ML20091H026
| ML20091H026 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 10/20/1983 |
| From: | Harrison J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17198A223 | List:
|
| References | |
| CON-BOX-09, CON-BOX-9, FOIA-84-96 NUDOCS 8406050031 | |
| Download: ML20091H026 (2) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULA10RY COf.11.1tSSIOt.
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0012 0 d MEMORANDUM FOR: Region III Files 1
FROM:
J. J. Barrison, Chief, Section 2, Midland
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SUBJECT:
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TEI.EPHONE CONTACT WITH DENNIS SAUNDERS i
On October 17, 1983, I was requested by the Regional Administrator to contact Mr. Saunders, as Mr. Keppler was involved in a conference.
4 At approximately 4:00 p.m. (CDT), I elephoned Mr. Saunders. Mr. F. Hawkins
, of Region III staff was preseat to assist in the call.
. Mr. Saunders (telephone number (301) 565-3955) i concerning the Midland Nuclear Plant:
made the fol1<, wing statements j
"Tell' Jim he is the one whb must sign-off on the plant."
"In my opinion it's a serious problem...the underpinning of the Diesel Generator Build-ing."
I corrected this statement.
Auxiliary Building and Service Water Pump Structure. Underpinning is related to the He further stated that, "..
cavities were analysed incorrectly as only a static load.". loads during an earth
" Absolutely ridiculous to continue work on the Midland Plant, do not have "a because of the salt cavities."fix at one million dollars / day while we don't know He further suggested, "You should stop work until you find out what the loads j
are during earthquakes with salt cavities below it."
Mr. Saunders stated he had performed some rough calculations showing the i
significance of his projected loads.
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Mr. Saunders inquired as to the involvement of Jim Foster at Midland.
,j' him Mr. Foster currently was not associated with the Midland Project.
I told i
" Foster not involved was good."
He stated t
He asked if I was an engineer, and if I knew the difference between dynamic l
and static loads.
d He also wanted to know if I knew about the $25,000 fine and five years in' jail 4
I and that I had better think about them and be careful.
He further stated the
. NRC had better think about Article 203, and tell ' Jim, "...not to expect any help from Denton."
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~2 I told Mr. Saunders his concerns would be relayed to Mr. Keppler.
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8 OCT 2 8 12 MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert E. Jackson, Chief Geosciences Branch, DE t
THRU:
.533 Stephan Brocoum, Leader Geology Section, GSB, DE eon Reiter, leader l
Seismology Section, GSB, DE i
FROM:
T. Cardone, Geologist Geology Section, GSB, DE J. Kimball, Geophysicist Seismology Sectici, GSB, DE
SUBJECT:
CONFERENCE CALL TO DENNIS SAUNDERS In our telephone conference call on Friday, October 14, 1983, between Mr. Dennis Saunder, Mr. V. Stello, S. Brocoum T. Cardone, and J.
Kimball, he expressed the following concarns:
i 1.
Solution Cavities exist under the plant structures.
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i 2.
The lack of dynamic analysis of the effect of an earthquake on the solution cavities and the resulting subsidence assuming collapse of the cavities.
l 3.
The role of the cooling pond during cavity collapse.
l Discussed below are staff comments that were stated to Mr. Saunders along with clarifications that were put together since the phone call.
Mr. Saunders referencedJable 2.5-24 in the Midland FSAR and i state:ient in the U. S. Geological Survey report on page 110 of the Construction i
Permit Safety Evaluation Report to support his first concern. We explained that the distances between wells nos. 10 and 17 and the plant site, and the estimated cavity diameters of these wells given in Table 2.5-24 places the plant structures approximately 200' and 900' outside-1-
of the estimated cavity perimeters for wells nos.10 and 17, respectively. Furtherinore, the statement that he quoted on page 110 in the U.S.G.S. reoort, "The plant site overlies the projected eastern 1
extremity of this brine and salt producing area " only indicates the gross relationship between the brine and salt producing area and the plant site. It'does not locate specific solution cavities beneath the' power plant structures.
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Regarding his concern that a dynamic analysis on the effect of an j.
earthquake on ti.' solution cavities was not made, the following reasons i
i are given:
i 1.
Conservatively, the dynamic stress due to the ground motion from the earthquake would be approximately 3 to 5 percent of the static i
l' stress and would last for a maximum of 10 to 20 seconds wnich represents the duration of strong motion vibrations.
This
-j represents a very small incremental increase in time and stress magnitude over the long term static stress condition around the solution cavities during the life of the plant.
4 2.
The geosciences staff has experience in evaluating seismic ground motion at depth for the Division of Waste Management, Office of Nuclear Material Safety.
l Findings of this review were that underground tunnels, mines and openings suffer less damage than r
surface structures during strong motion shaking. A list of some i
reference.t on this subject is attached.
F at the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) level would be well belowSubs I
that which is required to cause significant damage.
minor damage is likely to occur at shaking two to three times the ~
In fact only SSE.
As discussed in the subsequent points, the bulkin i
failed rock due to seismic shaking would be the same as'g of any 1
the static condition.
that for 1
Very severe damage to underground openin
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fault actually intersects the openings gs mainly occurs when a As discussed in the i
Staff's SER for Midland, there is no known faulting within 5 miles of the plant thus precluding this possibility.
In addition to the above discussion, one should also take into account the likelihood of the SSE.
I-The s SSE has a probability on the order of 10~ gaff has stated that the-to 10-4 the actual value probably being closer to 10~4 per year, with is located in one of the more quiet regions, in terms ofThe Midland site f
i seismicity, in the Central United States. The chance of ground j
motion of any sign (ficance is remote.
3.
In the event of cavity failure during an earthquake, the 'bulkin The bulking phenomenon would result from failure o 4.
4 overlying the cavity.
That is, the volume of broken rock would be 1.3 to'1.4 times the volume of in-place rock overlying the cavity
- that fails.
Compaction under the pressure or weight of the.
significant volume increase. overlying rock strata reduces this somew i
The amount of subsidence after ccmpaction that could occur was estimated from empirical data obtained from coal fields, althotgh observations of
-i surface bench marks in the brine and salt producing area over a ten year period indicated that no significant subsic'ence has occurred. Applying Il pq 1
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0 the empirical data on trough type subsidence resulting from the failure of the cavities prod ~uced by wells 10 and 17, the maximum estimated
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f superimposed subsidence is 0.23 inches. Very conservatively, the subsidence resulting from the failure of wells 9, 10, 17, 19 and 20 s
which are closest to the plant site, results in a maximum estimated superimposed subsidence of 0.36 inches. This amount of subsidence should not adversely affect the plant structures.
Regarding his third concern of the role of the cooling pond.during cavity failure, since there would o& no connection or connecting conduit j
between the cavity and.the cooling pond 4200' above, the cooling pond should have no effect on the collapse of the cavities or any subsequent subsidence.
He stated to !!r. Saunders that his calculations were based on an f
incorrect definition of what bulking is. Bulking is the increase in volume of a material due to manipulation. Rock bulks upon being excavated or broken up due to collapse. In this case volume will j
i increase by 30-40% due to collapse.
It is our opinion that the above comments fully respond to Mr. Saunders concerns, and that no further action need be taken by the staff in this regard.
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A. T. Ca done, Geologist Geology Section, GSB, DE
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HYk Jeff Kimball, Geophysicist Seismology Section, GSB, DE cc:
J. Knight 5
S. Brocoum L. Reiter 1
J. Kimball i
A. Cardone V. Stello
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I REFERENCES-l Dowding, C.H. and A. Rozen, 1978, " Damage to Rock Tunnels from Earthquake Shaking," J. Geotechnical Eng. Div., Am. Assoc. Civil i
i Eng., vol. 104, no. GT2, p. 175-191.
i Iwasaki, T., 5. Wakabayashi, and F. Tatsuoka,1977, " Characteristics of Underground Seismic Hotions at Four Sites around Tokyo Bay."
i Wind and Seismic Effects, Proceedings of the Eighth Joint Panel Conference of the U. S. Japan Cooperative Program in Natural Resources NBS Special Bulletin 477, pp. III-41-III-56.
McClure, C.R.,1981, Damage to Underground Structures During Earthquakes, Proceedings Seismic Performance of Underground j
Facilities, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., p. 75. R.
K., 1974.
i McGuire, Seismic Structural Response Risk Analysis, Incorporating Peak Response Regression on Earthquake Magnitude and Distance.
PH.0, Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.
Pratt, H.R.,1981, Earthquake Damage to Underground Facilities and Earthquake Related Displacement Fields, Proceedings Seismic Performance of Underground Facilities, E.I. du Pont de Newmours &
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Co., p. 43.
I Stevens, P.R. (1977), "A Review of the Effects of Earthquakes on Under-ground !!ines." U. S. Geol. Survy.*0 pen-File Rept.77-313, 47 pp.
Vortman, L.J., and J. W. Long,1982', Effects of Repository Depth on Ground Motion - The Pahute Mesa Data, Sandia flational Laboratories, SAH082, 0174.
Woodward Clyde Consultants,1981, Effective Peak Acceleration for Nuclear Power Plant Design; Technical proposal on Engineering 1
Characteristics of Ground Motion, submitted to the U. S. Nuclear l
Regulatory Comission.
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