ML20086T369
| ML20086T369 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 02/29/1984 |
| From: | Glasspiegel H CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20086T359 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8403060280 | |
| Download: ML20086T369 (24) | |
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} RMAIE.D CORiu.SE0dDr h45-DOCKETED February 29,7AE84 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '84 MAR -5 A11 :37 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION c ;u - -
. a ium 4 d6vii Before the Atoaic Safety and Licensing Board NA" In the Matter of )
)
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL. ) 50-441
)
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and 2) )
APPLICANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES ON ISSUE NOS. 6, 8, and 15 In accordance with the Licensing Board's Memorandum and Order of December 20, 1983,1/ Applicants submit supplemental answers to Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy (OCRE) and Sun-flower Alliance, Inc.2/ interrogatories on Issue Nos. 6, 8, 1/ Memorandum and Order (OCRE Motion to Reopen Discovery) at 2 n.3 (Dec. 20, 1983). The Memorandum and Order called for an update during January 1984. On January 30, 1984, the Board granted an extension of time until February 29, 1984 for sup-plemental responses to interrogatories on Issues Nos. 6, 8, and
- 15. On the same day, Applicants indicated that they had ob-tained no new information which would require supplementation of their responses to interrogatories on Issue No. 14. Letter from Michael A. Swiger to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (January 30, 1984).
2/ OCRE has replaced Sunflower Alliance as lead intervenor for Issue No. 6. See Memorandum and Order (Concerning Proce-(Continued Next Page) 8403060280 840229 PDR ADOCK 05000440 9 PDR
m and 15.
All documents supplied to OCRE for inspection will be pro-duced for inspection at Perry Nuclear Power Plant ("PNPP").
Arrangements to examine the documents can be made by contacting Mr. Bradley S. Ferrell of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company at (216) 259-3737, extension 5520. Applicants will provide copies of any of the produced documents, or portions thereof, which OCRE requests, at Applicants' cost of duplica-tion. Arrangements for obtaining copies can be made with Mr.
Ferrell.
Issue 6 A. First Round Discovery Requests of Sunflower Alliance, Inc.,
(December 2, 19E()
On February 5, 1982, Applicants submitted " Applicants' An-swers to Sunflower Alliance, Inc. First Round Discovery Re-quests." Applicants have obtained no new information requiring supplementation of answers to Interrogatories Nos. 56 to 76, which relate to Issue No. 6.
-(Continued) dural. Motions) (Sept. 17, lo82). OCRE is also lead intervenor on Issue Nos. 8 and 15.
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B. Sunflower Alliance, Inc. et al. Second Set of Interrogatories to Applicants (April 30, 1982)
On August 20, 1982, Applicants submitted " Applicants' An-swer to Sunflower Alliance, Inc. et al. Second Set of Interrog-atories to Applicants." On October 18, 1982, Applicants sub-mitted " Applicants' Amended Answer to Interrogatory 13 of Sunflower Alliance, Inc., et al. Second Set of Interrogatories to Applicants;" on December 13, 1982, Applicants submitted "Ap-plicants' Answers to Sunflower Alliance, Inc. et al. Second Set of Interrogatories, Nos. 20, 28, 31:" and by letter dated December 21, 1982,- Applicants updated Interrogatory No. 2 of Sunflower's Second Set of Interrogatories. With respec t to In-terrogatories Nos. 1, 3, 4, 6-21, 23,3/ and 24-36 therein, Ap-
-plicants have obtained no new information requiring supple-mentatica of their answers. With respect to the remaining interrogatories, Applicants provide the following answers which supersede previous responses:
Interrogatory No. 2: Produce any and all documents pertaining to ATWS in BWRs.
3/ See also Applicants' Answers to OCRE Sixth Set of Inter-rogatories to Applicants on Issue No. 6 (October 29, 1982) (Re-sponse to Interrogatory 6-35).
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Response
Applicants will supply for examination at PNPP documents related to SLCS initiation. See Response to Interrogatory No.
1, Applicants' Answer to-Sunflower Alliance, Inc. et al. Second Set of Interrogatories to Applicants (Aug. 20, 1982).
Interrogatory No. 5: Where does the PNPP design presently stand in regard to the alternatives listed in NUREG-0640, Vol.
4? E.g.,.does the current plant design implement Alternative 2A, 3A, or 4A?
Response
Applicants' current design for the SLCS, as described in the ESAR at 9 9.4.6,. implements Alternative 3A, except that SLCS initiation is manual.
Interrogatory No. 22: Give a cost estimhte for the installa-tion of an automated standby liquid control system at PNPP,
-Units 1 and 2; provide documentation to support this estimate.
Include in the estimate any necessary modifications to other systems, e.g., addition of sufficient diesel generator capaci-ty. Also give a cost estimate for the complete implementation ofLAlternative 4A as described in Vol. 4 of NUREG-0460.
Response
The cost estimate for changing a manually initiated SLCS to an automatically initiated SLCS is estimated to be one hun-dred thousand dollars. This estimate includes revisions to de-sign drawings and changes to control switches, indicating lights, and control logic circuits.
Applicants continue to object to the portion of the inter-rogatory that is not directed to whether Applicants should
automate their SLCS. See Response to Interrogatory No. 1, Ap-plicants' Answer to Sunflower Alliance, Inc. et al. Second Set of Interrogatories to Applicants (Aug. 20, 1982). In this re-gard, it should be noted that the SLCS initiation mechanism of Alternative 4A is no different from the initiation mechanism of Alternative 3A.
C. Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy Sixth Set of Interrogatories to Applicants (Sept. 27, 1982)
On October 29, 1982, Applicants submitted " Applicants' An-swers.to Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy Sixth Set of In-terrogatories to Applicants on Issue No. 6." See also Appli-cants' Answers to Sunflower Alliance, et al. Second Set of Interrogatories, Nos. 20, 28, and 31, relating in part to OCRE Interrogatory No. 6-9. With respect to Interrogatories Nos.
6-9 through 6-12, 6-14 through 6-18, and 6-20 through 6-42 therein, Applicants have obtained no new information requiring supplementation of their answers. With respect to the re-maining interrogatories, Applicants provide the following new answers, which supersede the previous responses:
Interrogatory No. 6-13: What portions of the SLCS have been installed in PNPP Unit I? Give % complete. In Unit 2?
Response
SLCS installation is approximately 80% complete for Unit 1 and is 10% complete for Unit 2.
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c.
Interrogatory No. 6-19:
Produce a list of documents in the possession of Applicants pertaining to ATWS and/or the SLCS, including all correspondence and transcripts.
Response
See Response to Interrogatory No. 2, supra.
Issue 8 A. Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy Fifth Set of Interrogatories to Applicants (Sept. 13, 1982)
On October 29, 1982, Applicants submitted " Applicants' An-swer to Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy Fifth Set of In-terrogatories to Applicants." With respect to Interrogatories Nos. 5-1 through 5-7, 5-9, 5-11 through 5-15, 5-17, 5-19, 5-22, 5-26 through 5-28, 5-30 through 5-40, 5-42, 5-45, 5-46, 5-48, 5-50, 5-55, 5-59, 5-60, 5-63, and 5-66 through 5-68 therein, Applicants have obtained no new information requiring supple-mentation of their responses. With respect to the remaining Interrogatories, Applicants prov-de the following answers which supersede previous responses:
Interroga. tory No. 5-8: Would the recombiners be turned off if this concentration [the concentration of H 2 at which recombiners become an ignition hazard) is reached? If not, wny not?.
Response
There are no credible accident scenarios that can generate hydrogen concentrations above 4% by volume. Recombiner op-eration will be addressed in plant operating procedures, which are under development.
Interrogatory No. 5-10: Provide all details of the Perry dis-tributed igniter system, including type and manufacturer of glow plugs, with all C.ata and specifications, lifetime of the glow plugs, and whether they are qualified for the environment expected (post-LOCA), including suppression pool loads.
Response
The requested information is contained in Applicants' "In-terim Report on the Hydrogen Control System," and the manufac-turer's procurement specifications and qualification documenta-tion. The documents will be supplied for examination at PNPP.
Interrogatory No. 5-16: Would the igniters be turned off if this concentration (a concentration that could threaten con-tainment integrity] is reached? If not, why not?
Response
Because the igniters are designed to burn off the hydrogen at low concentrations (see Applicants' Response to Interrogato-ry No. 5-15 in Applicants' Answer to Ohio Citizens for Respon-sible Energy Fifth Set of Interrogatories to Applicants (Oct.
29, 1982)), hydrogen concentrations that could threaten integ-rity would not be reached and there would ne no need to turn off the igniters. Igniter system operation will be addressed in plant operating procedures, which are under development.
Interrogatory No. 5-18: Describe the expected operational characteristics of the igniter system. What pressure and tem-perature transients will be experienced by the containment and the equipment therein? Is the controlled hydrogen ignition ex-pected to be cyclic?
Response
A study has been completed which establishes the pressure and temperature conditions resulting from a deflagration-type controlled hydrogen burn. The study, " Containment Pressure and Temperature Response to Hydrogen Combustion for Cleveland Elec-tric Illuminating Company Perry Nuclear Power Plant" (OPS-38A92), will be supplied for examination at Perry. A controlled hydrogen deflagration is expected to be cyclic. Ad-ditional studies are undarway to address the pressure and tem-perature effects of other postulated hydrogen combustion phe-nomena.
Interrogatory No. 5-20: Is the equipment in the containment subject to such conditions qualified for repeated pressure pulses and temperature transients? Document all such qualifi-cation.
Response
A study presently is underway which will demonstrate that the essential components inside the containment will survive the pressure and temperature conditions resulting from a controlled hydrogen burn.
Interrogatory No. 5-21: Would cyclic pressure pulses produced by the controlled hydrogen ignition damage any valves / components between the wetwell and drywell (e.g., vacuum breakers and H 2 mixing system), thereby allowing bypass of the suppression pool? Provide documented studies showing this would not happen.
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-Response:
A study has been completed to determine the magnitude of the pressure pulses produced by a controlled hydrogen burn.
' OPS-38A92, see Response to Interrogatory 5-20 supra. The ef-fect of the pressure pulses on various components in the con-tainment will be evaluated in light of the results of this study.
Interrogatory No. 5-23: Provide documentation showing that all parts of the hydrogen control system meet GDC 41 to 10 CFR Part 50, pertaining to redundancy in components and power supply.
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Response
Compliance of Applicants' Hydrogen Control System, the distributed igniter system (see 5 2 of Applicants' " Interim Re-port on the Hydrogen Control System"), with GDC 41 is discussed in Applicants' " Interim Report on the Hydrogen Control System."
The Report will be supplied for examination at PNPP.
Interrogatory No. 5-24: Demonstrate that the hydrogen control system meets GDC 42 to 10 CFR Part 50.
Response
Compliance of Applicants' distributed igniter system with GDC 42 is discussed in Applicants' " Interim Report on the Hy-drogen Control System." The Report will be supplied for exami-nation at PNPP.
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Interrogatory No. 5-25: Demonstrate that the hydrogen control system and PNPP procedures will meet GDC 43 to 10 CFR Part 50.
Response
Compliance of Applicants' distributed igniter system and procedures with GDC 43 is discussed in Applicants' " Interim Re-port on the Hydrogen Control System." The Report will be supplied for examination at PNPP.
Interrogatory No. 5-29: Provide a diagram of the PNPP contain-ment.(including drywell) showing locations of the recombiners, glow plug igniters, mixer components, and analyzer sampler areas.
Response
The Combustible Gas Control System components are located on the following drawings:
Component Tag No. Drawing Location Hydrogen M51D001A D-304-831 CO/16-644 Recombiners M51D001B D-304-831 CO/13-644 Drywell Mixing M51C001A D-304-831 CO/16-644
' System Compressors M51COOlB D-304-831 CO/13-644 Hydrogen H51PO22A E-001-032 AXD/AX3-620 Analyzer Panels H51PO22B E-001-043 IBC/IB3-654 These drawings will be supplied for examination at PM?P.
The locations of the glow plug igniters are described in Applicants' " Interim Report On the Hydrogen Control System."
Appropriate drawings are being prepared. The Report and the drawings will be supplied for examination at PNPP.
Interrogatory No. 5-41: For containment H2 concentrations above 4 volume-%, would the mixers accelerate combustion by providing a uniformly combustible atmosphere in the contain-mont? If so, is the mixing system shut off when the H, concentration reaches a certain value? At what value?
Response
The mixers are designed to inhibit combustion by pre-venting the formation of localized concentrations of hydrogen.
The mixing of the containment atmosphere to obtain a more uni-form atmosphere does not " accelerate" combustion. Operation of the mixers will be addressed in the operating procedures, which are under development.
Interrogatory No. 5-43:
drogen control measures (e.g., Have Applicants considered other hy-containment inerting, post-accident inerting, halon suppressents [ sic] in the con-tainment atmosphere, use of sodium metavanadate (NaVO3 ) 1" the coolant to inhibit H2 production from the radiolysis of water)_for Perry?
indicate why they were Listnot all measures chosen. which were considered and
Response
The other hydrogen control measures that were considered, and the reasons they were not chosen, are discussed in Appendix
! A to Applicants' " Interim Report on the Hydrogen Control Sys-l tem." The Report will be_ supplied for examination at PNPP. '
Interrogatory No. 5-44: SECY-80-lO7A contains view-graphs l
presented by General Electric to the NRC which state that con-I tainment inerting, hydrogen ignition, recombiners, and purging are all impractical for significant rates of H2 pr duction.
Do Applicants agree? If not, why not?
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Response
For the reasons set forth in Applicants' " Interim Report ,
on the Hydrogen Control System," Applicants believe that dis-tributed igniters adequately control hydrogen generated as the result of degraded core conditions. The Report will be supplied for examination at PNPP.
Interrogatory No. 5-47: Could the ignition of hydrogen by the glow plugs produce missiles that could damage the containment or any equipment therein? Provide documentation showing that this could not happen.
Response
'A study has been completed to determine containment pres-sure and temperature conditions resulting from a controlled hy-drogen burn. OPS-38A92, see Response to Interrogatory No.
5-18, supra. Whether missiles could be generated by the dis-tributed igniters will be reviewed in light of the results of the study.
4 Interrogatory No. 5-49: Have Applicants performed any analyses of the type which would be required by the proposed rule, "In-terim Requirements Related to Hydrogen Control," 46 FR 62281, December 23, 1981? Produce all such analyses.
Response
The proposed rule lists three analyses which shall be per-hormed: an evaluation of the consequences of large amounts of hydrogen generated after the start of an accident, including consideration of hydrogen control measures as appropriate; an
analysis justifying the selection of the chosen hydrogen con-c' rol system; and, an analysis showing that containment struc-tural integrity will be maintained. See 45 Fed. Reg. 62285 (Dec. 23, 1981). Applicants have performed the second and third of the three analyses for PNPP. See Applicants' " Interim Report on the Hydrogen Control System" and " Ultimate Structural Capacity of Mark III Containments." These Reports will be supplied for examination at PNPP. Studies presently are un-derway in connection with the first analysis for PNPP.
Interrogatory No. 5-51: What is the ultimate strength of the Mark III containment? Of the drywell?
Response
The ultimate strength analysis of the Mark III containraent is set forth in Applicants' report, " Ultimate Structural Capac-ity of Mark III Containments." The Report will be supplied for examination at PNPP. Although the precise ultimate capacity of the drywell structure has not been calculated, because the de-sign strength of the drywell structure is substantially greater i than the design strength of the containment, the ultimate strength of the drywell structure is greater than the ultimate strength of the containment.
Interrogatory No. 5-52: Has the assessment of containment
- strength considered both static and dynamic loada? List all assumptions made in this evaluation.
Response
The ultimate containment strength has been assessed for both static and dynamic loads. The assumptions underlying both analyses are discussed in Applicants' report, " Ultimate Struc-tural Capacity of Mark III Containments." The Report will be supplied for examination at PNPP.
Interrogatory No. 5-53: Has the assessment of containment strength considered containment penetrations as possible points of rupture? If not, why not?
Response
Applicants' report, " Ultimate Structural Capacity of Mark III Containment," recognizes that containment penetrations could serve as possible points of rupture. The ultimate capac-ity study provides a more detailed assessment of containment penetrations as possible points of rupture.
Interrogatory No. 5-54: Is the assessment of containment strength based on any experimental data? Produce all studies supporting the containment analysis.
Response
Although the assessment of the containment strength is in the form of an analytical model, various inputs in the model --
such as' manufacturers' specifications and industry codes -- are themselves based on experimental data. In this regard, see the
references listed on page 24 of Applicants' report, " Ultimate Structural Capacity of Mark III Containments." The Report will be supplied for examination at PNPP.
Interrogatory No. 5-56: Describe the pressure and temperature transients which would be experienced by the containment from i
the complete combustion of the following concentrations of hy-drogen (vol-%, assume abundant oxygen):
(a)~ 4%
(b) 6%
(c) 9%
(d) 12%
(e) 18%
(f) 24%
(g) 33%
Response
A' study has been completed which determines the contain-ment pressure and temperature conditions resulting from a controlled hydrogen burn at PNPP. OPS-38A92, see Response to Interrogatory No. 5-18, supra. The study does not, however, deal with each of the discrete-hydrogen volume percentages re-quested by the Interrogatory. Applicants object to the Inter-rogatory on the ground that they are under no obligation to perform such analyses in response to a discovery request.
Interrogatory No. 5-57: Are the results given above based on any experimental data or studies specific to either the Perry or the generic Mark III containment? Produce all such studies.
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Response
See OPS-38A92, referred to in Response to Interrogatory No. 5-18, supra.
Interrogatory No. 5-58: List any assumptions made in the prep-aration of such studies, e.g., regarding the quenching effects of steam / humidity or the effect of containment structures and equipraer,:. on flame fronts.
Response
See OPS-38A92, referred to in Response to Interrogatory No. 5-18, supra.
Interrogatory No. 5-61: Would direct leakage from the drywell to the containment (bypassing the suppression pool) exceed the capacity of the mixers? Provide documentation showing that this could not happen.
Response
Actual bypass leakage (leakage from the drywell to the containment bypassing the suppression pool) is not expected to exceed the capacity of the mixers. This expectation is based on drywell pressurization test results at the Grand Gulf nucle-ar station, where drywell bypass leakage measured did not ex-ceed the capacity of the Perry mixers. PNPP has a similar drywell design.
b Interrogstcry No. 5-62: From what area in the containment do the recombiners take suction? Could direct drywell-to-containment leakage dissipate hydrogen outside this region? Provide documentation showing that this could not hap-pen.
Response
As shown in drawing D-304-831, see Applicants' Response to Interrogatory No. 5-29 supra, the recombiners are located and take suction in the containment on elevation 664'-7" at column lines 13 and 16. Direct drywell-to-containment leakage could dissipate hydrogen outside this region.
Interrogatory No. 5-64: Would the drywell-to-containment dif-ferential pressure ever be great enough (e.g., after upper pool dump) that the mixer compressor head is insufficient to clear the upper suppression pool vents? Provide documentation showing that this could not happen.
Response
Based on the expected drywell bypass leakage, drywell-to-containment differential pressure (after upper pool dump) would not be great enough that the mixing subsystem com-pressors could not clear the upper suppression pool vents.
With respect to clearing the upper suppression pool vents, the worst drywell to containment differential pressure occurs in the event of an upper pool dump and when the suppression pool is at its High Water Level (HWL). For these conditions, the maximum pressure differential between the containment and the drywell, without suppressing the weir area water below the top of the upper row of vents, would be 5.80 psid. Under this
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situation and any defined inlet conditions (temperature, pres-sure, and relative humidity) the Drywell Mixing Subsystem Com-pressor will be able to suppress the weir area water below the top of the upper row of vents.
For example, each drywell mixing subsystem compressor is designed for a capacity of 500 scfm and a compression ratio of 1.48 when the containment (inlet conditions) is at 14.69 poda, temperature at 90*F, and a relative humidity of 50%. Assuming the 5.80 psid would exist between the containment and drywell, the compressor capacity would decrease to approximately 350 to 375 scfm with an approximate pressure ratio of 1.53. The re-sults indicate that the drywell mixing subsystem, under worst conditions, would pressurize the drywell volume and clear the top of the upper row vents and induce mixing between the drywell and containment atmosphere.
Interrogatory No. 5-65: Would the recombiner exhausts product
[ sic] " hot spots" which could adversely affect the containment or equipment therein? Provide documentation showing that this would not happen.
' Response:
The following layout drawings demonstrate that there is no essential equipment above the Hydrogen Recombiners that can be adversely affected by the thermal exhaust plume from the recombiners:
i
4 Drawings: Remarks:
E-001-057, Rev. 15 Above Elev. 664'-7" (Shows the level at which the H2 Recombiners are located)
E-001-062, Rev. 18 Above Elev. 689'-6" E-001-064, Rev. 1 Above Elev. 721'-0" E-001-065, Rev. 1 Above Elev. 757'-O" E-002-002, Rev. 14 Sections of the Reactor Building, Unit 1 -
E-002-003, Rev. 13 Sections of the Reactor Building, Unit 2 These drawings will be supplied for examination at PNPP.
Interrogatory No. 5-69: List all documents relied upon in an-swering the above interrogatories and list the persons respon-sible for the answers, along with their professional qualifica-tions.
Response
All documents relied upon are identified in the responses above. The following persons, Ms. Eileen Buzzelli, Mr.
Roger W. Alley, and Mr. Richard A. Pender, are responsible for the supplemental answers to OCRE Fifth Set of Interrogatories, as indicated in their affidavits. Resumes for these persons will be supplied for examination at PNPP.
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. Issue 15-4 1
A. Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy Ninth Set of Interrogatories (Jan. 31, 1983)
On March 8, 1983, Applicants submitted " Applicants' An-swers to Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy Interrogatories 9-1:through 9-25.and 9-38 through 9-52 Relating to Issues Nos.
13 and 15." On September 23, 1983, Applicants updated their answers to certain interrogatories relating to Issue No. 15.
Letter from Michael A. Swiger to Susan A. Hiatt (Sept. 23, 1983). With respect to Interrogatories 9-39, 9-40, and 9-42
.through 9-52, Applicants have obtained no new information a
! requiring supplementation of-their answers. With respect to the remaining interrogatories, 9-38 and 9-41, Applicants pro-I vide the following supplemental answers.
Interrogatory No.'9-38: Identify and produce all documents in the possession of Applicants or any of their agents pertaining to steam erosion.and measures that may be taken to prevent, de-tect, assess, or mitigate the effects-of same.
I ~ Response:
I; Applicants possess, in addition to documents previously
- identified relating to steam erosion, the following documents
t
- 1. M.E. Hollins, Main Steam Isolation Valve Historical Data. Evaluation and Assessment, 5-II(D)(8).
- 2. . Gilbert / Commonwealth, Interim Report: Root Cause of Erosion Corrosion in Wet ~ Steam Lines (June 24, 1983).
- 3. Letter from R.C. Mitchell to P.A. Nichols (December
. .5, 1983) (discussing steam erosion contribution to main steam isolation valve leakage).
- ,- _ , . _ . _ . - . _ _. _ . _ . . _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . -..._ __. _ ._ 2 _ _. _ . _ . _ .
- 4. Letter from Arthur H. Webber to T.A. Lentz (February 2, 1984) (discussing steam erosion of main steam isolation valve seats).
- 5. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Significant Event Report 41-82, Erosion of Steam Piping and Resulting Fail-ure (July 15, 1982) (proprietary).
- 6. Frederick Hammitt, " Flow of Wet Steam and Related Phenomena," Cavitation and Multiphase Flow Phenomena (1980), p.
360-91.
- 7. J. Brunton and M. Rochester, " Erosion of Solid Sur-faces by the Impact of Liquid Drops," Treatise of Materials Science and Technology-(1979), v. 16, p. 185-248.
- 8. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Operating Plant Experiences, Entry 721, Secondary Steam Pipe Erosion at Trojan (April 21, 1983) (proprietary).
9 Nuclear Operations and Maintenance Information Ser-vice, Rep. No. 2388A, Experience with Steam Erosion in a Simi-lar Plant (December 28, 1982).
- 10. Gilbert Associates, Inc., PNPP Rep. No. 2502, Steam Erosion Hazards Analysis.
All of the above documents except those designated as propri-etary are available for examination at PNPP. The events ad-dressed in the two proprietary documents are incorporated in Significant Operating Experience Report 82-11, Erosion of Steam Piping and Resulting Failure (November 17, 1982), which has previously been provided to OCRE.
Interrogatory No. 9-41: List every component, system, item of equipment, etc. at PNPP which is subject to steam flow. For each item identified, give the applicable ASME classification.
Response
Systems subject to single and/or two phase steam flow in additio.. .. those previously identified are:
6 Process System and Instrument Designation System Diagram FSAR E12 Residual Heat D-302-641/3 and Figure 6.3-3 Removal (Steam D-352-641/2 Sheets 1,2,3 Condensing Mode)
E32 MSIV Leakage D-302/352-341/2 Figure 6.7-1 Control Sheets 1,2 M29 Control and Com- D-913-018 Figure 9.4-29 puter Room Steam Humidification N33 Steam Seal D-302/352-141 Figure 10.1-10 Sheets 1,2 -
P61 Auxiliary Steam D-302-051/4 Figure 9.5-17/20 Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
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By: W Jay 2. Silperg, P.C.
A[
Harry H. asspiegel Counsel Eor Applicants 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-1000 Dated: February 29, 1984
,- y .
ret.ATED CORREsPONDGI CCCXETED UMP:
February 29, 1984
'84 MAR -5 All :37
=2 .: 0. 5ElatIAr DCC%iihG 1 SEPvid UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
)
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440
-ILLUMINATING COMPANY ) 50-441
)
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and 2) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that copies of the foregoing " Applicants '
Answers to Interrogatories on Issue Nos. 6, 8 and 15" were served by deposit in the United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid, this 29th day of February, 1984, to all those on the attached Service List.
%e ?r i d. (;
JAW l
$ILBJ:RG - ~
l DATED: February 29, 1984 J
2,____ _
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )
) .
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440
) 50-441 ILLUMINATING COMPANY
)
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and 2) )
SERVICE LIST Peter B. B3cch, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C.
Dr. Jerry R. Kline Docketing and Service Section Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C.
Mr. Glenn O. Bright Colleen P. Woodhead, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Executive Legal U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Director Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 i
Christine N. Kohl, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Ms. Sue Hiatt l OCRE Interim Representative Appeal Board '
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8275 Munson Avenue 20555 Mentor, Ohio 44060 Washington, D.C.
Terry Lodge, Esquire Dr. W. Reed Johnson 618 N. Michigan Street, Suite 105 Atomic Safety and Licensing Toledo, Ohio 43624 Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Donald T. Ezzone, Esquire Washington, D.C. 20555 Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Gary J. Edles, Esquire Lake Codnty Administration Center Atomic Safety and Licensing 105 Center Street Painesville, Ohio 44077 Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission John G. Cardinal, Esquire Washington, D.C. 20555 Prosecuting Attorney Atomic Safety and Licensing Ashtabula County Courthouse Jefferson, Ohio 44047 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ,
.-