ML20086T283

Proposed Tech Spec Changes Re Functional Test Program for Reactor Coolant Pump Snubbers & Seal Replacement Program for Hydraulic Snubbers

ML20086T283
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	02/17/1984
From:	GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20086T255	List: ML20086T252 ML20086T269 ML20086T283
References
NUDOCS 8403060236
Download: ML20086T283 (14)

Text

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF DOCKET NO. 50-289 LICENSE NO. DPR-50 GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION This is to certify that a copy of Technical Specification . Change Request No.105 Rev.1 to Appendix A of the Operatir.g License for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1, has, on the date given below, been filed with the U.S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission and been served on the chief executives of Londonderry Township, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania; Dauphin County, Pennsylvania; and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, Bureau of Radiation Protection, by deposit in the United States mail, addressed as follows:

Mr. Jay H. Kcpp, Chairman Mr. John E. Minnich, Chairman Board of Supervisors of Board of County Commissioners Londonderry Township of Dauphin County ,

R. D. #1, Geyers Church Road Dauphin County Courthouse Middletown, PA 17057 Harrisburg, PA 17120 Mr. Thomas Gerusky, Director.

Penna. Dept. of Environmental Resources Bureau of Radiation Protection P.O. Box 2063 Harrisburg, PA 17120 GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION BY Director, TMI-l DATED: February 17, 1984 9403060236 040217 PDR ADOCK 05000289 P PDR

4 I. Technical Specification Chance Reouest No. 105 Rev. 1 The Licensee requests that revised pages replace the following pages of existing Technical Specifications.

3-63 through 3-79, 4-60 through 4-71 and 6-21 This request No. 105 Rev. 1 supersedes the previous regtest No. 105 in its entirety.

II. Reasons for Change In a letter of November 20, 1980, NRC requested a license amendment application to incorporate changes to surveillance requirements for snubbers undar the Standard Technical Specifications (STS). Technical Specification Change Request 105 was submitted in response to that request on June 8, 1981 but was not approved at that time. Since that time there have been additional changes to the surveillance requirements for snubbers under the STS. This change request incorporates the applicable changes, clarifications and improvements.

This Technical Specification Change Request also includes the following:

1. A commitment to develop a functional test program for reactor coolant pump snubbers which have been exempt from functional testing. ,

2. A commitment to develop a seal replacement program for hydraulic snubbers.

III. Safety Evaluation Justifying Change The changes made through this proposed revision incorporate Standard Technical Specifications (STS) as approved by the NRC staff for another facility. Exceptions or modifications to that STS are justified as follows:

1) Snubbers inaccessible during reactor operation are to be inspected during each shutdown greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> if access is restored.

Restricticns on reactor building purging may cause snubbers in the reactor building to be inaccessible if purging is not permitted and the reactor building is not habitable. This change is justified since it provides clarification on inaccessibility of snubbers in the reactor building when the building is not habitable due to purging not being permitted.

2) To require the Radiological Controls Manager to determine and approve the accessibility of each snubber prior to performing each visual inspection appears to be an excessive administrative requirement. Section 4.17.lb. requires that the inaccessibility of snubbers determined to be inaccessible be reviewed and approved by the TMI-l Radiological Controls Manager or his authorized designee.

4 4

3) 6eference to mechanical snubbers has been omitted. This omission is justified since TMI-l has no safety related mechanical snubbers. If mechanical snubbers were to be added to safety related applications, Technical Specifications would be revised accordingly.

4) ' Reference to snubbers connected to a common hydraulic fluid reservoir has been omitted. This omission is justified since TMI-1 has no safety related snubbers connected to a common hydraulic fluid reservoir. If snubbers of this type were to be added for safety related applications, Technical Specifications would be revised to include this requirement.

5) Measurement of the force required to initiate or maintain motion of the snubber is not included in the functional test of 4.17.1.f.

Omission of this measurement is justified since these criteria were not included in the TMI-l design piping analysis. Breakaway force was not included in the piping analysis because actual thermal forces generated by thermal expansion of the piping is orders of magnitude higher than the breakaway force that might be developed by the snubber. Furthermore, negligible stresses would be generated on the piping by the application of a snubber breakaway force at safety related snubber locations.

6) The prcposed technical specification deletes exemption of the four 550,000 lb. McDowell Wellman reactor coolant pump snubbers and provides that a functional test program be submitted for NRC approval by cycle 6 refueling. This proposed' change is justified for the following reasons:

a) Reactor coolant pump snubbers are currently exempt from any functional tests. This change includes a commitment to develop a functional test program for these snubbers.

b) The need to refurbish and test these reactor coolant pump snubbers is indicated when these snubbers have been subjected to approximately 6 megarad, however, each TMI-l reactor coolant pump snubber has received no more than .17 megarad.

7) .The current TMI-l Technical Specifications includes a complete listing of all safety related snubbers. STS would only require a listing of the number of small, medium, and large safety related snubbers by system. The proposed change would delete such listings from the Technical Specifications. This deletion is justified for the following reasons:

a) The complete list of safety related snubbers is included in safety related surveillance procedure 1301-9.9 which is available for review at the station.

b) A listing by size (kips) into small, medium, and large does not characterize a particular design or appropriate grouping of TMI-l snubbers and therefore such a breakdown of information would not be useful.

c) Any changes to the list of safety related snubbers would be subject to review per 10 CFR 50.59.

8) A snubber seal replacement program for hydraulic snubbers has never been a requiremer.t based on service life. This proposed change includes a committment to develop a snubber seel replacement program in accordance with SIS which would be fully implemented by cycle 7.

The maximum expected service life for seals is cu"rently under investigation by GPUN in the absence of complete information from the snubber vendors. Until cycle 7, GPUN would Expedite the replacement of seals if it were determined that a seal end of service life condition were indicated by the I?w its of periodic visual inspections and functional tests.

9) Reference to inservice inspection requirements of Technical Specification 4.2.1 has been omitted. The edition of the ASPE Section XI Code which applies to TMI-l dif fers from the STS in the frequency, as well as the extent of examinations / inspections performed on snubbers. This change incorporates inspection requirements for safety related snubbers sufficient to ensure their operability.

The changes made through this proposad revision will increase the probability that snubbers will be operable. Therefore, the changes are in the direction of greater safety and are justified.

IV. No Sionificant Hazard Considerations This change would only affect the surveillance requirements for snubbers. The proposed amendment:

1) would serve to increase surveillance requirements for safety related snubbers and therefore would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previcusly evaluated.

2) affects only the surveillance requirement for safety related snubbers and does not involve modifications to plant equipment.

Therefore the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3) would increase the surveillance requirements for safety related snubbers. Therefore the proposed change would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

V. Implementation We request that this change be effective 60 days after receipt of the amendment.

VI. Amendment Classification (10 CFR 170.22)

As stated in NRC's letter of July 22, 1983, the staff has determinec~

that a class III fee of $4,000 is applicable for this change request.

This fee has been paid througn transmittal 5211-83-243 of August 19, 1983.

3.16 SHOCK SUPPRESSORS (SNUBBERS)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.16.1 Each safety related snubber si.all be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

'Whenever the system protected by the snubber is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

With one or more snubbers inoperable, within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> replace or restore the inoperable enubber(s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation per Specification 4.17.1.g.2 on the attsched component or declare the attached system inoperable and follow the appropriate action statement for that system.

BASES Snubbers are designed to prevent unrestrained pipe motion under dynamic loads as might necur during an earthquake or severe transient, while allowing normal thermal motion during startup and shutdown. The consequence of an inoperable snubber due to failure to activate (lockup) is an increase in the probability of structural damage to piping as a result of a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. The consequence of snubber inoperability due to failure to extend or retract is an increase in the probability of structural damage to piping as a result of thermal motion. It is therefore required that all snubbers required to protect the primary coolant system or any other safety system or component which is required to be operable must also be operable. During plant conditions other than operating, snubbers on those

-systems that are required to be operable during tnat plant condition are also required to be operable.

3-63 Amendment No. 30

INTENTIONALLY BLANK PAGES 3-64 through 3-79 Amendment No. 30, 61, 80

4.17 SHOCK SUPPRESSORS (SNUBBERS)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.17.1 Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following inspection program.

a. Inspection Types Ar. used in this specification, type of snubber shall mean snubbers of the same design and manufacturer, irrespective of capacity.

b. Visual Inspections Snubbers are categorized as inaccessible or accessible during reactor operation and may be treated independently. The inaccessibility of each snubber determined to be inaccessible shall be reviewed and approved by the TMI-1 Radiological Controls Manager or an authorized designee. The determination shall be based upon the then existing radiation levels in each snubber location and the expected time to perform the visual inspection and shall be in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10. Snubbers accessible during reactor operation shall be inspected in accordance with the schedule stated below, Snubbers inaccessible during reactor operation shall be inspected during each reactor shutdown greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> where access is restored

• unless previously inspected in accordance with the schedule stated below.

Visual inspections shall include all safety related snubbers and shall be performed in accordance with the following schedule:

No. Inoporable Snubbers of each Subsequent Visual type per Inspection Period Inspection Period **#

0 18 months + 25%

1 12 months 7 25%

2 6 months 7 25%

3, 4 124 days [25%

5,6,7 62 days + 25% ,

8 or more 31 days + 25%

• Snubbers may continue to be inaccessible during reactor shutdown greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> (e.g. if purging of the reactor building is not permitted).

• • The inspection interval for each type of snubber shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time unless a generic problem has been identified and corrected; in that event the inspection interval may be lengthened one step the first time and two steps thereafter if no inoperable snubbers of that type are found.

1. The provisions of Table 1.2 are not applicable.

4-60 Amendment No. 30

SHOCK SUPPRESSORS (SNUBBERS)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Conti_nued) ,,

c. Refueling Outace Inspections At least once each refccling cycle during shutdown, a visual inspection shall be performed of all safety related snubbers attached to sections of safety systems piping that have experienced unexpected,'potentially damaging transients as determined from a review of operational data and a visual inspection of the systems.

d. Visual Inspection Acceptance Criteria Visual inspections shall verify: (1) that t" e are no visible indications of damage or impaired operabilit, and (2) attachments to the foundation or supporting structure are secure. Snubbers which appear inoperable as a result of visual inspections may be determined OPERABLE for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, provided that: (1) the cause of the rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other snubbers that may be generically susceptible, and (2) the affected snubber is functionally tested in the as found condition and determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.17-lf. When the reservoir outlet port of a snubber is found to be uncovered by fluid, the snubber shall only be declared operable if functional testing in both extention and retraction directions is satisfactory and an engineering evaluation concludes that this snubber is operable.

e. Functional Tests At least once each refueling cycle during shutdown, a representative sample of snubbers shall be tested using one of the following sample plans. The sample plan shall be selected prior to the test period and cannot be changed during the test period. The NRC Regional Adninistrator shall be notified in writing of the sample plan selected prior to the test period, or the sat.ple plan used in the prior test period shall be used:

1) At least 10% of the total of each type of snubber in use in the plant shall be functionally tested eitner in-place or in a bench test. For each snubber of a type that does not neet the functional test acceptance criteria of Specification 4.17.lf, an additional 10% of that type of snubber shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or until all snubbers of that type have been functionally tested; or 4-61 Amendment No. 30 L

SHOCK SUPPRESSORS (SNUBBERS) i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) __

2) A representative sample of each type of snubber shall be functionally tested in accordance with Figure 4.17-1. "C" is the total number of snubbers of a type found not meeting the acceptance requirements of Specification 4.17.lf. The cumulative number of snubbers of a type tested is denoted by "N". At the end of each day's testing, the new values of "N" and "C" (previous day's total plus current day's increments) shall be plotted on Figure 4.17-1. If at any time the point plctted falls in the " Reject" region all snubbers of that type shall be functionally tested. If at any time the point plotted falls in the " Accept" region testing of that type of snubber may be terminated. When the point plotted lies in the " Continue Testing" region, additional snubbers of that type shall be tested until the point falls in the " Accept" region or the

" Reject" region, or all the snubbers of that type have been tested. Testing equipment failure during functional testing may invalidate that day's testing and allow that day's testing to resume anew at a later time, provided all snubbers tested with the failed equipment during the day of equipment failure are retested.

The representative sample selected for functional test sample plans shall be randomly selected from the snubbers of each type and reviewed before beginning the testing. The review shall ensure as far as practicable that they are representative of the various configurations, operating environments, and the range of size and capacity of snubbers of each type. Snubbers placed in the same location as snubbers which failed the previous functional test shall be retested at the time of the next functional test but shall not be included in the sample plan. If, during the functional test, additional sampling is required due to failure of only one type of snubber, the functional test results shall be reviewed at that time to determine if additional samples should be limited to the type of snubber which has failed the functional testing.

f. Functional Test Acceptance Criteria The snubber functional test shall verify that:

1) Snubber activation (restraining action or lockup) is achieved within the specified velocity range in both tension and compression.

2) Snubber release rate (bleed) is achieved in both tension and compression, within the specified range;

3) Fasteners for attachment of the snubber to the component and to the snubber anchorage are secure.

4-62 Amendment No. 30 v

SHOCK SUPPRESSORS (SNUBBERS)

SURVEILLANCE RE_QUIREMENTS (Continuad)

Testing methods may be used to measure parameters indirectly, or parameters other than those specified, if those results can be correlated to the specified parameters through established methods.

g. Functional' Test Failure Analysis

1. Cause of Failure Evaluation An engineering evaluation shall be made of each failure to meet the functional test acceptance criteria to determine the cause of the failure. The results of this evaluation shall be used, if applicable, in selecting snubbers to be tested in an effort to determine the operability of cther snubbers, irrespective of type, which may be subject to the same failure mode.

2. Damage Evaluation For the snubbers found inoperable, an engineerirg evaluation shall be performed on the components to which the inoperable snubbers are attached. The purpose of this e.xjineering evaluation shall be to determine if the components to which the inoperable snubbers are attached were adversely affected by the inoperability of the snubbers in order to' ensure that the component remains capable of meeting the designed service.

If any snubber selected for functional testing either fails to activate (lockup) or fails to extenc' or retract, i.e.,

frozen-in-place, the cause will be evaluated and, if caused by manufacturer or design deficiency, all snubbers of the same type which are subject to the same defect shall be evaluated in a manner to ensure operability. This testing requirement shall be independent of the requirements stated in Specification 4.17.le for snubbers not meeting the functional test acceptance criteria.

h. Functional Testino of Repaired and Replaced Snubbers Snubbers which fail the visual inspection or the functional test acceptance criteria shall be repaired er replaced. Replacement snuobers and snubbers which have repairs wilch might affect the functional test result shall have been tested to meet the functional test criteria before installation in the unit.

4-63 Amendment No. 32

SHOCK SUPPRESSORS (SNUB 3ERS)

. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

1. Snubber Seal Replacement Procram A snubber seal replacement program shall be developed whereby the seal service life of hydraulic snubbers is monitored to ensure that the service life is not exceeded between surveillance inspections.

The maximum expected service life for the various seals shall be established based on engineering information. The seals shall be replaced so that the maximum expected service life will not be exceeded during a period when the snubber is required to be OPERABLE. The seal replacements shall be documented and the documentation shall be retained in accordance with Specification 6.10.2. The program shall be fully implemented by startup following cycle 7 refueling.

4-64 Amendment No. 32

Bases All' safety related hydraulic snubbers are visually inspected for overall integrity and operability. The inspection includes verification of proper orientation, adequate hydraulic fluid level, and proper attachment of snubber to piping and structurcs.

The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection. Thus, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures. The number of inoperable snubbers found during a lequired inspection determines the time interval for the next required inspection. Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may be used as a new reference point to determine the next inspection.

However, the results of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed (nominal time less 25%) may not be used to lengthen the required inspection interval. Any inspection whose results require a shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

Those snubbers which are inaccessible during reactor operation are not required to be inspected in accordance with the indicated inspection interval but must be inspected during the next shutdown when access is restored.

When the cause of the rejection of a snubber by visual inspection is clearly established and remedied for that snubber and for any other snubbers that may be generically susceptible, that snubber may be exempted from being counted as inoperable if it is determined operable by functional testing. Generically susceptible snubbers are those snubbers which are of a specific make or model and have the scme design features directly related to rejection of the snubbers by visual inspection, or are similiarly located or exposed to the same environmental conditions such as temperature, radiation, and vibration.

When a snubber is found inoperable, an engineering evaluation is performed, in addition to the determination of the snubber mode of failure, in order to determine if any safety-related component or system has been adversely affected by the inoperability of the snubber. The engineering evaluation shall determine whether or not the snubber mode of failure has imparted a significant effect or degradation on the supported component or system.

To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability, one of the two sampling and acceptance criteria methods are used:

1. Functionally test 10% of a type of snubber with an additional 10%

tested for each functional testing failure, or

2. Functionally test a sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using Figure 4.17-1.

Figure 4.17-1 was developed using "Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Plan" 4 as described in " Quality Control and Industrial Statistics" by Acheson J.

Duncan.

4-65 Amendment No. 32

Snubber seal service life is evaluated via manufacturer. input and information through consideration of the snubber service conditions and associated installation and maintenance records. The requirement to monitor the snubber seal service life is included to ensure that the seals periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions. These records will provide statistical bases for future consideration of snubber seal service life. The requirements i~or the maintenance of records and the snubber seal service life are not intended to affect plant operation.

A technique and method for functional testing of the 550,000 lb. reactor coolant pump snubbers is currently under development. The functional test program shall be submitted for NRC approval by cycle 6 refueling. -

As a basis for permanent deletion of a snubber from the list of safety related snubbers, an engineering analysis must be performed to verify that the original safety analysis design criteria are either met or exceeded. Snubber additions and deletions are reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 requirements.

4 4-66

. Amendment No. 32

Pages 4-67 through 4-71 INTENTIONALLY BLANK Amendment No. 32

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8 7 /

s REJECT -

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4

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Es 7 CONTINUE

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g TESTING /

u N 2 /

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25 L,%

g z y ,/ ACCEPT L

5 L2 /

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j y 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100!

5 N CUMULATIVE NO, OF SMUBBERS OF TYPE TESTED l

i

FIGURE 4.17-1 i

SNUBBER FUNCTIONAL TEST - SAMPLE PLAN 2 l

l

m. Records of the service lives of all safety related hydraulic snubbers including the date at which the service life commences and associated installation and maintenance reccrds.

n. Records for Environmental Qualification which are covered under the provision of paragraph 6.15.

6.11 RADIATION PROTECTION PROGRAM Procedures for personnel radiation protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and shall be approved, maintained and adhered to for all operations involving personnel radiation exposure.

6.12 HIGH RADIATION AREA 6.12.1 In lieu of the " control device" or " alarm signal" required by paragraph 20.203(c)(2) of 10 CFR 20:

a. Each High Radiation Area shall be barricaded and conspicuously posted as a High Radiation Area, and personnel desiring entrance shall obtain a Radiation Work Permit (RWP). Any individual entering a High Radiation Area shall (a) use a continuously indicating dose rate monitoring device or (b) use a radiation dose rate integrating device which alarms at a pre-set dose level, or (c) assure that a radiologf. cal control technician provides periodic radiation surveillance with a dose rate monitoring instrument.

b. Any area accessible to personnel where a major portion of the body could receive in any one hour a dose in excess of one thousand mrem shall be locked or guarded to prevent unauthorized entry. The keys to these locked barricades shall be maintained under the administrative control of the Radiological Controls Foreman on duty.

The Radiation Work Permit is not required by Radiological Controls personnel during the performance of their assigned radiation protection duties provided they are following radiological control procedures for entry into High Radiation Areas.

6.13 PROCESS CONTR0_ PROGRAM (PCP) 6.13.1 The PCP shall be approved by the Commission prior to implementation.

6.13.2 GPU Nuclear Corporation initiated changes to the PCP:

1. Shall be submitted to the NRC in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the period in which the changes were made. This submittal shall contain:

a. sufficiently detailed information to justify the changes without benefit of additional or supplemental information;

b. a determination that the changes did not reduce the overall conformance of the solidified waste product to existing criteria for solid wastes; and 6-21 Amencnent No, 11, 35, 72, 77 L

f:

LIST OF TABLES Table Title &

l.2 Frequency Notation 1-8 2.3-1 Reactor Protection System Trip Setting Limits 2-9 3.5-1 Instruments Operating Conditions 3-29

'3.18-1 Fire Detection Instruments 3-87 3.21-1 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 3-97 3.21-2 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 3-101 3.23-1 Radioactive Cnvironmental Monitoring Program 3-122 3.23-2 Reporting Levels for Radioactivity Concentrations in 3-126 Environmental Samples 4.1-1 Instrument Surveillance Requirements 4-3 4.1-2 Minimum Equipment' Test Frequency 4-8 4.1-3 Minimum Sampling Frequency 4-9 4.2-2 Surveillance Capsules Insertion and Withdrawal Schedule 4-27a 4.19-1 Minimum Number of Steam Generators to be Inspected 4-84 During Inservice Inspection 4.19-2 Steam Generator Tube Inspection 4-85 4.21-1 , Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 4-88 Surveillance Requirements 4.21-2 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 4-91 Surveillance Requirements 4.22-1 Radioactive Liquid Waste Sampling and Analysis Program 4-98 4.22-2 Radioactive Gaseous haste Sampling and Analysis Program 4-106 4.23-1 Maximum Valves for the Lower timits of Detection (LLD) 4-118 vi Amendment No. 59, 72

)

r F LIST OF FIGURES Figure Title 2.1-1 TMI-l Core Protection Safety Limit 2.1-2 TMI-l Core Protection Safety Limits 2.1-3 TMI-l Core Protection Safety Bases 2.3-1 TMI-l Protection System Maximum Allowable Set Points 2.3-2 Protection, System Maximum Allowable Set Points for Reactor Power Imbalance, TMI-l 3.1-1 Reactor Coolant System Heat-up/Cooldown Limitations (Applicable to 5 EFPY) 3.1-2 Reactor Coolant System, Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Test Limitations (Applicable to 5 EFPY) 3.1-3 Limiting P.Tssure vs. Temperature Curve for 100 STD cc/ Liter HO2 3.5-2A Rod Position Limits for 4 Pump Operation From 0 to 125 1 5 EFPD, TMI-l 3.5-28 Rod Position Limits for 4 Pump Operation from 125 + 5 EFPD, TMI-1 3.5-2D Rod Position Limits for 2 and 3 Pump Operation from 125 + 5 EFPD to

'EOC, TMI-1

-3.5-2E- Power Imbalance Envelope for Operation from 0 EFPD to EOC 3.5-2F Deleted 3.5-2G LOCA Limited Maximun Allowable Linear Heat - TMI-l 1 3.5-2H APSR Position Limits for Operation from 0 EFPD to EOC 3.5-1 Incore Instrumentation Specification Axial Imbalance Indicatlon TMI-l 3.5-2 Incore Instrumentation Specification Radial Flux Tilt Indication TMI-1 3.5-3 Incore Instrumentation Specification 4.17-1 . Snubber Functional Test - Sample Plan 2 5-1 Extended Plot Plan TMI vii

' Amendment No. 11, 17, 29, 39, 45, 50 59, 72 1