ML20098E794
| ML20098E794 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1984 |
| From: | Segrest A, Wells J DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20098E789 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8410010386 | |
| Download: ML20098E794 (226) | |
Text
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s DETROIT EDISON COMPANY h
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"; FERMI 2 FINAL ASSESSMENT OF CONSTRUCTION J
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, OUKE POWER DUKE ' MANAGEMENT AND POWER TECHNICAL SERVICES R$AR$8SR'o!$851 e A PDR a
FERMI 2
( FINAL ASSESSMENT OF CONSTRUCTION l
Project Team Leader J. R. Wells
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l Project Manager A.M. Segrest 227 Assossment Conducted & Report Prepared by Duke Power Company
, Managent and Technical Services 422 South Church Street Charlotte, N. C.
July 1984
(.________-__-__-____-..__---_._----__-----._-----.-
DETROIT EDIS0N COMPANY l FERMI 2 FINAL ASSESSMENT OF CONSTRUCTION This is to certify that I, James R Wells, have reviewed the subject recommendations included in the construction assessment report herein and find them to be complete and in conformance with generally accepted industry practice.
(Seal) Signature: W r- Name: James R. Wells f "" Registered Professional Engineer i 9$9 Ch PE Number: North Carolina 2517 EEAL \ :}
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Date: 7" E 7 - [
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ABSTRACT This Duke Power Company Construction Assessment Team report presents the results, conclusions and recommendations of the Independent Final Construction Assessment of Fermt 2 Nuclear Power Plant conducted during the period of June 4, 1984 through July 13, 1984. This assessment was primarily on the hardware with a limited review of records in certain defined areas. Independent measurements, inspections, nondestructive tests and other types of physical examinations were utilized in the conduct of this assessment. All critical parts of the plant were covered as described in the assessment plan which was submitted to Detroit Edison and the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission prior to the beginning of the field work, ii
. TABLE '0F CONTENTS Page-
-1.0 ' Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 2.0 Introduction ..................... 6 3'. 0 Hardware Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 3.1, Supports and Restraints ............. 11
- 3. 2 . Stru ctu r al I tems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 3.3 Containment .......;............ 63 3.4_ Coatings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
71 3.5 Materials Testing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 3.6 Piping Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 3.7 Mec h an i c al Equ i pment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 3.8 Heating Ventilating and Air Conditioning . . . . . 128 3.9 Mechanical Instrumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 3.10' Electrical Distribution System ......... 137 3.11 Electrical C able System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 3.12 ' Electrical Motors 'atd Nbtor Operator Valves . . . 161 3.131 Electrical Instrumentation ........... 168 3.14 Electrical Control Boards and Cabinets. . . . . . 176 4.0 ' Records Evalu ati on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
' 4.1 Des ign C h anges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
187 4.2 Equipment Environment Qualification. . . . . . . . 189 4.3 Core Spray Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 4.4 HPCI Turbine Refurbishment Records Review. . . . . 194 4.5 Soils Record Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 5.0 L Third Party Assessments Evaluation. . . . . . . . . . . 197 5.1 Pipe Support Review by Stone & Webster . . . . . . 197 5.2 .Sargeant and Lundy Seismic' Interaction Study . . . 198 5.3 Thermal Separation Review by Detroit Edison. . . . 199 5.4 Cable Tray Review by Sargeant and Lundy. . . . . . 200 5.5 Piping Review by Cygna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 5.6 Record Review by Management Analysis Company . . . 202 6.0 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 Appendices ...................... 210-iii
1.0 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
1.1 Introduction The Fermi 2 plant is being built by Detroit Edison Company and is scheduled for fuel load in late 1984. During the period of construction, the work was under the Detroit Edison Quality Assurance Program. In addition to the oversight provided by the Detroit Edison QA program, there were a number of other audits, inspections, l evaluation and assessments made. These include regular NRC l inspection, contractor QA and QC audits and inspections, and some third party assessments. Since construction of the plant is virtually complete and the pre-operational testing is well underway, it was deemed advisable to have a Final Assessment of Construction.
1.2 Purpose The purpose of this Final Assessment of Construction was to:
(1) Make a final walkdown of a sample of the safety related structures, systems and components to determine the final 1 status.
(2) Determine if there are any significant deviations from the final I design disclosure documents.
(3) Perform a review of certain quality related records and design I change documents (4) Review certain previous third party assessments to determine I their value as part of this final assessment.
(5) Make recommendations, as appropriate, for actions that need to be taken as a result of this assessment.
l 1.3 Assessment Team The assessment was conducted at Fermi 2 from June 11, 1984 through July 13, 1984. Preparation for the assessment began on June 1, 1984.
I The assessment plan was presented to Detroit Edison and NRC representatives on June 11, 1984. The time between July 13 and July 31 was used to prepare the final report which was submitted on July 31, 1984.
The assessment was done by the Management and Technical Services Division of Duke Power Company. The team consisted of engineers, I technicians, and inspectors representing all disciplines. The team consisted of members with design, construction and inspection backgrounds.
Detroit Edison provided technical personnel to assist the team in obtaining design documents and the location of system and components in the field. Detroit Edison also provided qualified personnel to I
perform some of the tests and inspections. All of this work was, however, under the control of and directed by the assessment team.
The team made the decision on what to inspect or test and evaluated the results. None of the team members have had any prior association with the Fermi 2 project.
The NRC had an observer present during the entire period of the evaluation.
1.4 Concepts and Methods The basic concept of the assessment was to do a walkdown of selected structures, systems, ad components using the final design disclosure documents furnished by Detroit Edison. No attempt was made to determine the accuracy of these documents. In addition, selected quality records were reviewed. The walkdown included visual inspections by experienced engineers with both design and construction experience and independent measurements, tests, and examinations by these engineers and certified inspecters. The independent measurements consisted of nondestructive examinations when it was appropriate to employ them. The final assessment at Fermi 2 was essentially a hardware inspection to verify that the product was in conformance with the design document. Minimal reliance was made on the procedural and record aspect of the project. In this way a direct indication of quality and conformance with design was provided.
The Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant is composed of various structures, I systems and components which were designed and erected over a l relatively long period of time by different organizations. The assessment team selected for review a cross-section of items which represented the various phases of construciton, different erection contractors and the several disciplines involved.
The record review and evaluation of other third party assessments was done to supplement the field work and provide some confidence in the records.
l 1.5 Conclusions and Signficant Findings The following significant findings and conclusions resulted from this assessment:
l (1) The team concluded that supports for piping systeras and cable tray are of acceptable quality and there are no significant I deviations from the design.
L (2) The assessment of the supports for the HVAC systems have some deviations that need to be investigated for possible corrective r action.
L (3) The pipe whip restraints were constructed as designed with no significant deviations. Two significant findings involved I some vendor welds that did not meet design documents and the L
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removal of some restraints for later construction work without replacing them.
(4) The team concluoed that the concrete expansion anchors had no significant deviations from design.
(5) The torus supports have some welds that are smaller than the design documents indicate. Other than this deviation, the torus supports were found to conform to the design documents.
(6) The structural steel inspected conformed to the drawing with no signficant deviations. In one area, however, the bolts were not tight enough for a friction connection.
(7) Except for a honeycomb area around a watertight door, the team concluded that the concrete was of acceptable quality. Windsor probe tests indicated strengths considerably atave design requirements. A careful visual inspection of 4 different areas identified no significant deviations.
(8) An inspection of the shore barrier indicated that parts of it are signficantly below design elevation. A review of the settlement records indicated that virtually no settlement or lateral movement has taken place since it was constructed.
(9) The fire / security doors were erected with no significant deviations. The watertight doors had some significant deviations such at missing hardware and improperly installed closing I mechanism.
(10) The containment system meets requirements except in two areas.
There is considerable construction induced damage on the exterior I of the torus and the interior of the drywell and some of the welds requiring magnetic particle testing do not meet code requirements.
(11) The coatings which are in place inside the drywell meet specified requirements. There are, however, damaged areas and items which I have not been coated.
(12) Hardness tests performed indicated that the materials installed meet design requirements.
1 (13) The team concluded that the piping systems are erected with no significant deviations. NDE performed showed no deviations from I requirements.
(14) Based on a complete review of sample of welding procedures, it I was concluded that welding requirements have been met.
l (15) The team concluded that the mechanical equipment was installed I and has been maintained in an acceptable manner. While the exterior surfaces are dirty and need some repainting, the l
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interior of the equipment has not deteriorated during the time of installation.
(16) The HVAC systems were determined to have no significant deviations.
(17) The mechanical instrumentation is of acceptable quality.
(18) The 4160V switchgear has been installed to the design requirement. Some of the components have not been kept clean internally and this could affect the operability of this equipment.
(19) The 480 volt motor control centers have not been kept clean.
.Some of the fusing does not meet design requirements.
(20) The batteries have been installed as required by the design. The specific gravity has not been maintained at the required level.
(21) Electrical cables and their routing are in agreement with the l design with no significant deviations. Two items do not appear I to meet design, i.e., cable separation inside the cabinets and lack of grip type connections at cabinets. They appear to be acceptable but do not meet design documents.
(22) There was some signficant deviation of the cable in the trays.
This is fully described in Section 3.11.2.4.
I (23) The electrical penetrations had no significant deviations.
l However, there were a number of minor deviations and this number is cause for concern.
(24) The thermal shields meet requirements.
(25) There were a number of terminations of electrical cable that are not securely fastened.
(26) Electrical instrumentation had several findings due to incomplete work. A final inspection of these items should be done.
[ (27) Review of QA records and design changes did not disclose any B signficant deviations except for the retrievability time of l
records and length of time for outstanding design change paper.
(28) The third party assessment of pipe supports by Stone and Webster and the record review by MAC was found to agree with the team's l evaluation. The review of the other third party assessments was I inconclusive.
l 1.6 Recommendations The recommendations of the team are contained in Section 6.0 of this l report.
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1.7 Final Conclusion It is the opinion of the team that when all of the potential findings, as reported on CAT-1 forms are resolved and the recommendations are implemented there will be reasonable assurance that no significant deviations from the final design disclosure documents will exist.
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1. General This report documents 'the final assessment of construction made for the Fermi 2 plant of Detroit Edison Company. The assessment was made by Duke Power Company. during the' period ' June '1,1984 through July 13, 1984.
. Fermi .2 is 11 1100 MW Boiling Water. Reactor being built by Detroit Edison
. Company. Construction of the plant is essentially complete and fuel
- loading is scheduled in 1984. . Figure 2.1.1 gives a plot plan of the plant area. Figure 2.1.2.gives a transverse section of the General Plant Layout.
The work 'is being .done .in accordance with " Specification for Fermi 2 Final Assessment of Construction" Rev. 4, dated May 17, 1984. An assessment plan
. was developed and presented to Detroit Edison and the NRC on June 11, 1984.- t This plan was officially submitted to the NRC by Detroit Edison on
~ June 18,-1984.
r h 2.2 -Purpose'
- The purpose of this assessment was to make a final review of safety-related systems and structures in.the Reactor, Residual Heat Removal Complex and Auxiliary Buildings to determine if significant deviations from the final design disclosure documents exist that were not detected during previous i walkdown assessment, inspection or testing activities. This assessment is to provide reasonable assurance that the plant is constructed in accordance
' with the final design disclosure documents or recommend necessary action to be taken to gain this ' assurance. A review of some records were made. In particular a review was made of the core spray system records. Other selected records were reviewed. An evaluation was made of some previous I third party assessments to establish their value to the overall assessment of the. project.
2.3 Scope- l There was.an initial agreement made with Detroit Edison Company and the NRC that ASME code piping welds which required radiography would be excluded from this assessment. During the assessment, it was also agreed by all parties to exclude metallographic examination of stainless steel pipe.
Based on this agreement none of these welds were reviewed. With these exceptions a sample of all significant safety-related items were
, evaluated.
. 2. 4 Construction Assessment Team The ~ team consisted of 19 members either full or part time. Appendix 1 is a listing of the team members. The team members were selected to ensure a
> broad background of expertise. All are engineers, technicians, or inspec- ;
-tors with significant' experience in the design and construction of nuclear ;
power plants. Twelve members of the team are engineers, 3 are technicians, i and 4 are ANSI N45.2.6 certified inspectors. Fourteen members have a field construction background and 5 have a design background. All of their l 6
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resumes were submitted to Detroit Edison and the NRC observer. The utilization of some Quality Control Inspectors proved to be a very beneficial aspect of the assessment.
Independence of the evaluation was assured because no team member had ever worked on the project in any capacity. There was no pri?r review by any team member. in any of the Fermi 2 work.
2.5 Hardware Evaluation The assessment plan was developed to focus on the evaluation of the hard-ware with a minor emphasis on certain records and evaluation of previous third party assessments. Sufficient portions (samples) of safety-related systems, . subsystems and components were selected to provide confidence in the parts of the plant not inspected. The items for review were selected by.the team with no influence from_ Detroit Edison or their contractors' personnel. The systems selected included Mechanical, Electrical and I&C Systems and Subsystems, attached structural supports for these systems, and steel structures with emphasis on the drywell locations. The attributes selected to be verified were based on the experience of the team members with input from the NRC observer on significant deficiencies discovered at
- other construction sites. The methodology selected was dependent on the item being reviewed. As appropriate, checklists were prepared for the inspections and walkdowns. An example of a checklist is shown in Appendix 2. Items for review were selected to represent the total time span of construction, thus ensuring that a number of contractors' work was reviewed. Most of the work selected had a number of design changes ,
associated with it.
2.6 Records Evaluation The Core Spray = System was selected for a detailed record review. These records were reviewed for completeness and accuracy. Seils records for the ,
- backfilled trench between the RHR Building and the Reactor Building were selected for review. In addition certain other records were reviewed for work which was also walked down.
2.7 Review of Third Party Assessments As part of the on-going work, Detroit Edison had some third party assess-ments done in the past. Some of these were reviewed to establish their validity. A sample of the previous work was re-done by the team to deter-mine how much value could be placed on these assessments by this final
- assessment. Six of these previous assessments were chosen for review.
2.8 Assumptions The information presented to for use in this assessment was provided by Detroit Edison Company. It includes design information generated by Detroit Edison Company and its several contractors, A&E firms, and
< suppliers of hardware. No attempt has been made to verify the accuracy of this information. The final design disclosure documents are defined as those documents that were used to build the plant or the "as-built" docu-i 7
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ments that were reviewed and approved by Detroit Edison Company as being adequate.
2.9 Interim Reports to Detroit Edison Company i
During the assessment, certain items were brought to the attention of Detroit Edison Company. These items were either categorized as potential findings or assessor concerns. The assessment team documented these items on CAT-1 forms. An example is shown in Appendix 3. The potential finding is defined as an item that does not conform to the final design disclosure document. The assessor concern is defined as an item which conforms to the design document but does not appear to be correct in the judgement of an experienced engineer. A listing of these potential findings and assessor concerns is shown in Appendix 4.
In addition to those two methods of reporting items to Detroit Edison, daily briefings were made to the project management. In all cases, the NRC observer was in attendance at all meetings.
2.10 Documents and Report This report constitutes the official documentation of the results of this assessment. The Conclusions and Recommendations are summarized in Section 6. More detail is included in the body of this report. No attempt has been made to include all references in the appendices. All references cited are .available through libraries, tech.ic:1 societies, or industry publications.
The period of this assessment was from June 1,1984 to the presentation of the final report on July 31, 1984.
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3.0 HARDWARE EVALUATION l 3.1 Supports and Restraints 3.1.1 Pipe Supports 3.1.1.1 Purpose Pipe supports were inspected to assure that the supports were erected in accordance with the latest Design Disclosure Documents.
l I 3.1.1.2 Criteria !
1 (1) Detroit Edison Project Specification 3071-31, Appendix F l (2) Power Piping Catalog for Supports (77)
(3) NPS Catalog, NPSI-81 (4) PSA Catalog, PSA-4 I -(5) Applicable Supports Sketches 3.1.1.3 Items Evaluated A total of 51 pipe supports were randomly selected for inspection.
The supports included large and small bore piping systems. These 8 '
supports were given a general inspection for 1) Location, 2)
Configuration, 3) Material Conformity, 4) Damage, 5) Expansion Ancnors and 6) Quality of Welding. Special components such as 8 - variable and constant support springs and mechanical shock suppressors were compared to the design sketch and latest available catalog.
In addition to the above, 8 mechanical and 2 hydraulic shock suppressors were disconnected from their installed position in the field and stroked through their travel range twice (see Photograph I 3.1.1).
The review of concrete expansion anchors was limited to size, edge I distance, type, baseplate bearing and surrounding concrete.
Additional checks on expansion anchors are covered in section 3.1.5 of this report.
Table 3.1.1 provides a summary of the pipe supports evaluated.
Table 3.1.2 provides a summary of the stroking of mechanical and I hydraulic shock suppressors.
3.1.1.4 Results The location of supports relative to pipe and building structure were as specified on the design drawings. No problems were 11 g
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identified with material conformity, or sizing of special components (i.e. variable and constant springs, shock-suppressors). All mechanical. and hydraulic shocks were found to be in an acceptable condition.- Several minor' configuration problems were identified (see Notes 1-13 in Table 3.1.1). Usage of vendor catalogs to verify S standard components was very difficult. Several catalog part
' dimensions did not match support sketches. .
3.1.1.5' Conclusions t: On the basis of this evaluation, there were no significant
. deviations from the design documents for pipe supports. A concern continues to exist with the control of vendor catalogs used to
- verify standard component parts. The deviations encountered with the vendor catalog were minor in nature and judged insignificant to the structural intregrity.of the supports.
r 3.1.21 Cable Tray Supports
'- 3.1.2.1 Purpose Cable tray and conduit supports were inspected to assure that the support was erected in accordance with the latest design disclosure documents. -
3.1.2.2 Criteria (1)- Detroit Edison Project Specification 3071-128-ED " Electrical Engineering Standards" (Conduit Supports)
(2) Detroit Edison Project-Specification 3071-128-EB " Electrical Engineering Standard":(Tray Supports) .
(3) Applicable: Design Documents
'3.1.2.3 Items Evaluated
[ A total of 56 supports were inspected in this evaluation. Forty-si x
' cable tray supports were randomly selected in nine areas of the L
L plant listed below. Ten conduit supports were randomly selected in six of the areas of the plant.
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Area Name Site Nomenclatur-Upper Cable Spread Room QUEENIE
. Lower Cable Spread Room JADA Cable Tray Room RITA Re1ay Room NANCY Residual Heat Removal Complex RHR Reactor Building Basement 8080 Reactor Building First Floor CHARLES Reactor Building Subbasement ADAM Drywell Drywell Table 3.1.3 provides a summary of the supports inspected.
3.1.2.4 Results There were no significant deviations from design documents identified in the 56 supports inspected. Each support was inspected for general location in building, configuration, applicable I hardware, quality of tray. attachment welds, proper anchorage, structural weld quality, workmanship, damage, and the adequacy of adjacent tray splices. Minor items identified are documented on
{l Table 3.1.3. 'Although the team found the supports to be in an acceptable condition, the volume of the change paper required to inspect the supports was excessive. Contract personnel from Detroit Edison were familiar with this change paper and provided timely answers to questions which arose during the field inspection.
3.1.2.5 Conclusions Cable tray and conduit supports are acceptable and will serve their intended function. Detroit Edison needs to provide an under-standable method for determining what changes have been made in design drawings for the individual cable tray supports.
3.1.3 HVAC Supports 3.1.3.1 Purpose L HVAC supports were inspected to assure that the supports were c erected in accordance with the latest design disclosure d;ruments.
3.1.3.2 Criteria (1)- Detroit Edison project Specification 3071-174, " Erection of Ventilation and Air Conditioning Systems for Reactor, Turbine Radwaste Buildings, Control Center Complex and RHR Complex" (2) Applicable Design Drawings
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3.1.3.3 ' Items Evaluated-The scope of this evaluation covered 10 HVAC supports. Eight
-supports _ were randomly selected in the drywell and two supports in the control room. The supports were inspected for 1) Quality of Welding. 2) General-Condition of Steel, 3) Material Identification,
- 4) Fabrication / Workmanship, 5) Fit-Up of Members, 6) Size, Orientation and Dimension of Members, 7) Member Location, 8)
Location of Support. along Duct, and 9) Connections.
Table 3.1.4'is a summary of the_ supports inspected.
3.1.3.4- Results During the evaluation several problems were identified. Design drawings which apply to HVAC Support 4134-40 had conflicting details. Drawing 6M721-4385 section F-F does not agree with drawing SS721-3060 section 4-4.
Several supports which were evaluated either had missing members or members added that were not shown on the support drawing. HVAC Support 4130-73 had a 4"x4"x3/4" angle brace and baseplate missing.
This support had four 7/8" dia. bolts, one 12"x6"x3/4" plate and two
, 3"x3"x1/4" angle stiffeners added that were not shown on sketches.
HVAC Support 6M-2819-62 had a 2.1/2" x 21/2" piece of angle added
.that was not shown on drawing and HVAC Support 6M-2850-77A had a 4"x4"xl/8",12" long piece of angle added not shown on drawing.
In addition, HVAC Support 4130-32 had DCR H889 written against it.
. This DCR requires a piece of 3"x3"x3/8" angle to be relocated. This
(. work was not performed.
f -3.1.3.5 Conclusions L
Based en this evaluation, it is recommended that an additional
(. random sample of HVAC supports be inspected for. as-built /as-designed L adequacy. The sample plan should be concentrated in the area; cf 1) drawing (s) reviewed for conflicting details, 2) missing members on as erected supports and 3) members added which are not shown on
- current design documents. If no significant deviations are found,
' the HVAC supports -are considered acceptable.
I In addition, it is suggested that the items identified on CAT forms y 85, 88, 91, 93 and 94 be reviewed by Detroit Edison Engineering and accepted as erected or corrected to match the existing design
/ documents.
s
- j. 3.1.4- . Pipe Whip Restraints
' 3.1,4.1 Purpose The purpose of.this evaluation was to compare the as-built condition
( of pipe whip restraints to the latest design disclosure documents.
4-14
i 3.1.4.2 Criteria (1) FSAR Section 3.6, " Protection Against Dynamic Effects
. Associated with the Postulated Rupture of Piping Inside Containment" (2) Wismer & Becker Procedure, WB-C-122 (3) Detroit Edison Project Specification, 3071-227 3.1.4.3 Items Evaluated This evaluation covered detailed inspections of 6 pipe whip restraints and 2 system walkdowns. One walkdown covered a selected portions of the whip restraints on the Core Spray System. Another walkdown covered a selected portions of the whip restraints on the Reactor Feedwater System.
Pipe whip restraints were inspected for 1) identification quality of welding, 2) general condition of steel, 3) fabrication / workmanship,
- 4) fit-up of members, 5) size, orientation, dimension of members, 6) member location, and 7) connections. Material for whip restraint, steel is covered in Section 3.5, " Material Testing."
L Table 3.1.5 is a summary of the 6 whip restraints inspected along with the 2 walkdowns.
3.1.4.4 Results
( While performing this evaluation several pipe whip restraints were found to have missing cotter pins and one whip restraint was dis-connected from its structural attachment (see Photograph 3.1.2).
(- Detroit Edison advised that piping insulation was put up after the whip restraints were installed. Some restraints had to be e disconnected to insulate the pipe and apparently not all the whip L
restraints were replaced correctly.
During the evaluation of welding on a General Electric supplied whip restraint, it was discovered that 1/2" fillet welds were installed s rather than full penetration welds as required by the GE drawing (see Figure 3.1.1).
]
In addition to the detail inspection of 6 whip restraints, a walkdown was performed on two systems. During the walkdown of a portion of the Core Spray System, it was discovered that the field
,- iccation of 2 whip restraints (CSRIAA and CSR18A) did not match the location as shown on drawing (6M721-3053-2).
f 1.1.4.5 Conclusions s
On the basis of this evaluation, the following recommendations are
- provided:
s
)
15
.(1). Perform an engineering analysis to determine if 1/2" fillet welds are acceptable .for GE supplied whip restraints which were required- to have full penetration welds.
(2) Walkdown systems containing pipe whip restraints to verify field' locations versus drawing locations and observe complete-ness of installation (i.e. no disconnected or missing parts).
Contingent upon satisfactory completion of these recommendations, pipe whip restraints appear to conform to the deHgn requirements.
3.1.5 Concreta Expansion Anchors 3.1.5.'1- Purpose The purpose of this review was to evaluate concrete expansion anchor
-installations to the latest design disclosure documents.
, 3.1.5.2 - Criteria-Detroit Edison Project Specification 3071-226, " Purchase and Installation of Concrete Anchors Enrico Fermi Power Plant."
Detroit Edison Drawings SC721-2002 and SC721-2003 " Wedge Anchor Standard Details" and "Special Conditions - Wedge Anchor Installations."
In addition, a length code identification chart was used which was obtained from Detroit Edison Procedure WP-I-01.
. 3.1.5.3 Items Evaluated
.While performing this evaluation,~ 50 connections were checked that utilized concrete expansion anchors as their primary attachment to
? the building structure. These anchors were checked for 1) Type, 2) i Proper Torque, 3) Size, Spacing and Perpendicularity, 4) Embedment,
- 5) Full Thread Engagement, 6) Bearing, 7) Surrounding Concrete, 8)-
r ' Hole Examination, 9) Damage,10) Ultrasonic Test for stud length.
L Table 3.1.6 is a breakdown of the areas and number of connections that were inspected.
- Within each of these areas, the review covered a variety of structural supports ~which utilized expansion anchors as their primary connecting device. Table 3.1.7 is a summary of the support installations inspected.
3.1.5.4 Results
- During the evaluation of the 50 expansion anchor connections, the team found that several anchors had considerably higher torque values than that shown on the latest revision of Drawing SC721-2002.
From the evaluation, it was determined that the high torque values
('- could be caused by 1) baseplate bearing against anchor, 2) grout seepage in hole of baseplate and in threads of anchor, or 3) high 16
[: _
installation torque values which were allowed by earlier revisions of Drawing SC721-2002 (see Photographs 3.1.3 and 3.1.4.).
Expansion- anchor projection was measured before and after applying torque. Several of the larger anchors showed movement in projection when nut turned, the smaller anchors did not. An evaluation of the baseplate hole and expansion anchor was performed on several anchors when movement was not detected. No problems were identified.
Ultrasonic examination was performed on the 50 expansion anchors to verify length. From the 50 checked there was difficulty verifying the length of some 3/8" diameter anchors. A rough edge on the end of these anchors would not produce an acceptable UT reading.
However, the UT results obtained showed the expansion anchor lengths to be acceptable (see Photograph 3.1.5). Subsequent minimum embedment was checked and found to be acceptable.
3.1.5.5 Conclusions On the basis of the evaluation of 50 expansion anchor connections, no significant deviations from current design disclosure documents were identified. It was concluded that expansion anchor instal-lations conform to the requirements with only minor deviations.
l 1
i 17
.4 L
TABLE 3.1.1 Pipe Support Summary Support Identification System- ISO Support # Pipe Size Comments Ell -3164 G06
- 12" CAT Form 84, See Note 1 E21 3147 G38
- 12" E21~ 3147 G36
- 12" Ell ' 4612 G03
- 6" P44 3048 G18
- 4" N30- 3259 G68 24" CAT Form 83, See Note 2 N21 3137 G13 24" N30 ~ 3259 G04 24" CAT Form 80 N30 3259 G73 32" CAT Form 81, 82, See Note 4 Ell 2179 G14
- 16"
' Ell 2179- G13
- 16" CAT Form 67, See Note 5 Ell 2179 GIS
- 16" Ell 2179 G20
- 16" Ell 2179 G18
- 16"
'E41. 3172 G17
- 10" E41 3172 Gil
- 10" E41 3172 G13
- 10" E41 3172 'G12
- 10" E41 ~2183 G07 24" E41 2183 G17 18" CAT Form 64, See Note 6 Ell 2183 G06
- 18" Ell' 2183 G05
- 18" Ell 2183 .G02
- 24" Ell 2183 G16
- 18" E41 3172 G16
- 10"-
Ell 3159- Gil 12" C41 .2340 Gil
- 1 1/2" CAT Form 43, See Note 7 E21 3147 G21
- 12" CAT Form 44, See Note 8 C41 2979 G01 2" C11 3240 Gil 9" E11 4612 G01
- 6" Ell 3159 G06
- 12" E21 3144 G06
- 14" C41 2979 G07
- 1" Ell 4251 G08
- 2 1/2" CAT Form 46, See Note 8 Ell. 4239 G01 8"
.E41 2297 -G01
- 10" B21 2297 G08
- 10" ;
WP44 2183 G10 - 2" CAT Form 20, See Note 10 i E21' 3052 G01
- 12" E21 3052 G03
- 12" -l E21 3052 G09
- 12" C41 3361 G06
- 3" C11 3240 G09 9" E51 3174 G12
- 4" i
18
I TABLE 3.1.1 (Cont'd)
Pipe Support Summary
- Support Identification
-System' ISO- Support # Pipe' Size Comments E21 ' 3144 G08
- 14" CAT Form 42, See Note 11
~ N30 3259 G83' 24" CAT Form 51, See Note 12 Ell. 4251- _G18
- 2 1/2" CAT Form 34, See Note 13 C41 2340 6 06
- 1 1/2" Ell 3519 G10b
- 6" E21- 3053 - G04
- 12"
- These supports were inspected in the third party assessment by Stone and Webster Michigan, Inc..
, 821 Nuclear. Boiler System Cll CR0_ Manual Control System C41 Standby Liquid Control System Ell RHR and LPCI Flush
~ E21 Core Spray System
- E41 High Pressure Coolant Injection E51 Reactor Core. Isolation Coolant
-N21 Feedwater System-N30: Turbine Steam
.P44 Emergency Equip. Cooling Water NOTE 1: No revision level given for DECO sketch SK3M2331.
- NOTE 2: Dimension of pipe clamp installed varies from 1981 NPS catalog.
NOTE 3:- . Clamp dimension not as specified by power piping catalog.
NOTE 4: Cold load setting of variable support is less than what is specified on sketch. Clamp spacer is missing also.
NOTE 5: Strut is binding and will not rotate.
NOTE 6: Strut is binding and will not rotate.
NOTE 7: Fillet weld on Mech. Snubber not 3/16" as required.
NOTE 8: Pipe clamp dimension not as specified by NPS catalog.
NOTE _9: Nuts for standard U-bolt not installed per design sketch.
NOTE 10: Field welding of support not performed to design sketch. l
. \
NOTE 11: Concrete anchor edge distance not per support sketch. l l
i N0lE'12: Dimensions of pipe clamp do not support sketch.
i NOTE 13: Strut rear bracket dimensions do not conform to NPS catalog. l l
19
+ g e - s v- e , , v- e~ n nr.-,,,-e-n-e .- e, , w-w ,, -e,-wnn--,--,w,-m,., , , , , , , - - , -m_ w-n n, - - , - . -,ww--me
7 TABLE 3.1.2 Snubber Stroking Summary Support Identification Size Serial No. Type Comments T23-12837-36-G13 PSA 1/4 22429 Mechanicd High Traffic Area T23-12837-39-G43 PSA 1/4 12696 Mechanical Remote Area 821 2593 G03 PSA 10 9006 Mechanical High Traffic Area Ell 2327 G07 .PSA 35 9854 Mechanical High Traffic Area Shock was protected with a wooden cover Ell 2299 G02 PSA 1/4 33740 Mechanical Remote Area C41 2340 G76 PSA 1/2 13164 Mechanical Remote Area Ell 4611 G14 2" Bore 810210 Hydraulic Remote Area 5" Stroke Ell 3161 G13 2 1/2" Bore 830020 Hydraulic Remote Area 5" Stroke
' Ell 3161.G13 PSA 3 20957 Mechanical High Traffic Area Ell 3147 G26 PSA 10 12817 Mechanical Remote Area l
j l
l 20
TABLE 3.1.3 Cable Tray / Conduit Support Summary
. Support # Location
- Comments QU 10HV1 UCSR
.QU 70H6 UCSR BB 12 hlb RBB
-BB 12H2C RBB NA 13HV1 RR See Note 1 BB ll2H5A RBB BB 112H4A RBB BB 3H90 RBB 88 3H9C RBB See Note 2 RI 13H30 CTR JA 7HVIA LCSR
-2H08 0W 2H07 DW
- 2H09 ' DW See Note 13 NA'14H8A SCSR See Note 3 JA 70H3- LCSR JA JOH1 LCSR JA 112H58 LCSR JA ll2H5A LCSR NA 89H2B RR JA 93HV2 LCSR See Note 4 NA 33H2C RR See Note 5 ll2H3E RHR ll2H3F RHR RH 13H1 RHR RH 2H1 RHR RH 6HV7 RHR RH 2HV4B RHR See Note 6 RH 2HV58 RHR See Note 6 RH 2HV6B RHR See Note 6 JA 6HVlA LCSR JA 6HVlB LCSR JA 20H5A LCSR See Note 7 JA'20H58 LCSR See Note 8 JA ll2H48 LCSR JA 13H18 LCSR See Note 9 JA 13H5A LCSR JA 13H30 LCSR QU -ll5HV01A UCSR QU 115HV018 UCSR QU 70H7 UCSR CS NA203 RR See Note 10 CS NAll3 RR CS RI163 CTR
~
CS RIl73 CTR CS CC515 RBFF CS GG184 DW CS GG050 DW CS RHR369 RHR See Note 11 CS AA014 RBSB See Note 12 21
TABLE 3.1.3 Cable Tray / Conduit Support Summary (Cont'd)
Support # Location
- Comments CS RI3H4 CTR
.CC'40H2B RBFF CC ll2HV4A RBFF CC 112HV4B RBFF
- LOCATION KEY:-
UCSR - Upper Cable Spread Room LCSR - Lower Cable Spread Room CTR - Cable Tray Room RR - Relay Room RHR - Residual Heat Removal Complex RBB - Reactor Building Basement RBFF - Reactor Building First Floor
-RBSB - Reactor Building Subbasement DW - Drywell NOTE 1: CAT Item #127 - Conduit installed on tray but not shown on drawing. No section "T" on Drawing 6E721-2809-23 but was referenced.
NOTE 2: . CAT Item #111 - A 1" balance of plant conduit is located within 1/4" of the top support bracket. This is potential rattlespace problem.
NOTE 3: CAT Item #145 - Ceiling connection detail specifies wedge anchors; one anchor in each connect appears to be a self drill type.
NOTE 4: CAT Items #146, 147, 148 - South wall attachment not specified.
Existing concrete wall attachment is a 13"x13"xl/2" plate with 6 - 3/4" concrete anchors. Concrete baseplate detail is not as specified by the drawing. Six anchors were used instead of 8.
The detail for east wall attachment is incomplete. The middle plate attaching beam to wall is not detailed. ,
NOTE 5: CAT Item #141 - Drawing specifies 3/4" concrete wedge anchors, 5/8" self drill anchors appear to have been installed.
NOTE 6: CAT Item #142 - Weld detail for supports not as specified by drawing. Actual weld in place is a flare bevel with reinforcing fillet 1 1/2" at 4 1/2" on the top of the tube steel.
NOTE 7: CAT Item #143 - Floor connection not as specified, angle size is 5"x5"x3/8". Anchor spacing is not as specified by Detail 6 of Drawing 6E721-2809-18.
22
TABLE 3.1.3 Cable Tray / Conduit Support Summary (Cont'd)
NOTE 8: CAT Item #144 - Floor connection not as specified; angle size is 5"x5"x3/8"; anchor spacing is not as specified by Detail 6 of Drawing 6E721-2809-18.
NOTE 9: CAT Item #126 - Hole size for ceiling anchor is too large. One side of hole had been drypacked.
NOTE 10: CAT Item #158 - Anchor edge distance for support baseplate is 11/2"; the anchor in the southeast corner has an east west spacing of 13/4".
NOTE 11: CAT Item #160 - Concrete anchor edge distance of bottom 2 anchors is 1 1/4" drawing specifies 1 1/2".
NOTE 12: CAT Item #161 - Concrete anchor edge distance is 1 1/4" for the middle anchor, drawing specifies 1 1/2".
NOTE 13: Support 2H09 was missing sway braces, but further investigation revealed these to be listed on punchlist of work to be performed.
23
.I
TABLE 3.1.4 ..
HVAC SUPPORT
SUMMARY
l < :.
l HVAC Support No. Location Comments y,rj/;,.
43y C l . ~ .+ ;./
l IRSAY 4134 #40 Drywell See Note 1 See CAT Item #85 D[%]/ @
i: Q ;:
IRSAY 4134 #56 Drywell ---
- M + ,
$Q IRSAY 4134 #48 sDrywel1 ---
g.{h.':'.?;
IRSAY 4134 #55 'Drywell ---
l IRSAY 4134 #30 Crywell ---
IRSAY 4130 #73 Drywell See Note 2 See CAT Item f88 M.'.g.k v, ..
See CAT Item #94 L sM i IRSAY 4130 #32 Drywell See Note 3 M$h &
See CAT Item #93 Q'-0 ;-
g.
IRSAY 4130 #33 Drywell --- i$$q.-d.5 C ?fy 6M-2849-62 Control Center See Note 4 haamudE See CAT Item #91 y.;ga-+
y j. jr y 6M-2850-77A Control Center See Note 5 O$
NOTE 1: Support drawings do not match. Section F-F on Dwg. 6M721-4385 does not match with Section 4-4 on Dwg. 5S721-3060. :<);.pg NOTE 2: Support had a 4 x 4 x 3/4 angle brace and baseplate missing. In f,vvg!Q addition, (4) 7/8" dia, bolts, (1) 12" x 6" x 3/4" plate and (2) 3" x 3" x 1/4" angle stiffeners were added to support in field but not shown on sketch.
i ' k) y
,,ll.h,4' "y
Member dimensions not as shown on sketch. Wyg5 Ld L.
NOTE 3: Support had a DCR written against it which had not been * *
- incorporated into the building of the support. YQ Sq :"
NOTE 4: Support Item #6, 2-1/2" x 2-1/2" angle has a piece of angle added ~y i;-
to it by welding, which is not shown on sketch. ~ '
- NOTE 5: Support had an angle 4" x 4" x 1/8",12" long added but was not shown on sketch. Angle was not welded in center of baseplate and angle was coped without detail on drawing.
24
~
i-TABLE 3.1.5
)
PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT
SUMMARY
Pipe Whip Type of l System Restraint No. Location Inspection Comments !
S31- . 831-RR10A Drywell Detailed Reactor Recirc- Elev. 588'7-15/16" See Note 1 (
ulation System Az. 270* See CAT Item #39 E41 HP G3 Drywell Detailed ---
HPCI System Eley. 586'6-3/4" Az. 4* 24' N30 DR-20 Drywell Detailed See Note 2 '
Turbine Steam Elev. 587'8-15/16" See CAT Item #3 System Az. 330' 36' G33 CUR-16 Drywell Detailed ---
Reactor. Water Eley. 587'10-3/4" Clean-Up System Az. 241* 24' E51 RPR3 Drywell Detailed ---
RCIC Steamline Elev. 596'11-3/16" System Az. 339' 41' E51 RPR4 Drywell Detailed ---
RCIC Steamline Elev. 596'8" System Az. 333' 20' N21 FRIB Drywell System See Note 3 Reactor Feedwater Walkdown See CAT Item #36 System, South N21 FG3A Drywell System ---
Reactor Feedwater Walkdown System, South N21 FR4A Drywell System ---
Reactor Feedwater Walkdown System South N21 FRSA Drywell System ---
Reactor Feedwater Walkdown System, South E21 CSRIA.A Drywell System See Note 4 Core Spray Walkdown See CAT Item #37 System, South E21 CSR18A Drywell System See Note 4 Core Spray Walkdown See CAT Item #37 System, South 25
TABLE 3.1.5 (Cont'd)
PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT
SUMMARY
Pipe Whip Type of System Restraint No. Location Inspection Comments
-E21- CSR2A - Orywell System See Note 5 Core Spray Walkdown See CAT Item #38 System South E21 CSR3A Drywell System ~See Note 5 Core Spray Walkdown See CAT Item #38i System South-E21 CSR SA Drywell System See Note 5 Core _ Spray Walkdown See CAT Item #38 System South NOTE 1: GE Drawing B31-G003 requires all welds to be full penetration.
. Actual welds are 1/2" fillet (see Figure 3.1.1).
NOTE 2: This Whip Restraint had been disconnected. See Photograph 3.1.2.
NOTE 3: Cotter pins were missing on this restraint.
NOTE 4: Whip Restraints field locations and drawing locations do not match
-(6M721-3053-2, Rev. H).
! NOTE 5: Whip Restraints had missing cotter pins.
26
1 TABLE 3.1.6 CONCRETE EXPANSION ANCHOR AREAS Area Number of Connections ;
'l. Residual Heat Removal Building A. Pump Room 7 B. Diesel Room 3 ;
- 2. Reactor Building A. 1st Floor, 583' Elev. 5 B. 2nd Floor, 613' Eley. 5 C. Torus Support Area, 540' Elev. 7
- 3. Auxiliary Building A. High Pressure Coolant 7 Injection Room B. Elev. 551' 3 C. Elev. 583' 3
- 4. Drywell A. Eley. 572' 9 B. Elev. 581' 1 50 Total 27
l TABLE 3.1.7 CONCRETE EXPANSION ANCHOR
SUMMARY
Type of Size of Item Anchor Anchor Comments Pipe' Support Wedge 3/4" G-115-Instrumentation ' Support Wedge 1/2" Note 1 Between Columns E12.and F12 RHR Electrical Wedge 3/4" Support 074 Electrical Conduit Wedge 3/8" Support, 4' South of Col. G-11 Elev. 593' Pipe Support Wedge 3/4" E11-2184-G22 RHR 101, Electrical Wedge 3/4" Conduit Support, 10' South of Col. Eli Pipe Support Wedge 1" E11-2184-G23
~ Electrical Conduit Wedge 3/8" Support JB2-RHR-84, 10' East of Col. 09 Elev. 594'-3" RHR 503, 3' East of Wedge 3/8" Col. E9 Pipe Support Wedge 1/2" E11-2180-G14 Elect.. Conduit Support Wedge 5/8" RHR-024 Pipe Support Wedge 1" E41-3172-G14 Pipe Support Wedge 3/4" E41-3165-G08 Pipe Support Wedge 5/8" E41-3167-G08 Pipe Support Wedge 5/8" E51-4055-G15 28
=-
TABLE 3.1.7 (Cont'd)
CONCRETE EXPANSION ANCHOR
SUMMARY
Type of Size of Item Anchor Anchor Comments I&C Support Wedge 5/8" E41-7017-G13 i
Elect. Support Wedge 5/8" HP-102
- Elect. Support Self Orilling 5/8" HP-22 Pipe Support Wedge 5/8" Note 2 P50-3308-G43 and G46 Pipe Support Wedge 3/4" l P50-3307-G13 Pipe Support Wedge 7/8" 61721-2400-18-Gl9 l- Cable Tray Support Wedge 3/8" 10-001-11C Pipe Support Wedge 1" E21-3144-G06 Pipe Support Wedge 3/4" Note 3 i P42-3343-G32 Elect. Conduit Support Wedge 3/8" Note 3 CEI-002 Pipe Support Wedge 1/2" P44-3368-G11 Pipe Support Wedge 5/8" P44-3368-G31 Pipe Support Wedge 5/8" P44-3368-G35 Pipe Support Wedgt Both 7/8" and P44-3084-Gila 1" on this support Pipe Support Wedge 3/4" P44-3084-G20 Pipe Support Wedge 1" ,
Ell-3158-G08 29 t--
n_ . . - . .
TABLE 3.1.7 (Cont'd)
CONCRETE EXPANSION ANCHOR
SUMMARY
Type of' Size of Item Anchor Anchor Comments Elect.' Conduit Support Wedge 5/8" 88T-121 Pipe Support Wedge 1/2" G51-4056-Gl9 Pipe Support Wedge 3/4"
-G51-4055-620 Elect. Conduit Support Wedge 3/4" 88-461-2C2TS Elect. Conduit Support Self-Drilling 3/8" 88-401-21C4 Pipe Support Wedge 5/8" 6WI621F194 G18 HVAC Support ' Wedge 5/8" Note 4 Fan #8043 1 HVAC Support Wedge 5/8" Fan #8043 Pipe Support Wedge 1/2" P44-5334-G06 Elect. Conduit Support Wedge 3/8" GG-209-2K-1 Elect. Conduit Support Wedge 3/8" GG-07-10-2 Equipment Support Wedge 7/8" T47-008 or 008 Pipe Support Wedge 1" 821-2590-G17
-Pipe Support Wedge 5/8" T48-5314-C09 Pipe Support Wedge 3/8" T23-1237-39
- G01'
' Pipe Support Wedge Both 5/8" and T23-I-2837-39 1/2" on support
- G38 l 30
TABLE 3.1.7 (Cont'd)
CONCRETE EXPANSION ANCHOR
SUMMARY
Type of Size of Item Anchor Anchor Comments Pipe Support Wedge 5/8" T23-2837-39-G06 Pipe Support Wedge 7/8" T23-2837-39-G06 NOTE 1: Support was removed to observe baseplate and holes due to high torque readings. High torque reading were caused by plate bearing against anchors.
t Support had one missing nut and washer. Problem identified NOTE 2:
on CAT 1 Form No. 155.
NOTE.3: Spacing violation between these two supports. Problem
[. identified on CAT 1 Form No. 152.
( NOTE 4: Support had one anchor which was utilized to hold a suspended motor. Problem identified on CAT 1 Form No. 157.
i l
l 31
\
^L J^
\ /
\ j RESTRAINT FRAME
/
/
i 2 )
'!h AS SUILT
- ) AS DESIGNED SECTION " A - A "
ETROIT EDISON CO.
RECIRCULATION SYSTEM WHIP [,"",, , ,o, .
RESTRAINT B31-RRIOA FIGURE NO. 3.1.1 32
i 4 ..
[*
d J
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'i
- v. ,
{l, n@. y / ;' .:jv , ,
f@ f ' . _
'~~~* ,.:g;..a ; 9. .
Photograph 3.1.I strokin8 f a mechanical shock suppressor, 4
33
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i I l 7
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' - 6 $ . . .
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. . dr . .
Photograph 3.1.2 Disconnected Pipe Whip Restraint discovered during walk down.
2 l
4 4
l
> 34 i
.-- --n,-----.- _ _- - - _ - - - . - - - - _ _ - - - - - - -
s l
j i :t l
l
- $" 'k Photograph 3.I.3 Observation of
.,- I torque applied to expansion anchor'.
U
- l
, j i
- i I,
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4
-T[
i
{-M'y'
- m. Mjt . .
- 1.
- I l
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sto.
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S
/ 3 I
- a. -
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- . - ; r n . r g 1 1
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,; . : Q 's y ., ; , .
?
.it !_-
t
, Photograph 3.1.4 Removal of support due to high torque values. Anchors
} were binding against side of holes on baseplate.
i i .
35 '
N O
N ,
{
\ !
a 1 L 0"
-.:. - ;.s - & 'n , '
s.
Photograph 3.1.5 Observation of UT measurements used to determine expansion anchor length. ,
36 i
a- - - - - - _ , , ,m_.w.. _ _ __
3.2 Structural Items 3.2.1 Torus Support 3.2.1.1 Purpose The purpose 'of this evaluation was to compare the as-built condition of the Torus Supports to the latest design disclosure documents.
3.2.1.2 Criteria (1) Detroit Edison Specification 3071-171, " Containment Repair Program Torus Modification" (2) FSAR Section 3.13.2.9.1, " Torus Columns and Column ' Stubs' Design" "
- (3) Applicable design drawings 3.2.1.3 Items Evaluated There are a total of 16 supports required for the wetwell torus (see Figure 3.2.1).
'Ouring the evaluation, Torus Support Structure #12 was checked in detail along with parts of Suoports 11 and 13. These supports were compared to the latest design documents (see Photograph 3.2.1).
Inspection activities included 1) Quality of Welding, 2) General Condition of Steel, 3) Fabrication /krkmanship, 4) Fit-Up of Members, 5) Size, Orientation Dimension of Members, 6) Member location, 7) Connections and 8) NDE of welds. Material identification for torus support steel is covered in Section 3.5,
" Material Testing."
Table 3.2.1 provides a summary of the supports reviewed.
TABLE 3.2.1 TORUS _ SUPPORT
SUMMARY
Support Location Comments Support No. 11 Elev. 540' Inspection concentrated on Az. 213' 45' welding with visual observa-tion of erection.
Support No. 12 Elev. 540' Detailed Inspection Az. 237' 45' Support No. 13 Elev. 540' Inspection concentrated on l Az. 258' 45' welding with visual observa- I tion of erection.
I 37 i
~. -
't, 3.2.1.4 Results During the evaiuation', it was determined that the Torus Supports had been modified twice since their original installation. While performing the evaluation, 3 sets of drawings along with supple-mental " Change Paper" had to be used to evaluate as-built /as designed conditions. Problems were identified in the areas of welding, anchor bolt projection above concrete and confusing drawing details. Table 3.2.2 provides a summary of the deviations ,
ident1fied.
TABLE 3.2.2 TORUS SUPPORT DEVIATIONS Support Location Comments /
Support 11 Eley, 540' See Note 1 Az. 213' 45' Support 12 Elev. 540' See Notes 2 and 3 :
Az. 237' 45' 'y Support 13 Elev. 540' See Note 4 Az. 258* 43' NOTE 1: Drawing D4103 pg.1 of 2, section C-C required weld between side stiffeners and s:ddle plate to be 1/2" fillet weld. Drawing 04127 pg. 2 of 5 requires weld to 5/8" fillet. Detroit Edison Project Engineers later explained these details adequately. However, an independent assessor would need to know the original construction /
modification sequence for explaination to agree with as-built condition. This applies to all torus supports.
NOTE 2: For Torus Support #12, the anchor bolt projection above concrete violated drawing dimensions. Drawing 04127 sheet 2 of 5 and 04127 sheet 3 of 5 show the details.
NOTE 3: The horizontal weld between upper stiffener and torus shell contained porosity and slag.
NOTE 4: The weld between piece mark SCS2 and *3A is not welded full -
length. The weld is shown on Drawing D4103 sheet 1 of 2.
3.2.1.5 Conclusions l The original installation of these supports has seen two major ;
modifications. Three different sets of drawings have to be used l when inspecting the supports.
Due to the difficulties encountered during this evaluation and i potential difficulties on modifications to these supports after operation, it is recomunded that Detroit Edison review the several 38
l sets of revisions te the torus support drawings to determine that '
the as-built co: itsin meets design requirements.
3.2.2 Structural 5 teel 3.2.2.1 Purpose Structural steel fabrication and erection was reviewed for conform-ance to the latest design disclosure documents. -
3.2.2.2 Criteria l (1) Detroit Edison Project Specifications A. Drywell - 3071-129, 3071-163, 3071-179
- 8. Slab-Over-Torus - T21-00-0-000-CA-005 (B2-4C) -
(2) Chicago Bridge and Iron Procedures CBI-E-106, " Bolt Tensioning" IP-2, " Installation Procedure for AWS Beam Modification" _
(3) Applicable Design Drawings 3.2.2.3 Items Evaluated During this evaluation,10 members in the Drywell and 10 members in m the Slab-0ver-Torus were selected for inspection. Inspection activities included 1) Quality of Welding, 2) General Condition of Steel, 3) Fabrication / Workmanship, 4) Fit-Up of Members, 5) Size, Orientation and Dimension of Members, 6) Member Location, and 7)
Connections. Table 3.2.3 provides a summary of the items evaluated along with evaluator comments.
3.2.2.4 Results (1) Drywell Steel -
This evaluation covered structural steel beams and associated :
connections within the Drywell on Elevation 585'3-7/8" between azimuth 189' and 212*. This steel has been modified two times. _
The review covered the original installation as well as both modifications.
The evaluation found one beam that was square coped, and one ,
connection where the bolts were not centered in slotted connections as required by drawings. However, in general the locations, size, orientation, configuration and workmanship inspected resulted in no deviations.
Welds were checked for length, size, location and quality of -
.T weld. These checks indicated acceptable welding.
39
Bolt tensioning was checked on several connections to torque valves given in Chicago Bridge and Iron Procedure CBI-E-106.
No deviations were identified.
(2) Slab-Over-Torus Steel The evaluation covered structural steel beams and random con-nections on elevation 583'6" in and around Bays.10 thru 18.
This steel had been modified once. The evaluation covered the original installation as well as the modified steel.
The. steel was checked for the same criteria as the drywell
-steel- Bolted connections in this area were checked and most
. of the original connections did not have sufficient tension to qualify as a friction connection required by specification T21-00-0-000-CA-005 (B2-4C). An installation specifications for this steel..was not presented to the team.
Welds were given a visual examination. No deviations were identified.
3.2.2.5 Conclusion On the basis of this evaluation, the structural steel erected in the Drywell is of an acceptable quality. The deviations identified on ,
' CAT forms .182 and 183 should be corrected.
The structural steel erected in the Slab-Over-Torus was determined to be erected to the latest design disclosure documents except for
> the' original high strength bolted connections. These connections were not tensioned sufficiently to obtain a friction type connection
- (see. CAT Item #194).
Originally installed bolted connections in the Slab-0ver-Torus area should be analyzed in their as-built condition versus as-designed condition and corrected accordingly. .
3.2.3 Concrete 3.2.3.1 Purpose
. Windsor Probe Testing
.The. purpose of the Windsor Probe Test Series was to evaluate the in-place compressive strength of the structural concrete.
Concrete Walkdown The purpose of the concrete walkdown was to evaluate the concrete surface conditions. )
~
n 1
- . - -.i
Concrete Embedment Verification The purpose of the concrete embedment verification was to determine if embedded plates were placed at the correct location. ;
' 3.2.3.2 Criteria The Windsor Probe Testing was conducted in accordance with ASTM C803 and the Windsor Probe manufacturer's technical literature.
~The concrete walkdown was performed using concrete void categories 4
. developed by Sargent & Lundy Engineers. There is no specific in-place procedure or specification. addressing concrete surface criteria.
~.
- The concrete embedment verification was done using Sargent & Lundy design drawings that showed the specific locations of the items selected.
3.2.3.3 Items Evaluated Windsor Probe testing evaluated 3 areas in the Reactor Building,1 area in the Auxiliary Building and 1 area in the Residual Heat .
Removal Building. A review of the concrete field and laboratory tests was performed for the areas selected.
The concrete walkdown evaluated the exterior of the RHR complex at ground level, the Reactor Building Torus Support area in the subbasement including all accessible quandrant rooms, the Auxiliary Building ist floor and the Reactor Building Biological Shield wall and interior walls on the 1st floor.
-The concrete embedment location verification evaluated five embedded plates in the Reactor Building. The areas reviewed were the Drywell Reactor Support Pedestal and the Residual Heat Removal Heat !
Exchanger room. l 3.2.3.4 Results I The results of Windsor Probe testing are detailed in Table 3.2.4 l
)
.( see Photographs 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 for a typical Windsor Probe test). l The results of the record review of the pours selected did not j identify any deviations. Calculation checks were performed by the j team for laboratory cylinder tests. 1 The results of the concrete embedment plate verification are detailed on Table 3.2.5. Each embedment had a welded attachment.
An examination of the surrounding concrete was performed and found acceptable.
The results of the concrete Wkdown are detailed on Table 3.2.6.
See Photograph 3.2.4 for hortmomb identified around watertight door.
41
The embedded electray in the walls is beginning to rust to some degree on all of the uncoated interior walls reviewed. This rusting action may contribute to significant spalling of the adjacent con-crete in the future if the electray is not coated.
3.2.3.5 Conclusions A review of the compressive strength results indicates that in all areas surveyed, the values exceeded the 4000 psi minimum design requirements by at least 50%. There were no indications that there is any problem with the compressive strength values based on this random survey.
All embedded concrete plates were found to be located in accordance with the applicable Design drawings in the areas surveyed.
The walkdown on the concrete surfaces indicated several items that should be reviewed for possible repair action. All of the items noted were minor in nature and are of no structural significance.
3.2.4 Shore Barrier 3.2.4.1 Purpose The inspection program described below was undertaken to ensure that the shore barrier was constructed as designed and that no unaccept-able settlement or movement has taken place since it was completed.
The normal annual settlement and location reading were observed as the work was performed. In addition, two special cross sections were taken and several individual readings were made to verify those normally taken.
3.2.4.2 Criteria (1) Detroit Edison Drawing Number 6C721 Shore Barrier Plan and Sections (2) Detroit Edison Drawing Number 6C721-40A - Construction Sequence and Temporary Shoring Details Shore Barrier (3) Detroit Edison Drawing Number 6C721 Shore Barrier Survey Records (4) Project Specification Number 3071-176 Rev. B - Shore Barrier Construction (5) Detroit Edison letter from George W. Flowerday to Russel O'Sullivan dated July 20, 1983 -
Subject:
Lake Erie Shore Barrier Monitoring (including attachment - 3 pages) 42
+ - - - r.-e--, 4 e- - , , , -e % m e - _e- e- -y. -- - ---w----- .. - --
' 2.4.3
. Items Evaluated This evaluation includes a two phase assessnent of the Lake Erie Shore Barrier. The first inspection was done to determine if the barrier was constructed in accordance with the design. The second was to determine whether any unacceptable movement, either vertical or horizontal, has taken place since the barrier was constructed.
Figure 3.2.3 is a typical shore barrier section plan and Figure 3.2.4 is a plan view of the barrier. The elevation and horizontal readings are made annually and recorded on Drawing 6C-721-43. As part of this assessment the 1984 survey was observed in process by the team.
From a field observation by a team member, the elevation of parts of the barrier appeared to be lower than specified on drawing 6C721-40.
As a result of this observation the Detroit Edison survey team was
. requested to make two profiles of the barrier at Stations 6864 :
(North) and '7325 (North). These profiles are shown on Figure 3.2.5. ,
Photograph 3.2.5 is a view of the shore barrier.
It was noted that there are six stations along the barrier where permanent markers have been established to measure vertical and horizontal movement on an annual basis. At each of the six stations there are two markers. Both of these are on the horizontal part of the barrier and none are located on the sloping part. It is there-fore not possible to determine if there is movement in this part of
- the barrier.
3.2.4.4 Results The specifications for the annual reading require that an engi-neering analysis be made if any point surveyed has a total movement of one foot or move from its original position. A review of drawing:
6C721-43 shows that no point has had this much movement. In fact the movements have not been one-tenth of this amount.
The two profiles made show that the barrier is lower than specified for part of its length. It is lower by about 2 or 3 feet for about 80 ft. of length. It has apparently been this low since it was constructed because the annual reading show virtually no movement.
i 3.2.4.5 Conclusions On the basis of the above observations it is recommended that Detroit Edison take the following actions:
(1) Obtain an engineering evaluation to determine if the lower than specified top of the barrier has any significance to the barrier's intended function.
>< (2) Establish additional points on the slope of the barrier and
, incorporate them into the annual surveys. This would give-assurance thet the barrier is not sliding down the slope. The 43
- - - - ~ . - - . . - - - . _ . . - . . - - - - - _ - ...- - _ _ - .- -
i 1
location of the points should be determined by the engineer who designed the barrier.
3.2.5 Doors 3.2.5.1 Purpose The purpose of the door inspections was to insure that QA Level 1 fire doors and watertight doors were installed in accordance with the latest design disclosure documents and that the doors function properly.
3.2.5.2 Criteria Detroit Edison Design Drawings (see Table 3.2.7 for specific numbers) 3.2.5.3 Item Evaluated Five QA Level 1 doors were randomly selected from the Detroit Edison Door Schedule Drawings 6A721-2071 and 6A721-NS-2010. Two doors selected were watertight doors and three doors selected were fire doors with security devices. See Table 3.2.7 for a complete listing of doors inspected. Figure 3.2.2 shows a typical watertight door.
^
-3.2.5.4 Results The results of the inspection of the watertight doors R-1-ll and R-1-8 were unacceptable. Doors were found with loose and missing hardware. Door R-1-8 would not properly close because the locking sleeves were not installed. Door R-1-ll would not properly lock because locking pins would not fully engage. Honeycomb concrete was also found around the frame of Door R-1-8 (see Photograph 3.2.4).
Both watertight doors were missing welds that were specified by the door manufacturer. Documentation of the watertight door instal-lation inspection could not be located for these doors.
'The installation of the fire and security doors was acceptable with a few minor hardware problems. Door R-2-15 is a double door and had the lockset installed on the wrong leaf but the door would function properly. Door R-3-13 was missing the threshold. All doors had the proper security devices installed. All fire doors properly closed
, and would serve their intended functions. Doors R-2-15 and R-3-13 were not labeled with a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> tag rating. Drawing B6-210 specified that the doors were manufactured to meet 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> requirements, but the doors could not be labeled by UL because the hardware selected, a Brinks 2050 electric deadbolt is not fire listed hardware.
3.2.5.5 Conclusions Based on the results of the two watertight doors examined, the installations were not acceptable. The doors had not been pre-viously inspected for proper installation. All watertight door 44
installations need to be inspected for conformance to Design Drawings.
Although minor hardware deviations were identified on the three
- fire / security doors inspected, these type doors should function properly.
4 45
TABLE 3.2.3 STRUCTURAL STEEL
SUMMARY
(1) Drywell, Elevation.585'3-7/8", Between Az. 189* - 212' Torque on .
Beams Checked Connection Checked _ Remarks 104A Yes Torque acceptable to CBI-E-106 118A 122A 117A Yes Note 1, Torque acceptable to CBI-E-106 123A 120A Note 2 116A Note 2 121A Yes Torque acceptable to CBI-E-106 115A Note 3 119A NOTE 1: _ Bolts not centered in slotted connection, CAT Item
- 182.
4 NOTE 2: Beams had square cut copes, CAT Item #183.
NOTE 3: Slotted connection not effective. Rigidly connected
.by pipe support, CAT Item #185.
(2) Slab-Over-Torus, Elevation 583'6", Bays 10 thru 18 Beams Checked Connection Checked Remarks T66 -
AT26 -
T114 -
AT27 -
T159 -
T160 -
T18 -
T67 -
T65 -
AT29 -
T112 Yes Only item on these R15 Yes beams checked was R16 Yes torque. Torque AT21 Yes unacceptable to R14 Yes CBI-E-106. See CAT Till- Yes Item #194
.T157 Yes T107 Yes
TABLE 3.2.3 (Cont'd)
STRUCTURAL STEEL
SUMMARY
-(3). Structural Steel Certified Material Test Reports
. Drawing /
Location Detail- Heat No. Remarks Drywell SF-23 .
6 NAP Checked to side plate _ (dy) 1980 A588 Gr. A Drywell SF-454. 20AP Checked to side plate (eak) 1980 A588 Gr. A Drywell~ SF-481 9TAA Checked to stiffener angle (eja) 1980 A588 Gr. A Reactor 81dg. 6C721-3434 432N8431 Checked to Detail T 1980 A588 Gr. A Whip Restraint G33-3096-CUR-17 70A364 Checked to 1980 A588 Gr. A NOTE: .The above CMTR's were reviewed to ASTM 1980 Edition. No deviations were identified.
47
._o.. . . _ . . .,s.. _3 .
TABLE 3.2.4 u
- Windsnr Prrbe Te.st Data Tabulated Results Enrico Fermi 2 Aggregate Type: Limestone . .
Reference Procedure Mohr-Hardness: 4.0 Based on Windsor Probe's Aggregate Chart ASTM C-803 Windsor Driver CPT532CF Serial #9357 Calibrated 6/25/84 by Windsor Products, Hamden, Conn.
Average of Test Series Test Location Probe Power Estimated All Test
- Registry Setting / Compressive Compressive Number Type- Strength (PSI) Strength (PSI) 4 Reactor Building Drywell Reactor 216935- Standard / Multiple 7725 1 Pedestal
- Pour ~ #RPV#2 216941 Standard / Multiple 6675 7200 Pour Release 1999 l Design Release 577 j .
m Reactor Building First Floor 216950 Standard / Multiple 6850
' Biological Shield 6850 2 Pour #RB-100-Al 216938 Standard / Multiple 6850
! Design Release 399
! Pour Release 2022 i
Reactor Building Subbasement 216947 Standard / Multiple 7375 i
Drywell Pedestal 3 Pour Number RBil 216948 Standard / Single 6850 7025
- Pour Release 140 l Design Release 18A 216948 Standard / Single 6850 4
Auxiliary Building i
1st Floor 216936 Standard / Single 7750 Column C13.1 4 and Column Gg 216936 Standard / Single 6675 7383
- Pour Number RB110 Pour Release 1371 216932 Standard / Multiple . 7725
., Design Release 339 l
TABLE 3.2.4 (Cont'd)
Windser Probe Test Data Tabulated Results Enrico Fermi 2 Aggregate Type: Limestone Reference Procedure Mohr Hardness: 4.0 Based on Windsor Probe's Aggregate Chart ASTM C-803 Windsor Driver CPT532CF Serial #9357 Calibrated 6/25/84- by Windsor Products, Hamden, Conn.
Average of Test Series Test Location Probe Power Estimated All Test Registry Setting / Compressive Compressive
$ Residual Heat Removal 216931 Standard / Single 5450 i
Exterior Wall W2-9 216931 Standard / Single 6675 5 along a row from 8' 216933 Standard / Single 5975 Standard / Single
- South of column Row 12 216933 6150 6063 to column Row 13 from 216939 Standard / Single 5975 A Row 70, 10'-8" East 216939 Standard / Single 6150 of column Line B I
l J
-- a
- _a..
. TABLE 3.2.5 Concrete Embedment Plate Verification CORRECT AREA LOCATION ELEV AZIMUTH S&L DRAWINGS LOCATION 1 Reac.or 81da 578'-9" 210' B133 Yes Drywell-Reactor 8136 Support Pedestal 2 Reactor Bldg- 591'-10" 180* B133 Yes Drywell-Reactor B136 Support Pedestal 3 Reactor Blda 594'-10" 51' 30' B133 Yes Drywell-Reactor 8136 Support Pedestal 14' Reactor Blda 589'-0" 36' B133 Yes Drywell-Reactor 8439
-Support Pedestal
- 5 Reactor Bldo 621'-6" 8'-3" off B78 Yes RHR deat 10 line B201 Exchanger Room I';
o 50
_. . - _ _ . . .__ .-. - -. _____. - ._ _._.. ..-,.. _ ._.- _ .. _ .~ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . -
TABLE 3.2.6 Concrete Walkdown Summary AREA: Auxiliary Building /ist Floor Item #1 Column G & 11 Elev. 590 Honeycons adjacent to embedded plate, upper right hand corner, 7/8 inch deep.
Honeycomb just above embedded plate to right.
Item #2 Column H & 16' South of 10 Line Elev. 590.5 Column has honeycomb in edge of the colunn, North corner.
Item #3 Column 9 and 7 ft off H toward G Elev. 585 Two abandoned anchors adjacent to nonsafety cable tray supports have a large hole excavated around them.
Item #4 Column H & 11 Elev. 590 Honeycomb in column, South face.
Item #5 9 and halfway between G & H Elev. 584 to 592 Door # Rl-8 Honeycomb around the interior face of watertight door. See Photograph 3.2.4.
AREA: Reactor Building / Biological Shield Wall Item #1 Az. 150* Elev. 592 Exterior Face Penetration X45
, a 51
TABLE 3.2.6 (Cont'd) '
Concrete Walkdown Summary
-AREA: Reactor Buildina/ Subbasement Item #1
'SW Quandrant RHR 0 Pung area Gateway beneath QAl Assy #9 Mark #P029 Concrete spalled around elec tray embed Embed damaged as well. Spalled area 1 ft2
. Concrete spalled over RHR C Pump on access hatch, excessive rusting on frame of hatch opening.
AREA: RHR-Exterior Wall Item #1 Backfill under east wall entrance on south side missing.
52
. ,_ . - - _ - ___ _ _ . ._ . _ - . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . . _ . _ . _ - _ _ _ . _ _ . , - _ . - - _ . . _ ~ . . . _ . . . . . .
TABLE 3.2.7 Door Summary 1 D0OR NUMBER TYPE LOCATION DRAWINGS USED R-2-15 Fire / Security Switchgear Room 6A721-NS-2010 6A721-2071 6E721-NS-2980-26 6E721-NS-2992-6 R-2-24 Fire / Security Cable Spread Room 6A801-2426 6A721-2071 R-3-13' F1re/ Security Control Room 6A721-NS-2010 6A721-2071 6E721-NS-2980-27 6E721-NS-2992-6 R-1-ll Water tig'nt Reactor Bldg 6A721-2071 BP 15 BP 16 BP 17 BP 18 R-1-8 Water tight Auxiliary Bldg 6A721-2071 6A721-2078 SS721-2508 SS721-2509 BP 6128 thru 136 L
4 53
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=
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\ 15'-3" INS. RADT ELEV. 556-7" ~^ . ,
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= ELEVATION VIEW NO SCALE ;
I THE DETROIT EDISON CO.
TORUS SUP3 ORT t
b FERMI H P. P. MONROE, MICHIG AN SYSTEM COMPLETION ORGANIZATION FIGURE NO. 3.2.1 i i 54
? -
1
I 22Lle" _ 8-4' M. OP E N ING i.
yg \ 3'- 2'/z" _ 4' T/O SLAS OVER.
DOOR WIDTH CABLE ENTRY g E L .5 93'-o" h
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., 4 SOUTH ELEVATION (LOOKING NORTH)
WATER-TIG HT DOOR / FRAME RI-8 FIGURE NO. 3.2.2 55
/
EAST EAST EAST EAST EAST EAST EAST EAST EAST 6000 5940 5950 5960 5970 5930 5990 5920 5S30
=
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SEE
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EXPECTED
'Vh i 1 CAP STONE
' NORMAL MEAN t
I[ MONTHLY LAKE g \
3'-6" 7*-6" [ NhNII8 N iME --
~'
Y q ELEV. , -
567C l C L AY M SEAL '"~
- "*" "A" STONE ELEV. = 562.0 -
NOTES CRUSHED STONE !
I A SECURITY FENCE (FOUNDATION SLEEVE) EET PILING -- ;
SEE DETAIL DWG, 6 C 721Y-2OO3 BY SHORE EAST 6000.83 BARRIER CONTRACTOR THE DETROIT EDISON CO.
TYPICAL SHORE BARRIER SECTION 3LAh FERMI ll P.P. MONROE , MICHIGAN SCALE l": 10'-O" l FIGURE NO. 3.2.3
I l
l NORTH 7842 -
l NORTH 7800 NORTH 7700 N_Lp -s
% -vw NORTH 7000 CREST OF BARRIER ELEV. 583.0 EAST 5958.83 -CENTERLINE OF SHEET g g PILE- E A ST 6000.83 LtMIT OF"B" STONE 2 LIMIT OF CAP STOUE - - _
NORTH 6900
% L AKEh '=^- _
ncERIEE
~
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MORTH 6792 PROVIDE WALER W8 = 31 AT EL. 57f-O" .
'\
EAST 5900 EAST 6000
.If
'p EAST 5956 EAST 5971 g THE DETROIT EDISON CO.
SHORE BARRIER PLAN FERWItl P. P. MONROE, MICHIGAN SCALE I" = 50'-O" l FIGURE NO. 3.2.4 57
\/
PLAN ELEV. 683'-0" f 5 81.8 ,581.7 f g 580.2 ry I 575l PLAN ELEV. 572'-O"
/m- ~
~ ^ E-A B C D E N F G H I
STATION 7325 (NORTH )
PLAN ELEV. 563'-0" l[ / / 581.4 .3 l 579.8
[ 576.7 74.7
/
' PLAN EL EV. 572'- 0" MM64--
N STATION G864 ( NORTH ) !
A- 5925 (EAST) FENCE l B- EAST 5930 f C- EAST 5940 ,
D-EAST 5950 .
E EAST 5960 {
F EAST 59.'O G -E AST 59 80 - EDGE OF WATER H -EAST 5990 l -E AST 8000.83 CENTERLINE OF SHEET PILING WE DEMOIT EDISON CO.
SHORE BARRIER PROFILE FERMIE P.P. MON ROE,WICH.
AS-BUILT SURVEY DATE JUME 28,l984 i FIGURE NO. 3.2.5 58
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59
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m e, Photograph 3.2.2 Setting windsor probes in triangular pattern with test gun.
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60
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Photograph 3.2.4 Iloneycomb concrete around a watertight door frame.
61 1
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e t
62
3.3 Containment 3.3.1 Purpose The purpose of the containment review was to inspect welding, review radiographs, perform NDE and review mill test reports for conformance to specified code requirements and the latest design disclosure documents.
3.3.2 Criteria (1) Detroit Edison Project Specification 3071-9 " Containment Vessels" (2) ASME Code Section II, III, VIII and IX thru Summer 69 addenda.
(3) Chicago Bridge and Iron Quality Control Procedures MTP-12 and MT-lN.
3.3.3 Items Evaluated For the purpose of this report the containment is divided into four zones (see Figure 3.3.1). Zone 1 is the wetwell and Zone 2 - 4 are the drywell areas. Table 3.3.1 outlines the welds which were selected for this review including the NDE performed. The scope of the radiographic review was increased from 50 to 100 due to a concern relating to improper film storage. While selecting the initial sample of 50, a box of radiographs was discovered with a discoloration on the film. It appeared that the interleaf sheets had become maist and had caused minor watermarks / discoloration on the film. The team decided at this point to increase the sample size to 100 radiographys and examine film which did not have a storage concern. The film with the discoloration / watermarks was readable.
Fifty-eight welds were selected for a visual inspection to the originally specified inspection criteria. Twenty-six of the those welds selected were magnetic particle tested to the original procedure specified. The MTs were performed by certified Detroit Edison contract personnel.
Five containment plates were randomly selected for a review of their certified Mill Test Reports. Table 3.3.2 outlines the containment plates which were selected for a detailed documentation review.
A visual inspection of the containment plate was made at random locations for construction induced damage (i.e., arc strikes and gouges).
63
3.3.4 Results-
. The review of 103 radiographs by a Level III RT. inspector resulted in no deviations. A' concern relating to improper storage of radiographs was _ identified on one box of film. Although this film is readable at this time, precautions should be employed to monitor the film quality of these radiographs. The visual inspection of the 58 welds selected
- did not identify any major' deviations. One weld on penetration X-25 had a 1/8" deep gouge 1" long. This gouge appears to be construction induced damaged because the gouge had occured after the weld was coated.
The 26 welds which were magnetic particle tested resulted in 3 welds which. contained rejectable indications in accordance with the originally specified criteria. Paint was removed from these welds to insure that a proper MT test could be performed.
~
Cert 1fied Mill Test Reports identified in Table 3.3.2 were reviewed.
for compliance with the ASME Code Sections II and III thru Summer 1969 addendum and ASTM A516 (1970 edition) . All CMTRs contained values which were in compliance with the code requirements.
The exterior of the wetwell and the interior of the drywell has not been properly protected from construction induced damage. Arc strikes were identified in both areas which were not repaired. Additionally, metal construction scaffolds were found erected in direct contact with the containment plate. These areas have scratched the coatings and in some. areas gouged the containment plates.
)
3.3.5 Conclusions Based on the radiographic review and the visual inspections, the welds on the containment are acceptable. Based on the concern.iden_tified with storage, the team recommends that Detroit Edison monitor the '
quality of radiographs in storage. The number of rejects identified by MT, 3 out of 26, is an area where additional tests should be performed. It is recommended that a sample be selected on welds not
. Based on the construction induced damage (arc strikes and gouges) identified on the exterior of the wetwell (torus) and the interior of
. the drywell, it is recommended that a complete walkdown of these areas be performed to ensure that the containment integrity has not been violated. Additionally, procedures need to be instituted which prohibit erection of scaffolds against the containment vessel.
64
I TABLE 3.3.1 Containment Weld Summary Review Weld Number Interval Zone Visual MT RT Comments 2R 11-12 2 X 2M 16-17 2 X 2M 10-11 2 X 2H- 19-20 2 X
-2H- 14-15 2 X 2H 9-10 2 X 2D 19-20 2 X 20 16-17 2 X 20 9-10 2 X 2D 5-6 2 X 2L 6-7 2 X 2L- 1-2 2 X 2K 15-16 2 X 2J- 0-1 2 X 2H 0-15 2 X 2H 13-14 2 X 2H 12-13 2 X
~2H 6-7 2 X 2H 0-1 2 X 2K 4-5 2 X 3F 8-9 3 X 3F 12-13 3 X 3F 17-18 3 X 3H 5-6 3 X 3H 18-19 3 X 3H 15 3 X 3H 22-23 3 X 3H 27-28 3 X 3J 0-1 3 X 3J 9-10 3 X 6D 0-1 4 X 6C 4-5 4 X 68 3-4 4 X 6A 5-6 4 X 6A 1-2 4 X 50 5-6 4 X SD 1-2 4 X SC' 2-3 4 X SA 4-5 4 X 1A 21-22 2 X C9 17-18 1 X C9 16-17 1 X C9 12-13 1 X C9 0-1 1 X C8 15-16 1 X C8 8-9 1 X C8" 3-4 1 X CA 19-20 1 X 65
TABLE 3.3.1 (Cont'd)
Containment Weld Sumary Review Weld Number Interval Zone Visual MT RT Comments C4 s 13-19 1 3 X
-C3 .; 20-21 1 X 11-12 -
49-50 4 X 11-12
- 44-45 4 X 11-12 ~
25-26 4 X 11-12 11-12 4 X
-12A 11-12 4 X 12A- '
7-8 4 X 21GG / 4 X 21GF 4 X 21GE '
4 X 21EA 4 'X
. 037 8-9 1 X 037 15-16 1 X 040 19-20 1 X 040 + 14-15 1 X D40 6-7 1- X 039 - ,
, 13'14 1. X 037 037 f,
18-19 11 . - l-
'l X
X 036 16-17 1 X 036 7-8 , 1 X 09 1 6-7 l' X 09 , 12-13 'l X 09 17-18' .1 ' X D10 '
/7-8 i X D10 12-13 1 X D10 , :- 14-15 1 X D10 ,
20-21 1 X D21 ' 2-3 1 X D21 5-6 1 / X D21 11-12 1
X D21 19-20 1 '
X D22 , 4-5 1 X D22 .
- 5-6 1 '
X Al 2-3 1 X Al 6-7 1 X F-Al- '10-11 1 -
X A48 1-2' 1 X A48 _, _ '6-7 1 X A48 13-14 1 X A48 i 20-21 1 X A6 j 5-6 1 X A6 9-10 1 X A6 16-17 1 X B21 , 6-7 1 / X
- B21 7-8 1 X 821' j l4-15 1 X
- > s 66
.c
TABLE 3.3.1 (Cont'd)
Containment Weld Summary Review Weld Number Interval Zone Visual MT RT Comments 821 19-20 1 X 03 6-7 1 X 03 11-12 1 X 04 2-3 1 X 04 11-12 1 X 04 18-19 1 X 015 1-2 1 X 36-3 3 X 46 3 X 73 3 X 42 3 X 367 3 X 36-2 3 X 173 3 X 381 3 X 333 3 X 345 3 X 101 3 X 106 3 X X-548 4 X X X-7A 2 X X X-ll 2 X X X-8 2 X X X-98 2 X X See Note 1
.X-45 2 X X See Note 2 X-55B 4 X X See Note 3 X-17 4 X X-31B 2 X X-13A 2 X X-25 4 4 See Note 4 A18 1 X QA104-A 3 X QA104-B 3 X QA104-C 3 X QA104-0 3 X 3 X QA104-J Torus Support No.12-1 1 X X Torus Support No. 12-2 1 X X Torus Support No.12-3 1 X X Torus Support No. 12-4 1 X X Torus Support No. 12-5 1 X X Torus Support No. 12-6 1 X X Torus Support No. 12-7 1 X X Torus Support No. 12-8 1 X X Torus Support No.12-9 1 X X See Note 5 Elev. 569'5"-576' Az. 145* 2 X Plate to plate welds Elev. 586'6" Az. 135*-150* 2 X Plate to plate welds 67
TABLE 3.3.1 (Cont'd)
Containment Weld Summary Review Weld Number Interval Zone Visual MT RT Comments Elev. 581'-584' Az. 152' 2 X Plate to plate welds Elev. 644'7" Az. 135*-180" 4 X Plate to plate welds Eley. 652'-659' Az. 90* 4 X Plate to plate welds Elev. 654'-659' Az. 210' 4 X Plate to plate welds Elev. 586'6" Az. 20l*-215' 2 X Plate to plate welds Elev. 592'6"-595'-6"/ 2 X Plate to plate welds Az. 70*-90' Elev. 623' Az. 36*-65* 3 X Plate to plate welds Elev. 623'-627' Az. 47* 3 X Plate to plate welds Torus Penetration Pads 1 X X X-213A15 Torus Penetration Pads 1 X X X-213A-19 Torus Penetration Pads 1 X X X-213A-8 Torus Penetration Pads 1 X X X-213A-4
. Torus Penetration Pads 1 X X 206F weld P Torus Penetration Pads 1 X X 206F weld Q Torus Penetration Pads 1 X X 206F weld N Torus Penetration Pads 1 X X X-231 Torus Penetration Pads 1 X X X-206C Torus Penetration Pads 1 X X X-206E NOTE 1: CAT Item (63 - Rejectable linear indication in penetration weld. .
I NOTE 2: CAT Item #54 - Lack of fusion and slag ho'e identified in penetration weld.
NOTE 3: CAi Item #53 - Lamination identifie, , ar' .11 plate.
"0TE 4: CAT Item #124 - Gouged area in weld dpproximataly 1/8" deep by 1" long at '
approximately 8:00 o' clock. Gouge area occured after penetration was painted.
NOTE 5: CAT Item #21 - Rejectable weld with porosity, slag and cold lap.
68
TABLE 3.3.2 Containment: CMTR Review Containment Piece MK # Serial # Zone Heat Number
(
10 - 5 6 2 517A1289 10 - 6 11 3 517A1598 11 - 1 1 4 801A04399 11 - 3 5 4 802A03100 13 - 2 6 3 802A06240 l
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ELEVATION VIEW D RYWELL FIGURE NO. 3.3.1 70
\
3.4 Coatings 3.4.1 Purpose Coatings were examined for conformance to Design Specifications and industry practices.
3.4.2 Criteria (1) Detroit Edison Specification 3071-9 " Containment Vessels" (2) Detroit Edison Specification 3071-316 " Field Painting - Level I Steel Containnent Coating Inside Drywell" (3) Detroit Edison Specification 3071-55 " Painting"
.(4) Detroit Edison Specification 3071-317 " Field Coating Inside Drywell" (5) ANSI N512-1974 " Protective Coatings (Paints) for the Nuclear Industry" (6) Detroit Edison Qualit," Control Instruction C4.0 "Positector 2000 Calibration" 3.4.3 Items Evaluated Areas were randomly selected on steel surfaces and on the concrete reactor vessel support pedestal. Twenty-two areas were selected for a visual inspection and dry film thickness check on the interior of the drywell. See Table 3.4.1 for location and sunmarized results.
Twenty areas were randomly selected on steel surf aces other than containment (i.e., tubular supports for hangers, equipment and structural steel) for a visual inspection and dry film thickness check. Areas were selected which were considered remote and high traffic. Remote is an area where it is isolated from heavy traffic.
High traffic is an area where the components inspected were walked on or climbed on frequently. See Table 3.4.2 for location and summarized results.
Five areas were randomly selected on the concrete reactor vessel support pedestal for a visual inspection and an adhesion test. Areas were selected which had been repair coated and original coated. .ee Table 3.4.3 for location and summarized results.
3.4.4 Results In the Drywell locations for steel surfaces (containment and miscel-laneous steel supports) the majority of the areas inspected had some form of coatings damage. The most frequently occuring damage was 71
scratches to the CZ-11 Carbo Zinc primer. This was identified on most areas of high traffic and on some remote locations. Refer to Tables 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 for locations. This damage appears to be typical construction induced which results from scaffolding, rigging and handling materials. Detroit Edison had started repairs in the upper locations of the drywell. Areas inspected in this zone had less damage. In most cases where scratches had occured some zinc primer was still intact on the component. Dry film thickness check results and areas selected are outlined in Tables 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. The majority of the areas checked were acceptable. Areas where low readings were observed were areas of high traffic where the coating had been worn down to an unacceptable level. In the areas of the drywell, the acceptable limits per specification are: minimum 1 mil and no upper limit. In the area of miscellaneous steel supports the acceptable limits per specification are minimum 2 mils and maximum of 9 mils. The dry film thickness gage used was calibrated to Detroit Edison Quality Control Instruction C4.0. See Photographs 3.4.1 and 3.4.2.
Adhesion tests were performed using an Elcometer Adhesion Tester Model 106/A. These tests were performed by Detroit Edison contract personnel and observed by the team. The results of these tests are documented in Table 3.4.3. See Figure 3.4.1 for Elcometer calibration data. All areas examined were within the recommended acceptable limits provided in ANSI N512-1974. Areas were selected on originally coated surfaces and areas which had been recently repaired. See Photographs 3.4.3 and 3.4.4.
3.4.5 Conclusions Based on the areas examined on the containr.nt plate and the concrete surf aces inside the drywell, the coatings applied were acceptable with the exception of minor damage. The team recommends that a final inspection be performed to ensure that the damages have been repaired as required by the specifications.
Based on unclear commitments, the team could not assess the other areas inside the drywell (i.e., miscellaneous steel and coatings to equipment). It is recommended that Detroit Edison clarify their
'osition on these coating requirements.
72
TABLE 3.4.1 Coatinas Summary - Steel Surfaces: Containment Location
- Area # Elev Azimuth Average DFT (mils) Comments 1 654 210' 4.5 Repaired Area 2 652 210' 7.6 Coating Scratched 3 654 330' 6.7 Coating Scratched 4 .649 315' 10.6 Penetration Plate - Coating Scratched Penetration Plate - Coating
~
5 649 315* 10.3 Scratched 6 618 150' 15.5 Coating Scratched Overhead Paint Application with Sags & Runs
-7 618 150* 11.6 Coating Scratched Overhead Paint Application with Sags & Runs 8 615 60' 17.2 Repaired Area 9 615 61* 12.2 10 610 120' 10.8 Coating damaged by welder's arc strikes 11 610 170* 9.8 Weld Pad - Coating Scratched 12 604 190* 4.7
! 13 601 196* 14.5 Penetration Plate - Coating l Scratched i.
14 595 262' 12.0
'15 598 240* 11.7 16 588 210' 5.5 17 589 175* 5.3 Personnel Access Hatch Coatings Scratched 18 590 120' 6.4 Equipment Hatch Collar Coatings Scratched 19 589 110' 4.5 20 574 145* 3.9 21 579 160* 6.7 Penetration Plate 22 573 190' 17.3 Area Top Coated - Needs Repair 73
TABLE 3.4.2 Coatings Summary - Steal Surfaces: Misc. Steel Location
- Area # Elev Azinuth Average DFT (mils) Comments 1 577 210' 6.0 Pipe Support - Coatings Scratched 2 579 100* 3.2 HVAC Support - Welds not
' coated 3 585 114* 2.5 Pipe Support - Coatings Scratched 4 587 61* 3.4 Pipe Support - One member not coated 5 590 62* 4.4 Pipe Support - Welds not coated 6 597 0* 1.2 Pipe Support - Strut, high traffic area 7 597 10' 5.3 Pipe Support Clamp 8 617 240* 5.2 Struct. Steel 9 617 240' 3.5 HVAC Support - Coatings Scratched 10 630 '225' 6.7 Door on Scaf. Shield Wall 11 628 240* 2.4 Pipe Support Clamp - Welds not coated 12 -609 230' 4.5 HVAC Support 13 603 195* 3.4 Pipe Support - Shock Suppressor 14 605 194* 5.0 Struct. Steel - Welds not coated s .~
~
15 .605 200* f, 5.3 Pipe Support - Spring Can
<16 6d3 195*~ 2.2 Elec. Penetration Cover -
~ .." Coatings Scratched 17 603 2053 3.6 Elec. Penetration Cover -
3 Coatings Scratched v
-~
-18 585 200* 5.4 Struct. Steel - Coatings Scratched 19 590 140* 5.1 Steel Embedment in Concrete Wall 20 585 152* .7 Pipe Support - High Traffic Area - Low Mils due to Location 74
-- . .- - - . - . . , - - - . ~ . _ - - . . . _ _ - . . _ - . _ - _ _ - . .
TABLE 3.4.3 Coatina's Summary: Concrete Surfaces
.(
l Location Azimuth Test Value Value (lbs) Type or Surface Break
- Test Id. No. Elev A 575 100* 3.5 250 100% Concrete
- g. B 577 210' 8.0 710 100% Surfacer
.C 596- 114* 4.5 350 60% Surfacer, 40% Concrete
.D 590 53* 3.5 250 70% Surfacer, 30% Concrete i
E 592 113' 5.0 400 95% Concrete, 5% Surfacer
- Refer to Photograph 3.4.4 for types of surface breaks.
l l
l L 75
(
I E_ CON ETER ADHESION TESTER MODEL IO6 / 2,S/N 18 713 CALIBRATION DATE 6-25-84 ENGINEERING RESEARCH REPORT 84 C 50-29 AD PSI LB. S .bl O O O TEST STD. WAS A 2 45 90 RIEHLE TESTING MACHINE, 4 15 0 300 ER OOO7. NEXT CAL.DATE:
8 7 JUNE 1985 9 405 810 10 455 910 1000-800- ' /
/
600-400- /
D TA ARE ES O ADJUSTMENTS MADE TO TESTER.
200-
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l I I I I I O 2 4 6 8 9 10 W 10 0 INDICATED READING ON ADHESION TESTER, PSI FIGURE NO. 3. 4. I 76
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- Photograph 3.4.1 Typical dry rilm thickness check on the containment plate.
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Photograph 3.4.2 Typical condition of Drywell area. The concrete wall in this area had been repaired. The restraint located in the center i of this picture is not coated. The small support shown in the lower l
right hand corner has been properly coated, but the welds were not coated. ,
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Photograph 3.4.3 Elcometer adhesion testing of coating to concrete. i 9
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= ruu a sw _ . i a . .. . ,
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.- ADntston ' Tasr Puves Photograph 3.4.4 Surface breaks for test plugs.
k 78
a
/3.5.MaterialsTestina 3.5.1 Purpose
, The purpose of these tests were to determine material identification of as-built structural conponents. A Telebrineller hardness tester was used to sample steel hardness in order to obtain an approximation of material tensile strengths.
3.5.2 Criteria i
(1) Material Test Reports from Suppliers (2) ' Telebrineller's - Manufacturers Instruction Sheet (3) Applicable ASTM Specification 3.5.3 . Items Evaluated
-Eight different items were tested from four categories of steel (see Photographs 3.5.1 and 3.5.2). Table 3.5.1 summarizes the items tested and location.
The items were evaluated by taking three material impressions
-performed for each of the materials and averaged to obtain an overall hardness value. Hardness was calculated from a dial which computes material hardness given bar hardness, material ' impression diameter, and bar impression diameter. An industry chart was used to correlate Brinell hardness to tensile strength. The chart is only acceptable for tensile values above 70000 psi.
For the three tests values below 70000' psi, a graph was developed to approximate tensile values.
3.5.4 Results While performing the hardness test on the Torus Support Steel and Drywell Containment Plate, problems were encountered. In both cases one test came up low on tensile strength. However, an average of the three tests performed results in tensile strengths well above the required values for A588 and A516 Gr. 70 respectively.
3.5.5' Conclusions On the basis of this evaluation, the team concludes that material grades specified by design documents were installed correctly.
79
TABLE 3.5.1 Hardness Testing Summary Test Description of No. Item Tested Location Material Identification 1 Torus Support Elev. 540' A588 No. 10 Az. 200*
Bay 9 side
) 2 Torus Support Elev. 540' A588 No. 9 Az. 170*
Bay 8 side 3 Pipe Whip Restraint Elev. 587' A588 Support Steel Az. 270*
B31-RR-10A 4 Pipe Wh'1 Restraint Elev. 587' A588 Support A c1 Az. 240' G33-3096-CUR-l' 5 Drywell Containment Elev. 588' A516 Gr. 70 Plate No. 10-6-2 Between 215*
and 220' 6 Drywell Containment Elev. 578' Bad test due to primer on Plate No. 10-4-2 Between 180* steel.
and 190*
7 Retest of Test 6 Elev. 578' A516 Gr. 70 Between 180*
and 190*
8 Pipe Support Tube Elev. 577' A500 Gr. 8 Steel, 831-5269-G17 Az. 190*
Drywell
- 9. Electrical Conduit Aux Bldg A500 Gr. B Support Tube Steel, Eley. 640' 0U-241 10' south of Col. G-15 1
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Photograph 3.5.1 Brinell hardness test on Pipe Whip Restraint Steel.
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Photograph 3.5.2 Exactining Brinell liardness test results. ,
82
3.6 Piping Systems 3.6.1 Piping Walkdown 3.6.1.1 Purpose Selected portions of piping systems were examined to determine if they had been installed in accordance with the Piping Drawings and Specifications 3.6.1.2 Criteria (1) Detroit Edison Company Specification 3071 Pipe Erection (2) Detroit Edison Com any Specification 3071-525 - Design Specification for Nuclear Class 2 and 3 Small Piping and Instrument and Control Piping and Tubing
~
(3) Detroit Eidson Company Piping Drawings as listed in Table 3.6.5 3.6.1.3 Items Evaluated The systems for which portions were selected for walkdown were Core Spray, Residual Heat Removal, High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling. These systems are shown diagrama-tically in Figures 3.6.1 through 3.6.5. The piping was examined for size, material type, marking, dimensional configuration, branch and instrument connections, valve orientation, bolting, and state of completion. Selected flanged joints were checked fcr proper bolt torque. Also, a check was made for the installation of the proper valves and equipment.
(1) Core Spray System (Figure 3.6.1)
The South loop of the Core Spray System was selected for walk-down. This loop was examined from the connection at the Sup-pression Pool (Torus) through Pumps B & D and on to the nozzle on the Reactor Vessel.
.(2) RHR System (Figure 3.6.2)
The portion of the RHR System selected tor walkdown starts at Heat Exchanger A and continues through valve V8-2187. It also includes the branch to Drywell Penetration X-13B.
(3) HPCI System (Figure 3.6.3)
The portion of the HPCI System selected for walkdown starts at the pug discharge and continues to the tie into the Feedwater System.
83
(4) RCIC System (Figures 3.6.4 & 3.6.5)
The portion of the RCIC System selected for walkdowm consisted of the Vacuum Pung Discharge and associated small bore piping around the Barometric Condenser.
3.6.1.4 Results No major deviations were identified. The portions of the systems examined are considered to conform to the design drawings and specifications. The noted exceptions are listed below. Due to the large amount of insulation in place, it was not possible to examine all materials for identification and marking. The portion that was visible did have the required marking and identification.
(1) Core Spray System Where the riser passed through the floor sleeve at Elevation 613'-6", there was only 1/2" clearance on one side. On valve V8-2034, the operator was turned down 30* instead of being on the horizontal. The drain point at Elevation 622'-2" had a hose adapter still in place rather than a pipe cap. Valve V23-2031 was tagged V8-4004. On Restricting Orifice R0-00018, 4 of 8 bolts did not have full thread engagement.
(2) RHR System The 2" Vent Line shown on small bore piping drawing 6WME11-5305-1 is not shown on the main piping isometric. Penatration X-12 had minor damage to the bellows. The 1/2" piping connection on this penetration had not been capped on the outside while some did have caps.
(3) HPCI System A 1" branch connection was found which did not show on Isometric 6M721-3167-1. Two of the four studs on the inlet flange of relief valve V22-2044 were undertorqued by approximately 15%.
(4) RCIC System Instrument TWT-E51-L426 was not installed. Five out of eight studs on flanges for Restricting Orifice R0-D009 were under-torqued approximately 30%. On Restricting Orifice R0-0005, half of the studs were undertorqued by 40% to 50%. On Flow Orifice FE-N001 half of the studs were undertorqued 10% to 30%.
3.6.1.5 Conclusions On the basis of the above results, the piping examined meets the requirements of the specifications and drawings except as follows.
Some bolts on flanged joints appeared to be undertorqued. This is 84
to be expected due to relaxation of gaskets and stress cycling during hydrotesting and preoperational testing. The primary reasons for torquing bolts to some established value during installation are to seat the gasket, provide enough preload stress in the joint to counteract hydrotest stresses, and to protect the flanges and bolting from yielding due to excessive torque. In the event that any leakage occurs due to torque relaxation, it may be eliminated by retorquing the bolts. From this standpoint, the low bolt torques found are not considered to be a significant problem. This philosophy is established by Appendix XII of ASME Section III.
General observation around the penetrations did indicate a number of 1/2" connections not piped up or capped off and the protective bellows covers not properly secured. It is recommended that a walkdown be made of the penetrations to check these two items.
3.6.2 Nondestructive Examination (NDE) 3.J.2.1 Purpose Selected welds were subjected to PT or Visual Examination, as appro-priate, to demonstrate acceptable quality. Also selected points in various piping systems were examined by UT to measure pipe wall thickness.
3.6.2.2 Criteria (1) Wismer and Becker Liquid Penetrant Procedure WB-Q-102 (2) Wismer and Becker Ultrasonic Thickness Measurement Precedure WB-Q-105 (3) Wismer and Becker Final Visual Weld Examination Procedure WB-Q-103 3.6.2.3 Items Evaluated PT - 33 ASME Section III Class 1 and Class 2 socket welds were selected for PT. These are listed in Table 3.6.4.
Visual Examination - 22 ASME Section III Class 3 socket welds were selected for examination. These are listed in Table 3.6.2. Also, 24 ASME Section III Class 3 butt welds were selected for examination. These are listed in Table 3.6.3.
UT - 20 areas on the piping were selected for wall thickness checks.
These were in the Core Spray, RHR, HPCI and RCIC Systems. These are listed in Table 3.6.1.
3.6.2.4 Results No major deviations were identified. The welds and piping examined conform to the requirements of the applicable procedures. The noted exceptions are listed below.
85
PT - In some instances, acceptable rounded indications were identified. Also the as forged surface of the socket weld fittings showed acceptable indications. See Photograph 3.6.1 for a typical example. Several minor arc strikes were detected as noted in Table 3.6.4. Also, one rejectable indication was identified on a fitting as noted in Table 3.6.4.
UT - In on': area of the HPCI piping, two UT readings were found to be below n.inimum required wall thickness. See Table 3.6.1 and Figure 3.5.6.
3.6.2.5 Conclusions On the basis of the above results, the welds and piping examined meet the requirements of the applicable procedures, specifications and codes except as follows. One rejectable PT indication was identified, but this appears to be an isolated case that is not indicative of a generic problem. The two low UT readings identified appear to be an isolated case and not a generic problem. It is recommended that the areas identified on Figure 3.6.6 be evaluated to determine if they are acceptable for the applicable design conditions. .
3.6.3 Welding 3.6.3.1 Purpose Two welding procedures were selected for review, one for stainless steel and one for carbon steel with impact property requirements.
ihe review was made to determine if the procedures were written and qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX and if they would produce welds with the desired properties. Also, two welds were selected to verify compliance with the procedures.
3.6.3.2 Criteria (1) ASME Section IX-1971 Edition through Winter 1972 Addenda (2) Wismer & Becker WPS-103, GTAW and/or SMAW of P1 Materials Groove Welding 21/2" NPS and larger - Socket Welding all NPS (3) Wismer & Becker WPS-805, Combination GTAW and SMAW with a Consumable Insert for Recirculation System Stainless Steel Piping (G.E.)
3.6.3.3 Items Evaluated The selected welding procedures were reviewed for compliance with ASME Section IX with respect to format, content and procedural qualification. A weld made with each of these procedures was selected for review. These were weld A-1 on G.E. drawing 761-E-214 (Reactor Recirculation System) and weld 1WO on Detroit Edison Co. drawing 6M721-3053-1 (Core Spray System). The process control sheets for these welds were reviewed for compliance with the welding 86
orocedures. The qualification papers for the welders involved were also reviewed.
3.6.3.4 Results No major deviations were identified. The procedures are in com pliance with ASME Section IX and have been properly qualified. The welds reviewed were in compliance with the procedures and the welders were properly certified. One deviation was noted on weld 1W0. This weld joined P1 Group 1 material to P1 Group 2 material. ~
The applicable procedure (WPS-103) only covered P1 Group 1 material.
A subsequent revision (No.16) incorporates P1 Group 2 materials but does not address welds joining the different materials. This item is documented on CAT-1 Number 125.
3.6.3.5 Conclusions On the basis of the above findings, the procedures have been properly qualified and should produce welds of the required quality.
1
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TABLE 3.6.1 UT Results .
System Nominal Dwg. Number .
Wall Location Size Thickness Results RCIC Dwg. 6M721-3175-1 At Field Weld 6" .432" .424" .396" FW E51-3175-0W1 .417" .432" Riser through Basement 6" .432" .416" .430" Floor at El. 555'1 .436" .424" At Field Weld 6" .432" .399" .410" FW E51-3175-0361 .446" .424" At Field Weld 6" .432" .415" .425" FW E51-3175-2WO .396" .410" RHR Owg. 6M721-2297-1 At Field Weld 24" 1.218" 1.243" 1.194" FW E11-2297-0WR2 1.165" 1.212" HDwg. 6M721-2298-1 At Field Weld 24" 1.218" 1.213" 1.175" FW E11-2298-0W2 1.202" 1.238" Dwg. 6M721-3177-1 At Field Weld 20" .594" .596" .602" FW E11-3177-1W0 .570" .569" Dwg. 6M721-3152-1 At Field Weld 20" .375" .370" .360" FW E11-3152-11W0 .368" .363" HPCI Owg. 6M721-6163-1 Between Field Welds 16" .375" .368" .357" FW E41-6163-0W7 & 7WO .356" .364" l
Cross-over between HPCI 12" .406" .387" .404" '
, Booster Pung & Main Pump .337"(1).352"(1)
(1) Reading below required minimum wall tnickness. See Figure 3.6.6.
88
TABLE 3.6.1 (Cont'd)
UT Results
. System Nominal Dwg. Number Wall Location Size Thickness Results HPCI (cont'd) 10wg. ~ 6M721-3167-1 Between Field. Welds 10" .844" .813" .853" FW E41-3167-0W1 & lWF1 .868" .859" Between Field Welds 14" .750" .725" .718" FW E41-3167-0W4 & 4WO .696" .713" CORE SPRAY L Dwg. 6M721-3147-1 Between Field Welds 14" .438" .441" .425" E21-3147-5WF1 & SWF2 .432" .473" Between Field Welds 3" .216" .224" .216" E21-3147-11 WOC 1 & 11WF1 Above Field Weld 14" .438" .431" .452" E21-3147-15W16R4 .437" .443" Below Field Weld 14" .438" .409" .432" E21-3147-15W16R4 .430" .432" Dwg. 6M721-3053-1 Horizontal Run 12" .844" .793" .855" Spool Piece E21-3053-2 .842" .836" Below Field Weld 12" .844" .798" .820" E21-3053-2W0 .831" .822" Dwg. 6M721-3149-1 Next to Field Weld 16" .500" .486" .460" E21-3149-6WF2 .482" .467"
' Downstream of Valve V8-2010 16" .375" .380" .381" 10" from Outlet of Tee .361" .371" Owg. 6M721-3148-1 Downstream of Valve V8-2011 16" .375" .388" .382" Above Tee .326" .366" 89
TABLE 3.6.2 Visual Inspection - Class 3 Socket Welds Weld No. Size Results 4001-G 3/4" Acceptable 4001-3&4 3/4" Acceptable 4001-4&5 3/4" Acceptable 4001-5&6 3/4" Acceptable 4001-11 3/4" Acceptable 4001-D 3/4" Acceptable 4001-22&23 3/4" Acceptable 4001-23&24 3/4" Acceptable 4001-46&47 3/4" Acceptable 4001-47&48 3/4" Acceptable 4001-48&49 3/4" Acceptable 4001-49&50 3/4" Acceptable 5218-A 3/4" Acceptable 5218-70&71 3/4" Acceptable 5218-71&72 3/4" Acceptable 5218-72&73 3/4" Acceptable 5218-T 3/4" Acceptable 5218-U 3/4" Acceptable 5218-77&78 3/4" Acceptable 5218-8 3/4" Acceptable
.5218-54&55 3/4" /v:ceptable 5218-55&56 3/4" Acceptable ~
90 I .
. . . .__ _.__m._m___._m. _-.._ - - - ' - - -
TABLE 3.6.3 Visual Inspection - Class 3 Butt Welds Weld No. Size Results FW-P44-3084-5WF6 8" Acceptable FW-P44-3084-5W2 8" Acceptable
- FW-P 44-3084-5WF1 8" Acceptable FW-P44-3084-5WF3 8" Acceptable
. FW-P 44-3084-5WF4 8" Acceptable FW-P44-3084-2WO2 8" Acceptable FW-P 44-3084-0W3 8" Acceptable FW-P44-3084-3WF1 8" Acceptable FW-P 44-3084-3WF3 8" Acceptable FW-P44-3084-4WF1 (C1) 8" Acceptable FW-P44-3368-02W6 6" Acceptable FW-P44-3368-01W6 8" Acceptable FW-P 44-3368-5 WO 8" Acceptable FW-P44-3368-0W5 6" Acceptable FW-P 44-3368-4WO 6" Acceptable FW-P44-3368-2WF2 8" Acceptable FW-P44-3368-2WF1 8" Acceptable FW-P44-3368-0WF1 8" Acceptable FW-P44-3368-0W2 8" Acceptable FW-P44-3368-0WV1 8" Acceptable FW-P44-3368-0WF1 8" Acceptable FW-P44-3368-0WF2 8" Acceptable
, FW-P44-3368-2W3 8" Acceptable FW-P44-3368-1WO 8" Acceptable L
91
TABLE 3.6.4 P T of Class 1 and 2 Socket Welds Weld No. Size Results 3027-I6A 3/4" Acceptable 5827-I4B 3/4" Acceptable 5218-34 & 35 1" Acceptable 5218-35 & 36 1" Acceptable 5218-36 & 37C2 '1" Acceptable 5218-37 & 38 1" Acceptable 5218-38 & 39 1" Rejected (3) 5218-40 & 41 1" Acceptable 5218-41 & 42 1" Acceptable 5218-39 & 40C1 3/4" Acceptable 7212-9 & 10 1" Acceptable 7212-10 & 11 1" Acceptable 7212-27 & 28 1" Acceptable 7214-24 & X33A 1" Acceptable 7214-44 & X33A 1" Acceptable 7214-41 & 42 1" Acceptable 7214-18 & 19 1" Acceptable 7214-38 & 39 1" Acceptable 7214-21 & 22 1" Acceptable 7214-41 & 42 1" Acceptable 7214-23 & 24 1" Acceptable 7217-38 & 39 3/4" Acceptable 7217-39 & 40 3/4" Acceptable 7220-47 & 48 3/4" Acceptable (1) 7220-57-& 58 3/4" Acceptable (1) 7220-11 & 12 3/4" Acceptable 7220-A 3/4" Acceptable 7220-C 3/4" Acceptable 7269-48 & 49 1" Acceptable (2) 7269-49 & 5 Id Acceptable 3150-IWSI -
3/4" Acceptable 3147-8WSI 2" Acceptable 3147-B 2" Acceptable 2016-4 & 5 2" Acceptable (1) Arc strike noted on 90' elbow.
(2) Noted 1/16" rounded indication - acceptable.
(3) Linear indication picked up on fitting which runs into weld.
92 i
TABLE 3.6.5 Piping Drawings for Walkdown CORE SPRAY 6M721-3147 Rev. S 6M721-2199-1 Rev. L 6M721-3053-1 Rev. U 6M721-3148 Rev. Y 6M721-3149-1 Rev. P 6M721-2034-1 Rev. P 6 W-E21-2188-1 Rev. E 6W-E21-3150-1 Rev. P B0M R4-14M Rev. E RHR-6M721-3164-1 Rev. 0
-6M721-2083-1 -Rev. Q 6W-E11-5305-1 Rev. B PCI ,
1 6M721-3167-1 Rev. M 6M721-2336 Rev. V l 6M721-2035 Rev. Q 6M721-2043- Rev. K RCIC' 6M721-2045 Rev. M 6WM-E51-3709-1 Rev. E o 6W-E51-5126-1 Rev. 0 .
l 6WM-E51-5168-1 Rev. B l 6WM-E51-5163-1 Rev. D L
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Shows acceptable rounded indications and as-forged surface on the fittings.
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Photograph 3.6.2 Instrumentation penetration X-33A. One line covered over with tape. Should be capped off or piped up.
100
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'k 101 Y
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E a-w E
{ 3.7 Mechanical Equipment 3.7.1 Pumps E -
7 3.7.1.1 Purpose p A representative grouping of QA Level 1 pumps was inspected to y
determine conformance with the applicable design disclosure docu-ments (e.g. vendor drawings and manuals, design drawings, procure-g' ment specifications, etc.) and to determine overall acceptability of L the installation and physical condition of each component inspected.
h 3.7.1.2 Criteria
, Each pump selected was evaluated against a standard set of inspec-E tion items that included overall condition, installation, anchoring, instrumentation, piping connections, driver-to-component coupling,
}4 pressure boundary bolting, support / restraints (if applicable), and 4 accessibility. A number of checks were required to be completed for each inspection item to form the basis for acceptance or rejection.
E The following is an example: ,
Overall Condition
= -
o Damage
[ o Cleanliness
^
o Lubrication o Condition of External Coating t o Severe Corrosion o Missing Parts o Arc Strikes r
g The applicable design disclosure documents were assembled by Detroit Edison for each pu m inspected. A listing of the documents utilized 7 is given in Table 3.7.1 on a punp-by-pump basis. The installation . . .
- configuration was compared to these documents and any findings and
- concerns reported, j 3.7.1.3 Items Evaluated A listing of the pumps that were inspected is given in Table 3.7.1.
The tabulation also identifies wnich pumps had pressure boundary bolting checks performed or were disassembled for internal 7 inspection.
3.7.1.4 Results s
. Evaluation results can be basically broken down into three cate-gories as identified in the following text.
E
?
102
Overall Evaluation of Installation Unless identified below, there were no significant deviations on the pug s that were inspected.
(1) RHR Pug A - General cleanliness of the pump was poor. Exter-nal surfaces were dirty, there was standing water inside the motor support stand on the pum casing, and miscellaneous trash was present. In addition, the outlet line from the seal water heat exchanger appeared to be bent to enable connection to the seal water piping, there was evidence of rust scaling on the seal water heat exchanger main cover to casing bolt head, and the coupling guards were missing. These concerns were identified by CAT Item #G0.
(2) RHR Service Water Pumps - Excessive amount of lubricant was present around the motor shafts indicating possible over packing of the grease lubricated lower motor ball bearings.
(3) HPCI Main Pump and Booster Pu g - The seal water piping on both pugs has evidence of deep scoring of piping 0.D. by pipe wrench. Photograph 3.7.1 shows one section of the piping that has been scored. This concern was identified by CAT Item #95.
(4) EECW Pump (Div. I and II) - The condition of the exterior of the pug and its baseplate did not appear to be acceptable.
Large areas had coating missing or damaged and the surface was dirty. See Photograph 3.7.3.
(5) Reactor Recirculation Pumps - There were no identification numbers present for either Pump A or the motor drive. This
} concern was identified by CAT Item #195. The 4 inch drain line .
I tap on the suction side of both pumps has PVC pipe installed as temporary piping. It appears that a blind flange should be installed. This potential finding was identified by CAT Item
- 193.
(6) Control Center HVAC Chilled Water Pumpe - Leakage was noticed coming from the discha'*ge
. and suction connections during operation of the Division II pumps. This concern was identified by CAT Item #198. The nameplates on both pumps indicated class 3 design and manufacture but did not have the N stamp symbol on the nameplate. This potential finding was identified by CAT Item #197. Also, there was considerable rusting present on the carbon steel flanges and bolting of the connecting suction and discharge piping of both pumps.
l l
Pressure Boundary Bolting Condition and Torque Tests l
t Casing pressure boundary bolting torque was checked on a sample of the pugs inspected. The pumps tested are listed below along with the applicable results.
(1) Core Spray Pump D - The torque was checked on five of the casing studs. All of the studs checked were torqued to at 103 u
?
least 375 ft.-lbs. which exceeds the 360 ft.-lbs. required by the pump instruction manual.
(2) RHR Punp A - The torque was checked on five of the casing studs. Although breakaway torques were below the required torque, all match marks realigned exactly when the casing studs were retorqued to the value required by the instruction manual of 1100 ft.-lbs. Twelve of the sixteen studs did not have sufficient thread engagement. This potential finding was identified by CAT Item #70. ..
(3) EECW Pump (DIV. I) - Incomplete thread engagement exists on four of the sixteen casing pressure boundary bolts. This potential finding was identified by CAT Item #151.
(4) EECW Pump (DIV. II) - Four of the sixteen casing pressure boundary bolts were unacceptably torqued. Three of the four bolts were torqued to less than 10 ft.-lbs. 50ft.-lbs. is the required torque value. There was no evidence, however, of -
=
leakage from the casing flange. This potential finding was -
identified by CAT Item #150. _
Pump Disassembly EECW Pump (DIV. II) was disassembled to allow visual inspection of the punp internals. Minor nicks were observed on the outer edge of ~
the impeller but were determined to be of no concern. Overall -
condition of the impeller was good with no evidence of cavita tion damage or impeller vane cracking. Casing wear rings were in good condition. Mechanical seal face surfaces were in good condition.
The pump bearings appeared to be over greased but had no evidence of corrosion or damage. Internal surfaces of the upper and lower half of the pump casing were in good condition. Photographs 3.7.2, 3.7.3, 3.7.4, and 3.7.5 show the overall condition of the casing assembly lower half, bearings and impeller wear surfaces.
3.7.1.5 Conclusions Overall Evaluation of Installation y The majority of potential findings and concerns identified are f varied and not considered to be indicative of any problems that are generic in nature. The group of concerns regarding cleanliness and overall physical condition of the pumps should be resolved accept-ably following pre-operational testing and final cleaning and painting of all areas of the plant. No further action is considered to be necessary other than proper resolution of the applicable CAT c Items.
Pressure Boundary Bolting Condition and Torque Tests As a result of these inspections, there is sufficient reason to believe that lack of full thread engagement and proper torquing of pressure boundary bolting may be a generic concern. It is recom-104 ,
---m.m.mm-- - -
i p
.u mended that Detroit Edison conduct an inspection of pressure boundary bolting for proper torquing and full thread engagement on a sample of additional QA Level I pumps. Based upon the results of - -
this further testing, a decision should be made as to whether all QA Level 1 pumps should be inspected.
Pump Disassembly .
The pump internals and internal surf aces were in good condition overall. Based on this inspection and other similar valve inspec- -
tions, there is no reason to believe that there is widespread, unacceptable corrosion of piping system or component surfaces exposed to process fluids. No further action is considered necessary.
z 3.7.2 Turbines 3.7.2.1 Purpose Both QA Level 1 turbines (i.e. HPCI and RCIC) were inspected to determine conformance with the applicable design disclosure docu-ments (e.g., vendor drawings and manuals, design drawings etc.), and - e to determine overall acceptability of the installation and physical condition of each turbine.
3.7.2.2 Criteria The turbines were evaluated against a standard set of inspection ,.
items that included overall condition, installation, anchoring, instrumentation, piping connections, driver-to-component coupling, pressure boundary bolting, support / restraints (if applicable), and accessibility. The same checks were required to be completed for each inspection item as were for the pumps to form the basis for .
acceptance or rejection. The applicable design disclosure documents were assembled for the two turbines by Detroit Edison. A listing of the documents utilized is given in the tabulation contained in Section 3.7.2.3. The final installation was compared to these documents and any deviations reported.
3.7.2.3 Items Evaluated Component Number Component Name Reference Document E4101-C002 HPCI Turbine 6M721-2043, Rev. K I/M (E41.-01-C-002-JA-003)
E5101-C002 RCIC Turbine 6M721-2045, Rev. M I/M (E51-01-C-002-JA-002) 105 i
~ , _ , _. . . . . . . . . . _. _ . . . . _ ,_ . ,. _
3.7.2.4 Results i HPCI Turbine The installation and physical condition of the HPCI turbine was l found to be acceptable except for two concerns. The bearing cover bolting on the outboard bearing was missing, and there were no tags present indicating the reason. This concern was identified by CAT Item #96. A level sensing instrument (E4100-N018) off of the tur-bine exhaust steam line drain pot had an unf astened cover that was unsecured and partially off of the gasketed seat. Also, the cool ing fins were badly damaged (see Photograph 3.7.6). This concern was identified by car Item #103.
RCIC Turbine The installation and physical condit' ion of the RCIC turbine was -
2 found to be acceptable. The area around the turbine and pump assembly is congested which will make maintenance difficult. It was also noted that (2) four-bolt orifice flanges were uncoupled for hanger modification NCR 84-063.
3.7.2.5 Conclusions The potential findings and concerns that were identified are not considered to be indicative of any problems that are generic in nature. No further action is considered to be necessary other than proper resolution of the applicable CAT Items.
3.7.3 Valves 3.7.3.1 Purpose A representative grouping of QA Level I valves was inspected to determine conformance with the applicable design disclosure docu-ments (e.g., vendor drawings and manuals, design drawings, etc.),
and to determine overall acceptability of the installation and physical condition of each valve inspected.
3.7.3.2 Criteria Each valve selected was evaluated against a standard set of inspec-tion items that included overall condition and installation, and pressure boundary bolting. A number of checks were required to be completed for both inspection items to form the basis for acceptance or rejection. The following is an example:
Overall Condition and Installation o Valve type, materials and pressure class correct o Correct placement and orientation of valve and operator o Correct orientation of valve for flow
^
106
o Condition of external portion of valve stem o Actuator type, number and location of limit switches, and connection of pneumatic lines.
The applicable design disclosure documents were assembled by Detroit Edison for each valve inspected. A listing of the documents utilized is given in Table 3.7.2 on a valve-by-valve basis. The final installation configuration was compared to these documents and any (. iattas reported.
- 3. 7. 3. . Items Evaluated A listing of the valves that were inspected is given in Table 3.7.2.
The tabulation also identifies which valves had pressure boundary bolting torque checks performed or were disassembled for internal inspections.
3.7.3.4 Results Evaluation results can be basically broken down into three cate-gories as identified in the following text.
Overall Evaluation of Installation "
Unless identifiad below, there were no significant deviations on the valves that wer1 inspected.
(1) V8-2091 (Ell) - The exposed threads of the Limitorque actuator base to valve yoke bolting were severly burred. This concern was identified by CAT Item #92. :
(2) VE-2132 (Ell) - Nameplate design conditions do not match the j master valve list. This potential finding was identified by ;
CAT Item #110.
(3) VG-2204 (E41) - Nameplate design conditions do not match the master valve list. This potential finding was identified by CAT Item #109. '
(4) V17-2024 (E41) - There was evidence of leakage at the valve packing gland resulting in what appears to be rust blistering and scaling of the valve yoke. This concern was identified by CAT Item #102. Photograph 3.7.7 shows the condition of the valve when inspected.
Pressure Boundary Bolting Condition and Torque Tests Valve body pressure boundary bolting torque was checked on a sample ;
of the valves inspected. The valves tested are listed below.
y 107
l Ell E41 P44 V8-2091 V8-2193 V8-2410 V8-2132 V8-2204 V8-2172 The torque values of all valves tested were found to be acceptable.
Valve Disassembly A sample of valves were selected for disassembly to allow visual inspection of the valve internals. The valves inspected are identified below along with a summary of the inspection results.
(1) V8-2132 - Valve seating surf aces were in good condition. Valve body internal surfaces were in good condition. Gasket seating surfaces were cleaned and inspected. There was no evidence of severe pitting or through surface scratches.
(2) V8-2204 - Valve seating surfaces were in good condition. Valve body internal surfaces were in good condition with only minor light surface rust present in spots. Gasket seating surfaces were cleaned and inspected. There was no evidence of through surface scratches or severe pitting. Photograph 3.7.8 shows the condition of tie valve when inspected.
(3) V8-2410 - Valve dis: seats were inspected and found to be in good condition. Internal surfaces of ve've were in good condition. Gasket seating surfaces were in good condition.
Since the valve could not be completely drained, valve body seats and disc guides were inspected by touch and determined to be in good shape with no nicks, scratches or burrs.
3.7.3.5 Conclusions Overall Evaluation of Installation The overall condition and installa? f tha laives insuected was acceptable with the exception of tuo ,1 2ntial findings eclating to nameplate design conditions. Based on tse sample of vi es inspected, there is sufficient reason to believe that mismatch of nam 3 plate design conditions with design disclosure documents may be a generic problem. It is recommended that Detroit Edison conduct a comparison of design conditions on the valvo r" aplate versus the design conditions given on the master valva li; plus the applicable vendor drawing for a sample of additional, randomly selected, QA Level I valves to determine if deviations exist. Based upon the results of this comparison, a decision should be made as to whether all QA Level I valves should be inspected.
Pressure Boundary Bolting Condition and Torque Tests Since the torque values of all valves tested were found to be acceptable, no further action is considered to be required.
108
i .
Valve Disassembly The valve disc and body seating surfaces, and the valve body internal unmachined surfaces were in acceptable overall condition .
for all three valves inspected. Based on these results and the pump inspection results, there is reason to conclude that the plant piping systems and component surfaces exposed to process fluid are in acceptable condition.
3.7.4 Heat Exchangers 3.7.4.1 Purpose A sample of five QA Level I heat exchangers were inspected to determine conformance with the applicable design disclosure documents (e.g., vendor drawings and manuals, design drawings, etc.), and to determine acceptability of the installation and physical condition of each heat exchanger.
3.7.4.2 Criteria The heat exchangers were evaluated against a standard set of inspection items that included overall condition, installation, anchoring, instrumentation, piping connections, pressure boundary bolting and accessibility. The checks required to be completed for each inspection item to form the basis for acceptance or rejection were similar to those required for the pumps and turbines. Tha applicable design disclosure documents were assembled by Detroit Edison. A listing of the documents and drawings utilized is given in the tabulation contained in Section 3.7.4.3. The final installation was compared to these documents and drawings and any deviations were reported.
3.7.4.3 Items Evaluated '
Component Number Component Name Reference Document E1101-8001A RHR Heat Exchanger A I/M (E11-01-B-001-SG-002)
R1-231, Rev. 4 R4-207, Rev. 1 R4-205, Rev. 2 R4-206, Rev.1 E1101-80018 RHR Heat Exchanger 8 I/M (E11-01-B-001-SG-002)
R1-231,Rev. 4 R4-207, Rev. 1 R4-205, Rev. 2 R4-206, Rev. 1 P4400-8001 EECW Cooling Water 6M721-2196, Rev. F Hx. - Div. I S21-4, Rev. 6 P4400-8002 EECW Cooling Water 6M721-2196, Rev. F Hx. - Div. II S21-4, Rev. 6 .
rc 109 ,
l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
R3001-B003 Diesel Generator I/M (R30-00-S-900-SG-0Fv) 011 Cooler 3.7.4.4 Results RHR Heat Exchangers The installation and physical condition for each RHR Heat Exchanger was found to be acceptable except for the upper key and block guides / supports for Heat Exchanger A. The required radial clear-ances were not provided during installation of the blocks. This potential finding was reported by CAT Item #199.
EECW Heat Exchangers The installation and physical condition for each EECW Heat Exchanger was found to be acceptable except the sliding supr?rt for the Divi-sion I heat exchanger. One of the anchor bolts is positioned in the slotted hole so that there appears to be little if any room for thermal expansion. In all cases, the nuts are tack welded to the anchor bolts on the sliding support end which makes verification of clearances difficult. This concern was identified by CAT Item #149.
Photograph 3.7.9 shows the position of the anchor bolt in the slotted hole. It was also observed that the relief valve at the end of each heat exchanger had a discharge pipe that was rigidly sup-ported. Assuming that full thermal growth occurs over the 32'-6" span from the fixed support to the valve connection, unacceptable stresses may be induced in the discharge piping, safety relief valve body, and heat exchanger nozzle. This concern was identified by CAT Item #201.
Diesel Generator Oil Cooler The installation and physical condition for this heat exchanger was found to be acceptable.
3.7.4.5 Conclusions It is recommended that each support on both RHR Heat Exchangers and both EECW Heat Exchangers should be re-examined by Detroit Edison to assure that all clearances required for proper installation of the sliding supports and guides are met. The applicable design dis-closure documents and engineering judgement should be utilized.
3.7.5 Vessels and Tanks 3.7.5.1 Purpose A sample of five QA Level I tanks were inspected to determine conformance with the applicable design disclosure documents (e.g.
vendor drawings and manuals, design drawings, etc.), and to deter-mine acceptability of the installation and overall physical condi-tion of each tank.
110 1 -
-muss- - -
3.7.5.2 Criteria The same criteria was used for inspection of tanks is was used for >
inspection of heat exchangers (see Section 3.7.4.2). A listing of the documents and drawings utilized for the tank inspections is given in the tabulation contained in Section 3.7.5.3. The final installation was compared to these documents and drawings and any deviations were reported.
3.7.5.3 Items Evaluated Component Number Component Name Reference Number P4400-A001 EECW Makeup Water 6M721-2196, Rev. F Surge Tank - Div. I S20-16, Rev. II 6M721-5444, Rev. B 6M721-5357, Rev. C a=
P4400-A002 EECW Makeup Water 6M721-2196, Rev. F _
Surge Tank - Div. II S20-16, Rev. II 6M721-5444, Rev. B 6M721-5357, Rev. C B2103-A001A Prim. Cont. Pneumatic 6M721-5007, Rev. B Accumulator Tank 1A 6M721-2089, Rev. J D74-370, Rev. 3
~
3071-31, Rev. J -
Component Number Component Name Reference Number 82103-A0018 Prim. Cont. Pneumatic 6M721-5007, Rev. B 6M721-2089, Rev. J Accumulator Tank 1B 074-370, Rev. 3 - .
3071-31, Rev. J 82103-A001D Prim. Cont. Pneumatic 6M721-5007, Rev. B ,
Accumulator Tank 10 6M721-2089, Rev. J ,
074-370, Rev. 3 3071-31, Rev. J 3.7.5.4 Results The installation and physical condition for each tank inspected was found to be acceptable. _
3.7.5.5 Conclusions Based upon the above results, no further inspections are recommended.
m 111 h . - - - - . - -
c-3.7.6 Miscellaneous Mechanical System Components 3.7.6.1 Purpose A sample of various QA Level I components that do not fit under one of the previously listed generic categories were chosen for inspection. These items were composed of strainers, restricting orifices, and compressed air system equipment. Each item was inspected to determine conformance with the applicable design disclosure documents, and to determine acceptability of the installation and overall physical condition.
3.7.6.2 Criteria Each component selected was evaluated against a standard set of inspection items that were similar or identical to the inspection items used for the previously identified generic categories. The applicable design disclosure documents were assembled for each component inspected by Detroit Edison. A listing of the documents utilized is given in the tabulation contained in Section 3.7.6.3.
The installation was compared to these documents and drawings, and any deviations were reported.
3.7.6.3 Items Evaluated Component Number Component Name Reference Document R3001-D027 Fuel Pump Strainer 6M721N-2048 T1-2740 R3001-0028 Fuel Punp Strainer 6M721N-2048 T1-2740 Component Number Component Name Reference Document R3001-0026 Fuel Oil Transfer 6M721N-2048 Pump Strainer T1-2740 E5100-0011 RCIC Condensate Pung P1-2414, Rev. 3 Suction Strainer E1150-0001A RHR Sys. Restricting 6M721-3178-1 Orifice Plate 86-107 E4150-0005 HPCI Sys. Restricting 6M721-3165-1 Orifice Plate 86-107 E2150-0001B Core Spray Sys. 6M721-3150-1 Restricting Orifice R4-14M, Rev. E Plate 112
P5002-0012 Control Air Sys. 6M721-2015, Rev. O Air Dryer 6M721-5462 G 6M721-5437, Rev. 0 3071-520, Rev. A P5002-0013 Control Air Sys. 6M721-2015, Rev. 0 - =
Air Dryer 6M721-5462 -
6M721-5437, Rev. 0 ,
3071-520, Rev. A P5002-0016 Control Air Sys. 6M721-2015, Rev. O After Filter PDC 1000AF8, Rev. D 3071-520, Rev. A P5002-0017 Control Air Sys. 6M721-2015, Rev. O After Filter P OAF 8 Rev D P5002-D001 North Control Air 6M721-2015, Rev. O r Compressor S2190-2C S2366-1 3071-520, Rev. A P5002-D002 South Control Air 6M721-2015, Rev. O Compressor S2190-2C S2366-1 3071-520, Rev. A P5002-A001 Control Air Receiver 6M721-2015, Rev. 0 --
Tank-1 L2946, Rev. 5 ._
K4375, Rev. 0 3071-520, Rev. A 1 Component Number Component Name Reference Number P5002-A002 Centrol Air Receiver 6M721-2015, Rev. O Tank-2 L2946, Rev. 5 K4375, Rev. 0 3071-520, Rev. A R3001-A012 Diesel Starting Air 6M721N-2046, Rev. O Receiver T1-2529, Rev. 1 113
3.7.6.4 Results Evaluation results are presented in a generic category format as follows:
Strainers The installation and physical condition for each strainer inspected was found to be acceptable. During inspection of strainer R3001-D028, it was observed that drain valve V8-3937 was tagged with one tag calling for V8-3947 and another tag calling for V8-3936.
Similarly, strainer R3001-0027 drain valve V8-3936 was tagged cor-rectly with a yellow tag but the attached metal tag identified the valve as V8-3937.
Restricting Orifice Plate The installation and physical condition of all three orifice plates inspected was found to be acceptable. Flanged joint bolting was checked for proper torque and full thread engagement for each of the orifice plates. In all three cases, the bolting torque values were below the torque requirements of the applicable maintenance proce-dure MI-M055. Indications of no or minimal leakage were also observed. Full thread engagement was not achieved on four of the eight bolts of the flanged joint for orifice E2150-00018. This potential finding was identified by CAT Item #68.
Air Dryers The applicable design drawing for the air dryers requires that the dryer clamp support plates be welded en both sides to the 3x2x1/4 angle. It was observed that the plates were welded only on one side for both dryers. This potential finding was identified by CAT Item
- 162.
Compressors, Air Filters and Air Receivers The installation and physical condition for each component inspected was found to be acceptable.
3.7.6.5 Conclusions Strainers Based upon the above results, no further inspections are recommended.
Restricting Orifice Plates The lower than required torque values, per procedure MI-M055 acceptance criteria, for the flanged joint bolting is considered to be a common occurence for small bore piping. Although the bolt torque readings were below the torque required to be applied during installation, ASME Section III, Appendix XII recognizes the fact 114
that bolt stress may decrease over a period of time after initial tightening for various reasons. The bolt torquing of the three joints checked is, therefore, considered to be acceptable. Further discussion of flanged joint bolt torquing to substantiate this conclusion is presented in Section 3.6.1.5 of this report.
The lack of complete thread engagement for the flanged joint bolting associated with E2150-0001B is not considered to be indicative of a generic problem. This conclusion is based on the fact that this flanged joint was the only joint exhibiting lack of thread engagement not only of the flanged joints that were specifically identified as being inspected in this report, but also of the flanged joints inspected during the various piping system walkdowns and component inspections.
No further action .is recommended other than the proper resolution of the applicable CAT items.
Air Dryers The improper welding of the dryer clamp support plates is not con-sidered to be indicative of a generic problem. No further action is recommended other than the proper resolution of the CAT Item.
Compressors, Air Filters and Air Receivers Based upon the above results, no further action is recommended.
115
. . . - . . . . - . . . - . . . . _ . - . . . _ . . - . . . . . . . . . . . -~ .
TABLE 3.7.1 Pumps Inspected Component No. Component Name Reference Doc. Notes E2101-C001A Core Spray Pump A 6M721-2679, Rev. F R4-ll6, Rev. D I/M (E21-01-C-00-DA-002)
Spec. (21A9243AU, Rev. 2)
E2101-C0018 Core Spray Pump B 6M721-2679, Rev. F R4-116, Rev. D I/M (E21-01-C-00-DA-002)
Spec. (21A9243AU, Rev. 2)
E2101-C001C Core Spray Pump C 6M721-2679, Rev. F R4-ll6, Rev. D I/M (E21-01-C-00-DA-002)
Spec. (21A9243AU, Rev. 2)
E2101-C001D Core Spray Pump D 6M721-2679, Rev. F R4-116, Rev. D I/M (E21-01-C-00-DA-002)
Spec. (21A9243AU, Rev. 2) (1)
E1102-C002A RHR Punp A 6M721-2734, Rev. K (1)
I/M (E11-02-C-002-JA-003)
R4-331 E1102-C0020 RHR Pump D 6M721-2734, Rev. K I/M (Ell-02-C-002-JA-003)
R4-331 E1151-C001A RHR Serv. Water I/M (Ell-51-C-001A-SG-002)
Punp A E1151-C001B RHR Serv. Water I/M (Ell-51-C-001A-SG-002)
Pump B Ell 51-C001C RHR Serv. Water I/M (Ell-51-C-001A-SG-002)
Pump C Ell 51-C001D RHR Serv. Water I/M (Ell-51-C-001A-SG-002) .., ,
Pump D ' fi u f;A?b E5101-C002 RCIC Pump Dll743X, Rev. 4 .((
014128 J /y 011810, Rev. D 9.6 012414 Rev. 3 7'{y
-4nf gf i.%f.k 116 ["l };
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i
TABLE 3.7.1 (Cont'd)
Pumps Inspected _
Component No. Component Name Reference Doc. Notes E4101-C001A HPCI Main Punp R4-148, Rev. O I/M (E41-01-C-001-SC-001) 6M721-2043, Rev. Q E4101-C001B HPCI Booster Punp R4-148, Rev. 0 .-
I/M (E41-01-C-001-SC-001) 6M721-2043, Rev. Q E4101-C005 HPCI Turbine Aux. 1/M (E41-01-C-002-JA-003) - -
011 Pump R3001-C002 Diesel Fuel 6M721N-2048, Rev. S Transfer Pump I/M (R3000-S-900-SG-020) e R3001-C007 D. G. Serv. 6M721N-2053, Rev. S Water Pump I/M (R30-01-C-900-DA-001)
R3000-C003 Fuel Oil 6M721N-2048, Rev. S c Transfer Punp I/M (R30-01-0-900-0A-004)
P4400-C001A EECW Punp - Div. I 6M721-2196, Rev. F S24-108 P4400-C0018 EECW Punp - Div. II 6M721-2196, Rev. F S24-108 (2) 83101-C001A Reactor Recirc. 6M721-2833, Rev. J Punp A T-120, Rev. 4 6WM-B31-4002-1, Rev. E T-205 6WM-B31-5251-1, Rev. E Rl-174 B3101-C0018 Reactor Recire. 6M721-2833, Rev. J Punp B T-120, Rev. 4 6WM-831-4002-1, Rev. E T-205 6WM-831-5251-1, Rev. E Rl-174 T4100-C040 Control Center HVAC 89-646, Rev. 3
, Chilled Water Pung 89-649 Div. II I/M (T41-00-C-040-JR-003)
T4100-C041 Control Center HVAC 89-646, Rev. 3 Chilled Water Punp 89-649 Div. I I/M (t41-00-C-040-JR-003) _
NOTES: (1) Bolt Torque Test (2) Bolt Torque Test and Disassembly 117
TABLE 3.7.2 VALVES INSPECTED System Valve Number Actuator Manual Reference Documents Notes E21 V8-2022 F0058 6M721-2871, Rev. L P1-158, Rev. 6 Core P1-208 Spray V8-2021 F005A' 6M721-2871, Rev. L Pl-158, Rev. 6 P1-208 V8-2023 F006A 6M721-2871, Rev. L Pl-515, Rev. F V8-2024 F0068 6M721-2871, Rev. L Pl-515, Rev. F Ell V8-2091 F009 6M721-2874 Pl-3356 (1)
Pl-3350 RHR Pl-2670
& V8-2132 X Pl-919, Rev. 2 (2)
RHR 6M721-2875, Rev. L Service V8-2164 F0508 Pl-10632, Rev. H Water V8-2172 F022 6M721-2876, Rev. R (1)
PI-155, Rev. 6 Pl-2106, Rev. 6 V15-2069 ';400 Cl-1218, Rev. B V15-2080 X P1-1705 E41 Vll-2006 F021 6M721-2908, Rev. M Pl-5055, Rev. 4 Pl-5202
.V17-2024 F028 6M721-2933, Rev. M P1-3384 HPCI V17-2022 F001 6M721-2933, Rev. M Pl-943 V8-2191 F004 6M721-2877, Rev. P P1-225 Pl-136 V8-2193 F007 6M721-2877, Rev. P (1)
Pl-130 V8-2204 F041 6M721-2877, Rev. P (2)
Pl-128 l.
P44 V8-2410 X 6M721-2898, Rev. H (2)
Pl-955, Rev. 4 EECW V8-2482 F403A 6M721-2901, Rev. G Cl-2251, Rev. B l ,
Cl-2252, Rev B Cl-2293, Rev. A l
V3-?484 F6068 6M721-2901, Rev. G P1-1203, Rev. 6 NOTES: (1) Bolting Torque Test Conducted (2) Bolting Torque Test Conducted and Valve Disassembled 118
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1 Photograph 3.7.I Seal piping to llPCI Ifain Pump. Piping shows severe scoring by pipe wrench during assembly and/or disassembly.
119
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3.8 Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) 3.8.1 Fire Dampers 3.8.1.1 Purpose
- A sample of QA Level I fire dampers were inspected to determine conformance with the applicable design disclosure documents, and to determine acceptability of the installation and overall physical j condition of each damper.
3.8.1.2 Criteria The fire dampers were evaluated against a standard set of inspection items to determine conformance with installation requirements and acceptable overall physical condition. The applicable design disclosure documents were assembled by Detroit Edison. A listing of the documents and drawings utilized is given in the tabulation contained in Section 3.8.1.3. The final installation was compared to these documents and drawings, and any deviations were reported. 3.8.1.3 Items Evaluated Fire Damper Number Reference Document T4100-F095 6M721-2849, Rev. R 6M721-2751, Rev. G T4100-F096 6M721-4317, Rev. D T4100-F098 6M721-4317, Rev. D T4100-F097 6M721-4317, Rev. O T4100-F099 RICO-2848-2, Rev. 3 T4100-F102 R1C0-2848-2, Rev. 3 3.8.1.4 Results The installation and physical condition of each fire damper inspected was found to be acceptable. Two of the six dampers were tripped and functioned properly. All fusible links and hooks were in place with no visible damage. 3.8.1.5 Conclusions Based upon the above results, no further inspections are recommended. 3.8.2 Equipment 3.8.2.1 Purpose A sample of various QA Level I HVAC components were selected for inspection. These items were composed of chillers, cooling units, air filters, and f ans. Each item was inspected to determine 128
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- 3.8.2.? Criteria
[ ^ Each component selected was evaluated against a standard set of inspection items that were similar to the inspection items used for f the previously identified generic categories. The applicable design
; disclosure documents were assembled by Detroit Edison. A listing of the documents utilized is given in Table 3.8.1. The final 1 installation was compared to these documents and drawings, and any 1 deviations were reported.
t 3.8.2.3 Items Evaluated i A listing of the HVAC components that were inspected is given in Table 3.8.1. 3.8.2.4 Results
, Evaluation results are presented in a generic category format as Cooling Units Installation and physical condition for each of the cooling units inspected was found to be acceptable except for the following ; findings, concerns or observations:
(1) HPCI Emergency Equipment Cooling Unit - Incomplete thread engagement was observed on one of the eyebolt nuts that are
, used to adjust drive belt tension. This condition was due to the eyebolt in question being shorter than the other eyebolt.
{ This concern was identified by CAT Item #191. E (2) Core Spray Pump Room Cooler - All sheet metal screws were missing from the lef t side access panel. This concern was
.f identified by CAT Item #189. The internal cooling coils were dirty and unprotected from debris (see item 3 below).
(3) Control Air Compressor Room North Cooling Unit - The internal
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cooling coils were dirty and unprotected from blinding by a
, debris. The design does not call for filters or trash screens, i however, it is felt that blinding of large coil areas or ; unacceptable degradation of thermal performance could occur.
( This concern was identified by CAT item *190. This concern also applies to cocling units T4100-8037, T4100-8020, T4100-8022, and T4100-8018. Drywell Cooling Horizontal Cooling Unit - Instrument TE-N0048 (4) is not labeled. This concern was identified by CAT Item #172. (5) Drywell Cooling vertical Cooling Unit (8001) - Instruments TE-N012A and TEW-N002A are not tagged. This concern was _; identified by CAT Item #172. Valve V8-3723 had no identifi-129
G. 1 cation or national board tag. This concern was identified by CAT Item #173. Valve V8-3724 was tagged V8-3723. 5 7 Drywell Cooling Vertical Cooling Unit (B003) - North and South
; (6) 4 access panels are missing some of the nuts and one bolt on each a panel is broken off. This concern was identified by CAT Item
#176. In addition, instrument TE-N012C is damaged and missing m -
parts. Outlet isolatica valves are switched. V8-3752 is labeled V8-3751 and V8-3751 is labeled V8-3752. (7) Drywell Cooling Vertical Cooling Unit (B004) - One access panel
' is damaged and has one bolt broken off. The other access panel 1 has loose (not torqued) hold down bolt nuts. This concern was identified by CAT Item #179. Instrument TEW-N003D is not tagged. This concern was identified by CAT Item #172.
f- Chillers The installation and physical condition for both of the chillers was found to be acceptable. 3
# Air Filter Units
-? The installation and physical condition for each of the air filter
- units inspected was found to be acceptable.
Fans f The installation and physical condition for each of the f ans h a inspected was found to be acceptable except for the following concern: }y M (1) Drywell Cooling Horizontal Cooling Fan - The auxiliary conduit box cover is missing. This concern was identified by CAT Item
#175.
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; 3.8.2.5 Conclusions Cooling Units
-] As a result of the inspections, seven of the nine cooling units were y observed to have some type of identifiable concern. Due to these
; findings, it is recommended that all additional cooling units be
.- inspected for dirty or damaged cooling coils, damaged instrumen-
- tation, incorrect or missing tags on associated instruments and valves, external damage and missing pieces.
J Chillers E
; Based upon the above results, no further inspections are recommended.
T.
- 130
- Air Filter Units Based upon the above results, no further inspections are reconnended.
Fans Based upon the' above results, no further inspections are recommended other than the proper resolution of the identified CAT Item. I-I 131 _ _ - _ _ _ _ l
TABLE 3.8.1 HVAC EQUIPMENT INSPECTED - f Component No. Component Name R.eference Document h l T4100-B008 Control Area HVAC Chiller - 6M721-4325, Rev. K Div. I B9-585, Rev. F _ 89-644, Rev. D I/M (T41-00-B-008-JA-005) T4100-8009 Centrol Area HVAC Chiller - 6M721-4325, Rev. K [ B9-585, Rev. F . Div. II i B9-644, Rev. O
- I/M (T41-00-B-008-JA-005)
I a. T4100-8022 HPCI Emerg. Equip. Cooling 89-234, Rev. 3 Unit [ T4100-8018 RHR Emerg. Equip. North Cooling Unit 89-235, Rev. 3 T4100-8020 Core Spray Pump Room B9-233
- Cooling Unit 6M721-4148, Rev. F E T4100-8029 Control Air Compressor 89-659, Rev. H Room North Cooling Unit w-
- T4100-8037 Thermal Recombiner Room B9-659, Rev. H East Cooling Unit e T4700-8001 Drywell Cooling Unit 6M721-4127, Rev. J i 6M721-3922, Rev. A y 26170, Rev. J T4700-8003 Drywell Cooling Unit 6M721-4127, Rev. J { 6M721-3922, Rev. A 26170, Rev. J T4700-8004 Drywell Cooling Unit 6M721-4127, Rev. J g 6M721-3922, Rev. A 26170 Rev. J T4700-8002 Orywell Cooling Unit 6M721-4127, Rev. J ? 6M721-3923, Rev. A 6M721-3924, Rev. 8 26169 (Shts 1 - 3) ^ T4600-0002 SGT 11ter Unit - Div. IT 6M721-2649-1, Rev. E 6M721-2268, Rev. R E T4600-C004 SGT Exhaust Air Filter Unit 61721-2649-1, Rev. E 73-725 132 E
TABLE 3.8.1 (Cont'd) HVAC EQUIPMENT INSPECTED Component No. Component Name Reference Document T4100-C053 Control Center Cooling Fan B9-1860 T4100-C008 East Battery Room West 89-197 Essential Exnaust Fan 89-198 T4100-C010 West Battery Room West 89-197 Essential Exhaust Fan 89-198 T4100-C047 Emergency Make-Up Air Fan 89-692, Rev. D 89-1115 I/M (T41-00-D-016-JA-002) T4700-C001 Drywell Cooling Fan 6M721-4127, Rev. J 6M721-3924, Rev. B 6M721-3925, Rev. B FF-15421, Rev. I 26168, Rev. G T4700-C002 Drywell Cooling Fan 6M721-4127, Rev. J 6M721-3924, Rev. B 6M721-3925, Rev. 8 FF-15421, Rev. I 26168, Rev. G T4600-C001 SGT Cooling Fan - Div. I 61721-2649-1, Rev. E 6M721-2268, Rev. R R3-731 R3-732 T4600-C002 SGT Cooling Fan - Div. II 61721-2649-1, Rev. E 6M721-2268, Rev. R R3-731 R3-732 T4600-C003 SGT Exhaust Fan - Div. I 6I721-2649-1, Rev. E R3-712 133
3.9 Mechanical Instrumentation 3.9.1 Loop Walkdown 3.9.1.1 Purpose Selected Instrument Loops were examined to determine if they had been installed in accordance with the Instrumentation Drawings and Specifications. 3.9.1.2 Criteria (1) Detroit Edison Company Specification 3071-525 Rev. D, " Design Specification for Nuclear Class 2 and 3 Small Piping and Instrument and Control Tubing" (2) Detroit Edison Company Drawings as listed in Table 3.9.1 3.9.1.3 Items Evaluated The instruments, piping and tubing as listed below were selected for walkdown. Core Spray - PT-E21-L403B FE-E21-N0028 RHR - PT-Ell-L4118 FE-Ell-L417B HPCI - FE-E41-N007 Main Steam - FTH-821-L002 Examination was made for proper materials, configuration, connections and evidence of damage. 3.9.1.4 Results No major significant deviations were identified. The items examined are considered to conform to the design drawings and specifications. The noted exceptions are listed below.
- 1) On the piping for PT-Ell-L4118, the valve had yellow tag 3153 instead of 3152 as shown on the drawing.
(2) Two loose and leaking tubing connections were noted incidentally on Instrument Loop Ell-N007B. (3) Instrumentation Penetration X-33A had one connection which was taped up - no pipe or cap. See Photograph 3.9.1. (4) Instrumentation Penetration X-55B had four connections which ' were not piped up or capped. (5) Tape and tape residue were noted on surface of pipe between welds P and 58 & 59 on piping for instrument FTH-821-L002A. 134 ,
.3.9.1.5 Conclusions On the basis of the above results, the Instrumentation examined meets the requirements of the specifications and drawings. It is recommended, however, that a check be made to ensure that all unused connections in Instrument Penetrations are sealed.
t 135
TABLE 3.9.1 MECHANICAL INSTRUMENTATION REFERENCE DRAWINGS Instrument Number & Drawing Numbers' Revision
- Instrument FE-E41-N007 6Wl-E41-7016-1 8 61721-2281-13 8 OA-FE-E41-N007 E 6h721-3167-1 M
- Instrument FTH-821-L002A 6WI-821-7422-1 C 61721-2281-22 C 601-821-7248-1 C 731E 756 (G.E. Dwg.) C Instrument PT-E21-L4038 6WI-E21-7122-1 8 61721-2281-18 0 12-PT-E21-L4038 C 6M721-3147-1 S Instrument FE-E21-N0028 6WI-E21-7001-1 0 6I721-2281-18 0
, 09-FE-E21-N0028 E 6M721-3147-1 S Instrument PT-E11-L4118 6WI-E11-7010 E 61721-2281-19 I 06-PT-E11-L4118 C 6M721-3177-1 M Instrument FE-E11-L4178 6WI-E11-7014-1 E 61721-2281-19 I 06-FE-E11-N0148 E 6M721-3151-1 y 136
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3.10 Electrical Distribution System 3.10.14160V Switchgear 3.10.1.1 Purpose A sample of safety-related electrical 4KV switchgear consisting of three switchgear and four compartments was selected to assess the conformance of their installation to the final design documents. Attributes evaluated included installation, identification, separation, proper components, cable terminations and environmental integrity. 3.10.1.2 Criteria (1) Detroit Edison Electrical Engineering Standard Specification 3071-128. (2) Detroit Edison Electrical Installation Specification 3071-33. (3) Detroit Edison Drawing SE721-2992 Mounting details for 4KV a switchgear. (4) Detroit Edison Schematic and Connection Drawings referenced herein. 3.10.1.3 Items Evaluated (1) Switchgear 64C compartment C10 - Core Spray Pump C (2) Switchgear 64C compartment C11 - Transformer 72C (3) Switchgear 13EC compartment EC5 - Transformer 72EC (4) Switchgear 65E compartment E10 - Core Spray Pump B 3.10.1.4 Results (1) Switchgear 64C compartment C10 and C11 Compartment C10 of the 64C switchgear as shown on Figure 3.10.1 is the power source for Core Spray Pump Motor C. Compartment Cll provided the power source for the 4160/480V transformer 72C and motor control center 72C-3A. Seven cables entered and terminated in compartment C10 and four cables entered and terminated in compartment Cll. The cables were checked for tightness and compliance with the connection and schematic drawings. No deviations were identified. The compartments were anchored to embedded channels utilizing plug welds at manufacturer's supplied mounting holes. No deviations from the mounting drawings were noted. A comparision of the devices in each cabinet to the equipment drawings resulted in one minor deviations. The drawings indicated a 85 watt resistor for 137
device LC in each compartment, however a 100 watt resistor was installed. When the rear of the compartments were opened, large quantities of dust, dirt, cigarette butts, and nails were found on the bottom of the compartments. This item was brought to the attention of Detroit Edison personnel. The compartments were cleaned at that time. The installation of nameplates on the switchgear had not been completed. The nameplate for 64C switchgear had been affixed to the rear of the swite.hgear. The installation of white device nameplates had not been completed on portions of the 64C switchgear. (2) Switchgear 65E compartment E10 Compartment E10 is the power source for Division II Core Spray Punp Motor B as shown on Figure 3.10.1. Seven cables entered from the bottom and terminated in this compartment. The cable entrances were sealed. The cables were checked for tightness and compliance with connection and schematic drawings. Cable tags 220088-2C and 220081-2C were attached to the same cable. One cable in the compartment was not tagged. Apparently, the cable tag for cable 220088-2C had fallen off and was re-attached to cable 220081-2C in error. The untagged cable in the compartment was terminated as shown for cable 220088-2C on the drawings. A check of devices located in the compartment revealed the same minor deviation with device LC (resistor) as found in switchgear 64C compartments C10 and C11. No other device deviations were noted. The switchgear was properly identified with blue nameplates, however, the installation of white device nameplates on each compartment door had not been completed. Dust and dirt was also found in this compartment. The ccmpartment was cleaned during the review. (3) Switchaear 13EC compartment EC5 Switchgear 13EC as shown on Figure 3.10.2 is located in the RHR complex. Compartment EC5 is the power source for the Dhi-sion II 4160/480V transfcrmer 72EC, which provides support power for various diesel systems. Four cables entered com-partment EC5 from the top and terminated in the cabinet. These cable entrances were not sealed. The cables were checked for tightness and compliance with connection and schematic drawings, . No deviations were noted. A check of the mounting of the equipment to its base indicated some confusion in the reference design drawings. Drawing SE721-2992-1 had been revised by DCN 10287 to reference drawing 6E721N-37 for mounting all RHR complex switchgear. However, drawing 6E721N-37 referenced SE721-2992-1 for the mounting of the j equipment. The switchgear had been mounted utilizing the detail shown on SE721-2992-1. Detroit Edison personnel indi-cated the mountings were correct. They also indicated a design change would be made to the note on drawing SE721-2992-1 to indicate mounting the RHR switchgear by that drawing. 138
3.10.1.5 Conclusions The 4160V switchgear reviewed were installed as required by the design documents. Various minor deviations were noted including missing / misplaced nameplates, incorrect resistor wattage, and drawing deviations. However, it is felt that none of the deviations would have prevented proper operation of the equipment. The quality of housekeeping needs to be improved to prevent recurrance of the debris and foreign material found in some of the switchgear. Dirty electrical components could impair the operation of the equipment. A complete cleaning and sealing of the 4KV switchgear at this time is recommended to ensure proper equipment operation. 3.10.2 480 Volt Motor Control Centers (MCC) 3.10.2.1 Purpose A sample of the safety-related electrical 480V motor control center compartments from four separate MCC's was selected to assess the conformance of their installation to the final design documents. The sample consisted of a cross section of MCC's supporting Core Spray, RHR, and Diesel Support systems (see Figures 3.10.1, 3.10.2, and 3.10.3) . Attributes evaluated included installation, identification, wiring connections, fuse coordination, overload rating, proper components, separation and environmental integrity. 3.10.2.2 Criteria (1) Detroit Edison Electrical Installation Specification 3071-33. (2) Detroit Edison Electrical Engineering Standard Specification 3071-128. (3) Detroit Edison Drawing SE721-2992 Standard for typical MCC mounting. (4) Detroit Edison documents, schematic and connection drawings as referenced herein. 3.10.2.3 Items Evaluated (1) MCC 72C-3A compartment 8B - Core Spray (2) MCC 72EC-2C compartment 1C - Diesel Generator #13 (3) MCC 728-3A compartment 3AR - RHR (4) MCC 72F-4A compartment 4C - Core Spray 139
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3.10.2.4 Results (1) MCC 72C-3A compartment 8B i This compartment provided power to Division I Core Spray Valve
#E2150F005A/V82021 (Inboard Valve A). Two cables entered and terminated in compartment 88. The cables were checked for tightness and compliance with schematic and connection draw-ings. No deviations were noted. A check of the internal wiring was made. No deviations were found. It was noted during the assessment that EECW System piping was routed immediately overhead (see Photograph 3.10.1). Detroit Edison letter EF2-68.571, dated 5/31/84, confirmed the need for water spray protection. Potential for damage to the MCC exists until the protection is provided. Also noted during the assessment I
was the direct contact of steel channel from an adjacent' stair landing with the MCC. There was no evidence the stairs in contact with the MCC was considered in the MCC seismic evalua-tion (see Photograph 3.10.1). The housekeeping within the motor control center was poor. The bottom section of the MCC was covered with heavy dust, cigarettes, and other foreign material. (2) MCC 72EC-2C compartment 1C MCC 72EC-2C is located in the RHR complex. Compartment 1C provides power to Division II Diesel Generator #13 Fuel Transfer Pump B. Two cables entered and terminated in this compartment. A review of the cable terminations and internal wiring for tightness and compliance with wiring drawings was completed with no deviations noted. A check of the MCC including attachment to the base, grounding, compartment identification, and housekeeping resulted in no deviations. (3) MCC 728-3A compartment 3AR Compartment 3AR provides power to Division I Residual Heat Removal Valve E1150F004A/V8-2099 (Suction Pump 2A Valve A). Four cables entered and terminated in the compartment. C able 214231-1C entered the MCC from the bottom as indicated by the cable routing sheet (CR-7). Drawing 550721-2512-168 indicated top entry. This is considered a minor deviation in this instance but appears to be a generic problem. The bus con-nection for the number 1 conductor of the main feeder cable (200565-1P) was found loose and the wire located on terminal
#12 of the interface block in compartment 3AR was also loose.
The motor control center was dirty. The section of the MCC containing compartment 3AR had an accumulation of dust, dirt, trash and cigarette butts located inside. Efforts were made by Detroit Edison ta immediately begin cleaning the MCC. 140 I
(4) MCC 72F-4A compartment 4C Compartment 4C provides power to the Division II Core Spray Valve E2150F0058/V8-2022 (Inboard Isolation Valve B). Two cables entered and terminated in this compartment. An assessment of MCC grounding, base attachment, cable terminations, internal wiring, and housekeeping resulted in no deviations. An assessment of the fuses located in the compartment indicated a deviation between drawings. Drawing SSD721-2512-19A indicated 25 amp fuses on the main switch, while drawing 61721-2211-7 indicated 30 amp fuses were required. Thirty (30) amp fuses were installed in the field. This is a penetration circuit and may compromise penetration protection. 3.10.2.5 Conclusion Housekeeping was noted as a concern in two of the four MCC's dcccket' . This seems to continue as a trend from the 4KV switchgear reviews. It was noted, however, that the equipment in the RHR complex was much cleaner and free of debris. A complete cleaning and sealing as required of the motor control centers is recom mended. MCC 72C-3A, apparently located in a hazardous environment, requires additional protection for water spray and a review of its siesmic qualifications due to possible interaction from stairway landing. In addition, MCC (72F-4A) had fuses installed which may have been contrary to the intended design. This item is particulary significant, because had the deviation gone undetected, the electrical penetration may not have had adequate protection. It is recommended an additional sample of penetration circuits be inspected to determine if the proper fuse protection has been installed. If there is evidence of a generic problem the sample i should be extended to all penetration circuits with fuse protection. In addition, a review of all motor control center frontal, schematic, and connection drawings is recommended to determine consistency between drawings and the two loose terminations identified in MCC 728-3A should be corrected. 3.10.3 Batteries 3.10.3.1 Purpose One of the safety-related 260/130 VOC batteries was selected to assess the conformance of the battery installation to the final design documents. Six cells of this battery were inspected. Attributes evaluated included battery rack installation, identification, cable terminations, battery parameters, ventilation, cleanliness and damage. ( I 141
3.10.3.2 Criteria (1) Detroit Edison Ins'allation Specification 3071-128. (2) Detroit Edison Installation Specification 3071-128. (3) C & D Installation and Operation Instruction Manual for Stationary Batteries. (4) Detroit Edison Electrical Schematic and Connection Drawings as referenced herein. 3.10.3.3 Items Evaluated (1) Battery 28-1, cell numbers 5, 9,16, 30, 45, and 60 (Division 2). 3.10.3.4 Results The battery room for 28-1 battery was clean and adequately venti-lated. The battery had recently been cleaned. No corrosion was evident on the terminal posts or connecting bars. It was noted however, that the cleaning of the posts and bars had removed some of the lead protective coating. While this may not affect the operability of the battery, it would eventually increase maintenance time. A check of the specific gravities resulted in high readings. Readings ranged from 1.255 to 1.265 specific gravity. A normal reading would have been in the range of 1.210 to 1.220. A review of the battery maintenance record indicated low specific gravity readings. Apparently, acid has been added to raise the specific gravity levels. All cell voltages checked were good. Other minor deviations included a missing cable tag, missing nameplates on terminal boxes and doors, and a deviation between the battery connection box fabrication drawing and the schematic drawing for the fuse locations. The fuse was located by the schematic drawing. 3.10.3.5 Conclusions The high specific gravities should be lowered to within the recommended range specified by the manufacturer. Based on the evaluation, the batteries were installed as specified. l 142
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3.11 Electrical Cable System 3.11.1 Cable 3.11.1.1 Purpose The purpose of this review was to assess the installation of electrical cables in the plant for their compliance with Detroit Edison specifications and drawings. Attributes evaluated included routing, identification, separation during routes and at entrances to equipment, damage during installation, grounding, and environmental protection. A sample of cables was selected with primary emphasis on the Core Spray and Residual Heat Removal systems. 3.11.1.2 Criteria (1) Detroit Edison Specification 3071-33 (2) Detroit Edison Specification 3071-128 (3) Cable routing sheets (CR-7) as applicable for each cable reveiwed. (4) Detroit Edison Electrical Connection and Schematic Drawings as referenced herein. 3.11.1.3 Items Evaluated Table 3.11.1 lists the cables reviewed in this assessment. A total of 56 cables were evaluated. All were reviewed at the terminating ends for separation and support. Twenty percent of the cables were inspected over their complete route and fifty percent were inspected only for tray / conduit separation along their route. 3.11.1.4 Results i Of the 56 cables reviewed, the following cables had separation, routing, or support deviations. (1) Tray IC-140 was not shown on route sheets for cables 235803-1C, 2146628-1C, and 2145428-1C. (2) Cables entering cabinets in the relay room lack a grip type support required by specification 3071-33. Example: Cable 240105-2K leaves tray 2K-012 and enters cabinet Hil-P817. Cable is unsupported for approximately 8 feet. (See Photo-graph 3.11.1 for example.) (3) Cable routing sheets for cables 220090-lP, 254316-1K, and 231561-El do not indicate cables to be run in conduit. The cables were installed in conduit during parts of the route. 147
3.11.1.5 Conclusions The routing of the cables through point IC-140 and the use of con-duit not shown on the routing sheets does not constitute a signifi-cant deviation from the design documents, since the cables maintained their divisional integrity. It is recommended that routing sheets should be reveiwed and updated to reflect the 'as-bailt' condition. The cable support problems identified in the Relay Room represented a deviation from the specification. Subsequent discussions with Detroit Edison personnel indicated that engineering evaluations have been completed justifying the lack of grip type supports. It is recommended that the specification 3071-33 be revised to reflect the fact that deviations are permissable with Design Engineering analysis. 3.11.2 Tray and Conduit 3.11.2.1 Purpose The purpose of this review is to assess the installation of cable tray and electrical conduit for compliance with Detroit Edison Specificationi, erd drawings. This review was performed in con-junction with the cable review described in section 3.11.1. Attributes reviaw.) included tray and conduit installation, identification, grounding, cable tray fill, separation, fire stops, housekeeping, and damage. 3.11.2.2 Criteria (1) 0etroit Edison Specification 3071-33 (2) Detroit Edison Specification 3071-128 (3) Detroit Edison Cable Tray Drawings as referenced herein (4) Detroit Edison Conduit Drawings as referenced herein 3.11.2.3 Items Evaluated The selection of cable trays and conduits evaluated in this section were based on the cable routes selected in Section 3.11.1 of this report. 3.11.2.4 Results The following is a tabulation of the findings resulting from this review:
- 1) Vertical cable tray 2P-003 contained cables not attached to the tray for a vertical distance in excess of 15 feet. Specifi-cation requires attachment to the tray at 8 foot intervals.
(See Photograph 3.11.2.) 148
- 2) Cable tray 2C-062 and OK-116 have cables installed above the side-rails creating an over-fill condition. (See Photograph 3.11.3)
- 3) Cables in tray 2C-062 located in cable tunnel adjacent to Relay Room are not installed in a " neatly trained manner." (See Photograph 3.11.4.) An example of neatly trained is shown in Photograph 3.11.5.
- 4) A cable, assumed to be abandoned, was coiled up and left in tray 2P-525 (RHR Complex).
- 5) Orange tray #1K-015 and blue conduit BB-021-2K do not meet the required 3'/5' separation criteria. Location G-17 at elevation 562'.
- 6) Orange conduit (AA-050-10) violates 3' separation criteria with blue conduits (BB-007-2C and 88-008-2C). Location G17, elevation 562'.
- 7) Flex conduit, containing Cable 228252A-lK, is pulled apart at device exposing cable.
- 8) Spare conduits in the Relay Room have not been plugged or capped (loc: G-9, El. 631' next to tray 2C-054 and G-17, El. 631'). :
- 9) Division 11 pullbox did not have cover installed. No cover was observed in area. No other identification was available.
Approximate location: Column F17, El. 562'.
- 10) 80P cable was observed installed outside of cable tray (see Photograph 3.11.6).
3.11.2.5 Conclusion Of the ten deviations, two (items 5 and 6) can be combined. These two were directly related to separation violations. The remaining items covered areas including tray overfill, cable not secured to tray, cable installation techniques, damaged conduits, spare
- conduits sealing, and pullbox covers. While each item may be an isolated case, combined they indicate a lack of compliance with the project final design documents.
This assessment was made on a small sample (28 cables) as compared to the total cables on the complete project. It is therefore recommended that Detroit Edison select a sample of cables and perform an inspection similar to the one performed by the team. The results of this inspection and the results of the CAT evaluation should then be analyzed by the Detroit Edison engineers to determine the need for any possible corrective actions. 149
, b 3.11.3 Electrical Penetrations 3.11.3.1 Purpose s ,
The' purpose of this review is to sample the installed electrical penetrations to determine if installation is as specified by the design drawings and 3pecifications. Attributes reviewed included damage, environmental sealing, cable terninations, identification, and circuit protectfon. The sample lncluded one power penetration, two control penetrations, and one %nstrutentation penetration. These penetrations are inc)uded i(Figures 3.10.1 through 3.10.5. 3.11.3.2 Criteria ' f s! (1) Conax Insta?latica IManual for electrical penetrations.
!s (2) Detroit Edison Spei:ification 3071-33.
s (3) Detroit Edison Specification 3071-128. (4) Detroit Edison connection and outline drr..vings as referenced berein.
- m. ,
* '3.11.3.3 Items Evaluated e
)I Penetration T23-X-1050 - p/ver - Rht( Head Spray W2) PanetrationT23-X-102A-ControlJdoreSpray
, 3y -
I (3) Penetration T23-X-1028 - Control - RHR Shutdown Suction (4) Penetration T23-X-1038 - Instrumentation - Core Spray 3.11.3.4 Results (1) Penetration T23-X-105D - A check for loose bolts was made prior
~
to removing the covers to the penetration. Three loose bolts were found on the outboard side and numerous bolts and screws j were311ssing from the inboar# covers. A check of cable 214660A-1P for continuity through the penetration revealed no problems. It was noted that a RaychN seal had been partially installed at the cable entrance to 4he gutboard side of the penetration. Drawings 6E7?l-2839-30.and 6E721-2839-21 showed the Raychem seals. Heat hed'or. been applied to the Raychem to
- provide the environmental seci.' Also noted during the assessment was a wirir.g chaagg it.corporating redundant penetration fuse protection made by DCP No..T2301E01. This DCP thad been originated in October 1982, however, had not been incorporatad into the, drawing. The changs had been incorporated' in the field. Thegastprespregaugeindicated20 s
psi 9. . ,
'i (2) Penetra. tion:T23-X-102'. - A check for loose bolts and screws was made prior t9 any attempt to renhve the covers. Numerous bolts
, and screws were missing on tha inboard and outboard side of the
, 150
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penetration. A review of the wiring on the outboard terminal blocks was severely hampered by the supports added for the RPS terminal boxes attached to the front of the penetration (6E721-2808-7). Removal of the top half of the cover was impossible. Consequently, future work and maintenance at this penetration will be extremely difficult. The circuit for cable 235208-2C through the penetration was checked for continuity. No deviations were encountered. Gas pressure gauge indicated 18 psig. (3) Penetration T23-X-1028 - Prior to removing the covers, a check for proper sealing of the covers revealed numerous missing screws and bolts. A continuity check of the circuit for cable 235803-lC through the penetration did not indicate any prob-lems. Heat shrink material had been installed on the cables as indicted by drawing 6E721-2839-21, however, no heat had been applied to environmentally seal the opening. The gas pressure gauge indicated 16 psig. Congestion at the inboard side of the penetration made the assessment extremely difficult. (4) Penetration T?3-X-103B - A check of the bolts and screws in the covers prior to removal indicated none were present on the outboard side and numerous bolts were missig on the inboard side. The covers were locked close with key locks to prevent unauthorized entrance. However, there was no environmental seal attained on the outboard side of the penetration. A check of the gas pressure gauge indicated 30 psig. The Conax manual recommended 15 psig. A continuity check of cable 2543168-lK through the penetration indicated no problems. Also noted during the termination check was that cable 251462-lK was severed at the inboard termination. 3.11.3.5 Conclusions l Instances of missing bolts and screws from the terminal box covers were encountered at every penetration reviewed. Environment cable seals were not properly installed. It is recommended that all penetration terminal boxes and cable seals be reviewed to verify that all seals, gaskets, and bolts are installed properly to provide an environmental seal. One example of a broken instrument cable was found. This example was an isolated case. A disparity in gas pressure ruadings for the penetrations was noted. The manufacturer recomends 15 psig during operation. The range encountered varied from 16 psig to 30 psig. It is recommended that all penetrations be inspected for proper gas pressure and that proper gas pressure be maintained. It is also recommended that a generic repair procedure be developed and implemented, prior to fuel loading, requiring periodic checks of penetrations for gas pressure fluctuations and damage. 151
( The inaccessability of one of the penetrations inspected and the inability to remove the top half of the terminal box cover indicates a need for e9gineering to review the penetration installations to provide accessability for future maintenance and modifications. 3.11.4 Thermal Shields
- 3.11.4.1 Purpose ,. .
' The' purpose of the ;viewwTstodetermineif_thermalshieldswere installed as. rec;uired by Detroit Edison Engineering Specifications
' ' and drawings'. Attribute inspected included separation, materials
. and methods of securing and location.
3.11.4.2' Criteria = (1) Detroit Edisco Specification-3071-33 (2) Detroit Edis'on Specification 3071-51
.(3) Mirror Insulation Dwg. 590001047C shts. 1 & 2 (4) Mirror Insulation Dwg. 590001043C shts.1 & 2 m Detroit Edison D(N #E-4845 Rev. 0 I -
(6) Detroit Edison DCN #E-4854 Rev. 0-(7) DetroikEdisonDCN#E-4708Rev.B
'(8) Detroit Edison FM #S-7118 Rev. 0 (9) Detroit Ediscii Fm #S-6980 Rev. 0 J
.3.11.4.3 Items Evaluated (1) Conduit GG007-1C Az. 189* Elev. 572' (2) Conduit GG001-0P Az. 330* Elev. 607' (3) Conduit GG-219-2K Az. 225' Elev. 620' (4)_ Reactor Racirculation Piping Lo$p Hanger 821-HC3
- i. (5) Feedwater Ma'n ifold Loop B - Hanger N21-3536-G24 3.11.4.4 Results The thermal shielding was checked at five locations. Three of the shielded locations covered ' electrical condutt and two locations covered mechanical piping hangers shielded to protect electrical equipment. Mechanical hanger 821-HC8 was.' shielded to protect pullbox GG-571 (Div. 1) and electrical penetration T23-X-101F.
Mechanical hanger.N21-3536-G24 was shielded to protect conduit i 152 b
GG-093-2C (Div. II). A review of the material utilized and of the compliance with Design documents resulted in no deviations. 3.11.4.5 Conclusion The evaluation indicated that the installations had not been completed in accordance eith current design documents. However, it was observed that all five locations of thermal shielding were installed utilizing field initiated design change documents. The earliest of these five documents was originated in March 1984 and the most current was originated in June 1984. From this observation, it was concluded that the thermal shielding program is still in its preliminary stages. There are no recommendations for further action. 153
ABLE 3.11.1 Cable Lis_t, Cable No. Color Fr. .T_o 220080-2P BL 65E-E10 Core Sprsy 9umo B Div. 2 Note 1 212533-0C BLX Hil-P823 Hil-P832 B0P Note 1 212542-2C BL Hll-P820 EzlOF004B/V8-2020 Div. 2 Note 3 212560-2C BL 72F-4A-4C E221bi005B/V8-2022 Div. 2 Note 1 212562-2C BL Hil-P820 E2150F005B/V8-2022 Div. 2 flote 1 225101-lC OR Hil-P626 Hil-P601 Div. 1 Note 1 I 225150-1C OR Hil-P823 Hil-P 601 Div. 1 Note 1 225344-2C BL Hil-P820 Hil-P 602 Div. 2 Note 1 230900-1C OR Hil-P626 Hil-P823 Div. 1 Note 1 l 254316B-lK SS PEN X1038 T5000N412A Div. 1 Note 1 225123-1K OR Hil-P 613 Hil-P601 Div. 1 Note 1 232700-1K OR Hil-P613 H2100P001 Div. 1 Note 1 214540A-1P OR 72C-3A PEN X105D Div. 1 Note 2 214542A-1C OR 72C-3A PEN X1028 Div. 1 Note 2 217446-2C BL 72EC-2C Hil-P862 Div. 2 Noto ? I 214662A-lC OR 72C-3A PEN X1028 Div. 1 Hote 2 220090-lP OR 64C-C10 Core Spy Pug C Div. 1 Note 2 225140-1C OR Hil-P822 Hil-P601 Div. 1 Note 2
*228821Y-0C BLK Crossover Hil-P828 B0P Note 2
*228821Y-2C BLK Dsl Oil Tnk Crossover B0P-BL Note 2 Lev Sw.
230905-2C BL H11-P627 Hil-P820 Div. 2 Note 2 l 231561-El MAG Hil-P606 D1100N006A RPS-El Note 2 ) 7, 232047-Al BLK Hil-P606 Hil-P609 RPS-Al Note 2 .. m 235209-2C BL PEN X102A E1103F0508/V8-2164 Div. 2 Note 2 4 l 235217-0C BLK Hil-P820 Hil-P832 B0P Note 2 94 . i 235611-lc OR H11-P822 Hil-P602 Div. 1 Note 2 ?i 245753-1K OR H21-P082 H21-P004 Div. 1 Note 2 't 254316-lK BL PEN X1038 Hil-P601 Div. 1 Note 2 9 256445-2C BL 72EC-2C Cont Pnl EDG 13 Div. 2 Note 2
- 212550-1C 212543-0C OR 72C-3A Hil-P820 E2150F005A/V8-2021 Hil-P832 Div. 1 Note 3 Note 3
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BLK B0P N.' T 2146608-lP OR PEN X105D E1150F022/V8-2172 Div. 1 Note 3 L a .. 2145408-lP OR PEN X1050 Ell 50F009/V8-2091 Div. 1 Note 3 ';.. 235205-2C BL PEN X102A E2100F0068/VA/2024 Div. 2 Note 3 V 235610-1C OR Hil-P822 Hll-P602 Div. 1 Note 3 pA 212552-1C OR Hil-P823 E2150F005A/V8-2021 Div. 1 Note 3 .,.'. Div. 1 '+; ' 245757-lK OR H21-P080 H21-P009 Note 3 . 245751-lK OR H21-P082 H21-P004 Div. 1 Note 3 4,4 232901-2K BL E5100N0268 Hil-P614 Div. 2 Note 3 %' ' 232878-lK BLK E5100N021A Hil-P614 Div. 1 Note 3 @; ) 261530-0K YEL PEN X103A Hil-P921 BOP Ncte 3 [.' i Q)u.],-
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TABLE 3.11.1 (Cont'd) Cable List Cable No. Color Fr. To o 228276A-2K BL H21-P584I P4400N401B Div. 2 Note 3 228252A-lK BLK H21-P584G P4400N401A Div. 1 Note 3 231561-El MAG Hil-P606 D1100N006A RPS-El Note 3 { 214661-lC OR 72C-3A Hil-P822 Div. 1 Note 3 234752-2C BL Hil-P623 Hil-P820 Div. 2 Note 3 ( 214546-lC OR 72C-3A H21-P100 Div. 1 Note 3 L 235803-lC OR PEN X102B E2150F006A Div. 1 Note 3 214542B-1C OR PEN X102B E1150F009/V8-2091 Div. 1 Note 3 214662B-lC OR PEN X1028 Ell 50F022/V8-2172 Div. 1 Note 3 h 225301-2C BL Hil-P627 Hil-P602 Div. 2 Note 3 212532-lc OR Hil-P823 E2150F004A/V8-2019 Div. 1 Note 3 234754-2C BL Hil-P623 H21-P021 Div. 2 Note 3 234759-2C BL Hil-P623 H21-P021 Div. 2 Note 3 { 225347-2C BL H11-P820 H11-P602 Div. 2 Note 3 230922-lC OR Hil-P622 Hil-P822 Div. 1 Note 3 230939-2C BL Hil-P618 Hil-P820 Div. 2 Note 3 { NOTE 1: These cables were checked for proper routing, separation and [ termination over their complete route. This review was made utilizing a detailed hand over hand check through the tray systems. [ NOTE 2: These cables were reviewed for tray separation and termination through their complete route. A hand over hand check of the routes was not done. { NOTE 3: These cables not included in note 1 and 2 were checked for reparation and support at the terminating ends only. I
- Designates 80P cable with partial route in Divisional tray.
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3.12 Electrical Motors and Motor Operator Valves 3.12.1 Motors 3.12.1.1 Purpose A sample of safety related motors (4) was chosen to assess the conformance of the motor installation to the final design documents. The sample included motors from the Core Spray, Residual Heat Removal, and Diesel Generator Support Systems as illust ated in Figures 3.10.1 through 3.10.3. 3.12.1.2 Criteria (1) Detroit Edison Engineering Standard Specification 3071-128. (2) Detroit. Edison Installation Specification 3071-33 . (3) Detroit Edison Electrical Schematic and Connection Drawings as referenced herein. 3.12.1.3 Items Evaluated l , (1) Diesel Generator #13 Fuel Transfer Pump B Motor
- (2) RHR Outboard Valve E1150F008 l
(3) Core Spray Pump B Motor (4) Core Spray Pump C Motor 3.12.1.4 Results { (1) Diesel Generator #13 Fuel Transfer Pump B Motor - (480V, 1 HP The pump / motor was located in the RHR complex. A check of the cable termination indicated the cable was terminated according to schematic and connection drawing. All bolted connections were tight. A megger test of the motor indicated 900 megohms. The motor lead box was clean and properly sealed. No nameplate was located on the motor lead box. With the exception of the [ nameplate on the lead box, this motor appeared in excellent condition. (2) RHR Recirculation Extraction Outboard Valve - Ell 50F008 [. (250 VDC, 10.8 HP)
. A check of the cable terminations to this valve motor indicated the power cable to the motor had been spliced. Detroit Edison personnel indicated the splice was necessary to obtain a wire size small enough to fit in the terminal lugs. The larger
[ 161
1 ( cable was necessary to minimize voltage drop during the cable ^ route. A check of the drawings showed the splice at the motor, however no splice was shown at distribution center breaker, 2FB-1 pos SA (drawing 61721-2201-5). A check of the distri-bution center showed similar splices had been made to permit terminating in the breaker lugs (see Photograph 3.12.2). This was not considered a major deviation. During the assessment of the valve operator, a wire (wire #13 from limit switch 7 to terminal block #13) was found broken at the wire lug (see Photograph 3.12.1). It appeared the lug had been broken because of excessive bending and movement of the lug. Detroit Edison personnel were immediately made aware of this deviation. Also noted during the assessment was t' ack of identification of the valve. (3) Core Spray Motors B & C (4160V, 800 HP) Both motors were checked for proper installation according to manuf acturer and Detroit Edison drawings. Of the two motors, motor B had the least concerns. Motor B had only one ground connection but required two according to the manufacturer (GE Spec. 992C510BA) and Detroit Edison (Specification 3071-33, para. 5.20.12.6) specifications. Motor C had a loose upper bearing oil drain plug, and a loose upper bearing cooling water pipe connection. The spare upper bearing thermocouple for Motor C had a loose blue lead at the thermocouple terminal block. The main power cable for Motor C was not terminated as - shown on the drawings (61721-2211-3 and 6SD721-2501-31). The . wires were apparently rolled to obtain proper motor rotation. Both motors had identification deviations. For example, Motor . . B utilized a black nameplate on the lead box instead of a blue nameplate designating Division 2 and Motor C did not have a nameplate attached (this created confusion and a delay in the assessment since it could not be determined if the motor was A or C). During the assessment, a black nameplate was attached, however, the nameplate should have been orange designating Division 1. Other identification deviations noted with Motor C included no tag on the motor heater cable (should have been tagged 2012718-0P), and the conduit containing the main power cables to the motor was not marked with Division 1 markings. Also noted, on both motors, was the opening from the thermo-couple terminal box through the casing to the rotor. Concern was expressed that this opening needed to be sealed. Detroit Edison personnel forwarded this concern to the manufacturer (General Electric) for review. During the assessment, team members requested the high-potential test records for the main power cables for each motor. In revidwing the records, it was noted that these cables had been tested at 35KVAC on multiple occasions (Motor B three times and Motor C twice). Concern was __ expressed to Detroit Edison personnel that repeated testing at 35KV would damage the cable. This was not considered an operability problem since the cables operate at 4KV normally, 162
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7 2 w but was pointed out to help prevent unnecessary damage to the g-cables in the future. 3.12.1.5 Conclusions N 13 Identification was a concern in all four motors assessed. It is j recommended that all safety related motors be inspected to assure = that the required identification is provided. t 3 The incidence of the cable connection to the motor being -f contradictory to the drawing is not significant. To alleviate - '= similar instances and prevent excessive paperwork, a note could be e added to future motor connection drawings permitting the rolling of 1 ' wires to attain proper rotation. _= The incidence of the openings in the Core Spray motors is not T significant to prevent proper operation. The cover to the thermo- _ L couple terminal box should provide adequate sealing, however, a _= review is recommended to determine if the seal is adequate for j_ operation during hostile environmental conditions. _ The loose terminations on Core Spray Pump Motor C and the broken termination on valve E1150 F008 could present future operational _ problems. These two deviations should be corrected and a sample y inspection of other safety system motors and EMOV's should be y conducted to determine if a generic problem exists. A q 3.12.2 Electric Motor Operated Valves (EMOV's) [ 3.12.2.1 Purpose _ The purpose of this assessment is to verify that the as-built installation of the selected electric motor operated valves is in - accordance with the applicable drav'ngs and specifications. A combination of the following attrit Jtes were utilized for the i assessment: Instr..ation, orientation, identification, termina- { tions, overload connections and settings, and environmental seals. ? j = t 3.12.2.2 Criteria 2 3071-33 Electrical Installation - Project Specification -
-4
[ J 3071-128 Electrical Inseallation - Project Specification 7 CAIO.000.006 Checkout and initial operations test procedure - { " Hand Operated, Motor Operated Valve Test."
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.r r 61721-2211-7 Electrical Schematic " Core Spray Inboard Isolation 1 L Valves A & B E2150-F005A & F005B" -
4 6I721-2201-12 Electrical Schematic " Reactor Recirc. Extrac. Iso. - T [ to RHR Valve Ell 50-F009" % 163 + A
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i N-61721-2201-15 Electrical Schematic " Head Spray Inbd. Isol. Vlv. a1
& RHR. Extr. to Equip. Orain Viv. Ell 50-F022 and it E1150-F040" E
-I, 550721-2512-18 MCC 72C-3A " Frontal Elevation" y
3.12.2.3 Items Evaluated g Four EMOVs were evaluated for installation adequacy. This evalua- A tion included electrically stroking each valve (locally with the use _, j of jumpers), both open and close, in order to verify proper motor
- rotaticn, limit switch calibration and valve stroke time. Elec- 1~
trical terminations were inspected for tightress and compliance with applicable electrical schematic. Electrical termination in each 3 valve respective motor control center compartment and fuse panel, a - when applicable, was verified as well as the fuse sizing. Valve orientation was checked to assure the motor / limit switch compartment f was not beneath the o g.ator gear box. Additionally, the valves ] were checked to determine if it was adequately tagged for identifi- 3 cation and the wiring and cabling at the point of termination was in compliance with the separation requirements. 3
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3.12.2.4 Results +
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Limit and torque switches were verified as the valve was stroked to 2 be in accordance with the switch development provided on each valve 2-electrical schematic. Additionally, proper motor rotation and valve ji stroke time was verified and no deviations were found. 9 All cables terminating on the valves were verified to be tight and in accordance with the drawings. No deviations were found with the exception of valve E1150-F022 where the red and white conductors in 5 cable 214660-B-1P were rolled in terminating them on motor terminals % T2 and T3 respectively. Drawing shows red to T3 and white to T2. 7 Additionally, the same cable did not have an identification tag at 4
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the valve. v Y~ Valve motor on Ell 50-F009 was found to be 19.2 horsepower. Both the _ electrical schematic and the MCC arrangement drawing shows the motor , as being a 12.8 horsepower. Additionally, DCN-10558 was originated 1 adding additional fusing for penetration overcurrent protection. __ The fuse on the secondary side of the control transformer should _ have been changed from a 15A to a SA fuse but the 15A fuse was still 5 installed. NCR 84-0943 was originated to resolve both the HP and g fuse discrepancy. As a result of the above finding (19.2 hp vs. , 12.8 hp), an additional 13 EMOVs were inspected to verify that the ( y horsepower specified on the design drawings reflected the horsepower i of the EMOs that were installed. No additional deviations were . i found. i 5 Valve E2150-F0053 has an electric brake intergal with the motor ' operator that is not shown on the electrical schematic. i s 164 I s
m b b- 3.12.2.5 Conclusion r_- The results of the construction assessment indictes the EMOV's have been installed in accordance with the specified design requirements r with the following exceptions:
- 1) The conductor on valve Ell 50-F022 motor terminals were rolled to
- achieve proper motor rotation. Proper rotation was verified s through valve operation. This item is not considered to be of e major significance, however, installation drawing should be i revised to reflect the as-built installation. e ~
- 2) The electrical brake on valve E2150-F0058 is not considered to l be of major significance since the " Electrical Equipment for
- Harsh Environment Report" states that the valve will be changed out in 1985 to meet NUREG 0588, however, the drawing should be - revised to reflect the as-built installation.
- 3) DCN-10588 had not been effectively implemented demonstrating a -
E deficiency in the QC inspection. Had the deficiency remained " undetected the electrical penetration may not have been ade- ' quately protected. Information provided for valve Ell 50-F009, indicated that the power cable, fuses and electrical penetra-tions for the 19.2 horsepower motor had been sized under the E assumption that the motor was 12.8 horsepower, therefore, they should be evaluated to determine if they are adequate for the = - greater load requirement. Since no additional horsepower e discrepancies were found in the 13 additional EMOV motors that r were inspected, this is considered an isolated incident. E However, the final design drawings should reflect the presence y of the installed 19.2 HP motor. L E T 165
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3.13 Electrical Instrumentation 3.13.1 Process Instrument Loops 3.13.1.1 Purpose The purpose of this assessment is to verify that the as-built installation of the selected electrical Process Instrument Loops is in accordance with the applicable drawings and specifications. The attributes reviewed include separation, termination, cabling, grounding, calibration and environt. ental protection. 3.13.1.2 Criteria (1) Electrical Installation Project Specification - 3071-33 (2) Electrical Engineering Standard Specification - 3071-128 (3) Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant Unit 2 Instrument List (4) Detroit Edison Electrical Schematic and Connection Drawings as referenced herein. 3.13.1.3 Items Evaluated (1) Instrument B21-N091C - Reactor Level Indication (2) Instrument B21-N094A - Reactor Pressure Indication (3) Instrument T50-N412A - Drywell Temperature Monitoring (4) Instrument E21-N003A - Core Spray Flow Monitoring (5) Instrument Dll-N006A - Radiation Monitoring 3.13.1.4 Results (1) Instruments 821-N091C and B21-N094A - These instruments provided reactor level and pressure indications. A check of the wiring associated with these instruments revealed that the ground for the instrumentation in cabinet H21-P802 (Reactor Protection System Cabinet) was connected to station ground. A review of the instrumentation calibration records showed that the instruments were calibrated to an accuracy level of 0.5%. However, the Fermi 2 Instrument List showed a required calibration accuracy of 0.25%. (2) Instrument T50-N412A - This instrument provides temperature monitoring for the drywell. A complete check of the wiring associated with this instrument was not possible because the terminations to the recorder were not complete. A check of the wiring from the thermocouple to the recorder was made. Con-struction was in the process of replacing the thermocouple during the assessment. A team member observed the changeout 168
and the calibration-of the new thermocouple and wiring to the recorder. Detroit Edison personnel indicated the recorder was out of calibration, but it would be re-calibrated when the new thermocouple was connected. (3) Instrument E21-N003A - This instrument is a GE flow transmitter (model 555111BDAA4WAL) used to monitor flow in the Core Spray System. A check of the wiring associated with this instrument resulted in no deviations. This instrument went through a complete calibration check during the CAT assessment. It was observed that a 4% accuracy was required and 1.4% accuracy was attained. (4) Instrument D11-N006A - This instrument provides radiation monitoring for the Main Steam Line Isolation. Some confusion existed initially regarding the availability of this instrument for review. Subsequent questioning indicated the cables to the instrument had been severed without Detroit Edison's knowledge (see Photograph 3.13.1). It was decided to continue the
. assessment after repair of the cables had been made. During the first stages of the assessment it was noted that the operability of the instrument and wiring loop was approximately 50% complete. Because of this determination, a check of only the wiring, calibration, and separation requirements for the instrument was not made. Detroit Edison personnel indicated the instrument was not within calibration at that time. A visual inspection of the instrument was made. During this review it was noted that coaxial cables 231575-E2, 231574-E2, 231569-El, and 231568-El appeared to have been spliced.
Detroit Edison personnel indicated these locations were not splices, but had been crimped and the jackets repaired to maintain environmental protection. A review of the Detroit Edison specificatfor.s indicated this was an acceptable practice. 3.13.1.5 Conclusions Of the five instruments and their associated electrical loops assessed, only one assessment (Core Spray) was completed without findings. Of the remaining four instruments, two were not completed sufficiently to permit an assessment of the complete loop. The remaining instruments (reactor level and pressure) were completed but both a problem and an assessor concern was found (calibration and grounding). The problem of the required calibration accuracy for the reactor level and pressure instruments should be resolved prior to pre-operational testing of the system. The concern of instrument ground connected to the station ground in the Testability Cabinet is not necessarily contrary to the specified requirements. This was addressed as an assessor concern as the p 169
- . ._ . ~. . . .- - - - . . - _
result.of the induced voltages that were identified in the COP / Relay Room-area (ref. Sections 3.14.1.4 and 3.14.1.5). The results of this review indicate that a significant portion of the instrumentation loops have been physically installed but may not ' be completely operable. A comprehensive operability verification of all instrument loops should be completed by Detroit Edison prior to fuel loading.a 3.13.2 Air Operated Valves (A0V) 3.13.2.1 Purpose The purpose of this assessment is to verify that the as-built installation of the selected AO:'t is in accordance with the appHeable drawings and specifications. H, tributes reviewed were separation, terminations, cable ir.stallation, limit switch calibration, and environmental protectirn. 3.13.2.2 Criteria
-(1) 3071-33 Electrical ' Installation - Project Specification (2) 3071-128 Electrical Engineering Standard Specification (3) 61721-2155-10 Schematic Diagram - Scram Solenoid Valve (4) 61721-2155-13 Schematic Diagram - Scram Valve Position l
Indication
-(5). 6I721-2154-6 Wiring Diagram - Scram Solenoid Fuse Panel (6) 61721-2154-2 Wiring Diagram - Scram Solenoid Tenn. Base (7) 61721-?215-4 Schematic Diagram - E21-F006A and 68 (0) 61721-2135-1 Schematic Diagram - C41-F007
-3.13.2.3 Items Evaluated Five A01's were evaluated for installation adequacy. This evaluation included: Electrically energizing each solenoid from the control room and stroking the valve both open and closed;
~ verification of limit switch calibration; checking compliance with separation requirements at the A0V; inspection of electrical termin-tions as necessary to assure compliance with applicable design documents and specifications.
170
The five A0V's selected are as follows: Identification System Description
- 1. E21-F006A Core Spray Inboard Isolation Testable Check Valve A
- 2. E21-F006B Core Spray. Inboard Isolation Testable Check Valve B R3. C41-F007 Standby Liquid Testable Check Valve Control
- 4. C11-D001-117 Reactor Protection Scram Valve - Hydraulic System Control Unit 30-03
.5. Cll-0001-118 Reactor Protection Scram Valve - Hydraulic System Control Unit 30-03 3.13.2.4 Results All cables terminating at the local terminal boxes were verified to be in 'accordance with appropriate. design drawings. Loose termination were identified on two valves as follows: Valve Location Terminal No.
- 1. -Scram Valves on GE Term. Box 15 HCU 30-03 on Hydr. Cont.
Unit
- 2. E21-F0068 Local Term. Box 1, 7 and 10 Valves E21-F006A, B and C41-F007 have two sets of two limit switches e ach. Two to indicate open, intermediate and close position on the pneumatic actuator and two to indicate open, intermediate and close position on the valve disk. The actuator limit switches on all three valves were properly set to indicate the appropriate posi-tions, however, the disk limit switches on valves E21-F006A and 8 did not provide the correct indication. Valve E21-F006A disk limit switches did not indicate intermediate position and the limit switch
- actuating mechanism on valve E21-F0068 was loose and could be manually rotated.
During the inspection on the scram valves on Hydraulic Control Unit 30-03, it was noted that the adjacent Hydraulic Control Unit's (number 46-07), limit switch actuating plate was aligned such that it would not actuate the limit switch when the valve was operated. The limit switch, therefore, would not provide an indication of valve operation during a reactor scram. This deviation was
. identified on valve Cll-F117-ll7 only.
Additionally, a general survey was conducted of the conduit instal-
.lation in the area of the Scram Hydraulic Control Units. It was noted that many of the conduit installations were loose and could be 171
moved by touch. Conduit fitting on A0V C41-F007 limit switches was loose as well.- The' backplate on the disk limit switch for valve C41-F007 was not tightened securely to the limit switch. The Detroit Edison technician,- accompaning the assessors, was able to turn the backplate screws approximately two full turns without completely tightening the plate. The pilot solenoid valve E/V-C41-F400 for A0V C41-F007 stuck. in the open position during testing of the valve operation. Although the A0V operated properly, the pilot solenoid malfunctioned. 3.13.2.5 Conclusions Out of the five A0V's inspected, two had loose terminations. One of these ADV's was located inside the drywell. Due to the critical nature of these valves, particularly the scram valves which had been
-preoperationally tested, it is recommended that the instrumentation circuits be inspected for tightness of terminations to assure the adequacy of the electrical connections.
The assessment of the five A0V's selected for inspection resulted -in two significant deviations. They are as follows:
- 1) The limit switches on two valves, E21-F006A and B, and a third valve (scram valve Cll-Fil7-ll7 on HCU 46-07) not initially included in the survey, were not properly calibrated to provide the required indication. The results of this assessment indicates a possible significant inadequacy in the overall calibration program of A0V limit switches. It is recommended that essential A0V's be inspected to assure all their limit switches are calibrated and will perform according to the design requirements.
2)' The scram valve had been preoperationally tested and the deviation relative to the limit switches had not been identified. The cause of this should be investigated to determine if a deviation exists in the preoperational test _ program, or if this is an isolated incident. If the preoperational testing program is found to be deficient, the deviation should be resolved and the preoperational testing on other systems be repeated as required. The preoperational test on the A0V's assessed should be repeated. Conduit fittings and equipment covers should be installed such that an adequate environment seal is provided as dictated by the equipment location. It is recommended that equipment located in hazardous locations have a final inspection prior to plant oper& tion to assure all conduit fittings and equipment covers are installed properly.
' Pilot solenoid valve E/V-C41-F400 should be replaced due to its incperability.
17?
l PRIMARY CONTAINMENT l gg'EL,(,, ATMOSPHERE TEMP. DIV. t T/ C T50-N412A
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THE DETROIT EDISON CO. ELECTRICAL-INSTRUMENTATION FE RW: II P P. MONROE,WICHIGAN PROCESS INSTRUMENT LOOPS .mE w o- ===*r. FIGURE NO. 3.13.1 173
CONTROL
- BOARD
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igo ya; oiyII 232064-12-' <- 232414-12 p lOS2-12 FIG. e j25tO52-12 / S A SOL FUSE PANEL hg' . C71-POO2E Box l2 .-212543-OC 251053-12 251053-12 Hil-P832 lHPENETRATION XIO2A TB9 SCR AM VALVE 235205-2C CII-DOOI-il7 H2I-POO3 & LOCat C)<3 ; r ( G.E. TERM. 233494-0C BOX ON HCU f L - 8-20 )
/ CORE SPRAY INBOARD ISOL.
6 CRAW VALVES ON TESTA E CK go,at'iiss a ,"gao' = T so-= @ x 6 1721-2155-13 p q.t72i-22 5-4 g, ggt THE DETROIT EDISON CO. ELECTRICAL-INSTRUMENTATION AIR OPERATED VALVES "" " " " " " " ' " ' " * ^ ' FIGURE NO. 3.13.2 174
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175
3.14 Electrical Control Boards and Cabinets 3.14.1 Control Board 3.14.1.1 Purpose The purpose of this assessment is to assure that the installation of the Control Board (Combination Operating Panel - COP) (Photograph 3.14.1) and two interface cabinets (Photograph 3.14.2 and 3) are in compliance with applicable design drawings and specifications. Attributes included in this assessment were separation, materials installation and traceability, cabinet and component identification, point-to-point wiring check and cable interconnection with interface cabinets. 3.14.1.2 Criteria (1) 14124-FEP-5.0 Bechtel Const/ Maintenance Proc. "Meggering & Continuity Test" (2) 3071-33 Electrical Installation - Project Specification (3) 3071-128 Electrical Installation - Project Specification (4) 6I721-2003-16 Assembly Drawing Hil-P601B (5) 6I721-2003-8 Assembly Drawing Hil-P601A (6) 6I721-2041-7 Wiring Diagram Hil-P823 Part 1 (7) 6I721-2041-8 Wiring Diagram Hll-P823 Part 2 (8) 61721-2045-59 Wiring Diagram Hil-P626 (9) 5I721-2040-20 Panel Layout Hil-P626 (10) Electrical Schematics for Core Spray Pumps A & C, Valves E2150-F036A, 4A, SA,15A and 31A 3.14.1.3 Items Evaluated The Division I Core Spray Portion of the COP, the Core Spray Relay Cabinet and the associated termination cabinet were evaluated for installation accuracy. This evaluation included verifying electri-cal continuity between control board switches / indicating lights and the relay / termination cabinets. During this inspection the control switches on the C0P were operated to verify proper contact status per the electrical schematic for all switch positions. This was done through continuity checks at the appropriate termination cabi-net terminals. Verification of the C0P and termination cabine6 wiring was provided in this manner. Panel and cabinet assembly and mounting was compared with the fabri-cation and arrangement drawing to assess the as-built enclosures 176 i
compliance to the design drawings and specifications. Components were compared with their respective parts lists to evaluate trace-ability. Cabinet and components were inspected for proper nameplate identification. Wiring and cable terminations were reviewed for compliance with separation requirements and tightness of electrical connections. The C0P Par.el Inserts and associated relay cabinet and termination cabinet that were inspected are as follows: i C0P Insert Hil-P601A501 C0P Insert Hil-P601B511 Termination Cabinet Hil-P823 Relay Cabinet Hil-P626 l CDP switch and indicating light wiring for the following Core Spray equipment was verified: Equipment Switches & Indicating Lights Core Spray Pump A 1A2 (SSA) Core Spray Pug B 1A4 (S5C) EMOV E2150-F036A 1A5 (S7A) 1A6 (S70A) EMOV E2150-F004A 181 (S2A) 182 (S20A) EMOV E2150-F005A 1B3 (SlA) 1B4 (S10A) EMOV E2150-F015A 189 (S4A) 1810 (S40A) EMOV E2150-F031A 1811 (S3A) 1812 (S30A) Including also was the inspection of Cable 225150-lC connector J4 in the top of termination cabinet Hil-P823. A point-to-point wiring check was made from each connector pin to the cabinet terminal block to verify installation per the cabinet wiring diagram and connector drawing. 3.14.1.4 Results Interconnecting wiring and cabling between C0P Hll-P601A and B and termination / relay cabinets Hil-P823 and P626 for the selected con-trol circuits was verified to be as specified on design drawings. The additional wiring checks inside the termination and relay cabi-nets identified no wiring deviations with the exception of one loose terminal connection on the right hand side of terminal F2 in termination cabinet H11-P823. During the continuity check, Switchgear and Motor Control center power was disconnection. The terminations to be inspected were tested to verify that no voltage was present on the circuit. Con-trol voltages were off, however, a voltage was measured ranging from 0 volts to 50 volt from the following terminal points and ground. 177
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'50V pulsating G35 thru G43 5.5V p'ulsating F35 No Voltsg'e 10 Volts.
F36 . F1 , 1 40 Volts ~ F5 N O Volts
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During the Control Board inspection, it was recognized that C0P panel _ inserts Hil-P601A501 and Hil-P601B511 were not properly bolted to the C0P structure. Insert Hil-P6013511 hat 18 studs securing it to.the C0P frame. Only three of the studs had nuts to secure it in place. Additionally, one of the studs was broken off at the insert to the immediate left (front view) of insert Hil-P601B511. The C0P sections Hil-P601 and Hil-P602 were checked to verify the supports bolting had been torqued to values specified in specification 3071-128-ED. Approximately forty (40) bolts were checked to 80% of the required values for the specified bolt size. Twenty of these bolts .had been SC inspected and had been torqued to the specified values. Thei remaining twenty (20) bolts which had not been QC inspected had not been jorqued to specified values. The ma,jority of the_ remaining bolts within the cabinet have not been inspected. A nameplate (ite'm 405) on C0P insert Hil-P601B511, did not agree with the engraving drawing. The valve ngmber on the nameplate shouldgave an."Ai suffix which" was' not present. Material' types and quantities installed were compared against the design drawings and parts lists. No deficiencies were 1dentified on the C0P,'however, many of the Vendor drawings referenced on Partt.
. List drawings 3I721~'2374-35, 36,: 42 and 43 were not available as Detroit Edison controlled documents. These drawings would be
' nedessary for both maintaining .or replacing the components. The
' following vendor drawings identified as not available through' document control were as follows:
Parts' List for Hil-P601A501
~
Item No. Vendor Dwa. No. 4 145C3226 5 159C4478 23 248A9754 28 248A9938 34 15%4391 40 225A5137
~41 145A5322 64 175A7293 b
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Parts List for H11-P6018511 Item Nu. Vendor Dwg. No. 24 248A9683 37 225A5137 38 145A5322 40 193B1507 43 159C4391 65 175A7293 Material types and quantities installed in termination cabinet H11-P823 were compared against the design drawing and parts list. Items 6, 7, 8 and 9 on drawing 6I721-2977-24 had discrepancies in the quantities shown for each item, however, installed quantities were correct as shown on drawing 61721-2056-3. For cabinet H11-P823, no controlled Edison document existed for the Pyle-National connectors that are used on the interconnecting cabling. A vendor catalog was used as information for verifying pin to terminal wiring. Material types and quantities installed in relay cabinet Hil-P626 were compared against the design drawings and parts list. The following deviations were noted: G.E. P/L No. PL 238X734TG P/L Ref Dwg. Installed Item No. Qty Cat. No. Cat. No. I 10 12HGA111A2F 12HGA11A52F 3 12 12HFA51A2F 12HFA151A2F Device R31-S017 had loose screws and fuses lying on its top cover inside cabinet Hil-P626. The screws or fuses could fall between the terminal strip and cover on the back and possibly cause electrical damage to the equipment or prevent it from functioning properly. Additionally, an aerosol can of dust remover, with the label clearly identifying the contents to be flammable, was found in termination cabinet Hil-P823. Separation requirements, as specified in Note 4 for cabinet H11-P602 . on drawing 6I721-2002-13, has not been met with the as-built instal-lation. Note 4 requires 1" separation inside C0P between opposite division cables when one is routed inside conduit. Orange conduit . fQU-Oll-1C is in physical contact with blue cables #225340-2C and '
#225311-2C (see Photograph 3.14.5). Orange conduit #NA-068-lC is in physical contact with blue cables #225273-2C and 225376-2C (see Photograph 3.14.4).
179
3.14.1.5 Conclusions The results of the construction assessment indicates the C0P and interface cabinets have been installed in accordance with the specified design requirements with the following exception:
- 1. Loose termination found in H11-P823 was resolved by Detroit Edison with NCR-84-0889.
- 2. The voltages found present on control circuits and identified by
, the assessment team as a concern during the C0P wiring check was addressed in two meetings attended by Detroit Edison Engineer-y ing, Duke Power and the'NRC. The CAT Team was informed by Detroit Edison that the Diesel Generator Load Sequencing cir-cuits was the only location where there was a problem with induced voltages. Detroit Edison has concluded that the induced voltages..as found on the control circuits by the CAT, does not constitute a problem in the operation of the plant.
- 13. The traceability of the materials and control c'omponents on the C0P and interface cabinets is inadequate. Vendor drawings on all components should be obtained such that they are available through Document Centrol as controlled drawings. Additionally, Parts' Lists drawings that are available should be kept current with the as-built installation. Where Vendor drawings may not be available or are inadequate, Detroit Edison should generate controlled documents containing all pertinen: information
- > , necessary for maintaining or replacing the equipment.
- 4. The tightening and checking of bolts was not an identified activity on the project punchlist. However, the rev'ew indi-a cated large' quantities of bolts and nuts were found damaged or missing. Because of these findings, it is recommended that the
~ checking of bolts and nuts be identified in a comprehensive listing in the project punchlist to assure they are completed by the system turnover to Operations date.
- 5. Detroit Edison should inspect all control panels and terminal f
cabinets to eliminate the buildup of miscellaneous hardware,
, potential fire hazards, and debris.
~6. The entire C0P should be reviewed to assure that all areas requiring the 1" minimum separation between cable and conduit have been identified and corrected as necessary to meet the specified separation criteria.
3.14.2 Miscellaneous Terminal Cabinets 3.14.2.1 Purpose The purpose of this assessment was to assure that the installation of the selected terminal cabinets were in compliance with applicable design drawings and specifications.. Attributes reviewed in the 180
assessment included installation, terminations, separation, lugging, splicing, grounding, identification, tagging and mounting. 3.14.2.2 Criteria (1) 3071-33 Electrical Installation - Project Specification (2) 3071-128 Electrical Installation - Project Specification (3) 6I721-2793-1 and 2 - Remote Shutdown Wiring Diagram (4) 61721-2006 Hil-P6028511 Wiring Diagram (5) 61721-2714-40 and 41 - Diesel Sequencer Panel Wiring Diagram (6) 61721-2041 Termination Cabinet Hil-P822 Wiring Diagram 3.14.2.3 Items Evaluated Four miscellaneous control or terminal cabinets or boxes were inspected in addition to the C0P and associated terminal / relay cabinets described in Section 3.14.1. They are as follows: Cabinet Number Description 8988 Diesel Sequencer Panel Hil-P602B511 Misc. Terminal Box H21-P100/C35-P001 Remote Shutdown Panel hii-P822 Termination Cabinet The terminations of a selected number of cables in all four en-closures were evaluated for installation accuracy. Tightness of the connection as well as the correct wire gauge, proper separation and terminal identification was inspected. A random sample of the internal wiring was checked against the wiring diagrams for instal-lation accuracy. In addition to the above, the Diesel Sequencer Panel was inspected for proper tagging, grounding and mounting. Control components installed were compared against those specified on the design drawings. 3.14.2.4 Results The installation of three items on the Diesel Sequencer Panel 8988 did not conform with final design drawings. The installation of the ground bar did not conform to drawing 6I721-2714-1 which gave the location as left rear corner. However, the acutal location was in the center of the rear as specified by drawing 6I721-2002-17. The nameplate size installed on the cabinet was 2 1/2" x 4", whereas, drawing 4I721-2714-27 specified a 2" x 18" nameplate. Additionally, the cabinet nameplate located on the front of the panel was not shown on drawing 61721-2714-3. 181
Conductor terminations on ten cables were checked for conformance with the drawings with no deviations noted. However, on the internal wiring check, one loose termination on Relay XK13 terminal 6 was identified. In cabinet Hil-P822 two loose terminations were identified. These were cable number 235611-1C terminated at terminal E56 and cable number 214541-lC terminated at terminal E32. Wires between terminal box Hil-P602B511 and the combination opera-ting panels (COP) were specified as being 14 gauge on drawing 61721-2006-12. The as-built ir.stallation is a combination of 14 and 20 gauge wiring. Additionally, the terminal strip marker by the terminal box identifying the individual terminal numbers was lying on the bottom of t,he box. Spare conductors, color code "R" and "0B", on cable 214546-1C terminating on panel H21-P100/C35-P001, were shown on drawing 6I721-2793-2 as not being terminated. Conductors were actually terminated in cabinet but were not used in any circuit. During the internal wiring check on panel H21-P100/C35-P001 (Remote Shutdown Panel), two wiring deviations were identified. Wiring from terminal strip AA to switches 100C7(BP) and 100C8(BR) were incorrect. The switches were to provide remote open and close control and indication for valve E1150-F009. The wiring, as installed, would open the valve when the close pushbutton was pushed and would close when the open button was pushed. : During the cable termination check on panel Hil-P623, a 5" section of a bare copper ground wire with eight soldered copper wire con-nectors, approximately 3/4" long, .esembling a section of a picket fence, was found lying on some cables in the upper part of the cabinet. This is one of nume ous cases found where unsealed openings in the top of the cabinets had allowed debris and foreign materials to enter the cabinet. The accumulation of debris and foreign materials presents a future haz a to the proper operation of the equipment. 3.14.2.5 Conclusions l The nametag and ground bar deviations on panel 8988 are not I considered significant. The as-built installation is adequate, I however, it is not in compliance with the design documents. The drawings should be revised to reflect the as-built condition. One loose termination was identified in termination cabinet Hil-P823, one in panel 898B and two in termination cabinet Hil-P822. A total of 4 loose termination were found out of approximately 400 checked for a 17. ratio. Due to the critical nature of these termi-nations, all terminations within the panel that are essential to the safe operation of the plant should be inspected and be verified to be sufficiently tight to assure a good electrical connection. 182
The 20 gauge wiring in terminal box Hil-P602B511 is consistent with Detroit Edison's wiring practice for that type indicating light, however, it is a deviation from the drawings and the drawing should be revised to reflect the as-built condition. Additionally, the spare conductors in cable 214546-lC in panel H21-P100/C35-P001 are installed contrary to the design drawings and the drawings should be revised to reflect the as-built installation. The incorrect wires identified in panel H21-P100/C35-P001 represented a significant breakdown in the plant pre-operational testing program. This panel had recently completed its preoperational testing and the deviations had not been identified. Due to the critical nature of this type of deviation, Detroit Edison should investigate the cause and determine if it could be of a generic nature to all the preoperational tests. If the cause is generic, it should be resolved and preoperational tests should be repeated on other systems as required. It is recommended that the testing of the systems within the panel be completely redone. The foreign materials and debris found within the cabinets and panels represent insufficient attention to housekeeping. It is recommended that Detroit Edison inspect all panels and terminal cabinets to remove all dust, dirt, foreign materials, and debris. Also, provide an adequate method of sealing those panels and cabinets to prevent future repeat of this problem. 183
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4.0 RECORDS EVALUATION 4.1 Design Changes 4.1.1 Design Changes - Civil The purpose of this review was to assess the effectiveness of the design change notices, design change packages, design change requests and field modification requests. Within the raviews conducted in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4, these type documents were reviewed as part of the normal inspection process. As a result of this review, the civil team made two recommendations relating to design changes. In the area of cable tray hangers (Section 3.1.2) an excessive amount of change paper is necessary to inspect a support. In the area of torus supports (Section 3.2.1), three sets of drawings and outstanding change paper on each set is necessary to inspect a support. The team's recommendations are outlined in Section 6.0. The recommendations included providing an understandable method for determining what changes have been made and a review of the three sets of torus support drawings. Although problems were encountered in the above areas, the overall program in the civil area appeared to be effective since only minor deviations were identified in the other civil areas examined. 4.1.2 Design Changes - Mechanical The purpose of this review was to assess a sample of design change documents associated with the various mechanical systems and components covered by this report. These included such documents as Design Change Requets, Design Change Notices, Design Disposition Requests, Field Modification Requests and Nonconformance Reports. For some examples of the items reviewed, see Sections 4.3 and 4.4 of this report. A review was made to determine if the documents had been processed in accordance with applicable procedures and that the as-built or as-installed items reflected the required changes. Based on this review, the design change documents sampled have been properly processed and any required changes ;ncorporated into the hardware with exceptions noted as follows. On the HPCI turbine, verification of the completion of FMRS-2572 Rev. A could not be traced from the records reviewed. There were some discrepancies in the resolutio of NCR 84-620 on RCIC level switch E51-LSEE51N010 (see CAT-1 Number 112). These were considered isolated cases and not a generic problem. 4.1.3 Electrical Design Changes - Core Spray 4.1.3.1 Purpose The purpose of the review was to assess a sampling of field and design originated design change documents for the Core Spray System. The assessment includes an evaluation of field installation, drawing incorporation and records tracking. A total of eighty-two design 187
s change documents for the Core Spray System were obtained by the team for review. 4.1.3.2 Items Evaluated (1) FMR S-650 (2) FMR 4284 (3) FMR S-1709 (4) DCR SUE-0346 (5) DCR SUE-427 (6) DCR SUE-1076 (7) FMR SM4000 4.1.3.3 Results Eighty-two change documents were reviewed by the team. Twenty-three of these remained open awaiting incorporation in the referenced design documents. Four of the 23 open documents were reviewed for construction status and all had been completed in the field prior to December 1982. The remaining 59 were shown as incorporated into the referenced design documents. Nine of these remaining 59 documents were reviewed for compliance with the revised design documents. One design change document had not been incorporated as written. This was DCR SUE-427 which had revised the fuse size and overload size in MCC 72C-3A - sition 8A as shown on drawing 5S0721-2512-18 Rev. G. The DCR cnanged the fuse size from 30 amps to 25 amps and the overload size to G30T44. The revised drawing (Rev. H) showed the fuse size as 30 amps and the overload size as G30T44A. A check of the field status showed 30 amp fuses and G30T44A overloads in place. 4.1.3.4 Conclusions DCR SUE-427 had not been effectively incorporated on ;he design documents demonstrating a deviation in the verification of design changes. Had the unincorporated design change remained undetected, the electric circuit and motor may not have been adequately protected. With the exception of the above, no additional deviations were identified. However, it is a concern of the assessor that drawing updates emain outstanding for excessive periods of time after field installation. A time lag of 2 1/2 years was noted on the 4 open documents that were reviewed for construction status. 188
4.2 Equipment Environment Qualification 4.2.1 Purpose The purpose of this assessment was to determine if the installed equipment is in compliance with the current Environmental Qualification requirements. 4.2.2 Criteria Electrical Equipment in Harsh Environment - 4 Volumes EQ1-EF2-039 Detroit Edison Equipment Qualification File - Conax EQ1-EF2-082 Detroit Edison Equipment Qualification File - Okonite EQ1-EF2-D40 Detroit Edison Equipment Qualification File - Rosemount EQ1-EF2-058 Detroit Edison Equipment Qualification File - General Electric EQl-EF2-044 Detroit Edison Equipment Qualification File - Limitorque 4.2.3 Items Evaluated The environmental qualification data for the following items were reviewed to determine their suitability for the environment in which they were used. Item No. _T,ype. Description 254316B-1K Cable Thermocouple and Cable - Conax 214542A-lC Cable Okonite Cable 214540A-lP Cable Okonite Cable 231567-F2 Cable Raychem Coaxial Cable 231566-F2 Cable Rockbestos Coaxial Cable T50-N412A Thermocouple Drywell Temperature Thermocouple B21-NC91C Level Transmitter Reactor Vessel Level Transmitter 821-N094A Press. Transmitter Reactor Vessel Pressure Transmitter E2101-C001C Motor Core Spray Pung Motor "C" E2150-F005A EMOV Core Spray Inboard Isolation Valve 4.2.4 Results The documentation on the qualification of the five (5) cables and level transmitter 821-N091C indicate they are qualified for the environment in which they are used. The thermocouple T50-N412A had recently been changed under FMR #5809 in order to meet NUREG 0588. Pressure transmitter 821-N094A had been tested by an independent laboratory and determined to be adequate for a two year interim operation. This is documented as well as a component functional 189
k
- analysis in the " Justification for Interim Operation" report in Equipment Qualification file number EQ1-EF2-040.
b- -Motor E2101-C001C' had been tested and qualified by its supplier, General Electric' Company (see ED file #50.2621.0400 and G.E. Test Report #22A4722 dated -1/12/77) to the applicable environmental parameters.. [' EMOV 2E2150 F005A qualification data was reviewed and it was & determined that it is scheduled for replacement in 1985 to meet NUREG L- ' 0588 requirements due to an unqualified brake. Several other EMOV's were reviewed but they were either to be replaced due to NUREG 0588 or r had been -reclassified to 'a non-safety classification not requiring L _ qualification.
- h. 4.2.5 ' Conclusion Equipment Qualification status on the sample items was adequately documented.
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4.3 Core Spray Records r 4.3.1 Purpose r A portion of the Core Spray System records were selected for review to L determine that the required records were available and retrievable, completed in proper manner and in agreement with the installed - equipment. L , 4.3.2 Items Evaluated 4.3.2.1 Equipment Component Number Component Name { E2101-C001A Core Spray Pug A E2101-C001B Core Spray Pug B E2101-C001C Core Spray Pu g C E2101-C0010 Core Spray Pug 0 ( Valve Number V8-2016 V8-2048 V8-2018 V8-2050 { V8-2020 V8-2057 V8-2022 V8-2058 V8-2024 V8-2097 [ V8-2026 V8-3584 V8-2034 V8-3585 V8-2036 V8-3586 (- V8-2037 4.3.2.2 Piping Components [- Records and components reviewed for Drawings 6M721-3053 and 3147 were as follows: F L ODRs for Drawing 6M721-3053 - 1395 2060 2452 ' 1413 2206 2554 1414 2246 2565 1475 2305 2575 F 1554 2322 2578 ' 1635 2391 3932 r NCR 82-065 and 82-035 L Penetrations X-16A and X-53 Restricting Orifice E21-50-00028 191
Expansion Joints E21-50-D003 and D004 N5 Data Report Packages 186 and 252 Small Bore Trim Sketches 01-DRl-MW-3053 07-TL-MW-3147 02-DRl-MW-3053 08-TL-MW-3147 03-UT-MW-3053 18-P LG-MW-3147 04-PT-E21-L4008 19-PLC -MW-3147 02-BYP-V8-2018 6WM-E21-5300-1 05-PLG-MW-3147 6WM-E21-2199-1 04-BYP-V8-2016 DRAVO Spool Pieces Sketch 2734-462 Sketch 2734-240
, Sketch 2734-463 Sketch 2734-241 Sketch 2734-464 Sketch 2734-242 Sketch 2734-465 Sketch 2734-243 Sketch 2734-289 Sketch 2734-244 Sketch 2734-233 Sketch 2734-245 Sketch 2734-234 Sketch 2734-246 Sketch 2734-235 Sketch 2734-247 Sketch 2734-236 Sketch 2734-248 1 Sketch 2734-237 Sketch 2734-249 Sketch 2734-238 Sketch 2734-250 Sketch 2734-239 Sketch 2734-251 4.3.3 Results 4.3.3.1 Equipment Manuf acturer QA documentation packages and receipt inspection reports were reviewed for each of the components identified in 1 Section 4.3.2.1. In each case, the documentation packages and receipt inspection reports were considered to be complete, all paper in each package traceable to an applicable unique identifying number for the component being reviewed, and acceptable in content. During the Core Spray System piping walkdown, each component reviewed was identified in the field and correct locaticn in the piping system verified.
4.3.3.2 Piping Components The DDRs were reviewed and found to be adequately handled and completed. The two NCRs that were reviewed were properly completed. For the Penetrations, Restricting Orifices and Expansion Joints, the manufacturer's documentation was found to be in order and complete. The installation of the proper components was verified during piping walkdown . The N-5 Data Report Packages were reviewed and contained Field Weld Travelers, MTRs on filler metal, Hydrotest Reports, Walk-down Records and Walk Down Discrepancy Reports. All of these were 192
'found to be properly completed except 3 minor items on the Walk Down Discrepancy Sheets. The Small Bore Piping and Trim Sketches were reviewed and found to have all required information completed. The Dravo spool piece drawings were reviewed against the piping drawings and found to be in order. The Dravo documentation packages were reviewed and found to be complete and contained the required infor-mation such as Data Reports, Certificates of Compliance, Examination Reports and QA Traceability Records.
( 4.3.4 Conclusions f The records reviewed for Core Spray Equipment and Piping Components were found to be complete and acceptable. (- [ [ [ [ [. [- [ [ u L 193 l _ - _ - - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . - _ _ _ - J
4.4 HPCI Turbine Refurbishment Record Review 4.4.1 Purpose The applicable records were reviewed to determine if the HPCI Turbine has been refurbished and is in acceptable operational condition. 4.4.2 Items Evaluated Component Number Component Name E4101-C002 HPCI Turbine 4.4.3 Results The applicable contractor turn-over records were assembled by Detroit Edison for review. Below is a highlight summary of inspections and refurbishment work completed on the turbines. Turbine Auxiliary Piping and Tubing Inspection An inspection of the auxiliary piping and tubing was conducted during July 1980. As a result, the piping and tubing was cleaned, broken gauges replaced, and a thermocouple replaced. Terry Turbine Assisted Turbine Inspection A representative from the manufacturer, Terry Turbine, was present to assist Detroit Edison in conducting inspections and making any neces-sary repairs over the period of October 5 to October 14, 1983. Following is a list of the work comnleted during the period. (1) Mechanical Hydraulic Overspeed Trip Inspection (2) Gland Case Removal, Inspection and Reassembly (3) Inboard Bearing Removal, Inspection, and Reassembly Pressure Boundary Bolting Torque Check Pressure boundary bolting was checked for proper torquing over the period of November 29, 1983 through December 1, 1983 on the following Turbine parts: (1) Case Vertical Flange (2) Case Horizontal Flange 194
=
(3) Steam Chest (4) By-Pass Elbows (5) Stop Valve (6) Turbine Exhaust Flange Torque values were recorded and compared against vendor required tor-que values. All bolting tested was found to be torqued acceptably. E In addition to the above work completed, General Electric has identi-fied seven areas where design changes will improve tha reliability and
- availability of the HPCI Turbine. Detroit Edison has initiated Field
- Modification Report (FMR) S-2572, Rev. A, to make the necessary changes. Completion of the FMR could not be verified from the records
, reviewed.
4.4.4 Conclusion 4
- Based upon the records reviewed, there is reason to conclude that the Turbine is currently in acceptable overall condition and that Detroit y Edison has initiated actions to make modifications that will enhance reliability and operability.
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d34umMELRE m 4.5 Soil Record Review
- 4.5.1 Purpose The purpose of the Soils Record Review was to evaluate the RHR Complex l
Backfill Inspection Reports and the problems associated with the testing activities. 4.5.2 Docurr.entation Reviewed The following documents were reviewed: A. Daniel Inte national Internal Correspondence
- 8. Daniel QC c.s;rtion Reports C. Detroit Ed w. Inter.:al Correspondence D. loledo Testing Laboratry Correspondence E. Sargent & Lundy Correspondence and Final Analysis F. Design Disposition Request is C2663, C2738, C3150 and C3151 4.5.3 Results The backfill density tests required as part of the evaluation of the Design Disposition Requests were reviewed. A total of 21 test pits were dug in the course of that evaluation. A random review of the actual calculations found no errors. These tests were documented in a standard acceptable soil density format.
4.5.4 Conclusions All of the testing required by the disposition of the DDRs was ade-quate to evaluate the in-place density of the backfill. All of the testing complied with the requirements of ASTM C1557-70 and ASTM C136. However, a number of the in-place density test performed did not meet the 125 lb/ft3 wet density parameter established earlier. Addi-tionally, a number of the in-place gradations did not comply to the specification requirements. A final design analysis by Sargent and Lundy was conducted after receiving all of the density and gradation reports. A geotechnical evaluation determined that what was in place was acceptable. Based on this review, the testing was adequate to give the E- neer an adequate analysis of the field conditions. Since the Engine e deter-mined the values to be acceptable, this series of tests met che intended purpose. l 196
5.0 THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENTS EVALUATION 5.1 Pipe Support Review by Stone & Webster Michigan, Inc. 5.1.1 Purpose During the period of February 1983 to June 1983, Stone and Webster Michigan, Inc. was contracted to perform an engineering evaluation of pipe supports. The purpose of the CAT review was to evaluate the effectiveness of the Stone and Webster analysis of pipe supports. 5.1.2 Criteria The criteria used was the Engineering Evaluation and Pipe Supperts Reports issued by Stone and Webster Michigan, Inc. dated November 21, 1983 and April 26, 1984. The task number assigned to this project is 13067.64. 5.1.3 Items Evaluated As stated in Paragraph 8.3 of Assessment Plan, inspection of 15 pipe hangers in 4 different systems were to be performed. Table 3.1.1 out-lines the pipe supports which were inspected. Thirty-eight pipe supports in 10 systems were checked to the criteria which is outlined in Paragraph 3.1.1.2. 5.1.4 Results The review of supports resulted in no major findings. The only con-cern deals with control of hardware catalogs. For additional data concerning this item, refer to Paragraph 3.1.1.5. The pipe supports reviewed will serve their intended purpose. 5.1.5 Conclusions Based on the results of the pipe support review, the conclusions reached by Stone and Webster Michigan, Inc. appear to be a valid. This conclusion is that the pipe supports erected will serve their intended purpose. 197
5.2 Seismic Interaction Review by Sargent & Lundy The purpose of the Sargent and Lundy interaction "rattlespace" walkdown study was to investigate all components in Category 1 buildings to verify that adequate spacing exists between components. Drawing revision should be submitted if adequate spacing does not exist. No report was available to review any results. Based on the CAT review this is an ongoing program l and not a third party assessment. The CAT team observed drawing revisions which were a result of the interaction study. It appears that based on the minimal rattlespace concerns identified by the team, the interaction study has been effective. ' l l l 198 I,
5.3 Thermal Separation Review by Detroit Edison The assessment of Thermal Shielding at Fermi 2 by Detroit Edison was reviewed. The review indicated the Detroit Edison assessment consisted of an evaluation of the thermal shielding problem, the generation of shielding criteria (Revision S to Specification 3071-33, April 1984), the training of personnel to evaluate shielding problem areas, and the implementation of the criteria. Based on the review, it was concluded that the Detroit
- Edison assessment is actually a program to solve a recognized problem and is not a third party assessment. A review of thermal shielding was
- conducted as detailed in Section 3.11.4.
199
5.4 Cable Tray Review by Sargent & Lundy Through discussion with Detroit Edison personnel, it was determined that the Sargent & Lundy cable tr J assessment is currently an ongoing process and when complete will cover 100% of the safety-related cable tray system. Their assessment is not complete and therefore an evaluation cannot be made at this time. The sample selected for the CAT Review would obviously fall within the Sargent & Lundy's 100% assessment and should be an accurate assessment of their review as well. Refer to Sections 3.1.2 and 3.11.2 of l this report for the results and conclusions of the CAT Review. i 200 _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ l
f 5.5 Piping Configuration Review by'Cygna 5.5.1 Purpose f In 1983, Cygna Energy Services of Chicago, IL Nas contracted to ! perform an independent design verification of a portion of the RHR l System. The purpose of the CAT review was to evaluate the effectiveness of this design verification. 5.5.2 Criteria (1) Cygna Report TR-83021-1, Rev. O dated April 29, 1983 (2) Detroit Edison Co. Drawing 6M721N-2053 Rev. S l (3) Detroit Edison Co. Drawing 6M721N-2184-1 Rev. R (4) Detroit Edison Co. Drawing 6M721N-2184-2 Rev. G 5.5.3 Items Evaluated A portion of RHR System reviewed by was selected for walkdown. This was the return line inside the RHR Complex to the Cooling Tower. A check was made to assure that the piping was installed in accordance with the drawings, that the required hangers were in place, and that the proper equipment and valves had been installed. 5.5.4 Results
.The review of the piping, hangers and equipment resulted in no major findings.
5.5.5 Conclusions Based on the results of the CAT review, the conclusions reached by Cygna appear to be valid. They conclude that the design control is adequate for the scope of the work evaluated. 201 I -
Y
- 5.6 Record Review by Management Analysis Company 5.6.1 Purpose During the period of February 27 through April.18,1984 Management
- Analysis. Company conducted a third-party audit for Detroit Edison Company.. LThe purpose of the audit was to assess the' effectiveness of
_ program implementation as evidenced in the quality records that have been generated over the course of the project. The Team made a review of this MACiaudit as part of the overall program to determine the readiness for operation of Fermi 2. 5.6.2 Criteria
~ The criteria used for this review was the report issued by Management Analysis company dated May 14, 1984. This is MAC project number:
L MAC-84-G057 and Detroit Edison Company contract number: CC-434316. 5.6.3 Items Evaluated As stated in paragraph 8.3 of Assessment Plan a check was planned to
'be made of 25 records which were reviewed in the MAC audit. Table
.5.G.1 is a. list of the ones which were reviewed. This shows a total of 42 which were reviewed by this CAT assessment. Twenty-five of those were specifically reviewed for an assessment of the MAC report.
The other 17 were reviewed as part of the CAT review of the Core Spray records. These records were reviewed for availability, completeness, and accuracy. No attempt was made to assess the retrievability of these records. 5.6.4 Results All of the records which the CAT team selected for review were found except for one record of some electrical equipment. Upon further search the next day this record was found. The records appeared to be complete and accurate. No errors or missing records were identified.
- Two items of concern resulted from _this review. One is that the retrievability of all records are extremely slow. The system is not well organized and it takes an extremely long time to find a desired record. The other is that the records are not well organized and it is-difficult to determine if all of the required records are in the files. No system was evident to define what records are required for each item.
5.6.5 Conclusions
- Management Analysis apparently did a comprehensive audit of the records. It is evident from their report that they had the same difficulty finding records that this CAT team had. Once the records were fcund they appeared to be complete and accurate. It is 202
I i L-recognized that some of the records are more than ten years old and the requirements have changed over these years. Considering the raquirements of the time frame of these records it is the opinion of l this team that adequate records do exist. It is noted that the MAC , report made seven significant recommendations concerning the L management of the Fermi 2 records. In his letter of July 29,1984 (QA-84-1876) to the Duke Construction Assessment Team, Mr. G. M. Trahey, Director Nuclear Quality Assurance i committed to certain actions on the part of Detroit Edison if all of these recommendation are acted upon and these actions are verified by a QA audit, the records for Fermi 2 should be at an acceptable level. l t e 203
TABLE 5.6.1 VENDOR RECORDS Equipment Type RIR Number Gaskets 8-21-80-2 Pipe Supports 3-13-81-2 2 x 3 Relief Valve & Core Spray 3-3-76-2 i Pipe Whip Restraints 6-13-79-1B Pipe Support Assenblies 11-10-78-28 Strainers 5-15-79-2 Hydraulic Snubbers 1-28-83-2H }; 4-18-79-1B [ l 1/2" Relief Valve 5-28-82-2 Pipe Clamps 1/2" Globe Valves-RHR System 8-7-75-7 t Steel Rebar 5-9-78-3 Mechanical Snubbers 9-1-82-2A Pipe Spool 3-30-79-10 Regulators, Transfers Switchgear-Power Supplies 2-22-71-1C Regulators, Transfers Switchgear-Power Supplies 2-22-77-11 Regulators, Transfers Switchgear-Power Supplies 2-22-77-2C INSTALLATION RECORCS Valves V08-2024 V8-3386 V15-2008 Pipe Spools P 44-3055-002 Ell-N2208-014 FW-E41-2297-1WF1 E-41-3162-9WF0 NS-333 FW-E41-3172-7W0 Pipe Supports E21-3149-G010 E21-3053-CSR2A l E21-3053-G001 E21-3053-G004 E21-3149-G003 Equipment E2101 C001 Pump E2150 00028 Orifice 204
. - - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ \
t TABLE 5.6.1 (cont'd) Penetratio'ns X-53 X-37A X-220 X-224A X-1040 Conduit-GG026-2C HH-001-16 Cable Ell 214480-1C E50 218240-lP 044 211510-2C h-k L l l l 205 r
6.0 CONCLUSION
S AND RECOMMENDATIONS' ( 6.1 Recommendations The following is a summary of the recommendations which the team feel
,should be implemented. For more detail see the specific- section of the report.
(1) Provide an understandable method for determining what changes have been made in the design drawings of cable tray hangers. (Ref. Section 3.1.2.) - (2) Based on the results of this evaluation, the team re. commends that additional inspections of critical HVAC supports be performed. This i inspection should coveril ) a review of drawings for conflicting j details, 2) a walkdown ot_ as erected supports checking for missing members or members added which are not shown on current design documents. If no additional problems are discovered, HVAC supports should be judged acceptable. (Ref. Section 3.1.3.) (3) Perform an engineering analysis of pipe whip restraints to determine if 1/2" fillet welds are acceptable for GE supplied restraints which are required to have full penetration welds. Walkdown the systems containing pipe whip restrairft ; to verify all of those which have been removed for construction purposes have been replaced. (Ref. Section 3.1.4.)
~
1 (4) Review the several sets of revisions to the torus support drawings to determine that the as-built condition meets design-requirements. (Ref. Section 3.2.1.) (5) Tighten the originally installed bolted connections in the Slab-Over-Torus, area to the required values or provide an analysis for the acceptance of the connections as presently installed. (Ref. Section 3.2.2.) (6) Obtain an engineering evaluation to determine if the lower than specified top of the barrier has any significance to the barrier's intended function. Establish additional points on the slope of the barrier and incorporate them into the annual surveys. This would give assurance that the barrier is not sliding down the slope. The location of the points should be determined by the engineer who designed the barrier. (Ref. Section 3.2.4.) (7) Inspect all watertight doors for conformance to the design drawings. (Ref. Section 3.2.5.) (8) Inspect the exterior surf aces of the wetwell and the interior surf ace to the drywell to assure that construction damages has not violated containment integrity. (Ref. Section 3.3.) 206
(9) Monitor the quality of radiographic film in storage and perform some
' additional MT on containment welds not requiring radiography. . (Ref. Section 3.3.)
(10) A final inspection should be made to ensure that the damages to the coatings inside the drywell have been repaired as required. Clarify the commitments concerning coatings within the drywell. (Rev. Section 3.4.) (11) All -iping and penetration should be checked for capping of 1/2" connection and bolting of protective bellow covers. (Ref. Section -l 3. e.1. 5. > j (12) Evaluate the areas below minimum wall thickness in the HPCI system to u determine if they are acceptable for the applicable design conditions. (Ref. Section 3.6.2.5 and Figure 3.6.6. of this report.) (13) Inspect additional pumps for torquing of pressure boundary bolting and fall thread engagement on nuts. Further action will depend on the results of this inspection. (Ref. Section 3.7.1.5.) (14) Compare the design conditions on nameplate, master list and vendor drawings for some additional valves to check for further discrepancies. Further action will depend on the results of this inspection. (Ref. Section 3.7.3.5.) 3 (15) All QA-1 cooling units not covered by this review should be inspected j for dirty or damaged coils, external damage or missing parts and incorrect or missing tags on associated instruments and valves. (Ref. Section 3.8.2.5.) (16) The quality of housekeeping needs to be improved. A complete cleaning 1 and sealing of equipment at this time is recommended to ensure proper equipment operation. All associated work activities (tightening and repair of conduit fittings; removal of dirt, dust and debris from electrical equipment, sealing of penetration, terminal box covers, and equipment covers, etc.) should be identified in the Project Punch List as work ta be completed prior to fuel load. (Ref. Sections 3.10.1.5, 3.10.2.5, 3.11.3.5, 3.13.2.5, 3.14.1.5 and 3.14.2.5 of this report. ) (17) This report has identified six areas where drawing updates or technical accuracies of the drawings are inadequate. The most l significant of the six was the parts list drawings for the C0P and Vendor supplied relay cabinets that either were not contorlled l documents or did not reflect the as-built installation. The remaining five deficiencies (fuse sizing, minor as-built discrepancies, j drawing / specification discrepancies) as well as the panel and cabinet l5 parts lists should be resolved prior to fuel load. (Ref. Sections 3.10.2, 3.12.1.5, 3.12.2.5, 3.14.1.5, 3.14.2.5, of this report.) (18) It is recommended that the deviations found in the internal wiring of the remote shutdown panel (H21-P100/C35-P001) and the alignment of the scram valve limit switch on hydraulic control unit 46-07 be corrected. l Since portions of the preoperational test on these units had been 207
r completed, it is recommended that those tests be completely redone for this equipment ot verify system adequacy. It is further recommended that the preoperational test program should be reviewed to determine why the above deviations were not identified during the original tests and, if there were generic breakdowns in the preoperational test l program, further preoperational tests be repeated as required. (Ref. i Section 3.13.2.5 and 3.14.2.5). (19) An inspection of a sampie of additional penetration circuits should be conducted to determine if proper fuse coordination has been applied. If there is evidence of a generic problem in applying this protection, 2 then the inspection should be extended to include all penetration
~
circuits. (Ref. Section 3.10.2.5, 3.12.2.5 and 4.1.3.3.) (20) A comprehensive review should be conducted of the operability and calibration of all QAl air operated valves limit switches and process - instrumentation loops to ensure their proper operation. (Ref. Sections 3.13.1.5 - 3.13.2.5.) (21) Conduct a cable tray and conduit inspection on a sample of cables I similar to tie inspection performed by the CAT team. This inspection should include separation, tray fill, cable installation techniques . including cable supports, sealing and installation of pull box covers. The results of the CAT team assessment should then be analyzed to determine if corrective actions are required. (Ref. Section 3.11.1.5 and 3.11.2.5.) (22) Due to the number of loose wiring terminations found during the assessment, an inspection of a comprehensive sample of safety system terminations in all types of electrical equipment installations should be undertakan to determine the degree of what appears to be a generic prchlem and the action required for correction. (Ref. Sections 3.10. 2. 5, 3.12.1. 5, 3.13. 2. 5, 3.14.1. 5 adn 3.14. 2.5. ) (23) The environmental protection of MCC-72C-3A from both water spray and seismic interaction should be reviewed and appropriate protective action taken. (Ref. Section 3.10.2.5) (24) A comprehensive review of the identification of electrical equipment should be undertaken to assure that proper identification has been provided to all safety related equipment. As a minimum, an inspection of c sampling of equipment on the order of that covered by the CAT assessment should be undertaken. The results of this inspection plus that of the CAT team should be utilized to determine if this is a generic problem and what action needs to be taken. (Ref. Sections 3.10.1.4, 3.10.1.5, 3.10.2.4, 3.10.3.5, 3.12.1.4, 3.12.1.5, 3.12.2.4 and 3.14.1.4.) m
~
208
6.2 Final Conclusions The areas found to be in acceptable conditions include pipe supports, concrete, welding in general, and the condition of mechanical equipment. . It is the opinion of the team that when all of the potential findings, as - reported on the CAT-1 forms are resolved and the recommendations are implemented there will be reasonable assurance that no significant deviations from the final design disclosure documents exist. _ s r X i m M Y" b 209 _ _ _ . . . . . . . >a
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.S . APPENDIX 1 Y '.',w'Ckg ;.
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- .5 4 ',, %
DUKE POWER COM?ANY i; j i . ~ $t A 't CONSTRUCTION ASSESSMENT TEAM (CAT) ff7 @,
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,[.f &.
A" Team Leader: J. R. Wells P= ...t--
- I".*O t .==
4 : .. .. - ..7 ys.~. 4 . .
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'l Civil, Structural, Pipe Supports, Cable Tray Supports, and HVAC Supports , '7 - C 1
- q : . < ..v' 'j g
.(,; Ass't Team Leader: R. A. Morgan j ,f ' g..s; R. L. Medlin M. O. J. ., ,, - -
- o. Fortenberry , y. c r ,e+
., i W. G. Robinson NjD.; /",! . D. H. Llewellyn ' 9 .. 'T N
.., L. C. Arnold lim ' 2 J. L. Moore 1 a 1. ,73'f? - w ..
.: . .. o. . g x . .
q ( . *.. . .: .i! l Electrical and Electrical Instrumentation . . . -
; . .,c". c? a . -
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p.c Ass't Team Leader: B. M. Rice 7 C. C. Tompkins ,'jQr'.: l.
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+ R. S. Hulen IT'Y Y. ?
^l M. L. She1by -
.j ; G. D. Chronister '.,
h' X4 .7 A i J. M. Hoover i- ., . s',
- M ' -
4 ., fTg M. . y Mechanical, Welding, NDE {ff- .
, v .9 :
$ Ass' t Team Leader: R. L. Willi ams , M.e..F... <- .. 9 J. C. Sigmon 3 V
- 4. ~":, *., . c '.
A -. c"J f T. R. Bowen
- f." M. H. Linderman Mbs ' , .[C T .e J. E. C avender S~1&. vc v. c -
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Appendu 2 FTJLMI-2 CAT-CIVIL-CHECKLIST te Expansion SECTION 7.1 e , Ites Identificatiot.: [fban c. fer bec. hor ere hen s , (50 Location 132 r inu ( . Ace a Mac /< [ f/#M . Drawing ref. Er 72/ - 2aB2 _Rev1 Spec. Ref 307/- /_7 (o Rev E TO 72 /- Zoo 1 Rawd QA Procedure Ref Rev Rev _ Other Ref Rev Rev _ g, Rev _ g,y temen. Coinnent s : Inspection Activit7 N/A Accept Reject i Type Csi,,,, Eh Me so 7, spa,44 edge deck d po j A Self Drilling NM%# C8r7 2 Torque Check 3 Size. Spacing. Perpendicua'rity h sad % 4 m ,,,,,, % ry 3 66.s. 5 Thread Engagement 6 Plate Bearing On Concrete f 7 Visual: Surrounding Concrete 8 Hole Examination Y f2 r> d.er e. restw ai he ar s 9 Damage ~ 7 -c no e% - gm
'O UI Stud Length see ur pp O
Asseeuer bol$ fedlin Date b- 2 7- EV 211 mE n umu um EII
FORM CAT-1 g5r.R4 - YlT'% FERHI 2 , .-
- 1. ..
D 4 - %' FINAL CONSTRUCTION ASSESSMENT WPOTENTIAL FINDING r. eem .. POTENTIAL FINDING / CONCERN REPORT C ASSESSOR CONCERN ffU.. ';.e,.1.
,o .
Y;' Y .
. /.
- 1. CAT ASSESSOR ob EC in DATE lo [i Cf
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- 2. CAT ITEM NUMBER -. .
- 3. ITEM OF POTENTIAL FINDING / CONCERN .,p '( , ,7 f f % d 0 bofE SPE4v RrPING SSW 0M hr e s W %. .M M W %S% / COMPONENT NAME SS COMPONENTPIbNO. -
- 4. LOCATION [fGJ, & $@ ' f i 'g " $4- f*S t I b4 Nev,659'&7 /$h, SRIk, jkE,120* -: ; .' y. .
- 5. DESCRIPTION OF POTENTIAL FINDkNG/ ASSESSOR CONCERN b )k ra She ,, 4 'A.'. i-if Ireld lembe e d clr u Tnu loc.cd rew hoW721 2 so s -2 rev.14) ifh A ., A LL Q$. .w .
( 'f ((e 4y0
- 6. THERE ARE ATTACHMENTS TO THIS REPORT YES [ NO @ .w ..
- 7. IF YES LIST BELOW THOSE ATTACHMENTS l N- h ?'D
.l [ M i.7
- 8. DOES THE ITEM OF POTENTIAL / CONCERN YES % NO C -
APPEAR TO BE IN DISAGREEMENT WITH A FINAL v.
.~D ; $7 DESIGN DISCLOSURE DOCUMENT? :? ' J %
- 9. IF YES, UHICH DOCUMENT 6. M 72 ( - 3o53-2. -e v N h.
- 10. REVIEWED 7"-
#d ' ,w.,:3 ,. k .
AT TEAM LEADER l - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7
;.'.9y> .tft .)&.
-ffM This part to be cocipleted by Detroit Edison Cocipany g. ; , -J*"
.Mi
.Q " <
- 11. NAME -
$2GNATURE- YO.
s-DISCIPLINE LEADER w t . .k, ~. PERSON ACCOMPANYING ASSESSOR
- 12. RESOLUTION, __
i
- 13. ACTION COMPLETED DATE NQA ENGINEER E
100/R297/2.8 212 ... . 061384 __ w
APPENDIX 4 d.' l List of CAT-1 Forms - Potential Findings and Assessment Concerns 6g F yf.ys,..s,
. x.x , .,
%t c 1 g
..s Finding / 0;Q,f.
CAT No. Concern Subject - 1 Concern Construction Induced Damage to Torus k b'
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2 Finding Missing Plates on Torus Support by.4J 3 Finding Disconnected Rod on Pipe Whip Restraint Vfd [ 4 Concern Control of Documents gA 4A% 5 Concern Control of Pump Manual L 6 Finding Conflicting Operator Size on Valves j % 7 Finding Undersized Fillet Weld on Restraint < V{ 8 Concerr Maintenance on Batteries *L 9 Concern Identification of Batteries and Cable ).[,fA :. 10 Concern Battery Rack Installation and Equipment Location d.Q - 11 Concern Core Spray Motor Equipment Installatic i 12 Concern Motor Control Center Protection and Maintenance !/.;p. h[b 13 Finding Motor Cable Termination Mk . ' 14 Finding MC' Fuse Sizing Disagreement on Drawings C 15 Concern Dar..oge to Penetration # 4: 15 17 Concern Finding Switchgear Nameplates and Housekeeping Equipment Installed in Switchgear Not per Drawing
%[$
f fgy 18 Finding Equipment Installed in Switchgear Not per Drawing - 14 & 19 Concern Motor Thermocouple Box has Unused Opening 7"' i-20 Finding Weld Symbols for Pipe Support 21 Finding Rejectable r! eld on Torus Support M;9YS -d 22 Concern Loose Cable Connection and Housekeeping in MCC py h 23 Finding Installed Equipment and Cab h: Tag Not per Drawings 7 [f.Q 24 Finding Incorrect Motor Grounds and Nameplate .? g W. 25 Finding MCC Cable Not Installed per Drawing .my 26 Findirg Panel Cables Not Installed per Drawing [dj 4 27 Concern Loose Material on Top of Devices in Panel g y.N 28 Finding Incorrect Quantity of Items on Par ts List dQs - 29 Finding Loose Terminal Connection on Control Panel Dny j 30 Finding Watertight Door Deficiencies 31 Finding Watertight Door Deficiencies Y(.,9 pd, i 32 Finding Loose Termination and Improper Identification 33 Finding Coatings for Drywell g 1;p%g. 34 Finding Pipe Support Catalog Item MJ 35 36 Concern Concern Confusing Switchgear Mounting Details Mis'ing Cotter Pins on Restraint
~4 1 p 37 Finding Coaf1Nting Drawings for Restraint 38 Concern M s ing Cotter Pins on Restraint 39 Finding Wi ong Welds Made on Restrdnt 40 Finding broken Wire Lug, Incorrect Drawing, Incorrect Identification 41 Concern Fire Door Deficiencies gga 42 Finaing Anchor Edge Distance Deficiency a:s 2: .5 43 44 Finding Finding Fillet Weld Too Smell on Pipe Support Pipe Support Catalog Item hhM ff .y .
Pipe Support Spring Cans Need Resetting 45 Concern q;4 pg%'i 213
^
APPENDIX 4 (Cont'd) Finding / ' CAT No. Concern Subject 46 Finding Nuts on Pipe Support not Properly Installed - 47 Concern Exposed Rebar in RHR Cumplex 48 Finding Incorrect Valve Control Wiring Installation -r 49 Finding Safety Valves Not Installed _ 50 Finding No Motor Identification 51 Finding Pipe Support Catalog Item ' 52 Concern Arc Strikes on Dr,<well Plate 53 Concern Lamination on Drywell Plate : 54 Finding Weld Deficiency on Drywell Plata 55 Finding Items in Core Spray Records Not Closed Out z 56 Finding Installed Components Not per Drawing w - ' 57 Finding Cab le Termination Not per Drawing - 58 Concern No Edison Drawing for Installed Equipment Plus l Housekeeping ; 59 Finding Size of Installed Motor Differs From Drawing 7 60 Concern Lack of Cleanliness on Core S, ay Pump i 61 Finding Piping Not in Accordance With Design Drawing 1 62 Finding Motor Connections Not per Drawing 63 Finding Weld Deficiencies on Drywell Plate . _ 64 Concern Binding Strut on Pipe Support c 65 Finding Locse Termination on D.G. Panel Device 66 Concern Installed Motor Brake Not per Drawing 67 Concern Binding Strut on Pipe Support , 68 Finding Lack of Full Thread Engagement on Bolts .
~
]
69 Finding Bolts Undertorqued 70 Finding Lack of Full Thread Engagement on Pump Bolts . j-71 Concern Valve Not Tagged [ 72 Finding Installed Items on Cabinet Not per Drawings 73 Finding Incorrect Nameplate on Control Board -
];
74 Concern No Edisor Drawing for Intalled Devices on Control Board Finding Control Board Bolts Not Torqued - 75 , i 76 Finding Valve Tagged With Wrong Number ..- ? 77 Finding Valve Connections at Wrong Location c - j 78 Finding Valve Operator Orientation Not in Accordance With Dwg ) 79 Concern Temporary Rigging to HVAC Support - - 80 Firling Pipe Support Catalog Item .. ; 81 Concerr. Pipe Support Shimming 82 Finding Wrong Cold Load Setting and Missing Part for Pipe , Support -t-83 Finding Pipe Support Catalog Item 84 Concern Pipe Support Lug Detail 85 Finding Conflicting Design Drawings 86 Finding Installed Wire Size Not per Drawing 87 Concern Instrument Not Irstalled . _ _ _ _ _ . 88 Finding HVAC Support Parts Not Installed Properly fgmp _ 89 Finding Instrument Valve Not Properly Tagged N.A. N 90 Concern Missing Welder I.D. - E . .. .. - 91 92 Finding Concern HVAC Support Drawing Detail Inadequate Damaged Bolts on Valve Operator -p. -[ wyf:h Q
%L -j; *
-^ ' .I%,
214 ;MN
. . 4% 4 -
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' .? 'N ,
5 .. APPENDIX 4 (Cont'd) F Finding / CAT No. Concern Subject EJ B _ 93 Finding HVAC Support Not Erectd to All Change Paper i 94 Finding HVAC Support Dimensions Wrong E 95 Concern Deep Wrench Marks on Pipe 96 Concern Turbine Bearing Cover Bolting Missing
- . 97 Finding Cable Not Identified at EMOV 98 Concern Penetration I.D., Damaged Gaskets, Missing Cover Bolts "
99 Finding Incomplete Environmental Sealing, Missing Cover Bolts .~ Finding Incorrect Penetration Pressure, Missing Cover Bolts 100 [ 101 Concern Incomplete Shield Wire Installation thru Penetration Valve Rusted Due to Packing Leakage i 102 Concern - [ 103 Concern Damaged Level Sensing Instrument 6 104 Finding Incomplete Environmental Shield on Penetration Cable 105 Concern Induced Voltages on Control Circuits 106 Concern Inability to Remove Penetration Top Cover _ 107 Concern Inadequate Pull Space on Pump and Turbine 3, y..
- 108 Finding Cables not Secured to Tcay per Specification
[ 109 F iriding Conflicting Design Conditions on Valve yhre t- g 7 l 110 Finding Conflicting Design Conditions on Valve _NN 111 Concern Conduit / Tray Rattlespace item 7 112 Concern Questionee Disposition of NCR
- 113 Finding Installed Fuse Not per Drawing .,. 3 y; 114 Finding Studs Found Undertorqued - RCIC Joint No. R0-0005 g f ..~ A '
115 116 Finding Finding Studs Four.d Undertorqued - RCIC Joint No. R0-0005 Puig Strainers Tagged Improperly gK h;47
, 117 Concern PIS Numbers Do Not Agree With Drawing / Equipment Installed MfN ?:'.'
118 119 Finding Finding Studs Found Undertorqued - RCIC Faulty Limit Switch Mechanism 23~il h'? kq C. J P 120 121 Finding Concern Cable Severed on Penetration Termination Incorrect Instrumentation Grounding
?!g; 5 g
y,A E lE2 Concern Trash in Tube Steel Support .s yi4 W 4 123 Finding Studs Found Undertorqued - Valve V22-2204 7 '? e 124 Concern Gouge in Drywell Plate Weld j$ [.% *I 125 Finding Weld Procedure Qualification Review g 126 Finding Anchor Hole Too Large W'.P.J 3, . . ., 5.: 127 Concern Missing Drawing Detail on Cable Tray " g g i: ... 128 129 Finding Finding Loose Cable Termination unsupported Cables in Tray 3.(NQ DM 9 i 130 Finding Cable Tray Overfill +.. ~$ [ 131 Finding Cables Not Installed per Drawing j ' ' N ;; - 132 Concern Damaged Flexible Conduit a-Finding Installed Tray Not on Cable Documents 133 134 Finding Cables Not Supported as Required [/$l$ L,i .1 h 135 Finding Cable Hanging Outside of Tray EEEquerrme
- 136 Finding Pull Box Cover Off and No Identifiction EMNGBH 137 Finding Tray Violation of Separation Criteria g Finding Conduit Violation of Separation Criteria 138 ---
139 Concern Cable Abandoned in Tray i 140 Finding Spare Conduit Not Capped per Specifications m' l 215
APPENDIX 4 (Cont'd) Finding / " CAT No. Concern Subject 141 Finding Wrong Type Anchors Installed on Cable Tray 142 Finding Weld Symbol Incorrect on Cable Tray 143 Finding Floor Connection Not per Drawing on Cable Tray 144 Finding Floor Connection Not per Drawing on Cable Tray 145 Finding Wrong Type Anchors Installed on Cable Tray 146 Fidning Detail Not Specified for Cabic Tray Support 147 Finding Detail Not Specified for Cable Tray Support 148 Finding Incomplete Work on Cable Tray 149 Concern No Thermal Expansion Capability - Support P4400B001 150 Finding Casing Bolts Not Torqued Properly - EECW Pung Div. II 151 Finding Incomplete Thread Engagement - EECW Pump Div. I 152 Finding Anchor Spacing Violation 153 Finding Installed Conduit Not on Cable Cards 154 Concern Foreign Items Located in Control Cabinets 155 Finding Missing Expansion Anchor 156 Finding Spare Conduit Not Capped per Specification ._ 157 158 Concern Finding Fan Motor Attached to Expansion Anchor Ancher Edge Distance Violation 4 Q 159 Concern Cover Missing on Electrical Box 1Li 160 Finding Anchor Edge Distance Violation J..' . 0 161 Finding Anchor Edge Distance Violation 162 Finding Plates Improperly Welded - NIAS North Dehydration Units $%y 163 Finding Improper Belts Installed - Decay Heat South Fan @;e. (T4600C002) -i. 164 165 Finding Finding unsupported Cables Entering Cabinets Inoperable Pilot Solenoid Valve
$fC.N 166 Finding Valve Disk Limit Switches Out of Calibration J j 167 Finding Loose Terminations on Two Valves ' .+ 1 168 Finding Loose Conduit Fitting of Valve Limit Switch .jb 169 Concern Loose Back Plate on Disk Limit Switches ?i3 170 Finding Shore Barrier Below Specified Grade WP 171 Findhg Design Document and Field Installation Not per 4Gd Completed DCR ' 30 172 Finding No I.D. Tags on Instruments Of).
173 Finding No I.D. - Valve V8-3723 M. a 174 Void 175 Finding No Cover on Heater / Thermocouple Lead Box - Drywell M;4 w Cooling Fan C002 *
#7 Finding Missing Nuts / Broken Bolts - Drywell Cooling Unit 8002 176 177 Finding Instrument TE-N012C Damaged - Drywell Cooling Unit B003 %j 178 Void '. t.#
179 Finding Damaged Access Panels - Drywell Cooling Unit B004 : p:' 180 Concern Installed Hanger Interferes With Terminal Box Cover , 181 Finding Linear Indication on Weld 6WM-831-5218 182 Finding Bolts Not Centered in Slotted Holes i
$s 183 Finding Beams Have Square Cut Copes W$
184 185 Concern Concern FfEs & DCR Completed in 1982 Not on Drawings Slotted Connections Not Effective R$ 186 Concern Connections Not Capped / Hooked Up - Instrument Penetration X-55B 216
9 APPENDIX 4 (Cont'd) Finding / CAT No. Concern Subject 187 Concern Connection Not Hooked Up or Capped - Instrument Penetration X-33A ' 188 Concern Excessive Hi-Pot Testing of 4KV Cable 189 Concern Missing Screws cn Access Panel - Core Spray Pump Room ,_ . Cooler gb%i i 190 Concarn No Filters /Tr ash Screens Designed for Cooling Units /./ W*i . 191 Concern Incomplete Thread Engagement - HPCI Cooling Unit 192 Finding (T4100-8022) Instrument Calibration Not per List ,- 9;I W 193 Finding Drain Line Tap Needs Blind Flange - Reactor Recirc .i '}..i '.f-Pumps A & B -M ; 194 Finding Torque Checks on Structural Steel Bolting kN ..7..; 195 Concern Improper I.D. Tags - Reactor Recirculation Pump A 46 196 197 Finding Finding Separation Criteria Violation in Control Board No N-Stamp on Nameplates - Control Center HVAC Chilled
.f.M' Water Punps
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198 Concern Significant Leakage - Control Center HVAC Chilled Water
- W.'. -
Pumps 9 Y# 199 Finding Required Radial Clearances Not Provided on Block /Kay ;e[i 200 Finding Supports Honeycomb Concrete Around Door Frame id.X 201 Concern Possible Unacceptable Stress Due to Rigid Pipe Support ';g..c[ lQ N. y ', . ~ 7. j [. p 3 e:y. y ac
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I _ i APPENDIX 5 ~
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4L 7 MINUTES OF MEETING 9 ' !N
^ ' $.A.Y
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Subject:
C.A.T. Report JN':
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==
Date: July 19, 1984 ..p;;.i,' J
= yhg D.
g Time: 9:30 a.m.
%m< A ff . > . r.
j, y, V Place: Fermi I Office Building - Green Room a %y#vv$pg p g
--- Attendees: Detroit Edison q.m ..
p.
) k-E T. A. Alessi - Director, Corporate Q. A. $. . J p J. C. Buck - NQA -l. .4;l j
_- J. R. Mullens - Engineering *: - /j, 1 S. H. Noetzel - Assistant Manager, EF2 74b !,
-3 G. Sharma - Engineering M-$:
7 W. M. Street - Engineering %$ p Duke Power s/.c"; h
] n *+
.; . g., d R. S. Hulen - C.A.T.
R. A. Morgan - C.A.T. Mf.',M J. R. Wells - C.A.T. ?:f%.'
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( . Nuclear Regulatory Commission kSn ;
' P. M. Byron - Senior Resident Inspector ..f:d. 4 T. P. Gwynn - Observer ,, ,
....................-- ... ---------------------------------------------- if.;g
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( The purpose of the meeting was to discuss techrical coraents on the draft 'j.f . report of the Duke Power Company Assessment. h judgement was to be l questioned. glt g. The conclusions and recommendations in the draft are still in the ..
= preliminary stage. Some of the conclusions may not be expressed in the %in final report as they are in the draft. 4% p. :
Ut.) L
= T. P. Gwynn stated there were three items to be discussed: l'"d.cp c.m . .
- 1) Minutes should be part of public record. J. R. Wells stated that .M ; F these minutes will be an attachment to the Duke Report (o.ppendix fp.ff.g 5). 3%d TE4;:
lI -
- 2) Have any substansive changes been made to report since draft was issued? J. R. Wells stated that there are a number of areas with 7.@.s1 v1K" E minor changes but none judged substantive by Duke. Results and g
-3 f 218
Conclusions may be supplemented by additional material but not
- substantive changes.
4 The correct title should be "NRC Observer." Duke agreed. The following are page by page review comments: - Abstract NCR should be changed to NRC. 2 The word " Independent" second line should not r be capitalized. _ ( P age 1 Section 1.0 T. P. Gwynn asked if the Executive Summary will include significant findings? Yes, in ] p the conclusions. Page 2 Section 2.3 ASME Code Welds should be ASME Code Piping ;
= Welds. Duke agreed and will make the
; W change. k' is -
, .%.M;!
3 Page 2 Section 2.4 ANSI "N45.6 qualified" shall be "N45.2.6 WEi< certified." Duke concurred and will raake 7. correction. . 5 Page 4 Section 2.9 Add - NRC Observer was at the daily meetings. kk,7 Duke will add this. %.S j q e. ;.; 3 Page 5 Fig. 2.1.1 Drawing doesn't show RHR Building. Duke will add a note referencing RHR Complex location. f.T.[
".,. 6 7 .,
-y .. -
v j P age 10 Section 3.1.4.3 Edison commented word " missing" should be Q1lQ? 3rd line "not cortpleted. " Duke will not incorporate ? .. . this comment. M @c.W 4 . Q. , :. Page 10 P age 3.1.4.3 Most of the items in this paragraph are 4th line shown on drawings. Edison disagrees with [y. t .jbjg-
;j both paragraphs. Edison disagrees tnat these
= are deviations because the items were shown QI{O G.
on the drawings. Duke will not incorporate 4/Q;' EA.-
; this information in Report because betroit g Edison did not provide the information at the time of the assessment.
E P age 11 P ara. 3.1. 4. 5 letroit Edison suggests adding that there was I a confl M between Manuf acturer's Shop Drawings and 3. E. Drawing. Duke will not I incorporate this comment because Shop Drawing did not have G.E. approval. Page 35 Section 3.2.2.4 The word " drawing" shoula be changed to I i Para. 6 " spec." Duke accepted comment and will make 4th line the change. I 219
i Page 39 Section 3.2.5.4 It was brought up that the fire doors installation inspection records were not requested. 3 Page 40 Section 3.3.4 T. P. Gwynn commented the report does not " identify the physical status of the radiograph or the devations from the original 2 work plan sample size. Duke will address in the final report and will report the actual number reviewed.
$ Page 66 Section 3.4.5 Duke intends to reword 3.4.5. Detroit Edison agrees with this decHion.
- Page 78 Section 3.6.1.5 Needs considerable rewriting for m' clarification. 3.6.1.5 states "The m
undertorquing on some of the bolting should __ $ have shown up in the form of leakage during 4", .s 9 testing if it were a problem." Question is. .
"Did this conclusion consider that i .:*
- VJ.
= undertorquing may have occurred after leak 4. k ' ] testing?" Duke's response is that they will VM
~
consider in their rewrite of that paragranh. .GF4 e Page 107 Section 3.7.6.5 Duke should consider the NRC's comments made ky$ on 3.6.1.5 when they rewrite Paragraph ' Ji 3.7.6.5 g;Qg 9 - Meeting adjourned at 11:30 a.m. for lunch. Reconvaned at 12:30 p.m. p .:'=l.} } c;g 3 Page 129 Section 3.10.1.5 Request by Edison isi to insert "as required" g.;j
- f. '
(last sentence) af ter the word " sealing." Duke agrees with f.E this and will make the change. 3 /i:.j .[.
- ,;,f:
" Page 130 Section 3.10.1 After "see photograph" Detroitidison , suggests that the words "seismir two over - -Y;5y one" was considered in the design. Duke will ? f check with their evaluator's notes and if % p.3 2 ' there are any changes, Duke will make them. L (3 5 Duke will determine what is appropriate.
'. 57.-
3 Suggested additional words by Edison: 7 'i 3 Page 130 Section 3.10.2.4
" Drawings used for purchase of motor control 1 j (last para. of g Item 3) centers and not for cabling." Duke .wuq g understands Detroit Edison's comments fWy regarding the differences in drawings and A i.
what they are used f(r. They will discuss - ;j . I this using their own notes and make any appropriate changes. y; li
;!;l.A Page 131 Section 3.10.2.5 Edison suggests adding the words "as Ng, I. required" after " sealing" in the fourth sentence. Duke agrees.
67 0
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220 m xc _ . . . _ . . . . , , m wmemmum
M f Page 137 Section 3.11.1.4 Detroit Edison believes that the spec allows (Para. 2 -- for the use of tie wraps in lieu of a grip first sentence) type of connection in this case. Duke does not agree with this interpretation and recommends that the spec. be revised. Page 141 Section 3.11.3.5 Edison suggests adding phrase "and has 3 (Para 3 verified in writing that pressures up to 70 2nd sentence) psig are acceptable." Duke will review their notes and Edison will furnish Duke with that _ manufacturer's recomtrendations. They will review them along with their notes and make any recommendations that are appropriate.
) Page 151 Section 3.12.1.4 Sentence should be deleted. The sentence (Para 3 does not reflect Detroit Edison's position on bottom of pg. - the subject. Edison's correct position is
- last sentence) stated in the reference memo EF 2-63,333.
8 Duke agrees that this section needs to be reworded to make it clear.
"5 _
Page 168 Section 3.14.1.5 Edison suggests clarifying sentence that only (Sect. 3 qualified items or components have been Para. 2) ordered and installed. Duke agrees to look at their notes and discuss whether there needs to be a change made.
- im Page 171 Section 3.14.2.5 Edison suggests that this is not a rolled 7 .g (Para. 4) wire incidence. Duke agrees it's not a yJW rolled wire and they will change the words to l.;.;. (,/j
=
reflect the actual situation. . Page 171 Section 3.14.2.5 Edison suggests that in the last sentence the 'b] T. fj%
. last sentence words " pre-operational tests" be changed to P..-l' .f. ?
g -
"C&IO tests." Duke will review this 3 [M paragraph to clarify its meaning and intent. .3 %
.- l. 2.7. "
j Page 175 Section 4.1 This section references the electrical design ? }. O changes, but the assessment plan (Page 3) 43 / .1 included in the scope of the assessment a ' .% I review of the design change program to verify its adequacy. Only electrical design changes are addressed in the final report. Duke
'p'.f t O f ff/ '
i V: m agrees with that comment and they will take N 4d I action to include the design changes for the other disciplines in the report. 'M v Y v
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I Q U. [ .,} (.P. ll? .!% 'f m .: m-9 221
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i',... i A L3 2 Page 175 Section 4.1.4 Tha conclusions did not state Duke's #~de 1$4 assessment of the adequacy of the design i.T. M
'i change program. Duke will review this sN .x paragraph and clarify the conclusions A.Q.
J7 reference. jTey l s : y. .q , , Page 176 Section 4.2.4 NRC question is: "Where are the results?" Q '.@ G- Duke's reply: "The results will be u- w f* provided." j M. W s. m/$.f; rJ' Page 183 Section 5.4 T. Alessi to review and verify that this is a '
;N.
h.. ~f true Detroit Edison statement. If not, he 3 .P F C will provide the correct information to 3 Duke will rewrite this section to @V ?- :.
; -i.. Duke.
t reflect the fact that this is not a third . i i party assessment, ., pp
. .l.[ Page 188 Gen. Comment The NRC requested that Duke review their b.$
conclusions with regard to the facts provided q - 190 on Section 6.1 j ,.? t
- ( in the report to assure themselves that the conclusions and recommendations are supported 4#.. v _
E-K i
, = . -:
s; by the facts presented. Duke will review the
'.[4 conclusions and .'ecommendations to assure % themselves that they are supported by the .,. o . +
tJN f acts contained in the report. 'k '
. .. ; O .
.1 *
~ ;s The NRC asked what is the basis for the $s . .t,
/?/ determination of sample sizes and their ~ y.h.3f
' recommendation. Duke intends to deleta the *>~..
specific sample sizes. ;
.(( e'7 4, '.- 7 Page 190 Item 21 During the daily briefing (June 29) the khy!
J.. briefing indicated that terminations were a M '.- f problem, mainly at the equipment end, rather $.JM . r than at the panel end of the wires. The 4:Y.Qf b report indicates the opposite. The NRC asks }W.; Js for clarification. Duke will look back and / o. clarify their records and make any :Ts/'M corrections that are needed in the report 'l i, c ' ..G h':J.( n. The meeting adjourned at 2:15 p.m. to allow for typing of the minutes. To .:. q, z f j be reconvened at 2:45 p.m. fQ%l The minutes were reviewed for accuracy and ccncurred in by all parties. < C The meeting was adjourned at 3:45 p.m. <f4%
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