ML20151V483
| ML20151V483 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 09/09/1998 |
| From: | CENTERIOR ENERGY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151V475 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9809140329 | |
| Download: ML20151V483 (62) | |
Text
=
PY-CEl/NRR-2322L Page 1 of 1 pCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continuet, SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCi SR 3.6.1.3.11
NOT nly required to be me in MODES 1. 2.
2.,. E ud_ piV.. l i o sf..Mt..oXd W.d.
h Verify combined leakage rate of 1 gpm In accordance times the total number of PCIVs through with the hydrostatically tested lines that Primary penetrate the primary containment is not Containment exceeded when these isolation valves are Leakage Rate tested at a 1.1 P,.
Testing Program i
SR 3.6.1.3.12
NOTE------------------
Only required tote met in MODES 1.
2, and 3.
Verify each outboard 42 inch primary 18 months containment purge valve is blocked to restrict the valve from opening > 50.
SR 3.6.1.3.13
NOTE-------------------
Not required to be met when the Backup Hydrogen Purge System isolation valves are open for pressure control. ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances or special testing of the Backup Hydrogen Purge System that require the valves to be open.
Verify each 2 inch Backup Hydrogen Purge 31 days System isolation valve is closed.
=.
9809140329 990909 ADOcK0500g0 PDR PERRY - UNIT 1 3.6-19 Amendment No.
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TABLE 3.2-1 (Continued) e-E.
e QualiN)
Group Prircipal(5) 7 Safety (2) j Classifi-Construction Seismic (0) kn Principal Component Class LocationIN cation Code Category Comment II.
Nuclear Boiler System 5
1.
Vessels, level instrumentation condensing chambers 1
D A
III-1 I
D
- 2. -Vessels, air 1
i accumulators 3
A/D C
III-3 I
F 3.
Piping, relief i*
h valve discharge 3
C/D C
III-3 I
(7)
C 4.
Piping, main steam, within outermost f,
isolation valve 1
A/D A
III-1 I
5.
Piping, feedvater g-vithin outermost o
i isolation valve 1
A/D A
III-1 I
7 Pipe supports, main f
steam i
D A
III-NP I
)
7.
Pipe restraints, e
D N/A N/A I
p 8.
Piping, main steam, p
between isolation 7
7 valve and M.0.
I stop valve 2
A B
III-2 I
9.
Piping, main steam y
between M.0.
stop valve and turbine stop valve NSC A/T D
B31.1 N/A (24) l
4 3 f1 i
p g-
>1]
TABLE 3.2-1 (Continued)
,iN Qualikl)
Group Principal (5)
Principal Component Safety (2)
Classifi-Construction Seismic (6) 5 Class Location (
cation Code Category Comment S
1b 2.
Heat exchangers, secondary side 3
A C
III-3&
- % p j TEMA-C I
3 3.
Piping, within (y
outermost isolation valves 1
C A
III-1 I
(8) i 4.
Piping, beyond outermost isolation w
valves 2
A B
III-2 I
(8)
'f 5.
Pumps 2
A B
III-2 I
g 6.
Pump motors 2
A N/A None I-7.
Valves, isolation and LPCI line between 1
C A
III-1 I
(8)
F %
8.
Valves, isolation, other 2
A B
III-2 I
9.
Valves, beyond isolation valves 2
A B
III-2 I
- y q >
- 10. Mechanical modules 2
M,A,C N/A None I
il 6k
- 11. Electrical modules ym{
Ea O@E i
with safety function 2
M,A,C N/A IEEE I
- 12. Cable,with safety 3x
'Q $
function 2
M,A,C N/A IEEE I
d M
- g-
- 13. Suppression pool g-strainer 2
C N/A II, IX I
(36) wo be
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~n
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--. -..--.--.-- a-.--.
.--- --------u..
iI
' i ~r' TABLE 3.2-1 (Continued)-
1l [-l '
l t i
Qualikl) 3 Group Principal (5)
Safety (2)
Classifi-Principal Component (
Class Location ( I cation Construction Seismic (6) 2 Code Category Comment S
yl
~XIX.
System i
t.
17 p) 1.
Vessels:
Filter /
I '
demineralizer NSC
.C C
III-3 N/A y
2.
Heat exchangers
(
carrying reactor I
water NSC C
C III-3,TEMA-C N/A 3.
Pump suction piping, to outermost P
isolation valve 1
C A
III-1 I
(8),(16)
[
4.
Pump-discharge
[
piping, to RHR and m
3 feedwater 2
M,W 3
III-2 I
(8) 5.
Pumps NSC C
C III-3 N/A 6.
Valves, isolation valves and piping l
between 1/2 C
A/B III-1,III-2 I
(8), (16), (37) l 7.
Valves, pttmp
- P 5 >
discharge to RHR k
q and feedwater 2
M,W B
ASME III-2 I
(8) 7.i i
8.
Filter /demineralizer NSC C
C III-3 N/A
\\
0 2 $
9.
Filter /demineralizer h
- h*
gg precoat subsystem NSC C
D B31.1 N/A y
";1 M
r n.
e8 G
. - ~,
___m..,
TABLE 3.2-1'(Continued)'
i --
lY Quali Group $)
Principal (5)
{ 0p, '
Seismic (6) g j
Safety (2) Location ( ) Classifi--~ Construction Principal Component ( )
Class cation Code Category Comment 35.
Containment Spray Piping and Nozzles 2
C B
III-2 I
( b.
- 36. Dryvell Vacuum Relief 2
C B
III, NEMA, I
IEEE
[W l
i XXXVI. Other Components
~
1.
Containment Crane 3
C N/A N/A I
2.
Refueling Cask Crane 3
M
-N/A N/A I
1 w
'm Containment L,
isolation valves
/
and piping 2
C B
III-2 I
'y f
f between for all o
l containment 2
penetrations not listed above j j}g a
f o'o(n XXXVII.
Suppression Pool bl Q w P J
t Make-up System 0
%s h
1.
Valves 2
C B
III-2 I
7 2.
Piping 2
C
-B III-2 I
p 3.
Electrical modules I
re vith safety function 2
C,M N/A IEEE I
SE e
.--_-x, - - _._. - _ -. - -.. -.
. - -.. _, - _. - _ - _. _ - - - _ _ - - _ -. - -. _ - _ -. _. _ -. _ _ _.. - _. _ - _ _ _ _.. -.. -. _. ~ _ _. _ - _ _..... - _.. _. - -. - - -. - - - - _. - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ - - _.... _ _. _ -. _ - -
ih^ "
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=t TABLE 3.2-1-(Continued)
Quali Group [l)
-Principal (5)
Safety (2)
Seismic (6)
Location ( ) Classifi-Construction I1)
Principal Component Class cation Code Category Comment
.XLIX.
Feedvater Leakage Control __
System
,' N b,i v is. o.s h 1.
Piping and valves of-r the imbemM! system 2
A
'B III-2 I
2.
Piping and valves of the ;=',;;; ' system 2
A B
III-2 I
w T
-D 's vI [ o
- p y
t 2kk a
w6R i
wmg
$Ea e
O t-f
--__m._____
-.m.
m._..__._
f- [
M ;A fo
'fOcN b S*
Page 5
TABLE 3.2-1 (Continued) i UL Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc.
UL 507
" Safety Standards for Electric Fans" (ANSI)
- UL 586 "High Efficiency, Particulate, Air Filter Units" l-l.
UL 900
" Air Filter Units" IEEE The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
l t
l.
10 CFR 50 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50,
" Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities" 6.
I - Constructed in accordance with the requirements of Seismic Category I structures and. equipment as described in Section 3.7, Seismic Design. N/A - The seismic requirements are not applicable i-to the equipment..
7.
Safety relief valve discharge line piping from the safety relief l'
valve to the suppression pool consists of two parts. 'The first is attached at one end to the safety relief valve and attached at its other end to the structural steel just below the main steam header through a pipe anchor. The main steam piping, including this portion of the safety relief valve discharge piping, is analyzed as i
a complete system. The second part of the safety relief valve l.
discharge piping extends from the anchor (located below the
+
L mainsteam header) to the suppression pool.
Because of the upstream L
anchor on this part of the line, it is physically decoupled from the main-steam header and is, therefore, analyzed as a separate l-piping system.
8.
a.
Lines 3/4 inch and smaller which are part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are Safety Class 2 up to and including the root or isolation ~ valve.
]
.b..
' Instrument lines larger than 3/4 inch which~are connected to l
Safety Class 1 (SC-1) process lines have a restricting orifice installed between the process connection and the root or l
isolation valve.
c.
Lines that are connected to safety class process lines are classified as the same safety class as the process line from the process line connection to and including the root or i
isolation valve except as noted in paragraph a above.
l 3.2-63 f
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PY-CEl/NRR-2322L Page 7 of 56 In order to minimize the amount of radioactive material that leaks to the secondary containment following a design basis accident, all primary containment penetrations are provided with redundant, ASME Code,Section III, Class 2, Seismic Category I isolation valves, one inside of the primary containment and one outside of the shield building) k DM rectier of pipe betectn the tu containacnt i;;1ation al::: is also ASME Code,Section III, Class 2.
This isolation valve arran "through-line" leakageg:; A is twHeA %gementtus
- 44AzA wh functions to pr: :nt h ::::: in the :errt af 2ny.
i mle failure, - r~2;;h lin; 1r"2;;r beyed t'a f2CTc 4e y Qtle. hscn*bd in rv AshAll Thecontainmentisolationsystemisdiscusse(fnSection6.2.4.
The M.
containment and reactor vessel isolation control system is discussed in Section 7.3.1.
The containment boundary and all penetrations except for penetrations with guard pipes terminate in the annulus. Therefore, containment shell leakage and penetration leakage are considered to be totally directed to the annulus. The sources listed in Table 6.2-33 are a summary of potential leakage paths that could bypass the AEGTS.
The containment design basis accident leakage is 0.2 percent by velght of the contained atmosphere in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The maximum test leakage rate permitted from the sources listed in Table 6.2-33 is 5.04 percent of the total containment leakage. This value vill be the technical sp'ecification commitment for leakage bypassing the AEGTS as listed in the Technical Specifications.
In order to verify that the total amount of potential bypass leakage vill be within this limit, a testing and evaluation program vill be conducted on isolation valves, personnel airlocks and guard pipes as described in Section 6.2.4.3.1.
The expected leakage rates per valve have been calculated and are shown on Table 6.2-33 for the potential bypass leakage paths.
In these calculations, it was assumed that the onsite leakage limit per valve vill be the same as the shop test limits given in the valve specifications.
Revision 1 6.2-70 March, 1989
_._2 4
' Attachm:nt 4 PY-CEl/NRR-2322L Page 8 of 56 Insert Page 6.2-70
...or some other acceptable configuration such as a closed system outside of containment. The piping out to the outboard containment isolation valve or in the closed
. system..
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Attachm:nt 4 PY-CEI/NRR-2322L Page 9 of 56 The isolation criteria for determination of quantity, type and location of containment isoletion valves for a particular system generally conform to the requirements of General Design Criteria (GDC) 54, 55, 56, and 57, and comply with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.11.
Redundancy and physical separation are required in the electrical and mechanical design of the systems to ensure that no single failure in the containment isolation systems prevents perfomance of the intended functions.
Protection of system components from missiles and from the effects of tulated high and moderate energy line breaks is also a design consider
' n.
I-s W V Instrument lines that penetrate the containment boundary conform to the requirements of GDC 55 and 56, and comply with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.11.
Containment isolation valves and associated piping and penetrations satisfy the requirements of the ASME Code,Section III, Class 1 or Class 2, as applicable. These components are also Seismic Category I.
Classification of systems and equipment is presented in Table 3.2-1.
Upon loss of instrument air, air operated containment isolation valves fail in the position required for containment isolation. Closure times and leak tightness of containment isolation valves are sufficient to ensure that the site boundary dose guidelines specified by 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded following a postulated accident. The
'B' Train of the safety-related instrument air system provides post-accident makeup to the outboard MSIV accumulators to assure leak tightness of the outboard HSIVs.
A capability for rapid closure of all lines provides a containment barrier within the lines that is sufficient to maintain
)
leakage within permissible limits.
Revision 7 6.2-79 March, 1995
Attachm:nt 4 PY-CEl/NRR-2322L l:-
Page 10 of 56
- Insert
- Page 6.2-79 Exceptions are noted in the " justification of differences" discussion provided for GDCs 55, 56 and 57, which document that specific isolation provisions provide an acceptable configuration.
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PY-CEI/NRR-2322L Page 11 of 56 rapid valve closure under operating conditions, is required by the design specifications for piping systems associated with containment isolation valves. The valve operability assurance program for active, safety-related valves is discussed in Section 3.9.
Electrical redundancy is provided for power operated valves.
Power for the operation of two isolation valves in a line (inside and outside containment) is supplied from two redundant, independent power sources without cross ties.
In general, isolation valves outside containment are povered from the Division 1 power supply while isolation valves within containment are povered from the Division 2 power supply. Both Division 1 and Division 2 valves are generally povered from ac power sources. Loss of power to each motor operated valve is annunciated.
Provisions for detecting leakage from remote-manually controlled systems are discussed in Section 5.2.5.
Detection of leakage from containment is discussed in Section 6.2.6.
Section 6.7 describes the main steam isolation valve leakage control system.
The fraction of the total containment leakage following a design basis accident /LOCA that could bypass the containment annulus exhaust gas treatment system is limited to the leakage from sources which constitute open systems or nonsafety-related systems.
Safety class systems which
{
are open systems are considered. For example, it is assumed, for nonsafety em that the only portio of such a system remaining
.llr"ing : q!::.
eje ould be the containment isolation Talves and the piping between these valve. Additional leakage sources considered are the containment penet tions with guard i
pipes.
Co r-k*-Yw S M. Mon l
Ch podeJ\\bAk (ALE
\\u% chr p m
Cosw % s % Fw%4-aF %,y %,
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6.2-82
PY-CEl/NRR-2322L Page 12 of 56 The containment boundary is surrounded by the annulus, containment penetrations, except those with guard pipes, terminate in the annulus.
Therefore, containment she.11 leakage and penetration leakage are totally directed into the annulus.
Containment design basis accident leakage is 0.2 percent, by weight, of the contained atmosphere in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The maximum permitted leakage rate from potential sources listed in Table 6.2-33 is 6.72 percent of the total containment leakage. The maximum allowable combined test j
leakage rate from potential sources listed in Table E.2-33 is 5.04 percent (0.75 times 6.72 percent) of the total containment leakage.
This value is the technical specification commitment for leakage bypassing the containment annulus exhaust gas treatment system.
l To verify that the total amount of potential bypass leakage is within the established limit, the following test and evaluation program will be l
conducted in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program:
i
]F.M par.5. IcA %
a.
Isolation valves he g #iWo s e-3 >
j g
f A
w since it is assume that nonsafety-related systems outside the j
1 containment isolation valves will not remain intac fell ni.5 a j
containmentatmospheremustterminatea[the outer con isolation valve seat. The same effect is possible for open fety class systems. To assure that this potential source o ea age is checked, isolation valves listed in Table 6.2-40 are included in the periodic " Type C" test program discussed in Section 6.2.6.
The test method is also described within this section.
By measuring the time related pressure decay or by directly measuring the leakage flow rate, each valve is quantitatively evaluated for leak tightness.
(, w % % euAws w li s 3 & S r at"'6 % " ha^r a LOCA h dowM Revision 9 u
6.2-83 April, 1998 l
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PY-CEI/NRR-2322L Pag 213 of56 g., fq m y; Q
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-Such alternates are described in Sections 6.2.4.2.2.1 through 6.2.4.2.2.3.
The final measure by which GE is assured that the BVR design is in agreement with the GDCs is receipt of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) letters permitting construction and operation of previous plants with comparable valving arrangements.
'6.2.4.2.2.1 Justification with Respect to General Design criterion 55 The reactor coolant pressure boundary, as defined in 10 CFR 50, Section 50.2 (v), consists of the following:
pressure retaining appurtenances attached to the vessel; valves, and pipes which extend from the reactor pressure vessel to, and including, the outermost isolation valve. The lines of the reactor coolant pr' essure boundary which penetrate containment are capable of isolating j
~the containment, thereby precluding any significant release of radioactivity.
Similarly, for lines which do not penetrate containment, but which do comprise a portion of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the design ensures that isolation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary can be achieved.
Itemsia, b and c, belov, address influent lines, effluent lines and conclusions, respectively, with regard to GDC 55.
I a.
Influent Lines i
Influent lines which penetrate containment and the dryvell directly to the reactor coolant pressure boundary are equipped with at least two isolation valves.
One valve is inside the dryvell; the second is as close as possible to the external side of containment.
These isolation valves protect the environment.
Where needed, protection of the containment in the event of pipe rupture outside the dryvell but within containment is further ensured by extension of the
'dryvell by use of guard pipes.
These guard pipes, together with the isolation valves, assure protection in the event of an active l
3 6.2-87
Attichm:nt 4 PY-CEl/NRR-2322L Page 14 o.'56 failure between dryvell and containment. Table 6.2-34 lists those influent lines that comprise part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and penetrate containment. The purpose of this table is to summarize the design of each line with respect to the requirementr of GDC 55.
Items 1 through 8, below, demonstrate
'that, although a word-for-vord comparison with GDC 55 is not always practical, it.is possible to demonstrate adequate isolation provisions on some other defined basis.
_n omMYk 1.
Feedvater P121[Pil2 and P414/P410)
Feedvater lines are part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary since they penetrate both the containment and dryvell and connect to the reactor pressure vessel. Each line includes three isolation valves and is enclosed in a guard
' pipe.
i The isolation valve inside the dryvell is a control closure anti-vater hammer check valve. The first isolation valve outside containment is also a control closure check valve and is located as close as possible to the outside containment vall.
The outermost valve is a motor operated gate valve.
The two control closure check valves are designed and tested to close with no reverse flo 1:
wwO Extension of the dryvell by means of the guard pipe protects the containment from overpressurization in the event of a feedvater line break between the dryvell and containment valls. The internal design temperature and pressure'for the guard pipes which enclose the feedvater lines are the same as the design values specified for the enclosed feedvater lines.
t
[
i 6.2-88 l
f
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eg Attrchment 4 PY-CEl/NRR-2322L Page 15 of 56 f
Page 6.2 insert -
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' The ' control closure check valves provide isolation in the event of a feedwater line break.
l 9 ',
, outside of containment. The motor operated gate valves provide long term, high integrity.-
l M
containment isolation in the event of a line break /LOCA inside or outside of the containment..
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1 PY-CEI/NRR-2322L Page 16 ofS6 LSCIY
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Should a break occur in a feedvater line, th L control closure check valves prevent significant loss of re tor coolant inventory and provide immediate isolation.
The outermost motor operated valve does not close automatically upon occurrence of a protection system signal since, during a LOCA accidente enintenan.ce of reactor coolant makeup from all
{
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Inis valveNu,vever, can be remotely high sourcey s esiraole.
closed from the control root, to provide long ter$
k e
protection when, in the judgment of the operator, continued makeup from the feedvater system is no longer necessary. /In
]C^5'FY addition, after feedvater flov terminates, the operator vill initiate the feedvater leakage control system (refer to Section 6.9) to provide a positive water seal on the Laclation i
- h ::.
Y s,.nr4-2.
High Pressure Core Spray Line (P410/P411)
The high pressure core spray line penetrates both the containment and the dryvell and connects to the reactor pressure vessel. Isolation is provided by a hydraulically testable check valve inside the dryvell and a motor operated gate valve as close as possible to the outside of the containment vall. This gate valve maintains long term leakage control. Position indication for the hydraulically testable check valve is provided in the control room.
The gate valve is automatically and remote-manually operated.
A guard pipe is not necessary since the high pressure core spray fluid is at an energy level during system operation that containment overpressurization cannot result should the line break between the containment and the dryvell.
i e
6.2-89
PY-CEUNRR-2322L Page 17 of 56 j
insart Page 6.2-89 These check valves are tested in accordance with Technical Specification 5.5.6, inservice Testing Program, to verify this closure function. However, these valves are not Type "C" tested because the long term, high integrity leakage protection for the feedwater lines is provided by the motor operated gate valves (B21-F065A/B), which receive Type "C" hydrostatic tests.
Insert Power to these motor operated valves can be provided from an alternate divisio1 under administrative controls, if necessary following a LOCA.
I insert
... seat, stem and bonnet of the motor operated valve in each line. The check valves, I
coupled with the single motor-operated high integrity leakage protection gate valve on each line, 'provides an acceptable configuration for the feedwater lines.
A branch line connects to the Feedwater line outboard of the second Feedwater check valve, which is outboard of the containment. This line provides the pathway for RWCU water and RHR shutdown cooling water to return to the reactor vessel. For the RHR-shutdown cooling retum line,'a safety-related globe valve is treated as a high integrity containment isolation valve, similar to the Feedwater gate valves. The RHR system i
" outboard' of the globe valve is also treated as a closed system outside of containment, to control any leakage. For the RWCU return line, the piping " outboard"' of the RWCU branch line check valve leads directly back to containment penetration P132, and is ASME Code Class 2, Seismic Category 1, protected from pipe whip, missiles and jet
)
forces, and analyzed for " break exclusion". This line is also treated as a closed system i
outside of containment (see Table 6.2-40 for testing details on containment
{
penetrat. ions).' The design of these branch lines also provides an acceptable i
. configuration.
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sAttachment 4 e, S.,J fr e 's fo e-4 'h e^.
blo i
h 3 PY-CEI/NRR-2322L
_ -Page 18 of 56 usv,
vessel.
Isolation is provided by a check valve inside the dryvell and a check valve and explosive valve outside the dryvell. The explosive valve provides an absolute seal for long term leakage control, as well as preventing leakage of sodium pentaborate into the reactor pressure vessel during normal reactor operation.
Since the standby liquid control line is normally an isolated, nonflowing line, rupture is extremely improbable. However, should a break occur subsequent to actuation of the explosive valve, the check valves ensure isolation.
y 7.
Residual Heat Removal Shutdown Cooling Return Lines (P121/P112 l
and P414/P410) i The residual heat removal shutdown cooling return lines discharge into the feedvater line between the testable check valve and the motor operated gate valve outside of containment. A check valve and a normally closed, motor operated, remote-manually actuated globe valve provide for isolation of the residual heat removal shutdown cooling return lines.
B.
Reactor Vater Cleanup System Line (P419/P432)
The discharge line from the reactor water cleanup pumps penetrates containment and serves the reactor water cleanup regenerative heat exchangers inside containment.
Automatically actuated motor operated gate valves, one inside, one outside containment, provide for isolation.
6.2-93 4
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Page 19 of 56 b.
Effluent Lines t
Effluent lines that form part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and penetrate containment and/or the drywell are equipped 7
with at least two isolation valves. One valve is inside the drywell, the other outside, but as close as possible to the containment.
Where needed, the containment is protected, in the l
event of a pipe rupture outside of the drywell but inside containment, by guard pipes which enclose the process lines, forming an extension of the drywell.
This combination of isolation i
valves and guard pipes assures protection in the event of a failure i
between drywell and containment walls.
i Table 6.2-35 lists those effluent lines that comprise part of the r
]
reactor coolant pressure boundary and that penetrate containment and/or the drywell.
Items 1 through 4, below, address specifics of these lines.
5 1.
Staam Lines (P124/P116, P416/P.414, P122/P115, and P415/P415)
Steam lines include main steam, main steam drain, residual i
heat removal, and reactor core isolation cooling steam lines.
The main steam lines from the reactor pressure vessel to the turbine penetrate both drywell and containment. Main steam line drains (one for each main steam line) in the drywell are j
headered together to form one line which penetrates both drywell and containment.
Isolation for the main steam lines and main steam drain line is provided by automatical'ly actuated block valves, one inside the drywell and one outside
]
containment except for that provided by the outboard MSIV drain valves, 1B21F067A, B, C, D, which are locked closed.
l Revision 9 6.2-94 April, 1998 l
1
^'"~%
~ - = - - -
,, Q g,-. l a f c, % - h" e g - /\\le c hg.4._5 )
PY-CEI/NRR-2322L f'7 f Pcge 20 of 56 The residual heat removal steam supply and reactor core isolation cooling turbise steam line branches from the main steam line inside the dryvell. Isolation for this line is provided by one normally open gate valve and one normally closed globe valve inside the dryvell, and one normally open gate valve outside containment. These motor operated valves I
are capable of automatic and remote-manual actuation.
t
?
Use of guard pipes to enclose these steam lines prevents containment overpressurization in the event of line break t
between the dryvell and containment valls.
The internal design temperature and pressure for the guard pipes which enclose these steam lines are the same as the design values specified for the. enclosed lines.
--- p.
2.
Reactor Vater Cleanup Lines (P131/P132) t The reactor vater cleanup pumps are located outside containment; the heat exchangers and filter demineralizers, are located inside containment,'but outside the dryvell. The reactor water cleanup pump suction line from the reactor recirculation system lines and the reactor bottom head penetrates the dryvell and containment. Two automatically actuated, motor operated velves provide for isolation of this line.
One valve is just inside the dryvell, the other is outside containment. A guard pipe encloses the line between the dryvell and containment valls.
The reactor water cleanup pump discharge line to the heat exchangers and filter demineralizers penetrates containment.
Two autoc:atically actuated, motor operated valves (one inside I
and one outside containment) provide for isolation of this line.
4 4
6.2-95
~ w-N N~~^~~~~i I
- g, Qe, ed.h(
(v.,e iAfor. M 'c p d okopS PY-CEl/NRR-2322L
- Page 21 of 56 v
A blovdown line-from the filter demineralizers penetrates j
containment and divides to form separate lines to the
{1 condenser and radvaste system.
Automatically actuated, motor operated valves, one inside and one outside containment, I
provide for isolation of this line.
l I
The return line from the filter demineralizers penetrates i
i containment and connects to the feedvater line between the F
outboard feedvater gate valve and the outboard (feedvater)
I check valve. Two' automatically actuated, motor operated gate j
valves provide for isolation of this line.
One valve is inside, the other outside of containment.
1 3.
Residual Heat Removal Shutdown Cooling Line (P421/P406) i The residual heat removal shutdown cooling line branches from the B reactor recirculation loop and penetrates both the dryvell and containment. A check valve, in parallel with a i
normally closed, remote-manually actuated, motor operated
'j valve isolates the line inside "the dryvell; a normally closed, l
I remote-manually actuated, motor operated valve isolates the j
line outside containment. A guard pipe encloses this line from the dryvell vall to the conts.inment vall to protect against containment overpressurization in the event of a line break.
1 4.
Recirculation System Sample Line (NA) j A sample line from the recirculation system penetrates the i
dryvell. This line is 3/4 inches in diameter and is designed
]
in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code,Section III, Class 2.
A sample probe with a 1/8 inch diameter hole is located inside one reeirculation discharge line within i
i the dryvell.
In the event of a line break, this probe acts as 1
6.2-96 l
l i
L
=-
/
~C' h pv pro d b1 itF $AdF h NCA AO As P -C 2322L j
p a restricting orifice and limits escaping fluid flow. Two air operated valves which fail closed are provided for isolation of this line. Both sample isolation valves are located outside the dryvell.
Conclusions Concerning General Design Criterion 55 l
c.
l l
To assure protection against the consequences of accidents involving the release of radioactive material, piping which forms portions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary has been shown to provide adequate isolation capability on a case-by-case basis. In all cases, a minimum of two barriers is shown to protect against release of radioactive materials. Where necessary to protect the l
containment against overpressure, guard pipes are provided which enclose the process pipes between the dryvell and containment valls.
l In addition to satisfying the requirements of GDC 55, the pressure retaining components which comprise the reactor coolant pressure l
boundary are designed to satisfy otlier appropriate requirements which minimize the probability or consequences of an accident I
rupture. Quality requirements for these components ensure that-they are designed, fabricated and tested to the highest reactor plant component standards.
The classification of components which i
l comprise the reactor coolant pressure boundary is Quality Group A; these components are designed in accordance with the ASME Code,Section III, Class 1.
Additional information concerning classification is presented by Table 3.2-1.
The containment and l
reactor vessel isolation control system is addressed in l
l Section 7.3.
l.
I e'
- lt
P 6.2-97 j'
+
l l
i
gf m-N h_
PY
/N -2322L D *s
(> A(
- CV'M YTI
- W'"
~
^
i Page 23 of 56 d.
Specific activity in the reactor coolant was conservatively assumed I
to be 6.56 pCi/g of 1-131 and 34.9 pCi/g of Xe-133, with other isotopes in proportionate quantities. This corresponds to spike conditions.
Turbulence resulting from the high blowdown rates and operation of e.
fan coolers in containment was assumed to ensure good mixing in the entire containment volume.
f.
Containment air was assumed to be released through two 18 inch purge lines, one supply and one exhaust, for five secor Constant flow rates through the open purge lines corresponding to the maximum containment pressure of approximately 3.0 psig during t.he release period (see Figure 6.2-2) were used to determine a-total flow to the environment of 1,020 pounds. This value is 1
conservative since it ignores lover flow rates due to lower j
containment pressures and partial closure of the purge isolation valves at times prior to five seconds, i
No credit was allowed for iodine removal by the 99 percent i
g.
. efficient charcoal adsorbers in the containment purge exhaust
- lines, h.
Site boundary X/0 (see Table 15.6-12) was used in the dose i
calculation.
6.2.4.3 Design Evaluation 6.2.4.3.1 General Evaluation To ensure the accomplishment of the design objective stated in Section 6.2.4.1, redundancy is provided in all design aspects of the containment isolation systems.
Mechanical components are redundant and each isolation valve is protected, by separation and/or adequate ll.
6.2-106 i
L
[
py.CEl/NRR-2322L barriers, against the consequences of potential missiles.
i Page 24 of 56 Also, system design specifications require each containment isolation valve to be l
operable under the most severe operating conditions to which it may be exposed.
A program of testing is inplace to ensure valve operability l
and leak tightness.
Isolation valve arrangements provide backup in the i
event of accident and satisfy the requirements of GDC 54, 55, 56, and 57, and follow the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.11.
Electrical j
redundancy is provided by valve arrangements which eliminate dependence upon one power source to achieve isolation. Electrical cables for isolation valves in the same line are routed separately.
Cables are i
selected with consideration of the specific environmental conditions to l
l vhich they may be subjected, such as magnetic fields, high radiation, high temperature, and high relative humidity.
The containment isolation l
valve' arrangements, vi,th appropriate instrumentation, are illustrated by Figure 6.2-60.
i Modes of valve actuation are also redundant.
primary mode is automatic; the secondary mode is remote-manual.y i
T active failure of a single valve or other component can prevent j
o containment isolation.
j y
All nonpowered isolation valves are administratively controlled and/or
(
locked to ensure that posi. ion is known and maintained.
The position of l
all power operated isolation valves is indicated in the control room.
l Instrumentation and controls associated with the containment isolation j
systems are discussed in Chapter 7.
l 6.2.4.3.2 Failure Mode and Effects Analyses A single failure can be defined as a failure of some component in any safety system which results in a loss or degradation of the capability of the system to perform the safety function.
Active components are defined as components that must perform a mechanical motion in the process of accomplishing a system safety function.
Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 requires that electrical systems also be designed against 1
6.2-107 1
1
PY-CEl/NRR-2322L Page 25 of 56 Insert Page 6.2-107 Exceptions are noted in the " justification of differences" discussions provided for GDCs 55,56 and 57 which document that specific isolation provisions provide an acceptable configuration.
I 1
l
W
.,,,)
.m.
TA CONTAINMENT GDC/
g3)
Line Fig.
Sys. and Penetration No Reg.
Size Essengt 6.2-60 valve
(
2 UNIT 1 MN M Guide System Number Fluid (in)
_Sys.
Arr. No.
Ntsnber 13 P120 P427 CDC56 Containment Leak Rate -
Air 8
No 35(b)
Spect. flange O Pressurization Line Air 6
No 35(b)
Spect. Flange Is Air 8
No 35(b)
Blind Flange I P121 P112 GDC55 Feedwater A, RHR, and Water 20 Yes*
2 821F065A 0
RWCU Return to Reactor 2^
":P 2
22M??".
O
'.': t : r Pressure Vesse'
'.A Zi__
A.^
" ~ 55?"
C Wattf-( 2.
1ts 1
Et2 FOS'3 A o P122 P115 GDC55 Main Steam Line C steam 26 Yes-1(a) 821F028c o-Steam 26 Yes*
1(a)
B21F022C I
Steam 1-1/2 Yes*
1(a)
B21F067C 0
Steam 2-1/2 Yes*
1(a)
E32F001J 0
P123 P117 GDC55 RCIC Punp Discharge and Water 6
Yes*
5 E51F066 1
RHR Head Spra)
Water 6
Yes*
5 E51F013 0
Water 6
Yes 5
E12F023 0
P124 P116 CDC55 Main Steam t.ine A Steam 26 Yes*
1(a) 821F028A 0
Steam 26 Yes*
1(a) 821F022A I
steam 1-1/2 Yes*
1(a) 821F067A 0
Steam 2 1/2 Yes*
1(a)
E32F001A 0
P131 P132 GDC55 RWCU Ptrip suction Water 6
Yes*
49 G33F001 I
Water 6
Yes*
49 G33F004 0
P132 P408 CDC55 RWCU Line from Regenerative Water 6
Yes*
44 G33F040 I
Heat Exchanger to Feedwater Water 6
Yes*
44 G33F039 0
P201 P218 GDC56 Drywell Atmosphere Orywell Atmos. 1 No 52 D17F079A 0
Radiation Monitor Line Drydell Attros. 1 No 52 D17F0798 I
Drywell AtKos. 1 No 52 D1TF071A 0
Drywell Atmos. 1 No 52 D17F0718 I
P203 P301 GDC56 Fuel Pool Cooling Supply Water 8
No 26(a)
G41F100 0
Water 8
No 26(a)
G41F522 I
P204 P302 CDC55 Control Rod Drive to Reactor condensate 2-1/2 Yes*
3 C11F083 0
Pressure vessel condensate 2 1/2 Yes*
3 C11F122 I
P205 P205 GDC56 Fuel Transfer T e e Water 24 No 36 Do @te gasket 1 4 e
.e-ei F20' P122 CDC56 Containment Vacuum Atmos.
24 Yes 19 M17F025 0
Relie8 Atmos.
24 Yes 19 M17F020 I
P210 P206 GDC56 Carbon Dioxide to Fire 00 4
No 42 P54F340 0
2 Protection System CO 4
No 42 P54F1098 I
P301 P222 GDC56 Fuel Pool Cooling Water 10 No 26(t)
G41F145 0
Return Water 10 No 26(b)
G41F140 1
P302 P211 GDC56 Backup Hydrogen Drywell Atmos. 2 Yes 39(b)
M51F110 0
Purge System Drywell Atmos. 2 Yes 39(b)
M51F090 1
W MM
Attachm:nt 4 PY-CEI/NRR-2322L gaghU,yhy y
Page 26 of 56 LE 6.2 32 (Continued)
I ISOLATION VALVE
SUMMARY
ggo Ave.E.b4 on
/Wa@TO bmd Type Actuation Valve Position Pwr.
Norm.
Closure Sourc Flow
)
C Pipe Valve Mode Shut Post Pwr Isolatg Time (sec) 9) 11 Bus (10) g7)
_ lest tenath(6)
Type Oper. % h yo_rm down Acc.
Btil Signal Ofr.
In Nr 128-9-1/2" (16)
In No NA (16)
No In (16) 2.(,' 9 /s "
f
{ ^ ; "/O-Gye EM E
M OP CL OP or CL Al Rg 1 (2.0) In p Std.
Yes b bi b bb ((
b E
"EE
'.A EEE a
a ca L.
OP' c,L-A T-R w. A,LA 33 1
n7 Ned 39' *1 /f "
Glebe. Erg M
8 Yes 1 78-2-3/4 " Globe A A
SP OP CL CL FC C,E,F,$,N,F,KM (13)
Out c
Yes NA Globe A A
SP OP CL CL FC C,E,l',S,N,P,RM (13)
Out Yes 25'-2-3/4" Globe M M
Out l
Yes 21'-2-3/4" Gate LM E
M CL CL OP A!
RM[,HH,11,JJ,KK,LL 22 1
Out Yes NA Chk P
(11) -
CL CL OP or CL Rev. Flow In Ys
!.38-6" Gate EM E
M CL CL OP or CL A!
In A,A,U,RM, Std.
1 In Yes 50'-5" Globe EM E
M Cl Cl OP or CL Al Yes 1d'-5-7/8" Globe A A
SP OP CL CL FC C,E,F,S,N,P,RM (13)
Out C
Y:s kA Globe A A
SP OP CL CL FC C,E,F,S,N,P,RM (13)
Out c
Yes 23'-5-7/8" Globe M M
Yes 20'-5-7/8" Gate EM E
M CL CL OP Al RM *,HH,II,JJ,KK,LL 22 1
Out g
Yes NA Gate EM E
M OP 09 CL Al L,B,F,H,Y,RM 20/15 2
Out L,B,F,H,W,Y,EM,RM, 20/15 1
Out Y:s 14'-0" Cate EM E
M OP OP CL Al Yes NA Gate EM E
M OP OP CL A!
L,B,F,H,RM 27 2
Out Yes 108-9" Gate EM E
M OP OP CL Al B,F,H,L,RM, 27 1
Out j
OP OP CL Al B,G,RM
<3 1
In Yes
<10' Globe S E
c Yes
<108 clobe S E
OP OP CL Al B,G,RM
<3 2
In C
ies
<10' Ball EM E
M OP OP CL FC B,G,RM
<3 1
Out C
Yes
<108 Ball EM E
M OP OP CL FC B,G,RM
<3 2
Out Yes 10'-9" B' fly EM E
M OP OP CL Al B,C,RM 35 1
In Rev.Ffow In OP OP CL Yes NA Chk P
P Yes 18'-0" Gate EM E
M OP OP CL Al RM Std.
1 In Re6. Flow In Yes NA Chk P
P OP OP CL No u
(16)
Yes 28-6" B' fly EM E
M OP OP CL Al B,G,X,RM 5
1 In Rev. Floe In CL CL CL Yes NA Chk P
V Yes 128 6" Gate EM E
M CL - CL CL Al B,G,RM 20 1
In CL CL CL Rev. Ffow In Yes NA Chk P
P Yes 13' 0" B' fly EM E
M OP OP CL Al B,G,RM 35 1
Out C
Yes NA B' fly EM E
M OP OP CL A!
B,G,RM 35 2
Out Yes 188 0" Globe EM E
M CL OP CL A!
1 Out or CL Yes NA Globe EM E
2 Out Revision 9 6.2-203 April,1998 9309 No 37/-O(
.~ -
I w we l
l TAB)
CONTAl4 MENT GDC/
11ne Fig.
Sys. and Penetration No.g3)
Reg.
Size Essengt 6.2-60 valve (9
UNIT 1 UNIT 2 Guide System Number Fluid h
SYS.
Arr No.
Nmber i
P413 P124 GDC56 PASS Water 3/4 No 61 P87F049 I
Water 3/4 No 61 P87F055 0*
l Water 3/4 No 61 P87F046 I i Water 3/4 No 61 P87F052 0 '
l P414 P410 GDC55 Feedwater 8, RHR and Water 20 Yes*
2 B21F0658 0
RWCU Return to Reactor
=;;,-
22 7;;^
2 W O!20
^
Pressure Vesset 20 "n' _
2 "2 r : 5 ^-
f lah gJ-12
$4 2.
E.tLFoSJB C
P415 P415 GDC55 Main Steam Line D ueam a
,ves-Ka) 52 n ucau O _ i Steam 26 Yes*
1(a) 821F022D I
Steam 1 1/2 Yes*
1(a) 821F067D 0 )
Steam 2 1/2 Yes*
1(a)
E32F001N O
j P416 P414 GDC55 Main Steam Line 8 Steam 26 Yes*
1(a)
B21F0288 0
Steam
?6 Yes*
1(a)
B21F0228 I j Steam 1 1/2 Yes*
1(a)
B21F067B 0~j o
Steam 2-1/2 Yes*
1(a)
E32F001E j
l P417 P128 CDC56 Drywell and containment Water No 40 G61F080 0
Equipment Drain Sunp to Water 3
No 40 G61F075 I
Redweste Water 3/4 No 40 C61F0655 I
P418 P127 GDC56 Drywell and Containment Water 3
No 43 G61F170 0 i Floor Drain Stmp to Water 3
No 43 G61F165 I
Radweste Water l'
P419 P432 GDC55 RWCU Ptamp Discharge Water 4
No 48 G33F054 0
l Water 4
No 48 G33F053 I
P420 P412 GDC55 RWCU Backwash Transfer Water 4
No 46 G50F277 0
Ptap to Radweste Water 4
No 46 G50F272 I
l P421 P406 GDC55 RHR Reactor Shutdown Water 20 Yes 20 E12F008 0
Cooling Suction
'!ater 20 Yes 20 E12F009 I
sater 3/4 Yes 20 E12F550 1
P422 P407 GDC55 RNR and RCIC Steam Steam 10 Yes*
1(c)
E51F063 I
l Supply Steam 10 Yes*
1(c)
E51F064 0
Steam 1
Yes*
1(c)
E51F076 I
P423 P129 GDC55 ' Main Steam Line Drain Water 3
No 1(b) 821F019 0
Water 3
No 1(b) 821F016
.ee le P424 P420 GDC55 RWCU to Main Condenser Water 4
No 14 G33F034 0
and Radweste Water 4
No 14 G33F028 I
Water 1/4 No 14 G33F0646 1
i i
em**'#
q I
fAm-
i APERTURE g;,g"g2322t CARD 6.2-32 (Continued)
N kDt' Ail 0N VALVE StP#LARY werture Card Type Actuation Vatve Position Pwr.
Norm.
Closure Sourc Isolatg Time (sec) g 1EBus[10)
C Pipe Vatve Mode Shut Post Pwr
,1111 Leneth(6)
,1ype,, Oper. & Sec. Norm M Acc.
Fall {7)
Signal Dir.
CL CL OP or CL FC RM
<3 Out Yes NA Globe 5 E
P Out Yes c10' Globe S E
CL CL OP or CL FC RM
<3 P
CL CL OP or CL FC RM
<3 Out Yes LL Globe S E
P Yes
<108 Globe S E
CL CL OP or CL FC RM
<3 Out E
24, 1 NI" W
i Yes
? ' '/'" Gate EM E
M OP CL OP or CL Al RM Std.
1 In 1
l
?::
C" CL "^ : CL
-d
^^
CL ^^ cr CL t; ":
I
?-
Ch'
^^
c.L OP
( L.
Ar 6Lw.. A. u S3 2
L J I
~
.s
'39 ' ~7 4T " Catek 4., EM P\\
h Yes 16'-5-7/5" Globe A A
SP OP CL CL IC C,E,F',5/N,P,RM (13)
Dut c
Yes NA Globe A A
SP OP CL CL FC C,E,F,S,N,P,RM (13)
Out j
C Out l
Yes 23' 5-7/8" Globe M M
Yes 208 5 7/4" Cate EM E
M CL CL OP Al RM *,HH,II,JJ,KK,LL 22 1
out Out Yes 17'-4 3/4" Globe A A
SF OP CL CL FC C.E,F,$,N,P,RM (13)
C out Yes NA Globe A A
SP CP CL CL FC C,E,F,S,N,P,RM (13) out l
Yes 248-4-3/4" Globe M M
LC LC LC Yes 218-4 3/4" Cate EM E
M CL CL OP Al RM[,HH,II,JJ,KK,LL 22 1
Out Yes 26' 6" Cate EM E
M OP OP CL Al B,G,RM 22 1
out c
Yes NA Gate EM E
M OP OP CL Al 8,G,RM 22 2
Out Rev.Ffow l
Yes NA Check P P
CL CL OP or CL Yes 28' 3" Gate EM E
M OP OP CL AI 8,G,RM 22 1
out c
Yes NA Gate EM E
M OP OP CL Al B,G,RM 22 2
Out g
Yes 108-6" Cate EM E
M OP OP CL Al L,B,F,H,RM, 15.5/15 1
In Yes NA Gate EM E
M OP OP CL AI L,B,F,H,RM, 15.5/15 2
In Yes 128-0" Gate EM E
M OP OP CL Al B,G,RM Std.
1 Out c
Yes NA Gate EM E
M OP OP CL Al B,G,RM Std.
2 out Yes 14'-0" Gate EM E
M CL OP CL At U,A,M,RM e33 1
out s
Yes NA Gate EM E
M CL OP CL Al U,A,M,RM
<33 2
Out Rev.Flo$
Out Yes NA Chk P
P CL CL CL i Yes NA Gate EM E
M OP CL Op or CL Al J F,K,M,T,RM,V,0 20 2
out Yes 13' 2" Gate EN E
M OP CL OP e* CL Al J,F,K,M,T,RM,V,0 20 1
out l Yes NA Globe EM E
M CL CL CL Al J,F,K,M,T,RM,V,0 Std.
2 Out j Yes 138-0" Gate EM E
M OP CL CL Al C,E,F,S,N,P,RM,,RM, 25 1
M Yes NA Gate EM E
M OP CL CL Al C.E,F,S,N,P,RM, 25 2
Out 8)
Yes 8'-6" Gate EM E
M CL CL CL Al L,B,F,H,RM 20/15 1
Out C
83 i
Yes NA Gate EM E
M CL CL CL AI L,B,F,H,RM 20/15 2
Out l
Yes NA Ret P
P CL CL OP or CL l
C 70% o 32% O 1
Revision 9 6.2-207 April,1998 l
\\
\\
i
PY-CEl/NRR-2322L Page 29 of 56 -
Insert Page 6.2-216 20.
Division 3 power is also available by post accident operator manual action (procedurally controlled).
l
)
i i
I i
i
_ TABLE 6.2-33 POTENTIAL SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS ( }( }
l l
Primary Containment Line Bypass Expected Penetration No.
Size Leakage Air Leakage (3) i Unit 1 Unit 2 Description Valve No.
Valve Type Loc.
(in.)
Barrier Rate (SCCM)
)2 P106 RCIC Turbine E51-F0068 Gate 0
12.00 10(b) 190.0 Exhaust, RCIC E51-F0040 Noz.Chk.
0 10.00 10(b) 2.0 f5 Turbine Exhaust Vacuum Relief, and E12-F102 Gib.
0 1.5 10(a) 23.8 RHR A&B Relief Valys Discharge to N27-F751 Glb.
0 1.0 37 0.08 Suppression Pool P87-F083 Gib.
0 0.50 57 0.0 7
-P87-F264 Gib.
0 0.50 57 0.0 i
P (15)
/ I' i
Y t
O P108 P434 Condensate Supply P11-F060 Btf.
O 12.00 27(a) 0.63
]
I
,y
[
Pll-F545 Chk.
I 12.00 27(a) 384.48 t
i P109 P428 ILRT Blowdown Line (6) 8.00 35 0.00 e
?
Pill P426 Condensate Return P11-F080 Btf.
O 10.00 27(b) 0.52 P11-F090 Btf.
I 10.00 27(b) 0.52 P114 P121 Containment Vacuum M17-F015 Btf.
O 24.00 19 3.60 Relief M17-F010 Chk.
I 24.00 19 3.40 0-rings I
24.00 19 (13)
P115 See P106 O.
P117 P413 Nitrogen Supply to P86-F002
.Glb.
O 2.00 41 64.88
$ [:{
.e e >.
{@
CRD P86-F528 Chk.
I 2.00 41 64.88 am5
=
P119 P429 ILRT Pressure (6) 0.50 35 0.00 p., E g Indicating Line g$E sa
i TABLE 6.2-33 (Continued)
NOTES:
1.
A Technical Specification commitment of 5.04 percent of total design containment leakage is made for l
the maximum test leakage bypassing the containment annulus exhaust gas treatment system (for leakage sources in lines penetrating primary containment.and personnel airlocks).
2.
Expected bypass vater leakage sources from components that circulate core cooling vater following LOCA:
4 a.1 a.
Pumps -
total leakage of 5 gal./ day.from residual heat removal, high pressure core spray, and lov pressure core spray pumps.
A t
valve stem leakage of 300 cc/hr from systems handling reactor fluid outside b.
Valves oa containment.
es h
+
FV-LCS, ECCS and RCIC Branch Lines - total leakage of 1.663 gal./hr.
A:
c.
.E$
3.
Bypass leakage barrier arrangement is shown on the designated detail of Figure 6.2-60.
-s I
i
~
4.
Closed Systems Outside Containment h k k e A, A S u.H o,s t 6 4 6 5. L 2-. h.
Piping systems which penetrate containment and are closed,outside containment are tested for potential vater leakage under the guidance of NUREG-0737 :! tem III.D.1.1.
The expected bypass water 7 JyR 5 65 leakage from these systems is identified in Note 2 above.1 Valves in closed systems outside containment, which are potential air leakage sources, are identified in the text of Table 6.2-33.
3Pi o28 mW-The redundant containment isolation provisions for each penetration consist of an isolation valve ande ? A a clcsed system outside containment which are in compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Criteria 54.
O N$
The closed system is missae protected, Seismic Category I, Safety Class 2, and has a temperature and y
i xx
@.7 pressure rating in excess of that for containment.
. g.
G"
$~
i m.
.m
. m -
-~.
r
f TABLE 6.2-33-(Continued)'
NOTES:
(Continued)
The following penetrations lead to closed systems outside containment:
Unit.1:
P101, P102, P103, P104, P105, P107, P112, P113, P118, 123, P132, P401, P402, P403, P407, P408, P409, P410, P411, P412, P421, P429, P431. Q Y l2.b h Unit 2:
P101, P102, P103, P107, P106, P108, P109, P113, P114, P111, P117, P133, P408, P401, P402, P403, P404, P405, P407, P409, P411, P417, P418, P406, P419, P421.
- 5. O
~C. w r f
_3
- Aa m ument I,ines Instrument lines penetrating containment are assumed to allow zero bypass leakage. Valves in instrument lines penetrating containment are open post-LOCA in order to fulfill the instruments' functions. The instruments are designed to allow zero bypass leakage.
Penetrations containing instrument lines appear below:
-g y'
t Unit'1:
P102, P318, P320, P401, P402, P425, P433, P434 Unit 2:
P102, P422, P423, P401, P402, P219, P220, P221 6.
Soectacle or Blind Flanges t
Penetrations which contain lines isolated by spectacle or blind flanges are assumed to allow zero bypass leakage. Spectacle and blind flanges are type C tested.
Any leakage determined by type C a 7: >g tests will be eliminated by tightening and/or re-sealing the flange.
Penetrations whose lines are 1@e isolated by spectacle or blind flanges appear below:
EklE
{@
gy Unit 1:
P109, P119, P120, P205, P317, P319 er <:
g
~ h,'
Unit 2:
P428, P429, P427, P304 5
~
,a
$8
'm
PY-CEl/NRR-2322L Page 33 of 56 f
insert Page 6.2-226
- These feedwater penetrations have a branch line leading to the RHR Shutdown Cooling Return Line and the RWCU Retum Line. The RHR Shutdown Cooling Return Line leads to RHR, which is considered a closed system outside containment. The RWCU Return Line leads back into the containment, and is considered a closed system outside containment, with the specific acceptance criteria that leakage exterior to the piping will be eliminated (see Table 6.2-40 for testing details on containment penetrations).
l l
l
TABLE-6.2-33 (Continued)
NOTES:
(Continued) 7.
Leakace Control Systems The main steam lines have been excluded as potential bypass leakage paths. The main steam isolation valve leakage contrei system (refer to Section 6.7) controls leakage from the isolation valves. The main.cteam lines go through the following penetrations:
Unit 1:
P122, P124, P415, P416 Unit 2:
P115, P116, P415, P414 1^ M The feedwater system has a dedicated' leakage control system.(refer to Section 6.9) which-prc: uriccc-
-th: piping httu :: the inh :rd ch::P :1 :: and Suth: rd gat: ;11;c.
^nly th; airbczn; fractica of any fer&-::ter le:Rege fre- *he F"-LCS erill bc cencidered ac hyp :: Icch:gc.
Th: FP LCS ::al: lince gc through-the follcuing penetratiene:
i hJ
^>
Unit 1:
P121, P414
.a Unit 2:
P112, P410 1
The leakage control systems meet single failure criteria, are missile protected, Seismic Category I, Safety Class 2, and have temperature and pressure ratings in excess of that for the containment.
8.
The personnel airlock door seals are not considered a bypass leakage path when the outer door is s' :jg operable because all leakage through the outer door seals is routed back into the annulus area
% oM between the annulus shield wall and containment where it is treated by the Annulus Exhaust Gas 5"'$~
Treatment System.
E
$aA om e
OO rt <
b w
M
-. ~.
eO r
wc
<n 00 h
PY-CEl/NRR-2322L Page 35 of 56 l
i l
Insert Page 6.2-227 l
.provides seat water to the bonnet, stem, and seat of the outboard gate valves l
(821-F065A/B). Water leakage from the Feedwater Leakage Control System (FWLCS) piping, and from the bonnet, stem, and seat of the outboard gate valves, are controlled l
under the Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment Program, Technical I
Specification 5.5.2 Outboard gate valve bonnet and stem leakage identified during the system walkdown at pressures >1000 psig will be eliminated. The gate valves will be closed during this check. Gate valve seat water leakage measured at 21.1 P, will be limited by the Program, which restricts allowable leakages to half of that assumed in the dose calculations (see Section 15.6.5.5.1.2.b). This water leakage is not added into the secondary containment bypass air leakage totals. The FWLCS seals the feedwater lines-going through the following penetrations:
l 1
l TABLE 6.2-40 f, )
Y \\
PRIMARY REACIOR CONTAIINENT PENETRATION AND CORrAftNENT ISOIATICN VAINE LEAFAGE RATE TEST LIST 1
i Inboard outboard Contairunent Containment Penetration Pene-Inboard Icolation Bstrier Outboard Isolation Barrier 7
i No. Unit 1/
tration Barrier Barrier Description /
Barrier Barrier Description /
3 Unit 2 Descr!ption Test Test Valve No.
Notes Test Valve ilo.
Notesk $,
P202/P306 Equipnent hatch
-B Double 0-ring 1
P305/P205 Imer Fersonnel Airlock Barrel B
Inner door 2
Outer door 2
g Inner door Inflatable gaskets 1
Inflatable gaskets 1
D C
F53F536*/F570 3
C P53F015*/F070 f [1 C
P53F556 C
P53F035 7
C S F160 C
P53F010*
ip P
j m
C P53F030 l,
T ss d,
r{
(* inboard / outboard function varies with mode of operation) h' P312/P215 Upper Personnel Inner deroY 2
Outer door 2
g 1 Airlock Barrel B
Inflatable gaskets 1
Inflatable gaskets 1
Inner door C
P53F541*/F571 3
"I, C
P53F025*/F075 e
C PS3F561 C
PS3F045 7
i C
P52F170
'h C
E}F020*
p C
P53F040
(
V
(* inboard / outboard function varies with mode of operation) o 22 Ok P205/P304 Fuel transfer tube B
Double gasket 1,12
% 8 {R 73>
w w.
P124/P116 Main steam line A B
C B21F022A 3,4,12,13 C
B21F028A 4,13 wm
$0 C
B21F067A 13 O {p ?.
o o
m, C
E32F001A 13 mMA b!
M e-
4.
- 21%
b b
TABLE 6.2-40 (Continued)
Inboard Outboart Contairnent Containment' Penetration Pene-Inboard Isolation Barrier.
Outboard Icolation Barrier No, Unit 1/
tration Barrier Barrier Description /
' Barrier Barrier k scription/_
Unit 2' ebscription
_ Test Test Valve ib.
Notes _ Test Valve ib.
-Notes P416/P414' Main steam line B ~
B~
C
. R21F022B 3,4,12,13 C
.B21F028B
~,13 4
C B21F067B 13 C
E32F001E 13 P122/P115 Main steam line C B
C'
'B21F022C 3,4,12,13 C
B21F028C
~
I 4,13 C
- B21F067C.
13 C
E32F001J 13 P415/P415 Main steam line D B
C-B21F022D 3,4,12,13 C
B21F028D 4,13
~
C B21F0610 13 C
E32F001N 13 g
m P121/P112 Feedwater A, RHR, B
%75 2^A *---
5, 13 0
22N002A 3# -
L RWCU Return to C
B21F065A 5,13 Reactor Pressure C
g,tt roF3A 7, t 3 y
Vessel AtconC4* Sad $sbm 13, 3 o 0'
"" T M ^ ^ ^ -
5, e 13
^2'r0220
^
RWCU Return to-A C
B21F065B 5,13 Reactor Pressure C.
EL:2# 053IS 7,13 :
Vessel gg,3cu c{ M frp h g3,30 P102/P102 RHR pung A suction C
E12F004A 9,13,17 Closed system 7
~
[hh P402/P402 RHR pung B suction C
E12F004B 9,13,17 Closed system 7
SQ4
-a P403/P403 RHR punp C suction C
E12F105 9,13,17 Closed system 7
2g
~
MhE
@g P421/P406 RHR shutdown cooling B C
E12F03 12,18
.C E12F008-16 b$
et <:
suction C
E12F550' 18 M
jr r
Cr wa m
oO L
-i L
.mm m
. m.
m
- +
r
e
~.
L 3
t
- L q
- }
TAELE 6.2-40'(Continued):
T.
Inboard l Ottboard Containment'-.
Containment
' *a-I ?
Penetration Pene-'
Inboard Isolation Barrier Outboard Isolation Starrier tration Barrier: Barrier Description /
Barrier
' Barrier Description /
e No. Unit 1/
. Description
' Test-Test Valve No.
Notes Test Valve No.
Notes Unit 2 I
P410/P411 HPCS pung discharge C-E22F005 13,25 C'
. E22F004 13,25 i
h to RPV
(:
P409/P409 HPCS min. flow and C
E22F012 13,16 Closed system
-7 l
test line to C
E22F035 8,13,16 Closed system ;
7 l
'{
.i suppression pool
. 13,16 Closed system 7
I C
E22F023
[
'C' E21F001 9,13,17 C
Closed system 7 $\\
P103/P103 LPCS pump suction
?
13,25 y >.
E 1F005 2
P112/P113.
. LPCS punp discharge C
E21F006 13,25 C
4 t
{
to RpV 7
i y
P423/P423 Main steam line drain B C
B21F016 3,12 C
B21F019 f[).
i.
NO P131/P132~
RWCU punp suction B
C
-G33F001 12,13 C
G33F004 13 P419/P432 RWCU pung discharge C
-G33F053-C G33F054 p
l r
O
~
C G33F040-C G33F039 0
P132/P408 RWCU return to-f P424/P420 RMCU to main C
G33F028
.C G33F034 f )I 4
[
d' i
condenser and C
radwaste
{
]
C G41F100
{o P203/P301 Fuel pool cooling
'C.-
G41F522 4
y and cleanup supply
/ p j
{7 4
- W
. s.
4 r e.
m 8
V Fa>R 5-
=9 a,[ 5
=
a e
w b
i u
i r
l
-m.
. _.,, -.. _ - _. _.. _... _ ~. _.. --
PY-CEI/NRR-2322L Page 39 of 56 TABLE 6.2-40 (Continued) 110TES:
(Continued)
-m
.T_ ^ s42-t 5.
e feedwater lines ~are sealed post-LOCA with water from t D '
feedwater leakage control system (FWLCS). Feedwater lines wil.
tested as follows. The inboard and outboard check valves I bc )
tested with water to a pressure not less than 1.10 P. #Acceptable check valve leakage is 1 gpm per valve.
The ou ard gate valve stems and bonnets will be Type 'C' tested
- h air.
A high pressure (1,000 psig) water leak tes f the outboard gate valve stem and bonnet may be perfome as an alternative test in lieu of the Type
'C' air test, wit zero water leakage being acceptable.
Water leakage throug e check valves is not included in the 0.60 L Type B C test totals. Also, if e Type "C" test with a
air is per rmed, air leakage through the gate valve stem and bonn will be eliminated. Gate valve through-seat leakage is not nsidered bypass leakage.
6.
System remains water filled post-LOCA.
Isolation valve tested with water to a pressure not less than 1.10 P.
Isolation valve leakage a
not included in 0.60 L, Type B and C test totals.
ksart The redunda t containment isolation provisions for this penetration
/
7.
consist of f inflatable seal and an isolation valve.
A si active failure can be accommodated. For the leak ontrol function, which is applicable to the s Ine from outer door to annulus, the line to the annu s designed to standards for a closed system to se ry containment. The closed system is missile ed, Seismic Category I, Safety Class 2, and has a erature and pressure rating in excess of that for the r
Revision 8 6.2-250 Oct. 1996
. ~. -... -
-. _. ~ _ -... - - -. - _.... -.. -. -...
)
PY-CEI/NRR-2322L Page 40 of 56 i
Insert for NOTE 5 Page 6.2-250 The Appendix J Type "C" test for the Feedwater lines is provided by the Type "C" hydrostatic tests performed on the long term, high integrity leakage protection valves, i.e., the matcr operated gate valves (821-F065A/B). Water leakage from the Feedwater Leakage Control System (FWLCS) piping, and from the bonnet, stem and seat of tha motor operated gate valves, are controlled under the Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment Program, Technical Specification 5.5.2. Outboard gate valve tonet and stem leakage identified during the system walkdown at pressures >1000 psig will be eliminated. The gate valves will be closed during this check. Gate valve seat water leakage measured at 21.1 P, will be lim;ted by the Progmm, which restricts allowable leakages to half of that assumed in the dose calculations (see Section 15.6.5.5,1.2.b).
This waterleakage is not redundantly added into the Type C 0.60 L, totals secondary 1
containment bypass air leakage totals or the hydrostatic test program totals.
Insert for NOTE 7 Note to reviewers:
Tne following insert for NOTE 7 on page 6.2-250 is simply restoring the correct wording j
7 for this NOTE regarding closed systems outside containment. A change made in i
Revision 8 of the USAR had incorrectly revised NOTE 7 such that it became a specific l
i h
note forjust one type of penetration (the airlocks), versus the generic note that it had historically been. This is being corrected under the PNPP Corrective Action Program.
The Insert to NOTE 7 therefore, is not a change being made as a result of the proposed
~
feedwater penetration improvement amendment, per se.
...an isolation valve and a closed system outside containment which is in compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 54. A single active failure can be accomodated. The closed system is missile protected, Seismic Category 1, Safety Class 2, and has a l
temperature and pressure rating in excess of that forthe containment. Closed system integrity is maintained and verified during periodic Type A test and during system leak n
tests (per NUREG-0737 Item ill.D.1.1).
I I
}'
f i
J 4
1
/
x_
7~
'q
'g PY-CEl/NRR-2322L f,7 f m j JLt.A b/~
O.
". ^*
[)
Page 41 of 56
-s
--~
TABLE 6.2-40 (Continued)
_ NOTES:
(Continued) 12.
Penetration design utilizes a double bellows for containment isolation.
The bellows is leak checked by pressurizing the space between the inner and outer bellows. The fuel transfer tube bellows is sealed on both ends with double gasketed flange joints.
These joints are leak checked by pressurizing the space between the double gaskets. The fuel transfer tube has a bellows assembly installed in the annulus to permit confirmatory leak testing of the i
fuel transfer tube bellows. The fuel transfer tube bellows is leak l
s checked by pressurizing the annular space betwaen the IFTS tube and the bellows assembly via a test connection on the bellows assembly.
i
~ w 13. System is not vented and drained for Type A test.
This allowance for main steam lines is provided by Reference 33.
Isolationvalvingforinstrumentlinbswhichpenetratethe 14.
containment conform to the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.11.
The ISI program will provide assurance of the operability and integrity of the isolation provisions. Type 'C' testing will not be performed on the instrument line isolation valves.
The I
instrument lines will be within the boundaries of the Type
'A' test, open to the media (containment atmosphere or suppression pool water) to which they will be exposed under postulated accident conditions. Three exceptions to the above are Penetrations P401, P318 and P425.
Isolation valves for the three penetrations include H Analyzer and Postaccident Sampling System Valves.
The valves 2
are normally closed post-LOCA, open only intermittently, and will therefore receive Type C tests.
15.
System remains pressurized with air post-LOCA.
Revision 8 6.2-252 Oct. 1996
~... -... -..
.-. _ ~
. ~.... -..
8 PY-CEl/NRR-2322L Page 42 of 56 4
- 28. The containment purge 18-inch supply and exhaust lines are provided 4
--with double inboard isolation. valves. For each 18-inch line, both inboard valves are Type C tested and the highest leakage is designated as the inboard barrier leakage. Leakage through the test connection between the 18-inch isolation valves is summed with the innermost 18-inch valve leakage.
l 29; Deleted 30 Ln w t N
I i
Revision 8 6.2-255a Oct. 1996 l
1 i
.___..,..__.m....__..
.... _. _. _.~.. _._.. _ _.. _._ _._. _ _.-_.._. _ __ _ _._.
i PY-CEl/NRR-2322L U'
Page43 of 56 Insert Page 6.2-255a This RWCU line returns the filtered RWCU water to the Reactor Vessel via the
~ Feedwater lines. The piping " outboard" of the RWCU branch line check valve.
(1G33-F052NB) leads directly back to containment penetration P132, and is ASME Code Class 2, Seismic Category 1, protected from pipe whip, missiles and jet forces, and analyzed for
- break exclusion". This closed system outside containment contains only
- J mechanical joints, including the packing on the outboard containment isolation valve j
(1G33-F039) for Penetration P132 (see the P132 entry). This outboard valve, including
- the stem and bonnet, is already part of the air leak rate test program. The remainder of
. the RWCU piping between the Feedwater line and Penetration P132 will be added to the Technical Specification 5.5.2 Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment Program, with a specific leakage acceptance limit of zero (0) water leakage when tested at i
. > 1000 psig.
h i
n w
-. ~
v
+o
f
.e,
' PY.CEl/NRR-2322L
A Page 44 of 56
]
6.9 FEEDVATER LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM 6.0.1 DESIGN BASES 1
l The feedvater leakage control system (FVLC) is designed in u.
accordance with Seismic Category I and quality group classification requirements to comply with Regulatory Guides 1.26 and 1.29.
The system meets the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.96, where applicable (see Table 3.2-1).
l
'b.
The FVLC system is designed with sufficient redundancy, separation, reliability, and capacity as a safety-related system consistent with the need to maintain containment integrity for as long as i
postulated LOCA conditions require.
t The FVLC system is capable of performing its intended safety c.
function following a loss of all offsite power coincident with the postulated design basis LOCA.
t d.
The FVLC system is designed with sufficient capacity and capability to prevent leakage through the feedvater lines consistent with containment integrity under the conditions associated with the postulated design. basis LOCA.
e.
The FVLC system is provided with interlocks actuated from I
appropriately designed safety. systems or circuits to prevent inadvertent system operation.
f.
The FVLC system is designed to permit testing of the operability of controls and actuating devices as well as the complete functioning of the system during plant shutdowns.
i 6.9-1 l'
l i
l l
l PY-CEl/NRR-2322L I
Page 45 of 56 g.
The FVLC system is designed so that ef fects resulting from a system single active component failure vill not affect the integrity of the feedvater lines or the operability of containment isolation valve ) J-n y t h.
The FVLC system is protected from the effects of internally generated missiles, pipe break failures and adverse environments associated with a LOCA.
6.9.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The FVLC consists of piping, valves and instrumentation as shown in Figure 6.9-1.
The system components are designed to the requirements of Table 3.2-1, Item XLIX.
The FVLC system consists of two independent subsystems designed to eliminate thrnuch-line
~
leakace in the feedvater nioin (for 4ki St% aonnot anA se _oe ue.] g by providing a l
positive seaIXbetween tne containment icnicion check valves and ConeuA No (bWi sioA 27 outboard isolation valv he inh:: W_ ubs stem uses the residual heat tvis ion 1) removal (RHR) vaterleg pump and the e deoeru unsystem uses the Inu_
(L SAJ pressure core spray (LPCS) waterleg pump to supply sealing vatt'r g.
d;rn :::;r and up:::::: cid:: cf th: :::b::rd ::rteirmert is:1stica ch:: alv:, :::p::ti :1y.
Following a LOCA, the FVLC system is manually initiated from the control room. The operator first verifies feedvater unavailability through low feedvater pressure (approximately 30 psig), then closes the. outboard containment isolation (mntor operated gate) valves with the keylock switches, and ope otor operated FVLC system valves f~ Q e control room. The su on pool sealing vater fro schosa-a; leg water moVsj pump is routed to bot p t:ter lines. The ::: ling fluid fr:r th:
>>:terle; purp diccherg lire fill: 22:5 fred > t-14 na hatuaan tha
-::r::!rmen icel !!:r ch :P v21'? :
The :::!!n; " ter th : ugh he v:17:
m.. a ll, fill; th: f :d :::: !!n: up :: th: :::::: v :::1 (;r irt; 6.9-2
.- ~....... -. -
. ~
_... - ~... - -. _ - --._
., ~.
~.
PY-CEI/NRR-2322L Page 46 of 56 l
Insert
' Page 6.9-2
]
...except for the extremely unlikely possibility of a failure of one of the motor operated l.
gate valves to close. The licensing basis for the feedwater penetrations is that the gate j
valves are successfully closed by the control room operator. Power is available to the
)
gate valves from either Division 1 (normal source) or Division 3 (alternate power source
)
connected per plant emergency procedures). Physical and electrical separation between Divisions 1 and 3 will be maintained by employing two features:
- i
. 1. Normally open, fused disconnect switches at bcth ends of the circuit, and
- 2. Fuses normally stored out of the circuit.
1 Insert.
l
...through the bonnets of the MOVs. Following closure of the MOVs, the sealing water seats the stems, bonnets and seats, and isolates the feedwater lines.
)
t l
2
'l 1
)
i b
w y
-yNi
.=
y-p.
w e.w..i rn1 e
PY-CEIHRR-2322L Page 47 of 56
-th; dquell in the c2ce of 2 feet ater pip k e?k _nride dryacil) and finally the.:ter retu nr to t' rupprerd en pee! *bregb the LOCA br-sak,.
Since the source of sealing water is the suppression pool, a 30-day water supply is ensured.
Operation of the FWLC system will not affect the function of the suppression pool since the _"
-_ter.
o-eventually return the pool when the dryw_g.la it flooded back over the weir wall.
anoMMve, b d53AA of h Co MiA M -
j u&. ;&
% wNn%4 mQ 1s va.rys,s h The :::. ling.::ter f re-t' L?c? "?terle; p" r dier"rge li e fill: :::h Tca etcc lin hetu:en th: Outh rd :ntzirment i 012ti n ch::k c;1c; and th: f::ducter chut:ff ;2tc f21fc.
When the FWLC system is initiated manually following a LOCA, there should be no demand for keep'-fill water in the RHR and LPCS systems since these systems will be operating.
Therefore, the waterleg pump should be totally dedicated to provide sealing water to the FWLC system.
l A single waterleg pump has the capacity to provide the necessary sealing water to the FWLC system.
The feedwater system will not be completely drained since the system will be intact and operating initially post-LOCA.
The feedwater design includes a backup flow path through a mctor driven pump. When the turbine driven feed pumps lose driving steam and trip on vessel Level 2 port-LOCA, flow is automatically diverted through the motor driven pump. The motor driven feed pump and/or the feedwater booster pumps will continue to pump water into containment post-LOCA.
The pumps will continue to operate for about 10 minutes before the feedwater booster pumps trip on low water level.
During this time, no extraction heating is available and cold water from the condenser hotwell is being pumped into the vessel which cools down the feedwater Revision 9 6.9-3 April, 1998
PY-CEl/NRR-2322L Page 48 of 56 and the piping. When feedvater flow is finally stopped, feedvater j
flashing is not expected to occur. Therefore, a significant voiding of.
the piping is not expected.
11s case of a LOCA where the feedvater lines remain water filled, static hea sure and the feedvater check valve disc veight force the feedvater check valve, close.
Initiation of the FVLC system pressurizes the volumes between inboard and outboard isolation check valves, and between the outboard isolation s valve and the motor operated gate valve. Since the waterleg pumps operat pressure higher than the static head pressure, leakage is into the reacto vessel (or dryvell as discussed previously).
1 In the case where the feedvater lines do not remain completely
~
vater filled, the feedvater system can be operated to ensure positive pressurization up to the motor onerated care valve and thus leakare i A
(it m. ( oc A h a Fu. Awe.c nu. sw.c ww rw
/
~
intothereactorvessel(ordryveup: d1:203::: 7: ricu 1y).
2ne twLc system vill be initiated and begin to fill the volume @ t"eer th d h Ln M M ht ef inb:::d :nd ::th: rd irclet!:r ch: h v 'rer, 2nd 5:t. ::r th: :,.ti:::_
.g g i
lati:r ch::h ":Iv :nd ::::: :p:::::d gat: :Irc.
Th
- ight ef th
+d.
- be 9:9 vrl"cg[
S J.::h Ir: d!::c,~2nd n:-upstrrr prerrrrr, "!!! ferer 4
g
-:: 21 :.
When the volumes fill up, the pressure vill incre the re!;ht ef th: d!:: !: everce-r-
^ + 9!: prirt, the d!:: ;!!i1!!!
- %l,s i
';; ;;pr::in ::1;, 2.25 p:i;} :nd 12 h;;; ir:: i5: ;;;;;l ill ;;;;.
f.:
3 9.: precrur: i r reli e"ed, ^- '" r- "" '
er^~+ r-+i1 precrure bufld: up
- ir
- I $ dir
- lif'r.
"'f r prrrrrr "ill cr-*.irrr thr:rder' 't 1
N iiei. ;f th: ' ^" ' : : : t f"ir:^ varv little voiding is expected, a conservative approach to l
+n assume one feedvater line is evaluate the FVLC system would 5 completely drained.
Fill time in this case vould be apptvu...;tr'y, _b 18 minutes.
If a divisional failure is assumed, enly enegvaterleg pump Y (YWi\\
f\\
6.9-4 i
PY-CE!/NRR-2322L Page 49 of 56 em.A:^Q 37f *\\oh du s
voul e available for.illi:g the feedvater line.
"::d c : t';cs:
c;nd!!*
c, c21r"'2 tie m 9 e" 4* u~i1 A + tn err im "1y M -!wter te
-H44-;;d ::!-t:I
- feeder +rr r ml.
Based on the conservative assumptions listed above, the FVLC system vill provide an adequate seal within one hour following OCA.
If a loss of 6 & ss %c]
a offsite power is assumed at this time.
FwLC ste ill maintain the Con M W, 6e m ek a 4 n t &- % Q volume of w ha e=cen na 2e:ard ;cc:20e ched caln and the C%.
outboard motor operated gate valv 5, During ;-n; 4<rst:n, our, operation of the feedvater system vill maintain a stem pressure higher than the dryvell pressure, thus ensuring vater le kage into the vessel.
[T esar Y a h w P W t Nk hora %)
Ns minMninj h 6.9.3 DESIGN EVALUATION famAweder lina isolo,b on.
The FVLC system is designed to prevent the release of radioactivity s ap pkwh wahr through the feedvater line isolation valves by providing p
g fler of veter thrcq;F the.feederter lirce following a loss of all offsite power coincident with the postulated design basis loss-of nelant accidnnt. The tun rodim d an t subsystems are physically 6,s e x W e et pracEcaA h ora c) separate to minimize the exposure or the system components to missiles and to the effects of pipe whip or jet impingement from high energy line breaks. % wwA pie.1 g sa p nts a.ra-eky s6uy pro 4a.ded 4r.~]_
- Q s4 pos+At-.4. 4&Ets. f The FVLC system is Seismic Category I and is capable of performing its intended function following an active component failurg Each 2nd:perdert subsystem is powered from a different diviq ion of the ESF egapt-as ^0+*d power supply.
hh NL C 5 Web llM un in 54dion, G.*l. (.3 Double series isolation valves are provide to ensure that no single active failure vill affect the integrity of the feedvater lines.
6.9-5
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l PY-CEl/NRR 2322L Page 50 of 56 l
m The following USAR Figures are. expected to need revision, but the drawing changes will not be complete until the Design Change Package has been i
completed. If requested by the NRC reviewers, these could be submitted when
= the drawings are complete:
Fig. 6.2-60. " Containment and Drywe!! Isolation" Fig. 6.9-1
' "Feedwater Leakage Contro! System" l
Fig.10.1-3 "Feedwater" U
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Attachm:nt 4 PY-CEI/NRR-7322L Page 51 of 56 Insert Page 15.6-18 The operator should initiate the Feedwater Leakage Contral System as dese,ibed in Section 6.9.2.
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py.CEl/NRR-2322L Page 52 of 56 pool cooling mode and check that the emergency service water system has been automatically initiated. After the RilR system and other auxiliary systems are in proper operation, the operator should monitor the hydrogen concentration in the dryvell for proper activation of the recombiner and mixer, i. necessary.
nw-M 15.6.5.2.2 Systems Operations Accidents that could result in the release of radioactive fission products ditectly into the containment are the results of postulated reactor coolant pressure boundary ripe breaks.
Possibilities for all pipe breaks sizes and locations are examined in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, including the severance of small process system lines, the main steam lines upstream of the flow restrictors and the recirculation loop pipelines.
The most severe nuclear system effects and the greatest release of radioactive material to the containment result from a complete circumferential break of one of the two recirculation loop pipelines. The minimum required functions of reactor and plant protection systems are discussed in Sections 6.2, 6.3, 7.3, 7.6, 8.3, and Appendix 15A.
15.6.5.2.3 The Effect of Single Failures and Operator Errors Single failures and operator errors have been considered in the analysis of the entire spectrum of primnry system breaks. The consequences of a LOCA with consideration of single failures are shown to be fully accommodated without the loss of any required safety function.
See Appendix 15A for further details.
15.6-18 I
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PY-CEl/NRR-2322L Page 53 of 56 i
Insert Page 6.9-7 Division 1 electrical power Division 1 electrica: power Division 3 electrical power i
to the feedwate. shutoff is made available to the valves is inoperable.
valves by manual operator action per plant emergency procedure.
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. Insert to the "Feedwater shutoff valve malfunction" item The Feedwater Leakage Control System is j
vulnerable to this extremely i
unlikely event. _However, the licensing basis for the.
Feedwater penetrations is that a water sealin the Feedwater piping outboard of the shutoff valves would remain for a sufficient length of time following the accident until the control room operator successfully isolates the motor-operated valves. Therefore, these valves are assumed to work.
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PY-CEl/NRR-2322L Page 54 of 56 TABLE 6.9-1 SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS OF FEEDVATER LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM COMPONENT / EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION CONSEQUENCES RHR vaterleg pump Either pump fails to One subsystem is LFCS vaterleg pump operate inoperative.
System requirements met by redundant pump and associated subsystem.
Motor operated valve on Either valve fails to One subsystem is either waterleg pump open inoperative.
System discharge line requirements met by-su-t n e* li I+ C-h
'" "" *" '" 878 ***
Feedwater shutoff Feedwater shutoff valve e outboard subsystem valve fails to close as ciated with the fail valve remains deacti ted by virtue of an in rlock signal from shuto valve position sw h.
The 4
FVLC system requirements ar met by the redundant nboard subsystem.
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PY-CEI/NRR-2322L Page 55 of 56 i
Non-seismic systems and components in the area of the FVLC system h,'ve been analyzed for the effects of their failure.
Additional supports or 1
protection by barriers is provided to assure-the FVLC system is not jeopardized by non-seismic failures during an earthquake.
A single failure analysis of the FVLC system is contained in Table 6.9-1.
6.9.4-TESTS AND INSPECTIONS
'The FVLC system is hydrostatically tested prior to startup.
The complete functioning of the system, including operability of controls
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and actuating devices, can be tested during periods of plant shutdown, but in no case at intervals greater than two years.
6.9.5' INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS Each FULC subsystem is manually initiated from the control room following a postulated LOCA. Independent pressure instrumentation is provided for each TVLC subsystem in order to prevent operation while feedvater lines are pressurized.3 The motor operated valv tboard subsystem of the FULC system ocked with each feedvater e
' shutoff valve to n.tiation of the subsystem of the FVLC system
(
e shutoff valve is not fully closed.
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t^4erlock.4 A. 4e p*c LA.t ki+i 244 c.s elu.C
% se-ogs, kA sk+sf+ n\\ves n C Led.
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PY-CEl/NRR-2322L Page 56 of 56 insert Page 6.9-5 In the event that the feedwater system becomes inoperable during the rapid vessel depressurization following a LOCA, the water in the feedwater piping will begin to flash into the drywell. It is expected that a water seal would remain for a sufficient length of 4
time following the accident until the operator remotely isolates the motor operated valve.
Tnus, a water seat would exist in the piping beyond (outboard) of the motor operated valve. Initiation of the FWLCS to the bonnet, stem and seats of the motor operated i
valve will then provide the water seal for the remainder of the 30 days.
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PY-CEl/NRR-2322L Page 1 of 2 8 3.
BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.11 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS demonstrated at the frequency of the leakage test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
This SR is modified by a Note that states these valves are only required to meet the combined leakage rate in MODES 1.
- 2. and 3 since this is when the Reactor Coolant System is pressurized and primary containment is required.
In some instances, the valves are required to be capable of automatically closing during MODES other than MODES 1. 2.
and 3.
However, specific leakage rate limits are not appl _icable in these other MODES or conditions.
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SR 3.67.3.12 Verifying that each outboard 42 inch (1M14-F040 and 1M14-F090) primary containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve is blocked to restrict opening to s 50 is required to ensure that the valves can close under DBA conditions within the time limits assumed in the analyses of References 2 and 3.
The SR is modified by a Note stating that this SR is only required to be met in MODES 1. 2. and 3.
If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES the purge valves must close to maintain containment leakage within the values assumed in the accident analysis. At other times when the purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g.,
during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment), pressurization concerns are not present, thus the purge valves can be fully o>en.
The 18 month Frequency is appropriate because the bloccing devices are typically removed only during a refueling outage.
SR 3.6.1.3.13 This SR ensures that the 2 inch Backup Hydrogen Purge System isolation valves are closed as required, or, if open. open for an allowable reason. These backup hydrogen purge isolation valves are fully qualified to close under accident conditions: therefore. these valves are allowed to be open for limited periods of time. This SR has been modified by a (continued)
PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-32 Revision No. 1
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- Attachment 5 PY-CEl/NRR-2322L Page 2 of 2 l
3 Bases insert:
Page B 3.6-32 A second Note states that the Feedwater lines are excluded from this particular hydrostatic (water) testing program. This is because water leakage from the stem, i
bonnet and seat of the third, high integrity valves in the feedwater lines (the gate valves) is controlled by the Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment Program (Technical Specification 5.5.2)). The acceptance criteria for the Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment Program is 5 gallons per hour.
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