ML20079H356

Answers to Second Set of Interrogatories,Numbers 20,28 & 31. Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20079H356
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	12/13/1982
From:	Silberg J CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
To:	SUNFLOWER ALLIANCE
References
NUDOCS 8212160251
Download: ML20079H356 (9)

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Tjj s SEggr UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ""Ni NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRI;C ) Docket No. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL. ) 50-441

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(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

APPLICANTS' ANSWERS TO SUNFLOWER ALLIANCE, l

INC. ET AL. SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES, NOS. 20, 28 and 31 Pursuant to the Licensing Board's November 8, 1982 Memorandum and Order (Concerning Motion to Compel: Standby Liquid Control System), Applicants file these answers to Interrogatories 20, 28 and 31 from the second set of interrogatories to Applicants filed I by Sunflower Alliance, Inc., et al. on April 30, 1982.

In addition to the answers set forth below, Applicants will -

make available for examination at Perry Nuclear Power Plant ("PNPP")

a copy of SOP-C41, the draft system operating procedure pertaining 1 1/

Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy ("OCRE") has replaced Sun-flower Alliance as the lead intervenor for Issue No. 6, to which these interrogatories are addressed. See Memorandum and Order (Concerning Procedural Motions), dated September 17, 1982.

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to the Perry standby liquid control system ("SLCS") that was furn-ished to the BWR Owners' Group during its evaluatiod of the Perry control room in January 1982. See Memorandum and Order, November 8, ,

1 1982, slip og. at 4. Arrangements to examine the draft procedure can be made by contacting Mr. Ron Wiley of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company at (216) 259-3737. At OCRE's request, Applicants will provide a copy of the document at Applicants' cost of duplication. Arrangements for obtaining a copy of the document can be made with Mr. Wiley. o RESPONSES

20. Describe in detail the manual scram capabilities at PNPP.

What is the sequence of operation? What is the speed of rod in-sertion? How much time clapses from the initiation of the manual scram until its completion? When is manual scram used?

Response

The Perry design provides actuation circuitry and operator controls to effect a manual scram of the reactor. The manual scram system is designed to perform the same function as the automatic scram system, namely, the simultaneous insertion of all control rods into the reactor core. The Perry physical design for manual I scram includes three separate controls that the operator can use to effect a manual scram. All of these controls are located on the operator's main control panel in the control room. The first consists of a set of four push button manual scram switches. The second control capable of initiating a manual scram is the reactor system mode switch. The third control is a set of four push button redundant reactivity control system ("RRCS") switches.

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l The four push button manual scram switches are connected to l

the four channels of the Perry Reactor Protection System ("RPS"). l The actuation circuitry for this system is described in 57.2.1.1.11 of the Perry FSAR. To perform a manual scram using this method, the operator would activate all four switches by turning the collar  !

on each switch to the " arm" position and depressing the push button for each switch.

The reactor system mode switch is a four position switch which establishes the conditions under which the reactor may nor-mally operate. When the operator places the switch in the shutdown position, a scram signal is actuated which is designed to insure that all control rods are inserted into the core. See Perry FSAR S7.2.1.1.12.

The RRCS is one of the Perry systems used to mitigate the potential consequences of an ATWS event. The four push button RRCS switches are connected to two channels in each of the two redundant divisions of the RRCS. To perform a manual scram using this method, the operator would activate all four switches by turning the collar on each switch to the " arm" position and depressing the push button for each switch. The actuation circuitry provides that only two channel switches from the same division are required to activate the manual scram. Depression of all four switches thus provides redundant scram actuation capability.

Whenever plant conditions reach automatic scram limits, the automatic scram system will be initiated and the control rods will be inserted into the core. In addition, when control room indica-tors show plant conditions requiring a scram, the operator will i

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turn the reactor mode switch to the shutdown position. In these circumstances, the operator will perform this action whether or not the control indicators show that an automatic scram has occurred.

Thereafter, if the average power range monitors ("APRMs") on the main control console indicate that scram has not occurred, the operator would immediately arm and depress the four manual scram switches as a backup procedure to effect scram actuation. If the APRMs indicate that scram still has not occurred, the operator would then immediately arm and depress the four RRCS switches as c a second backup procedure to effect scram actuation. -

Plant technical specifications and operating instructions, which are currently being written, will describe other situations in which manual scram would be used. In all of these situations, manual scram would be accomplished by using the four manual scram switches, with the reactor mode switch as a primary backup in-itiating method and the four RRCS switches as a secondary backup initiating method. In addition, the training program for Perry operators instructs operators that the manual scram system should be activated whenever in the judgment of the operator a reactor scram is warranted to protect the public health and safety or plant personnel or equipment.

The average speed of rod insertion using either the four man-ual scram switches or reactor mode switch for initiating scram is approximately six feet per second. The average speed of rod inser-tion using the RRCS method is approximately 1.2 feet per second.

With the first two initiating methods, two seconds would elapse from

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.e the initiation of the manual scram until all rods are fully inserted I into the reactor core. Using the RRCS method, approximately 25 seconds would elapse from initiation to full rod insertion. This includes a 15 second delay before the start of control rod insertion.

28. What provisions will be made to ensure that, after SLCS activation, the boron will not be diluted by the ECCS to such an extent that recriticality may occur (see NUREG-0460, V.ol. 4, P. A-69)?2/

Response: ,

There is no differential risk that boration would be defeated by subsequent dilution when a manual SLCS is cmployed, as contrasted to when an automated SLCS is employed.

31. Has the use of different chemicals as neutron poisons, e.g., gadolinium, been investigated? If not, why not? If so, with what results?3/

Response

Applicants are not aware of any investigations of the use l

of different chemicals as neutron poisons for light water reactor 2/

In its decision on OCRE's Motion to Compel, the Licensing Board ruled that "[i]n response to interrogatory 28 applicant should i

provide information on the differential risk, if any, that boration would be defeated by subsequent dilution when a manual SLCS is employed , as contrasted to when an automated SLCS is employed." Memorandum and Order, November 8, 1982, slip op. at 3.

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l In its decision on OCRE's Motion to Compel, the Licensing Board ruled that " applicant should respond to interrogatory 31 by explaining whether the expected cost of inadvertent activation of an automated SLCS could be reduced by using a different neutron poison, other than boron." Memorandum and Order, November 8, 1982, slip op. at 4.

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l SLCS applications. Applicants have no information as to whether the expected cost of inadvertent activation of an automated SLCS would be reduced by using a neutron poison other than toron. The nuclear industry has had extensive experience with boron, which has been demonstrated to be an effective neutron poison. The compatability of boron with water and boron's material and metal-lurgical effects are now understood. Because of this experience, Applicants did not consider other neutron poisons. o Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE By: Iv1 Jay (ilbedg, P.C. ]

Har HI Glasspiegel /

l Counsel for Applicants 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-1000 Dated: December 13, 1982 i

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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY CLEVELAND, OHIO Robert A. Stratman, being duly sworn according to law, deposes that he is General Supervisor, Nuclear Services Section of the Cleveland Electric illuminating Company and that the facts set forth in the foregoing Applicants' Answers to Sunflower Alliance, Inc. et al, Second Set of Interrogatories, Nos. 20, 28 and 31, dated December 13, 1982, are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

i fJ Sworn to and subscribed before me this /J d day of 6464 ntj u. L. / 9 l l W kL-sts / N VV

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December 13, 1982 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board c

In the Matter of } _

)

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket No. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL. ) 50-441

)

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that copies of the foregoing " Applicants' Answers To Sunflower Alliance, Inc. et al. Second Set Of Inter-I rogatories, Nos. 20, 28 and 31"were served by deposit in the United States Mail, First Class, postage prepaid, this 13th day of December, 1982, to all those on the attached service list.

% - 55 HARRY H. GLASSPIEGEL ' F DATED: December 13, 1982 1

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

)

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket los. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY ) 50-441

)

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

SERVICE LIST Peter B. Bloch, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissio$

Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Jerry R. Kline Docketing and Service Section Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissio9 Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Frederick J. Shon James M. Cutchin, IV, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Executive U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Legal Director Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissiod Washington, D.C. 20555 Christine N. Kohl, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Ms. Sue Hiatt Appeal Board OCRE Interim Representative U.S. Nuclear RE.alatory Commission 8275 Munson Avenue Washington, D.C. 20555 Mentor, Ohio 44060 Dr. John H. Buck Daniel D. Wilt, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Post Office Box 08159 Appeal Board Cleveland, Ohio 44108 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.O. 20555 Donald T. Ezzone, Esquire Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Gary J. Edles, Esquire Lake County Administration Center l

Atomic Safety and Lipensing - 105 Center Street Appeal Board Painesville, Ohio 44077 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 John G. Cardinal, Esquire Prosecuting Attorney Atomic Safety and Licensing Ashtabula County Courthouse Board Panel Jefferson, Ohio 44047 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Terry Lodge, Esquire 915 Spitzer Building Toledo, Ohio 43604

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