ML20094F205
| ML20094F205 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 11/02/1995 |
| From: | CENTERIOR ENERGY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20094F202 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9511080225 | |
| Download: ML20094F205 (130) | |
Text
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Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 PY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attachment 3 Page 2 of 57 ACTIONS (continued) REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION As required by K.1 Isolate the affected Immediately K. Required Action C.1 penetration flow i and referenced in path (s). lable 3.3.6.1-1.
- OE K.P.2 !=:dhtcly
{g g.yE m ...... . . ~ . , SUO f e et 9 l l Immediately 1
' Suspend movement o (K.2.2, irradiated fuel tssemblies in the primary containraent.
AND K.2 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations
" with a potential for l draining the reactor vessel.
L. As required by L.1 n;:nd C^".E Ir:dhtcly ! Required Action C.1 /[ ALT "ATIO"S. and referenced in _ Table 3.3.6.1-1. [?"" r L.2 Initiate actions to Immediately ruspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. 1 i PERRY - UNIT 1 3.3-52 Amendment No. 69
. . - - . - _ _ . ~ . - -
i' Primary Containment and Drywell isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 PY-CE1/NRR-1995L Tabte 3.3.6.1 1 (page 2 of 6) Attachment 3 Primary contalrunent and Drywlt 1 solation Instrisnentation Page 3 of $7 APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED' OTHER CHANNELS FROM , SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVE!LLANCE ALLOWABLE l ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE l FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM l
- 2. Primary Contalruent and Drytsett Isolation
- a. Reactor vessel Water (c) 2*' L SR 3.3.6.1.1 a 127.6 inches Levet-tow Low, Level 2 SR 3.3.6.1.2 (continued) SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6,1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
- b. Drywell Pressure- High 1,2,3 2*' H SR 3.3.6.1.1 5 1.88 psig l SR 3.3.6.1.2 ,
SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.3 1
- c. Reactor vesset Water 1,2,3 2*' F SR 3.3.6.1.1 a 14.3 inches Levet - Low Low Low, SR 3.3.6.1.2 4 Level 1 (ECCS SR 3.3.6.1.3 i Divisions 1 a t 'o SR 3.3.6.1.4 l SR 3.3.6.1.5 (c) 2*' L SR 3.3.6.1.1 a 14.3 trches 1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 l sa ,
SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 l SR 3.3.6.1.5
- d. Drywet t Pressure - High 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 5 1.88 psis (ECCS Divisions 1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 and 2) SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
- e. Reactor vesset Water 1,2,3 4 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 a 127.6 inches Level -I ow Low, Levet SR 3.3.6.1.2 2 (HPCS) SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 (c) 4 L SR 3.3.6.1.1 2 127.6 inches SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
- f. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 4 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 5 1.88 psig (hPCS) SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
- p. Containment and Dryweli 1,2,3 2** F GR 3.3.6.1.1 5 4.0 udt/hr Purge Exhaust Pletusn SR 3.3.6.1.2 above Radiat i on - H igh SR 3.3.6.1.4 background SR 3.3.6.1.5 (continued)
(b) Required to initiate the drywell isolation function. (c) During ".?:^^!:^^C,_-)operationswithapotentialfordrainingthereactorvessel. PERRY - UNIT 1 3.3-55 Amendaent No. 69
Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 l 4 Tabte 3.3.6.1-1 (page 3 of 6) Primary Contairnent and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation PY-CEI/NRR-1995L I Attachment 3 Page 4 oE 57 i APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS
- FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWA9tE
. FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE l
- 2. Primary Contairveent and DryweLL Isolation
- g. Contairunent and (d) 2 K SR 3.3.6.1.1 5 4.0 mR/hr above Drywell Purge Exhaust SR 3.3.6.1.2 background i Plenum Radiation- High SR' 3.3.6.1.4 {
(continued) SR 3.3.6.1.5
- h. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 2** G SR 3.3.6.1.5 NA I l
I (d) 2 K SR 3.3.6.1.5 NA
- 3. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Isolation
- a. RCIC Steam Line 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 298.5 inches F tow - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 water SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
" b. RCIC Steam Line Flow 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.2 a 3 seconds and Time Delay SR 3.3.6.1.4 5 13 seconds SR 3.3.6.1.5
- c. RCIC Steam Supply Line 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 2 55 psig Pressure - Low SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
- d. RCIC Turbine Exhaust 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 20 psis Diaphragm SR 3.3.6.1.2 Pressure - High SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
- e. RCIC Ecpalpment Area 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 145.9'F Anbient SR 3.3.6.1.2 Tenperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
- f. Main Steam Line Pipe 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.L 1 s 158.9'T Tunral S:t 3.3.6.1.2 Temperature - H igh SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 (continued)
(b) Required to initiate the drywelt isolation functior.. (d) Duringh: JJ:^^?:=hrations with a potentist for draining the reactor vesset, and movement f f'ot3AM irradiated fuel assembtles in primary containment. PERRY - UNIT 1 3.3-56 Amendment No. 69
CRER System Instrumentation 3.3.7.1 Table 3.3.7.1 1 (page 1 of 1) Control Room Emergency Recirculation System Instrumentation PY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attachment 3 Page 5 of 57 APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED , REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM i SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 1. Reactor vessel Water 1,2,3, 2 6 SR 3.3.7.1.1 2 14.3 inches Level - Low Low Low, (a) SR 3.3.7.1.2 Level 1 SR 3.3.7.1.3 SR 3.3.7.1.4 SR 3.3.7.1.5
- 2. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2 s SR 3.3.7.1.1 s 1.88 psig SR 3.3.7.1.2 SR 3.3.7.1.3 SR 3.3.7.1.4 SR 3.3.7.1.5
- 3. Control Room 1,2,3, 1 C SR 3.3.7.1.1 5 800 cpm ventilation Radiation (b) SR 3.3.7.1.2 Monitor Sa 3.3,7.1.4 SR 3.'3.7.1.5 (a) During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. l (b) Durth5^ :=;3 operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, and movementh rAmt irradiated fwl assenelies in the primary containment or fuel handling building. <
.i l
l 1 PERRY - UNIT 1 3.3-73 Amendment No. 69.
Primary Containmeat Air Locks 3.6.1.2 PY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attachment 3
**S' ' ' 57 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.2 Primary Containment Air Locks LCO 3.6.1.2 Two primary containment
- air locks shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement o i radiated fuel assemblies in the primary enntainment. A 6 ding C0"i ALTE"ATIONS, 3 During operations wun a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs). ACTIONS
NOTES------------------------------------ '
- 1. Entry and exit is permissible to perform repairs of the affected air lock components.
- 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock.
- 3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.6.1.1, " Primary l Containment-operating," when air lock leakage results in exceeding overall -
containment leakage rate acceptance criteria in MODES 1, 2, and 3. ,
__- == ..........------------------------
\
l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i A. One or more primary ------------NOTES------------ containment air locks 1. Required Actions A.1, with one primary A.2, and A.3 are not containment air lock applicable if both doors door inoperable. in the same air lock are inoperable and Condition C is entered.
- 2. Entry and exit is l permissible for 7 days 1 under administrative controls if both air locks are inoperable.
(continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 3.6-3 Amendment No. 69
Primary Containment Air Locks 3.6.1.2 FY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attachment 3
"*9' 7 ' 5' ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.3 Restore air lock to 24 hours OPERABLE status.
D. Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A, AND B, or C not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. D.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours 3 E. Required Action and QE.1e 14suspen } d movement immediately associated Completio irradiated fuel Time of Condition A, assemblies in the B, or C no t durinc primary containment, movement f(ir)raciatec fuel asse bt'4s in the AND 3rimary_ containment, (:0REALTEfa'T!02,)or E.2 S g.d CORE l= di:teb OPDRVs. ^ LTEPf.T!0MS .
#G-
,C.2 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.
PERRY - UNIT 1 3.6-6 Amendment No. 69
= ~ . . . . . - . . . .- .. - - . - . . ~ _ -
. . . . - -w . .. . . . . . - . . _ - . .
PCIVs 3.6.1.3 PY-CEI/NRR-1995L i Attachment 3 Page 8 of 57 ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION D.3 Perform S't 3.6.1.3.6 Once per 92 days ! D. (continued) for the esilient l seal pu*ge valves closed to comply with Required Action D.1. 1 E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A, AND B, C, or D not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. E.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours rec %+b Required Action and F.1 Suspend movement of Immediately F. associated Completion irradiated fuel Time of Condition A, assemblies in primary B, C, or D not met containment. for PCIV(s) required
-sm to be OPERA during
( Dj ' movement fuel asse radiated es in the primary containment. C. n;;;ic;d fetien :nd 4kWh- S;;;;;d CORE !:::dicte?y ;
- i:ted C: ;10ti:n ' ^LTERATIOMS.
Ti : Of C:ndition A, B, C, :r D :t ::t f r PCIY(:) required to b; OPERASLE during COR: ALTCRATIONS. (continued) 3.6-13 Amendment No. 69 PERRY - UNIT 1
i PCIVs l 3.6.1.3 l PY-CEI/NRR-1995L l
- Attachment 3 ,
4 ACTIONS (continued) ! ! CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l l
$ O immediately Initfate action to !
1
%l Required Action and i K.1 l d- associated Completion V suspend OPDRVs.
Time of Condition A, ' i B, C, or 0 not met DE for PCIV(s) required 6 i
- to be OPERABLE during R2 Initiate action to Immediately j MODE 4 or 5 or during restore valve (s) to e operations with a OPERABLE status.
j potential for i draining the reactor
- vessel (0PDRVs).
l l PERRY - UNIT 1 3.6-14 Amendment No. 69
.- . -..- .- - . . . - . . - -. ..~ .-. - ....-. . . . .- .- _ ....- ---. 1 l Primary Containment-Shutdown 3.6.1.10 . j PY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attachment 3 i 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS rase 10 of 51 ( 3.6.1.10 Primary Containment-Shutdown LC0 3.6.1.10 Primary containment shall be OPERABLE. J l rst *^+1j] . l APPLICABILITY: During movement o- I containment,'
^i radiated fuel assemblies in the primary
(^2r' : C^^.5 ^.LTE"".!! ^"! .7 i During operations with a potential for draining the reactor ! vessel (OPDRVs). l I ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Primary containment A.1 Suspend movement of t**10 Immediately inoperable. irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment. AN.R A.2 S;;; =d 00"E -lamedi;t:1.,
" LTE"",T IO"0.
4:4- Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs. l l l PERRY - UNIT 1 3.6-29 Amendment No. 69
i Primary Containment-Shutdown 3.6.-l.10 . PY-CE!/NRB-1995L ! Attachment 3 I Page 11 of 57 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS - ] SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY , I SR 3.6.1.10.1 ey0TES*
- 1. g- g.k y-t t required't 5: ::t f r vent :nd i
drein line p;thw:y: provided th ,
- t:r h:: b :n ;;b ritic 1 f :- l 1 7 d:y;.
- 2. Not required to be met for pathways capable of being closed by OPERABLE primary containment automatic ,
isolation valves.
- 3. Not required to be met for the Fire Protection System manual hose reel ,
containment isolation valves. l
- 4. Not required to be met for manual isolation valves open under l administrative controls. l l
Verify each penetration flow path, 31 days 1 required to be closed durina accident conditions, is c1ssed, i l l I PERRY - UNIT 1 3.6-30 Amendment No. 69
Containment Vacuum Creakers 3.6.1.11
-C"'"""-"'5' Attachment 3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS Page 12 of 57 3.6.1.11 Containment Vacuum Breakers LCO 3.6.1.11 Three containment vacuum breakers shall be OPERABLE and four containment vacuum break *ers shall be closed.
I" ' ^ APPLICA8ILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, k) During movement o *i radiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment. ( " M .; CD".E ^1TE."^.T!^5 , 3 During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs). ACTIONS - - - - - - - - - - = - - - - - -
=------------NOTE--------------------------------------------
Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.6.1.1, " Primary Containment-Operating" when the containment vacuum relief subsystem leakage results in exceeding overall containment leakage acceptance criteria. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. ---------NOTE--------- A.1 Close the associated 4 hours Separate Condition motor operated entry is allowed for isolation valve. each containment vacuum breaker. AND A.2 Restore containment 72 hours One or two containment vacuum breaker to vacuum breakers not OPERABLE status. , closed. 1 08 One required containment vacuum breaker inoperable for other reasons. (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 3 . 6 ." Amendment No. 69
Containment Vacuum Breakers 3.6.1.11 PY-CEls44RR-1995L Attachment 3 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Action and ------- ----NOTE--- --------- associated Completion Only applicable in MODE 1, 2 Time of Condition A or 3. not met. ----------------------------- QB B.I.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours Three or more AND containment vacuum breakers not closed. B.I.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours QB AND Two or more required -------------NOTE---- ------- containment vacuum breakers inoperable Only applic le during movement o rradiated M)fuel for other reasons, assemblies the primary containmen - -) C.LTCl' a !!0N[t r;gn fandOPDRVs. B.2.1 Suspend movement 01 Immediately
^4 irradiated fuel assemblies in the ;
primary containment. AND ; B.2.2 *p[g gd {^{I , n m . m . ,m . . ., ~ .
- di:t:1h')
y ANO-- 0.0.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs. l l 1 1 PERRY - UNIT 1 3.6-32 Amendment No. 69
l Containment Humidity Control 3.6.1.12 py.cEIAIRR-1995L 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS att.cament 3 Page 14 of 57 3.6.1.12 Containment Humidity Control LC0 3.6.1.12 Containment average temper maintained within limits. ,ature-to-relative humidity shall be ; i APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, I'**^*lb() f During movement o< ^ rradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment, (0 During
?:;; CC".E "iTE""T!0"S, operations witn a po]tential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).
( ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i A. Requirements of LCO A.1 Restore containment 8 hours not met in MODE 1, 2, average temperature- l or 3. to-relative humidity ' to within limits. , (continued) , t PERRY - UNIT 1 3.6-34 Amendment No. 69
Containment Humidity Control 3.6.1.12 l PY-CE1/NRR-1995L j ACTIONS (continued) ^7,*'((1) h l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Action and B.1 Be ,in MODE 3. 12 hours { i associated Completion Time of Condition A AND : not met or in MODE 1, l 2, or 3. B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours j l C. Required Action and C.1 Suspend movement o' Immediately i associated Completion irradiated fuel i Time of Condition assemblies in the not met dur n reh primary containment. movement o rra e : fuel assem ies in the AND i L mary containment, - C C0"L AL L""TI0fQnd OPDRVs. C.2 S:p=d CORE
'iTE""TI0t$.
I rdiste' y d C.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs. ! SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.12.1 Verify containment average temperature- 24 hours to-relative humidity to be within limits. l l 1 PERRY - UNIT 1 3.6-35 Amendment No. 69
Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 PY-CEI/NRR-1995L 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS $ll'EI*SI!7 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment LCO 3.6.4.1 The secondary containment shall be OPERABLE. : APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, r_wD During movement o i radiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment, C Odh; C0" ALTE"AT:0Z,7 During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs). ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Secondary containment A.1 Restore secondary 4 hours inoperable in MODE 1, containment to 2, or 3. OPERABLE status. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours : associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met. B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours (continued) l l l l J PERRY - UNIT 1 3.6-51 Amendment No. 69
Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 PY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attachment 3 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Secondary {Fa-wM C.1 t[F Suspehd movement o e immediately containment irradiated fuel inoperable, Amino _; assemblies in the . movement oFfirradiated primary containment. l
. fuel assemdMs in the ainment, AND _
i b_er n;; C0., -lTERATIONS,;or C.2 during C"gend C E I-ediately-ALI[ RATIONS. OPDRVs. . M l C.3 Initiate action to immediately- ! suspend OPDRVs. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.1 Verify secondary containment vacuum is 24 hours 2 0.66 inch of vacuum water gauge. 4 l SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify the primary containment equipment 31 days hatch is closed and sealed and the shield blocks are installed adjacent to the i shield building. SR 3.6.4.1.3 Verify each secondary containment access 31 days door is closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit. PERRY - UNIT 1 3.6-52 Amendment No. 69
. - . - - . . - ~ _ - _ _ . . - . - . _ - . . - . . . . . - - . . - . . . . - - . . . . . - - _ - - - . - - - . . SCIVs : 3.6.4.2 PY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attach =ent 2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS Page 18 of 57 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) LCO 3.6.4.2 Each SCIV shall be OPERABLE. i MODES 1, 2, and 3, # APPLICABILITY: During movement o radiated fuel assemblies in the primary . containment. g O;d;;; C^^E "iTE."'TI^" ,) During operations with a potential for draining-the reactor vessel (0PDRVs). ACTIONS
-------------------------------------NOTES------------------------------------
- 1. Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.
- 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path, i
- 3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made '
inoperable by SCIVs. ____________== == =-- - ______________________________________________________ CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Isolate the affected 8 hours - penetration flow paths penetration flow path with one SCIV by use of at least inoperable, one closed manual valve or blind ' flange. AND (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 3.6-53 Amendment No. 69
- . . - . . . . . - ._-.- ~.- - --- ..-.....- -..~ -. - .-.-_- -.-. . . - - p,y k, infer A% edf, SCIVs 3.6.4.2 l 60 fY PY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attachment 3 Page 19 of 57 _; ACTIONS
~
REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION A. { continued) A.2 - a-----NOTE--------- l Isolation devices in j' high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative l means. , Verify the affected Once per 31 days penetration flow path ! is isolated. i f
--- ----NOTE-----------
Only applicable to B.1 Isolate the affected 4 hours
. penetration flow paths penetration flow path with two isolation valves. by use of at least :
-------------------------- one closed manual !
valve or blind B. One or more flange. i penetration flow paths l' with two SCIVs inoperable. C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion l Time of Condition A 8E or B not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours (continued) t PERRY - UNIT 1 3.6-54 Amendment No. 69
SCIVs 3.6.4.2 PY-CEI'NRR-1995L
/
Attachment 3 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and -hC#^"_3) D.1 suspen d movement o immediately associated Completion irradiated fuel Time of Condition A assemblies in the ci 8 not m rina ; primary containment. movenent f{irtadiated fuel ars br' 's in the AND orimarv ginment, - ducir.; C..m D.2 Su gcr.d COPS: Ir;;.cdi ately AtTE"ATIOl:,jor during ALTErai:07; . OPDRVs. Ai40
. Initiate action to immediately-suspend OPDRVs.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.2.1 ------------------NOTES------------------
- 1. Valves and blind flanges in high l radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.
- 2. Not required to be met for SCIVs that are open under administrative l controls.
Verify each secondary containment 31 days isolation manual valve and blind flange ' that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. PERRY - UNIT 1 3.6-55 Amendment No. 69
AEGT System l 3.6.4.3 l PY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attachment 3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS Page 21 of 57 3.6.4.3 Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment (AEGT) System LCO 3.6.4.3 Two AEGT subsystems shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 N*h During movement 0 i' radiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment. 4 Ger 5 COPE ^' TEPf?!^"SD During operations witn a potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs). ACTIONS 1 CONDITION COMPLETION TIME REQUIRED ACTION j A. One AEGT subsystem A.1 Restore AEGT 7 days inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status. 1 B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion' l Time of Condition A AND l not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours 1 l C. Required Action and C.1 Place OPERABLE AEGT Immediately j associated Completion subsystem in Time of Condition A operation. I not met dur -e movement girradiated fuel asse les in the OB ' {*th rimarv containment, _er4g COPE l ALTE"AT!0"S,-jor during OPDRVs. (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 3.6-56 Amendment No. 69
AEGT System 3.6.4.3 PY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attachment 3 Page 22 of 57 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME TecudQ C. (continued) C.2.1 Suspend movement immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment. AND C.2.2 Serpend CORE ! r dictely "LTE'LaT!0f!S . W C.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs. D. Two AEGT subsystems D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.
- 1 QuemHO E. Two AEGT subsystems E.1 Suspend movement o Immediately inoperable ina irradiated fuel movement f r adiated assemblies in the fuel asse b i s in the primary containment.
primary co ainment,
%r; ;,3 ;",",:_ AND
"' " "'T!0f!S, r during M -
E.2 Suspend CORE
^ LT E"f,T!0f!S .
I- :di:tely ANO-E.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs. PERRY - UNIT 1 3.6-57 Amendment No. 69
_ _ _ _ . . . _ . . _ . . _ _ . _ _ . _ . . _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ ~ . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ CREa System 3.7.3 PY-CEI/NtR-199sL j Attacharat 3 3.7 PLANT SYSTEM reg. 2t or s7 3.7.3 Control Room Emergency Recirculation (CRER) System LCO 3.7.3 Two CRER subsystems shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, # I During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment or fuel handling building, ( N 4 -- C^"E ".'.T "."J :'"$ .7 During operations with a potential for draining the reactor
~
vessel (0PDRVs). ACTIONS ; CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I A. One CRER subsystem A.1 Restore CRER 7 days inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status. ! 1 B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours Associated Completion Time of Condition A Atgl not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours (continued) l l PERRY - UNIT 1 3.7-4 Amendment No. 69
CRER System 3.7.3 PY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attachment 3 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and ------------NOTE------------- associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. Time of Condition A ----------------------------- not met du movement f r adiatedT C.1 Place OPERABLE CRER Immediately fuel asse b in the subsystem in primary co ainment or emergency fuel handlino recirculation mode. building 53 ;; C ^"_E)
@iwa;;^^l5,ftTr during T UPURVS.
~
QR re.u edgl _ C.2.1 Suspend movement o Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment and fuel handling building. AND i C.2.2 . !=citab M9-- C.2.2 nitiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs. l D. Two CRER subsystems D.1 Enter LC0 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3. (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 3.7-5 Amendment No. 69
CRER System 3.7.3 PY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attachment 3 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME g6 mMQ ; i E. Two CRER subsystems i E.1 Suspend movement 'Immediately inoperable ing j irradiated fuel ^ movement ftTrfadiated assemblies in the . fuel asse its in the primary containment primary containment or and fuel handling fuel handl'- building. 11 din dur in;; CORC ! ALTm.m. 0" ,71Fr during AND UPUKVs.
'-- "'"^'"
E.2 S;; pend CORE
^1TEPf??ONS. !
l l E.2 Initiate action to Immediately ! suspend OPDRVs. l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.7.3.1 Operate each CRER subsystem for 31 days 2 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating. l I -SR 3.7.3.2 Perform required CRER filter testing in In accordance accordance with the Ventilation Filter with the VFTP Testing Program (VFTP). SR 3.7.3.3 Verify each CRER subsystem actuates on an 18 months actual or simulated ' initiation signal. (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 3.7-6 Amendment No. 69
Centrol Room HVAC System 3.7.4 PY-CE1/NRR-1995L NNYN !7 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 Control Room Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System LCO 3.7.4 Two control room HVAC subsystems shall be OPERABLE. MODES 1, 2, and 3, * .3 APPLICABILITY: During movement ofdirradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment or fuel handling building, M C TE "iTE"*J!^"S,) During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs). ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One control room HVAC A.1 Restore control room 30 days subsystem inoperable. HVAC subsystem to l OPERABLE status.
.~.
1 B. Two control room HVAC B.1 Verify control room Once per 4 hours subsystems inoperable. afr temperature is s 90*F. AND B.2 Restore one control 7 days l room HVAC subsystem to OPERABLE status. i C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours Associated Completion Time of Condition A or AND B not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 3.7-8 Amendment No. 69
Control Room HVAC System 3.7.4 PY-CEI/NRR-1995L' Attachment 3 Page 27 of 57 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l 1 D. Required Action and ------------NOTE------------- 1ssociated Completion LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable. Time of Condition A - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - not met du movement radiated 0.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately fuel asse er in tne control room HVAC , primary containment or subsystem in : fuel handlino operation. ' au UVunvs. g QB re cMh > - D.2.1 Suspend movement b Immediately irradiated fuel ^ assemblies in the i primary containment , and fuel handling l building. AND D.2.2 S: pend CORE ! rd htely l ALTE"ATIONS. !
/ -AN9- l D.2.2 Initiate action to Immediately 1 suspend OPDRVs. I (continued) l I
i PERRY - UNIT 1 3.7-9 Amendment No. 69
. - . . - - -.__.---_ - . . - . - - . . . . . . - - - - - . - . . - - . . . - . ~ . _ -
i
- Control Room HVAC System j 3.7.4 l PY-CE1/NRR-1995L 1
Attachment 3 i ACTIONS (continued) p.g. 28 or s7 1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 4 E. Required Action and ------------NOTE------------- l associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. Time of Condition B s not met d movement {1 "ydiated
'r Met E.1
\
suspena movement J S Immediately fuel asse bTi in the irradiated fuel ^ primary co ainment or assemblies in the fuel handl primary containment buildinc.ynnr k; COP.E ,J and fuel handling . 6LTEP",Tl0MS,]5rduring building. l OPDRVs. : S __ - l l 1 E.2 Su cend CORE ! rdietely
^ LTEP.",T!0NS .
+:4--- Initiate action to Immediately ,
suspend OPDRVs. l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.4.1 Verify each control room HVAC subsystem has 18 months the capability to remove the assumed heat load. i
)
I l i 1 PERRY - UNIT I 3.7-10 Amendment No. 69
Fuel Handling Building 3.7.8 PY-CEI/NRR-1995L , Attachment 3 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Fuel Handling Building ! LC0 3.7.8 The fuel handling building (FHB) shall be OPERABLE. re M l_3 1 APPLICABILITY: During movement i radiated fuel assemblies in the FHB. l ACTIONS j
... - ---- - ------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------
LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
$S'*^U&
A. FHB inoperable. A.1 Suspend movement p }Immediately i irradiated fuel ! assemblies in the FHB. n i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.7.8.1 Verify all FHB floor hatches and the shield 24 hours blocks adjacent to the shield building are installed, and the FHB railroad track door is closed. SR 3.7.8.2 Verify each FHB access door is closed, 24 hours except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit. PERRY - UNIT I 3.7-15 Amendment No. 69
) Fuel Handling Building Ventilation Exhaust System ' 3.7.9 PY-CE!/NRR-1995L Attachment 3 l Pa9' 30 of 57 ! 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS L 3.7.9 Fuel Handling Building Ventilation Exhaust System LCO 3.7.9 Three _ fuel handling building (FHB) ventilation exhaust !
. subsystems shall be OPERABLE.
rscutly) l APPLICABILITY: During movement i radiated fuel assemblies in the FHB. j
'l l ACTIONS L i i -------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------
LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable.
~
l l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME. ! i 1 l 1 A. One required FHB A.1 Restore FHB 7 days ventilation exhaust ventilation exhaust subsystem inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE ,
-- status. l l l l
l l B. Required Action and B.1 Place two OPERABLE Immediately l associated Completion FHB ventilation ! , Time of. Condition A exhaust subsystems in I l not met. operation. N < . B.2 Suspend movement o o lImmediately j l irradiated fuel ^ l assemblies in the FHB. (Wk& C. Two or three FHB C.1 Suspend movement o [')Immediately-ventilation exhaust irradiated fuel - subsystems inoperable. assemblies in the FHB. (continued) I PERRY - UNIT 1 3.7-16 Amendment No. 69 l
AC Sources--Shutdown 3.8.2 PY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attachment 3 P*S' 'l ' 57 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 1 3.8.2 AC Sources--Shutdown. 1 l LCO 3.8.2 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:
- a. One qualified circuit between the offsite transmission !
network and the onsite Class 1E AC electrical power ! distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.8, I
" Distribution Systems--Shutdown";
- b. One diesel generator (DG) capable of supplying one division of the Division 1 or 2 onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystein(s) required by LCO 3.8.8; and
- c. One qualified circuit, other than the circuit in LC0 3.8.2.a, between the offsite transmission network and the Division 3 onsite Class 1E electrical power distribution subsystem, or the Division 3 DG capable of supplying the Division 3 onsite Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem, when the Division 3 onsite Class IE electrical power distribution subsystem is required by LC0 3.8.8.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, P During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment or fuel handling building. I i l PERRY - UNIT 1 3.8-17 Amendment No. 69
AC Sources--Shutdown 3.8.2 ' PY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attachment 3 Page 32 of 57 ACTIONS
----------=-= ---=-------------------NOTE-------------------------------------
LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.
------- =--=-----------------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
------------NOTE-------------
A. LC0 Item a not met. Enter applicable Condition and Required Actions of LC0 3.8.8, when any required division is de-energized as a result of Condition A. A.I Declare required Immediately feature (s) with no ; offsite power available from a , required circuit inoperable.
08 A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately l ALTERATIONS.
AND , reA*^& m A.2.2 Suspend movement of ^a Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment and fuel handling building. AND A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs). AND (continued) PERRY - UNIT I 3.8-18 Amendment No. 69
AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 PY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attachment 3
* S' 3 3 f 57 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. A.2.4 Initiate action to Immediately (Continued) restore required offsite power circuit ;
to OPERABLE status. B. LCO Item b not met. B.1 Suspend CORE Immediately i ALTERATIONS. AND at B.2 Suspend movement p' Immediately-irradiated fuel assemblies in primary containment and fuel handling building. 1 AND i ~ B.3 Initiate action to Immediately ' suspend OPDRVs. AND B.4 Initiate action to Immediately restore required DG to OPERABLE status. C. LC0 Item c not met. C.I Declare High Pressure 72 hours Core Spray System inoperable, i PERRY - UNIT 1 3.8-19 Amendment No. 69 ! I
I' DC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.5 PY-CE1/NRR-1995L a Attachment 3 Page 34 Of 67 + 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS
- 3.8.5. DC Sources-Shutdown j LC0 3.8.5 The following DC electrical power subsystems shall be OPERABLE
i a. One Class IE DC electrical power subsystem capable of 1 supplying one division of the Division 1 or 2 onsite Class IE electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.8, " Distribution Systems - Shutdown";
- b. One Class 1E battery or battery charger, other than the DC electrical power subsystem in LCO 3.8.5.a, capable of supplying the remaining Division 1 or Division 2 onsite ,
Class IE DC electrical power distribution subsystem when required by LC0 3.8.8; and
- c. The Division 3 DC electrical power subsystem capable of supplying ti.e Division 3 onsite Class IE DC electrical distribution subsystem when the Division 3 onsite-Class 1E DC electrical power distribution subsystem is required by LCO 3.8.8.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, r# During movement o ni radiated fuel assemblies in the primary ; containment r uel handling building. 1 l PERRY - UNIT 1 3.8-28 Amendment No. 69
~fhispap pri N Of(^hruh'on DC Sourcas-Shutdown 3.8.5 ody no hge 5 Mc- pmpcM,A b b 's S-* PY-CE!/NER-1995L
@ Attachment 3 Page 35 of 57
--------------------------------------NOTE----------
LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. . CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Declare affected Immediately DC electrical power required feature (s) subsystems inoperable inoperable. 98 A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND (continued)
+
PERRY - UNIT 1 3.8-29 Amendment No. 69
DC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.5 FY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attachment 3 l Page 36 of 57 l ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME , CONDITION ^
)
Suspend movement of Twet9) Immediately A. (continued) A.2.2 irradiated fuel , assemblies in the primary containment : and fuel handling building. AND D att. - A9 %K o w M vc Acri c N. A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately. . I irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment and fuel handling building. AND A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. AND l i A.2.4 Initiate action to Immediately i restore required DC l electrical power i subsystems to OPERABLE status. PERRY - UNIT 1 3.8-30 Amendment No. 69
- . - - . - _ . - .~ - - - - _ -
Distribution Systems -Shutdown 3.8.8 PY-CEI/WRR-19 9 5 L Attachment 3 j
"*S* ' 5' 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.8 Distribution Systems--Shutdown LCO 3.8.8 The necessary portions of the Division 1, Division 2, and Division 3 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE to support equipment required to be OPERABLE.
re ^D APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, During movement fii radiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment fuel handling building. ACTIONS
-----------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------
LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Declare associated Immediately AC or DC electrical supported required power distribution feature (s) subsystems inoperable. inoperable. 08 A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND A.2.2 Suspend movement o .< Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment and fuel handling building. BLD. (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 3.8-38 Amendment No. 69
1
)
Prev'N isc (A6cabw o 3 Distribution Systems-Shu de eso chegs proposed io %is. pp PY-CEI/NRR-1995L l Attachment 3 i Page 38 of 57 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. A.2.3 Initiate. action to Immediately (continued) suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. AND l A.2.4 Initiate actions to Immediately restore required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems to OPERABLE status. AND A.2.5 Declare associated Immediately required shutdown cooling subsystem (s) inoperable and not in operation. I 1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.8.I Verify correct breaker alignments and 7 days voltage to required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems. l i PERRY - UNIT 1 3.8-39 Amendment No. 69
-. . . . . . . - - . . . . . - - . . - . - . . . . . . . - . - . - , . - - - . . _ - . . . . . - . - _ . . . . . . . . ~ . . - . , - . . . . - , , _ . . .
A PY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attachment 3 + Page 39 of 57 1 2 1 i l
. i MARKUP OF CURRENT TECH SPEC PAGES l
TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued) ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION Q C g -j995L ACTION rage 40 or 57 ACTION 20 - In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION #, suspend (0"I tLTEPEONE =d_) operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. ACTION 21 - Close the affected systes isolation valve (s) within one hour or:
- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- b. In Operati Condition *, suspendDE "LTC't'TIOZ,J g.ag handling radiated fuel in the primary containment and operation th a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
ACTION 22 - Restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or:
- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION *, suspendf^"E ALTEE^.TI"S D operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, and handling of irradiated fuel in the primary containment. (Qg ACTION 23 -
Be in at least STARTUP with the associated isolation valves closed within 6 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours. ACTION 24 - Be in at least STARTUP within C hours. 4 ACTION 25 - Verify SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY with the annulus exhaust gas treatment system operating within one hour. ACTION 26 - Restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within 8 hours or close the affected system isolation valves within 1 hour and declare the affected system inoperable. ACTION 27 - Close the affected system isolation valves within' one hour and declare the affected system inoperable. ACTION 28 - Within one hour lock the affected system isolation valves closed, or verify, by remote indication, that the valve (s) is closed and electrically disarmed, or isolate the penetration (s), and declare the affected rystem inoperable. ACTION 29 - Close the associated isolation valves within 6 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours. p ey NOTES , en hand 11 a i adiated fuel in the primary containment and during
-ALTUe!!;Z i perations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
When any turbine stop valve is greater than 90% open and/or the key locked Condenser Low Vacuum Bypass Switch is in the normal position.
# DuringkORE ".LTEi".T!OMC3 operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
*** OPERATIONAL CONDITION I or 2 when the mechanical vacuum pump lines are not isolated.
PERRY - UNIT 1 , 3/4 3-15 Amendment No.20.42.Ed,58
n TABLE 4.3.2.1-1 (Continued) 7 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS E CHANNEL Z CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL
- CONDITIONS IN WHICH IR19 FUNCTION CHECK TEST CALIBRATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
- 6. RHR SYSTEM ISOLATION
- a. RHR Equipment Area Ambient Temperature - High S Q R 1, 2, 3
- b. RHR Equipment Area A Temperature - High S Q R 1, 2, 3
- c. RHR/RCIC Steam Line Flow - High S Q R(6) 1, 2, 3
- d. Reactor Vessel Water Level -
Ra Low, level 3 ff S Q R(6' 1, 2, 3 y e. Reactor Vessel (RHR Cut-in g Permissive) Pressure - High S Q R(6' 1, 2, 3
- f. Drywell Pressure - High ## S Q R(6) 1, 2, 3
- g. Manual Initiation __ NA R NA 1, 2, 3 recaA9
- When hand 11 g ir adiated fuel in the primary containment and during h "E 'lTE"*.T!a"! D perations with a pote for draining the reactor vessel.
** When any turbine stop valve is greater than 90% open and/or the key locked bypass switch is k in the normal position.
- 8. *** OPERATIONA'. CON)ITION 1 or 2 when the mechanical vacuum pump lines are not isolated, g # During 0^^: "J :""JI" =Soperations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
5 (a) Each train or logic channel shall be tested at least every other 92 days, ,
= (b) Calibrate trip unit setpoint at least once per 92 days. o .o ## These Trip Functions (Ib, 3b, 6d, and 6f) utilize instruments which are common to RPS instrumentation. :: 9 = *gg - "O RE:
O N i
I t n Pags 42 of 57 j TABLE 3.3.7.1-1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM CHANNELS APPLICABLE ALARM / TRIP l INSTRUMENTATION OPERABLE CONDITIONS SETPOINT ACTION )
- 1. Fuel Handling I ** 5 1500 cpm 70 Area Vent Exhaust Radiation Monitor I (Noble Gas) l 6
- 2. Offgas 1
* $ 1 x 10 cpm (b) 71-Post-treatment . !
Radiation Monitor
- 3. Control Room 1 All OPERATIONAL 5 800 cpm 72 Ventilation Radiation CONDITIONS and ***
Monitor (Noble Gas)
- 4. Offgas Pre-treatment 1 * (*) 73 )
Radiation Monitor l S. Area Monitors
- a. (DELETED)
- b. Control Room 1 At all times 3 2.5 mR/hr'*) 75 Area Radiation Monitor '
*When the offgas treatment system is operating.
**With radiated fuel in the Fuel Handling Building.
***when d rr ed fuel is being handled in the Fuel Handling Building or primary containmen .
(*) Alarm only. (b) Isolates the offgas system. (*) Alarm setpoint to be set in accordance with Specification 3.11.2.7. . i PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-62 Amendment No. 62
_ __ . - - - .. . - - . . ~. ~~ - . . - - - - . . - - r py.CEI/NRR-1995L Attach 2ent 3 TABLE 3.3.7.1-1 (Continued) Pag, 43 of 57 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION ACTION ACTION 70 - With the required monitor inoperable, obtain and analyze at least one grab sample of the monitored parameter at least once ' per 24 hours. In addition, with the Unit 1 Vent nobre gas monitor inoperable, restore the inoperable noble gas monitor to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or place the inoperable noble gas monitor in the tripped condition. ACTION 71 - With the required monitor inoperable, release via-this pathway ' may continue provided grab samples are taken at least once per 8 hours and these samples are analyzed for gross activity within 24 hours. ACTION 72 - With the required monitor inoperable, assure a portable con- , tinuous noble gas monitor or the Control Room Area Radiation Monitor is OPERABLE in the control room within 24 hours, and restore the inoperable monitor to OPERABLE status within 7 days. Otherwise, within I hour, either: ,
- a. Initiate and maintain operation of at least one of the ,
control room emergency recirculation subsystems in the emergency recirculation mode of operation, or
- b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 or 3, be rexa^NM ,
at least HOT SHUTDOWN the followingwithin the next 12 hours and i COLD SHUTDOWN within 24 hours. In OPERATIO CONDITIONS 4, 5 or ***, suspend COP.E ^.LTEP"!0"!, handling o. radiated fuel in the Fuel Handling Building and the primal containment, and operations .with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. ACTION 73 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by : Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, release via this pathway may continue for up to 30 days provided:
- a. The offgas system is not bypassed, and
- b. The offgas post-treat' ment monitor is OPERABLE, and
- c. Grab samples are taken at least once per 8 hours and analyzed within the following 4 hours; ~
Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours. l ACTION 74 - DELETED ACTION 75 - With the required monitor inoperable, perform area surveis of the monitored area with portable monitoring instrument'ation at least once per 24 hours. PERRY - UNil 1 3/4 3-63 Amendment No.M,64 mi.
te n Page 44 of 57 TABLE 4.3.7.1-1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS CHANNEL CONDITIONS IN CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL WHICH SURVEILLANCE INSTRUMENTATION CHECK TEST CALIBRATION RE0VIRED
- 1. Fuel Handling Area Vent Exhaust Radiation Monitor S M R **
(Noble Gas)
- 2. Offgas Post-treatment Radiation Monitor S M R *
- 3. Control Room Ventilation Radiation ALL OPERATIONAL Monitor (Noble Gas) S M R CONDITIONS and ***
- 4. Offgas Pre-treatment Radiation Monitor S M R *
- 5. Area Monitors
- a. (DELETED)
- b. Control Room Area Radiation Monitor S M R At all times
*Whe he offgas treatment system is operating. ** Wit radiated fuel in the Fuel Handling Building.
- Whe radiated fuel is being handled in the Fuel Handling Building or pri r containment.
O e.u ^M PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-65 Amendment No. 62
PY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attachasnt 3 Pags 45 of 57 3/4. 6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION m s - 3.6.1.1.2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY
- shall be maintained.V>
APPLICABILITY: radiated fuel is being handled in the primary containment, and during QP" " " ^"" 7:poperations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. Under tnese conditions, the requirements of PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY do not apply to normal operation of the inclined fuel transfer system. ACTION: N Without PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. suspend handling ir adiated fuel in the primary containment,C^^." "1;;.:' J .TI^"g and operatio h a potential for draining the reactor vessel. _ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.1.2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all primary containment penetrations not capable of being closed by OPERABLE primary contain-ment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deacti-vated automatic valves secured in position, excep or valves that may be opened as permitted by Specification 3.6.4 Q ;
- b. By verifying each primary containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.
*The primary containment leakage rates in accordance with Specification 3.6.1.2 are not applicable. A
#Except that six (6) 3/4" vent and drain liae ;:t. boys may be opened for the purpose of performina ca-t:i..~.t isolation valve leak rate testing provided the ni:n; i,ch Deen subCritical for at least seven ('7) days.
PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-2 Amendment No. 19 M,44
$(($"n"'j" Pags 46 of 57 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION .3.6.1.3 Each primary containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with:
- a. Both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for normal transit entry and exit through the containment, then at least one air lock door shall be closed, and
- b. An overall air lock leakage rate of less than or equal to 2.5 scf per hour at P,.
APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3 and #. ACTION:
- a. With one or both air locks having:
- 1. an inoperable interlock mechanism, for each affected air lock, a) Maintain at least one OPERABLE air lock door closed
- and within 24 hours lock one OPERABLE air lock door closed.
b) Operation may then continue provided that at least once per 31 days, one OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed
- 2. one inoperable air lock door, or, both one inoperable door and an inoperable interlock mechanism, for each affected air lock, a) Maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed ** and within 24 hours lock the OPERABLE air lock door closed.
b) Operation may then continue until performance of the next . required overall air lock leakage test provided that at least once per 31 dayys the OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed Otherwise, in 0_PERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3, be in at least HOT m v4c.utti)
# When hand 1i gli radiated fuel in the primary containment,G H n; C^"O (ALCAT:^%, d operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
Entry into and exit from the air lock (s) or primary containment, including through a " locked closed" door, is permitted under administrative controls.
** If one or both air locks have one inoperable door, entry into and exit from the air lock (s) through the OPERABLE door is permitted under administrative controls to perform repairs of the affected air lock components. Also, if both air locks have one inoperable door, entry into and exit from primary containment is permitted under administrative controls for 7 days.
PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-6 Amendment No. 56.57
PY-CET/NRR-1995L Attachment 3 Paga 47 of 57 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. Otherwise, in OPERATIONAL CONDITg#,_ sus)end handling of adiated fuel in the primary containment,vZ ALTE'a!!0 Q and operations with a > potential for draining the reactor vessel. t.
~
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
- b. With a primary containment air lock inoperable in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS l
1, 2 or 3, except as a result of an inoperable air lock door and/or ; interlock mechanism, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore ; the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within, the following 24 hours. ' l
- c. With a primary containment air lock inoperable, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION
#, except as a result of an inoperable air lock door and/or interlock !
mechanism, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore the l inoperable air lock to OPERABLE atus within 24 hours or suspend all l operations involving handling o gi adiated fuel in the primary : containment,C0% AL!um:0Z,lar operations with a potential for l draining the reactor vessel. r=tb
~
l l l 4 l 1 J l PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-6a Amendment No. 56
. . _ _ _ _ . _ . _- . _ . _ ~ - - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ ___
l 1 PY-CEI/NRR-1905L CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS Q,**$';j h 3/4.6.4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.4 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.# l APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, and **. l ACTION:
- a. With one or more of the containment isolation valves inoperable, maintain l at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and within 4 hours either:
- 1. Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status, or
- 2. Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolated position,* or
- 3. Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange.*
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable provided that the affected penetration is isolated in accordance with ACTION 4.2 or a.3 above, and provided that the associated system, if applicable, is declared inoperable and the appropriate ACTION statements for that system are performed. Otherwise, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3 be in at least HOT SHLITDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. ya Otherwise, in OPERATIONAL C0 TION ** suspend all operations involving 005 ALT RATIOZ , handling radi ed fuel in the primary containment and operations with a potent' for raining the reactor vessel. The j provisions of Specification 3.0. re not applicable.
- Isolation valves c d to satisfy these requirements may be reopened on an intermittent s under administrative controls.
**When handli a 1} radiated fuel in the primary containment and duringh U.LTCRATIOC bgoperations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. !
(The Containment Vessel and Drywell Purge system 42-inch inboard purge valves IM14-F045 and -F085 are not required to be OPERABLE in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3. The RCIC system containment isolation valves are not required to be OPERABLE in OPERATIONAL CONDITION **. The Fire Protec-tion system manual hose reel containment isolation valves IP54-F726 and
-F727 may be opened as necessary to supply fire mains in OPERATIONAL CONDITION **. Locked or sealed closed isolation valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative controls.
PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-28 Amendment No. 44
... . . _ - . - ~ . . . . - - . _ - -_. - ..--- - - - - - - - . - _ - - .
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS - PY-CEI/NRR-1995L 3/4.6.6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ^jjl*yfl} h SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.6.1 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained. APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3 and *. ACTION: Without SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY:
- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION I, 2 or 3, restore SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 4 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the followino 24 hours.
rmHD
- b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION *. sus)end handling o radiated fuel in <
the primary containment,(CORE _TERATIO.'C)and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.6.1 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated by:
- a. Verifying at least once per 24 hours that the vacuum within the secondary containment is greater than or equal to 0.66 inches of l vacuum water gauge.
- b. Verifying at least once per 31 days that:
- 1. The primary containment equipment hatch is closed and sealed and the shield blocks are installed adjacent to the shield building.
- 2. The door in each access to the secondary containment is closed, except for routine entry and exit.
- 3. All penetrations terminating in the annulus not capable of being closed by OPERABLE automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in position.
( -
*Wh_gdfirradiatedfuelisbeinghandledintheprimarycontainmentandduring (C . . . m . . . . ~ ..., operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-45 Amendment No. 66
PY-CE1/NBB-1995L Attachment 3 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS " " " '" ANNULUS EXHAUST GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.6.2 OPERABLE. Two independent annulus exhaust gas treatment subsystems shall be APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3 and *. i ACTION: a. With one annulus exhaust gas treatment subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or: 1. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3, be in at least HOT SHUTOOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. rmM J
- 2. In Operational Condition * :
, suspend handlina f i radiated fuel '
in the primary containment,00P.E ^.LTER^TIO!Oan perations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable. j '
- b. With both annulus exhaust gas treatment sub ms inoperable in Operational Condition *, suspend handling ir.adiated fuel in the+
primary containment,[ COP.E ".LTE"*T!?Oand tions with a potential for draining the reactor vessee. Ine provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.6.2 OPERABLE: Each annulus exhaust gas treatment subsystem shall be demonstrated a. At least once per 31 days by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the subsystem operates for at least 10 hours with the heaters OPERABLE.
*Whebihradiated fuel is being handled in the primary containment and dur (00Pi71TE"".T:Ct:E r.3} operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-46
PY-CE1/NRR-1995L age s 0 67 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.2 Two independent control room emergency recirculation system subsystems shall be OPERALLE APPLICABILITY: All OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and *. ACTION: '
- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3, 2 or 3, with one control room emergency recirculation subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4, 5 or *:
- 1. With one control room emergency recirculation subsystem inoper-able, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days or initiate and maintain operation of the OPERABLE subsystem in the emergency recirculation mode of operation.
- 2. With both control room emergency recirculation stems inoperable, suspend $ 1 a' T "?!^" O handling f
- radiated fuel in the Fuel Handling Building and the prima ontainment, ;
and operations with a potential for draining the rea or vessel.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable in Operational Condition *.
(~Lcu& \3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l 4.7.2 Each control room emergency recirculation subsystem shall be demonstrated i OPERABLE: i
- a. l At least once per 12 hours by verifying that the control room. air temperature is less than or equal to 90'F. l
- b. At least once per 31 days by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the subsystem operates for at least 10 hours with the heaters OPERABLE.
f
*WhfnfifradiatedfuelisbeinghandledintheFuelHandlingBuildingor primary containment.
l i PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-3
. .. . . . . _ ~ . . . . . . . . - _ ~ . - . , _ . . . 1 PY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attachment 3 Page $2 of $7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.7 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING FUEL HANDLING BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7.1 At least three Fuel Handling Building (FHB) ventilation exhaust subsystems shall be OPERABLE. l APPLICABILITY: Whe radiate Buil ing. fuel is being handled in the Fuel Handling ACTION:
- With one FHB ventilation exhaust subsystem inoperable, resto e inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or suspend handling radiated fuel in the FHB. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not ap cable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.7.1 Each of the required FHB ventilation exhaust subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: a. At least once per 31 days by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the subsystem operates for at least 10 hours with the heaters OPERABLE. b. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housing, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the subsystem by:
- 1. ,
Verifying that the subsystem satisfies the in place penetration I testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% and uses the test ' procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions C.S.a. C.S.c and C.S.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the subsystem flow rate is 15000 scfm + 10%. i l l 2. Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, by showing a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1% when tested at a temperature of 30*C and a relative humidity of 70% in accordance with ASTM D3803; and 3. Verifying a subsystem flow rate of 15000 scfm i 10% during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980. PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-17 Amendment No. 22 l
- n. -n_. . . - . , , . - - - ~ . ~ - . ~ . - . . - . ~ - ~ . . . - ~ . . . . . . . _ . . - . - - - . .- . . . ~ .-. - - . ..
4 1
. PY-CE1/NRR-1995L Attachment 3 Page 53 of 57 PLANT SYSTEMS FUEL HANDLING BUILDING INTEGRITY.
)
l LIMITING CONDITION FOR'0PERATION l 3.7.7.2 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING (FHB) INTEGRITY shall be maintained. APPLICABILITY: Whe i radiated fue is being handled in the Fuel Handling Bui1Wng. i 1 ACTION: ' h Without FUEL HANDLING BUILDING INTEGRITY suspend handling ei adiated fuel in Fuel Handling Building. The provisions of Specification .0.3 are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.7.2 FHB INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated by: a, Verifying at least once per 24 hours that the FHB ventilation exhaust system is operable as required by Specification 3.7.7.1. b. Verifying within 24 hours prior to the start of handling f r6C8-^+h irradiated fuel in the FHB and at least once per 24 hours handlin radiated fuel in the FHB that:
\
1. ro6Hf) Th doors in eacrr access to the 620-foot elevation of the FHB are closed, except for normal entry and exit,
- 2. The FHB railroad track door is closed, and
- 3. The fuel handling area floor hatches are in place.
- 4. The shield blocks are installed adjacent to the shield butiding.
PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-19
PY-CEI/NRR-1995L ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS A.C. SOURCES - SHUTDOWN : LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i 3.8.1.2 As a minimum, the following A.C.* electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:
- a. One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE distribution system, and
- b. Diesel generator Div I or Div 2 and diesel generator Div 3 when the HPCSsystemisrequiredtobeOfERABLE,witheachdieselgenerator having:
- 1. A day tank containing a minimum of 225 gallons of fuel for Div 1
- and Div 2 and 204 gallons of fuel for Div 3.
- 2. A fuel storage system containing a minimum of 73,700 gallons of fuel for Div 1 and Div 2 and 36,100 gallons of fuel for Div 3.
- 3. A fuel transfer pump.
APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4, 5 and *. ACTION: ce h
- a. With less than the offsite circuits ar d or diesel generators Div 1 or i
, Div 2 of the above re ired A.C. elec cal ower sources OPERABLE suspend CORE ALTERATI S, handling radi ted fuel in the primar,y containment and Fuel Handling Build l operations with a potential , for draining the reac vessel and crane o erations over the spent 1 fuel stora ool whe f 1 assemblies are herein. In addition when in OP IONAL C TION 5 with the water level less than 2E feet 9 inches above th reactor pressure vessel flange immediately l initiate corrective ac ion to restore the required powe,r sources to OPERABLE status as soon s practical. g m + g g a g
- b. With diesel generator Div 3 of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, restore the inoperable diesel generator Div 3 to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or declare the HPCS system inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specifications 3.5.2 and 3.5.3.
- c. With the fuel oil contained in the storage tank not meeting the properties specified in TS 4.8.1.1.2.d.2 or 4.8.1.1.2.e, the fuel oil shall be brought back within the specified limits within 7 da the associated diesel generator shall be declared inoperable.ys or I
- d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE RE0UIREMENTS 4.8.1.2 At least the above required A.C. electrical power sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.1, 4.8.1.1.2 (except for the re i remont of 4.8.1.1.2.a.5), and 4.8.1.1.3. rec,emth containment.(v*When handlir glifradiated fuel in the Fuel Handling Building or primary PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 8-11 AMENDMENT NO. 34,f 7,57
.. - - - - = - -. . . - - - . . . . . . . . . _ - . . -
I PY-cgi/NRR.199sL Attschssnt 3 - ! Page ss of s7 j ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS D.C. SOURCES - SHUTDOWN ' LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION } 3.8.2.2 As a minimum, Division 1 or Divisio'n 2, and, when the HPCS system is required to be OPERABLE, Division 3, of the D.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE with: l- a. Division 1 consisting of:
- 1. ;
i ' 125 volt battery _1R42-5002 or 2R42-S002. t
- 2. 125 volt full capacity charger 1R42-5006 or OR42-5007.
- b. Division 2 consisting of:
i 1. 125 volt battery 1R42-5003 or 2R42-5003.
- 2. 125 volt full capacity charger 1R42-5008 or OR42-5009. ;
- c. Division 3 consisting of: t
- 1. 125 volt battery 1E22-5005 or 2E22-5005. t
- 2. 125 volt full capacity charger 1E22-5006 or OR42-5011. '
APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4, 5 and *. 1 t ACTION:
- a. ,
With the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Division 1 batteries and/or both chargers of the above required Division 10.C. electrical power sources and the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Division 2 batteries and/or both. chargers of ' the above required Division 2 D.C. e' rical power sources inoperable, ' l suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, handling o' ir adiated fuel in the fuel ha'ndling building or primary containi and operations with a poten-tial for draining the reactor vessel. b. l With the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Division 3 batteries and/or both chargers ' of the above required D.C. electrical power sources inoperable, l declare the HPCS system inoperable and take the ACTION required by t Specification 3.5.2 and 3.5.3. r
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l l 4.8.2.2 Each of the above required battery and charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per Surveillance Requirement 4.8.2.1.
*When handlinh i radiated fuel in the Fuel Handling Building or primary
+ containment. ) 3, PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 8-16 Amendment No. 6
hvad Ar hfecuHs4 Wy $ $ $"*-j895' ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS
; DISTRIBUTION - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.3.2 As a minimum, the following power distribution system divisions shall !
be energized:
- a. For A.C. power distribution, Division 1 or Division 2, and when 4
the HPCS system is required to be OPERABLE, Division 3, with: ,
- 1. Division 1 consisting of
- a) 4160 volt A.C. bus EH11. >
4 b) 480 volt A.C. busses EF-1-A and EF-1-B. c) 480 volt A.C. MCCs EF-1-A-07, EF-1-A-08, EF-1-A-09, i EF-1-A-12, EF-1-B-07, EF-1-B-08, EF-1-B-09, and TSPS r EF-1-B-10/EF-1-D-10.* I 004g i d) 120 volt A.C. distribution panels EB-1-Al and EK-1-Al
- l in 480 volt MCCs EF-1-B-07 and EF-1-A-07. '
' e) 120 volt A.C. bus EV-1-A energized from inverter 1R14-5012 i connected to D.C. bus ED-1-A-06, or energized from A.C. bus EF-1-B-07. . J i 2. Division 2 consisting of: a) 4160 volt A.C. bus EH12. b) 480 volt A.C. busses EF-1-C and EF-1-D. I c) 480 volt A.C. MCCs EF-1-C-07, EF-1-C-08, EF-1-C-09,
.EF-1-C-12, EF-1-D-07, EF-1-D-08, and EF-1-0-09.
} d) 120 volt A.C. distribution panels EB-1-B1 and EK-1-B1 in 480 volt MCCs EF-1-D-07 and EF-1-C-07. e) 120 volt A.C. bus EV-1-B energized from inverter 1R14-S013 i connected to D.C. bus ED-1-B-08 or energized from A.C. i bus EF-1-0-09.
- 3. Division 3 consisting of: .
{ a) 4160 volt A.C. bus EH13. l b) 480 volt A.C. MCCs EF-1-E-1 and EF-1-E-2. c) 120 volt A.C. distribution panel EK-1-C1 in 480 volt MCC EF-1-E-1.
- b. For D.C. power distribution, Division 1 or Division 2, and when the HPCS system is required to be OPERABLE, Division 3, with:
- 1. Division 1 consisting of 125 volt D.C. distribution panels ED-1-A-06 and MCC ED-1-A-09.
- 2. Division 2 consisting of 125 volt D.C. distribution panels ED-1-B-06 and ED-1-B-08.
*480 volt MCC EF-1-B-10/EF-1-0-10 is normally energized from Division 1. -
Division 2 provides an alternate power source. PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 8-19 Amendment tio. 3
PY-CE1/NRR-1995L Attachnant 3 Page 57 of 57 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)
- 3. Division 3 consisting of 125" volt D.C. distribution panel 1R42-5037.
APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4, 5 and *. ACTION:
- a. For A.C. power distribution:
- 1. With less than Division 1 and/or Division 2 of the above required A.C. dist ion system energized, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS,
__ handling radiated fuel in the Fuel Handling Building and
/ primary c neent and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
re_cem+1
~ . With Division 3 of the above required A.C. distribution system not energized, declare the HPCS sp tem inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.5.2 and 3.5.3.
- b. For D.C. power distribution:
f 1. With less than Division 1 and/or Division 2 of the above required D.C. distr' tion system energized, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, handling fli radiated fuel in the Fuel Handling Building and { primary ainment and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
- 2. With Division 3 of the above required D.C. distribution system not energized, declare the HPCS system inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.5.2 and 3.5.3.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE RE(;UIREMENTS 4.8.3.2 At least the above required power distribution system divisions shall be determined energized at least once per 7 days by verifying voltage and correct breaker alignment on the busses /MCCs/ panels.
- When handli g i radiated fuel in the Fuel Handling Building or primary containment.
PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 8-20
M "-4 Aewa -m-+e <,r-4+A -aea w M9m + 4 4 'W& -O -M~"4' am 4- "sH mw;-++Aa wMa am- maa-e a -- e bemM
-em*Ls- mi.,--w- A"en-A m- en .ne.ar.-,e o a w1 a A$tY$I!
Page 1 i i MARKUP OF IMPROVED TECH SPEC BASES l PAGES 1 1
Prie:ary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 ESICII" em 2 BASES l l APPLICABLE 2.a. 2.e. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 SAFETY ANALYSES, -(continued) LCO, and - ) APPLICABILITY since isolation of these valves is not critical to orderly l plant shutdown. Thit Function is required to be OPERABLE during GORE-- r n ng the : GLTE"^.T"".'S reactor vessei@(operations with a potential forOPDRVs) because , potential sources of leakage must be provided to ensure that I offsite dose limits are not exceeded if core damage occurs. However, OPDRVs assume that one or more fuel assemblies are loaded into the core. Therefore, if the fuel is fully off- i loaded from the reactor vessel, this Function is not ! required to be OPERABLE. This Function isolates the IE22-F023 Valve (Function 2.e), i and the Group 1, 5, 7, and 8 valves (Function 2.a). - l 2.b. 2.d. 2.f Drywell Pressure-Hiah i
- High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB. The I isolation of some of the PCIVs on high drywell pressure - I' supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Drywell Pressure-High Function associated with isolation of the primary containment is implicitly assumed in the USAR accident ,
analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA. In addition, Functions 2.b and 2.d provide isolation signals to certain drywell isolation valves. The isolation of drywell isolation valves, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, functions to ensure that steam and water releases to the drywell are channeled to the suppression pool to maintain the drywell suppression function of the drywell. High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the drywell. Four channels of Drywell Pressure-High per Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. The Allowable Value was selected to be the same as the ECCS i Drywell Pressure-High Allowable Value (LC0 3.3.5.1), since this may be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment. (continued) PERRY UNIT 1 B 3.3-146 Revision No. O
Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES E Page 3 APPLICABLE 2.c. Reactor Vessel Water level-Low Low Low. Level 1 SAFETY ANALYSES. (continued)
- LCO. and APPLICABILITY This Function is required to be OPERABLE duringCE,0E--
CITEPH"X =po)erations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (0)DRVs) because the capability of isolating potential sources of leakage must be provided to ensure that , offsite dose limits are not exceeded if core damage occurs. t However. OPDf;Vs assume that one or more fuel assemblies are loaded into the core. Therefore, if the fuel is fully off- t loaded from the reactor vessel, this Function is not required to be OPERABLE. This Function isolates the Group 21 solation valves. 2.a. Containment and Drywell Purae Exhaust-Plenum Radiation-Hiah High purge exhaust plenum ventilation exhaust radiation is an indication of possible gross failure of the fuel cladding. The release may have originated from the 3rimary containment due to a break in the RCPB. When Purge Exhaust-Plenum Radiation-High is detected, valves whose penetrations communicate with the )rimary containment atmosphere are isolated to limit tie release of fission
)roducts. Additionally, the Purge Exhaust-Plenum Radiation-High is assumed to initiate isolation of the primary containment during a fuel handling accident (Ref. 2). In addition, this Function provides an isolation signal to certain drywell isolation valves. The isolation of drywell isolation valves, in combination with other .
accident mitigation systems, functions to ensure that steam ) and water releases to the drywell are channeled to the ! suppression pool to maintain the drywell suppression i' function of the drywell. The Purge Exhaust-Plenum Radiation-High signals are initiated from radiation detectors that are located on the purge exhaust plenum ductwork coming from the drywell and containment. The signal from each detector is input to an individual monitor whose trip outputs are assigned to an isolation channel. (continued) PERRY UNIT 1 B 3.3-148 Revision No. O
l Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 i
' i BASES Page 4 APPLICABLE 2.a Containment and Drywell Purae SAFETY ANALYSES, Exhaust-Plenum Radiation - Hiah (continued)
LCO, and APPLICABILITY Four channels of Containment and Drywell Purge Exhaust-Plenum Radiation-High Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. The Allowable Values are chosen to promptly detect gross failure of the fuel cladding and to ensure offsite doses remain below 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR 100 limits. The Function is required to be OPERABLE duri c Lc @ the ' GLTE"/T:0"C} operations with a potentia ining reacwr vessel (OPDRVs), and mover.ent g irrac ed fuel assemblies in the primary containment the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (due to fuel uncovery or dropped fuel assemblies) must be provided to ensure offsite dose limits are not exceeded. However, OPDRh assume that one or more fuel assemblies are inaded into the core. Therefore, if the fuel is fully off-loaded from the reactor vessel, this Function is not required to be OPERABLE.J , Due to radioa These Functions isolate the Group 8 valves. decay, handling of fuel only requires 2.h. Manual Initiation OPERABILITY of The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals this Function into the primary containment and drywell isolation logic when the fuel that are redundant to the automatic protective being handled is instrumentation and provide manual isolation capabili.ty. i recently There is no specific USAR safety analysis that takes credit irradiated, i.e., for this Function. It is retained for the isolation fuel that has function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing occupied part of a basis. al reactor f There are four push buttons for the logic, two manual core within the initiation push buttons per trip system. There is no previous seven Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are days- . mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons. Four channels of the Manual Initiation Function uired to be OPERABLE in MODE s3, and during (*HfeAT40NS3- movement ofhra fuel assembl es in primary containment, or ions with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, since these are the MODES in (continued) PERRY UNIT 1 B 3.3-149 Revision No. 0
I Primary Containment and Drywell isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES Page 5 APPLICABLE 2.h Manual Initiation (continued) SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and which the Primary Containment and Drywell Isolatio APPLICABILITY automatic Functions are required to be OPE _RABLEj " = = r ,,_ OPDRVs assume that one or more fuel assemblies are loaded ! into the core. Therefore, if the fuel is fully off-loaded from the reactor vessel, this function is not required to be OPERABLE. The manual initiation channels for the RCIC System is discussed in Section 3.k below, and for the HPCS System is discussed in the Bases description for ECCS Instrumentation
" ~
Due to radioactive decay, handling of fuel only requires 3. Reactor Core Isolation Coolina System Isolation OPERABil.lTY of this Function 3.a. RCIC Steam line Flow-Hiah when the fuel being handled is RCIC Steam Line Flow-High Function is provided to detect a recently break of the RCIC steam lines and initiates closure of the steam line isolation valves. If the steam is allowed to irradiated, i.e., continue flowing out of the break, the reactor will fuel that has depressurize and core uncovery can occur. Therefore, the occupied part of a isolation is initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize I criticai reactor core damage. The isolation action, along with the scram core within the function of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), ensures previous seven that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the days' limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Specific credit for this Function is not assumed in any USAR accident analyses since the bounding analysis is performed for large breaks such as recirculation and MSL breaks. However, these instruments prevent the RCIC steam line break from becoming bounding. The RCIC Steam Line Flow-High signals are initiated from two transmitters that are connected to the system steam lines. Two channels of RCIC Steam Line Flow-High Functions are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. The Allowable Value is chosen to be low enough to ensure that the trip occurs to prevent fuel damage and maintains the MSLB event as the bounding event. This Function isolates the Group 9 valves. (continued) PERRY UNIT 1 B 3.3-150 Revision No. O
I Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 i BASES Page 6 1 ACTIONS J.1. J.2. J.3.1. J.3.2. and J.3.3 (continued) function is needed to provide core cooling, these Required Actions allow the penetration flow path to remain unisolated provided action is immediately initiated to restore the l channel to OPERABLE status or to provide an alternate decay heat removal capability and subsequently isolate the RHR Shutdown Cooling System, or to provide means for control of potential radioactive releasas. This includes ensuring primary containment is OPERABLE, and primary containment ; isolation capability (i.e., at least one primary containment isolation valve and associated instrumentation are OPERABLE or other acceptable administrative controls to assure ! isolation capability) in each associated penetration flow ) path not isolated that is assumed to be isolated to mitigate i radioactivity releases. This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information, to deterrine if the components are out of l service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored
- to OPERABLE status. In this case, the Surveillances may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status.
In addition, at least one door in each primary containment air lock must be closed. The closed air lock door completes the boundary for control of potential radioactive releases. With the appropriate administrative controls however, the closed door can be opened intermittently for entry and exit. This allowance is acceptable due to the need for containment access and due to the slow progression of events which may result from a reactor vessel draindown event. Reactor vessel draindown events would not be expected to result in the immediate release of appreciable fission products to the containment atmosphere. Actions must continue until all requirements of the Condition are satisfied. jLJ. K.2.1..K.2.2. g X.2.3 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated penetration flow path (s) should be isolated (Required Action K.1). Isolating the affected penetration flow path (s) accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable (continued) PERRY UNIT I B 3.3-168 Revision No. O
Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 1 1 PY-CEI/NRR-1995L. BASES g ? ""'
- 1 ACTIONS K.1. K.2.1. b and K.2 (continued) l V
instrumentation. Alternately, the plant must be placed in a , ndition in which the LCO doe a . If applicable, ' CORLAL;unTIONSanSmovement firrS d fuel assemblies ; in t.ne primary containment must ve nanediately suspended. ; Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe condition. Also, if ap)licable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend ; OP)RVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission production release. . Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. l l L.1@$L.2] If the channcl is not rc;tored to CPEPACLE status or
-in tri within the allowed Completion Timc. CORE ALTEMTIONS al D I Sus uctbE4-cdiatelysuspended.Cha" net preclude ccm activitic:
l compenent te a cafc condition E c.iff) y applicable, action j must be immediately initiated to susp(ntf OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs. the SRs for each REQUIREMENTS Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.1-1. The Surveillances are also modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains primary containment isolation capability. U)on completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 lour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the a)plicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. T1is Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 5 and 6) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the automatic isolation valves will isolate the penetration flow path (s) when necessary. (continued) PERRY UNIT 1 B 3.3-169 Revision No. 0
CRER System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 BASES
$$UT!"
Page 8 APPLICABLE 2. Drywell Pressure-Iliah (continued)
' SAFETY ANALYSES. .
LCO and Drywell Pressure-High signals are initiated from four APPLICABILITY pressure transmitters that sense drywell pressure. Four channels of Drywell Pressure-High Function are (two channels per trip system) required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude CRER System initiation. The Drywell Pressure-High Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Drywell Pressure-High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1). The Drywell Pressure-High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2. and 3 to ensure that control room personnel are protected during a LOCA. In MODES 4 and 5. the Drywell Pressure-High Function is not required since < there is insufficient energy in the reactor to pressurize the drywell to the Drywell Pressure-High setpoint.
- 3. Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitor The Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitor measures radiation levels downstream of the supply plenum discharge of the control room. A high radiation level may pose a threat to control room personnel; thus, the Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitor Function will automatically initiate the CRER System.
The Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitor Function consists of one noble gas monitor. One channel (which provides input to both Trip Systems) of the Control Room ventilation Radiation Monitor is required to be OPERABLE. Since a LOCA signal will also initiate the CRER System isolating the control room from the environment, and considering the fact that a LOCA signal itself incorporates sufficient redundancy, the airborne radiation monitor signal is considered a diverse signal, and does not require redundancy. The Allowable Value was selected to ensure protection of the control room personnel. The Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitor Function is enuired tn ha OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2. a
' W during m0"E fLTE"^TICQ OPDRVy2)and movement Y T8j)ted fuel in the primary containment'tfr Fuel Handling 15uliaang to ensure (continued)
PERRY UNIT 1 B 3.3-204 Revision No. O
.. . - --- . . . - - - - . ~ - . . - . - - . ~ - _ . . - - - _ . -
CRER System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 , BASES ClEOM""' Page 9 APPLICABLE 3. Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitor (continued) SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and that control room personnel are protected during a L A l APPLICABILITY fuel handling event, or a vessel draindown event.f xcu:. , OPDRVs assume that one or more fuel assemblies are loaded into the core. Therefore, if the fuel is fully off-loaded from the reactor vessel, this Function is not required to be OPERABLE. During MODES 4 and 5, when these specified conditions are not in progress (e.g., C0"I n ! "?T:0,NC), the I probability of a LOCA or fuel damage s low; thus, the i Function is not required. gp)q i s ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to l CRER System instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that , Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each ' Due to radioactiv additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial decay, handling of entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable CRER System instrumentation channels provide fuel only requires
- appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable OPERABILITY of channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows this Function separate Condition entry for each inoperable CRER System when the fuel instrumentation channel.
being handled is .- recently L.1 irradiated, i.e., fuel that has Required Action A.1 directs entry into the appropriate occupied part of a Condition referenced in Table 3.3.7.1-1. The applic~able criticai reactor Condition specified in the Table is Function dependent. core within the Each time an inoperable channel is discovered, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the previous seven appropriate subsequent Condition. days. B.1 and B.2 Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the CRER System , design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours has < been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 4 and 5) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. However, this out of service time is only acceptable (continuedl PERRY UNIT 1 B 3.3-205 Revision No. O
4
- Primary Containment Air Locks i 8 3.6.1.2 i
BASES h BACKGROUND DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness (continued) may result in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the unit safety analysis.
- APPLICABLE The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive
- SAFETY ANALYSES material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE, such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage. The primary containment is designed with a maximum allowable leakage rate (L ) of 0.20%
by weight of the containment and drywell air per 34 hours at I the calculated maximum peak containment pressure (P,) of 7.80 psig. This allowable leakage rate forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs associated with . the air locks. l Primary containment air lock OPERABILITY is also required to minimize the amount of fission product gases that may escape primary containment through the air lock and contaminate and pressurize the auxiliary building. involving handling During plant operations in other than MODES 1, 2, and 3, the f recently primary containment contains the fission products from a irradiated fuel Quel Handling Accidenf,sinside the primary containment (Ref. (i.e., fuel that has 4), to 11mn aoses at the site boundary to within limits. occupied part of a The primary containment air lock OPERABILITY assures a leak criticai reactor tight fission product barrier during activities with the core within the unit shutdown. previous seven days) Primary containment air locks satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LC0 As part of the primary containment, the air lock's safety function is related to control of containment leakage rates following a DBA. Thus, the air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event. The primary containment air locks are required to be OPERABLE. For each air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door to be open at a time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of primary containment (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-6 Revision No. O
Primary Containment Air Locks B 3.6.1.2 BASES Page 11 LC0 does not exist when primary containment is required to be (continued) OPERABLE. Closure of a single door in each air lock is sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events. Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed when the air lock is not being used for normal entry into and exit from primary containment. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1. 2. and 3. a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5. the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, maintaining OPERABLE primary containment air locks in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume is only required during situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated: such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs).G=; COR D C5. TERAT!05]or during movement ofprradiateo Tuel ramtly assemblies in the primary containment. pcvegoPDRVs assume that one or more fuel assemblies are ioaded into the core. Therefore, if the fuel is fully off-loaded from the reactor vessel, the primary containment air locks are not requiredtobeOPERABLE.y ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by Note 1. which allows entry and exit to perform repairs of the affected air lock component. Due to radioactive If the outer door is inoperable, then it may be easily decay, handling of accessed for most repairs. If the inner door is the one fuel only requires that is inoperable, then it is preferred that the air lock primary contain- be accessed from inside arimary containment by entering ment air lock through the other OPERAB E air lock. However, if this is OPERABILITY not practicable, or if repairs on either door must be when the fuel performed from the barrel ride of the door, then it is permissible to enter the air lock through the OPERABLE door, being handled .is which means there is a short time during which the 3rimary recently containment boundary is not intact (during access t1 rough irradiated, i.e., the OPERABLE door). The ability to open the OPERABLE door, fuel that has even if it means the primary containment boundary is occupied part of a tem)orarily not intact, is acceptable due to the low criticai reactor pro) ability of an ever,t that could pressurize the primary core within the containment during the short time in which the OPERABLE door previous seven is expected to be o)en. After each entry and exit, the OPERABLE door must 3e immediately closed. days. (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-7 Revision No. O
Primary Containment Air Locks B 3.6.1.2 BASES EPage 12 1 l ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued) MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The I allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. E.1 and E.8 w ' If the inoperable )rimary containment air lock cannot be restored to OPERAB_E status within the associated Completion Tinesdrir.; CORE ALT 0",TIONS. uring operations with a potentiai Tor are actor vessel (0PDRVs), or during movement Mr d fuel assemblies in the primary containment, act un i; .c uired to immediately susoend
- activities that represent a potential forCeleasipg2%EM M O radioactive that minimizes material, risk. If thus placing applicable, the unit i[ngb.
movement 1rr gio a d fuel assemblies in the primary containment (A' mm =gmust be immediately suspended.G.c ,~,, , suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Action must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.2.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining primary containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirsents of 10 CFR 50 A)pendix J (Ref. 2), as modified by approved exemptions w1en in MODES 1, 2, and 3. This SR reflects the leakage rate testing requirements with regard to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The acce)tance criteria were established 3rior to initial air loc ( and primary containment OPERA 3ILITY testing. The periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall primary containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-12 Revision No. 0 l l l
- - _. . .- .- -~ . -. - ----- ----- -. -
PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 i FY-CEI/NRR-1995L BASES (continued) ^% tat
- l l APPLICABLE The PCIVs LCO was derived from the assumptions related i SAFETY ANALYSES to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory, 2nd establishing the primary containment boundary dur' , major accidents. As part of the primary containment bo;ndary, PCIV OPERABILITY supports leak tightness of primary containment. Therefore, the safety analysis of any event requiring isolation of primary containment is applicable to this LCO.
The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material for which the consequences are mitigated by PCIVs, are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), a main steam line break (MSLB), and a fuel handling accidenp inside primary - containment (Refs. I and z). In the analysis for each of these accidents, it is assumed that PCIVs are either closed involving handling or function to close within the required isolation time of recently following event initiation. This ensures that potential irradiated fuel paths to the environment through PCIVs are minimized. Of (i.e., fuel that has the events analyzed in Reference 1, the LOCA is the most occupied part of a limiting event due to radiological consequences. It is ( criticai reactor assumed that the primary containment is isolated such that release of fission products to the environment is core within the
~
controlled. previous seven days) The inboard 42 inch purge supply and exhaust valves may be unable to close in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, each of the purge valves is required to remain sealed closed during MODES 1, 2, and 3. PCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LCO PCIVs form a part of the primary containment boundary and some also form a part of the RCPB. The PCIV safety function is related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory, and establishing primary containment boundary during a DBA. The power operated isolation valves are required to have isolation times within limits. Additionally, power operated automatic valvs; are required to actuate on an automatic isolation signal. Primary containment purge supply and exhaust valves are not qualified to close under accident conditions and therefore must be sealed closed (inboard) or blocked to prevent full opening (outboard valves) to be OPERABLE. (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-16 Revision No. O
PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 i EtTIIEUY" u 4 BASES r... LC0- The normally closed PCIVs or blind flanges are considered (continued) OPERABLE when, as applicable, manual valves are closed or ' opened in accordance with applicable administrative controls, automatic valves are de-activated and secured in their closed position, check valves with flow through the l valve secured, or blind flanges are in place. The valves ' covered by this LC0 with their associated stroke times, if applicable, are listed-in Reference 3. Primary containment l purge valves with resilient seals, secondary containmeat ; bypass valves, MSIVs, and hydrostatically tested valves must ; meet additional leakage rate requirements. Other PCIV leakage rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1.1, " Primary ; Containment-0perating," as Type B or C testing. , i This LCO provides assurance that the PCIVs will perform i their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of- l reactor coolant inventory, and establish the primary containment boundary during accidents. . APPLICABILITY In MODES 1,.2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of ! radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 w and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are ; reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, most PCIVs-are not required to be l OPERABLE and the primary containment purge valves are not , required to be sealed closed in MODES 4 and 5. Certain i valves are required to be OPERABLE, however, to prevent i inadvertent reactor vessel draindown and release of radioactive material during a postulated fuel handling accidentA These valves are those whose associated instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE according to [ involving handling LCO 3.3.6.1, " Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation i of recently Instrumentation." (This does not include the valves that ( irradiated fuel isolate the associated instrumentation.)j i
- / j
[ " ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow i path (s) except for the inboard 42 1M14-F045 and IM14-F085
- ( Due to radioactive decay, inch primary containment purge supply and exhaust isolation handling of fuel only .
valve flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under requires conta.inment administrative controls. These controls consist of
- solation valve stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the OPERABILITY when the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control fuel being handled is room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated re:cently irradiated, i.e.. when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated.
fuel that has occupied Due to the size of the containment purge supply and exhaust
/ part of a critical reactor core within the previous 9 (continued) k seven days. j PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-17 Revision No. 0
,-- .--. < - . . .--3 ii 9, y T-fw1,
PCIVs l B 3.6.1.3 , PY-CE1/NRR-1995L BASES ,A C $ *"*
- f6 6 ACTION F.1. 4-f K.1. and i.2 >
(continued) . If any Required Action and associated Completion T' annot be met the plant must be placed in a conditi yLiic the LC0 does not apply. If applicable movemen ofi,)r)T fem ed fuel assemblies in the primary containmenteu:_ i OLE"JIO"Omust be immediately suspended. Suspen31on of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement . of a component to a safe condition. . Also, if applicaisle. l action must be immediately initiated to suspend operations ; with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and ! subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. If suspending the : OPDRVs would result in closing the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling isolation valves, an alternative Required Action is provided to immediately initiate action to restore the valves to OPERABLE status. This allows RHR to remain in service while actions are being taken to restore the valves. i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.1 REQUIREMENTS Each inboard 42 inch (M14-F045 and M14-F085) primary containment ) urge supply and exhaust isolation valve is required to )e verified sealed closed at 31 day intervals ' because the primary containment purge valves are not fully ' cualified to close under accident conditions. This SR is cesigned to ensure that a gross breach of primary containment is not caused by an inadvertent or spurious opening of a 3rimary containment purge valve. Detailed analysis of t1ese purge supply and exhaust isolation valves failed to conclusively demonstrate their ability to close during a LOCA in time to limit offsite doses. Primary containment purge valves that are sealed closed must have motive power to the valve operator removed. This can be accomplished by de-energizing the source of electric power or removing the air supply to the valve operator. In this application. the term " sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness. The 31 day Frequency is based on primary containment purge valve use during unit operations. This SR allows a valve that is open under administrative controls to not meet the SR during the time the valve is open. Opening a purge valve under administrative controls (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-23 Revision No. 0
I PCIVs : B 3.6.1.3 i l PY-CEI/NRR-1995L BASES (Continued) Q=7 4 ! SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.1 (contir -{ ! REQUIREMENT . is restricted to one valve in a penetration flow path at a ' given time (refer to discussion for Note 1 of the ACTIONS) ' in order to effect repairs to that valve. This allows one purge valve to be opened without resulting in a failure of the Surveillance and resultant entry into the ACTIONS for this purge valve provided the stated restrictions are met. , Condition D must be entered during this allowance, and the valve opened only as necessary for effecting repairs. Each purge valve in the penetration flow path may be alternately opened, provided one remains sealed closed, if necessary, to complete repairs on the penetration. ; The SR is modified by a Note stating that the inboard 42 inch primary containment purge supply and exhaust isolation i valves are only required to be sealed closed in MODES 1. 2, and 3. If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, the purge valves may not be capable of closing before the pressure pulse affects systems downstream of the purge - valves and the subsequent release of radioactive material will exceed limits prior to the closing of the valves. . At other times when the purge valves are r be capable of closing (e.g. , during movemen ed fuel i assemblies), pressurization concerns are and the ; purge valves are allowed to be open. SR 3.6.1.3.2 1 This SR verifies that the 18 inch (1M14-F190.1M14-F195. ) IM14-F200. and 1M14-F205) and outboard 42 inch (1M14-F040 and 1M14-F090) primary containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are closed as required or, if open, open for an allowable reason. If a purge valve is open in violation of this SR. the valve is considered inoperable. If the inoperable valve is not otherwise known to have excessive leakage when closed, it is not considered to have purge valve leakage outside the limits (Condition D). The SR is also modified by a Note (Note 1) stating that primary containment purge valves are only required to be closed in MODES 1. 2. and 3. At ti than MODE 1. 2. or 3 when the purge valves are r ireq gto b capable of closing (e.g. , during movement f hV fuel assemblies)pressurizationconer8sa&Wt ot present and the purge valves are allowed to be automatic isolation ! capability would be required by SR 3.6.1.3.5. SR 3.6.1.3.7. i and SR 3.6.1.3.8). (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-24 Revision No. O
PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 j BASES E Pace 17 l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.5 (continued) REQUIREMENT , full closure isolation time is demonstrated by SR 3.6.1.3.7, The isolation time test ensures that the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analysis. The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the Inservice ; Testing Program. j SR 3.6.1.3.6 i For primary containment purge valves with resilient seals, ! additional leakage rate testing beyond the test requirements ! of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 4), is required to ensure i OPERABILITY. Operating experience has demonstrated that ; this type of seal has the potential to degrade in a shorter j time period than do other seal types. Based on this observation, and the importance of maintaining this i penetration leak tight (due to the direct path between i primary containment and the environment), a Frequency of i 184 days was established. Additionally, this SR must be performed within 92 days after opening the valve. The 92 day Frecuency was chosen recognizing that cycling the valve coulc introduce additional seal degradation (beyond that which occurs to a valve that has not been opened). 4 Thus, decreasing the interval (from 184 days) is a prudent ! measure after a valve has been opened. l The SR is modified by a Note stating that the primary l containment purge valves are only required to meet leakage rate testing requirements in MODES 1, 2, and 3. If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, purge valve leakage must be minimized to ensure offsite i radiological release is wit imits. At other times when the purge valves are re red 1p, capable of closing (e.g., during handling of7raba d fuel), pressurization j concerns are not prese t and t Jurge valves are not i required to meet any sp leacage criteria. 1 1 SR 3.6.1.3.7 , i Verifying that the full closure isolation time of each MSIV is within the s)ecified limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. T1e full closure isolation time test ensures that the MSIV will isolate in a time period that does not (continued) 1 PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-27 Revision No. O
I PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES h!!! l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.11 (continued) REQUIREMENTS . This SR is modified by a Note that states these valves are only required to meet the combined leakage rate in MODES 1.
- 2. and 3 since this is when the Reactor Coolant System is pressurized and primary containment is required. In some instances. the valves are required to be capable of '
automatically closing during MODES other than MODES 1. 2. and 3. However, specific leakage rate limits are not applicable in these other MODES or conditions. . SR 3.6.1.3.12 Verifying that each outboard 42 inch (1M14-F040 and 1M14-F090) primary containment purge supply and exhaust - isolation valve is blocked to restrict opening to s 50 is required to ensure that the valves can close under DBA conditions within the time limits assumed in the analyses of References 2 and 3. , The SR is modified by a Note stating that this SR is only : required to be met in MODES 1. 2. and 3. If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, the purge valves must close to maintain containment leakage within the values assumed in the accide 31ysis. At other times when the purge valves are ir ; e capable of closing (e.g., during movement f[ ra i he fuel assemblies in the primary containment). p ssur n concerns are not present, thus i the purge valves can be fully o)en. The 18 month Frequency is appropriate because the bloccing devices are typically removed only during a refueling outage. REFERENCES 1. USAR Chapter 15.
- 2. USAR. Section 6.2.
- 3. USAR. Table 6.2-32.
- 4. 10 CFR 50. Appendix J.
i PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-30 Revision No. O
Primary Containment-Shutdown B 3.6.1.10 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS hha B 3.6.1.10 Primary Containment-Shutdown i BASES
\
BACKGROUND The function of the primary containment is to isolate and I contain fission products released from the Reactor Coolant ' System following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) and to confine the postulated release of radioactive material to I within limits. The primary containment surrounds the l Reactor Coolant System and provides an essentially leak i tight barrier against an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment. Additionally, this structure I provides shielding from the fission products that may be l present in the primary containmer.t atmosphere following ' accident conditions. The isolation devices for the penetrations in the primary l containment boundary are a part of the primary containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier for accidents during shutdown conditions:
- a. All primary containment penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
- 1. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE primary containment automatic isolation system, or
- 2. closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LC0 3.6.1.3, " Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)";
i
- b. Primary containment air locks are OPERABLE, except as ;
provided in LCO 3.6.1.2, " Primary Containment Air i Locks"; and !
- c. The equipment hatch is closed.
ionally,administrativecontrolsensurethatopenvent) and pathways will: (1) only be opened to support leakage ra sting; (2) not exceed 6; (3) control room operators will be of the openings; and (4) test engineers will make reaso ttempts to isolate vent / drain lines prior to evacuati ' evacuation is nnounced over the public address system . (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-53 Revision No. O
Primary Containment-Shutdown B 3.6.1.10 BASES SUSEISEE1" Page 20
- BACKGROUND This Specification ensures that the performance of the (continued) primary containment, in the event of a fuel handling acciden ...__. . _... critied it O or reactor vessel
- draind n, provides an acceptable leakage barrier to contain fis
- n products, thereby minimizing offsite doses.
i i i' APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the primary containment is that ! SAFETY ANALYSE it contain the fission products from a fuel handling accidentfinside the primary containment (Ref.2), to limit doses at the site boundary to within limits. The primary
; I;gh g containment OPERABILITY in conjunction with the automatic closure of selected OPERABLE containment isolation valves E* (LC0 3.6.1.3, " Primary Containment Isolation Valves tre (PCIVs)," and LC0 3.3.6.1, " Primary Containment and Drywell 4'~ Isolation Instrumentation"), assures a leak tight fission 2
product barrier. Its leak tightness is required to ensure that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment is restricted to those leaksge rates assumed in m safety analyses. - f ~
%D
/ The fuel handling accident inside p m ry' onta inment !
~ as been ana hzed for 50 cases, n
'gc ado the fuel bundles containment purge system is in ope isola @teson involved are high radiation. This produces - i;..;.;Jiot; efil red recently irradiated. release to the environment. In the fir:t ::::, T fission i.e., they have products which remain within tne primary contairnfient are occupied part of a conservatively assumed to be released at rates consistent criticai reactor core with the DBA LOCA assumptions (e.g., 0.2% of the containment !
within the previous volume per day), and be filtered by the Annulus Exhaust Gas ! seven days. j Treatment System prior to release to the environment. ! i In the second case, the fuel handling accident inside the finvolve fuel primar ncontainment is assumed top;;; c ;ni; :fter i 7 ny; ( bundles that have _ 7,;; q; 7;;;;;7 ,;g ;;;; ;7;;g;1. With the radioactive not been in a decay provided with this delay, all gaseous fission products criticai reactor core released from the damaged fuel bundles are assumed to be within the previous immediately discharged directly to the environment. seven days. Primary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy i' Statement. LC0 Primary containmerit OPERABILITY is maintained by providing a contained volume to 11 t fission product escape following a fuel handling accidenj r other unanticipated N water level excursion. Compliance with this LCO will ensure a primary containment configuration, including the equipment (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-54 Revision No. 0 ,
Primary Containment-Shutdown B 3.6.1.10-BASES CUIEM"' Pace 21 LCO hatch, that is structurally sound and that will limit (continued) leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analysis. Since offsite dose analyses conservatively assume LOCA leakage pathways and rates, the isolation and closure times of automatic containment isolation valves supports an OPERABLE primary containment during shutdown conditions.s 7.,0WeVcI. On3ly5i5 JU;;;ULlr'JLCd th0! Uny numbCI Of priGGry f contairment penetratier vent and drain valv= may remain (Openedandtheprimarycontei"mentconsideredO,PEPABLE rgvu a +s, -e,cte u,- u_ -..L-itieg r : zu, Furthermore, normal operation of the inclined fuel trarisfer system (IFTS) without the IFTS blind flange installed is considered acceptable for meeting Primary Containment-(ShutdownOPERABILITY. Leakage rates specified for the primary containment and air locks, addressed in LCO 3.6.1.1 and LCO 3.6.1.2 are not directly applicable during the shutdown conditions addressed in this LCO. APPLICABILITY In MODES 4 and 5. the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature Due to radioactive limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining an decay, handling of OPERABLE primary containment in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a fuel only requires , control volume. is only recuired during situations for which
/ OPERABILITY of significant releases of racioactive ma n be Primary Containment postulated: such as during movement 1rra ed fuel when the fuel being assemblies in the primary containment.Gr;ng GPU handled is recently J (%LTEraTION5J or during operations with a potenu al for irradiated, i.e., fuel \;drainina the reactor vessel (OPDRVs)JCL~;cverJ0PDRVs that has occupied assume that one or more tues assemolies are loaded into the core. Therefore, if the fuel is fully off-loaded from the } part of a critical reactor vessel, the primary containment is not required to reactor core with.in i be OPERABLE.
the previous seven / (days. j A l ACTIONS A.1 A . 2, $yWM whh ' In the event that primary ntainment is inoperable, action is required to immediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing adioactive material, thus placing the unit i . Rtionthatminimizesrisk. If applicable, movement firracuted fuel assemblies in the primary containmentGrn COT " '"ATIONSlmust be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-55 Revision No. O
1 1 Primary Containment-Shutdown l B 3.6.1.10 PY-CEI/NRR-1995L BASES gTat J ACTIONS A.1, A.2 . (continued) 1
\
position. Also, if applicable, action must be immediately l initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a l vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission I product release. Action must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.10.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that each primary containment penetration that could communicate gaseous fission products to the environment during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive gases outside of the primary containment boundary is within design limits. The method af isolation must include the use l of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed manual valve, a closed and de-activated automatic valve, and a blind flange. This ,
~
SR does not require any testing or isolation device ' manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that these isolation devices capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. The 31 day Frequency was chosen to i provide added assurance that the isolation devices remain in the correct positions. " C W MD This SR is modified by four Notes. The first Notl ten :t .
- r: quire the SP te be ret fer vent 2nd dr9 '4-e At'M2"s j pre"ided that +'e etcte- hit beer subcritical f r :t lent 7 day;. The second Note does not require this SR to be met ;
for pathways capable of being isolated by OPERABLE primary containment automatic isolation valves. The third Note permits the Fire Protection System manual hose reel containment isolation valves (IP54-F726 and IP54-F727) to be ! open during shutdown conditions to supply fire mains. The l fourth Note is included to clarify that manual valves opened under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the manual valves are open. l
.hM
-(aC S;f;ty A Eninti;n
.' ".cp;rt f r T : Hic:1 REFERENCES 1. .
Specific; tion f.n nda nt f35, d;tcd Scpta ccr 20, 1000.
- 2. USAR, Section 15.7.6.
I PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-56 Revision No. O
Containment Vacuum Breakers B 3.6.1.11 BASES g;ggg-299so Page 23 APPLICABLE b. Inadvertent actuation of both primary RHR containment SAFETY ANALYSES spray subsystems during normal operation: (continued) . The results of these two cases show that the containment vacuum breakers, with an opening setpoint of 0.1 psid. are capable of maintaining the differential pressure within design limits. The containment vacuum breakers satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LC0 Only 3 of the 4 vacuum breakers must be OPERABLE for opening. All containment vacuum breakers, however, are required to be closed (except during testing or when the vacuum breakers are performing their intended design function). The vacuum breaker OPERABILITY requirement provides assurance that the containment negative differential 3ressure remains below the design value. The requirement tlat the vacuum breakers be closed ensures that there is no excessive bypass leakage should a LOCA occur. I APPLICABILITY In MODES 1. 2. and 3. the RHR Containment Spray System is l required to be OPERABLE to mitigate the effects of a DBA. ' Excessive negative pressure inside the containment could occur due to inadvertent actuation of this system. The vacuum breakers, therefore, are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 2. and 3. to mitigate the effects of inadvertent actuation of the RHR Containment Spray System. In MODES 4 and 5. the probability and consequences of these events are reduced by the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES: therefore, maintaining i containment vacuum breakers OPERABLE is not required in l m l m MODE 4 or 5 Due to radioactive khen handli ked fuel in the primary containment, decay, handling of g cnne wrc""^Q and during operations with a fuel only requires potential for craining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) the OPERABILITY of primary containment is required to be OPERABLE. Containment Containment Vacuum vacuum breakers are therefore required to be OPERABLE during Breakers when the these evolutions to protect the primary containment against fuel being handled is an inadvertent initiation of the Containment Spray System. recently irradiated, Since OPDRVs assume that one or more fuel assemblies are i.e., fuel that has loaded into the core. this LC0 would not be applicable for occupied part of a OPDRVs if no fuel is in the reactor vessel. critical reactor core on N eO within the previous seven days. [ PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-58 Revision No. O
Containment Vacuum Breakers B 3.6.1.11 BASES g;gg p9st Pace 24 ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) A Note has been added to provide clarification that separate Condition entry is allowed for each containment vacuum breaker. B.1 and B.2 If the Required Action of Condition A cannot be met, or if there are three or more containment vacuum breakers not closed, or if there are two or three required vacuum breakers inoperable for other reasons, the plant must be brought to a MODE or condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status. if the plant is operating. ACTION B.1 requires that the plant be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and that the plant be brought to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable. based on operating experience, to reach the recuired phint conditions from full power conditions in an orcerly manner and without challenging )lant systems. A Note has been added to stipulate that t1ese Required Actions are only applicable if the plant is in MODE or 3. If the Condition occurs during movement f5 N ed fuel in the primary containment.G- """"3 or during operations with a potential for draining t1e reactor vessel (OPDRVs), then ACTION B.2 requires that action be c[;%d taken to immediately suspend activities that re) resent aa &
/ thn pnit in a enndition that mi k. If applicable.
@ E ^1TEPF IONS B movement d fuel in the primary containment must be su diately.
Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be taken to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Action must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. A Not s been added to the Required Actions to stipulate J requirements are only applicable while mov nc 3 8 ed fuel assemblies in the primary containment r COR y ( ALTERATICL.jor during OPDRVs. (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-60 Revision No. 0 i
Containment Humidity Control B 3.6.1.12 ME"oTi""
% 2s BASES 1
LCO containment saray are deactivated, the average temperature i (continued) and relative lumidity are not required to be maintained l within the prescribed limits. iI APPLICABILITY In MODES 1. 2. and 3. the RHR Containment Spray System is required to be OPERABLE to mitigate the effects of a DBA. Excessive negative pressure inside the containment could occur due to inadvertent actuation of this system. The containment average temperature relationship with relative , humidity. therefore, is required to be within limits in ! MODES 1. 2. and 3. to mitigate the effects of inadvertent l Due to radioactive actuation of the RHR Containment Spray System. decay, handling of fuel only requires In MODES 4 and 5. the probability and consequences of these control over > events are reduced by the pressure and temperature Containment humidity limitations in these MODES. , Therefore, maintaining limits f when the fuel being on containment relative humidity and temperature is not handled is recently required in MODE 4 or 5. irradiated, i.e., fuel Wbenhandliq$a ed fuel in the primary containment, that has occupied (tr".; CORE ,^ .u.r.: wm and during operations with a part of a critical potential for craining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs) the reactor core within primary containment is required to be OPERABLE. Therefore. the previous seven the proper relationship between containment average days. temperature and relative humidity must exist during these evoluti g ACTIONS Al With the 3rimary containment average temperature and relative lumidity not within the established limits, actions must be taken to restore the primary containment relative humidity and tem)erature to within limits. With the plant o)erating in MODE 1, 2. or 3. Required Action A.1 stipulates tlat restoration must occur within 8 hours. The eight hour Completion Time is based on the time required to restore the relative humidity and temperature limits, and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period. (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-64 Revision No. O
~ Containment Humidity Control B 3.6.1.12 Cf!?OM""
%u BASES ACTIONS B.1. B.2. B.3. B.4. and B.5 (continued) .
If the 3rimary containment relative humidity and temperature cannot 3e restored to within limits within the required Completion Time of Condition A. actions must be taken to place the plant in a MODE or condition in which the LCO does not apply. Required Action B.1 requires that the plant be brought to at i least MODE 3 within 12 hours and Required Action B.2 requires that the plant be brought to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on
- operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
A i C.1,n[ C 1.2,. rd C.1 M M If the primary containment relative hu ^ temperature are not within limits during movement b'd""@Nted fuel in the primary containment.Cduring Luut ,-.~w or during 4 OPDRVs. action is required to place the plant in a MODE or ! i condition in which the LC0 does not ano Required Actions C. J.2 A.d C.1 " e' -that actions be taken to limittuiately sucn^"d represent a potential for releasidNd5I8tD""Ne 't l. thus placing the unit in a conditioT1 that minimizes risk. ruun If applicable.d'PIO ALTEPATICE MMmovement f irra[ ed fuel in the primary containment must be suspen immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be taken to l suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel ; draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. (continued) i PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-65 Revision No. O
Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 j PY-CEI/NRR-1995L B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS gype 4 ; B 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment l BASES l BACKGROUND The function of the secondary containment is to contain. I dilute, and hold up fission products that may leak from primary containment following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). In conjunction with operation of the Annulus Exhaust Gas I Treatment (AEGT) System and manual closure of certain valves whose lines penetrate the secondary containment, the secondary containment is designed to reduce the activity level of the fission products prior to release to the environment and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during certain operations that take place inside primary containment such as during movement (Krecu+Q irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment, G ury c _ m , - ,m.,or during operations with a potential for draining ttle reactor vessel (OPDRVs). The secondary contain ent is a structure that completely encloses the primary containment. This structure forms a control volume that serves to hold up and dilute the fission products. It is possible for the pressure in the control volume to rise relative to the external pressure. To prevent ground level exfiltration while allowing the - secondary containment to be designed as a conventional structure, the secondary containment requires support systems to maintain the control volume pressure at less than , the external pressure. Requirements for these systems are specified separately in LCO 3.6.4.2. " Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)." and LCO 3.6.4.3. " Annulus Exhaust , Gas Treatment (AEGT) System." l The isolation devices for the penetrations in the secondary l containment boundary are a ) art of the secondary containment l barrier. To maintain this aarrier:
)
- a. All penetrations terminating in the secondary containment required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by at least one manual valve or blind flange, as applicable, secured in its closed position, except as provided in LC0 3.6.4.2. Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)";
(continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-104 Revision No. O ;
i Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1.
^
BASES Page 2P BACKGROUND b. The containment equipment hatch is closed and (continued) sealed and the shield blocks are installed 1 adjacent to the shield building; and
- c. The door in each access to the secondary containment is closed, except for entry and exit.
APPLICABLE There are two principal accidents for which credit is SAFETY ANALYSES taken for secondary containment OPERABILITY. These are a LOCA (Ref. 1) and a fuel handling accident >inside primary containment (Ref. 2). The seconaary containment performs no involving handling active function in response to each of these limiting i events; however, its leak tightness is required to ensure of recently that the release of radioactive materials from the primary irradiated fuel containment is restricted to those leakage paths and (i.e., fuel that has associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis, occupied part of a and that fission products entrapped within the secondary criticai reactor containment structure will be treated by the AEGT System core within the prior to discharge to the environment. previous seven days) Secondary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC ^ Policy Statement. An OPERABLE secondary containment provides a control volume ! LC0 into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary l containment, or are released from the reactor coolant I pressure boundary components locate'd in secondary ' l containment, can be diluted and processed prior to release to the environment. For the secondary containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced ,due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-105 Revision No. 0
Secondary Containment i
,B 3.6.4.1 I
PY-CE1/NRR-1995L BASES ^1;$'* 4 l APPLICABILITY or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situations ! (continued) for which significant releases of radioa 1 terial can I be postulated, such as during movement fp rr ated fuel ; assemblies in the primary containment,C: "'"r ^ i (fTE"f T'ONQor during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PRDVs)./ M=c>cr, OPDRVs assume that one or more fuel assemblies are loaded into the core. Therefore e fuel is fully off-loaded from the reactor vessel, t-h46 'condary containment is not required to be OPERABLE. ACTIONS A.1 If secondary containment is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours. The 4 hour Completion Due to radioa Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that I decay, handling of is commensurate with the importance of maintaining secondary fuel only requires ' containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also OPERABILITY of ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods Secondary where secondary containment is inoperable is minimal. m Containment when the fuel being B.I and B.2 handled is recently irradiated, i.e., fuel If the secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE that has occupied status within the required Completion Time, the plant must ! part of a critical be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To - ! reactor core within achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least the previous seven MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The days' allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. C.1.
. Movement ted fuel assemblies in the primary containment [g"i riTEP"!0MQand OPDRVs can be postulated h s^ N '*^ Y,. tomtcausesfission t proauct releaser,t; the m e i r.,Inguch cases, t henvironment. It applicable,
=9* barrieMj o release of fission product to the movement [f% ' ted fuel assemblies in the prinary containmentCM 05 ^t =f 706) must be immediately suspended if the secondary containment is inoperable. Suspension of these activities shall not (continued)
PERRY - UNIT 1 8 3.6-106 Revision No. O
1 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES Pace 30 ACTIONS C.l. ntinued) preclude completing an. action'that. involves moving a component to a safe p'osition. Also, if applicable, action must be immediately. initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures that the secondary containment boundary is sufficiently leak tight to preclude exfiltration under expected wind conditions. The 24 hour Frequency of this SR was developed based on operating experience related to , secondary containment vacuum variations during the applicable MODES and the low probability of a DBA o'ccurring between surveillances. Furthermore, the 24 hour Frequency is considered adequate in l view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal , secondary containment vacuum condition. SR 3.6.4.1.2 and SR 3.6.4.1.3 Verifying that the primary containment equipment hatch is closed and-the shield blocks are installed adjacent to the shield building, and secondary containment access doors are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur. In this application, the term
" sealed" has no connotation of leak. tightness. Verifying that all such openings are closed provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur. Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying each door in both access openings are closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit. The 31 day Frequency for these SRs has been shown to be adequate based on operating experience, and is considered adequate in view of the other controls on secondary containment access openings.
(continued) PERRY - UNIT I B 3.6-107 Revision No. O
i SCIVs ' B 3.6.4.2 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS %!%% Page 31 l""' B 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) BASES . BACKGROUND The function of the SCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) (Ref. 1). The OPERABILITY requirements for SCIVs help ensure that an adequate secondary containment boundary is maintained during : and after an accident by minimizing potential paths to the i environment. Isolation barrier (s) for the penetration are ; discussed in Reference 2. The isolation devices addressed : by this LC0 are passive. Manual valves and blind flanges I are considered passive devices. 1 Penetrations are isolated by the use of manual valves in the closed position or blind flanges. - APPLICABLE The SCIVs must be OPERABLE to ensure the secondary SAFETY ANALYSES containment barrier to fission product releases is established. The principal accidents for which the secondary containment boundary is required are a loss of _ coolant accident (Ref.1), and a fuel handling accidentjt inside primary containment (Ref. 3). The secondary involving handling containment performs no active function in response to each of recently of these limiting events, but the boundary established by irradiated fuel SCIVs is required to ensure that leakage from the primary (i.e., fuel that has containment is processed by the Annulus Exhaust Gas occupied part of a Treatment (AEGT) System before being released to the , critical reactor environment. 4 core within the Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE ensures that fission products Previous seven will remain trapped inside secondary containment so that days) they can be treated by the AEGT System prior to discharge to the environment. SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (continued) PERRY - UNIT I B 3.6-109 Revision No. 0
I SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES (continued) g g j995L Pace 32 LCO SCIVs form a part of the secondary containment boundary. The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs. The normally closed isolation valves or blind flanges are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed, or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, or blind flanges are in place, l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product i release to the primary containment that leaks to the Due to radioactive secondary containment. Therefore, OPERABILITY of SCIVs is decay, handling of required, ue o re es g In MODES 4 and 5, the pr 'ility and consequences of these events are reduced dur ssure and temperature secondary limitations in these Therefore, maintaining SCIVs containment isolat. ion OPERABLE is not requi. riODE 4 or 5, except for other valves when the fuel situations under which significant releases of radioactive being handled is material can be postulated, such as during movementQMnft) recently irradiated, irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment, i 1.e., fuel that has Gr ' n: C"" "'"f"*Mor during operations with a ' occupied part of a 7 aotential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs).A criticai reactor core ner:vcOOPDRVs assume that one or,more fuel assemblies are within the previous loaded into the core. Therefore, if the fuel is fully off-seven days. loaded from the reactor vessel, the SCIVs are not required to be OPERABLE. ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by three Notes. The first Note allows penetration flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when the need for secondary containment isolation is indicated. The second Note provides clarification that, for the purpose of this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable SCIV. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, ! and subsequent inoperable SCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions. (cont i nued_). PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-110 Revision No. O
SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES
$EEEE1""
Pace 33 ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) Required Action A.2 is ' modified by a Note that applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low. B.1 With two SCIVs in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 4 hours. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this short time. l The Condition has been modified by a Note stating that : Condition B is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two isolation valves. This clarifies that only Condition A is entered if one SCIV is inoperable in each of two penetrations. C.1 and C.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B cannot be met in MODE 1. 2. or 3. the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without ; challenging plant systems. D.1. RC v , If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of -- Conditions A or B cannot be met during movement (f roc. MMC irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment. (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-112 Revision No. 0
I SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES EEU' Paae 34 ACTIONS D.1. _ ntinued) (dbriq C0"E ^1TcPF!0MQor during OPDRVs the plant must be n which If piaceainacondition=7r'rTdMtheLCOdoesnotapply. applicable, movement ot ed fuel assemblies in the primary containmentgr.c-in C u"'1"qmust be immediately 4 suspended. Suspension of these activin es shall not , preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if apalicable, action must be immediately initiated to. suspend 0)DRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that each secondary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or isolation device manipulation. Rather it involves verification that those isolation device in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. Since these isolation devices are readily accessible to personnel during normal unit operation and verification of their position is relatively easy. the 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide added assurance that the isolation devices are in the correct positions. Two Notes have been added to thi.s SR. The first Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable. since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1. 2 and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these isolation devices once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low. A second Note has been included to clarify that (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-113 Revision No. O
. .- - .- . ~, ..-.- - .. -.- . .- ..._.-.- _ .-.- - - . - - - -
AEGT System B 3.6.4.3,
. BASES Ei$[$$E1""
r.n
-BACKGROUND humidity of the airstream t'o less than 70% (Ref. 2). The (continued) roughing filter removes large particulate matter, while the HEPA filter is provided to remove fine particulate matter and protect the charcoal from fouling. The charcoal adsorber removes gaseous' elemental iodine and organic iodides, and the final HEPA filter is provided to collect involving handling _ any carbon fines exhausted from the charcoal adsorber.
of recently irradiated fuel,- The AEGT System automatically starts and operates in i.e., fuel that has response to actuation signals indicative of conditions or an-occupied part of a accident that could require operation of the system. AEGT critical reactor System flows are controlled by two motor operated control core within the dampers installed in branch ducts. One duct exhausts air to previous seven the unit vent, (AEGT Subsystem A exhausts to the Unit 1 plant vent; AEGT Subsystem B exhausts to the Unit 2 plant (days vent), while the other recirculates air back to the annulus. APPLICABLE The design basis for the AEGT System-is to mitigate the l SAFETY ANALYSES consequences of a loss of coolant accident and fuel handling acci_denty (Ref. 2). For all events analyzed, the AEGT system is'shown to be automatically initiated to reduce, via
- . filtration and adsorption, the radioactive material released to the environment.
The AEGT System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LC0 Following a DBA, a minimum of one AEGT subsystem is required to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and to process gaseous releases. Meeting the LCO requirements for two operable subsystems ensures operation of at least one AEGT subsystem in the event of a single active failure. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product
, release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, AEGT System OPERABILITY is required l during these MODES. ;
In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced,due to the pressure and temperature , limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the AEGT System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-116 Revision No. O i n- e--, -+ -- ~ -
AEGT System B 3.6.4.3. Et3MEE1"' BASES mu APPLICABILITY other situations under which significant releases of (continued) radioactiv gal can be postulated, such as during movement iirradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment, 6 M r.; CCRE ALTERATIO C)or during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs). h0PDRVs assume that one or more fuel assemblies are loaded into the core. Therefore, if the fuel is fully off-loaded from the reactor vessel, the AEGT System is not
-required to be OPERABLE. ~
i ACTIONS A.1 With one AEGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE AEGT subsystem is adequate Due to radioactive to perform the required radioactivity release control decay, handling of function. However, the overall system reliability is i fuel only requires reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem OPERABILITY of the could result in the radioactivity release control function ! not being adequately performed. The 7 day Completion Time J AEGT System when the fuel being is based on consideration of such factors as the ; availability of the OPERABLE redur. dant AEGT subsystem and d " the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
,"diat ef that has occupied B.1 and B.2 part of a critical reactor core within If tho AEGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status the previous seven within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the days. plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
C.I. C.2.1. 4.2.^ 0 During movement ed fuel assemblies in the primary containment, @ nr a n ! = l L w,) or during OPDRVs, when Required Action A.1 cannot be corrpleted within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE AEGT subsystem should be immediately placed in operation. This Required Action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-117 Revision No. O
I l l AEGT System _ B 3.6.4.3 BASES Pace 37 ACTIONS C.1. C.2.1. ntinued) failures that could prevent automatic actuation have occurred. and that any other failure would be readily detected. An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to l cy 3 4 immediately suspend activities that present a potential sc & scconcare; pb / for releasingsradioactive materi QA Cbnt:1m:nn thus placing the un' in a Co minimizes risk. If applicable, movement ofDrrad ated fuel assemblies in the primary containmentdhd C0RL ALlLMATIONO must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if ap)licable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend 0)DRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. D.1 If both AEGT subsystems are ino)erable in MODE 1. 2, e 3. the AEGT System may not be capa)le of supporting the required radioactivity release control function. Therefore. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately. E.1. When two 6ECT #= fat 2 fuel assemblies in the primarytoms are movement (of%Wd ^ i containmentn 5c tt.: . LTut^JI"Wmust be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not l preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if ap)licable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend 0)DRVs to minimize the probability of a - I vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.3.1 REQUIREMENTS Operating each AEGT subsystem for a 10 continuous hours ensures that both subsystems are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. Operation with the heaters on for a 10 continuous hours every 31 days (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.6-118 Revision No. 0 l 1
CRER System B 3.7.3 PY-CEI/NRR-1995L BASES (continued) EN~' APPLICABLE The ability of the CRER System to maintain the SAFETY ANALYSES habitability of the control room is an explicit assumption for the safety analyses presented in the USAR, Chapters 6 C. - and 15 (Refs. 3 and 4, respectively). The emergency (. involving handling recirculation mode of the CRER System is assumed to of recently operate following a loss of coolant accident, main steam irradiated fuel, line break, fuel handling accident,A and control rod drop i.e., fuel that has accident! The radiological dose 5 to control room personnel occupied part of a as a result of the various DBAs are summarized in criticai reactor Reference 4. No single active or passive failure will cause core within the the loss of ability to recirculate air in the control room, previous seven days The CRER System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LCO Two independent and redundant subsystems of the CRER System are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failure disables the other subsystem. Total system failure could result in a failure to meet the dose requirements of GDC 19 in the event of a DBA. The CRER System is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to control operator exposure are OPERABLE in both subsystems. A CRER subsystem is considered OPERABLE when its associated:
- a. Fans are OPERABLE;
- b. HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber are not excessively restricting flow and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and
- c. Heater, demister, ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.
In addition, the control room boundary must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the CRER System must be OPERABLE to control operator ekposure during and following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission product release. (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.7-11 Revision No. O
CRER System B 3.7.3 INES[E}""' raa n BASES APPLICABILITY In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a DBA (continued) are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the CRER System Due to radioactive OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the decay, handling of following situations under which significant radioactive fuel only requires releases can be postulated
- OPERABILITY of the re.a # b8 Control Room a. During movement fi ated fuel assemblies in the Emergency primary containmen or fuel handling buildi he the I be g b- G III 'I handled is recently irradiated, i.e., fuel b.f. During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs).
that has occupied part of a critical @; 1:O OPDRVs assume that one or more fuel assemblies are reactor core within loaded into the core. Therefore, if the fuel is fully off-the previous seven loaded from the reactor vessel, the CRER System is not required to be OPERABLE.
- ACTIONS Ad With one CRER subsystem inoperable, the inoperable CRER subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE CRER subsystem is adequate to perform control room radiation protection. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE CRER subsystem could result in loss of CRER System function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and that the remaining CRER subsystem can provide the required capabilities. B.1 and B.2 In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable CRER subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status withi, the associated Completion Time, the unit must be plac.ed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit cond'itions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.7-12 Revision No. 0
CRER System B 3.7.3 USll01""' raa a BASES ACTIONS C . l . C . 2.1. ~ (continued) The Required Actions of Condition C are modified by a Note indicating that LC0 3.0.3 does not a) ply. If irradiated fuel assemblies while in iODE 1, 2,goving or o. 1.ne rece.MLC fuel movement is independent of reactor op retinas Therefore, inability to suspend movement 'irr
- ted fuel assemblies is not sufficient s q requ e a reactor shutdown. During movement 11rrad M ed fuel assemblies in the primary containment or fuel handling building,0 W O
@"E ^iTE""'05]or during OPDRVs if the inoperable CRER subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time of Condition A, the OPERABLE CRER '
subsystem may be placed in the emergency recirculation mode. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected. An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk. ruwB If applicable, movement irr ted fuel assemblies in the pr 3 nary containment and fu andling building ~ " " ' CU=10rinust be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a ccmponent to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended. D.1 If both CRER subsystems are ino)erable in MODE 1, 2, or 3. the CRER System may not be capa)le of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside of the accident analyses. Therefore. LC0 3.0.3 must be entered immediately. (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.7-13 Revision No. 0
CRER System B 3.7.3 CSis%E1""' a~ n BASES ACTIONS E.1 (continued) nu^%ated fuel assemblies in the primary During movement containment _or fue handling building,00r M COR D (ALTE"AT=Nor during OPDRVs with two CRER subsystems inoperable, action must be taken immediately toEnonci activities that present a potential fordeleasing sytht - radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk. ett ed fuel assemblies in the If applicable, movement f 1r Drimary containment and handling building 6 C=^.1=Qmust be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 l l REQUIREMENTS Operating each CRER subsystem for = 10 continuous hours ensures that both subsystems are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. Operation with the heaters on for a 10 continuous hours every 31 days eliminates moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The 31 day Frequency was developed in consideration of the known reliability of fan motors and controls and the redundancy available in the system. SR 3.7.3.2 This SR verifies that the required CRER testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program , (VFTP). The CRER filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 5). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP. (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.7-14 Revision No. O
t Control Room HVAC System B 3.7.4 BASES (continued) g g g >9st i Pane 42 LCO Two independent and redundant subsystems of the Control Room . HVAC System are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at l least one is available. assuming a single failure disables i the other subsystem. Total system failure could result in the equipment operating temperature exceeding limits. The Control Room HVAC System is considered OPERABLE when the : individual components necessary to maintain the control room temperature are OPERABLE in both subsystems. These components include the cooling coils, fans, chillers with compressors, ductwork, dampers and associated instrumentation and controls. The heating coils are not required for control room HVAC OPERABILITY. APPLICABILITY In MODE 1, 2, or 3. the Control Room HVAC System must be OPERABLE to ensure that the control room temperature will not exceed equipment OPERABILITY limits. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a Due to radioactive Design Basis Accident are reduced due to the pressure and decay, handling of temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the Control Room HVAC System OPERABLE is not fuel only requires recuired in MODE 4,or 5, except for the following situations OPERABILITY of the h significant radioactive releases can be Controt Room HVAC s 1 System when the fuel r eM.5 being handled is a. During movement fairra ed fuel assemblies in the recently irradiated. primary contain fuel handling building:1 1.e., fuel that has J occupied part of a 6 Dr h; C3 E ALTEPf.TICNS M . critical reactor core within the previous hg. During operations with a potential for draining the roactor vessol (OPRDVs). seven days. J C hicyc O OPDRVs assume that one or more fuel assemblies are loaded into the core. Therefore, if the fuel is fully off-loaded from the reactor vessel, the Control Room HVAC System is not required to be OPERABLE. ACTIONS A.1 With one control room HVAC subsystem inoperable, the ; ino)erable control room HVAC subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE control room HVAC subsystem is adequate to perform the control room air (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.7-17 Revision No. O I
l l Control Room HVAC System B 3.7.4 BASES ,,u ACTIONS D.1. D.2.1. .2. (continued) '. The Required Actions of Condition D are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If qnoving r&w@) irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2. or 3. the fuel movement is independent of reactor ope Therefore, inability to suspend movement ted fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. During movement o ated fuel assemblies in the primary containment or fuel handling building.d0r= COPD SER^!w"Oor during OPDRVs. if the inoperable control room HVAC subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time of Condition A. the OPERABLE control room HVAC subsystem may be placed immediately in operation. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE. that no failures that would prevent automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected. An alternative to Required Action D.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for(releasing 4ht
*-ts radioactivity that might require isolation of the control 8+
room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk. rau^% d fuel assemblies in the If applicable, movement f,1r ! primary containment and handling building C d CC"EJ CLTE"^.T = g must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement ; of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable. actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to i minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and f subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended. J (continued) 4 PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.7-19 Revision No O
Control Room HVAC System B 3.7.4 BASES ngsim.g,9st Pane 44 ACTIONS E 1. ~ (continued) . The Required Actions of Condition E.1 are modified by a Note indicating that LC0 3.0.3 does not apply. If 6oving reu s wf) irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1. 2. or 3. the - fuel movement is independent of reactor op "QqNted fuel Therefore, inability to suspend movement assemblies is not sufficient reason to req e a reactor 3rr ' shutdown. Daring movement o ed fuel assemblies in the primary containment or fuel handling building. 00ri m CC"EJ , GLTE"JTICL.j or during OPDRVs if the Required Action and associated completion Time of Condition B is not met, action must be taken to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing adioactivity that might require , isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition tbd minimizes risk. s.e; h t u.a Q wa^4 If applicable, handling 1rra ted fuel in the orimary containment or fuel handling uilding must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these t activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also. if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend 0)DRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission aroduct release. Actions must , continue until the OPDRVs are suspended. I i l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.4.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the l system is sufficient to remove the control room heat load assumed in the safety analysis. The SR consists of a combination of testing and calculation. The 18 month Frequency is appropriate since significant degradation of the Control Room HVAC System is not expected over this time period. REFERENCES 1. USAR. Section 6.4. 1
- 2. USAR. Section 9.4.1.
PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.7-20 Revision No. O
r ! Fuel Handling Building B 3.7.8 USE*E1"" BASES BACKGROUND With the boundaries in place, the FHB Ventilation Exhaust (continued) System will assure that any releases occurring as a result of a FHA are filtered.
)
)
l l APPLICABLE There is only one principal accident for which credit is ! SAFETY ANALYSES taken for FHB OPERABILITY. This is the FHarin the FHB-r (Ref. 1). The FHB performs no active function in response involving handling of to the FHA: however, proper air flow patterns are required r;cently irradiated fuel to ensure that the release of radioactive materials is j (i.e., fuel that has , restricted to those leakage rates assumed in the accident : i occupied part of a critical analysis. r2rctor core within the FHB satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (pr::vious seven days) f LCO An OPERABLE FHB provides a control volume into which fission products can be diluted and processed prior to release to the environment. For the FHB to be considered OPERABLE. it must provide proper air flow patterns to ensure that there
- is no uncontrolled release of radioactive material during a l FHArin the FHB. _
l
%.% MN & r=N ter.m4.A M APPLICABILITY In plant operating MODES. OPERABILITY of the FHB is not required since leakage from the primary containment will not be released Regardless of the plant operating MODE. anyti N" " FHB.ted fuel is being handled in the FHB there is the ntial for a F nd the FHB is required to mitigate the consequences.
w yh& rat.uh rh.59 ACTIONS wo etating The Required that LC0 3.0.3 isActions have beenIf modified not aaplicable. movir by @arP5Medfuel ' assemblies while in M n?4- . LC0 3.0.3 wouia not specify ' any action. If movi dim ed fuel assemblies while in i MODE 1. 2. or 3. the e movement is independent of reactor operations "g^ fore, in either case, inability to suspend , i movement irr ted fuel assemblies would not be a sufficien to require a reactor shutdown. (continued) c Due to radioactive decay, handling of fuel only l requires OPERABILITY of the Fuel Handling Building when the fuel being handled is r_ecently ! irradiated, i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous seven days PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.7-32 Revision No. 0
)
i i
Fuel Handling Building ! B 3.7.8 i UJE"M"" no u BASES ACTIONS AL1 . (continued) . I With the FHB inoperable, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the LC0 does not apply since the FHB is . incapable of performing its required accident mitigation t function. To achieve this, irr: dict:d f=1 handling ust be ; suspended immediately. Suspension shall not preclude ! completion of fuel movement to a safe position. of r.<utty ;
; ters W M SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.8.1 and SR 3.7.8.2 M !
REQUIREMENTS Verifying that FHB floor hatches and access doors are closed, that the shield blocks are in place adjacent to the shield building, and that the FHB railroad track door is closed ensures that proper air flow patterns will exist in l the FHB, and that any release following a FHA in the FHB ! will be filtered prior to release. Verifying that all such openings are closed provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the FHB will not occur. Maintaining FHB OPERABILITY requires verifying each door in the access . opening is closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit. i' The 24 hour Frequency for these SRs has been shown to be adequate based on operating experience. , REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 15.7.4. l l I B 3.7-33 Revision No. O PERRY - UNIT 1
fHB Ventilation Exhaust System B 3.7.9 BASES EIEnTI"" Paae 47 BACKGROUND radiation condition, an alarm will occur in the control (continued) room, and the operating supply fan from the FHB Ventilation Supply System will trip.. The exhaust subsystems remain operational to continue exhausting contaminated air from the fuel handling area through the charcoal filter trains, thus precluding any uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the outside environment. APPLICABLE The design basis for the FHB Ventilation Exhaust System is SAFETY ANALYSES to mitigate the consequences of a FHAf(Ref. 3). For all [ involving handling of' events analyzed, the FHB Ventilation Exhaust System reduces,
/ r:cently irradiated fuel, via filtration and adsorption, the radioactive material i i.e., fuel that has released to the environment.
occupied part of a critical l The FHB Ventilation Exhaust System satisfies Criterion 3 of r: actor core within the the NRC Policy Statement. previous seven days _ (o WWhw3 e rw+% wr*Ata+d NO ! LCO Following a FHf a minimum of two FHB ventilation exhaust subsystems are required to maintain the FHB at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and to process gaseous releases. Meeting the LC0 requirements for three i OPERABLE subsystems ensures operation of at least two FHB j ventilation exhaust subsystems in the event of a single active failure. APPLICABILITY In plant operating MODES, OPERABILITY of the FHB Ventilation Exhaust System is not required since leakage from the
- Fl primary Regardless containment will not be of the plant operating released MODE, anytiinto ffr"f ted !
fuel is being handled in the FHB there is the potential for , aFHQndtheFHBVentilationExhaustSystemisrequiredto
/'mitidite the consequences. M - l
%%mmuk emwe rak,u W%
> s 7 ACTIONS ThTe Required Actions'have been modified by Tstating that LCO 3.0.3 is not app able. If movi g"fiVMIted fuel assemblies while in , LC0 3.0.3 Id not specify any action. Ifmovng7r*ra' ed fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or he ovement is independent of reactor operations ore, in either case, inability to suspend movement sufficient 7 ted fuel assemblies would not be a to require a reactor shutdown.
Due to radioactive decay, handling of fuel only m (continued) l requires OPERABILITY of the Fuel Handling Building Ventilation Exhaust \ ' System when the fuel being handled is recently irradiated, i.e., fuel that has oqcupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous seven daysj PERRY - UNIT 1 u 4./-35 Revision No. O
FHB Ventilation Exhaust System B 3.7.9 BASES [ICI$$E'I"" Paae 48 ACTIONS Ad (continued) With one FHB ventilation exhaust subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE FHB ventilation exhaust subsystems are adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function. However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in one OPERABLE subsystem could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE FHB ventilation exhaust subsystems and the low probability of a FHA occurring during this period. B.1 and B.2 If the FHB ventilation exhaust subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time the two remaining OPERABLE FHB ventilation exhaust subsystems should be immediately placed in operation. This Required Action ensures that the remaining subsystems are OPERABLE, and that any other failure would be readily detected. An alternative to Required Action B.1 is to immediately 2hs
.e suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing radioactive material to the FHB, thus placing the unit n condition that minimizes risk by sospending movement of rm4W 4 irradiated fuel assemblies. Suspension of this activity '
l shall not preclude completion of fuel movement to a safe ; position.
.C.d With two or three FHB ventilation exhaust subsystems inoperable the plant must be brought to a condition in which the LCO does not apply since the system is incapable of performing Ms required accident mitigation function. To achieve this,-irr:di:ted S:1 handling n the FHB must be suspended immediately. Suspension shall ot reclude completion of fuel movement to a safe posit on. rg+p '
(continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.7-36 Revision No. O
. . .. -. . . - .~ . . - ..-.- -..- - - .
AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2.
- B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ggTj"5L t
B 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for , LC0 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating." : APPLICABLE .The OPERABILITY of the min C during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of, rdgourc 4 SAFETY ANALYSES a fuel assemblies in the primary containment o ndling building ensures that:
- a. The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is ;
available-for monitoring and maintaining the unit l status; and
- c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accideny involving handling In general, when the unit is shut down the Technical of recently Specifications (TS) requirements ensure that the unit has irradiated fuel, the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated I.e., fuel that has accidents. However, assuming a single failure and occupied part of a concurrent loss of all offsite or loss of all onsite power criticai reactor is not required. The rationale for this is based on the ,
core within the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are i previous seven analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 have no specific analyses in MODES 4 and 5. Worst case bounding events are deemed not days credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and the corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrence significantly ; reduced or eliminated, and minimal consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCOs for required systems, j (continued) ; PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.8-35 Revision No. O
AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES USIEEE1"" Parre 50 LCO powered from offsite power. An OPERABLE DG, associated with (continued) a Division 1 or Division 2 Distribution System Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) bus' required OPERABLE by LC0 3.8.8, ensures a diverse power source is available to provide electrical power support, assuming a loss of the offsite circuit. Similarly, when the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system is required to be OPERABLE, a separate offsite circuit to the Division 3 Class lE onsite electrical power distribution subsystem, or an OPERABLE Division 3 DG, ensure an additional source of power for the HPCS. This additional source for Division 3 is not necessarily required to be connected to be OPERABLE. Either the circuit required by LC0 Item a, or a circuit required to meet LC0 Item c may be connected, with the second source available for connection. Together, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuit (s) and ' DG(s) ensure the availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accident reactor vessel draindown). - w,% wa% dredy:USAM*A h The qualified offsite circuit (s) must be~ capable or , maintaining rated frequency and voltage while connected to j their respective ESF bus (es), and accepting required loads l during an accident. Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the USAR and are part of the licensing basis for the plant. One offsite circuit consists of the Unit I startup transformer through the Unit 1 interbus transformer, to the Class IE 4.16 kV ESF buses through source feeder breakers for each required division. A second acceptable offsite circuit consists of the Unit 2 startup transformer through the Unit 2 interbus transformer, to the Class IE 4.16 kV ESF buses through source feeder breakers for each required division. The required DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage, and accepting required loads. This sequence must be accomplished within 10 seconds for Division 1 and 2 and 13 seconds for Division 3. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as: DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.8-37 Revision No. O
I AC Sources-Shutdown ) B 3.8.2 l i PY-CEI/NRR-1995L BASES g,pa
- LCO with the engine at ambient conditions. Additional DG (continued) capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillances e.g., capability of the DG to revert to standby status on an ECCS signal while operating in parallel test mode.
Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function for DG , OPERABILITY. In addition, proper load sequence operation is ! an integral part of offsite circuit and DG OPERABILITY since its inoperability impacts the ability to start and maintain , l energized loads required OPERABLE by LC0 3.8.8. It is acceptable for divisions to be cross tied during shutdown conditions, permitting a single offsite power circuit to supply all required AC electrical power distribution subsystems. As described in Applicable Safety Analyses, in the event of an accident during shutdown. the TS are designed to maintain the plant in a condition such that, even with a single failure, the plant will not be in immediate difficulty. ; APPLICABILITY The duringAC sources re movement A $rrade OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and ed fuel assemblies in the primary , containment or f . ling building provide assurance ! that: !
- a. Systems to rovide adequate coolant inventory makeup ue to radioactive are availab e for the irradiated fuel in the core in decay, handling of case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor fuel only requires vessel:
OPERABILITY of the AC Sources when the b. SystemsneededtomitigateafuelhandlingfccidentWMS fuel being handled is areavailabj wh 4 i recently irradiated, ? i.e., fuel that has c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events irW that can lead to core damage during shutdown are (wA occupied part of a critical reactor core ava11able: and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available within seven days the p)revious for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold
---- shutdown condition or refueling condition. .
The AC power requirements for MODES 1. 2. and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.1. i (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.8-38 Revision No. O
- AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES (continued) II"" m ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified jlp
-does not apply. Ifmov.'g,rra'p;indicatingthatLCO3.0.3 d ed fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2. . the ement is independent of reactor o gg Therefore, inability to suspend movementoffrr3 ted fuel assemblies is not sufficient '
reason t e reactor shutdown. A.1 A required offsite circuit is considered inoperable if no . cualified circuit is supplying power to one required ESF civision. If two or more ESF 4.16 kV buses are required per LCO 3.8.8. division (s) with offsite power available may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow . continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS. i r:dicted f=' movemen . and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, a,p irr* M By allowing the option to declare required features i f..A inoperable which are not powered from offsite power, appropriate restrictions can be implemented in accordance with the required feature (s) LCOs' ACTIONS. Required features remaining powered from offsite power (even though that circuit may be inoperable due to failing to power other features) are not declared inoperable by this Required Action. , l A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. A.2.4. B.1. B.2. B.3. and B.4 With the offsite circuit not available to all required divisions, the o) tion still exists to declare all required features inoperaale. Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made. With the required DG inoperable, the minimum requir diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, erg re. required i to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS movement fS r ated fual assemblies in the primary containment a e handling building, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. ! Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to initiate (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.8-39 Revision No. O
DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 8 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ggligi$$5'
.. . u 8 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LC0 3.8.4. "DC Sources -Operating."
APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the USAR. Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2) assume that Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators, emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation. The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.
~
The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electric ources during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement fp era ted fuel assemblies in the 3rimary containment or uel ing building ensures t13t: [ a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or ( involving handling refueling condition for extended periods: of recently irradiated fuel, b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is i.e., fuel that has available for monitoring and maintaining the unit occupied part of a status; and ! critical reactor core within the c. Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown such as an previous seven draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling days The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LCO One DC electrical power subsystem (consisting of either the Unit 1 or 2 battery, either the normal or reserve battery charger, and all the associated control equi ament and interconnecting cabling supplying power to t1e associated (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.8-61 Revision No. O
DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 BASES $[I"" LC0 bus), associated with the Division 1 or Division 2 onsite (continued) Class 1E DC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8, " Distribution Systems-Shutdown," is required to be OPERABLE. Similarly, when the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System is required to be OPERABLE, the Division 3 DC electrical power subsystem associated with the Division 3 onsite Class 1E DC electrical power distribution subsystem required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8 is required to be OPERABLE. In addition to the preceding subsystems required to be OPERABLE, a Class 1E battery or battery charger and the associated control equipment and interconnecting cabling capable of supplying power to the remaining Division 1 or Division 2 onsite Class 1E DC electrical power distribution subsystem, when portions of both Division 1 and Division 2 DC electrical Jower distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8. This ensures the availability of sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g. , fuel handling accidente an inadvertent reactor vessel draindown). 4*WS %@$ d r%& x2 trnAt*M fvd APPLICABILITY The DC electrical power sources re g e OPERABLE in ' r MODES 4 and 5 and during movement fa rra ed fuel assemblies in the primary containm fuel handling building provide assurance that:
- a. Required features to provide adequate coolant inventory makeu) are available for the irradiated fuel ue to radioactive assemblies in t1e core in case of an inadvertent decay, handling of draindown of the reactor vessel: i fuel only requires OPERABILITY of the b. Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling DC Sources when the accident are availab pl fuel being handled is ' # - ,
recently irradiated, c. ' Required Teawres necessaryTo mitigate the effects of l events that can lead to core damage during shutdown i 1.e., fuel that has are available; and occupied part of a criticai reactor core d. Instrumentation and control capability is available within the previous for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold even days.) shutdown condition or refueling condition. The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1. 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.4. (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.8-62 Revision No. O
DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 PY-CEI/NRR-1995L BASES (continued) ;ttype 4 The ACTIONS are modified - icating that LCO 3.0.3 If movi g ra c% N h ' fuel assemblies while ACTIONS does not apply. in MODE 1, 2 the ement is independent of ' reactor o rati p . Therefore, inability to suspend movement of rr ted fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to re reactor shutdown. i A.1. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 , If more than one DC distribution subsystem is required according to LCO 3.8.8, the DC subsystems remaining OPERABLE with one or more DC power sources inoperable may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow l continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS. irradiot;d fucl movemen :p and operations with a potential for draining the reactor 'M i I vessel. By allowing the option to declare required features associated with an inoperable DC power source (s) inoperable. l a)propriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with l t1e Required Actions of the LCOs for these associated i required features. Since this option may involve undesired ; l administrative efforts, t ance for sufficiently l conservative alternate ct ( .e., to suspend CORE l ALTERATIONS, movement f ed fuel assemblies in the primary containment an ndling building, and operations with a potential for draining of the reactor vessel) is made. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. ! These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately . initiate action to restore the required DC electrical power i
- subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary DC electrical l power to the plant safety systems.
The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required DC electrical power subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power. (continued) , 1 l l l i PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.8-63 Revision No. 0 1
Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.8 PY-CEI/NRR-1995L B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS tii Y ' B 3.8.8 Distribution Systems-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.7.
" Distribution Systems-Operating."
APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the USAR Chapter 6 (Ref.1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems is consistent with the initial assum3tions of the accident analyses and the requirements for t1e supported systems
- OPERABILITY.
The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC and DC electrical power sources and associated power distri Es systems during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement "f rd@ ed fuel assemblies in the 3rimary containm Io el handling building ensures taat:
- a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or involving handling refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is ad e fuel avaHaMe for monRodng and maintaining Ge und i.e., fuel that has status; and occupied part of a criticai reactor c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events
! core within the postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent prevbts seven , draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accideny de:js. The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.8-82 Revision No. O
1 Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.8 I C%lS"M"" BASES (continued) i LC0 Various combinations of, subsystems, equipment, and components are required OPERABLE by other LCOs. depending on the specific plant condition. Implicit in those requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary support required features. This LCO explicitly requires energization of the portions of the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems necessary to support OPEPABILITY of Technical Specifications
- required systems, equipment.
and components-both specifically addressed by their own LCOs and implicitly required by the definition of OPERABILITY. Maintaining these portions of the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems energized ensures the availability of , sufficient power to operate the plant in a safe manner to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and inadverte reactor vessel draindown). u,W wu cf ryttdam APPLICABILITY The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems r % be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement : o ed fuel assemblies in the primary containment or f ling building provide assurance that:
- a. Required features needed to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel Due to radioactive in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the (decay, handling of reactor vessel;
- b. Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling OE Bil of the accidentpreava11 ably 2 Distribution Systems .
when the fuel being c. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of handled is recently events that can lead to core damage during shutdown irradiated, i.e., fuel are available; and that has occupied part of a critical d. Instrumentation and control capability is available reactor core within for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold the previous seven shutdown or refueling condition.
"Y" The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 1. 2. and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.
(continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.8-83 Revision No. 0
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Distribution Systems-Shutdown 1 B 3.8.8 ICMEE?"
-u BASES (continued) ,
ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modifie.d aRat.e'ndicatingthatLCO3.0.3 does not apply. If movi g rM W ed fuel assemblies while in MODE 1. . the ement is independent of ! reactor o rati . Therefore, inability to suspend movement rra ted fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to ' e reactor shutdown. A.1. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. A.2.4. and A.2.5 Although redundant required features may require redundant divisions of electrical power distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE. one OPERABLE distribution subsystem division may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to ! allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS.N r 2 m d "^ 0 movement. / and operations with a potential for draining the
,(. reactor vessel. By allowing the option to declare required r
features associated with an inoperable distribution I w M subsystem inoperable, appropriate restrictions are i I g implemented in accordance with the Required Actions of the LCOs for these associated required features-. Since this l he ; option allowance mayforinvolve undesired sufficiently administrative conservative actions efforE qd l (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS movement o 3 Tr J ted fuel assemblies in the primary containment and handling building and operations with a potential for draining of the reactor vessel). Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical ( power distribution subsystems and to continue this action l until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the plant safety systems. Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required residual heat removal-shutdown cooling (RHR-SDC) subsystem may be inoperable. In this case. Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.4 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6. the RHR-SDC ACTIONS (continued) PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3.8-84 Revision No. O
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1 4 j ! PY-CEI/NRR-1995L Attachment 4 Pnne %9 4 MARKUP OF CURRENT TECH SPEC BASES PAGES
3.4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS Cl%7}" Pace M ILggs 3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT 3/4.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY + PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the accident analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR Part 100 during accident conditions. g g4 y p4 During shutdown when irradiated fuel is being handled in the prim containment, and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a p a for of six vent draining the reactor vessel, the # footnote permits the o and drain pathways for the purpose of performing co ' ment isolation valve i . leak rate surveillance testing provided the r r has been subcritical for l at least seven days. Offsite doses wer culated assuming the postulated l fuel handling accident inside pri containment after a seven day decay time, and assuming all the orne activity existing inside containment after. a seven day decay tim d assuming all the airborne activity existing inside containment aftv e accident is immediately discharged directly to the environme .e., no containment). Although this analysis would indicate i that er of estriction on thewas number of vent andfor drain pathways was required, the)- open pathways restricted to six conservatism. _ 3/4.6.1.2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the accident l analyses at the peak accident pressure of 7.80 psig, P,, As an added conservatism, the measured overall integrated leakage rate is further limited to less than or equal to 0.75 L, during performance of the periodic tests to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests. Overall integrated leakage rate means the leakage rate which obtains from a summation of leakage through all potential leakage paths. Where a leakage path contains more than one valve, fitting, or component in series, the leakage for that path will be that leakage of the worst leaking valve, fitting, or component and not the summation of the leakage of all valves, fittings, or components in that leakage path. Operating experience with the main steam line isolation valves has indicated that degradation has occasionally occurred in the leak tightness of the valves; therefore the special requirement for testing these valves. PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-1 Amendment No. /S, BE, / ,66 i
EiS5fd57}""
.n JNSERT A In Operational Conditions 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of LOCAs are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these Operational Conditions.
Therefore, maintaining Primary Containment Integrity - Shutdown is only required during situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated; such as during operations with the potential for draining the reactor vessel, or during handling of recently irradiated fuel assemblies. Due to radioactive decay, handling of fuel only requires Primary Containment Integrity - Shutdown when the fuel being handled is recently irradiated, i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous seven days. l l l l l l l
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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES ; 3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT: (Continued) , 3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE (Continued) The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates is consistent with the requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 with the exception of exemptions granted for testing the air locks after each opening. 3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and the containment leakage rate given in Specifications 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2. The specification makes allowances for the-fact that there may be long periods of time when the air locks will be in a closed and secured position during reactor operation. Only one closed door in each air lock is required to . maintain the integrity of the containment. *
} urV E> %D an asiowance nas been provided within Action a.1 for access into or through the containment. air locks when an interlock mechanism in one or both air locks is inoperable. Action a.1 requires that at least one of the two OPERABLE doors for each affected air lock be maintained closed, and if the interlock mechanism has not been restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours, one door must be locked closed. The provisions of footnote
- may,be utilized for entries and exits. The administrative controls of footnote allow the unlocking and use of the air lock provided that an individual is stationed at the air lock, dedicated to assuring that at least one OPERABLE air lock door remains closed at all times. This allowance is provided to address those situations when the use of an air lock with only an inoperable interlock mechanism may be preferred over the use of the other air lock, such as when the other air lock has an inoperable door.
An allowance has also been provided in Action a.2 for access into or through the containment air locks when one air lock door in one or both air locks is inoperable. The first sentence of footnote ** provides that entry and exit through the OPERABLE door on one or both air locks is permissible under administrative controls for the performance of repairs of the affected air lock components. The second sentence of footnote provides for entry into and exit from the containment for activities other than just the repairs i of affected air lock components under administrative controls, but only ! permits these entries when both air locks have an inoperable door, and limits such use to a 7 day period. The administrative controls for the second sentence shall define limits on entry and exit, in order to minimize openings of the OPERABLE door. ; PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-2 Amendment No.4 ,56 l
{55h55E'}"" INSERT B In Operational Conditions 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of LOCAs are reduced due to the pressure and temperature lirnitations in these Operational Conditions. Therefore, maintaining primary containment air lock OPERABILITY is only required during situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated; such as during operations with the potential for draining the reactor vessel, or during handling of recently irradiated fuel assemblies. Due to radioactive decay, handling of fuel only requires primary containment air lock OPERABILITY when the fuel being handled is recently irradiated, i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous seven days.
l CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS hh BASES DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEMS (Continued) , The suppression pool cooling function is a mode of the RHR system and functions as part of the containment heat removal system. The purpose of the system is to ensure containment integrity following a LOCA by preventing excessive containment pressures and temperatures. The suppression pool cooling mode is designed to limit the long term bulk temperature of the pool to 185'F considering all of the post-LOCA energy additions. The suppression pool cooling trains, being an integral part of the RHR system, are redundant, safety-related component systems that are initiated following the recovery of the reactor vessel water level by ECCS flows from the RHR system. Heat rejection to the emergency service water is accomplished in the RHR heat exchangers. The suppression pool make-up system provides water from the upper containment pool to the suppression pool by gravity flow through two 100% capacity dump lines following a LOCA. The quantity of water provided is sufficient to account for all conceivable post-accident entrapment volumes, ensuring the long term energy sink capabilities of the suppression pool and maintaining the water coverage over the uppermost drywell vents. During i refueling, there will be administrative control to ensure the make-up dump ! l valves will not be opened. The upper containment pool water level may be reduced (for example, for maintenance of the inclined fuel transfer system), provided the minimum required suppression pool level (volume) is raised to compensate. Raising the minimum required suppression pool water level provides the same effective volume of water (by transferring a portion of the upper pool dump volume to the suppression pool) and ensures that after a suppression pool make-up system dump, adequate water coverage over the uppermost drywell horizontal vents and the long-term energy sink capability of the suppression pool is maintainod. 3/4.6.4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA. WY G Y PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-5 AMENDMENT NO. 57
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4 4
. .'u I.N5cII7}"" 9 INSERT C in Operational Conditions 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of LOCAs are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these Operational Conditions.
Therefore, maintaining containment isolation valve OPERABILITY is only required during , situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated; such as during operations with the potential for draining the reactor vessel, or during handling of recently irradiated fuel assemblies. Due to radioactive decay, handling of fuel only requires containment isolation valve OPERABILITY when the fuel being handled is recently irradiated, i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous seven days. I I 1 l 1
~ CONTA1NtiENT SYSTEMS USIdN? i BASES I All required Containment Isolation valves are listed in the PNPP Unit 1 Plant Data Book. The opening of nonnally locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves under administrative controls in accordance with footnote # includes the
- i. following considerations: (1) stationing an operator, who is in constant comunication with the control room, at the valve controls. (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an acci<fent situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment.
The above considerations do not apply to the nonnally locked closed (LC) Fire Protection system manual hose reel containment isolation valves 1P54-F726 and
-F727 when opened as necessary to sunolv fire mains when handling irradiated fuel in the primary containment,$rt ; COPI A' TS13'0 Sand operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
urig re.wMy 3/4.6.5 VACUUM RELIEF , 3/4.6.5.1 CONTAINMENT VACUUM RELIEF AND 3/4.6.5.2 CONTAINMENT HUMIDITY CONTROL Vacuum breakers are provided on the containment to prevent an excessive vacuum from developing inside containment during an inadvertent or improper operation of the containment spray. Four vacuum breakers and their associated isolation valves are provided. Any two vacuum breakers provide 100% vacuum relief. The containment vacuum relief system is designed to prevent an excessive vacuum from being created inside the containment following inadvertent initia-tion of the containment spray system. By maintaining temperature / relative humidity within the limits for acceptable operation shown on Figure 3.6.5.2-1, the maximum containment vacuum created by actuation of both containment spray loops will be limited to approximately -0.7 psig. . 3/4.6.5.3 DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKERS Drywell vacuum breakers are provided on the drywell to prevent drywell flooding due to differential pressure across the drywell and to equalize pressure between the drywell and containment. Two drywell vacuum breakers and their associated isolation valves are provided. Any one vacuum breaker can provide full vacuum relief capability. 3/4.6.6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive material which may result from an accid provides secondary containment during(OM :;:r:ti:d hi=14Rpildinmen M payis e:qWed. ::::nt y ec .tri mat interity is spri'ici Establishing and maintaining a vacuum in the annulus with the annulus exhaust gas treatment system, along with the surveillance of the doors, hatches, and valves, is adequate to ensure that there are no violations of the integrity of the secondary containment. The OPERABILITY of the annulus exhaust gas treatment systems ensures that sufficient iodine removal capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The reduction in containment iodine inventory reduces the resulting site PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-6 Amendment No. 44
l i CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS EOlff!" BASES 3/4.6.6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT (Continued) boundary radiation doses associated with co,ntainment leakage. The operation of this system and resultant iodine removd1 capacity are consistent with the assumptions used in the LOCA analyses. Continuous operation of the system with the heaters OPERABLE for 10 hours during each 31 day period is sufficient i to reduce the buildup of moisture on the absorbers and HEPA filters. CTA u_rt D La re ; 3/4.6.T ATMOSPHERE CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the systems required for the detection and control of l hydrogen gas ensures that these systems will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within the containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. The containment hydrogen recombiner system is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with (1) zirconium-water l reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water and (3) cerrosion of metals l within containment. The combustible gas mixing system is provided to ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA. This mixing action will prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable limit. Two 100% combustible gas mixing subsystems are the primary means of H p control within the drywell, purging hydrogen produced following a LOCA into the containment volume. Hydrogen generated from the metal-water reaction and radiolysis is assumed to evolve to the drywell atmosphere and form a homogenous mixture through natural forces and mechanical turbulence (ECCS pipe break flow). The combustible gas mixing system forces drywell atmosphere into the containment. l The hydrogen control system is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, " Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment following a LOCA", November,1978. The OPERABILITY of the primary containment /drywell hydrogen igniters ensures that hydrocen combustion can be accomplished in a controlled manner , following a degraded core event that produces hydrogen concentrations in excess j of LOCA conditions. l 4 Inaccessible areas are defined as areas that have high radiation levels during the entire refueling outage period. These areas are the heat exchanger, filter demineralizer, backwash, and holding pump rooms of the RWCU system. PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-7
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1 l l i [IEEc*llEEE1"" INSERT D In Operational Conditions 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of LOCAs are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these Operational Conditions. Therefore, maintaining Secondary Containment Integrity and Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System OPERABILITY is only required during situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated; such as during operations with the potential for draining the reactor vessel, or during handling of recently irradiated fuel assemblies. Due to radioactive decay, handling of fuel only requires Secondary Containment Integrity and Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System OPERABILITY when the fuel being handled is recently irradiated, i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous seven days. l l l l i i i t l l l l i _ _ ._. _ _ ~ _. _ _ --
l i l I 3/4.7 PLANT-SYSTEMS gglg j99st. Dar,. Aq BASES 3/4.7.1 COOLING WATER SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the service water systems ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling _ capacity of these systems, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident conditions within acceptable limits. . 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the control room emergency recirculation system ensures that-1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continucus duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system and 2) the control room will remain habitable for operations per- ! sonnel during and following all design basis accident conditions. Continuous ! operation of the system with the heaters OPERABLE for 10 hours during each 31 day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 19 of Appendix "A", 10 CFR Part 50. k u r+- E kure _) 3/4.I.3 MthCIOR tunt ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM The reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system is provided to assure adequate core cooling in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel without requiring actuation of any of the Emergency Core Cooling System equipment. The RCIC system is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor pressure exceeds 150 psig. This pressure is substantially below that for which the low pressure core cooling systems can provide adequate core cooling for events requiring the RCIC system. The RCIC system specifications are applicable during OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3 when reactor vessel pressure exceeds 150 psig because RCIC is the primary non-ECCS source of emergency core cooling when the reactor is pressurized. With the RCIC system inoperable, adequate core cooling is assured by the , OPERABILITY of the HPCS system and justifies the specified 14 day out of-service j period. j The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that RCIC will I be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are testable and i full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation, a ] complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage and to start cooling at the earliest possible moment. i t I i PERRY - UNIT I B 3/4 7-1 l
$U55lI557I""
Pnne 9f) INSERT E in Operational Conditions 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of LOCAs are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these Operational Conditions. Therefore, maintaining Control Room Emergency Recirculation System OPERABILITY is only required during situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated; such as during operations with the potential for draining the reactor vessel, or during handling of recently irradiated fuel assemblies. Due to radioactive decay, handling i of fuel only requires Control Room Emergency Recirculation System OPERABILITY when l' the fuel being handled is recently irradiated, i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous seven days. i I l i 4 i
PLANT SYSTEMS h5 BASES 3/4.7.6 MAIN TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM The main turbine bypass system is required to be OPERABLE consistent with the assumptions of the feedwater controller failure analysis in FSAR Chapter 15. 3/4.7.7 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING FUEL HANDLING BUILDING INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the Fuel Handling Building following a fuel handling accident will be consistent with the accident analyses. The Fuel Handling Building Ventilation Exhaust System ensures that no significant fraction of the radioactive release from a postulated fuel handling accident could escape untreated. ;.v,l,; IrraM +c4 h,l wmH3
~
Q st.rt- @ ysra}rth kl.ra - Due to radioactive decay, handling of fuel only requires Fuel Handling Building INTEGRITY and Ventilation Exhaust System OPERABILITY when the fuel being handled is recently irradiated, i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous seven days. l I l PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-4
PY-CEI/NRR-1995L ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS i'N"'
- BASES 3/4.8.1. 3/4.8.2 and 3/4.8.3 A.C. SOURCES. D.C. SOURCES and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C.** power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety related equipment required for (1) the safe shutdown of the facility and (2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and D.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criteria 17 of Appendix "A" to 10 CFR 50.
The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation. The OPERABILITY of the power sources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions.af the safety analyse: and are based upon maintaining at least Division 1 or 2 of the onsite A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power and single failure of the other onsite A.C. or D.C. source. Division 3 supplies the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system only. $ry p, w The A.C. and D. C. source allowable out-of-service times are based on Regulatory Guide 1.93, " Availability of Electrical Power Sources," December 1974 as modified by plant specific analysis and diesel generator manufacturer recommendations. When diesel generator Division 1 or Division 2 is inoperable, there is an additional ACTION requirement to verify that all required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices, that depend on the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator Division 1 or Division 2 as a source of emergency power, are also OPERABLE. This requirement is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power event will not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems during the period diesel generator Division 1 or l Division 2 is inoperable. The term verify as used in this context means to administratively check by examining logs or other information to determine if certain components are out-of-service for maintenance or other reasons. It does not mean to perform the surveillance requirements needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the component. , The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and i associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that (1) l the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for ' extended time periods and (2) sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status. l The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the diesel generators are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, " Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies," March 10, 1971, and Regulatory Guide 1.108, " Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," , Revision 1, August 1977 as modified by plant specific analyses and diesel I generator manufacturer recommendations. PERRY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 8-1 REVISED BY NRC LETTER DATED 12/14/93
PY-CEI/NRR-1995L NageY$ st INSERT F Due to radioactive decay, handling of fuel only requires OPERABILITY of electrical power sources and distribution systems when the fuel being handled is recently irradiated, i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous seven days. i s}}