ML20091P228

Forwards Transcript of NRC Testimony Before House Subcommittee on Energy & Environ of Committee on Interior & Insular Affairs on 830616

ML20091P228
Person / Time
Site:	Midland
Issue date:	07/11/1983
From:	Kammerer C NRC OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS (OCA)
To:	Gilinsky NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML17198A223	List: IR 05000329/1981014 IR 05000329/1982013 IR 05000329/1983008 ML20090A052 ML20090A064 ML20090A067 ML20090A071 ML20090A076 ML20090A080 ML20090A090 ML20090A103 ML20090A106 ML20090A110 ML20090A367 ML20090A377 ML20090A397 ML20090A403 ML20090A447 ML20090A451 ML20090A456 ML20090A465 ML20090A481 ML20090A487 ML20090A491 ML20090A500 ML20090A504 ML20090A514 ML20090A517 ML20090A543 ML20090A547 ML20090A559 ML20090A590 ML20090A594 ML20090A600 ML20090A613 ML20090A614 ML20090A623 ML20090A626 ML20090A631 ML20090A637 ML20090A642 ML20090A656 ML20090A658 ML20090A673 ML20090A698 ML20090A703 ML20090A733 ML20090A741 ML20090A748 ML20090A751 ... further results
References
CON-BOX-08, CON-BOX-8, FOIA-84-96 NUDOCS 8406120630
Download: ML20091P228 (56)

Text

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SUBJECT:

T SCRIPT FOR EDI. TING: JUNE 16, 1983 jQUALITY ASSURANCE AT THE MIDLAND PLANT A transcript. of the NRC testimony; before the House Subcomittee on Energy and the Environment of the:Comittee on Interior and Insular Affairs on June 16, 1983, is attached. We request your coments be edited and returned with all required inserts-to OCA by close-of-business Thursday, July 21, 1983.. By copy of this memorandum E00 is asked to coordinate staff edits of this transcript and return to OCAlby ther above date. CONTACT: F. Combs, x41443

Attachment:

As stated cc: Chairman Palladino Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Asselstine vEDO SECY. OGC ELD IE REGION III (Keppler) 8406120630 840517 PDR FOIA = RICE 84-96 PDR

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SUBJECT:

SCRIPT FOR EDITING: JUNE 16, 1983 UALITY ASSURANCE AT THE MIDLAND PLANT t A transcript of the NRC testiraony, before the House Subcomittee on Energy and the Environment or the Comittee on Interior and Insular Affairs on June 16, 1983, is attached. We request your coments be edited and returned with all required inserts to OCA by close-of-business Thursday, July 21, 1983. By copy of this memorandum EDO is asked to coordinate staff edits of this transcript and return to OCA by the above date. CONTACT: F. Combs, x41443

Attachment:

As stated cc: Chairman Palladino Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Asselstine ,I EDO SECY OGC ELD j IE REGIONIII(Keppler) i I i 3 g{1 m.

r MAME: HII167050 PAGE 82 1926 ( 1927 l 1928 STATEMENTS OF HONORABLE VICTOR GILINSKY, COMMI3SIONER, t 1929 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOM; ACCOMPANIED BY JAMES KEPPLER, l 1930 ADMINISTRATOR, REGION III; RONALD COOK, NRC MIDLAND I l 1931 INSPECTOR; ROSS LANDSMAN, NRC MIDLAND INSPECTOR; R.M. L l 1932 GARDNER, NRC MIDLAND INSPECTOR; AND DANIEL EISENHUT, OFFICE 1933 Or hUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION j 1934 1935 Mr. SEIBERLING. All right gentlemen, Mr. Gilinsky? l 1936 Commissioner GILINSKY. Mr., Chairman, thank you for the 1937 opportunity to participate. I should say at the outset that 1938 I'm testifying in an individual capacity. The agency's i 1935 testimony will be delivered by the head of our Region III 1940 office, Mr. Kappler. 1941 I visited the plant about"a week ago in the company of 1942 many of the witnesses that appeared today. I visited 1943 inspectors, regional inspectors, various Intervanors, t I 1944 Chairman Selby of Consumer Power and members of his i j 1945 organization. I came away with a number of impressions and I 1946 uould like to share some of them with you. After the l 1947 previous testimony I don't think I need to recite the-l 1948 history of this plant. I do want to say that in reviewing 1949 the troubled history of the plant I an distressed, as it is 1950 clear that you are, that our systems for assuring safety, by L St

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l MAME: HII167050 PAGE 83 1951 the utilities and NRC's, turn up serious problems so late in l 1952 the construction process and that the solutions are slow in 1953 coming. i 1954 There has got to be a better way of spotting problems 1955 earlier, in dealing with them more promptly. ) 1956 I would like to say a few words about NRC's role, and ~ 1957 about our process. 1958 After the discovery of the soils problem that you have i 1959 beer hearing about, the NRC staff issued an order in 1979, { 1960 which modified the construction permit and required the 1961 halting of construction in certain areas. 1962 Unfortunately, the view of our lawyars in those days was 1963 that constructior eroblems did not justify immediate i 1964 enforcement action, and this meant the licensee could 5 1965 prevent the order from becoming effective and thus continus ~ 1966 in construction by requesting a hearing. This the company i 1,967 did, the planned continued construction and it has been in i 1 1968 hearing ever since. It is incidentally a useful reminder I 1969 that it isn't just Intervenors that take advantage of l' l 1970 hearingr. I should mention that the NRC Staff's formal. 1971 participation in the current. hearing does not fall into the 1972 usual pattern which I criticized recently before this i 1973 committee. Our staff cannot be accused of lining up with the i 1974 utility. At the same time, I also think that the involvement 1975 of the staff in a formal adjudication greatly complicates i t m

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t NAME: HII167050 PAGE 84 1976 Commission staff communication on the important issues. I i 1977 think this argues, then, for ending the NRC staff role as a 1978 formal party in such hearings. i 1979 In 1982 the Licensing Board took an unusually active step, i 1980 adopted an unusually active role, and issued its own order 1981 which put the plant's construction under the step by step 1982 control of the NRC staff. The order was not taken up by the 1983 Commission. 1984 It is unfortunate, to my mind, that the Commission itself 1985 has had so little to do with NRC's action in this 1986 trouble-plagued project. So far as I can tall, the 1987 Commission has never had a meeting on safety problems, or 1988 had never had a meeting on safety problems at Midland. Not 1989 in recent years, anyway. And until yesterday, the last L 1990 meeting of any kind in Midland uns in 1978, and that was on ^ 1991 a personal dispute between the staff and Intervanor lawyers. 1992 Upon my return from Midland last week I recommended to the 1993 chairman, our chairman, that the Commission address itself j 1994 to the safety problems at that site. 1995 We had the first meeting on the subject yesterday. Mr. 1996 Keppler made a presentation. I thought it was a very helpful 1997 meeting. And it shows, by the way, that the prospect of a 1 1998 committee hearing is a very useful way of concentrating i 1 > t 1999 Commission attention. 2000 Mr. SEIBERLING. Like an' election for an elected officials. 9%. .y- ,a., m .y w y 4

e XAME: HII167050 PAGE 85 2001 Commissioner SILINSKY. My own feeling is that given the 2002 scale of the problems, enormous sums involved, sums which 2003 uill ultimately be paid for by consumers--thats with a small J 1004 C--the complex interaction of the project with the NRC - l l 2005 through a Licensing Board and headquarters and regional 2006 staffs, it is essential that the Commission itself be l 2007 confident that the agency is dealing properly with Midland. 2008 We need to be sure that the company is complying with our 2009 regulations and that we are assured such compliance in a 2010 sensible manner. That is all I have to say at the moment 2011 except to introduce Mr. Kappler our administrator. 2012 I have one other point. I have prepared a large foldout 2013 describing the procedural history of Midland. I haven't 2014 quite got it ready for distribution, but I would like to a 2015 submit it for the record. I think it is instructive. ~ 2016 Mr. SEIBERLING. Without objection, we will include that. 2017 [The complete statement follows.] l 2018 i } 2011 1 4 4 b 5 P +- - W

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XAME: HII167050 PAGE 86 2020 Commissioner GILINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 2021 Mr. SEI3ERLING. Mr. Kapplar? 2022 Mr. KEPPLER. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. My name is James l 2023 Keppler and I'm the regional administrator of the NRC Region l 2024 III Chicago office. With me today I have Mr. Ronald Cook. I I' 2025 Mr. Ross Landsman, and Mr. Ron Gardner, three of my 2026 inspectors who have been very heavily involved in the 2027 Midland work. They are here at the request of the committee. 2028 I'll summarize my testimony if that's all right with you, 2029 recognizing 2030 Mr. SEIBERLING. Without objection, your entire testimony 2031 uill be included. 2032 Mr. KEPPLER. Thank you. l 4 2033 I think I'd start out by emphasizing that Midland has 2034 experienced repeated Problems since the start of i 2035 construction in 1972. The NRC and the licensea have taken .i 2036 actions to address these SA problems as they occur, and I l 2037 might' contrast that to, when I sat before this committee 2038 last summer, in the Zimmer case, where,.really, the NRC 2039 staff did not recognize the. full significance of the SA 2040 problems as they unfolded. 2041 .The NRC staff har been aware of the Midland problems and 2042 has been attempting to deal with them as they were I 2043 identified. 2044 In 1981 I provided testimony to the NRC's Atomic Safety k. s +m -e ~=- v 9 w ---p,, ,e. y e ec,-w 9-m-

i NAME: HII167050 PAGE 87 2045 and Licensing Board, presiding over the hearing on remedial ( 2046 soils issues at Midland plant. 2047 I testified at that time on the more sigdificant SA 2048 problems that had been experienced in connection with 1 i 2049 Midland and the corrective actions taken by consumers Power i 2050 Company and its contractors. 2051 I stated that while many significant quality assurance 2052 deficiencies had been identified, it was the NRC Staff's. 2053 conclusion that the problems experienced were not indicative 2054 of a breakdown in the implementation of the overall quality 2055 asruzance program. 2056 I also noted that while deficiencies had occurred which j 2057 should have keen identified earlier, Consumers Power 2058 Company's SA program had been generally effective in the 2059 ultimate identification and subsequent correction of these 2060 deficiencies. Furthermore, at"that hearing I discussed the .l 2061 results of a special SA inspection that I had conducted in 2062 May, 1981. A team of nine of my best inspectors that I sent 2063 up to the site, which I had initiated to determine whether i 2064 modifications made to Consumers' SA program in 1980 were 2065 effective. 2066 The results reflected favorably on the Midland plant 2067 quality assurance department formed in August 1980 to 2038 improve SA performance. The thrust of my testimony at that 2069 time was that I had confidence in the Consumers Power L t 'a =w- ,u ..e.4..,% g%. g M 4 a='= v y w* vi m t-umm P-- 4 ei

NAME: NII167050 PAGE 88 2070 Company's SA program both for the remedial soils work and 2071 the remainder of the construction. Mou, in April, 1982. I i 2072 was made aware that additional significant quality assurance 2073 problems were being encountered. This concerned me in view 2074 of my 1981 testimony to the Atomic Safety and Licensing j 2075 Board. 2076 As a result, I notified the Atomic Safety and Licensing 2077 Board that my previous testimony would have to be modified; 2078 directed staff evaluation to assess the cause and correction 2079 of the problems; and I created a special section within the i j l 2080 Region III office, solely to handle the Midland project and 2081 reviewing the facility's status and history. Meetings were ? 2082 held with consumers power Companf to discuss the MRC's 2083 concerns, and to inform them that additional measures were j 2084 required to assure the quality of the plant. i 2085 In addition, the Midland section reconmended and then 2086 . conducted the comprehensive inspection of systems and 2087 components with the diesel generator building, which 2088 ultimately led to the major.stop work action in 2089 December, 1982. 2090 The--where we stand today, Mr. Chairman, is that consumers 2091 Power Company has proposed a number of changes which the 2092 staff is reviewing, that will consist of a backwards look at 2093 the completed construction to dates will consist of a 2094 program to complete the plant and complete any necessary '4 I e e. w-- nw --,-.r*c--y

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l 1 NAME: NII167050 PAGE 89 2095 re wo r.': that may be done--all of this overviewed by a ( 2096 third-party organization in addition to the NRC. 2097 We believe these programs, when we complete our review of 2098 them and approval of them--we hope that these will provide l 2099 confidence that the project will be completed i 2100 satisfactorily. 2101 In any event, we want to assure this committee that the 2102 MRC will not issue a license for this facility until we are i 2103 satisfied the construction has been completed properly. I j 2104 With that, Mr. Chairman, we are prepared to answer any 2105 que'stions you may have. 2106 Mr. SEIBERLING. All right. There are no prepared 2107 statements of the inspectors? All right. Thank you very ? 2108 auch. 2109 Mr. Kappler, can you tell me, or maybe Mr. Gilinsky or ^ 2110 someone can, what assurances HRC requirai as to site 2111 suitability prior to approval of the site? Was the site 2112 originally approved'hy MRC? In 1969? 2'.13 Commissioner GILINSKY. It would have to have been approved 2114 as part of the construction permit proceeding. I guess you'd 2115 have to supply for the record exactly what was done at that 2116 time. 2117 Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Kappler, can you answer that? 1 2118 Mr. KEppLER. I-can't answer anything to that, Mr. 2119 Seiberling. w th y Tr w 4 p w

O i - MAME: HII167050 PAGE 90 4 2120 Mr. SEIBERLING. If a new plant were being submitted for k 2121 approval today, before any work had been done, what would 2122 NRC require in terms of such things as soil b rings, 2123 foundation plans, and so forth? How deeply do they go into 2124 that sort of thing? How deeply would you? 4 2125 Mr. KEPPLER. Mr. Eisenhut, our Office of Muclear Reactor 2126 Regulation might be able to Provide that answer. 2127 Mr. SEIBERLING. All right. Y 2128 Mr. EISENHUT. Let me try to help you somewhat. When we go V 2129 through the licensing process, early in the Process one of 2130 the first considerations to look at is the site. You look at 2131 it from a number of considerations. i 2132 You look at it from its basic soil characteristics; you 2133 look at it from the location of nearby facilities. One of k -i 2134 the keys you look at is population. 2135 The only area that I'm aware of that, today, if you 2136 relooked at the Midland site., that would be a much closer 2137 call than it unc at the time, would be the population issue. j 2138 We have not gone back and relooked at the population 2139 density criteria that we use today, to see whether the sita 2140 would in fact have passed that test. But I do know in the ~ 2141 time frame of the late '60s-and tarly '70s, we didn't have 2142 such criteria. It was done in a much different framework 2143 where we didn't have a specific criteria per square mile 2144 where we looked c.t number of people. (L q g,,,, m y o-w. ,e m-- ww-<v E** e- + =

NAME: RII167050 PAGE 91 I 2145 The one step we have taken recently on high population 2146 density sites, as we have called them, the higher population 2147 density sites of plants that are presently un[er l 2148 construction, for example the seabrook site, we have in fact 2149 required a probabilistic risk assessment to be done by the I 2150 utility. l 2151 We are doing that in recognition of the fact that these 2152 sites have grown to the point where the surrounding i 2153 population is higher than we previously thought. It does not 2154 at this time, I believe, include the Midland site. It.is 2155 somewhat below that--did not trip our threshold of 2156 asking--requiring a PRA, although one is being done for the 2157 Midland site. l 2158 So it is certainly not in the league of the Indian points, 2159 the Zions, the Limericks or the Seabrooks, which are in fact 2t60 the sites on the very high and'of the population density l 2161 scale. 2162 Mr. SEIBERLING. If you knew in 1969 uhat you know nou 2163 about soil conditions, would you have doubts about whether 2164 this was a suitable site? 2165 Mr. EISENHUT. From the basic framework, as far as a 2166 suitable site. I don't believe we would have the doubt. 2167 You see, you've got to remember that the basic underlying -i j 2168 glacial till is a satisfactory soil. The problem that came 2169 about in connection with the Midland project was that on I L l l y + -w-

W NAME: WII167050 PAGE 92 2170 certain pieces of the structure they had to put in compacted k 2171 soil. That is a perfectly acceptable process. However, the 2172 implementation of that is what broke down at dhe Midland i 2173 site. j 2174 That is, there is a satisfactory engineering solution from 2175 a design standpoint. But it was inadequately carried out at 2176 the site. { 2177 Mr. SEIBERLING. Thank you. 2178 All right. I don't know that I have time to go into all of 2179 the questions raised by the testimony of the Intervanors. 2180 However, they have certainly raised some very major 2181 questions. And the siting is one of them, of course. But let 2182 me just go through a couple of them here and then I'll yield 1 2183 to my colleagues and maybe we can get back to it after they 2184 have their time. ~ 2185 Mrs. Sinclair, on page 1 of hur testimony, says that: 2186 Subsequent inspection reports after construction was 2187 resumed in April 1973 showed that these promises were 2188 ignored by Consumers power Company- those are promises l 2189 about the quality control, apparently. And, she says, 2190 Region III did not act on these reports of-violations, but 2191 the attorney for the citi=en intervanors, Myron Cherry, read l 2192 the inspection reports'and brought them to the attention of 2193 the Appeals Board, pointing'out that Consumers power company 2194 did not honor its promises for improved quality control. t L ,,n ---nc ~ ~ y s w m m

=. _. f 4 .MAME: HII167050 PAGE 93 2195 Then she quoted from the Appeals Board, after the hearing { l 2196 in November--in the report, or letter, rather, that they 2!97 urote in November of 1973 to Mr. Muntzing, who#uns then .i i 2198 director of licensing. Here's what they said: i 2199 What we have here is a pattern of repeated, flagrant and l 2200 significant quality assurance violations of a non-routine i 2201 character, coupled with an unredeemed promise of 2202 reformation. Then says, the staff subsequently issued an 4 2203 order to suspend construction until Consumers power Company 2204 could demonst:ste uhy their license shouldn't be susper.uec, 4 2205 In a short time the order to halt construction was lifted. i 2206 because of political 3ressure. After an uncontested hearing, l 2207 approval of the license was renewed. t 2208 Mr. Keppler, can you comment on this? w 2209 Mr. KEPPLER. In late 1973 there was a problem that was ~ 2210 identified by the NRC involving cad welding operations at 2211 tht site. This is the splicing of reenforcement steel in the 2212 concrete. We found that the cad welding work was really not 2213 being controlled properly 2nd some of the cad welds were not 2214 being completed properly. 2215 As a result of that action the MRC, at that time tha AEC, 2216 required the utility to stop work in that area, and 2217psy@sequently the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board 2118 did write a letter to the director of regulation at that 2119 time, urging that a formal stop-work be issued in the form i A .. ~ - ~ r ~...

= _ _ a N A.ME : HII167050 PAGE 94 2220 of an order. And an order was issued that required immediate 2221 stopping of the cad welding operation, which had already i 2222 been stopped, but it also required a show caute--the licensee 2223 to show cause, why all construction activities should not be 2224 stopped, a matter that was dealt with in a formal hearing in 2225 the sunser of 1974. 2226 The cad welding operations were permitted by the NRC to 2227 resume after the NRC was satisfied that the procedures for 2228 controlling the work and the quality assurance activities 2229 were proper. There was no pressure on the NRC staff to i 2230 permit the resumption of operations that I'm aware of. And I 1 i 2231 certainly felt.no pressure in releasing that work. l 2232 Mr. SEIBERlING. APParently, going to the soil problem, 4 2233 someone wrote a memorandum in 1930 of a conversation with i 2234 you. This is a memorandum that was apparently attached to 2235 a--summary was attached to a memorandum from Thomas Gibbon to 2236 Samuel Choate with a copy to you, subject, possible ex parte 2237 contact in the Midland proceedings. 2238 It's a conversation and here is the summary of one of your 2239 statements. ' ' Midland is continuing to work today to make i 2240 resolution of the settlement problem much more difficult. 4 t 2241 Kappler said the staff had not yet made up their minds on 2242 whether the fix proposed by Midland was acceptable; 2243 therefore, the project continues to be built and the problem 2244 gets worse. He wanted the work stopped until the problem is m t 4 w 4 = = w e g n-- +- -w-

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/ NAME: MII167050 PAGE 93 2245 solved. Is-that a correct summary, accorCLng to your best k 2246 recollection? I 2247 Mr. KZppLER. Yes, it is. Could I give you a little [. 2248 background on that? 2249 Mr. SEIBERLING. Yes. 2250 Mr. KEppLER. Mr. Gibbon was the technical assistant to 2251 Commissioner Bradford, when he was with the agency. And ha 2252 made a visit to our regional office, and during the course 2253 of that visit we talked about a number of matters in which 4 2254 they were soliciting input from the field as to what matters 2255 the Commission might be able to focus attention on. One of i 2256 the issues that was discussed was the question of problems 2257 occurring in construction and whether or not work should 2258 stop--there should ever be a stop-work issued by the NRC. 2259 The view that I was expressing at that time was when you 2260 have a problem-and you don't inou what the fix is going to i i 2261 be, that I questioned the merits of letting that project i 8 2262 proceed, recognizing that it is being done at the utility's 4 1 2263 own risk. I questioned the merits of letting that type of 2264 activity proceed until it was determined that a technical 2265 fix was achieveable. And so I raised that question as really 2266 a philosophy question with Mr. Gibbon, to bring back to i 2267 commissioner Bradford. 2268 Commissioner GILINSKY. If I may interject a comment, Mr. 2269 Seiberling? + e b t- ,,,-.,4 +, y e ,.-,.p. g wF-e .m,, -v.y y -= or %s w 1 'By

I e ' NAME: MII167050 PAGE 96 2270 Mr. SEIBERLING. Yes. ( 2271 Commissioner GILINSKY. I think over the years, until 4 2272 really recently there was a feeling, which I dentioned in i 2273 the testimony, particularly in our lawyers, that l 2274 construction problems did not constitute immediate health i 2275 and safety problems and therefore did not justify immediate 2276 enforcement action. And the agency was--did not easily step i 2277 in and stop projects, even when there were problems that 2178 were fairly serious. l 2279 I think--well, for example, there were also very seldom--I 2280 think perhaps for many years--no civil penalties in the 2281 construction area. That has changed to some extent and I 2282 think-- 2283 Mr. SEIBERLING. Well, I think that's a very important u 2284 observation. ~ 2285 Mr. KEPPLER. Could I add one other point? f 2286 Mr. SEIBERLING. Yes. 2287 Mr. KEPPLER. I make the point, I think the only times ue 2288 exercised our authority to stop work in a formalized way was I 2289 when the continuation of construction might cover up work, 2290 so that you couldn't than inspect the completed work. Like, 2291 perhaps during pouring of concrete. 2292 Mr. SEIBERLING. What was the result of your [ 2293 recommendation? Was the work stopped or was it not? I I 2294 Mr. MEPPLER. No. But it wasn't a recommendation in that l I I / l = l ~ .n .a ., -. ~,. - +n

w = ~ NAME: MII167050 PAGE o7 2295 sense. It was a--again, we were focusing on the philosophical ( 2296 argument about uhether or not enforcement action should be E-2297 taken in the formal way of stopping work durin's plants under 2298 construction. It was brought up in that context. 7 2299 But when Mr. Gibbon realized that the matter could involve I s r 2300 an ex parte violation, he felt it necessary to summarire 2301 that conversation, which was one small part of a much bigger 2302 conversation. 5 2303 Commissioner GILINSKY. Also, Mr. Chairman, the vieu was if L P 2304 there were any problems the utility was proceeding at its N l 2305 own risk and then these wou.'.d be dealt with at the operating j y l 2306 license stage. I think we have since learned that you have -r 2307 to deal with these problems at an earlier stage. E 2308 Mr. SEIBERLING. That's another question I was going to get u 2309 into. Is it still the policy of MRC to-- 2310 Commissioner GILINSKY. We have-- l 1 2311 Mr. SEIBERLING. To allou the facility to proceed at their E i 2312 own risk? 2313 Commissioner GILINSKY. In some sense they proceed at their ( 2314 own risk. But the fact of the matter is, in the real world 2315 when things get built, th'at weighs pretty heavily on the I_ 2316 decisionrakers; and I think ue have decided, and I think I I i 2317 can speak for all the Commission on this, one has to bou a r h 2318 great deal firmer in the construction phase. 2319 Mr. KEPPLER. I might add, in the case of the Marble Hill u h_ M w p w L

e 4 NA,ME: MII167050 PAGE 98 2320 project in southern Indiana the NRC took formal actions to 2321 stop that project because of a dcficient quality assurance 2322 program, as well as the concern that completed work might l 2323 not be able so be inspected by continuing works and that i i 2324 project was shut down for 16 months as a result of our l 2325 action. 2326 Mr. SEIBERLING. Mrs. Sinclair cited another example where, 3 2327 in July 1981, Joseph Kane, MRC's chief geotechnical f 2328 engineer, in answering a question as to whether in j 2329 retrospect removal and replacement of the diesel generator 2330 building would have been a better option, he said

Well, 2331

uhen you are considering it from the standpoint of safety 2332 alone, it is my opinien that the removal and replacement is 2333 a better solution. If you are considering the other facets, i L 2334 that is the cost and impact on schedule, these are facets 2335 that enginesrs must address, than it may not be the superior 2336 option. 2337 of course, everything has to require a balancing, but 2338 apparently in this case the costs under consideration are 2339 deemed to be more important than the safety problem. Do you 2340 unnt to comment on that? 4 2341 Mr. KEPPLER. Yes, I would. I think this committee should 2342 he aware that the staff evaluations-~ 2343 Mr. SEIBERLING. All right. Go ahead. 3344 Mr. KEPPLER. That the staff assessment of this project, of g m.... --~ ...J*

T ^ NAME: HII167050 PAGE 99 2345 this remedial soils effort, included quality assurance k 2346 people, hydraulic engineers, mechanical engineers, L e j 2347 geotechnical engineers, structural engineers eithin the 2348 staff; and included consultants from, Technology Engineering 2349

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Army Corps of Engineers, U.M. Naval Surface j 2350 Weapons centers Brookhaven National Laboratory; Science 2351 Applications Incorporated; Geotechnical Engineers 2352 Incorycrated; Crima and Samuels and Associates, j 2353 Incorporated. There were a lot of people used by the agency .i j 2354 in formulating the staff's position, and I think it is a 2355 little bit unfair to assess that as an expedient type of i 2356 decision. 2357 Mr. SEIBERLING. In other words, you do review all of the 2358 agencies, and try to come to a decision in which safety is (s ^ 2359 not slighted in any serious way? Is that what you are ~ 2360 saying? 1 4 { 2361 Mr. KEppLER..I think the staff would say that safety was 2362 the foremost consideration-. Mr. Eisenhut would like to make 2363 a comment. 2364 Mr. EISEMMUT. Mr. Kane is, in fact, one of our senior j 2365 soils reviewers on the staff. I think I'd probably concur 2366 with him, that the best solution would be to remove the i 2367 building and start over. We don't require the best solution. t 2368 We require an acceptable solution and in this case there was i 2369 an engineering solution that came up in the problem. Mr. b i 4 +. - ye q-g- a g Ie y a--, -e ~s,-- re, ---w+-.~e y e

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MAME: MII167050 PAGE 100 f 2370 Kane was, in fact, a geotechnical engineer who was the C di 2371 principle geotechnical engineer who, in fact, did the final 2372 review and concurred in our overall position.I t 2373 so I think what you have seen is, there is clearly a l 2374 spectrum of views in this area. Any time you get a highly 2375 technical problem, you'll get--we vent to the best resources 2376 ue knew in the agency. Mr. Keppler mentioned some outside 2377 organizations: The Corps of Engineers, the Naval Surface 2378 Weapons center--a number of organizations. But the and result 2379 was, in fact, that we think un came up with an acceptable 2380 conclusion to the problem. It is a solution that is j 2381 certainly not the best. It is certainly not the cleanest. 2382 As I said, the cleanest would be to remove the building 2383 and start over. But we feel it was a satisfactory solution 2384 to go forward. It carries the final conclusion of all of 2305 these people, including Mr. Kane. 2386 Mr. SEIBERLING. Thank you, Mr. Lujan. 2387 Mr. LUJAM. The final line is that the building is not less 2388 safe because of the method used than if you had razed it 2389 completely down and started all over agains do I gather 2390 that? r 2391 Commissioner GILINSKY. I think what Mr. Eisenhut said--it 2392 was acceptable, he said. 2393 Mr. LUJAM. Is it any more dangerous because of the fact it 2394 was not torn down? g 9 l. .~. g.

l 1 MAME: MII167050 PAGE 101 2395 Mr. EISEMHUT. No, we believe not. When I said acceptable, ( 2396 it Passes the test, the acceptable level of safety test. I 2397 was just reminded of a comment that each of th'a various 2398 different specialists in the various different groups 2399 supported each of the different aspects. It covers quality i 2400 assurance, geotechnical, hydraulic engineering, mechanical 2401 engineering, structural engineering, it covered a very 2402 thorough process and each of those different disciplines 2403 feel that there was an acceptable level of safety in the i 2404 final product. 2405 Mr. MOODY. Will the gentlemen yield? 2406 Mr. LUJAM. Yes. 2407 Mr. MOODY. If we could follow up on that, when you say 2408 acceptable, that is not the same thing as saying not at all 2409 less safe. You are talking about a threshold level. It still 2410 asets the threshold criteria,'that high or above in terns of f 2411 safety? Which isn't to say that, had you torn it down and 2412 started over it wouldn't be at still a higher level? 2413 Mr. EISENHUT. That's right. 2414 Mr. MOODY. It's a series of probabilities. Different 2415 things happen. And the probabilities of different things 2416 going urong are not identical to a decimal point as they 1 2417 would be if you tore it down as a result and started later. 2418 'I.think the answer to the gentleman's question is less' safe 2419 had you torn it down and started over. I \\ L I _-_....i. .. ~. ~... _.

MAME: HII167050 PAGE 102 2420 Mr. EISENHUT. I'm not sure it is less safe. Because if k 2421 this mission is adequately carried out, and put that big 2422 proviso on it, you may and up uith the same end product. 2423 Because you have to remember what is being done. In effect 1 2424 in the limit, the worst case, call it the biggest facility 2425 modification of the worst case here, they are actually nou 2426 going in and removing all of the soil that is in question. 2427 They are then putting a structure in place that should have / 2428 been there in the first place. 2429 Mr. MOODY. Should have? 2430 Mr. EISIMHUT. Should have, because of this. Either you 2431 should have compacted the soil adequately in the first place 2432 or put an adequate concrete foundation in. Now they are J 2433 going back in the worst situation we are talking here and 2434 they are removing many, many, many cubic yards of soil and 2435 they are actually now putting a concrete structure in place, l 2436 all the way down to the acceptable glacial till which we l 2437 would have found in the first place. So it is not clear that 2438 one is less safe than the other. 2439 It's a distinction you really can't make. 2440 Mr. MOODY. The probabilities of an accident or something 2441 untoward happening are no greater now than they would have 2442 been had you started from the beginning and done it jusy the - l 2443 way you wanted it? 2444 Mr. EISENHUT. I would say I certainly can't distinguish a b u t Y r n s 9 h

NAMU HII167050 PAGE 103 2445 between the two in terms of the probabilities. l k 2446 Mr. SEIBERLING. The committee will recess for ten minuttes 2447 and resume. i 2448 [ Recess.) 2449 Mr. SEIBERLING. Let's continue, gentlemen. Mr. KePPlare I 2450 understand that at some point you informed the Midland i i 2451 Licensing Board, 'We believe that we simply cannot rely on 2452 Consumers Power Company's quality assurance program by 2453 itself. You suggested it would be necessary to supplement l r 2454 it by third-party overview. Does this indicate that NRC does i 2455 not have confidence that the licensee is capable of l 2456 conducting a quality assurance program in conformance with 2457 the commission's requirements? 2458 Mr. KEPPLER. Let me answer this way. Over the years, as 2459 problems have been identified with Consumers Power Company's 2460 quality assurance program, changes had to be.made to improve 2461 that program. And each time these changes were made, they ] 2462 appeared to be reasonable. But when it came to the actual 2463 implementation of these changes, the problems continued to 2464 occur. 2465 They have made change as recently as this year. And, 2466 again, these type of changes look good. But my reaction is 1 i e 2467 that because of the history of the problems at this-site, ? 2468 that realistically I cannot take the position that we can be-2469 satisfied with Consumers Power Company's SA program by' I l i 1 v 4 -~r-,-.e wyw--,--- gr--i-y gr

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MAME: H,II167050 PAGE 104 2470 itself. I think a Period of sustained proven good 2471 performance has to be shown before I can do that. And so, 2472 this was the situation that, as I said in my t'e s timo ny, in 2473 April 1982. I decided that we were going to have to have i 2474 further verifications of this plant to have the needed 2475 confidence in it to conclude that it had been built 2476 properly. 'And we decided that a program was going to have to 2477 he done to look at past work, and I mean an extensive 2478 program, and a program that ur s going to have to be done to l l 2479 oversee Consumers' SA efforts for future ongoing work. i 2480 I'm not about to back off that position until I can see 2481 that confidence is warranted in Consumers' SA program. 2482 Mou, let me go back. I really evaded your question, and 2483 let me go back and tell you why I think this approach is 2484 reasonable. ~ 2485 I had problems with the Palisades plant over the years. 2486 And in 1981 I was prepared to shut that plant down for 1 2487 safety concerns. And the company came forth with a program i 2488 of some rather stiff oversights of uhat.was going on, and a 2489 program to improve its regulatory performance. 2490 The company has demonstrated to my satisfaction that they 2491 have been able to lick that problem; and they took a plant 2492 which was the worst plant in my region at that time, and I 2493 they improved the regulatory performance at that facility to i 2494 a level that I am really comfortable with right now. I j 6 h l l . _ _ ~ _ _ _...

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MAME: H,II167050 PAGE 105 1 2495 In the case of Midland, they have not been able to lick lh 2496 this problem and we are not certain why, actually. And so I 2497 felt that it was prudent to have this type of 3hird-party l 3 2498 overview on this plant until ua can have some confidance l 2499 that the company can implement the SA program properly. And 2500 I'm prepared to let this thing run this way, with 2501 third-party overview, to the completion of this project, if 2502 that's what it takes. 4 2503 Mr. SEIBERLING. Well, has there been an independent i l 2504 third-party quaJ.ity assurance program set up? Overview i 2505 program? [ 2506 Mr. KEPPLER. There is a program of overview for the soils 2507 work, which is proceeding at a very limited rate based upon 2508 a Board order by the Atomic Safety and Licensing--that's 2509 being done by Stone and Webster. And Stone and Webster has ~ 2510 been proposed by the company to do the third-party overvieu i 2511 for the balance of construction work and that is under 2512 review right now. I I 2513 Mr. SEIBERLING. Do you--go ahead. 2514 Mr. KEppLER. We have not made a decision on that point 2515 yet. 2516 commissioner GILIM5KY. If'I may add a comment, Mr. 2517 Chairman? 2518 Mr. SEIBERLING. Yes. 2519 . commissioner GILIM5XY. I agree with Mr. Kappler's remarks 2 1 = _r .c_. ,v-+-+.. r -r- ,-e<w--e,. ee- -.--r-----em-- +tm

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NAME H,II167050 PAGE 106 2520 about the palisades project. I joined him one day at an ( 2521 enforcement meeting there. 2522 The thing that disturbs me, it disturbed he at the time, f 4 I 2523 was that while the company had responded--in fact I was i 2524 impressed with the way they had, to our--to the actions we 2525 uste taking, they had let the plant deteriorate very badly. 2526 Both in terms of the human complement and the plant itself. 2527 particularly with regard to procedures. And it really took j 2528 the most severe action, the threat of even severer action on 2529 the part of Mr. Kappler, to get them to turn arouna. i a 2530 Mou, they did respond and I think that's all to the good. 2531 Mr. SEIBERLING. Well, the Intervanors press the view that. 2532 first of all, that they didn't have any confidence in Stone 2533 and Webster. And secondly, they felt it should be someone 2534 who was clearly independent and was representing the 2535 consumer point Of view; and thirdly, that there should have 2536 been consumer participation in the selection of Stone and I 2537 Webster, at least having a public hearing. Have you any i 2538 comments on that? 2539 Mr. KZypLER. Well, let me say that, from our point of 2540 view, Stone and Webster is one of the major 4 2541 architect / engineering firms in this country. And we consider 2542 them to be competent technically to do the work. 2543 The Intervenors have expressed concern that some of the 2544 projects that Stone and Webster have been on, have not been W .w. 6$

HAME: H,II167050 PAGE 107 2545 handled too well from a quality assurance standpoint. And k 2546 that's a valid comment. But that's true about most of the 2547 big firms. I 2548 There have been problems with Bechtel plants, as Midland 2549 1. There have been good Bechtel plants. There have been good l t 2550 Stone and Webster plants. But as a company they certainly 2551 are more--ara qualified to provide that kind of service. 2552 Now, what we did in the case of our assessment of Stone 2553 and Webster, was we made sure that the individuals who were i .i 2554 to be doing the work at Midland had had a good track record 2555 at other projects. We called and did reference collection on 2556 these people to satisfy ourselves that we really had the 2557 first team in there. 2558 As far as the independence concern goes, what we try to do 2559 is to make certain that both the company and the individuals 2560 involved are free from any significant financiL1 types of 2561 responsibility with the licensee. And Stone and Webster had l 2562 done really only a very small amount of work with consumers 2563 Power Company. And we were satisfied that they were not 2564 deriving a significant amount of their income from Consumers 2565 Power Company. 2566 So we felt the independence concern from a company 2567 standpoint was adequate, and what we did was to require the 2568 individuals, as well, to provide sworn statements that they 2569 were not involved in any way with Consumers power Company. b .~m 9

MAME: MII167050 PAGE 108 9 t 2570 Mr. SEIBERLING. Does it comply with the guidelines set up I 2571 for the Diablo Canyon? q I, 2572 Mr. KEppLER. I think it does. That's my dieu. 2573 Mr. SEIBERLING. Thank you. 2574 Mr. KEPpLER. Let me add one other comment. You made the 2575 point about citizen participation. I feel we have, and I 1 2576 guess it comes down to a question of how much. We had--all of l 2577 the information by the utilities have been provided to the 1 1 2578 citizens. We had a public meeting up in Midland in yebruary j 2579 of this year--an all-day--and a meeting into the evening, to I 2580 discuss the programs that were going to be put in place, 2581 being proposed by consumers power Company. 2582 We had written input from the--from members of the public i 2583 and the Intervenors, and a meeting was even held back in (u j t 2584 Washington at which the Intervanors were allowed to attend, ~ i 2585 where further discussion were going on. + i 2586 I feel we have tried to be responsible in this way. And we t l 2587 intend to hold further meetings up at--in the vicinity of the i 2588 plant during the course of the ongoing work. I { 2589 Mr. SEIBERLING. Their point uns they thought there should f 2590 he citizen participation in the selection of the third-party j 2591 oversight. l 2592 Mr. KEppLER. You know, you get down to the point--and I'm l 2593 going to say it this way--there's a question of: Somebody I 2594 ultimately has to make a decision. There can't be a I L l l nn b v a

MAME: HIk167050 PAGE 103 2'595 handholding, shared decisionmaking process in this business. ( 2596 Mr. SEIBERLING. I see. I agree. It's a question of hou far / 2597 you should get the public into the operation., i 2598 Mr. KEppLER. I think we are genuinely trying to make sure i 2599 ue are aware of public concerns and I think ue made several 2600 modifications to the programs as a result of these concerns. 2601 Mr. SEIBERLING. ! Jell, I guess it's a question of judgment. 2602 They feel there should be more. 2603 Mr. Moody? 2604 Mr. MOODY. I have two questions. First, Mr. Kappler, you i 2605 referred earlier to $120,000 civil penalty that the NRC 2606 proposed against Midland. What were the reasons for that? 2607 Mr. KEppLER. The reasons were for two major violations 2608 that occurred in connection with an inspection of the diesel 2609 generator building, that we conducted. 2610 One was for multiple items of noncompliance with the 2611 quality assurance program. And one was for the procedures of 2612 handling--identifying problems, where they weren't recording 2613 all of these problems. We felt that that was defeating the 2614 purpose of trending problem areas in the plant. 2615 Mr. MOODY. You consider these serious violations? 2616 Mr. KEppLER. Absolutely. I wouldn't have issued the fine 2617 if I didn't consider they were serious. 2618 Mr. MOODY. Any similar situations or occurrences take 2619 place? a b F 4 sh, _#aa-.-,.

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MAME H,II167050 PAGE 110 t 2620 Mr. KEPPLER. I'm sorry? /2621 Mr. MOODY. Has anything elTe of that nature taken place? 2622 Subsequent to those fines? Are you satisfied ulth their { 2623 performance subsequent to this? 2624 Mr. KEPPLER. You do realize that the majority of the job 4 i 2625 is stopped right nou. The soils work that is going on is a 2626 very piecemeal effort that we are authorizing. And I would 2627 have to say that, if you ask, are we satisfied? I would have 2628 to say not totally. We are still encountering some problems. I l j 2629 The inspectors still feel that that the attentien to detail f 2630 is not there yet. We are just going to have to be very--to 2631 dog this thing in a very painstaking manner to make sure 2632 that we get the kind of attention to detail that ua want. We 2633 are not about to turn this thing loose until we are 2634 satisfied that the work will proceed properly. i I 2635 Mr. MOODY. I have a second question-- 4 2C36 Mr. SEIBERLING. We have about one minute before the vote. i 2637 Mr. M00DY. We have probably a minute or hardly any more l 2638 and then we have to go. I would like to follow my question 2639 earlier to Mr. Eisenhut. You said there was no loss of 2640 security--of safety. What buildings were you' referring to, 2641 sir? i 2642 Mr. EISENHUT. Principally the example I used was the l 2643 auxiliary building portion, that I rentioned, where they are 2644 putting a foundation completely down to the glacial till (. B ~. _m....,_ ..,. + y

MLMT: HII157050 PAGE 111 2645 underneath. Where I said, in the limit--that is certainly the 2646 limiting case in terms of the repair. 2647 It varies somewhat when you go to other facilities. It 2648 could be argued when yo.u look at some facilities that l 1649 perhaps might have cracking in those facilities, one could t f 2650 argue that even though it is acceptable, once you go down to 2651 the lower' probability numbers, there clearly is a 2652 degradation in terms of the difference in numbers. 2653 Mr. MOODY. What would you say about the diesel generating 2654 housing structure? 2655 Mr. EISENHUT. Certainly it still meets the threshold of 2656 acceptability. But certainly any facility that had--it 2657 depends on the degree of crack. If you had extensive 2658 cracking such as there is cracking in the diesel building, u 2659 certainly the probability of a failure of the building would I ~ 2660 he higher than a brand neu building, completely rebuilt. 2661 Mr. MOODY. So your statement to the committee could not be i 2662 made with respect to the diesel building? { 2663 Mr. EISENHUT. It is a degradation. Certainly as I used the l 2664 limiting case example before it certainly would be, but it 2665 would vary as you go to the diesel building and then the 2666 other buildings would be in between. There is, in fact, all 2667 of those buildings, though, by our evaluation, and up still 2668 acceptable from an overall point of view. i-2669 Mr. MOODY. I guess my point was, you gave us a threshold i 4 i,,% --.w.m- ,.e w w-w 4 ~ _

l NAME: HII167050 pAGE 112 2670 concept, but below the threshold there are varying f 2671 probabilities of something going wrongs and you did not i 2672 agree with that statement. You said indistingu:ishable { 2673 probabilities differs, so it was--but when you get to the 2674 diesels. I think you would probably stand by what I was I 2675 basically driving at? 2676 Mr. EISENHUT. That's right. On the limiting case if you 2677 carefully repair it, it is back to the original. 2678 Mr. SEIBERLING. I'm sorry, we'll have to recess for i 2679 another 10 minutes. 2680 (Recess.) 1 2681 Mr. SEIBERLING..The subcommittee will resume its hearing. 2682 Mr. Moody is still recognized. I /2683 Mr. M00DY. Mr. Eisenhut--is he still available? Mr. 2684 Eisenhut, we'll continue if that's all right with ysu. We 2685 had to kind of break off for tha vote. 2686 Mr. EI5ENHUT. Sure. 2687 Mr. MOCDY. The point I was trying to make earlier, we are 2688 only talking about relative probabilities and I think you l 2689 did not agree with me, and I did not make the distinction, 2690 building by building. But I was--apparently you in your nind t 2691 were making that distinction. Because you feel indeed there 2692 is a relative probability issue when you get to some of the 2693 buildings. 2694 Could we just pick up where we were talking? Go ahead. l l k s

~~ MAME HII167050 PAGE 113 2695 Mr. EISENHUT. I believe the relative probability argument 2696 would certainly vary with whom you ask. It is not a hard and l 2697 fast science you can put your hand on, and I think it varies i 2698 considerably with the set of experts you ask. I 2699 Clearly, it is some kind of spectrum, as you go to a i 2700 building that has more and more damage, the probabilities of 2701 that build'ing surviving, for example, an earthquake event or 2702 any other different phenomena, certainly is going to change. [ 2703 That's patently from basic understanding. 2704 To quantify it is a whole other matter, and we certainly j 2705 didn't make any effort in our evaluation to quantify it. i 2706 We went to the family of consultants that we use and asked 2707 them, basically: Do you believe that these fixes, the 2708 solutions to the different buildings, would in fact ensure 2709 that in fact they are adequately safe, using the NRC's ~ 2710 regulations as a standard of uhat's adequately safe? 2711 In the limit, as I said, if you replace the foundation you 2712 are back to basically an original structure if they did it 2713 right. As you get more and more damage, you would get to a 4 2714 building that just patently, from basic logic, has to be i 2715 somewhat less capable of withstanding an event. 2716 Mr. MOODY. That's why you surprised me with your answer to 2717 nr. Lujan's question when he asked you, are they any less 2718 safes and you said, no I followed up later because I said 2719 it must be. b i ~ 4

MAME: HII167050 PAGE 114 2720 Mr. EISENHUT. The record will indicate what I said, but I 2721 think I said the numbers would be indistinguishable if you 2722 went down and looked at those kind of lou numb,ars. That's 2723 uhat I meant by it. 2724 Mr. MOODY. Does what you are saying apply to all bcildings 2725 or only certain buildings? 2726 Mr. EISENHUT. I said it would be a variation. They are all 2727 going to be lou numbers. So, when it gets down to such a lou 2728 aspect. I don't think you can distinguish any of the 2729 numbers. And, again, it would vary considerably, with which 2730 experts you ask. And that's why, you know, we were really in e 2731 a hard pressed situation to evaluate these substructure l 2732 solutions to a problem. 2733 It is a somauhat controversial fix that was imposed on a L 2734 number of the facilities. It certainly is the first time it ~ 2735 was undertaken in a nuclear project. So the staff felt that 2736 we really had to go and collect a group of the experts, such 2737 as the Corps of Engineers and the Naval Surface Weapons 5 2738 center and Brookhaven National Lab and another half-dozen or i 2739 certainly another three or four independent consultant 2740 firms, and brought them together to try to reach a collegial l 2741 dudgment. With the different experts in that area, do you 2742 agree that this plant can go forth? That this is an 2743 acceptable restoration of the margins of safety? And that's 2744 what our evaluation basically concludes. That evaluation was e b 0

i ~ MAME: NII167050 PAGE 115 2745 issued last Falls that evaluation went to our Advisory 2746 Committee on Reactor Safeguards as another level of review t 2747 of the overall adequacy of the evaluation. Tha'y concurred in 1748 that overall avaJ uation and of course that evaluation is, 2749 now, the subject of the publications that are going on on 2750 the Midland project, and undoubtedly they are being tested 2751 in that forum, 2752 It is a--you need to look at it in an overall framework. 2753 The utility brought in a number of experts. The Intervenors 2754 are cross-examining on a number of aspects and the staff I 2755 brought forth another group of aspects. 2756 Mr. MOODY. You are going far beyond what I was asking, 2757 which is fine. I'm trying to narrou down this issue of 2758 acceptable versus distinguishable probabilities. And 2759 acceptable is a threshhold. And the other is something else. ~ 2760 And you say that you can't quantify it. But don't you have 2761 to quantify them to decide that they are over the threshold? 2762 Doesn't that require a quantification of probabilities? 2763 Mr. EISENHUT. You probably do, implicitly. You probably 2764 don't, explicitly. But get down to what you are really 2765 talking is a difference in numbers. Your question really. 2766 related to, is there a change from the fix over and 2767 opposed--over and above what you would have had originally in 2768 the correct manner? 2769 Mr. MOODY. And your answer was no for the, buildings you i +

M A,ME : MII167050 PAGE 116 2770 had in mind; but you admit or agree in the case of the 2771 diesel generator that that indicates-- = LfifdWMU7") 2772 Mr. meseg(. But I can't quantify them bec8use I think they l i i 2773 are very small numbers. l l 2774 Mr. MOODY. But you feel the diesel structure in any event, i I 2775 exceeds the thrashhold minimum? 2776 Mr. EISENHUT. No. It is acceptable with the modifications, 2777 if the modifications are adequately put in place. l 2778 Mr. MOODY. But in design terms it is adequate, above the 2779 threshold? i 2780 Mr. EISENHUT. That is correct. And I should caveat that f 2781 everything I'm looking at, in fact, the office of MRR looks 2782 at it from a design basis. We look at it from the basic 2783 design. Putting it in place in the construction and seeing w 2784 that it is adequately carried out is principally in the 2785 region, and I really can't add'ress that end of it. 2786 Mr. MOODY. Thank you, Mr. Eisenhut. Could I ask the other 2787 gentlemen at the table if they have any comments on that 2788 series of questions? i 2789 Mr. KEPPLER. I don't. 2790 Commissioner GILIH5KY. If you want my view, Mr. Moody, 4 2791 it's obviously better to have a building without a crack i i 2792 than a building with a crack. The question comes down to 2793 whether it meets, in the end, our' requirements.-As I say, I 2794 don't have a personal view on that. l 1 r

MAME: MII167050 PAGE 117 2795 Mr. M00DY. Mr. Cook? l 2796 Mr. RONALD COOK. I don't have any comment. 1 1797 Mr. Mo0DY. Mr. Cook, you heard the discus

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s l 2798 Mr. RONALD C00K. Yes. I don't have any comments with 2799 regard to the adequacy of the building at this time. I 2800 Mr. M00DY. Mr. Landsman? j j 2801 Mr. LANDSMAN. I agree with Mr. Eisenhut that the 2802 underpinning design is acceptable to the NRC staff. However, the diesel generator building is not one of the structures 2403 a 2804 that is going to be underpinned. It was that 20 feet of 4 2805 surcharge that we heard about earlier this morning that we 1 2806 are using to make the building a'dequate. 2807 As Mr. Kappler said, there's some members of the staff 2808 that do not think the diesel generator buildi.g is 2809 structurally sound. ~ 2810 Mr. MOODY. They do not? l { 2811 Mr. LANDSMAN. That's right. I i 2412 Mr. M00DY. Because of the fact it merely has a surcharge 2813 rather than an underpinning? j 2814 Mr. LANDSMAN. More structural integrity. The building is i 1815 highly cracked. There's no way to really analyze a cracked i 2816 concrete structure. So it is more the opinion of l 2417 everybody--if it was acceptable-- 2818 Mr. MOODY. This is indeed a revelation that we have a 2419 building here, that, as I gather, essential to the safety of h L a

I i MAME: MII167050 PAGE 114 i i 1 2820 the whole operation in case of power failure, you need these j 2421 diesel systems in order to keep the pumps functioning--is i ) 2422 that serreet? I t j j 2423 Mr. LANDSMAN. You need it for a loss of off-site power. l i l 2424 They are there to generate Feuer to control the plant, to 2825 safely shut it down. 2826 Mr. MOODY. If you had a less of outside power, which you i l 2427 sight have in a natural espaetty, if it was an earthquake. 2828 it would be essential that these diesel generators function. 1-i l 2429 And if the same earthquake threatened the structural i 1 2830 integrity of that building, you might have the same natural 2431 event knock out both the failsade and the haakup? In other j t l 2432 vords, you'd he kneeking out--might well kneek out the backup i i 1833 itself as well as the primary system which is the very thing k I 2434 you want to prevent? It is not really, riiven that structural i I 2435 efficioney, you don't really have the $<sint probability. Zue i I 2434 things happening beesuse the same event seuld trigger both 1 3 i 2837 the failuress is that serreet? i' 1834 Mr.14MDSMAN. If you are getting Ante-- I 1 1 2439 Mr. HOODY. They are not independent prehabilities. i { 2440 Mr. LANDSMAN. If you are getting into prehabilities, I j 2841 think the prehabilities that we have been previously l 2442 discussing--the building is right new standing. I think the 2443 leu prehability that people are talking shout is, if you hit j 2444 it with an earthquake. And I agree that there is a leu l i (. I i 4 l l ~ ~ .~3..-.- -r

NAME8 NZI147050 PAGE 119 2445 probability that you'll get a certain magnitude earthquake l 2844 there to hurt the structural integrity of the building. But 2847 there is that probability, and you have to dos,1gn for it. 2848 Mr. MOODY. I'm making a generie statement. One of the I 1849 characteristies of backup systems is that they have an j 2450 independent probability attached to them about their 2851 failure. So that if you have a joint failure you have the 2452 multiplication of two probabilities which becomes a very 2853 small number indeed very rapidly. Mouever, if the same event 1854 can trigger the failure of both the primary and backup j i 2455 systen, you ne longer have independent probabilities. One of 2454 the ways you lose independent probabilities is to have a 2457 structural threatened system, such as the one we have just l t 2458 described, where the same natural event, an earthquake, 1 ( r 2459 seuld trigger failures simultaneously in both the primary ~ 2440 and backup system. I guess maybe I'm in the wrong-- 2441 Mr. LANDSMAN. You have the wrong persen. { 2842 Mr. MOODY. I'm talking with the uteng person. It's a I I i 2843 generie yardstisk of failure systems that you want an I 2444 independent probability attached to their failure as to the 2445 primary system they are failsading, otherwise it is not a 2444 failsafe system. Mr. Eisenhut kneus. Am I might? 2447 Mr. EISEMMUT. Partially. You certainly are right. When you 2848 leek at tue systems, if you have the system that's the 2849 operational system, you want a backup system that's i b i m. .I

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MAME: MII147050 PAGE 1.4 2470 independent. So that the two systems don't interact. 2471 Mr. MOODY. The probability of their both failing becomes f I 2472 the product of the probabilities, besones a va'ry, very tiny i 2472 number. 2474 Mr. EISEMMUT. That's correst. Novever, from the earthquake 2475 standpoint, that doesn't apply, hesause if the earthquake 2476 shakes the' site, the entire site, everything in the site is 1877 going to shake. In fast, both of the redundant systems. 2474 Mr. MOODY. It depends en the nature. 1879 Mr. EISEMMUT. If you have an earthquake, the site is going 2440 to shake. It is a matter of degree of shaking, in fast, that 2441 is going te vary as the magnitude of the earthquake varies. 1est so, as Dr. Landsman said, it is really not a question in 1843 terms of the soils at this point. It is a question--there are i 2444 existing eracks in the diesel generator building. What you ~ 2445 have to leek at is, what is the probability of an earthquake 2446 ei suffielently high magnitude, such that it will, A, eause 2447 an assident, and, se an aseident which has a less of 2444 off-site power associated with its and also fail the diesel 2449 generator building to such a magnitude that it will in fact 2490 disable the emergency power system. Se, that sequence of 2491 events is a prehability of an earthquake is what you start 2492 with, as Dr. Landsman said. That's a lou probability. 2492 Mr. MOODY. Of that magnitude. 2494 Mr. IISIMMUT. It has to be big enough to fail the diesel k. wa++- ww 6 :wer<- ge- .a w e 4sw 6

MAME: MII167050 PAGE 121 2895 building in such a way to disable che AC power. k 2496 Mr. MOODY. Thst's a very different number than it would be 2497 if you did not have the cracks in the building;. 1894 Mr. EISEMMUT. It is a different number and that's why you 2899 have to go to-- 2900 Mr. MOODY. Significantly different number? 2901 Mr. EISEMMUT. I won't necessarily agree with that. But I 1902 uill--let me put it this way. This is now not a soils 2903 question. It is a structural question of concrete. 2904 steel-reinforced structure. So what we had to do then was go i 2905 to the structural experts and ask them for'their judgment. 2906 seeause there really is,not a hard and fast formula for 1907 analyzing it. 2904 You go to their judgment and their judgment would be that L l 2909 the probability of it is still lou enough. But it certainly ~ 1910 is higher, from basio logical sense, the probability of that 2911 structure failing has got to be higher for a given 1912 earthquake than it was before. 1913 Mr. MOODY. Lov enough, was what we are talking about. And J 2914 that's why I ttied to make the distinction between--you know, 1915 on the one hand um don't--there are indistinguishable numbers 1916 and yet low enough--it's almost a contradiation to say you 1917 have enough certified about a number to say it is lov 1918 enough, but not enough to quantify it. I don't want to drag 1919 this out any further. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. L s

NAME: MII167050 PAGE 122 2920 Mr. SEIBERLING. Thank you. ( 2921 Mr. Landsman, the testimony of Mrs. sinelair contained l 1922 several problems which she highlighted. One is, she says the t { 2923 concerns and recommendations of field inspectors are i i 1924 overruled by MRC management. MRC management performance is l l 2925 too often place ahead of publie health and safety. 2926 I would like to ask Mr. Landsman, Mr. Cook or Mr. Gardner, 2927 do you agree with that statement? Mr. Cook? 2928 Mr. RONALD COOK. No, I do not oospletely agree with that i 2929 statement. I think that Ms. Einelair is making reference to 2930 an issue that we discussed at the hearings referred to. The 1931 staff that was on an inspection wished to issue a 2932 sonfirmatory action letter to the licensees our 1933 conversations with our regional office indicated that that 1934 would be forthcoming. However, the next following week we ~ 2935 were informed that it would be this--we termed it a reverse 2936 confirmatory action letter, in which the licensee spells out 1 2937 the items that we would have put into our letter, except it i 1934 comes out under their letterhead. i 1939 The inspection staff vas, as Mrs. Sinclair, I think, 1940 indicated in her statement, were somewhat disappointed by 1941 this. Or embarrassed, whatever the term might be. However, 1942 our desires were that the work would be stopped. And, as a 1943 not result, that ultimate result did transpire in the 1944 electria area and brought under control. l k. I

• 3

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i NAME: M,II167050 PAGE 123 2945 Mr. SEIBERLING. Is this something that happens frequently? I 1944 This so-called reverse confirmatory action lettar? I 2947 Mr. RONALD C00X. Of course, we don't havg that many 1944 confirmatory action letters to start with. We have had, in 2949 the last. oh, I'd say to months or so--maybe 14 months, that 2950 there were two confirmatory action letters and this reverse l 2951 confirmato'ry action letter. So, the ratio there would be l 2952 one-third to two-thirds. f 2953 Mr. SEIBERLING. When you say reverse confirmatory action, i 2954 instead of HRC uriting a letter to the licensee, asking him 4 1955 if he's doing certain things, you can merely give the i 1956 opportunity to write a letter first and say it? Is that what l l 1957 you are saying? 2954 Mr. RONALD C00X. Yes, sir. My understanding is our present I L i 1959 policy is that we write all confirmatory action letters at i t 2960 this time. 2961 Mr. SEIBERLING. All right. Do you want to comment on that, 2962 Mr. Landsman? i 1962 Mr. LANDSMAN. The only comment I want to make, in the 1944 Midland special section that we are in, we get to voice our i 1965 concerns to our management all the time. It is up to the I 1966 management to make the decisions of what to do with our l 1 1947 concerns. 4 2964 I think we have set it in the hearing stand on the ASLB. 2969 If we really felt very strongly about something there is a h 9 'S s-. ees-, .m n

MAME: MIII'67050 FAGE 124 ~ ' 2970 uay--vays to voice our concern. We have a dissenting opinion 1971 or whatever. 1972 Mr. SEIBERLIMO. Mr. Gardner, do you have;anything to add? ( 1972 Mr. SARDMER. Me, I agree with Dr. Landsman and Mr. Cook. I 1974 Mr. MOODY. I would just want to return to what you said. 2975 Dr. Landsman. You say that certain of the staff do not feel 1976 that the diesel structure, given its practice, does meet the 2977 sufficiency standards am I characterizing what you have said 1974 about ten minutes ago correctly? 1979 Mr. LANDSMAN. I think I said some of us think it is 2940 structurally unsound because of the ersak. I' 2941 Mr. MOODY. Because of the s' rack. Do you think it should be 1942 rebuilt? 2943 Mr. LANDSMAN. I never looked into hou you seuld fin it. 2944 You could build a new wall around it and fasten it together. 2945 We really never got into how ti fix it. It is just some of 1944 us, because it is very difficult, almost impossible to i i 1947 analyse, as I was trying to say, a erask. 1944 Mr. MOODY. But your statement is a strong one, as I 2949 understand it. It is not--vould you say it again how you said 1990 it before? 1991 Mr. LANDEMAN. Some of the acabers of the staff--or I'll 1992 speak for myself. I guess--think it is structurally unsound. 1992 There are a let of eraeks in it. 2994 Mr. MOODY. Mr. Chairman, that's a pretty strong. L .i

NAME: MII167050 PAGE 135 I 3995 sempelling statement. j ( 3996 Mr. SEIEERLING. Well, it is. I'm still unclear hou I I 3997 important the diesel generatisy--the diesel structure is from l 3994 a safety standpoint as eenpared to the auxiliary structure. j 3999 Mr. LANDEMAN. It is as important a structure as you have f 3000 en-site. ) 3001 Mr. SEIBERLING. I sea. Then they are taking steps with i 2003 respect to the auxiliary power structure but not the diesel l 3003 structure? { l 3004 Mr. LANDEMAN. No. We are--they are underpinning the 3005 suniliary building, that's bringing the foundation down to 1 j 3006 the hard materials the surface unter pump structure, we are t 3007 hainging the foundation down to the hard materials they are [ 3000 rebodding and replacing a great majority of the essential ( 3009 surface unter piping on-sites they are rebuilding the ~ 3010 foundation en the water storage tanks, which are aise 3011 Laportant, if these orack. i 3013 The diesel generator building, early in the game in 1974 3013 er '79, their eensultants have decided to surcharge the ? 3014 huilding, piling the stand en it, trying to get all the [ i 3015 settlements out. In the seusse ed getting all the settlement t 3016 out of the soils, they continued to build the building. se, 3017 while they were trying to sink--trying to get the settlement 3010 out ed the building while the building was settling, and 3019 they sentinued to build it. And during this whole eeurse of W ,l ,-..,--..n -m-----,---+

MAME8 NII147050 PAGE 126 a 3020 time it continued to exack more and more. 3021 Consissioner GILINSMY. Mr. Chairman, I think it is worth 3022 understanding what the possible senseguances y re are. What 3 C 3023 us are verried about in the diesel generator building, as 3024 far as I een understand, is that the wall, if unsound, might 3025 dall en equipment that is important for safety in an i 3026 accident. In the other ease you are talking about rather 4 3027 more serious conseguances. But in any case those are the 3024 things that are involved. t 3029 Mr. SEIBERLING. That was my reaction but I don't knou-= 1 I ) 3030 Commissioner SILINSKY. The diesels are the emergency i l 3031 sourse of AC power. And they can he very important. There's 1 i 3032 no question about that. You don't want anything falling en i

l 3033 them.

i 3034 Mr. SEISERLING. Maybe they ought to tear down the building ~ 3035 and just put them in a tent. 1 f 3036 Well, thank you. We are going to have to resses again. Let i 3037 se just ask you again, one other question, Mr. Landsman. ] 3034 Mrs sinelair said very resently, en May 4 the chiai 3039 soils engineer at Midland. Dr. Ross Landsman testified that I i 3040 the feet of attempting to faree a natural fleedplain area in 3041 a nuclear plant site. l 3043 In the initial design ei Midland, the safety related 3043 huilding was designed to set en natural glastal till and se I 3044 forth. Dr. Landsman was asked by a censumers PeWer Company e l

i 1 d l MANE NIZ147050 PAGE 127 a i 3045

attenney,

if fill material had been placed properly and in l l 3044 iset the proper quality assurance had been felleued, the 3047 Midland imellity seuld be eyesated with due se, sand to public f 1 i j 3048 health and safety? Dr. Landsman's ensues was the possenal l 30 0 e,ini.n ei the soils on inees. Me. 1 i . 50

1. that eesseet?

i j 3051 Ms. LANDSMAN. Yes, that is. { l 1 i 3053 Ms. SEIBERLING. Is that still your opinient ~ 4 ] 3053 Mr. LANDSMAN. My possenal opinion, had the fill gene in i l 3054 sight, I still think as a soil engineer during a 40-yens i i j 3055 operating life ei that plant, we would have had a 3054 differential settlement pueblem. l 3057 Ms. SEIBERLING. Se in othes vends your opinien has been ? l 3050 ovesauled, as das as--se ahead? 5 j 3059 Ms. LANDSMAN. Me, no. We ese sensecting that, though. We j 3040 ase undespinning most of the installation, except the diesel ~ l 3041 generater building. a t i 1943 Mr. Meckt. Ms. Choiseen, seuld you yield des a second? I l j 2043 Mr. SEIBERLIMe. I'm a little pussied at this point. i j 2044 Ms. M00er. Ms. Nepples, uhe made the desisten not to 3045 underpin the diesel while doing it for the othest. I 3044 Mr. MIppLER. I think the eenpany made that deession. 1 l 3047 Mr. MOODY. Why did we let them aske that desisten if we l 3044 still have an unsound staveture in a beste sadety componentf I 3049 Ms. NEpp&ER. This was the proposal adopted by the eenpany. ) i I h s ( 4 s ms o .0

NAME H,II167050 PAGE 128 3070 It was reviewed by the staff here in Washington and they k 3071 accepted that position. l 3072 Mr. MOODY. We have one staff person who just testified 3073 that it is unsound as it is. 3074 Mr. SEIBERLING. That's where I am a little confused. I ] 3C75 think maybe what Dr. Landsman's testimony was, in his 3076 opinion th'is uns not a suitable place to put a plant. Is 3077 that right? 3078 Mr. LANDSMAN. No, no, no, that's not what I said. I said t 3079 that the original design of those structures, and my own a i 3080 opinion, because they were cantilevered out from the rest of 3081 the building and supported on uncompacted fill while the 3082 rest of the building is sitting on hard, natural material, j i 3083 you are looking for differential settlement problems. But as i 3084 the original design-- 3085 Mr. SEIBERLING. The fill is improper as a basis. Is that 3086 what you are saying? 3087 Mr. LANDSMAN. I'm saying the original design of the 3088 buildings was improper. 3089 Mr. M00pY. It is inherent in what the design calls for. 3090 Mr. LANDSMAN. That's a better way. 3091 Mr. SEIBERLING. But do you agree that the steps that are 3092 now being taken, if taken properly, will eliminate that 3093 aspect of the problem? 3094 Mr. LANDSMAN. Yes. Except the diesel generator building. l W h l l w. -...-w. +. l

MAME: HII167050 PAGE 129 3h95 Mr. MOODY. Except the diesel generator. 3096 Mr. SEIBERLING. Okay. I see. 1 3C97 Mr. MOODY. Mr. Chairman? I knou we have to go but, again, 3098 why is the NRC allowing that pituation, where the diesel -{ 3099 generator is, at least by some testimony here, unsound, and i l 3100 it is a major safety component? 3101 Mr. EISENHUT. Let me try to answer your question. If you f 3102 have need to know and nsed to do an evaluation on the 3103 structural adequacy of a building, we have a special group 3104 called the structural engineers. We go and ask the i 3105 structural engineers and they go get the appropriate--the f 3106 best consultants that they have under contract that they 3107 get. 3108 If you go to a soils problem, and want to evaluate the 3109 soils, you go to the soils engineers. ~ 3110 Now, Dr. Landsman is a soils engineer. There is a spectrum 3111 of views. He may have views just like I may have views on a 3112 number of things in the plant. But in'this case, we vent to 3113 the structural engineers to determine our position on the 3114 structural adequacy of the diesel building. 3115 Mr. MOODY. So you are saying he's speaking outside his 3116 expertise? 3117 Mr. EISENHUT. I'm saying we went to that group. We didn't 3118 go to other individuals. I don't know Dr. Landsman's 3119 background well enough to argue that he's outside his field i L "d ^ ..~ . ~_.. _ _... _.. -. - -,

I MAME HII167050 PAGE 130 3120 or not. But I do know that we vent to that center of pl 3121 excellence that we have set aside, structural engineering, 3122 with their consultants, to do the determination on 3123 structural engineering and there is a spectrum of views even f 3124 within our staff. But it will come to a conclusions 1 l 3125 judgment at one level, which is what they did in our safely i 3126 safety evaluation. 3127 Mr. MOODY. Is it possible to segment the problem into 3128 structural problems independent of soil problems? Don't they 3129 interact? Your expectation of what structural solution is i 3130 needed depends on what the soil conditions are that pertain? 3131 Is that--isn't that a dichotomy that might be dangerous, to 3132 segment the problem, to ask the structural people an 3133 isolated question and ask the soils people an-isolated 3134 question and really it is the interaction of the tuo? 3135 Mr. SEIBERLING. Can you give a short answer? { i 3136 Mr. EISENHUT. We did not ask them to do it in isolation. i I 3137 We asked them to do it working together. But when you get to 3138 someone who has to make a decision, you have to go back to 3139 the center of the knowledge in that area and they'have to 3140 take into consideration everything.they hear from the other 3141 disciplines, he it soil, mechanical, quality assurance, 3142 whatever, which is what they dos but they do not work in 3143 isolation. 3144 Mr. SEIBERLING. Would you like to dispose of the NRC t b h u.. _._.. 6 ~

a NAME HII167050 PAGE 131 ~ 3145 witnesses before we leave? f 3146 Mr. MOODY. procedurally, I assume you mean? I 3147 [ Laughter.] j i 3146 Mr. SEI3ERLING. The clock is ticking. First of all, Mr. i 3149 Eisenhut, do you think that someone who, like Mrs. Sinclair, 3150 in looking at this from a non-expert point of view over 10 3151 years, would be considered biased if she came to the 3152 conclusion that this is not a suitable place to locate this 3153 plant in the first place? 3154 Mr. EISENHUT. I certainly don't know enough personally 3155 about Mrs. Sinclair, whether or not she is biased. 3156 f.r. SEI3ERLING. I mean anyb'ody. Any layman, let us say. 3157 Mr. EISENHUT. Some people are and some people aren't. Just 3158 as congressmen are and regulators are. 3159 Mr. SEI3ERLING. I'm not asking was she biased..I'm asking ~ 3160 would it be a reasonable thing for someone, after reviewing 3161 all these facts, to come to the conclusion, not being an 3162 engineer, that this shouldn't have been put in this location 3163 in the first place? 3164 Mr. EISENHUT. Let me try to answer it this way. I would 3165 agree, and I have stated I have agreed with a number of the 3166 points she's made. I don't think they are of the magnitude 3167 that would conclude that the plant can't be built in this 3168 location. 3169 Mr. SEI3ERLING. Would you say reasonable people could b -.._7 N

0 MAME: HII167050 PAGE 132 3170 differ in that position? k 3171 Mr. EISENHUT. Oh, absolutely. 3172 Mr. SEIBERLING. That's all I'm asking. Mou, let me ask Mr. 3173 Kappler, I read to Mr. Selby and Mr. Cook of Consumers 3174 Power, the ACRS statement of the reasons why they 3175 believe--actually it's the the MRR inspection staff. Not 3176 ACRS. It is in their reports, however. Is that a correct 3177 summary of their viewpoint? j 3178 Mr. KEPPLER. Yes, it uns, i 3179 Mr. SEIBERLING. Do you agree with that, inspectors? 3180 Ms. GARDMER. I wrote it, so I guess I do. 3181 Mr. SEIBERLING. How about the others? 3182 Mr. LANDSMAN. We agree. 3183 Mr. RONALD COOK. I agree. 3184 Mr. SEIBERLING. Do you agree that the response Mr. Selby j 3185 gave se is a correct response to all those five points? Or 3186 is accurate in summary? Maybe you'd rather wait and look and 3187 see what she said in the record? 3188 Mr. KEPPLER. I do recall the last item, I uns.in 3189 disagreement on. 3190 Mr. SEIBERLING. Lack of an adequate quality assurance 3191 attitude? 3192 Mr. KEPPLER. Yes. An aggressive quality assurance 3193 attitude. 3194 Mr. SEIBERLING. Aggressive quality assurance attitude. [ M 4 1 4 4 -.~.m. . -, ~. - - ~. , - _.. ~. ,f-

~. ( MAME: HII167d50 PAGE 133 3195 Mr. KEPPLER. That was one of them, and I think I would 3196 disagree With that point of view. I feel that a more 3197 aggressive quality assurance approach by the c,ompany would 3198 have headed off a number of these problems. 3199 Mr. SEIBERLING. Do you feel that way, Mr. Landsman? 3200 Mr. LANDSMAN. I'll agree with Mr. Kappler. l l 3201 Mr. SEIBERLING. Any of the other inspectors? How do you 3202 feel? 3203 Mr. GARDMER. I agree with Mr. Keppler. 3204 Mr. RONALD COOK. I agree with that. In fact, we'll stress i l { 3205 that. 3206 Mr. SEIBERLING. This has been one of my biggest concerns 3207 in this whole field of nuclear power. I have the feeling 3208 that too many companies do not have the right attitude i e 3209 toward quality control, and zero defects. And, in fact, I 3210 would extend that to a lot of'American industry, and that's 3211 one of the reasons that we are in big trouble in our economy 3212 in competing with the Japanese and others. 3213 Do you feel that they are taking steps nou to. correct that i. 3214 attitude? Not just to correct already pointed out I 3215 deficiencies? ,~ j 3216 Mr. KEppLER. I do. But I would have to say I have been } 3217 disappointed before,:and that's the reason for the 3218 insistence that we have a backwards.look and a forward-look 3219 at this project. And I feel that I can't have the confidence (_ i 4 6 a :. . -l

,...i NAME: HII167050 PAGE 134 3220 in this aggressive attitude, approach of the company, ( 3221 without a sustained demonstration of it. I 3222 -Words just aren't good enough. 3223 Mr. SEIBERLING. What do you feel is the root cause of this 3224 problem? i 3225 Mr. KIPPLER. Mr. Seiberling, if I knew the root cause of ^ l 3226 the problem, I would have fixed it. I have tried to look i j 3227 into what really contributes to the problem, and you can get 3228 as many views on that subject as you go around this room. 3229 But, when I looked at all of the efforts, by my staff and i 3230 others to try to pinpoint the problems, we came to the } 3231 conclusion that we really aren't sure why Consumers Power is i 3232 having trouble. 3233 As we pointed out earlier, they have dealt with the 3234 Palisades problem successfully. And I think they mean well, 3235 but for some reason they haven't been able to come through. 3236 And we are just going to persist in our efforts. 3237 Mr. SEIBERLING. I just have one other point. Ms. Garde I i 3238 listed six things that on Monday they requested the 3239 commission to do. I guess the answer as to what they are 3240 going to do about that will become apparent when they have 3241 acted on the requests but, uill.the Commission take up those 3242 items and give it zone consideration? 3243 commissioner GILINSKY. I hope so, Mr. Seiberling. I hope 3244 that our meeting the other day was the first of a number of i l ] i l i i

v e NAME: HII167050 PAGE 135 P 3245 meetings and that we will pursue this--our role in this k 3246 project. 3247 I think that it is obviously one of the h,alf dozen t i 3248 trouble-plagued projects around the country. And it requires I l 3249 a hand-tailored solution, I think. l 3250 Mr. SEIBERLING. Well, thank you very much. I think that 3251 that concludes our testimony of this panel. I do appreciate 3252 your coming in and I'm sorry to keep you so late. We'll nou 3253 proceed to the next panel. I have already missed that call. 3254 Commissioner GILINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 3255 Mr. SEIBERLING. Our next witness is the mayor of Midland, 3256 the Honstable Joseph Mann. 1 } s + i I i m --.m.. ._-n n-._., ..n [ + _ _, _}}