ML20091B831
| ML20091B831 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1992 |
| From: | CENTERIOR ENERGY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20091B819 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9204020058 | |
| Download: ML20091B831 (6) | |
Text
-
i 2 N *E,
-n ,
- hp o :r -
mme ss oPJ x0 o, g g TABLE 1.8-1 (Continued) g , "?
dra s OO 00 Degree of Conformance Reference g
% _Ryulatory Guide (Rev.;RRRC Category )_ F 04 UtPJ 88 h127 - (Revision 1 - 3/78;RRRC Cat. 3)
PNPP conforms to this guide as lit applies to mota Obo Inspection of water control structures l ma the intake and discharge control structures.
O associated with nuclear power plants 1 1.128 - (Revision 1 - 10/78;RRRC Cat. 1)
Class 1E batteries are designec a and installed 8.1 Installation design and instaliation of in accordance with IEEE Standard 484-1975, as large lead storage batteries for modified by Regulatory Guide 1.128, except nuclesr power plants that a hydrogen survey vill not be performed.
r Calculations indicate that the maximum concentration in the battery area v;11 be less P
than 0.00*.%.
1.129 - (Revision 1 - 2/78 RRRC 1 Cat. 1) i 8.1, PNPP conforms to Regulatory Guide (E.C.) 1.129 Haictenance, testing and replacement of with the following exceptions: Tech. Specs.
lange lead storage batteries for nuclear povet plants 1. Regulatory Guide 1.129 endorses IEEE 450-1975. PNPP is adopting IEEE 450-1980 in lieu of IEEE 450-1973.
- 2. If scheduling of the 60 month battery k[
ij g performance discharge test coincides with the 18 nonth battery service test,~only g the 60 raonth battery perrormance discharge test vf.11 he performed.
<* atery
- 3. The performance discharge test capacity for a battery that sho 3 Igns of degradation or has reached 85% of expected service life is performed every 18 months. .
~
_ _ _ _ i f =
. PY-CE1/NRR-1460 L I Attachment 2 l Page 1 of $ I l
REACT!VITY CONTROL SYSTEMS
( llASES i
_ l CONTR0t ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS (Continued)
The RPCS orovide automatic supervision to assure that out of sequence rods will not be withdrawn or ir::erted.
The analysis, of the rod drop accident is presented in Section 15.4 ur 1 the FSAR and the techniques of the analysis are presented in a topical reoort, i Reference 1, and two supplements, References ? and 3.
The RPCS is also designed to automatically prevent fuel damage in the event of power erroneous operation. rod withdrael from locations of high power density during higher A dual channel system is provided that, above the low power setpoint, restricts at greatest thehighest withdrawal powerdistances levels, of all control rods. This restriction is 3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONT _ROL SYSTEM the reactor from full power to a cold, Xenon-free shutdown, assu withdrawn control rods remain fixed in the rated power pattc; n. To meet this objecti 3' g'}, tration ve it is necessary to inject a quantity of boron whie ;>roduces a concen-of 660 ppm in the reactor core.
imperfect mixing this concentration is increased by 25ETo The allow for atanW1 leakage and
_qu
\tration is achieved by havin a imum available quantity of 44 6. ired concen- 42(oO
( sodium pentauorate solution 7 by weight, containing a min mum %allons \, of of 5236 lbs. %-
of sodium pentaborate. This quantity of solution is the net amount above the pump suction, thus allowing for the portion that cannot be injected.
ing rate of 41.2 gpm provides a negative reactivity insertion rate over th9The pump-permissible sodium pentaborate solution voltne range which adequately compensates for the positive reactivity effects due to temperature and xenon during shutdown.
The temperature requirement for the sodlum pentaborate solution is necessary to ensure that the sodium potaborate remains in solution.
With redundant pumps and explosive injection valves and with a highly reliable control rod scram system, operation of the reactor is permitted to contirue for sort periods of time with the system inoperable or for longer period. of time with one of the redundant components inoperable.
Surveillance requirements are established on a frequency ttat assures a '
high reliability nt' the system. Once the solution is established, boron con-centration will not vary unless more boron or water is added, thus a check on the temperature and volume once each 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> assures that the solution is available for use.
Replacement of the explosive charges in the valves at requiar intervals will assure charges. that these valves will not fail because of deterioration of the
- 1. C. J. Aaone, 4 C. Stirn and J. A. Wocliey. " Rod Orop Accident Analysis for large BW s," G. E. Topical Report NE00-10527, March 1972
- 2. C. J. Paone, R., C. Stirn and R. M, Young. Supplement 1 to NE00-10527. July 1972 3.
J. M. Haun, C. J. Paone and R. C. Stirn. Addendum 2, " Exposed Cores."
Supplement 2 to NE00-10527, January 1973 PERRY - UNIT'l 8 3/4 1-4
P)-CEI/NRR 1660 L Attachment /
, Page 2 of s CONTAINHENT SYSTEMS
( BASES ,
DEPRES$URIZATION USTEMS (Continued) i
} In addition to the limits on temperature of the suppression pool water, J
operating procedures define the action O be taken in the event a safety-relief ,
valve inadvertently opens or sticks open. As a minimum this action shall include: (1) use of all available means to close the valve, (2) initiate suppression pool water cooling, and (3) if other safety-relief valves are used to depressurize the reactor, their discharge shall be separated from that of the stuck-open safety reifef valve, where possible, to assure mixing and uniformity of energy insertinn tn m ynl.
The cu,r;ainment sp ay system consists of two 100% capacity loops, each with three spray rings located ai. dif ferent elevations about the inside circum ference of the contair.eent. PHR pump A supplies one loop and RHR pump B sup-plies the other. RhN pap C cannot_ supplv_the spr s stem. Dispersion of the flow of water is effected b an shKia W b;p,,enhancin, the condensa-tion of water vapor in *.he contammhnt volume and'preiTenting overpressurization.
I Heat rejection is through the RHR heat exchangers. The turbulence caused by the 3 spray system aids in mixind)the containment Air volume to maintain a homogeneous mixture for Ha control, r_. g n gg g g gggg _
{ -
The suppression , e' s oling function is a mode of the RHR systes and functions as part of tne containment heat removal system. The purpose of the E ( system is to ensure containment integrity following a LOCA by preventing exces-5 sive containment pressures and temperatures. The suppression pool cooling mode is designed to limit the long term bulk temperature of the pool to 185'F con-sidering all of the post-LOCA energy additions. The suppression pool cooling trains, being an integral part of the TutR system, are redundant, safety-releted component systems ti.at are initiated following the recovery of the reactor p vesse' water level by ECCS flows from the RHR system. Heat rejection to the emergency service water is accomplished in the RHR heat exchangers.
The suppression pool make-up system provides water from the u90er containment pool to the suppression pool by gravity flow through two 100%
capacity dump lines following a LOCA. The quantity of water provided is sufficient to account for all conceivable post-accident entraument volumes, ensuring the long term energy sink capabilittes of the suppression pool and maintaining the water coverage over the uppermost drywell vents. Daring refueling, there will be administrative control to ensure the make-up dump valves will not be opened.
==
, 3/4.6.4_ CONTAINHENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the evant of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the cont.ainment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close culo matically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environw nt E will be etasistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.
PERRv - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-5
-m._.. .. .-.-
PY-CEl/NRR-1460 L
.ttachment 2
' Pige 3 of 5
, CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
[ BASES 3/4.6.5 VACUUM RELIEF 3/4.6.5.1 CONTAINMENT VACUUM RELIEF AND 3/4 6.5.2 CONTAINMENT HUHl0ITY CONTROL __
Vecuum breakers are provided on the containment to prevent an excessive vacuum from developing inside containment during an inadvertent or improper operation of the containment spray. Four vacuum breakers and their associated isolation valves are provided. Any two vacuum breakers provide 100% vacuum relief.
The containment vacuum relief system is designed to pr rtt.JLrj.. excessive vacuum from being created inside the containment following, dvertent) initiation of the containc,ent spray system. By maintsinin MUsfature/
relative humidity within the limits for-acceptable operation shown on Fig-ure 3.6.5.21, the maximum containment vacuum created by actuation of both containment spray loops will be limited to approximately -0.7 psig. ,
3/4.6.5.3 DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKERS
-Orywell vacuum breakers are provided on the drywell to prevent drywell ficoding due to differential pressure across the drywell and to equalize pres-sure between the dr}Nell and containment.
' Two drywell vacuum breakars and their associated isolation valves are
_provided.
Any one vacuum breaker can provide full _va:uum relief capability.
3/4.6.6 _ SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive material which may result from an accident. The Shield Building provides secondary containment during normal operation when the containment is sealed and in service. At other times the containment may be open and, when required,.secondarycontainmentintegrityisspecified.
Establishing and maintaining a vacuum in the annulus with the annulus exhaust gas treatment system, along with the surveillance of the doors, hatches, and valves, is adequate to ensure that there are no violaticas of the integrity of the secondary containment.
The OPERABILITY of the annulus exhaust gas treatment systems ensures that sufficient iodine removal capability will be available in the event of a LOCA.
The reduction in containment iodine inventory reduces the resulting site i
PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 G-6 i
n- M=
PY-CE!/NRR-1460 1.
Attachment 2 Page 4 of 5 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS
/
BASES 3/4.8.1, 3/4.8.2 and 3/4.8.3 A.C. SOURCES, D.C. SOURCES and ONSITE POWER O!STRIBUTION SYiTEMS The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and 0.C. power sourcu and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that suf ficient power will be available to supply the safety related equipment required for (1) the safe shutdown of the facility and (2) the mitigation and control of accident condi-tions within the facility. The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and 0.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements 3 of General Design Criteria 17 of Appendix "A" to 10 CFR 50. l The ACTION requirements specified for the 16els of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation. The OPERABILITY of the power cources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the safety analyses and are based upon maintaining at least Division 1 or 2 of the onsite A.C. and 0.C. power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident. conditions coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power and single failure of the other onsite A.C. or 0.C. source. Division 3 supplies the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system only.
The A.C. and 0.C. source allowable out-of-service times a:s based on
( Regulatory Guide 1.93, " Availability of s'ectrical Power Sources," December 1974 as modified by plant specific analysts ind diesel generator manufacturer recommendations. When diesel generator DivisWn 1 or Division 2 is inoperable, there is an additional ACTION requirement to verify that all required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices, that depend on the remaining OPER-ABLE diesel generator Division 1 or Division 2 as a source of emergency power, are alsn OPERABLE. This requirement is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite powei ev pt tion of criticol systemsLd'Anot result uring)the in adiesel period complete lossDivision generator of safety 1 orfunc-Division 2 is inoperable. The term verify as used in this context means to
, administrative 1y check by examining logs or other information to determine if I
certain components are out-of-service for maintenance or other reasons. It does not mean to perform the surveillance requirements needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the component.
The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C. and 0.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that (1) the facility can be maintained in +he shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods and (2) sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status, l The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the diesel generators are in act.ordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, " Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies," March 10, 1971, and Regulatory Guide 1.108, " Periodic Testing of
, Of esel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power
\ Plants," Revision 1, August 1977 as modified by plant specific analysis and diesel generator manufacturer recommendations.
DERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 8-1
PY-CE1/NRR-1460 L
( Attachment 2
. Page 5 of 5 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEks t
BASES
- 60. SOURCES.0.C.SOURCESandONSITEPOWERO!JTRIRUTIONSYSTEMS(Continued) 16eet M.k W PcD The surveillance requirements _for ccmonstrating the OPERABILIW of the unitbatteriesG v=d== h the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.129 "MaintenaiFce Testing and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants", February 1978, and IEEE Std 450-1980, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of large lead Storage Bat-g,,1ff.
sLwins for Gener3 tina Stations and Substations._"./bme. wrvefence, in\ero ld Verifying average electrolyte temperature above 1.he minimum for wnich the ~ --
battery was sized, total battery terminal voltage on float charge, connection resistance values and the performance of battery service and discharge tests ensures the effectiveness of the charging system, the ability to handle high discharge rates and compares the battery capacity at that time with the rated capacity.
Table 4.8.2.1-1 specifies the normal limits for each designated pilot cell and each connected cell for electrolyte level, float voltage and specific gravity. The limits for the designated pilot cells float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and not more than .015 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity or a battery charger current that had stabilized k' at a low value, is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity.
The normal limits for each connected cell for float voltage and specific grav-ity, greater than 2.13 volts and not more than .020 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity with an average specific gravity of all the con-nected cells not more than .010 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity, ensures the OPERABILITY and ctpability of the battery.
Operation with a battery cell's parameter outside the normal limit but -
within the allowable value specified in Table 4.8.2.1-1 is permitted for up to 7 days. During this 7 day period: (1) the allowable values for electrolyte level ensures no physical damage to the plates with an adequate electron transfer capability; (2) the allowable value for the average specific gravity of all the cells, not more than .020 below the manuf acturer's recommended full charge specific gravity ensures that the decrease in rating will be less than the safety margin provided in sizing; (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity ensures that an individual cell's specific gravity will not be more than .040 below the manuf Tcturer's full charge specific gravity and that the overall capability of tr sattery will be maintained within an accept-able limit; and (4) the allowable value for an individual cell's float voltage,
> greater than 2.07 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function, k
PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 8-2
_ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _