 N-10 :

March 1984 8

D

  • 100% & 78% Power
  • D 8 l 8 CV 8 CV -08 8 Turkey Point 3,48 Nov 85/Jan 86
  • Power
  • D
  • l N-26a N-26' N-268 N-26
  • Point Beach 1
  • July 1981
  • Cold Shutdown 8 5 l

D  !

0 I i

1 l, l

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l ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 37 Of 45 1

i

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TABLE 1 (Continued): CN-COA-92-470-RO PAGE 11 CITIES AND LASALLE IPEs. COMMON CAUSE EVENTS AND APPLICABILITY TO BYRON, BRAIDWOOD, Q I

i l

DAAA7dVVVVVVVVVVVVVUUUUU%

8 APPL-RATIONALE 8 0

TYPE' ID 8 BY

  • PLANT
  • DATE
  • t AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA7 STATUS a P/B 8 8 8 BR BRLA-01 a a BR
  • BRLA-02
  • N-14' N-14' N-14: N-14 8 Indian Point 3
  • November 1984 8 -

N-27' N-27' N-278 N-27 a Davis-Besse a

  • Cold Shutdown
  • D 8
  • BR
  • BRLA-03 August 1983 Shutdown *
  • N-14' N-14a N-14a N-14 a Zion 2
  • a D

BRLA-04

  • N-10' N-10' N-108 N-10 8 Turkey Point 4 " February 1979 8 555 power a a BR *
  • BR 8 May 1975 *
  • D BRLA-05 8 N-278 N-278 N-27a N-27 a Rancho Seco Refueling Shutdown
  • D 8
  • BR
  • BRLA-06 a July 1985 *
  • A
  • A 8A 8 A
  • Cooper
  • August 1984 Cold Shutdown
  • D 8
  • BR 8 BRLA-07
  • N-088 N-088 N-00* N-08 8 Oyster Creek
  • 90 t Power a D a 8

l 8

BR 8 BRLA-08

  • A > A *A September 19738 Shutdown
  • D
  • BR *
  • A 8 Cooper
  • January 1978 a 79% Power *
  • BR
  • BRLA-09
  • A-088 N-088 N-088 N-06
  • Hatch 1
  • 5
  • D June 1978 Shutdown
  • D 8
  • BRLA-10 ' N-108 N-10' N-108 N-10
  • Brunswick 2 BR a BRLA-11 October 1982 8 175 Power * *
  • BR 8 8 N-08a N-008 N-088 N-08
  • Dresden 2
  • May 1971 a Unknown 8 D
  • BR 8 BRLA-12
  • N-288 N-28a N-28' N-28 8 Washington Nuc 28* June 1985
  • D RRLA-13 8 N-108 N-108 N-10' N-10
  • Dresden 1,2,3 Hot Shutdown
  • D 8 BR 8 BRLA-14 8 August 1985 a 709 Power
  • N-10s N-108 N-108 N-10 a Hatch 1,2 8 April 1981
  • D 8 Refueling a D 8 RTB
  • RTB -01 N-25' N-25' N-25' N-25
  • Conn. Yankee
  • RTB
  • RTB -02 8 N-258 N-258 N-25a g.25
  • Oconee 1
  • December 1981 a Power
  • D *
  • February 197 9 ' 98 t Power *
  • RTB 8 RTB -03
  • N-258 N-25' N-25' N-25 8 St. Lucie 8 November 1980
  • 100t Power D 8 RTB 8 RTB -04 *A 8A *A *A
  • Salem 1 8 8

D

  • l February 1983
  • Startup 8 D

i 8 RTB 8 RTB -05 8 N-028 N-028 N-028 N-02 8 San Onofre 2

  • March 1983 8 Shutdown *

,8 RTB

  • RTB -06 8 N-15' N-15' N-158 N-15
  • McGuire 1 D
AAAAAAAAA1 h
  • March 1983 a Shutdown 8 D 8 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA0 I

l l

l l

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l l

1 i

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i i

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1

]

i I

3 ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 38 of 45

1 O 'o i

l

)

CN-COA-92-470-R0 PAGE 12 NOTES - The following describes the headings and entries in Table 1:

TYPE -

Type of component or common cause group. Acronyms used here defined below:

RTB - Reactor Trip Breaker DG - Diesel Generator MOV - Motor Operated Valve  ;

SRV - Safety Relief Valve; does not include Electromatic Relief Valves, EMRV- Electromatic Relief Valve j

HHP - High Head Pump RHSI- RH Pump and Low Head SI Pump CS - Containment Spray Pump AFW - A,uxiliary Feedwater Pump SWCC- Service Water and Component Cooling Water CC - Service Water Pump SW - Component Cooling Water Pump HPRC- High Pressure Core Injection (HPIC)

CHIL- HVAC Chiller and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Pumps '

i FAN - Containment Cooling and HVAC Fans l SLRV- Standby Liquid Control Relief Valve l CV - Check Valve i BRLA- Circuit Breaker, Large AC 10 -

Event Identification Evaluation", number PLG-0866, assigned PLG Inc., March to "A Database 1992. of Common Cause Events for Risk and Reliabilit PLANT -

Plant Name and Unit if available BY - Byron Station .

BR - Braidwood Station QC - Quad Cities Station LS - LaSalle Station

\

DATE -

Date of event STATUS P/B Plant status at time of event i Component applicability to PWRs (P), BWRs (B), or both (D).

APPL-RATIONALE - These columns contain the applicability of each event followed by the rational for its applicability or non-applicability to the CECO database. There are three columns which  !

I describe applicability. The BY (Byron Station), BR (Braidwood Station), QC (Quad Cities I Station), or LS (LaSalle Station) columns contain the site specific applicability-rationale.

The first application-rationale events to specific designator indicates assigned applicability of common cause stations as follows:

A .

N

- Applicable for common cause considerations at Ceco Plants. l P

- Not applicable for common cause considerations at CECO Plants. l

- Low probability of applicability. Used in MGL calculation in absence of other data. '

l i

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ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 39 of 45 l

l l 1

s e 9 CN-COA-92-470-R0 PAGE 13 The second designator (separated from the first by a hyphen is the rationale for assigning the applicability and where two or are non-applicability.

given, the firstThese listed isare theassigned most in an alpha numeric fashion. Each designator is unique The designators are described below: important with the second giving additional information.

01 - Events modeled explicitly in systems analysis.

02 - Events occurring prior to commercial operation detected as a result of start-up testing.

03 - Events occurring during shutdown conditions that cannot occur during power operation.

04 - Events involving failures or potential failures that do not have a significant impact in analyses for PRA applications.

05 - Root cause of common cause events removed a CECO plants by MOV directive,is torque switches on MOVs. This common cause failure mechanism has been Evaluation, Guidelines for Motor-Operated Valve (MOV)

Revision 2, NO Directive NOD-MA.1, Commonwealth Edison, September 1990. Testing, Maintenance and 06 - Root cause of common cause events is loose bolts on MOV.

removed a CECO plants by MOV directive, see note 5. This common cause failure mechanism has been 07 - Failure would have been prevented by a Post Operational Test or a Post Failure Test.

08 - Failure would not have occurred in a mature Ceco plant.

09 - Failure would have been prevented by the CECO EQ program for grease.

10 - Failure would not occur at the specific Ceco plant.

that specific plant. Equipment configuration or condition does not exist at 11 -Human 12 Failureerror would be prevented at Ceco have plant by independent verification post maintenance or control boar 13 -- Human problem. CECO plants procedures in place to prevent .

error problem. errors of this type.

easily recoverable. Ceco plants have procedures in place to prevent errors of this type and the event is 14 - Single failure (s). Little to no evidence that a common cause failure exists.

15 - Single period failure between(s). Little to no evidence that a common cause failure exists. There was a significant time failures.

16 - Modeled explicitly in IPE. '

10 - Event does not have any failures. Potential common cause event based upo 19 - Common cause event 20 - Common cause event is applicable butis applicable impact but impact to CECO plants is lessened.

21 - Common cause event is applicable but to CECO plants is lessened by MOV directive, see note 05.

22 - Common cause event is applicable but impact impact to CECO plants is lessened by EQ program.

its impact on MOV loose bolts. to CECO plants is lessened by MOV direct 1.w, see note 05, and 23 - Common performancecause event is applicable but impact to CECO plants is lessened. Event is based on degraded not failure.

24 - DG trip caused by permissives which are not (emergency condition). included in those in use when diesel is operated in bypass 25 - Modified RTB system with shunt trip makes this common cause failure unrealistic.

26 - This problem is well known and common cause failure mechanism has been removed.

27 -- There 28 This isare procedures in place a non-repeatable at CECO plants to prevent this common cause event from occurring.

event. Problem solved, procedures and\or equipment in place to prevent common cause failures of this type at Ceco plants.

29 - Failure mode not applicable to success criteria.

30 - Failure mode not applicable to success criteria. Not a failure, partial degradation.

31 - Failure mode not applicable to success criteria. Event is easily recoverable.

32 -- There 33 Failureismode not applicable to success criteria RTBs were slow, partial degradation.

reverse 34 - Applicable only to flow protection Testable Check to prevent this event from occurring.

Valves ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 40 of 45

l Attachment 4-C ,

i l

l k 'ada' drendennpeq wpf ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 41 of 45

a **

  • l TABLE 4.5.1-2 l LOOP SUPPORT MODEL QUANTIFICATION RESULTS I

1 1

NUMBER FREOUENCY PERCENT EVENT VALUE DESCRIPTION (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) ,

1. 2.54E-02 79.21 % LOOP 3.20E-02 SINGLE UNIT LOOP EVENTS 1TB 1.00 E+00 EVENT FAILS
2. 2.12 E-03 6 63 % LOOP 320E-02 SINGLE UNIT LOOP EVENTS l DG1 7.81 E-02 LOP FROM DG1 TO BUS 14-1 (6 HRS) '

1TB 1.00E+00 EVENT FAILS l

3. 1.91 E-03 5.97 % LOOP 3.20E-02 SINGLE UNIT LOOP EVENTS DGB 7.10E-02 LOP FROM DG1/2 (6 HRS) l 1TB 1.00 E+00 EVENT FAILS '
4. 1.24E-03 3 89 % LOOP 3.20E-02 SINGLE UNIT LOOP EVENTS SW 4.59E-02 FAILURE OF SW (LOOP) 1M 1.00E+00 EVENT FAILS
5. 5.07E-04 1.58 % LOOP 320E-02 SINGLE UNIT LOOP EVENTS 1TB 1.00 E+00 EVENT FAILS iM 1.96E-02 IA FAILS (LOOP. DLOOP)
14. 2.19E-05 0.07 % LOOP 320E-02 S!NGLE UNIT LOOP EVENTS DGB 7.10E 02 LOP FROM DG1/2 (6 HRS) l 18 1.13 E-02 LOSS OF BUS 18.13-1 UNAVAIL 1TB 1.00 E+00 EVENT FAILS
17. 1.02 E-05 0.03% LOOP 3.20E-02 SINGLE UNIT LOOP EVENTS DGB 7.10E 02 LOP FROM DG1/2 (6 HRS) 14 5.50 E-03 LOSS OF BUS 14 (345KV UNAVAIL) 1W 1.00 E+00 EVENT FAILS
21. 5.57E-06 0 02% LOOP 320E-02 SINGLE UNIT LOOP EVENTS 13 5.57E 03 LOSS OF BUS 13 (345KV UNAVAIL) 14 4.05E-02 LOSS OF BUS 14 AFTER 13.14-1 AVAIL 1W 1.00E+00 EVENT FAILS
26. 2.02 E-06 0.01 % LOOP 3.20E-02 SINGLE UNIT LOOP EVENTS l DGB 7.10 E-02 LOP FROM DG1/2 (6 HRS)

DG1 8.44E-02 LOSS OF DG1 AFTER DG1/2 (6 HRS) 141 1.17E-02 LOSS OF BUS 141.14 & DG1 UNAVAIL, X-TIE AVAll SBO? 1.00E+00 SBO OCCURS IN UNIT 1 Notes:

1. " Number" refers to support state model sequence.
2. " Frequency" is the frequency per year that this initiator / support combination is expected to occur.
3. " Percent" is the percent of off-normal conditions for the subject initiators that would involve this state.
4. " Event" is the model top event label.
5. "Value" is frequency (for initiators) or probability (for failures) that the event would occur.
6. " Description" defines the event label.

726316SU.145/121593 4-188 ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 42 of 45

Attachment 4-D k \nla\dresden\ peg t wpf ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 43 of 45

a ** 1 TABLE 4.5.1-3 DUAL UNIT LOOP SUPPORT MODEL QUANTIFICATION RESULTS NUMBER FREQUENCY PERCENT EVENT VALUE DESCRIPTION )

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 1 1

1. 1.21E42 74.98% DLOOP 1.61E42 DUAL UNIT LOOP EVENTS ,

1TB 1.00 E+00 EVENT FAILS

)

2. 9.85E 04 6.13% DLOOP 1.61 E-02 DUAL UNIT LOOP EVENTS DG1 7.81 E-02 LOP FROM DG1 TO BUS 14-1 (6 HRS) 1TB 1.00 E+00 EVENT FAILS l
3. 9.16E44 5.69% DLOOP 1.61 E-02 DUAL UNIT LOOP EVENTS DGB 7.10 E-02 LOP FROM DGU2 (6 HRS) 1TB 1.00 E+00 EVENT FAILS
4. 8.49E44 528% DLOOP 1.61 E-02 DUAL UNIT LOOP EVENTS DG2 6.60 E-02 LOP FROM DG2 TO BUS 24-1 (6 HRS) 1TB 1.00E+00 EVENT FAILS l
5. 3 61E44 2.24 % DLOOP 1.61E 02 DUAL UNIT LOOP EVENTS '

SW 2.85E42 FAILURE OF SW (DLOOP),23 UNAVAll

6. 2.41E44 1.50 % DLOOP 1.61E42 DUAL UNIT LOOP EVENTS ITB 1.00E+00 EVENT FAILS 11A 1.96E42 IA FAILS (LOOP, DLOOP) 1
7. 8.14E45 0.51 % DLOOP 1.61 E-02 DUAL UNIT LOOP EVENTS l DG1 7.81 E-02 LOP FROM DG1 TO BUS 141 (6 HRS)

DGB 7.68E-02 LOSS OF DG1/2 AFTER CGI,(6 HRS) 1TB 1.00E+00 EVENT FAILS

8. 7.69E-05 0.48 % DLOOP 1.61 E-02 DUAL UNIT LOOP EVENTS DG1 7.81 E-02 LOP FROM DG1 TO BUS 14-1 (6 HRS)

DG2 7.15E 02 LOSS OF DG2 AFTER DG1 (6 HRS)

SBO? 1.00E+00 SBO IN UNIT 2, NO $B0 IN UNIT 1

20. 1.11 E-05 0.07% DLOOP 1.61 E-02 DUAL UNIT LOOP EVENTS DG1 7.81E42 LOP FROM DG1 TO BUS 14-1 (6 HRS)

DG2 7.15 E-02 LOSS OF DG2 AFTER DG1 (6 HRS)

DGB 1.24E41 LOSS OF DG1/2 AFTER DG1 AND DG2,(6 HRS)

SBO? 1.00E+00 SBO IN UNIT 1. SBO IN UNIT 2 .

l

21. 1.05 E-05 0.07% DLOOP 1.61 E-02 DUAL UNIT LOOP EVENTS DGB 7.10 E-02 LOP FROM DG1/2 (6 HRS) 18 1.13E42 LOSS OF BUS 18,13-1 UNAVAIL 1TB 1.00E+00 EVENT FAILS
27. 4.73E-06 0.03% DLOOP 1.61 E-02 DUAL UNIT LOOP EVENTS DGB 7.10 E-02 LOP FROM DG1/2 (6 HRS) 14 5.50E-03 LOSS OF BUS 14 (345KV UNAVAIL)
30. 2.57E46 0.02% DLOOP 1.61 E42 DUAL UNIT LOOP EVENTS 13 5.57E-03 LOSS OF BUS 13 (345KV UNAVAIL) 14 4.05E-02 LOSS OF BUS 14 AFTER 13.14-1 AVAll
44. 916E 07 0.01 % DLOOP 1.61 E-02 DUAL UNIT LOOP EVENTS DG1 7.81E 02 LOP FROM DG1 TO BUS 141 (6 HRS)

DGB 7.68E-02 LOSS OF DG1/2 AFTER DG1,(6 HRS) 141 1.17E-02 LOSS OF BUS 141,14 & DG1 UNAVAIL, X-TIE AVAIL SBO? 1.00E+00 SBO IN UNIT 1, NO SBO IN UNIT 2 ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 44 of 45 726316SU,145/121593 4 189

afe TABLE 4.5.1-3 (Continued)

DUAL UNIT LOOP SUPPORT MODEL QUANTIFICATION RESULTS Notes: j

1. " Number" refers to support state model sequence.
2. " Frequency" is the frequency per year that this initiator / support combination is expected to occur.
3. " Percent" is the percent of off-normal conditions for the subject initiators that would involve this state.

l

4. " Event" is the model top event label. I
5. "Value" is frequency (for initiators) or probability (for failures) that the event would occur.
6. " Description" defines the event label.

l a

i l 726316SU.145/121593 4 190

( ESK-96-031, Attachment, Page 45 of 45 l

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