ML20082H195

Tech Spec Upgrade Program,Proposed Amend Section 3.4/4.4, 'Standby Liquid Control Sys.'

ML20082H195
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	08/15/1991
From:	COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20082H192	List: ML20082H188 ML20082H195
References
PROC-910815, NUDOCS 9108230233
Download: ML20082H195 (34)

Text

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QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION UPGRADE PROGRAM e

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PROPOSED AMENDMENT SECTION 3.4/4.4 " Standby Liquid Control System"

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l EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

Proposed Changes to TL 3.4/4.4

' STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM'

l EXECUTIVE EVEMARY QUAD CITIES TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION UPGRADE PROGRAM The Quad cities 1echnical Specification Upgrade Program was conceptualized in response to lessons learned from the Dresden Diagnostic Evaluation Team inspection and the frequent need for Technical Specificaticn interpretations. A comparison of the existing Quad Cities Technical Specification and, Standard Technical Specifications and later operating plants' Technical Specification provisions was conducted to identify potential improvements in clarifying requirements and to identify requirements which are no longer consistent with current industry practices.

The comparison review idertitled approximately one-hundred and fifty suggested improvements. The Technical Specification Upgrade Program was not intended to be a complete adoption of the Standard Technical Specifications.

Overall, the Quad Cities custom Technical Specifications provide for safe operation of the plant and, therefore, only a upgrade was deemed appropriate.

The comparison study revealed a mix of recommended upgrades which included the relaxation of certain existing Technical Specification requirements, the addition of surveillances, the removal of allowances which would no longer be allowed under new plant licensing, and better definition of appropriate action requirements in the event a Limiting Condition for Operation cannot be met. The Technical Specification dpgrade Program also implements NRC recommended line item improvements to the Technical Specifications which vera-issued under Generic Letters.

In response to an NitC recommendation, the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications are combined into one document.' To accomplish the combination of the Units' Technical Specifications, a comparison of the Unit 1 and 2 Technical Specifications was performed to identify any technical differences. The technical differences are identified in the proposed amendment package for each section.

The Technical Specification Upgrade Program was identified as a Station top priority during the development of Quad Cities Station's Performance Enhancement Program (PEP). The Technicci Specification Upgrade Program's goal is to provide a better tool to Station personnel to implement their responsibilities and to. ensure Quad Cities Stati.5n is operated in accordance with current industry practicos. The upgraded specifications provide for more safe and reliable operation of the plant. The program improves the operator's ability to use the Technical Specifications by more clearly defining Limiting Conditions for Operations and required actions. The most significant improvement to-the specifications is the addition of equipment operability requirements during shutoown conditions.

';XXC.9EME EVEMARY Icont1Av_e.Al PJonosec Chad 9ef 19 Technn cal speciflgatlq Ag S_!!tcS on___3 . 4 / 4 . 4 1 '!staDdby LjJIy1A Control System'f The proposed chance deletes the prenant Objective statement and prevides Applicability statements within each specification similar to the STS. The proposed Applicability statement includes the Reactor Modes or other conditions for which the LCO must be satisfied. An STS type of format is proposed while retaining the present two column layout. The bases of the technical specifications are relocated from the present location of immediately following the LCO material to the end of the section. For sections with tables or figures, the tables and figures will now be located after the LCOs and before the bases.

Present Specifications 3.4.C/4.4.A through 3.4.C/4.4.C are combined into one Specification, 3.4.A/4.4.A, thereby i implementing an STS type arrangement. l The proposed Applicability is equivalent to present provisions.

The proposed Action statements correspond to STS guidelines.

Present Surveillance Requiremcnts are replaced with STS 1 quidelines, where applicable.

Present pump monthly runs and verification of flow and head requirements are replaced with quarterly Inservice Testing provisions.

Present daily tests to check solution volume and temperature are expanded to also check operability of the heat tracing circuit.

Present monthly tests are expanded to arm verification of continuity of the explosive charge and to verify valve lineups.

Dresent operating cycle tests are replaced with STS testing guidelines except for testing to verify that heat traced piping is unblocked. Present testing requirements, to verify the heat traced piping between the storage tank and the reactor vessel is unblocked, is retained since system design does not allow implementation of STS guidelines.

STS controls for replacement of explosive charges are implemented instead of present provisions.

STS guidelines are used to add proposed SR 4.4.A.6.

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SUMMARY

OF CHANGES PROPOSED TS 3,4/4.4

' STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM' l

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031.M M B1 QZ CllAFlifa PROPOSED SPECIFICATION 3.4/4.4 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM This amendment package is one in a serica of proposals that will provide improvements to the present Quad Cities Technical Specifications. The summary of changes ancludes a general section to describe generic changes that are applicable to more than one section of the technical specifications and a section which provides the changes that are page by page specific.

GENERIC 4:HANGES Item 1:

The present Applicability and Objective statements at the beginning of each technical specification section are being deleted. The Applicability statomont is being included after the LCO statement in each indi.idual specification.

Item 2:

Each specification is rearranged to follow an STS type of format while retaining the present two column layout. Each specification will contain an LCO, Applicability, Action and Surveillance Requirement section, as applicable.

Item 3:

The Bases for each technical specification section is relocated to the end of the section.

SPECIFIC CHANGES Item 1:

Eaqqa 3.4/4.4-1 through 3.4/4.4-3. Snecifications 3.4.A/4.4.A.

3.4.B/4.4.B and 3.4.C/4.4.C. DPR-29

a. The present Specifications on Standby Liquid Control are combined into one Specification, 3.4.A/4.4.A. STS guidelines are used for the new LCO, Applicability, Action and Surveillance Requirements sections.

b. Proposed LCO 3.4. A implements present requirements and follows STS guidelines by requiring the standby liquid control system to be operable.

c. Proposed Applicability 3.4.A follows STS guidelines and requires. operability during Operational Modes 1, 2, and 5.

Operability in Operational Mode 5 is only required when

control rods are withdrawn but not when they are removed per Specifications 3.10.D or 3.10.E.

d. Proposed Actions are taken from STS quidelines and address, separately, provisions for operational Modes 1 or 2 and those  ;

for operational Mode 5.

o. Proposed Surveillanco Requirements use STS quidulinoa runs to rewrito present provisions. Present monthlySTSpump daily, monthly, oro i replaced with quarterly IST requirements.

and 18 month frequency tests are added to replace present testing requirements. Present operating cycle tests that demonstrate the pump suction lino from the storage tank is not plugged, is retained.

Item 2 Eartes 3.4/4.4-4-gid M /4.4-5, DPR-29 The Bases for Section 3.4/4.4 Changes are moved to the to the Basosandare of the made sectionto after proposed Figuro 3.4-1.

allow implomontation of the changes proposed to Section 3.4/4.4.

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DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES DROPOSED TS 3.4/4.4

' STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM' 1

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QESCRIPTION, QE PROPODED hMENDMENT REQUEST PRorOSED SPECITICATION 3.4/4.4 STANDBY LIQUID CONTpnL SYSTEM The chenges proposed in this amendment request are made to 1) improve the understanding and usability of the present technical specifications, 2) incorporate tecnnical improvements, and 0) include some provisions from later operating BWR plants.

An item by item description of the proposed changes requested is provided below. The Summary of Changes section can be referred to in order to reference back to a given change and its affected q page.

GENERIC CHANGES Item 1 The present Quad cities technical specifications contain Applicability and Objective statements at the beginning of most sections. These statements are generic in nature and do not provide any useful information to the ill userdelete of thethe technical objective specifications. The proposed change statement and provide Applicability statements withi" ach specification simila to the ST3. The proposed App 11-ability statement to be included in each specification will include the Reactor Operational Modes or other conditions for which the LCO must be satisfied. '

115ltm 1 The changes proposed in this item will provide an STS type of format while retaining the present two column layout. The presenc format does not provide a separation of LCO, Applicability, and Action requirements that are easily understood and identified.

The two column layout has been utilized at Quad Cities since initial licensing of the plant and is preferred by the plant over the single column STS layout.

Item 1 This item provides the relocation of che bases of the technical specificatlons from the present location of immediately following the LCO material to the end of the section. For sections with tables or figures, the tables and figures will now be located after the LCOs and before the bases. This change recognizes that the bases provide reference material which is of secondary importance to the other material in the technical specifications.

SPECIFIC CHANGES Item 1 The proposed changes to Specifications 3.4/4.4 include combining all the present requirements, 3.4.A/4.4.A through 3.4 C/4.4.C, This combination of into one specification, 3.4.A/4.4.A.

requirements for the Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS) will implement an STS type of arrangement while maintaining as many of the present technical requirements as possible.

The present Applicability for the SLCS is when fuel is in the reactor and prior to startup from a cold condition except when the reactor is in the cold shutdown condition, all control rods are fully inserted and the shutdown margin provisions of Specification 3.3.A are met. The proposed Applicability is Operational Modes 1, 2, and 5 where operability in Operational Mode 5 is required only with any control rod withdrawn butThe not proposed when they Applicability are removedisper Specification 3.10.D or 3.10.E.

equivalent to present provisions in that SLCS is re w ired operable in Operational Modes where control rods can be withdrawn. The exception in Operational Mode 5 allows the provisions of Specifications 3.10.D and 3.10.E to govern removal of control rod drives for maintenance without requiring operability of SLCS.

Specifications 3.10.D and 3.10.E contain adequate measures to allow control rod drive removal without SLCS operability.

Present Action requirements for the SLCS allow 7 days of continued reactor operation if a redundant component is inoperable.

Proposed Actions for the SLCS separate the provisions for Operational Modes 1 and 2 from those of Operational Mode 5. In with one pump and/or one explosive Operational Modes 1 valve inoperable, 7 daysand 2[s allowed to restore the inoperable equipment or the plant is required to be placed inthe at SLCS least Hot is not Shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. In Operational Mode 5, as likely to be required to perform an accident mitigation I function as in Operational Modes 1 or 2 since only 1 control rod can be withdrawn when refueling interlocks are active. Therefore, for Operational Mode 5, 30 days is allowed to restore an inoperable pump and/or explosive valve or all insertable control rods must be inserted within the next hour. If the-SLCS is inoperable in ways other than inoperable redundant components, ire, provisions are added for Operational Modes 1, 2, and 5 to requ as appropriate, either plant shutdown or insertion of all insertable control rods.

The present Surveillance Requirements forPresent the SLCS are replaced pump monthly runs with STS guidelines, where applicable.

and verification _of flow and head requiroments are replaced with quarterly Inservice. Testing provisions. These quarterly tests are in use at current operating plants with standby liquid control systems similar to those at Quad Cities and through use, have adequately demonstrated system capabilities and availability.

Present daily-tests to check solution volume and temperature are

expanded to also check operability of the heat trscing circuit.

Present monthly tests to determine boron concentration are improved and expanded to add verification of continuity of the explosive charge and to verify valve lineups.- Present-operating cycle tests are replaced with STS testing guidelines except for testing to verify that heat traced piping is unblocked.

Initiaticn of one of the loops each 18 months is retained and both loops are tested in 36 months. STS controls-for replacement of explosive charges are implemented instead of present provisions.

The proposed change requires the replacement charge for the explosive valve shall be from the esme manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch which has been certified by-having one of that batch successfully fired. The present requirements for disassembly and inspection of explosive valves is deleted since IST and other system testing with demineralized water provides adequate assurance of valve operability.- Present testing requirements, to verify the heat traced piping between the storage tank and the reactor vessel is unblocked, is retained since system -

design does not allow implementation of STS guidelines. Present testing provisions are retained that require boron concentration to be verified anytime water or boron is added-to the storage tank or when the-soluticn temperature drops below the-limits. Present pump relief valve testing is retained. STS guidelines are used to add proposed SR 4.4.A.6 which requires that whenever one or more heat tracing circuits have been found-to be inoperable and-the temperature in the affected section of piping is less than the i i

limit ir. Figure 3.4-1, SR 4.4.A.4.c must be performed to demonstrate the piping is unblocked.

The proposed change to present Figure 3.4-2 renumbers it-to 3.4-1 since present Figure 3.4-1 was deleted by an earlier technical specification amendment.

Item 1 The proposed changes to Bases 3.4/4.4 are=necessary to allow-implementation of the proposed changes to specification 3.4/4.4.

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4 PROPOSED TECH SPEC TS 3.4/4,4

' STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM' I

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QUAD CITIES UNITS 1 & 2 DPR-29 & DPR-30 3.4/4.4 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVE1LLANCE REQUIREMENTS A. Standby Liquid Control System A. Standby Liquid Control System The standby tiquid control system The standby liquid control system shall be OPERABLE, shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABT.LITY: 1. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying that:

OPERATIONAL MODES 1,2, and 5.

Requireo in OPERATIONAL MODE 5 only a, The temperature of the sodium with any control rod withdrawn but pentaborate solution is not when control rods are removed within the limits of Figure per Specification 3.10.D or 3.10.E. 3.4-1.

ACTION: b. The applicable unit's liquid poison tank contains at

1. In OPERATIONAL MODES 1 or 2: least:

3733 gallons (Unit 1),

a. With one pun.p and/or one 3321 gallons (Unit 2),

explosive valve inoperable, restore the it; operable c. The heat tracing circuit is component (s) te OPERABLE OPERABLE by determining the status within 7 days or be in temperature of the pump at least HOT SHUTDOWN within suction piping to be greater the-next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. than or equal to the sodium pentaborate solution

b. With the standby liquid temperature limit of Figure control system otherwise 3.4-1.

inoperable, restore at least i one subsystem to OPERABLE 2. At least once per 31 days by:

l status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN a. Verifying the continuity of within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. the explosive charge.

2. In OPERATIONAL MODE 5: b. Determining by chemical analysis that the boron

a. With one pump.and/or one concentration is at least 14 explosive valve inoperable, weight percent sodium restore the inoperable pentaborate decahydrate component (s) to OPERABLE (Na2BtoO16 - 10H 2O) .

status within 30 days or insert all insertable control c.. Verifying that each valve, rods within the next hour. manual, power operated or automatic, in the flow path 1.4/4.4-1

QUAD CITIES UNITS 1 & 2 DPR-29 & DPR-30 With the standby liquid that is not locked, sealed, b.

control system otherwise or otherwi-e secured in inoperable, insert all positior in its correct insertable control rods positic within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

3. Demonstrating that, when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.C, the minimum flow requirement of 40 gpm per pump at a pressure of greater than or equal to 1275 psig is met.

4. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by:

a Initiating one of the standbi liquid control system loops, including an explcsive valve, and verifying that a flow path from the pumps to the reactor pressure vessel is available by pumping-demineralized water into the reactor vessel. The replacement charge for the explosive valve shall be f rce the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch which has been certified by having one of that batch successfully fired. Both injection loops shall be tested in 36 months.

b. Demonstrating that the pump relief valve setpoint is between 1455 and 1545 psig and verifying that 'the relief valve does not actuate during recirculation to the test tank.

c. Demonstrating that the pump suction line from the storage tank is not plugged by.

I manually initiating the l

system, except the explosive l

valves, and pump solution in the recirculation path.

3.4/4.4-2

QUAD CITIES U!iITS 1 & 2 DPR-29 & DPR-30

d. Demonstrating that the storage tank heaters are OPERABLE by verifying the expected temperature rise f er the sodium pentaborate solution in the storage tank after the heaters are energized.

5. Anytime water or boron is added to the storage tank or when the solution temperature drops below the limits specified by Figure 3.4-1, Surveillance-Requirement 4.4.A.2.b shall be performed.

6. Whenever one or more heat tracing circuits have been found to be inoperable and the temperature in the affected section of piping is less than the limit shown in Figure 3.4-1, Surveillance Requirement

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4.4.A.4.c shall be performed.

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3.4/4.4-3

QUAD CITIES UNITS 1 & 2 DPR-29 & DPR-30 14 0 50LUil0N T[MPERATURE MJ51 BE (0UAL 10 OR GREAl[R THAN THAT INDICAi[0 BT THE CURVE 120 w r

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= 100 i h [

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40 0 10 20 30 _4o -

- 500104 P(NTAB08 ATE 5OLUTION (WElGHT PERC(NT)

FIGURE.3.4-1 SODIt?M DENTABORATE SOLUTION-TEMPERATURE-REQUIREMENTSJ 3.4/4.4-4

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QUAD CITIES UNITS 1& 2 DPR-29 & DPR-30 3.4/4.4 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM A. The design objective of the standby liquid control system is to provido the capability of bringing the reactor from full power to a cold, xenon-free shutdown assuming that none et the withdrawn control rods can be inserted. To meet this objective, inject the a

liquid control system is designed to quantity of boron which produces a concentration of no less than 600 ppm of boron in the reactor core in approximately 83 minutes with imperfect mixing. A boron concentration of 600 ppm in the reactor core is required to bring the reactor from fullcondition, power to 3% delta k or a more subcritical considering the hot to cold reactivity swing, xenon poisoning and an additional margin in the reactor core for imperfect mixing of the chemical solution in the reactor water. 'A normal quantity of 3321 gallons of solution having a 14% sodium pentaborate concentration is required to meet this shutdown requirement.

For a required pumping rate of 40 gpm, 3321 gallons of at least 14 weight percent solution will be inserted in approximately 83 minutes. This insertion rate of boron solution will override-the rate-of reactivity insertion due to cooldown of the reactor following the xenon peak. Two-pump operation will enable faster reactor shutdown for anticipated transients without scram (ATWS). events..

The q'larterly pump -minimum flowrate test shall-'

require a mininum flowrate of 40 gpm. This requirement, cortbined with the solution concentration requirements of at .least 14 - weight percent, will demonst.r ate that the standby liquid control system meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62.

Boron concentration, solution . temperature, and-volume are checked on a frequency _to assure a high l

l reliability ; of operation of the - system should it' l ever.be required. Experience with pump operability indicates that quarterly testing is adequate to detect if failures have occurred.

The only practical tine to test the? Standby liquid control system is during a refueling outage and by initiation from-local stations. . Components of_the l

system are checked periodically, as descrired above, l

B 1.4/4.4 .1

QUAD CITIES UNITS 1 & 2 DPR-29 & DPR-30 and make a functional test of the entire system on a f requency of less than once each refueling outage unnecessary. A test of explosive charges from one manufacturing batch is made to assure that the charges are satisfactory. A continual check of the pilot firing circuit continuity is provided by lights in the control room, only one of two standby liquid control pumping circuits is needed for propec operation of the system. If one pumping circuit is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to shutdown capability, and reactor operation A may continue reliability while analysis repair 9 are being made.

indicates that the plant can be operated safely in '

this manner for 7 days.

The standby liquid control system is operated by a five-position control' switch (SYS 1&2, SYS 1, OFF, SYS 2, and SYS 2&l). The single pump operation positions are for OPERATING CYCLE surveillance testing. This testing demonstrates the capability of firing the explosive trigger assemblies. Also during this testing, sodium pentaborate is circulated from the storage tank,- through one suction line, through a pump, and back into the storage tank. This is done separately for each system demonstrating that both suction lines are not-plugged. The two pump operation positions will be used for the injection of the sodium pentaborate into the vessel during an ATWS event. By using the two pump operation position, the standby liquid control system will be meeting the' requirements of 10 CFR 50.62 (Requirements for reduction of risk from anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) events for light-water-cooled nuclear power plants) .

The solution shall be kept at least 10*F above the saturation temperatura to guard against boron precipitation. The 10'F margin is included _in Figure 3.4-1. Temperature and liquid level alarms for the-system are annunciated in the control room.

Pump operability is checked on a frequency to assure l

a high reliability of operation of the -system, l should it ever be required. j l Once the _ solution. has been made up, boron-concentration wil'l not vary unless more boron or i

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l QUAD CITICS UNITS 1 & 2 DPR-29 & DPR-30 more water is added. Level indication and ala rm 1 indicate whether the solution volume has changed, {

which might indicate a possible solution concentration change. Considering these factors, the test interval has boon esteblished.

periodic tests to demonstrate two-pump tiow capability are not feasible in the present system configuration and are unnecessary because the flow path integrity can be determined from the test of a single pump. Comparison of single-pump test pressures with previous results and correlation of these data with initial two-pump tests aro used to verify the capability of the piping.

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EXISTING TECH SPEC TS 3,4/4.4

' STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM'

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1 QUA00CfT!ES OPR-29 3.4/4.4 STAN08Y LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM LimiinG con 0iiiGn:, r0R GrsRafien 5vhiEILLancs REQuisint.ni)

Ap icability:

Applicability:

Applie to the operating status of the Applies to the periodic testing 'quir quid control system, ments for the stancby liquiu e trol stancby system. ,

Objective:

Objective:

To verify the operab ty of the stanc To assure the aya 4bility of an indepen- Ifquid control sys dent reactivity cent 1 mechanism.

SPECIFICATIONS I

Normal Operation A. Normal eration A.

During periods when fuel is -the The perability of the standby lia j

reactor and prior to startup om a c trol system shall be. verified b-cold condition, the stanaby liq ' erformance of the following tests-i l control system shall be operable except as specsfied in Specificatio

3.4.B. This system need not be oper-

able when the reactor is in the cold I shutdown cond1 Lion, all control ro 3

are fully inserted, and Specific on i

3.3.A is met, i

1. t least once per month

! Den oralized water shall be recyc d to the test tank. - P l minimum low rate of 40 gpm

' - shall be rified against-a-system hea f 1275 psig.

2. At-least once ing each ope-ting cycle-

Manually initiate the ystem, except the' explosion va es a' pump solution in the reci ul tion path, to demonstrate t the pump suction line from th l sterace tank is not clucced. j l

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3.4/4.4-1 Amendsent No.,444-i t

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QUAD-CITIES OPR-29

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Explode two of six charges or two of four charges manuf acty4'i in the same batch using thee manent system wiring to v ify proper function. Then stall the untested charges the explosion valves.

Demineralized wa e shall be

\ . injected via a est connection into the rea or vessel to tes tnat valves except explosion valves) n checked by the recircu tion test are not clogg .

Te that the settf og of the stem pressure relief valves etween 1455 and 1545 psig.

Otsassemble and inspect one explosion valve so that it can be established that the valve not clogged. Both valves shal be inspected in the course of two operating cycles.

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'B . Oqeration with Inoperable Componey s B. eration with Inoperable Component From and after the date that redun- Who a component becomes inoperable dant component is made or f nd to be its r undant component shall be inoperable, Specification .4.A shall demons ated to be operable immedi-be considered fulfilled d continued ately an daily thereafter.

operation permitted pr ided that the component is returne to an operable condition within 7 ys.

C. Liquid Poison T k-Boron Concentration C. Liquid Poison Tan Boron Concentrat The availability of t proper The liquid gs son tank shall contain a boron-be ,ing solution of at least boron-bearing solution all be ver 3733 gal na of at least 14 WT percent fled by performance-of t followin sodium entaborate Decahydrate tests:

(Nas o0 e - 10H 0) at all times when the tandby liquid control system is r utred to be operable and the clution temperature shall not be less than the temperature presented i

\ (n M m. ma 't 1 9 3.4/4.4-2 Amendment No. M( )

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QUA0oCITIES OPR 29 Ns 1. At least once per month s

s Il s\ss Boron dete concentration rmined, in ad n, kbe tr boron concentra n shall be de te rmined time water or boron ar dded or if the solutt temperature drops t th sits specified by Fig 6

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.4-2.

. At least once per day Solution volume shall be che At least once per day sulution temperature sha-f' be c ed.

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D. Condition Requi g Reactor Shutdown If Spec ations 3.4.A through C are n et, an orderly shutdown sh41 e initiated and the reactor all be in the cold shutdown

-fcondition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. -

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3.4/4.4-3 Amendment No. 344P 1

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QUAD-CITIES OPR-29 s.4lu,4 sranat unuto eenrem. .stsrErn 3-4-MMI T I NG - CON 0 ! TIOE404-OPMAMO4-4A WS K The design objective of the standby liquid control system is to provide the cipability of bringing the rea:ter from full poner to a colo, xenon-free shutdown assuming that none of the withdrawn control rods can be inserted. To rnee* this objective, the liquid control system is designed to inject a quutity of boron which produces a concer,tration of no lebs than 600 ppm of boron in the reactor core in approximately 83 minutes with imperfect mixing. A bcron concentration of 600 ppm in g the reactor core is required to bring the reactur from full power to 3% AGmore subtritical conditiogonsidering the hot to celd reactivity swing, xenon poisoning and an additional margin in the reactor core for imperfect mixing of the chemical solution in the reactor water.

A normal quantity of pentaborateconcentra$21gallonsofsolutionhavinga14% sodium tion is required to meet this shutdown requirement.

For a required pumping rate of 40 gpm, 3321 gallons of at least 14 VT percent solution will be inserted in approximately 83 minutes. This

.> insertion rate of boren solution will override the rate of reactivity j(((

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insertion due to cooldown of the reactor followino the xenon peak,

/ TwcGpump operation wit 1 enabTe f aster reactor shutdown fof(ATWS) events. The m n}hly pump minimum flowrate test shall require a minimum l withcu.t scramJ flowrate of 40 cf$m. This requirement, combined with the solution concentration r quirementX of at least 14 WT percent, will demonstrate thattheAtandb i uid tontrol fystem meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62. aa rrer>

Boron concentration, solution temperature, and volume are checked on a frequency it ever be required. to assure a high reliability of operation of the system should Experience with pump operability indicates that monthly testing is adequate to detect if failures have occurred.

The only practical time to test the standby liquid control system is during a refueling outage and by initiation from local stations.

Components of the system are checked periodically,as described above7 and make a functional test of the entire systeni on a frequency of less than once each refueling outage unnecessary. A test of explosi_ve charges from one manufacturing batch is rade to assure that the charges are satisfactory. A continual check of the firin provided by pilot lights in the control room g circuit continuity is

% Only one of two standby liquid control pumping circuits is needed fer proper operation of the system. If one pumping circuit is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to shutdown chpability, and reactor operation may continue while repairs are being made. Anuranee that the tcma4ning ;y; tem will perform it; intended functi:n end their

%e reliability of th: ;y ncm is gc;d is obtained h de.menstreU ms operation of the pump in the-oper:ble circuit at lesst once deily. A 3.4/4.4-4 Amendment No.,3 W I

QUAD-CITIES DPR-29 reliability analysis indicates that the plant can be operated safely in this manner for 7 days.

The ptandoy /.iquid /ontrol fystem is cperated b a five$ position control switch (SYS 1&2, SYS 1, OFF, SYS 2 and SYS 2&1 . The single pumo of.eration positions are for .d////(f,M t/lYd surveillance testing. This testir.g demonstrates the capaDility of firing the explosive trigger assemblies. Also during this testing, sodium pentaborate is circulated from the storage tank, through ont suction line, through a' pump, and back into the storage tank. This is done separately for each system demonstrating that both suction lines are not plugged. The two pump operation positions will be used for the injection of the sodium pentaborate into the vessel during an ATVS event. By using the two pump f anticicded tmnslen t.3 operationposition,theftandbyfiquid/ontrolfystemwillbemeeting (witneuf scmm j the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62 (Requirements for reduction of risk n from/ATWS) events for light-water-cooled nuclear power plants).

The sclutica satur: tion-temperature of 13% sodium penteberate, by

% weight, is 59*F. The solution shall be kept at.least 10'F above the saturation temperature to guard against boron precipitation. The 10'F margin is included in Figure . Temperature and liquid level alarms for the system are an d in the control room.

Pump operability is checked on a frequency to. assure a high reliability ofoperationofthesysteghoulditeverberequired.

Once the solution has been made up, boron concentration will_ not vary _

unless more boron or more water is added. Level indication and alarm indicate whether the solution volume has changed, which might indicate a possible solution concentration change. Considering these factors, the test interval has been established.

[ Periodic tests to demonstrate two pump flow capability are not feasible in the present system configuration and are unnecessary because the flow path integrity can be determined from the test of a single pump.-

Comparison of single pump test pressures with. previous results and correlation of these data with initial two pump tests are used to verify the capability of_the piping.

3.4/4.4-5 Amendment' No. JM

QUAD-Cli1ES DPR-29

• • N DELETED FIGURE 3.4-1 STANDBY LIQUI'O CONTROL.~

l SOLUTION REQUIREMENTC 1

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SODIUM PENTABORATE-SOLUTION Amendment No. g TEMPERATURE REQUIREMENTS-

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS

-AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT- EVALUATION b f

PROPOSED TS 3.4/4.4 ,

STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL -SYSTEM' t

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KIALDATION EQB S10HIFICART EMABDR Q9ESIDElutT10M PROPOSED SPECIFICATION 3.4/4.4 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM The proposed changes provided in this amendment request are made in order to provide a more user friendly docunient, incorporate desired technical improvements, and to incorporate some improvements from later operating DWRs. These changes have been reviewed by Commonwealth Edison and we believe that they do not present a Significant Hazards Consideration. The basis for our determinaticn is documented as follows:

DASJH EQB ILQ SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIOE Commonwealth Edison has evaluated this proposed amendment and determined that it involver no significant hazards consideration.

In accordance with the critoria of 10 CFR 50.92(c) a proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility, in accordance with the proposed amendment, would not:

1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an acc.ident previously evaluated, because:

a. The Generic Changes to the technical specifications involve administrotive changes to format and arrangement of the material. As such, those changes cannot involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

b. The proposed changes to Section 3.4/4.4 involve the combination of present requirements into one specification similar to STS provisions. The changes also implement the Applicability and Action provisions of the STS and later operating BWR plants that have been evaluated and found acceptable for use at Quad Cities. Present Surveillance whtre applicable, with proven l

Requirements STS guidelines are replaced,ing that are be used at plants with a system

similar to that at Quad Cities. The changes in the present Surveillance Requiremerts add testing requirements l

that are not presently in the Cuad Cities technical specifications. The addition of these testing l

requirements and the use of IST provisions in the technical specifications helps to ensure operability when l

required. The proposed changes do not affect accident l

precursors and as such,-do not involve an increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

Operability of the SLCS is maintained, as necessary, in all reactor Operational Modes where control rods can be withdrawn. Allowed out of service times for inoperable components and other Action provisions follow STS and

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later operating BWR plant requirements with a SLCS similar in design to that at Quad Cities. The proposed changes to the Surveillance Pequirements implement testing l f requencies for the SLCS pumps in accordance with proven Inservice Testing provisions, delete unnecessary testing l of redundant components and add STS testing requirements.

Since the proposed changes to the SLCS Technical Specifications implement requirements that have been demonstrated to provide accuptable operability provisions at other facilities with a SLCS design similar to that at Quad Cities, the proposed changes do not significantly increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated because:

a. Since the Generic Changes proposed to the technical specifications are administrative in nature, they cannot create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

b. The proposed changes to the SLCS do not change the assumptions of the accident or transient analysis concerning required operability of the SLCS. The proposed changes do not implement design changes or modifications to the SLCS system and thus present operability assumptions are maintained. The proposed changes do not implement any new modes of reactor operation but do insure that SLCS operability is retained, as necessary, in reactor modes where control rods can be withdrawn. The proposed changes do not affect any accident precursors.

The proposed changes maintain SLCS operability within the assumptions of the present accident analysis and therefore, there is no possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because:

a. The Generic Changes are administrative in nature and as r

such they cannot involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety, i b. The proposed changes to the SLCS specification allow implementation of the reactor operational Mode terminology.

as proposed in Table 1-2 on operational Modes. The changes will maintain operability of the SLCS in reactor operational Modes where centrol rod withdrawal is possible.- The proposed changes recognize the greater importance of SLCS operability in Operational Modes 1 and

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2 as opposed to Operational Mode 5 and thus the Action provisions allow ~for a longer out of service time in Operational Mode 5 for inoperable redundant components.

$ 4 The changes to the Surveillance Pequirements implement the quarterly pump flow and head measurement provislons of the Inset =,1;n T; sting pr:gr:== instead of the present monthly delete unnocacsary testing of redundant pump testing,d components an add STS testing provisicas.

The quarterly pump tasts are being used at later operating SWP planta and have demonstrated the ability to maintain system operational readiness. Since the proposed changes maintain at least the present levnl of system operational readinoso, they do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

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ENVIRQEMENTAL ASSESSMENT EVALUATION  :

PROPOSED SPECIFICATION  ;

SECTICN 3.4/4,4 STANDSY LIQUID CONTROL Si,  ;

Commonwaalth Edison has evaluated the proposed a.

in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 51.21 ano determined that the amendment meets the requirements for categorical exclusion as specified by: 10 CFR 51.22 (c) (9) .

Commonwealth 2dison has determined that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, there are no significant change in the types or significant increase ~in the amounts of any effluent-that may be released offsite, and there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The proposed amendment does not modify the existing facility and does not involve any new operation of the plant .

As such, the proposed amendment does not-involve any change in the type or significant increases-in effluents, or increase individual or cumulative. occupational radiation exposure. The proposed amendment to Section 3.4/4.4

" Standby Liquid Control 1 System" contains administrat1ve changes such-as including appropriate applicability statements within the specifications to define the-applicability during operating mode and the required actions to be implemented in theLevent that' specification cannot be met. The added requirements are based on Standard Technical Specifications and later operating plant-requirements.

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QC-1 / QC-2 DIFFERENCES TS 3.4/4.4

• STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM'

i COMPARISON OF UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF TECHNICAL DIFFERENCES SECTION 3.4/4.4 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM Commonwealth Edison has conducted a comparison review of the Unit 1 anc Unit 2 Technical Specifications to identify any technical differences in support of combining the Technical Specifications into one document. The intent of the review was not to identify any differences in presentation style (e.g. table formats, use of capital letters, etc.), punctuation or spelling errors, but rather to identify areas which.the Technical Specifications are technically or administratively different.

The review of Section 3.4/4.4 " Standby Liquid Control System" revealed the following technical differences:

The required boron solution tank volumes are not identical in the Technical Specifications. Unit 1 Technical Specifications require a tank volume of 3733 gallons while Unit 2 requires a tank volume of 3321 gallons. Currently, Quad Cities Station is administratively controlling the Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) Tank volumes to be consistent with the Unit 1 value. Commonwealth Edison identified, following the approval of the Unit 2 Specifications, that the Unit 2 Technical Specification submittal did not properly account for unusable the location volume of the pump which remained in the tank due to suction. With the agreement of the NRR Project Manager, Commonwealth Edison committed to correct the Technical Specification during this upgrade program; however, Commonwealth Edison is currently re-examining the requirements for tank volumes, in response to the SBLC pump not positive suction head issue, and it is anticipated that the required tank volumes will be revised. As a result, a proposed amendment will be submitted, independent of this program, to reflect the required tank volumes based on our current efforts to recalculate the tank volumes.

Page 3.4/4.4-5 of the Unit 1 bases provides the following information:

The Standby Liquid control System is operated by a five position control switch (SYS 1&2, SYS 1, OFF, SYS 2, and SYS 2&l). The single pump operation operating cycle surveillance testing. positions are for This testing demonstrates the capat lity for firing the explosive trigger assemblies. Also during this testing, sodium pentaborate is circulated from the storage tank, through one suction lime, through a pump, and back into the storage tank. This is done separately for each system det astrating that both suction. lines are not plugged.

The two pump operation positions will be used for the injection of sodium pentaborate into the vessel during the ATWS event. By using the two pump operation  !

1

I position, the Standby Liquid Control System will be meeting the requirements of 1G CFR 50.62 (Requirements for reductica of risk from ATWS events for light-water-cooled nuclear power plants).

The infor:tation, however; is not contained in the Unit 2 bases. This information is applicable to Unit 2, since the Unit 2 Standby Liquid Control system is essentially a duplicate of the Unit i system.

Also on page 3.4/4.4-5, paragraph C refers to Figure 3.4-2 which defines the Sodium Pentaborate Solution Temperature Requirements. The Unit 2 Technical Specification bases refers to Figure 3.3-1. The Unit 2 Technical Specifications are in error in that there is no Figure 3.3-1 and the solution temperature requirements (LCO 3.4.C) have been governed by Figure 3.4-2. The reference to Figure 3.3-1 in the Unit 2 bases is, therefore, incorrect.

The following administrative changes have been identified:

Page 3,4/4.4-4 Paragraph 2 Unit 1: < incentration requirements ...

Unit 2: concentration requirement ...

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