ML20100L333
| ML20100L333 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1996 |
| From: | CENTERIOR ENERGY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20100L331 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9603040172 | |
| Download: ML20100L333 (3) | |
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PY-CEl/NRR-2030L Page 2 of 4 e.
Local Areas The computer programs used in the analyses of the various interior structures are capable of analyzing the effects of corners and general discontinuities. The vent region, as well as other major openings and penetrations, are analyzed using graded fine mesh finite element models. Boundary conditions for each of these large scale models are obtained from the general analysis discussed in Section 3.8.3.4.2.a.1.
Local reinforcement or stiffening is provided around the openings or penetrations for the calculated stress concentrations, f.
Analysis of the Equipment Hatch, Personnel Door and Dryvell Head Analysis of the drywell equipment hatch, personnel door and drywell head is in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III, Division 1, Class MC, for the metallic components and proposed ASME Code Section III, Division 2, for concrete anchorage details.
Figures 3.8-30, 3.8-31 and 3.8-32 give typical details of these appurtenances and the anchorage details. The STARDYNE computer program is used for the static analysis, and dynamic effects are evaluated by the use of floor response curves, g.
Variations in Haterial Properties and Assumptions For a general discussion on the effects of variations in material properties and assumptions, see Section 3.8.1.4.3.d.
- h. Se at TRIS c4AO$ REQllEST 3.8.3.4.3 Expected Behavior Under Load The methods of analysis and design used for these structures predict the i
~ behavior of the as constructed system. The analytical techniques allow for discontinuities, changes in section and materials such that these effects can be allowed for in the structural design. No impairment of 3.8-195 9603040172 960227 PDR ADOCK 05000440 P
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PY-CEl/NRR-2030L i
Page 3 of 4 Add new sub-item "h" to section 3. 8. 3. 4.2 as follows :
h.
Analysis of Drywell Personnel Airlock Shield Door Structural Support System Potential Issue Form (PIF)# 96-0141 documented that analysis performed using design basis accident loading combinations resulted in certain limited components within the structural support system for the drywell personnel airlock shield doors being stressed beyond design basis allowables required elsewhere within USAR Section 3.8 when the shield doors are in an open position daring operational conditions 1,2 or 3.
The shield doors may need to be open for limited time periods during plant startup and shutdown to perform specific activities such as inspections for piping flange leaks.
In the closed position, design basis stress allowables are satisfied within the door structural support system.
4 Subsequent structural analyses have confirmed that the overall design function of the doors with respect to plant nuclear safety has been maintained.
More specifically, the shield door structural support system is adequate to ensure that:
- 1. Safety related systems / components supported by 620'-6" structural steel platform (which also supports the shield door monorail) are not affected in their ability to perform their intended design function.
- 2. The monorail system supporting the shield doors will preclude falldown of the doors under accident loading conditions.
)
i The analyses supporting the above conclusions utilized certain alternate analytical techniques and acceptance criteria (as compared to pertinent design basis criteria within Sections 3.7 and 3.8) that are only applicable through plant operational cycle 6.
The alternate criteria used operability guidance from NRC Generic Letter 91-18, as well as other interim design criteria changes such as the use of modified loading combinations.
Refer to letter PY-CEI/NRR-2030L for a more detailed discussion of the alternate design criteria.
A long-term resolution to this issue is required to be completed prior to restart from the sixth refueling outage.
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e Enviremmental Condit19as for Containment Building 14*
Figure 3.11 21 As Reactor power increases, dose rates at the g,
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Drywell Personnel Airlock Shield Doors will Chk)4E increase linearly. rhe ganana/ neutron dose rate gf I adjacent to the shield doors at 100% power, Q [sss@'hl with the shield doors open, will be 45 mrem /hr. a m E Access to the 599' containment and drywell with 9,h h the reactor at power and the shield doors open will be controlled in accordance with Health 8 Physics procedures. h =. -. -}}