ML20095L543

Forwards Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant Exercise on 830517, Final Rept

ML20095L543
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	06/19/1984
From:	Krimm R Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Jordan E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
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ML20095L539	List: ML20095L543
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NUDOCS 8408300319
Download: ML20095L543 (8)

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. 1 Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 JUN I 91984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward L. Jordan Director, Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response j Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regula ory Commission FROM: ic im. *^^^

Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural aad Technological Hazards Programs

SUBJECT:

Fina' Report for the Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant Exercise Attached is the final report for the joint offsite radiological emergency preparedness exercise conducted on May 17, 1983, for the Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant with the State of North Carolina and New Hanover and Brunswick Counties. Also attached is the schedule of corrective actions which address each deficiency.

Although there were deficiencies observed at this exercise, they did not detract from the overall demonstrated capability by the State of North Carolina and New Hanover and Brunswick Counties to protect the health and safety of the public.

'If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 287-0200.

Attachments As Stated ,

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. Nor:h Carolina Department of CrimeControlgp

&PublicSafey 116 WestJones Street Raleigh 27611 Division of Emergency Management James B. Hunt, Jr., Governor Heman R. Clark, Secretary (9191733 3867 August 12, 1983 Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, Jr.

Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV 1375 Peachtree Street, N. E.

Atlanta, GA 30309

Dear Mr. Woodard:

Enclosed is the response to the final report for the Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant exercise. Each NUREG-0654 item listed in Sections IV and V of the report has been addressed. When appropriate, the dates for correcting the deficiencies have been indicated by underlining.

New Hanover County plans to more fully activate its EOC during the next exercise.

- Sincere ,

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J sse T. Pugh, III k1

( Enclosure l

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BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT -- 1983 EXERCISE Correction Schedule - Significant Deficiencies NORTH CAROLINA _

Public Education and Information (G.4.b.1: The SERT PIO will arrange a train-ing conference for public information officers directly concerned with incidents at the Brurswick Nuclear Plant. This conference will be conducted prior to September 19. 1983.

NEW HANOVER COUNTY Assignment of Responsibility (A.1.a.?: The exercise in this county was '

intentionally designed to limit participants to selected agencies. The agencies selected to participate were identified and the extent of their involvement was decided prior to the exercise. A greater number of agencies will participate in the next exercise.

Public Education and Information The(G.2.): Public infonnation activities did take place during the exercise. Public Infonnation Officer wrote, coordinated, and released the first EBS message during the exercise. There-after, there was no public information that required a unilateral release by New Hanover County. An effort will be made to more fully demonstrate this l

function during tne next exercise.

The agency Public Education and Information (G.3.a..G.4.a. .G.4.b..G.4.c.):

j identified in the olan as being responsible for puslic information fulfilled that role during the exercise. The procedures regarding this function are clear and work well. In this case, the evaluator seemed to think that a single individual should be appointed as the public information officer.

The plan does assign ,

Very few county governments can afford such luxury.

the responsibility and describe the manner in which the PIO function is to be accomplished. Also, as stated earlier, an effort will be made to more fully demonstrate this function during the next exercise. (See also Significant Deficiencies - North Carolina. The necessary training will be l

conducted by September 19,1983.)

Protective Response (J.10.d.): The plan provides for protecting mobility-impaired people. It was not intended to exercise this portion of the plan.

An effort will be made to more fully demonstrate this function during the next exercise.

Radiological Exposure Control (K.3.b.): The instruments being used were in current calibration (the evaluator might have been referring to an ooerational check). In any case, refresher training will be initiated by September 19, 1983.

This training will include instruction in the proper use of the instrumentation and record-keeping by emergency response organizations.

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-- l Exercise and Drills (N.I.a. and N.I.b.1: As stated earlier, an effort will be made to more fully demonstrate the ability of the county's staff during the next exercise. However, the evaluator who rated New Hanover County '

should take note of two facts: one, the exericse plan was approved by FEMA Region IV; and secondly, NUREG-0654 (N.1.b.) does not require that all major

- elements of plans and preparedness organizations be tested during every exercise. It appears that in this case, the evaluator's knowledge of require-ments and response procedures was limited to a checklist.

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BRUNSWICK COUNTY Emergency Facilities and Equipment (H.3.):f An effort to find a larger space in which to locate the county EOC is underway. The decision concerning this move will be made by September 19.1983.

See the comment under Significant Public Education and Infonnation (G.4.b.):

Deficiencies - North Carolina. The necessary training will be completed by September 1, 1983.

Correction Schedule - Minor Deficiencies NORTH CAROLINA Emergency Comunications (F.1.d.): Permanent antennas will be installed at the pre-selected State Emergency Response Team (SERT) operations facility in Wilmington. These antennas will be higher than the portable antennas pre-viously used and should improve comunication between SERT and the radio- -

, logical mobile laboratory. The antennas have been ordered and should be installed by September 30, 1983.

Assignment of Responsibility (A.4.): The Radiation Protection Section has recently added four fulltime staff members qualified to serve as field survey team members. This addition gives us 13 fulltime technically qualif ed i

staff members; and, combined with 5 secretaries, we will possess'a staff of '?3 individuals who can serve as comunications personnel during an emergency.

Two additional staff meders (one Deputy Chief and one Technical Planner /

Trainer) are in the process of being hired. These additions will bring our personnel strength up to 25 members.

Our TOREV (Team of Radiological Emergency Volunteers) members from the Health Physics Society are programed to augment our regular staff as comunications and technical suoporters during a continuous operations mode. TOREV support is currently estimated to be 32 individuals during a protracted situation.

Monetary restraints restricted the numbers of comunications personnel that could be comitted to the May 17, 1983 Brunswick Exercise.

Further, a SERT Interagency Comunication Support Team has been organized to provide support during protracted exercises or real emergencies. Adequate staffing, then, is already available.

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Emeroency Classification System (0.3.): Large, easily read plaques have been ordered to display the approoriate emergency classification in the SERT l operation room. These plaques will be on hand by September 1.1983. ,

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/ -Public Education and Infomation (G.3.a.): Space for the media atTelephones the SERT facility is deemed adequate; it is the largest room available.  ;

were not installed for the exercise because of. the expense and because media representatives were not expected (and did not visit) at the facility in great numbers. Within the limits imposed by physical restrictions, facilities for media representatives will be provided during real emergencies.

v Public Education and Infomation (G.4.a.): See the coment on G.4.b. under Significant Deficiencies - North Carolina.,. The necessary training will be conducted prior to September 19, 1983.

, y Public Education and Information (G.4.c.): The rumor con *:rol function was not played during this exercise. It was emphasized during the Brunswick Exercise in August 1981. Rumor control procedures in the North Carolina Emergency Response Plan are considered adequate as written. Also see the coment under Significant Deficiencies - North Carolina; training in this functional area will be conducted by September 19, 1983.

l Accident Assessment (I.8.): We do not agree that there was any confusion with respect to the difference between " population dose" and " individual dose" projections. No Radiation Protection Section staff member even considers

" population dose" (meaning number of people multiplied by projected exposure) for the very reason that it can create a multitude of numbers subject to the confusion which the evaluators felt had occurred. We will continue to deal only in terms of INDIVIDUAL DOSE PROJECTION OFFSITE.

Nor does Carolina Power and Light Company employ a concept of " population j dose" meaning population multiplied by the individual dose to a member of the

, population. The 70,000 REM iodine thyroid dose projection which was referred to actually occurred and in retrospect resulted from faulty controller infonnation on radiation measurements in the field, which resulted in back calculations to disturbingly high numbers. These back calculations were later redone and came up with a lower number on the order of 7,000 REM thyroid dose. .

With respect to these very high dose projections, both CP&L and the Radiation Protection Program personnel came up with comnarable numbers. Again, there was never any consideration of " population dose." It was never interoreted to be " population dose," rather " individual dose."

Protective Res mnse (J.10.m.): The Radiation Protection Section planned compliance witi J.10.m. is by recomended protective actions, based on PAGs in the plume EPZ, to be available from three sources if needed, i.e., SERT Radiation Protection representative, Radiation Protection computer center as 1330 St. Mary's Street, and the mobile lab in the field. It is expected that the primary source of recommended protective actions will come from the Radiation Protection Section's representative in SERT who will most likely make use of coer.puter and computation personnel at 1330 St. Mary's Street.

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Better direction of mobile laboratory personnel is expected during future exercises _ as a result of a planner / trainer person being on the staff of the In addition, key personnel assigned to the Radiation Pcotection Section. ..

mobile laboratory are now more familiar with their responsibilities.

Protective Res ense (J.9.): The Licensee advises that, according to the l

t U. 5. Nuclear tegulatory Commission report on the exercise, they .followed their procedures correctly. However, in light of this consnent, the Licensee will reevaluate their procedures for reconenending protective actions by September 1. 1983.

a rotective Response (J.10.e.): Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) of the Madiation Protection Section requires that the decision to use Radioprotective Drugs (KI) be made at SERT by the Radiation Protection Section's representative.

The Radiation Protection Section has the delegated authority to administer the first KI to its field personnel, based upon its own judgment. More training coupled with hardcopy comunications will speed up the decision to dispense Radioprotective Drugs (KI) and implementation of the decision in future exercises or emergencies.

Recovery and Reentry and Postaccident Operations (M.4.): This function was

+ not played during this exercise. Consideration will be given to demonstrat-ing this function during the next full-scale exercise.

NEW HANOVER COUNTY Assignment of Responsibility (A.4.): The exercise, as approved by FEMA Region IV, was not of sufficient length to require two or more shifts. Con-sideration will be given to demonstrating this capability in a future exercise.

Also, see earlier coments on exercise design.

Assignment of Responsibility (A.1.d.): It is physically impossible to place a full emergency operation center staff in the 911 emergency communication center that functions as the county warning point. Therefore, even if the

' EOC was located in the same building, a solit operation would result.

Coordination between the two sites has been effective in the past. Careful attention will be devoted to the coordination between the two sites in

, future exercises.

Assignment of Responsibility (A.2.a.): See earlier coments on exercise design, requirements, staffing and future exercises.

Emergency Facilities and Equipment (H.4.): The complete emergency staff was alerted during the initial notification process, and the complete emergency staff was advised each time the plant emergency status changed. The evaluator l

must not have checked the logs. As earlier stated, the staff was mobilized on a selective basis. See earlier coments on exercise design, requirements, staff, and future exercises.

Emergency Classification System (0.4.): See earlier conenents on exercise design, requirements, staffing, and future exercises.

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Protective Response (J.10.c.): The exercise permitted free play by local government. Specific actions were to be demonstrated. Some of these actions were not evaluated because the single field eyeluator became lost. Further, this function has been informally tested many times in prior exercises. It is our understanding that FEMA has not yet devised an accepted scientific

- method to test siren systems. In any case, this function will continue to be tested in future exercises.

Protective Response (J.10.c .?: 'See earlier coments on exercise design, requirements, staffing, anc Future exercises.

Protective Response (J.10.e.): The sheriff's vehicle intended to pick up XI for emergency workers departed the sheriff's office on a back-up alerting task prior to receiving instructions regarding XI. The personnel responsible for this function have already been re-briefed.

Protective Response (J.10.J.): Because the federal evaluator lost his way, this action was carried out twice. In the judgment of local law enforcement officials, one officer at the control point in question was sufficient because of the small population involved, and because access to the area is limited. Further, additional traffic control personnel will be available if needed. Consideration will be given to a more extensive demonstration of this function in the next exercise.

Radiological Exposure Control (K.3.a.): Emergency response personnel will receive refresher training in the use of survey meters, dosimetry and dosimetry records. This training will be initiated by September 19, 1983.

Radiological Exposure Control (K.5.a.): An actual wash-down of a contaminated (simulated) vehicle was not scheduled as a part of the exercise. Considera-tion will be given to demonstrating this function during the next exercise.

Notification Methods and Procedures (E.2.): As stated earlier, the complete EOC staff was alerted when the exercise began and notified each time the emeigency classification changed. Consideration will be given to

! participation by a larger part of the EOC staff during the next exercise.

BRUNSWICK COUNTY See the coment under Significant Notification Methods and Procedures (E.5.):

Deficiencies - North Carolina. The necessary training will be conducted by September 19, 1983.

See the coment under Significant Notification Methods and Procedures (E.7.):

Deficiencies - North Carolina. The necessary training will be conducted by

' September 19, 1983.

Public Education and Information (G.4.c.): See the coment on G.4.c. under Minor Deficiencies - North Carolina. The necessary training will be conducted by September 19, 1983.

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Protective Response fJ.12.1: The radiological monitor assigned to the West Brunswick High Schoot did not report to the shelter. The Emergency Operations Center was not inforined of this problem until near the end of the exercise. .

Assignments and procedures to report operational problems will be corrected during refresher training conducted by the county prior to September 30, 1983.

Protective Response (J.10.3.): An inventory of all raidological defense .

equipment and refresher training on the instruments will be completed by September 30. 1983. .

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